AN ACT OF FREE CHOICE



AN ACT OF FREE CHOICE

Decolonization and the Right to Self-Determination in West Papua

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Translated by
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Maria van Yperen &
Marjolijn de Jager

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Preface

During the course of 1997, the regime of President Suharto in Indonesia began to falter. The direct cause of this was the economic crisis which hit many Asian countries hard. In Indonesia it gave rise to unrest in the country, criticism of the administration, and eventually led to President Suharto's resignation. He was succeeded in May 1998 by his confidant B.J. Habibie, but this failed to usher in the political solutions that had been hoped for and, in quick succession, the Indonesian Congress appointed Abdurrachman Wachid (October 1999) and Megawati Sukarnoputri (July 2002) to the presidency. In 2004, direct presidential elections were held, which were won by Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, the previous Minister of Security. In due course, his presidency brought greater stability to the country. In the preceding years of political and administrative change, a better balance had come about between the executive and lawgiving powers in the state, and Yudhoyono was the man who knew how to handle them.

These events did not leave relations between the centre and the constituent parts of Indonesia undisturbed. Although many things were left undecided, more room was made for regional autonomy. For some territories even more far-reaching measures were deemed necessary. East Timor became an independent state after a UN-organized plebiscite in 2002. Aceh on the Northern tip of Sumatra effectively obtained autonomy and the Indonesian army was withdrawn from the province in 2005. In Irian Jaya, the former Netherlands New Guinea, voices demanding greater freedom were also heard. Half a century ago, at the time of the transfer of sovereignty in Indonesia, the territory had been kept out of the proceedings and had remained a Dutch-administered colony for another 12 years. However, on 15 August 1962, under strong pressure from Indonesia and the international community, the Netherlands agreed to sign the

New York Agreement, which regulated a transfer to Indonesia after a short interim administration by the United Nations. The situation was sealed in 1969 by a plebiscite among the Papuan population which came to be known as the Act of Free Choice. It had been carried out under the very nose of the United Nations, but had nevertheless taken place in circumstances that raised serious doubts about whether the result genuinely reflected the will of the population. Then and later, the world had been kept in the dark by the Indonesian government about events in this region. Nevertheless, through various channels a continuous stream of rather disturbing reports leaked out about revolts and countermeasures taken by the Indonesian army. In 1979, a more systematic description was given by the former Netherlands civil servant Kees Lagerberg. Under the title *West Irian and Jakarta Imperialism*, the author presented a shocking picture of the state of affairs in the territory. His account was confirmed by other publications that appeared at the time. For the Papuans themselves, it had been impossible to discuss them publicly in their own land. The opportunity for that only came after the transfer of power in the Indonesian capital in 1998, and even this was still very incomplete and shortlived.

A first push in this direction was given on 3 July 1998 at a meeting of about one thousand students from Cendrawasih University in Jayapura, formerly known as Hollandia. There the assembled crowd asked for demilitarization, the revision of the New York Agreement, and a new referendum. It was followed up by efforts to strengthen these demands. The initiative in this was led by a group of influential people operating under the name of *Forum Rekonsiliasi Rakyat Irian*, FORERI. At first, the reactions of successive presidents had been lukewarm, but now something had indeed been set in motion. During a visit to the territory on the first day of the new millennium, President Wahid conceded to the wish to use the name of Papua for Indonesia's easternmost province. Later that same year, two mass meetings took place in Jayapura, referred to respectively as the *Musyawarah Besar* (Great Consultative Council; 23–26 February 2000) and the *Second West Papua Congress* (29 May–4 June 2000). About five thousand people from all over the province participated in the latter, 501 of whom had been provided with voting powers by their respective constituencies. The name itself referred to an earlier National Papua Congress held in the final days of the Dutch administration in September 1962. A governing board was also installed; the *Presidium Dewan Papua*, which consisted of about twenty people. With good reason, it could be regarded as the most representative body of the Papuans.

The West Papua Congress debated numerous subjects and made several resolutions. These defined more narrowly the cultural elements that were deemed essential for the continued existence of Papuan society. One of them was the

demand for *Pelurusan Sejarah* (putting history straight). The Congress turned its attention to practical politics too. The most conspicuous verdict was a resolution, passed unanimously, which stated that Papua had already been independent since 1 December 1962 when, with the consent of the Netherlands administration, a Papuan flag had been hoisted for the very first time.

The establishment of the presidium and the proposal of the resolutions generated a shift in the Indonesian approach. Wahid now handed over Papuan affairs to his vice-president, Megawati Sukarnoputri, who, as the daughter of the first president of the Indonesian Republic, felt obliged to preserve her heritage. Shortly afterwards, she was elected president. The hand of the military was resting more heavily on the country, which was demonstrated by a number of unpleasant incidents. Nevertheless, it was not the end of the *reformasi*. The government introduced a new law which opened up the prospect of far-reaching autonomy. It had been designed in cooperation with a committee of Papuan intellectuals. Notwithstanding the darkening skies, the future still held promise for an understanding between the Papuans and the Indonesian administration, and a better future for the population of the territory as a whole. When taking office at the end of 2004, President Yudhoyono made it clear that he would maintain an open mind regarding the wishes of the rebellious provinces, but that the unity of Indonesia was to be his priority.

As might be expected, developments in Indonesia were followed attentively in the rest of the world, including in the Netherlands, where the fixation on New Guinea of the late fifties and early sixties had long since made way for a renewed interest in cooperating with Indonesia. However, events in New Guinea, which so evidently had their roots in that by now almost forgotten past, kindled a new interest in the fate of the Papuans as well. These were discussed in the Second Chamber of Parliament in December 1999 during the debates about the budget for the Department of Foreign Affairs. It was at a time when Wahid had just taken office as Indonesia's new president with a statement that his government intended to pay attention to the wishes of the various peoples living in the Republic of Indonesia, and had expressed his willingness to enter into a dialogue with them about the future. The Papuans had been explicitly included in this. In the light of these pronouncements, on 9 December two Members of Parliament (MPs) E. van Middelkoop and J.C. van den Berg, who represented two small Protestant political parties, brought up the matter in a question for the Minister of Foreign Affairs, J. van Aartsen. They asked him to commission an independent research study into the international developments preceding, during and after the Act of Free Choice of 1969. They argued that the dialogue announced by President Wahid would only profit from the availability of an

honest and complete survey of the historical events that had resulted in the incorporation of the former Netherlands New Guinea into the Indonesian state. They were of the opinion that such a study would also serve to answer the question of whether the right of self-determination had been given a fair chance during this process.[1]

The minister reacted to the request with energy. The Institute of Netherlands History in The Hague, which had already completed a large project involving the editing of state and private papers on the decolonization of Indonesia[2], was at the time preparing to extend the project to cover the years 1950–1963, that is to say the years of the dispute between the Netherlands and Indonesia on the future of West New Guinea. The Institute was now commissioned to write an analytical study of New Guinea as well. In the contract between the Ministry and the Institute, special safeguards were introduced that guaranteed the project's academic independence. The author would have access to all of the ministry's archives and could count on its support in acquiring access to any other archives he might ask for, either in the Netherlands or abroad. It was also explicitly stated that the Minister would not be responsible in any way for the outcome of the research. The academic integrity of the project was further guaranteed by the establishment of a supervisory committee appointed by the Institute. The task of writing the book was entrusted to the present author. It had to be combined with the work that was being carried out on the documentary edition on Dutch-Indonesian Relations from 1950–1963. The expectation was that combining the two projects in this way would be mutually advantageous to both.

It was under these conditions that the project began in November 2000. The original Dutch version of *An Act of Free Choice* was published five years later in the wake of considerable publicity.[3] In the following year, 2006, the digital publication of the documents relating to Dutch-Indonesian Relations from 1950–1963 was placed on the website of the Institute of Netherlands History.[4] The theory of synergetic advantages had apparently been at work. It had the additional advantage of enabling references to the documents in the documentary edition to be added directly to the footnotes of the book.

As is evident from the above, the decision to write the book was the result of actual political developments in Indonesia. These encouraged the publication of some other studies as well, such as the dissertation by John Saltford in 2000, which was eventually published in 2003 under the title: *The United Nations and the Indonesian Takeover of West Papua, 1962–1969. The Anatomy of Betrayal.* Here, for the first time, was a detailed reconstruction of the way in which the Act of Free Choice had been managed by the United Nations. In that same year,

Chris Penders published his book *The West New Guinea Debacle*, which shed new light on the role of the Australian government and many other issues. A year later, in 2004, Dirk Vlasblom's *Papoea, een Geschiedenis* (Papua, a history) saw the light of day; this study was largely based on interviews with the Papuans themselves. During the process of writing my book, I had to take the presence of these works into consideration.

Although existing published works were used when available, the present study on the Act of Free Choice is mainly based on extensive research in the archives, many of which often contained material that had not been consulted before. This was possible thanks to the full cooperation of the staff members of the National Archives and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in The Hague, the archival services in the United States and Australia, and those of the United Nations. I am also much indebted to the helpful approach of the Australian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, which not only showed a great deal of interest in the progress of the work, but also very helpfully made available documents in its possession that had been sealed until then. Together, these liberal policies have enabled me to give a clear account of the position of the relevant countries during the conflict. Things are different with the Indonesian government, which demonstrated much reservation and finally rejected my request to carry out research in the *Arsip Nasional* in Jakarta or in Papua itself. Apparently, political considerations were given priority. The resulting lack of information on the Indonesian side could be rectified to some extent by some older Indonesian publications on the subject. Happily, large amounts of information about Indonesian decision-making processes could be found in the archives of the Dutch, Australian and US embassies in Jakarta and in those of their respective Foreign Affairs Departments. Aside from official correspondence, important personal files were also available everywhere.

Whatever the advantages of archival research, additional information from the survivors of the past is very welcome too. For the present book it was a happy coincidence that, at the time I started writing, the text of some sixteen interviews with Papuan civil servants became available, covering their experiences in the transitional period between Dutch and Indonesian rule.[5] Afterwards, I interviewed fifteen more Papuans and Indonesians myself, who had been at the centre of things, one way or another, and were prepared to tell their story. Apart from these, former Dutch officials, missionaries, and military personnel in the Netherlands were always willing to contribute their side too. These exercises in living history added much to my knowledge and understanding of the time and place. Though not solicited for the purpose, they more often than not confirmed what I was already beginning to understand from my persistent plodding through the archives.

On the basis of these materials, it was possible to write a history of the vicissitudes of the Papuans, from their very first contacts with the Western world until well into the twentieth century. The 'Leitmotiv' is how these very primitive societies were gradually launched into the modern world. It went in fits and starts, and only very piecemeal at that. The emphasis is on the twentieth century, especially the postwar period until 1969. In 1950, the country was excluded by the Netherlands from the transfer of sovereignty in Indonesia. Since then, a much more active development policy has been followed; one that is now explicitly based on the principle of self-determination which had made headway since the Second World War. However, that late colonial project was started up against the will of the new Indonesian state, which took its opposition seriously. So it was that development policies became mixed up with heated national and international debates and preparations for large-scale military operations in the area. It all came to an end in 1962. In the New York Agreement of that year, arrangements were made for a transfer to Indonesia under the supervision of the United Nations. It paved the way for an Indonesian interim-administration that ended with the Act of Free Choice, which was carried out by Indonesia under UN supervision in 1969. After that, the territory was administered as a regular part of Indonesia.

The book follows these events on the level of the administrative, cultural and political history of New Guinea, the decolonization of Indonesia, and that of international relations. All things taken together, it is meant as an integral approach that will be relevant for the historian, the sociologist and the legal expert alike. Apart from its specific relevance for each of these disciplines, it is also meant to enhance the readers' awareness of the inadequacies of the philosophies and techniques employed by international society as a whole to accomplish the task of introducing a backward people to the wider modern world. It confronted the Papuans with fast changing perspectives but little choice. I hope this book will kindle the interest of its readers in their plight.

With the Resolution of the Second Papua Congress, the participants had asked for an historical study that would make sure that their history was 'put straight'. The formula is ambiguous but at least it reflects their opinion that their own history had 'gone wrong' somewhere. It has not changed since. By all accounts it is an honourable wish, whether it is understood as referring to the writing of history alone or to the wish of shaping the present in accordance with some lines set out in the past. Yet, it can hardly be the aspiration of the present book to be the instrument for carrying their Resolution into effect. As explained earlier, it was written to comply with a request made by the Netherlands Minister of Foreign Affairs to draw a balanced, even-handed picture of a complicated past. I have done so to the best of my knowledge. I hope

that it will play its part and will kindle further discussion and research. After all, 'putting history straight' cannot be done in one fell swoop but is, one would imagine, simply part of an ongoing process.

When writing about Indonesia in the twentieth century, one inevitably has to deal with problems of orthography. During this period, the Malay language has developed from a coastal trading language and the vessel for the lower and middle echelons of the administration in Indonesia and Malaya into a modern national language. Orthography has changed too. In Indonesia, the Dutch method, marked by the use of the bivocal *oe*, was replaced by the *u*. With the 1974 reform, the *dj* was replaced by the *j*, the *j* by the *y*, and the *tj* by the *c*. These changes not only affected the core vocabulary, but that of topographical and personal names as well.

However, in the field of personal names, these adaptations have been made only partially and incompletely. To get a balanced picture, throughout the book the recent orthography has been applied as much as possible. Exceptions are only made in quotations or, sometimes, in geographical names, to adjust them to the context in which they were mentioned. The irregularities resulting from this approach are compensated for in the index, which sticks to the present use throughout.

Another point that should be made is that, during the course of the twentieth century, quite a number of place names and geographical names in Indonesia and New Guinea changed for political reasons. That was the case, among others, with the name of the capital city of the country. Until 1963 it was Hollandia. Since then, it has successively changed into Kota Baru, Sukarnopura and Jayapura, and sometimes the name of Port Nubay is used as well. Here, these adaptations have been followed throughout.

Writing the book went hand-in-hand with working on the documentary edition about Dutch-Indonesian relations from 1950–1963. It enabled me to continue working closely with colleagues on the documentary project, of whom Ms M.J.B. Schouten (MA) in particular has to be mentioned. The result was that there was always a forum at my disposal with a thorough knowledge of the subject and its archival peculiarities, and quite prepared to discuss together the many larger and smaller questions that arose during the research. Other staff members of the Institute of Netherlands History offered their support as well. This is certainly true of its director, Dr D. Haks, who gladly solved the many organizational riddles that presented themselves. Writing monographs is not the core business of the institute, but the board of governors, successively led by Pim Kooy and Dick de Boer, did not consider it a breach of the

established customs of the Institute, but rather a welcome broadening of its opportunities. It was a pleasure too, to participate in the meetings of the advisory committee, as appointed by the Institute, in which Professors J.Th.M. Bank, J.W. Schoorl and O.D. van den Muijzenberg participated. They willingly shared their knowledge with me and were a great help in keeping some order in the operation as a whole. I cannot finish the list without mentioning my old friend and fellow historian Dr. J.J.P. de Jong who always was a great help, both at the time of the start-up of the project and for reading and commenting on the first draft of the book.

A separate category is made up of the discussions and interviews with participants in the historical process, be they Dutch, Indonesian or Papuan. Some of them are mentioned by name in the list of sources. However, I wish to convey my gratitude to them here as well. A special word has to be said about Amapon Jos Marey, who was really indispensable, always willing to share his knowledge of past events in Papua with me as well as practical everyday matters. Here, I also have to mention the names of Fred Korwa, Fred Athabu and Victor Kaisiepo.

It is quite superfluous to say that this entire context does not remove the stark reality that I am the only one to be held responsible for the content of the book. Yet, even so, it was a support for me that the board of the Institute not only closely followed the progress of the project, but that in the end it also made publicly known that it fully supported the outcome.

To round off, I want to express my satisfaction with the publication of this English translation of my book. After all, in the New Guinea debate much more was at stake than that of a conflict between Indonesia and the Netherlands alone. The way we handle our minorities is essential in determining the moral values of the modern world. It is one of the focal points of Oneworld Publications and I not only appreciate their willingness to take my book into their programme, but also the dedication with which its Editorial Director, Juliet Mabey, diligently set about the task of giving shape and form to the book. Finally, special mention has to be made of Theresa Stanton, Maria van Yperen and Marjolijn de Jager, who shared the job of doing the translation. They all confirmed to me that they had done so with fascination and pleasure. Let me respond to this by declaring that cooperating with them was my pleasure as well. And fascination there was too. Actually, translating a book is the best way of detecting the flaws of the original. I think the English reader will certainly profit from the process.

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
Netherlands New Guinea c. 1960
MOROTAI
HALMAHERA
TERNATE
TIDORE
WAIGEO
Sausapor
Amberbaken
Manokwari
SCHOUTEN ISLANDS
Dom
Sorong
BIRDS HEAD
NUMFOR
Biak
Bosnik
BACAN
Klamono
Anggi Lakes
Ransiki
JAPEN
RAJA AMPAT ISLANDS
Teminabuan
Serui
Hollandia
(since 1963, successively renamed as Sukarnopura and Jayapura)
OBI
Inanwatan
Steenkool
Sarmi
Geelvink Bay
Genyem
MacCluer Gulf
CERAM SEA
Wasior
Sentani Lake
NORTH NEW GUINEA
Fakfak
CERAM
Nabire
Idenburg River
Ubrub
Kaimana
Wissel Lakes
Wamena
BURU
AMBON
Triton Bay
Enarotali
CARSTENSZ MOUNTAINS
Etna Bay
STERREN MOUNTAINS
Wilhelmina Peak
Kokanao
Juliana Peak
BANDA SEA
Agats
SOUTH NEW GUINEA
Ninati
KAI ISLANDS
ARU ISLANDS
Kepi
Bade
Digul
TANIMBAR ISLANDS
FREDERIK HENDRIK ISLAND
Merauke
ARAFURA SEA
PORTUGUESE TIMUR

Chapter 1

A Distant Corner of the Netherlands East Indies

The Dutch East India Company (DEIC), Tidore and New Guinea

New Guinea, one of the largest islands in the world, is shaped like a giant bird. If one were to superimpose it onto a map of Europe, the most westerly part, the Bird's Head Peninsula, would cover the area between Antwerp and Liverpool, while the tail-feathers of the island would touch the Black Sea. The part that used to belong to the Netherlands has a surface-area the size of France. It is also a sparsely populated area. During the final years of the Dutch administration it was inhabited by approximately 800,000 Papuans. At that time, 16,000 Dutch people also lived there, along with approximately the same number of Indonesians and almost 3,000 Chinese. The number of Papuans has increased by half since then. Although the Dutch have disappeared, the number of immigrants coming from the rest of Indonesia has risen substantially in the meantime and now accounts for thirty five per cent of the population. Today, the total number of inhabitants has reached at least two million, although the real figure could be even higher. The newcomers not only come from the densely populated island of Java but also, in particular, from the islands in the East of the Archipelago. These mainly Buginese, Butonese and Macassarese migrants make up the urban element in a society in which the Papuan population occupies a marginal position. The fate of the latter is the main focus of this study.

Anyone looking up the word Papua in the Dutch Encyclopaedia of the Dutch East Indies will not be disappointed. In that fine specimen of colonial scholarship, this phenomenon is described in thirty nine densely written

pages.[1] It provides us with a list of the hundreds of different tribes that could be identified at that time, including details of their body shape, clothes and customs. The overall impression is one of a primitive people, consisting of dark-skinned individuals with frizzy curls, tall and muscular in the coastal areas but small and hardy inland. Their organizational levels were low and they lived in very small groups, ranging from a few dozen to several hundred people. For the majority, the political horizon extended no further than their immediate neighbours. Different theories abound about the true meaning of the word Papua. Recent studies link it to a Biak word meaning 'Land on the Western Horizon'. However, the more general view is that it is a corruption of a Malay word for 'woolly haired'.[2] The Papuans themselves referred to each other by the name of their tribe or the local area to which they belonged. Even the name of the island is foreign. The Spanish explorer Iñigo Ortiz de Retes, who visited the area in 1545, called it New Guinea, because both the land and the people reminded him of what he had seen along the coasts of Guinea in Western Africa. After the Second World War, the Biak name Irian also came into use and acquired strong political overtones during the years of conflict between Indonesia and the Netherlands. Following President Wahid's visit to the island in January 2000, the term Papua was elevated to a higher status and, after the autonomy law of October 2001, became the official name of the Indonesian province formerly known as Irian Jaya. Aside from this, it is also interesting to know that the name Papua was already being used during the time of De Retes.

The description in the Dutch *Encyclopaedie* reflects the scholarly opinions of that time; a time when the yardstick and compass were the primary instruments used to survey people and their surroundings. The focus was first and foremost on physical features. The cultural anthropologist measured body height and the contents of the skull, while the cartographer surveyed the physical features of the terrain. That is not to say that this information is irrelevant. Most of the data was in fact highly topical and previously unknown. Up until the middle of the nineteenth century the scientific exploration of New Guinea did not get any further than a comprehensive survey of the coastline. After the Spaniards, the Dutch went on to penetrate this area. Their ships' captains could easily identify landmarks from far out at sea. Names like Murderer's Bay, Turn Back and Wild Man's River indicated that initial encounters with the local inhabitants were not always peaceful. In 1623, Captain Carstensz saw the snow-capped mountains in the central mountain region, which have borne his name ever since. An important expedition took place in 1705, when a squadron led by a ship called 'De Geelvink', which was commissioned by the board of directors of the Dutch East India Company, explored the bay that separated the Bird's Head Peninsula from the main body of the island. Since then it it has borne the name of

Geelvink Bay, and presently that of Teluk Cendrawasih. During the course of the sixteenth century other European explorers also left their mark. The Humboldt Bay, where the capital of western New Guinea would be established at a much later date, is one such case, as is the MacCluer Gulf; the deep-sea inlet that lies between the Bird's Head and the Onin peninsula to the South.

Up until the end of the nineteenth century, European interest in the island was minimal. As far as the Dutch were concerned, the heart of their economic and political interests was in Java. Batavia, present-day Jakarta, was the capital of the Asiatic trading empire of the Dutch East India Company (DEIC), which had been consolidating Dutch interests in that part of the world since 1601. Nevertheless, a few of the island groups close to New Guinea were in fact the most important to them. These were the Molucca Islands, production centres for cloves, mace and nutmeg, precious spices that had already played an important role in world trade hundreds of years before the Dutch had arrived. During the first few decades of the seventeenth century, the latter had succeeded in monopolizing the trade in these goods. To this end, they had concluded agreements with the rulers in these areas and set up trading posts and forts in suitable locations that served not only as trading centres but also enabled them to ensure that agreements were kept.[3]

The most important Moluccan states were Ternate and Tidore. They were maritime powers with headquarters on each island. Since the thirteenth century, they had been expanding their influence throughout the surrounding territories. The Ternate kingdom extended to the South and the West and reached as far as the Celebes and the small Sunda islands. The Tidorese sultans, meanwhile, had their sights set on the East and their influence stretched as far as the nearby coastal area of New Guinea. The most important Dutch official there was the Governor of the Moluccas, who resided in Ternate.

There had been regular contact between the sea-faring peoples of the Moluccas and those of the western coastal areas of New Guinea since ancient times. This applied in particular to the inhabitants of the Schouten Islands, where Biak was a key shipping centre. The dry and barren island forced the islanders to seek their living overseas. They became good at building boats and were skilled at employing techniques developed elsewhere. They were capable of launching massive rowing vessels, called kora-koras, which (in the eighteenth century) seated seventy oarsmen or more. Their level of cultural advancement and outward appearance were only marginally different to those of the Moluccans. They used iron, which was still unheard of further inland. As blacksmiths and tradesmen they peddled their goods far and wide. Here too, as elsewhere in the archipelago, the fine line between trade and piracy was easily crossed. This was made even easier by the fact that, throughout the whole of

New Guinea, in the coastal regions as well as the inland areas, the usually mobile inhabitants were preoccupied with waging wars with one another, in which magical motives played an intrinsic role. Headhunting and cannibalism were outward expressions of a view of the world in which the survival of one depended on taking the life force of another.

The Biak people, albeit not in association with the inhabitants of the sago-rich coastal areas among whom they had settled, carried out raids that penetrated deep into the archipelago. Most of them confined themselves to the coastal areas of Ceram and Halmaheira, but sometimes the expeditions ventured as far as Java. It is clear, however, that the complexity of the activities carried out by these 'Vikings of the Eastern Seas' required great technical skills and advanced levels of organization. Biak settlements were found throughout the region of north and west New Guinea. This tallied with the geographical area covered by their language, Biak-Numfor.

What is remarkable is that these developments did not result in any system of government being set up at the location where most of their activities took place. One explanation for this could be that the supremacy of Tidore, which will be discussed in greater depth later on, blocked such a development. Although perhaps of greater significance is the highly developed sense of individualism that is prevalent throughout New Guinea and the concomitant view that no individual is allowed to rise permanently above the community. Leadership remained highly personal and subject to individual qualities. This also applied whenever such a leader derived his inspiration from messianic images which appeared everywhere in various shapes and forms. For Biak, the myth of Manseren Mangundi (the Saviour Incarnate), who upon his return would build the Utopian state or 'Koreri', was a continuous source of inspiration. As a trailblazer of the Messiah, or 'konoor' in the language of Biak-Numfor, a single individual could temporarily occupy a very powerful position and inflict turmoil upon vast areas. Nevertheless, his glory was always highly personal and vanished in a flash with his demise. In most places, and certainly in the Biak-Numfor area, the organizational structure was limited to family clans (kerets), from which powerful individuals occasionally emerged as heroes (mambri) or priests (mon). However, it should be emphasized here that not everyone had an equal opportunity: one's lineage played a significant role. On Biak, the oldest inhabitants of the land, the 'free men' or *manseren* were firmly in control. Only then came the descendants of the immigrants who had arrived after them and the slaves, for whom the road to fame and fortune was more precarious. Forms of monarchy, kingship or comparable systems of leadership were only admissible when they originated from outside and when the individual in question had no place in the local geneology. When viewed like this, it is

plausible that people from Biak were present at the creation of the four principalities or *Raja Ampat*, on the islands right in front of the Bird's Head, but that this did not lead to any permanent overarching Biak structure.

According to tradition, the Biak leader Sekfamneri, who became more well-known under the name of *Gura Besi*, was the founding father of this conglomerate of princely states. He was a great warrior who, at the end of the fifteenth century, came to the assistance of the ruler of Tidore during a war with the kingdom of Djailolo. Just like any good fairy tale, Gura Besi destroyed the sultan's enemies with superior ease and was rewarded with a kingdom and the hand of the sultan's daughter in marriage. The couple had four sons, who went on to lay the foundations of the Raja Ampat. In order to emphasize the supernatural origins of this kingdom, the legend reveals that the four sons were not conceived in the conventional way but rather entered this world after overcoming a number of obstacles, through an egg. That way, no Papuan needed to worry that he would be governed by a fellow-tribesman. In this respect, it is important that Gura Besi agreed when he was sworn into office that he would exercise authority in the name of Tidore, to which he would remain indebted.[4]

At least, that is how the legend goes. The fact remains that when the Portuguese and the Spanish pushed forward into these areas during the sixteenth century, they encountered 'Papuan kings' who were looked upon as formidable pirates. Such 'kings' or rajas were not only present in the Raja Ampat, but in the western point of the Bird's Head too. The link between Tidore and these rajas became clear in 1534, when the Portuguese laid siege to Tidore. A large fleet of Papuan kora-koras raced there as fast as they could to rescue the monarch. It was a magnificent naval assault, and one that forced the Portuguese to retreat temporarily.[5]

The relationship between Tidore and the Papuans was acknowledged as a matter of fact in the seventeenth century, when the Dutch began to take the initiative. We can conclude from both contemporary and later sources that scores of Tidorese officials were stationed throughout the entire region of the Raja Ampat and the west and north coast of New Guinea as far as deep in the Geelvink bay, with titles such as Raja, Kimelaha or Major and were, directly or indirectly, beholden to the Sultan of Tidor for their position and responsible for gathering the tribute owed to him. The princedoms of the Moluccas were tied contractually to the DEIC, and therefore to the Dutch state. This was also the case with Tidore. In 1667, the Sultan accepted the DEIC as his 'protector' and promised to abstain from making any other foreign alliances. This occasion was used to make it clear that 'Papua and all its islands' were included under Tidore. With this, limited Dutch control over the area was set down in writing. Dutch governors stationed in Ternate made sure that the

terms of the contract with Tidore were honoured. More than one hundred years later, in 1780, the DEIC occupied the sultanate of Tidore in accordance with the terms laid down in the older contract and gave it as a fief to the sultan who had just taken office. The Netherlands was now the sovereign or, according to the terms of feudal law, suzerain of New Guinea as far as Tidore's influence reached.

These agreements with Tidore and the other Moluccan states were highly significant for the DEIC, as they gave it a trading monopoly over a few important spices. The terms laid out in the agreements with Tidore concerning New Guinea and the surrounding islands were important in this respect, because cloves were found there too. According to the terms laid down in the contract, production could be halted and surplus clove trees could be cleared, which kept the price on the world market high. The political aspect was also important, because having these documents in one's possession made it possible to keep European competitors at bay. In addition to this, they could be used to hold the ruler of Tidore accountable for any acts perpetrated by Papuan pirates, who were exceptionally active during the eighteenth century. To make these claims visible, check the clove yields and collect the tribute claimed by the sultan of Tidore, large fleets of *kora-koras* were regularly dispatched from the Moluccas to traverse Papuan waters. These ventures, called *hongi* expeditions, were essentially no different from the expeditions carried out by Papuan sailors. Each village in the territory controled by the sultan was fitted out with one or more *kora-koras* and a fixed number of oarsmen. The inhabitants of the Papuan islands had to contribute to this too. Once the fleet was assembled it headed for the taxable coasts. In theory, the sultan's representatives were supposed to be waiting there with the tribute that had already been collected in advance. Reports by the Dutch reveal a different story. Here, the *hongi* is often depicted as a raiding fleet that brought about fear and destruction wherever it went ashore. The very sight of them caused the local inhabitants to panic and flee inland. Those who did not manage to escape in time were robbed of all their possessions, murdered, or carried off as slaves. Governance in the true sense of the word did not actually materialize. In actual fact, the outward expression of the sultan of Tidore's authority was limited to this recurring ritual. The DEIC did not mind this, as long as it served its policy of limiting the growth of 'superfluous' spices. And there were other advantages to be gained too. Its representatives on the Moluccas were constantly lobbying for *hongi* expeditions to be carried out. DEIC sergeants accompanied their Tidorese allies on their expeditions and monitored the proceedings with an eagle eye to make sure that the Company got its fair share of captured slaves. In this respect too, control over New Guinea had definite economic benefits for the Dutch. The slaves came in

very useful on the Banda islands where there was a chronic shortage of labour on the plots where nutmeg was cultivated.

In 1780, the appointment of a new sultan triggered a series of events that seriously damaged Dutch authority in that part of the archipelago. One of the candidates for the sultanate, a certain Prince Nuku, felt that he had been treated unfairly and rose up in defiance. He was supported by the Papuans who spotted an ideal opportunity to avenge themselves on the Tidoreses, whom they loathed. Their ships quickly set sail and it was thanks to their help that Nuku was able to keep the Dutch at arm's length for several years. He became increasingly involved with the English, who were now also present in the area. Around 1800, both Ternate and Tidore were conquered by Nuku and his allies. This represented a highpoint in the military history of the 'Papuan pirates', but it was shortlived. When the chips were down, it transpired that the Moluccans did not consider them to be equal partners. As soon as the situation had been reconsolidated, they did not give their Papuan partners the chance to share in the spoils. 'The majority of Papuans plucked from their homeland either perished or were condemned to a life of slavery. Few of them ever returned.' stated a Dutch report describing events at the time.[6] For the Papuans, it was a tragic end to a glorious episode.

The eastern frontier of the Netherlands East Indies

For the servants of the DEIC, New Guinea was a remote corner of their trading empire which they frequented as seldom as possible. Relations with the area were organized on an ad hoc basis. The Dutch relied entirely on Tidore for their contacts and were not particularly interested in the ins and outs of the relationship. They rarely troubled themselves with the question of how far Tidore's arm, and in this respect their own, actually extended. This situation changed during the last quarter of the eighteenth century. Up until then, the Netherlands had no serious rivals in the eastern parts of the Indonesian Archipelago. After this point, however, the results of the English overtaking the Netherlands as a maritime power were also visible in this area. This process was dramatically accelerated by the French revolution and the establishment of the Napoleonic Empire in Europe. The Dutch Republic perished in this process. The country was occupied by French troops and, one by one, the overseas territories came under the control of the English. For the Dutch position overseas, the liquidation of the DEIC in 1800 was also significant. All of its assets, contracts and debts were taken over by the state.

After the Napoleonic wars ended, the old status quo between the English and the Dutch was partially restored as a result of negotiations between the

respective governments of England and the Netherlands. This came into effect with the Anglo-Dutch Treaty signed in London in 1814, which also had consequences for the Moluccas and the surrounding areas. After the English occupied the Moluccas in 1810, they initiated an arrangement between Tidore and Ternate in which the region of Tidore was further defined. This included 'the Papuan Islands' and a couple of sketchily described districts on the northern Bird's Head.[7] When these areas were returned to the Netherlands under the terms of the London Convention, both parties commited themselves implicitly to this frontier. The finer details were worked out in the Anglo-Dutch Treaty of 1824. The agreements made between the Netherlands and Tidore were recognized in the treaty, which meant that both the Netherlands and England were at liberty to decide whether or not to settle in those areas of New Guinea that did not belong to Tidore. In order to avoid any possible misunderstandings, each party agreed to inform the other if and when they planned to take such steps.

The London treaties of 1814 and 1824 represented milestones in a process that made a sharper distinction between the Duch and English sphere of influence in Asia. One distinctive feature of this change in relations was that the Netherlands was obliged to withdraw from India and Ceylon. Henceforth, it would proceed to focus more strongly than before on the Indonesian archipelago. Batavia, which under the DEIC had been the headquarters of a trading company whose activities extended throughout Asia, evolved into the capital city of the colonial administration of the Netherlands East Indies. The merchant became a farmer and administrator. First on Java, and eventually on Sumatra too, the main thrust of Dutch activities was on cultivating cash crops for export to Europe and America. The administration was based on the Napoleonic model. Java was divided up into around twenty-two Residences, each one governed by a Dutch official who was given the title of *Resident*. The Residences were subdivided in a number of *Afdelingen* (Divisions) under the leadership of an *Assistant Resident*, who administered their territories with the help of a larger number of junior Dutch officials with the rank of *Controleur* (Inspector) or otherwise. This rather small Dutch civil service, or *Binnenlands Bestuur*, was put at the head of a much larger indigenous civil service. The power of the remaining indigenous feudal rulers was drastically reduced. In the rest of the archipelago, the indigenous and predominantly feudal order continued to be maintained as far as possible. It was only at the end of the nineteenth century that, here too, the Dutch order, the 'pax Neerlandica', was established. Initially, there was little enthusiasm for this because the tiny country of the Netherlands already had its hands full with Java, which was four times its size. Nevertheless, government officials in The Hague and Batavia showed that they were aware of the need to generate sufficient clarity about the external limits of the sphere of

influence. They seized every opportunity to explain their demands cautiously, but firmly, to the outside world.

The nineteenth century increasingly witnessed high-handed behaviour by the European powers toward the peoples of Asia and the rest of the World. This attitude reflected their burgeoning technical prowess, particularly with regard to the introduction of the steam engine and the industrial revolution that accompanied it. These circumstances sometimes made it necessary to deal with Asian matters directly at government level, as illustrated in both of the London treaties. In relation to this, one other development is significant. In the seventeenth century, partly as a result of the influence of the works of the Dutch jurist Hugo de Groot, the equality of states was the cornerstone of international law. This principle also applied to Asia. Obviously, in real life, circumstances triumphed over abstract principles and whoever was in power at the time had the final say. It was the same in the Indonesian archipelago, where the DEIC more often than not had concluded agreements with weak states. When differences of opinion arose, the DEIC was invariably given the benefit of the doubt. Nevertheless, the agreements that were forged between the DEIC and the local rulers gave it a key status, which was not only important for managing relations between the Europeans and the Asians, but also gave the weight of the law to claims between fellow-Europeans. The fastidiousness with which the DEIC formulated and documented these agreements is proof of this. They have been collated in a six-volume publication entitled *Corpus Diplomaticum Neerlando-Indicum*, which was published by the Dutch Royal Institute of Linguistics and Anthropology between 1907 and 1955.

Similar agreements were also concluded following the London Treaty of 1814, which enabled the Netherlands to carve out a new position for itself on the Indonesian archipelago. As we have seen, the agreement concluded between Tidore and Ternate under the watchful supervision of the English played a role in this. Nevertheless, the same convention demonstrated the ease with which European states had staked their own claims over the heads of everyone else involved. This development became more clearly visible in the course of the century. Some states were more equal than others. In the development of international law this idea triggered the theory of legal positivism. Civilized Europe imposed its own standards on the world. Its position of power was the basis for law. The highpoint of this development was undoubtedly the Berlin Congress of 1885, during which England, Germany and France appropriated large parts of Africa after consulting with each other. Here it was also agreed that, henceforth, such claims had to be made visible by actually setting up physical government posts. This not only demonstrated the internal rivalry between the modern imperialists of Europe, but also the moral foundation for

their actions. Whoever took the 'white man's burden' upon his shoulders, also had to do justice to it.

The trend described here can be seen in the process of marking out the area of Dutch influence in the eastern flank of the archipelago, but with many adaptations to local conditions. In actual fact, we see a remarkable mix of arbitrary acts being commited, while maintaining the traditional practice of hiding behind official Tidorese titles. It was in this context that an expedition was dispatched to New Guinea in 1828 which, in the name of the King of the Netherlands, formally laid claim to the south and west coast of the island. Here, a location close to the 141st meridian on the south coast was mentioned as the most eastern point with regard to Dutch claims. For the rest, the description was rather vague and ambiguous regarding how far it applied to the areas inland. At any rate, the border that had been claimed did not run straight to the coast in the north, since a point on the Bird's Head was mentioned as the furthest point East of the Dutch claim on the northern shores of the island.

With this act, Dutch claims were no longer primarily focused on Tidore, although the proclamation courteously referred to the entitlements of the sultan to certain regions of the claimed territory. The denouement of the story illustrates the risks inherent in negating the realities of the unruly island. The 1828 expedition resulted in the establishment of a station, called Fort du Bus, on the south coast, but it proved not to be a great success. The garrison was plagued by hunger, disease and attacks by the local people and had to be abandoned in 1836. One of the factors that contributed to its demise was the fact that the area that had been selected was visited regularly by merchants from Ceram, who were far from satisfied with what they perceived as the invasion of the Dutch into an area they considered their own. It showed that one should always be aware of local relationships and that fools rush in where angels fear to tread.

This lesson was learned when the Netherlands decided to make a renewed attempt in 1848. To gain more clarity about the scope of influence of both nations in the Eastern seas around Borneo and New Guinea, the government of the East Indies formulated a secret decree instructing its officials to assume in their day-to-day dealings that the territory of their Tidorese ally extended to both the southern and northern sides of the island as far as the 141st meridian. The following year, a frigate called the *Circe* was dispatched to place escutcheons all along the coast to leave no doubt about the Dutch claim. Whenever the opportunity presented itself, chiefs were appointed and furnished with Dutch orders and a Dutch flag. This type of interaction was the main manifestation of local activity carried out by the Dutch administration right up until the turn of the century. For the rest, the Dutch resident from Ternate, or one of his officials, made the odd personal appearance in these

parts, mainly to keep an eye on the comings and goings of the missionaries who had settled in the area around Geelvink Bay in 1855. Some trading also took place, mainly by a Ternate-based firm called Van Duivenbode which had had several schooners in service since the 1840s. Its captains had provided the missionaries, upon their arrival, with the first, generally speaking unreliable, information about the situation on the island.[8]

From 1865 onwards the Netherlands East Indies government openly expressed its claim to the 141st meridian as the Eastern border of its territory. It did this in a number of different ways, including simply registering this border in the semi-official *Regeeringsalmanak van Nederlandsch-Indië*, in which all details of the organization and staffing of the administration were published annually. This proved effective against any potential rivals from Europe. After this, both the British and the Germans focused their attention exclusively on the eastern half of the island. Australia's Queensland in particular wished to have the neighbouring parts of New Guinea within the borders of the British Territory, just to avoid any risk of being saddled with unfamiliar neighbours. There was a very real possibility of this happening as the new German Empire of Bismark and Wilhelm I did actually show an interest in securing a place in the tropics for themselves as a colonial power. New Guinea appeared to offer an opportunity for this. The outcome of this was that in 1885, England and Germany concluded an agreement whereby the north-eastern part of New Guinea, with its broad arch of islands around it, became German territory, while England with the help of Queensland took over the south-eastern part. The 141st meridian continued to function as the border between the two rivals and the area belonging to the Dutch part. On the face of it, it seemed that both England and Germany were delighted that they did not have to argue about it there at least. The Dutch claim was therefore laid down in an Anglo-Dutch border agreement in 1895 with very little discussion. A Dutch-German agreement never materialized due to the outbreak of the First World War, but in 1936, after Australia was mandated by the League of Nations to take over the German part of New Guinea, here too the 141st meridian was cited as the logical border in an exchange of notes between England and the Netherlands. Further investigation into the land frontier took place in the years that followed.[9]

The Netherlands implemented a two-pronged policy with regard to determining the Eastern border of its possessions in the Netherlands East Indies, where it was based alternately on its own authority and on agreements made with Tidore. The emphasis was predominantly on the latter until the last quarter of the nineteenth century. It was safer for the Netherlands further to adapt a claim that had already been recognized by England, than to engage in new issues that were totally unrelated. The reason for this was that, according to the

London Treaty of 1824, preliminary talks would be necessary for this, which could provoke possible difficulties. In the case of New Guinea, such talks never took place. We can ascertain, therefore, that the game with Tidorese claims facilitated a smooth passage for the establishment of the eastern border of the East Indies.

Establishing control and exploring the interior

This is how, over the course of three centuries, the western half of New Guinea gradually became part of the Dutch sphere of influence. The Papuans played no role in this whatsoever, despite the fact that it was very much their interests that were at stake. As soon as the lines had been drawn on the map, they instantly became Dutch, British or German subjects. With this, important decisions about their future were also taken without the negotiating parties thinking about this for a single moment. These inter-European agreements about national borders did not matter as much to the Tidorese. After all, they had been vassals of the Netherlands since 1780 and their territorial contacts had been completely taken over by the Netherlands, which had even extended these further. Nethertheless, the two-pronged policy of the Netherlands led to a change in outlook for the position of the sultanate. In 1826, the sultan was obliged to write a letter, upon the insistence of governor Merkus, in which he laid claim to the entire island, from head to tail. And only two years later, the Netherlands, acting on its own initiative, claimed large sections of the coast as its own area of control. In 1848, a bogus claim by the sultan once again served as the basis for the Dutch claim to the whole area to the west of the 141st meridian. This opened up interesting perspectives for the Tidorese. After Nuku's death, Tidore had practically disappeared from the political map and had only bounced back after Dutch influence in the region had been restored. Indeed, the Dutch interest in the *hongi* had waned significantly since then, certainly after the relaxation of the rules on the clove monopoly by Governor General Van der Capellen in 1824.

For the Tidorese, the decision of 1848—which, although secret, had nonetheless been communicated to them—represented an unsolicited excuse for all-out action. Hongis were instantly dispatched to the newly designated areas. It all took place according to the old traditions and, according to Dutch reports written at that time, was a veritable journey of subjugation during which they 'spread alarm and terror everywhere, stealing everything humanly possible' along the southern and northern coasts of New Guinea. Nineteenth century Dutchmen, who were the direct representatives of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, would have found this a more embarrassing spectacle than their

predecessors who lived during the era of the DEIC. The situation did not improve when, shortly afterwards, the expedition of the above-mentioned *Circe* took place and was responsible for displaying the Dutch flag in the newly claimed areas, placing escutcheons and appointing chiefs. The Tidorese *hongi* accompanied the ship. A contemporary report that hit the mark, and also illustrates the sense of embarrassment felt by the Dutch, runs as follows: 'The *hongi* fleet with the flags of the Netherlands, Tidore, Salwatti and Waigeo hoisted to the mast-head, rowed to the beat of the *tifa* and gong in the direction of Doreh (which later became Manokwari), ... women and children scattered in all directions, taking everything of any value with them, to escape the crew's insatiable appetite for pillaging and theft.'[10] Here too, the expedition did not make it to the eastern border which had been claimed. Instead, it became bogged down on the Schouten Islands, the farthest point anyone was able to place an escutcheon. In the years that followed, little progress was made. The first missionaries would only appear at Humboldt Bay towards the end of the century. For the Dutch people who lived during this era, the *hongi* had become a burden. This crude method of exercising power did not sit easily with the ideas of government that were increasingly being practised elsewhere in the archipelago. They were also at odds with the international campaigns to ban slavery and the fact that the missions had been active in these areas since 1855. In an agreement made with Tidore in 1859, the *hongi* were forbidden and countermeasures taken to soften the forms of slavery that still existed in these regions.

Tidore lost its importance as an ally and the emphasis came to rest more heavily on acting on one's own authority, certainly after the frontier had been secured from an international point of view following the 1895 treaty with England. In an age in which the European powers were staking claims to large swathes of Africa and Asia, the Netherlands could not afford to lag behind if it wished to retain its position in the archipelago. During the closing decades of the century, claims made by the Netherlands were clearly marked on the map and recognized as such by potential rivals in Europe. To keep it this way, the next step, which in concrete terms consisted of occupation, was inevitable. Events in Achin, where the Netherlands had waged a bloody war after it had been given a 'free hand' there by the English in 1870, are a prime example of this. It turned into a thirty-year war, which cost more than forty thousand lives on Achin's side alone.[11] Achin's resistance prompted discussions in the Dutch parliament about whether or not to continue along this path. The conclusion, as stated by Minister J.H. Bergsma in 1894, was that there was no turning back but that one should nevertheless proceed with caution in the rest of the outlying areas of the archipelago. When it seemed as if the worst was behind them in Achin, a campaign to 'consolidate' Dutch positions was also conducted in the

east of the archipelago from circa 1895. The line runs from the definitive occupation of Bali and Lombok to the expeditions to Ceram in the early years of the twentieth century. New Guinea was a low priority, and would remain so for the next fifty years. Yet, here too steps were taken that would lead to the region becoming more closely linked to the evolving Netherlands Indies colonial state. Once the formal claim had been made, physical occupation had to follow.

The opening move on the colonial chess board was made in 1892. The reason behind this was the establishment of German and English colonies on the island. It is true that the Dutch position was not contested by these new neighbours, yet their presence on the eastern half did give rise to some speculation. Due to German, British-Australian and Dutch commercial activities, shipping traffic along the coast also increased, which was evident from the fact that, among other things, the newly established *Koninklijke Paketvaart Maatschappij* (KPM: Royal Packetboat company) began having regular contact with the island after 1891.[12] The arrival of the new powers also led to problems, as the Papuans did not take any notice of either the new borders or the changing times. During the 1890s, a *konoor* had manifested himself, who commanded a large following along the shores and upon the islands of the Geelvink Bay. The inhabitants of the southern parts, the Marind-anim, simply continued with their headhunting expeditions to the neighbouring regions for which the English had assumed responsibility. This led to protests from the British government. It is interesting to note that there was some uncertainty among both the English and the Dutch about the issue of whose subjects these actually were, so to be on the safe side Batavia sprang into action. After a couple of KPM officers had also been murdered in these southern regions, a small outpost was set up in close proximity to the 141st meridian in 1892. It was not a great success. The post was attacked on all sides by the Marind and after a few months the detachment had to slink off humiliated, leaving dozens of dead bodies behind. It was definitely not the textbook example required by international law. If the Netherlands wished to realize its claims in full view of the world, it needed to assert itself more forcefully.

This took place in 1898. During that year, the western half of New Guinea was divided into two administrative *afdelingen* (divisions). Each one was governed by a Dutch civil servant with the rank of assistant resident. Both were subordinate to the resident in Ternate. These officials needed to have, first and foremost, safe and secure accommodation in their new realm of authority. This led to administrative outposts being set up that same year in Manokwari and Fakfak. Manokwari, which was situated on Geelvink Bay, became the capital of the North New Guinea department, an area that stretched from the newly

designated German border near the Humboldt Bay up to and including the largest segment of the Bird's Head. Fakfak became the principal town of the department of West New Guinea which consisted of the southern half of the island, including the Onin peninsular and the Raja Ampat islands.

The original intention was that the regions farther to the east from Kaimana would also be part of this department, but this proved overly ambitious. After the *controleur* of Fakfak, J.A. Kroesen, had explored the area that fell under his jurisdiction further, a decision was made to promote him to the position of assistant resident of a newly created *afdeling* South New Guinea, which fell directly under the governor general. In February 1902, Kroese embarked for Merauke with a small fleet of KPM steamers, accompanied by a rather impressive force of four officers, 160 soldiers, an armed police corps, a group of indentured labourers from Achin and the necessary administrative and medical personnel. He had orders to set up a post in Merauke which would act as the starting point for the establishment of actual Dutch rule in this remote corner of the East Indies.

This operation would not be an easy task for him, nor for his colleagues in Fakfak and Manokwari. Until then, little was known about the island. Next to nothing was known about what lay further inland and the handful of experiences that had been acquired were not encouraging. The events of 1892 were still fresh in people's memories. As far as the Papuans were concerned, these new administrators were trespassers who spoke a language they did not understand and whom they could not fathom in the slightest. Once again, first contact quickly led to a series of misunderstandings, as was evident from Kroesen's report: 'at first, the natives seemed friendly, but within a few days they steadily became more obstreperous and insolent. They stole everything they could lay their hands on; they even repeatedly tried to remove the chains for the buoyage. Everyone who stealthily sneaked past the security cordon was murdered; their corpses were retrieved later, stark naked and beheaded'.[13] Conversely, the attacks by the Marind on soldiers and forced labourers resulted in countless repraisals by the Dutch, as a result of which scores were killed. It was not much better in other parts and the upshot of all of this was that Fakfak and Merauke in particular were besieged outposts during the first few months. In Manokwari things went more smoothly because the missions had already been active there for a number of decades. At any rate, it can be concluded that, in contrast to previous attempts, the inducement-articles they had brought with them did their work. The Dutch were capable of looking after themselves and evoking a positive interest from the local Papuans living nearby. Items they had brought with them to give as gifts such as iron arrows and the inevitable beads and mirrors played an important role in this. Several other friendly encounters took

place and, after a few months, the barbed wire could be taken down in Merauke. A modus vivendi had already evolved with the local inhabitants in Fakfak at this time, while in Manokwari it was only the contacts further inland that caused problems. In this way, the first steps had been taken that would initiate the process through which these areas would slowly become integrated into the Netherlands Indies colonial state.

The further exploration was tackled with vigour. Right from the outset, the accompanying soldiers marched into the surrounding countryside from the new government posts. After 1907, at the proposal of H. Colijn, Achin veteran and later Minister President, this work was planned on a massive scale.[14] The East Indian army made several hundred officers and military personnel available for a military reconnaissance mission during which large sections of the island were explored and surveyed. The result of this was that at the end of the exercise, in 1915, a map had been compiled of the entire country. That same year, a number of scientific expeditions were also carried out. Two associations played an important role in this. They were the *Maatschappij ter bevordering van het Natuurkundig Onderzoek in de Nederlandsche Koloniën* (Society for the Pursuit of Natural Research in the Dutch Colonies), also known more simply as the Treub-Serrurier Maatschappij and the *Koninkijk Nederlandsch Aardrijkskundig Genootschap* (Royal Netherlands Geographical Society). The British also initiated a couple of expeditions. The sporting element consisted of making it a key priority to climb the eternally snowcapped mountains, which Captain Carstensz had spotted from his ship as far back as the seventeenth century. The first expeditions set off from the south coast, where the mountains were close to the sea. They were only partially successful, as although the expeditions led by Lorentz (1907), Wollaston (1910) and Franssen Herderschee (1913) managed to get as far as the snow line, they failed to reach the summit. Nor was an attempt in 1909 to push forward to the mountain tops from the north coast any more successful in this respect. However, taken altogether the expeditions did provide ample opportunities to gain a deeper understanding of the geographical, anthropological and geological condition of the countryside.

When the First World War broke out, explorations further inland were put on the back burner for a while. In 1920, activities were resumed and a massive full-blown expedition led by Captain A.J.A. van Overeem forged its way ahead from the north into the Central Highlands. The following year, Dutch New Guinea was crossed from north to south for the very first time. It did not make any more headway than this as a joint Dutch-American expedition in 1926, during which an aeroplane was used for the first time, had little success. Meanwhile, the introduction of the aeroplane heralded a revolution for expeditions inland. It meant that journeys that had to be carried out on foot could

be explored by air beforehand and it was no longer necessary to carry large amounts of supplies from the coast because these could be airdropped at various points along the route that was to be followed. In some cases, it was also possible to land on lakes or wide rivers with water planes. The aeroplane became a familiar sight in this area from 1935, when the newly founded *Nederlandsche Nieuw-Guinea Petroleum Maatschappij* (NNGPM) set itself up in Babo on the MacCluer Gulf. From this time forward, aeroplanes were constantly available, for civilian use too when needed. By the end of the 1930s, flying boats belonging to the *Koninklijke Marine* (Royal Dutch Navy) were also stationed in the area. They could be used as standard government equipment, albeit sparingly. One spectacular discovery made in 1936 was that of the three lakes in the Central Highlands: Paniai Lake, Tage Lake and Tigi Lake. They were collectively named the Wissel Lakes after the pilot of the aeroplane that had gone on the first expedition. One year later, around two hundred kilometres to the east, a similar group of valleys was discovered, stretching along the shores of the Baliem River. Agriculture was carried out systematically in both areas. Finally, and just as spectacular, was the fact that one of the highest peaks of the Carstensz Mountain range, which up until this point had not yielded to any attempt to climb it, could now be ascended with the aid of an aeroplane. A few oil company employees, including one of the sons of Colijn, spent a free weekend using an aeroplane to trace the main approaches. Afterwards, they embarked on an expedition that lasted for several months and were able to reach the summit. It was a wonderful moment. The Dutch flag was now flying from the roof of the archipelago as well![15]

All these tales of airborne adventures must not make us forget that the exploratory expeditions were, first and foremost, carried out on foot and, at the very best, on board small boats that sailed along the coast and rivers. It can also be added that the distances on New Guinea were huge and the terrain exceptionally heavy-going. This constantly chopped and changed from steep limestone formations and mosquito-infested swamps to endless jungles that could only be penetrated with any ease at all along the riverbanks. It was a really hard life there. But there were also moments during which the travellers were struck by the overwhelming beauty of the landscape. In reports written as early as the nineteenth century, we come across stunning impressions of the Doreh Coast, where the reflection of the towering Arfak is captured in the silent water of the bay. New Guinea repelled and attracted at the same time, and this applied to both its people and its scenery. Ultimately, government officials and people in the police force in particular were the ones who had to cope with this. With the expansion of the region controlled by the authorities, the distances they had to cover also increased. New Guinea stood out as the breeding ground for a new

generation of jungle explorers for whom 'Jungle Pimpernel', the nickname acquired by one of them, could be used as a generic term for all of them. It should be instantly made clear that there was rarely any enthusiasm for this. Most civil servants considered a placement on New Guinea to be a punishment.

Let us now feast our eyes on the countryside, as it would have appeared to the new rulers after 1900. The most southerly settlement was Merauke. It was situated on a sandy ridge, behind which swamps and forests stretched for hundreds of miles to the north. This predominantly malaria-infested area stretched as far as the Central Highlands, which ran in a straight line from the throat of the Bird's Head to the east, splitting the Dutch part of the island in two. It was criss-crossed by a lattice-work of rivers and inhabited by a large number of tribes made up of beligerent wanderers who, in a perpetual state of war with each other over the centuries, had built a precarious existence based on wild pigs, sago and fishing. Alongside the Marind were the Mappi, the Mujus, the Digulers, the Bianners and many others.

In the areas of the north coast that lay closest to the 141st meridian, at Humboldt Bay and Sentani Lake, one encountered a society that certainly resembled that of the south coast in many respects, but which displayed a more variegated social structure. Some of the smaller tribes in the countryside surrounding the small town of Hollandia, which was founded in 1910, showed signs of a strong authoritarian power structure. Further towards the West, along the Waropen Coast, people lived in houses on stilts above the creeks and rivers that criss-crossed the mangrove swamps. Their language and customs indicated a strong influence from the Melanesian region. One geographical feature that stands out in these parts is the Mamberamo River, which in fact flows into the sea to the east of Geelvink Bay. It takes care of the discharge of the two major rivers that pass through the great plains of the *Meervlakte*, a swampland the size of the Netherlands that lies between the Central Highlands and the mountain ranges along the North coast. The swamplands were rather uninhabited, but the areas around the Mamberamo were more densely populated. An extremely primitive population was found here. When the capable civil servant Van Eechoud, about whom more later, settled here in the 1930s, he hit upon the superb idea of compiling a number of family histories. The result was somewhat alarming. Of all the people who featured in it, around 60% of them died a violent death while the women, during their short lives, generally had three or more husbands in quick succession before they too were bludgeoned to death for being old and useless.[16]

According to all standards, the quality of life was much better in the western coastal areas of Geelvink Bay and the islands it encompassed. The oldest

missionary posts were based in the Wandamen area to the south of Manokwari and on the islands of Biak, Numfor and Japen. Manokwari was considered the most comfortable of the new government posts. It lay in the well-protected Doreh Bay, while the sago forests of the coastal plains provided it with food. The social structure in these areas was slightly more advanced as a result of previous contacts with the Indonesian archipelago and the activities of the Biakkers. There was certainly a sharp contrast here between the people on the coast and those who lived inland. The new settlement on Manokwari would have its hands full with the people from the hinterland for many years to come. For the sake of convenience they were collectively referred to as Arfakkers. Trade between the coast and the interior had generated a substantial amount of new capital in the form of porcelain, iron artefacts and the odd piece of textile. The so-called Kain-Timur complex had gained quite a reputation as a trading network, whereby textiles supplied by Indonesian peddlars were bartered along the coasts of the Bird's Head for goods and slaves with those who lived inland including, among others, the Moi, the Mejbrats, the Ajamaru and the Teminabuan. These fabrics (*kains*) played an important role in social interactions, particularly in the form of dowries.

The population of the islands lying to the west of the Bird's Head, the Raja Ampat, exhibited not only leanings towards East Indonesia in their language and physique but was, as we have already witnessed from Gura Besi's story, just as influenced by the Biak people during the course of their history. The Bird's Head was bordered on its southern side by the MacCluer Gulf and Bentoon Bay which lay further along. The population of the adjoining Onin peninsula, which consisted of four loosely related tribes, differed much from their brethren from the more northerly areas owing to the influence of traders from Ceram and the surrounding areas. For the latter, the slave trade was their main source of income. A number of these traders had settled here permanently and, as a result, had gained a certain level of authority. In addition to this, they used titles that matched those that were customary throughout the Tidorese sphere of influence.

Few people lived in the Southern coastal areas near Geelvink Bay, where New Guinea is at its narrowest. Larger concentrations of tens of thousands of people could be found along the Mimika coast. The administration got along very well with some of the tribes, coarsely referred to as the Mimikanen. They were sturdy people, although 'their spiritual development and customs were primitive'. Their biggest problem was their neighbours, the war-mongering Manowees, who were placed on record as being fierce headhunters and very dangerous warriors.[17] Kaimana was to become the biggest settlement here. Further towards the east lay, at first, hundreds of kilometres of sparsely

populated coastal swamps, after which we land once again in the areas surrounding the Digul river and Merauke, the point at which we began our round-trip.

The Dutch presence was originally confined to the coastal areas mentioned here. Subsequent expeditions to the Central Highlands brought the explorers into contact with a different type of people. Here one encountered people of small stature, such as the Ekari or Mek from the Wissel Lakes and the Danis of the Baliem. The contrasts were quite spectacular. They were not thick-set people like those on the coast, where a height of 1.80 metres was not unusual, but small people with a height of little more than one-and-a-half metres. These were not the only differences the explorers discovered. The Papuans living on the coast did not have to work. They had an abundant supply of sago, fish and juicy grubs. The medical anthropologist Bijlmer also spoke of 'the rugged wildmen of the swampy lowlands, where sago is there for the taking and the sea and the rivers provide all manner of side dishes', as a result of which they had all the time in the world for raiding and headhunting expeditions. They only turned their hand to horticulture when this was absolutely necessary, but when they did, they were actually very successful at it.

In this respect, more was demanded of those who lived inland. Elements of civilization had blown over from overseas and were present on the coast in the form of a piece of cotton, an iron axe or some beads. In the mountains, the Papuans could be found in their natural state wearing scarcely any art and no clothes other than a shell or penis gourd to cover their genitals. 'A veritable Garden of Eden; where one wanders around practically naked under God's heavenly canopy and eats the fruits of the fields, roasted in the ash of a smouldering fire or, especially in the case of meat, cooked in a blazing hot pit between hot stones until succulent'. Yet it was not difficult to establish contact with them. The first expeditions were usually well received. What was striking was the manner in which they were greeted. In addition to the knuckle greeting, a gesture that only occurred in these parts, they were also given a straight-forward handshake. For the western visitors, this was a strange sensation, because this custom did not exist anywhere else in Indonesia. Consequently, it gave them the feeling of intense kinship; of coming home and being among kindred spirits. The local people were also easy-going and friendly. 'There was no need for us to harbour any lingering doubts at all that we had landed in the company of normal people and that we in turn were looked upon as normal people.' Gardens were laid out in a neat and orderly fashion in places where the ground allowed it. 'Peaceful farmers' lived here in friendly villages, in the middle of fenced-in gardens. Furthermore, Bijlmer and his travelling companions were

struck by the Ekaris' level of development. Children from the Wissel Lakes could count up to one hundred quite easily, while those from the Mimika area could not go beyond three.[18]

These enthusiastic accounts show first and foremost that Westerners expected to find something completely different in the innermost areas of New Guinea. They were charmed by these natural people with their recognizable humanity. In fact, these people were less isolated than Bijlmer originally supposed. They were quite mobile, because it was easy to travel through the highlands and in some places it was possible to come into contact with the nearby south coast (Mimika). The Ekari and the Moni were not that surprised at the arrival of the whites, because they already knew of their existence. In that sense, this meeting was a greater surprise for the discoverers than the discovered.

Besides, the community from the Central Highlands seemed to display all the features that were typical of the rest of the island. In anthropology, the people of New Guinea, from both a physical and cultural perspective, are grouped entirely under the Melanesian area, which includes the Southern part of the complex of islands in the Pacific Ocean. This was anything but a homogeneous whole, as each different area had been exposed to a variety of outside influences. This was also visible on New Guinea. The western coastal regions had been influenced, irrespective of how superficial this might have been, by East Indonesia. Conversely, the residents of the Central Highlands still exhibited the traits and customs that had already vanished from the coast but which could still be found elsewhere in Oceania. For example, the cowrie shell was still regularly used here as a means of exchange. This was also the case with wearing the penis gourd, which had since disappeared from the coast. Bijlmer and his travelling companions were struck by the rustic simplicity of this community. Yet it was no Garden of Eden here either. As everywhere else on the island, war between the tribes was endemic. It was a basic component in the social and political fabric. What was striking was the constant drive to get even. In the land of the Ekari and Moni too, a matter could only be considered to be settled when the number of fatalities on both sides was the same. It was a mechanism that locked one into an endless cycle of action.

One important feature of Melanesian culture is the phenomenon of the 'big man', the leading figure who through his own strength dominates his surroundings. With regard to the Biak people, we have already encountered this figure in the form of the *mambro*, the hero. He was the one who organized overseas expeditions and took his place in the centre of his *kora-kora* to lead the whole group. We encounter similar phenomena throughout the entire region of New Guinea: energetic young men engaged in sailing expeditions to their

immediate neighbours and older men assuming an advisory role until they are pushed to one side as being too old and weak. Those specializing in religion and magic stayed in contact with the ancestors, who for their part were the most prominent champions of the people in a world occupied by the many-headed gods and spirits who controlled their lives. This spirit world could be manipulated by human beings. Malicious individuals took advantage of this to incapacitate their opponents. This was the basis of a universal belief in Black Magic that was responsible for continuously placing a great strain on the relationships that people had with each other. A death that could not be unequivocally attributed to old age was immediately suspect. The family was then obliged to punish the culprit. Within the social relationships of the small community, it was standard practice to take the law into your own hands.

Headhunting and canibalism were the most spectacular expressions of an animistic thought process, in which a fear of magical powers, which resided in people and inanimate objects, was the 'leitmotiv'. The social structure placed the strongest men in a central position, but a more far-reaching political organization was generally absent. Every community, some with no more than a few dozen people, others with several hundred individuals, formed an independent unit and differentiated itself from its neighbours in terms of language and customs. Aggression in its most explicit and effective form regulated the relations the communities had with each other. For the Dutch who had now settled in their midst, they represented the living embodiment of what the eighteenth century English philosopher, Hobbes, had presented as the natural state, in which the life of human beings was 'nasty, brutish and short'.

These were the basic elements of how people in New Guinea lived, with variations in outward appearances, customs and religious expression. Cannibalism was mainly confined to the rivers on the South coast but also occurred in the Bird's Head. The tribes mentioned above consisted of large groups; in the case of the Marind, approximately 60,000 individuals. The Biak people, including the overseas colonists, numbered around 40,000 people. In addition to this, there were numerous smaller tribes, some of which consisted of little more than a couple of hundred members. All of these tribes belonged to different language groups, which in turn could be broken down into groups of dialects and hybrid mixtures. Present day statistics still show enormous differences. For the former Dutch part alone, estimates vary from around two hundred to one thousand different languages. Although some of these languages have been studied in great detail since then, little or nothing is known about the majority of them and no comprehensive survey exists.

This mist of obscurity also shrouds the political and social structures. It is obvious that the tribes were not the most salient form of organization. Dutch

people coming to New Guinea mainly had dealings with the clans, whom they encountered first. These were family groups, such as the *kerets* in Biak, which consisted of a few hundred people or so. No indications of any organizational structure that transcended the clans can be found in any government reports compiled during this period. However, these can be derived from the notable power differences within and between the clans, and from phenomena such as positions being inherited and power differences between the distinct tribes. For example, in South New Guinea the far more numerous Marind clearly dominated the rest. Under these conditions, an imposing individual who was the leader of a prominent family group could exert influence over a much greater area than that of his own clan. These structures appeared to be self-sustaining. Certain families were able to play a prominent role, year in and year out, as long as they were capable of churning out effective leaders. Local history can be seen, to some extent, therefore, in terms of rivalry between specific clans.

The basis of an individual's position of power was grounded, firstly, on their strength of character and brawn. Alongside this, social skills and a knowledge of the cultural baggage of the area played a role. Every tribe had its own myths and legends about the origin of the universe, and every clan cherished its own variations on this theme. They provided insights into the relationships between different members of the clan and held the key to relations with the ancestors, who possessed power as intermediaries between the living and the supernatural forces. Whoever could exercise demonstrable influence over this, possessed power over his surroundings. In some places this was more or less institutionalized, so one could speak in terms of priests or wizards. The arrival of the Dutch created new opportunities for acquiring positions of power. As a way of getting a grip on the seemingly amorphic structure, they decided to set up villages and appoint village heads. Although they were viewed with suspicion, these institutions eventually developed into a meaningful factor in the local power balance. This also applied to the church and the missions, which not only introduced a new value system, but also claims to authority based on this. Originally, the leading positions were reserved for Ambonese and Keiese civil servants, schoolmasters and religious teachers, but Papuans would also eventually belong to this group. It would take years before it got to that stage. Nevertheless, it was clear to assertive individuals long before then that the Dutch possessed power which, with a little bit of forethought, they could turn to their own advantage as well.[19]

Administrative policies up to the Second World War

The Netherlands East Indies, as it had been shaped during the course of history, consisted of a disparate collection of hundreds of former states and mini-states

that were all joined to the central government in Batavia in some form or another. In the oldest and, from an economic or political aspect, the most important areas, the link was the strongest. This was the area that was governed directly; where Dutch civil servants, the *residenten* and their subordinates personally exercised control, albeit in the name of the King. They were assisted in this by a group of civil servants from the indigenous administrations with whom they had a close working relationship. The upper layer of this body consisted of the *regenten*, or *bupati* as they were called on Java. The area that fell under direct rule was found mainly on Java. Elsewhere, relations were more casual and varied, although here too there was a strong desire to standardize all of this. This was the area of indirect rule, where the old kingdoms and rajaships had retained certain elements from their past. They were bound to the central government in Batavia through contracts that had to be renegotiated when a new ruler came to power. These 'self-governing rulers' had their own personnel and resources at their disposal, which partly consisted of subsidies from the government in return for rights that had formerly been relinquished. Officials of the Civil Service (BB: *Binnenlands Bestuur*) were responsible for checking to see whether these contracts were honoured. The main advantage of this division between direct and indirect rule was that in the more developed parts, where direct rule applied, a degree of standardization could be achieved with regard to legislation and jurisdiction. This was not possible in the more diverse, outlying districts, where contact was more limited. In areas where Batavia had very little control and the rules and regulations were more relaxed, there was more space for governance based on local customs, even if this was at loggerheads with what the Dutch believed to be just and fair.

As we have seen, New Guinea under the old agreements used to belong to the area under indirect rule. Dutch officials occasionally visited it, but for the rest of the time it was assumed that the reins of government were in the hands of representatives of the ruler of Tidore. For North and West New Guinea, this form of Tidorese self-governance continued to be maintained even after the arrival of the Dutch civil servants in 1898. In practice, however, it was pushed aside by the new rulers, who allowed themselves to be assisted by Moluccan government support staff or *bestuursassistenten* (BAs). In South New Guinea, where Tidore's influence had never been felt and the local world of the Papuans offered no point of departure at all, a form of direct rule was chosen out of absolute necessity. The rights to this area, which in 1848 for reasons relating to international law were assigned to the sultan, were bought in 1900 in return for a sum of six thousand Dutch guilders that was added to the treasury of the sultanate. By this time it was already clear that the East Indies government did not take Tidorese claims to the other parts of the island too seriously. For this

reason, it was formally documented in an agreement that the government would be free to take control of the administration at any given moment. In practice, there was hardly any difference between the way in which the different parts of New Guinea were administered. The Papuans did whatever they pleased, and when they did brush with this new authority which had been imposed upon them it was usually in the form of Dutch administrators and soldiers with their Moluccan assistants. The sultan of Tidore was indeed responsible for the budget and managing the financial coffers. However, in practice he had nothing to do with the actual proceedings and simply signed everything that his European superiors pushed in front of him. For many years after 1905, the sultanate was run by a committee of grandees of the Sultanate. On New Guinea, it was represented by a Tidorese prince, who is invariably described in Dutch sources as a shadowy figure with no influence. It is, however, important to know that his son, Zainal Abidin Alting, would become the new sultan of Tidore in 1944. In the final years before the war, he had his first professional experiences as *bestuursassistent* in the Sorong area. As sultan of Tidore he will have a key role to play in the next part of our story.

All in all, New Guinea was not an easy region in which to set up and administer colonial rule. There were countless disappointments. After spending four years in Marauke, Kroesen wrote a rather up-beat report. Certainly, the first few months had been difficult, but he had eventually managed to set something up a little while later. The coasts from the east to the west had been explored, boats had sailed through the estuaries, and expeditions had penetrated the interior. At any rate, the main objective of the exercise had been achieved, as the trips by the Marind to the British area had been stopped. Despite the language barriers, they had managed to establish friendly relations with the tribes they had visited. It went well, stated Kroesen, as long as one 'adopted a calm, patient and tactful approach, in order to overcome the fear and distrust of the natives'. A start could also be made with improving the economy through the arrival of a couple of trading vessels and the concentration of trade on Merauke. Shops and warehouses were built which gave the settlement an urban look. Copra was also collected to swap for iron implements, mats to lie on and textiles. The result of all of this was that, when the occupational force left in 1905, all the security services could be seamlessly taken over by the police. The actual work of government also got under way because the population spontaneously called upon the administration to intervene whenever there was a difference of opinion.[20]

Kroesen's successors likewise submitted reports that were confident and up-beat. This is how assistant resident R.L.A. Helwich concluded his hand-over report, which was intended for his successor in 1910, with the reassuring

thought that he 'had been charged with the stark yet pleasant task of felling tall trees and tempering the swamps', but that the time for planting and harvesting was approaching. At the Colonial Office in The Hague, these outpourings earned him a small note in the margin, stating that he had apparently been highly dedicated when carrying out his work.[21] All that could be coaxed out of his immediate successor, L.M.F. Plate, were some derisory sneers. Five years later the latter wrote that, when he began his position, practically nothing had been done in the area of implementing rule and that headhunting was still zealously being practised as far as the sea shores. He, on the other hand, had been the one who had set things right. He fiercely suppressed headhunting by using harsh punitive expeditions during which he, 'the Great Lord of Merauke', came in person to collect hundreds of freshly decapitated heads, punish those responsible, and burn their houses ('all the filthy shacks and hovels in which the skulls were found'). During one of these expeditions, 32 Marind had even died, but that—he reassured his readers—was exceptional. The number of victims was usually quite limited.

The result of these operations had been, in his opinion, that headhunting no longer took place on the coast in 1915 but that further inland the old ways still prevailed. It was impossible to catch the inhabitants: as soon as one approached a village, everyone fled. Meanwhile, the area that was controlled along the coast was expanded by stationing two extra civil servants there. Besides, Plate was not overly optimistic about the civilizing effect of the Dutch influence there. Trade was slow because the Marind did not require anything. Their forests provided them with everything they needed. Of course, the iron axes had certainly been welcome, but now that everyone had one there was no need for any more. Nor were textiles needed. A trouser market on the path leading into Merauke, where visiting Papuans could temporarily pick up such an item of clothing, was enough to maintain the decency of the town. For the rest, Plate had already reached the conclusion that, for reasons of hygiene, this attire was not recommended. The result was that there was absolutely no reason for the Marind-anim to supply sago to the traffickers. Neither material goods nor money held the slightest appeal for them.[22]

One of the key aspects of the civilization offensive of the administration and the Roman Catholic mission, which had also settled here in the meantime, was to persuade the inhabitants to give up their homes. The people used to live in separate male and female houses, which were set up in accordance with the old beliefs and rituals. The very fact that they existed at all ensured the continuity of the old ways of thinking. Both the Catholic and Protestant missions and the colonial administration wanted to bring the inhabitants together in larger groups, consisting of at least one hundred people, and place them in model

villages, where everyone would be placed neatly in separate houses for single families and where young people could be pressured into attending school. This is where the foundation would be laid for new virtues and a new morality. For the Papuans, this was an appalling idea. It represented a direct attack on their identity and customs and, besides that, it was impractical. Their sago gardens were scattered over a wide area and were hard to reach from the few new villages which were located far away from each other. Throughout the whole of New Guinea, this aspect of the civilization offensive was to remain a laborious exercise during the next few decades and one which could only be enforced successfully in a few populated areas.

Another source of anxiety for the new administrators in Merauke was that, soon after their arrival, the inhabitants suffered badly from a sexually transmitted disease (granuloma inguinale). It was probably introduced by bird hunters; Chinese, Moluccan and European adventurers who flocked there to hunt the birds of paradise, whose feathers were used for many years to create beautiful plumage on ladies' hats in Europe and America. The spread of the disease was aggravated even more by the exuberant sexual habits of the inhabitants, whereby young women were made available to many men and feasts could easily turn into events of mass copulation. The disease quickly took hold and the administration recorded a sharp fall in the number of inhabitants, particularly in the Marindanim area. In Plate's view, this was not necessarily a negative development. If this continued in the same vein, the Marind would die out within a couple of decades, and in so doing share the fate of the original inhabitants of nearby Australia. The result would be that the sago yield could then be brought under the supervision of the Europeans, which would be more beneficial for the region's economic development. This was actually a serious consideration for Plate, although he understood at the time that it would not be appreciated by everyone. At any rate, it was in direct conflict with the civilization offensive which the Netherlands had taken upon itself under the banner of ethical politics. For this reason, he noted candidly, one had to continue along the road upon which one had originally embarked, even if it clashed with one's better judgement.

What was important was that the seven thousand Marind who came under Plate's administration in 1915 no longer ran away as soon as a civil servant and his henchmen came into sight. This made them accessible for the Catholic missionaries and, possibly also, for contributing taxes, forced labour and other demands of civilization. All this would only be effective once control had also been established further inland. It was clear to Plate that intense control was not yet possible. The task of a government official, according to this ambitious administrator, was of a purely didactic nature. It was about 'turning Wild Creatures into Men'.[23]

Following these lines, modest but undeniable advances were made in subsequent years in South New Guinea. The expansion of the administered area went rather slowly and the administrative set-up remained modest. Disappointingly, the sago exports, which had initially been the main focus of attention, amounted to very little. The outpost was therefore reduced to a *controleur*'s office after 1920. Nevertheless, two district officers of lower rank were stationed inland as well and so there was continuous contact with the inhabitants. In addition to this, the administration and Catholic missionaries threw themselves into combatting the sexually transmitted diseases. Vaccination campaigns were organized, a network of support hospitals was set up in the countryside around Merauke, and there were enforced changes to the local inhabitants' lifestyle and housing arrangements. Building houses, abolishing dancing parties and setting up schools for young people were the main focus of both the administration and the mission. By 1934, the disease had practically vanished.[24] Nevertheless, sometimes government officials were plagued by nagging doubts. Dr Jan van Baal, who was the *controleur* in Merauke at that time, was painfully aware of what had been taken away from the people. In his opinion, the arrival of the Dutch administrators had been a disaster for the Marind. They had lost the essence of their existence and what they had received in return for this was still of questionable worth.[25] In later years too, the Marind remained a self-sufficient and inaccessible group. It would seem that the transition to the new era was more difficult for them than for the other inhabitants of New Guinea, although it is of course impossible to confirm this beyond any doubt.

As a matter of fact, the Marind not only lost their traditional culture, but also their dominance over the surrounding tribes. For the latter, this was a plus point. This applied in particular to the inhabitants of the Frederik-Hendrik Island, a desolate swamp region where many fled out of fear of the murderous Marind. One can therefore ask whether Van Baal's judgement applies to the entire region. The Dutch brought many things that the inhabitants did not understand or did not want. On the other hand, the personal safety of every individual increased significantly in the areas that were administered by the Dutch, which meant a fundamental change in living conditions. The new religion brought, slowly but surely, another outlook on life, the threat of animistic ideas diminished, diseases were treated effectively and the introduction of iron implements saved having to do laborious work with the stone axe. Eventually, these issues would go on to influence the division of roles between men and women, and thus the character of society. The process of acculturation had begun and could no longer be stopped.

This was the situation in South New Guinea which, according to the experiences of all the civil servants who had been stationed there, was a difficult region. In principle, it was no different in the two other divisions, although the results there were more clearly visible in a shorter space of time. In the division of West New Guinea, attention was initially focused exclusively on the Onin peninsular. The influence of the administration emanated from here and spread through the wider region around the MacCluer Gulf. Here too, the emphasis was initially on the military patrols. It was twenty years after the post had been established on Fakfak that the assistant resident who was taking up his position at that time was able to confirm once and for all that the 'iron era' of continous patrols and expeditions had ended. The hongi raids had stopped, the interior had been completely charted and a certain degree of peace and order had been created in the area around the administrative centres. The problem was still how to get to grips with building a functioning administration. It was tricky to get out of this without falling back on the rajas who were already present, dozens of whom resided in this region. They were seen by the Dutch administration as parasitic tyrants, whom one nevertheless had to take into account, because they stood out above the rest of the population, due to their status and level of development. Through their knowledge of the Malay language, they could serve as intermediaries. The upper echelon consisted of the rajas of Ati-Ati, Fategar, Namatotti, Rumbati, Arguni, Sekar and Patipi. In addition to this, there were a number of rajas who depended on the above for their own authority. They were appointed by the rajas or by the Dutch administration with the title *raja commissie*. The ruler from Kaimana on the South Coast was one of them.

It was impossible to sidestep all these title holders, yet there was often a complete lack of trust between them and the Dutch and, in the opinion of the latter, between the former and the local inhabitants. Already in 1908, an end was made to the trading monopoly they had in their region. The trick now was to exercise some influence over them by monitoring them closely, systematizing their positions and powers and, in questions regarding appointments, to press for the favourites of the government. The tendency was therefore one of gradually marginalizing them, and then transforming those officials who were kept on into standard, salaried civil servants. As a result of this, the administration gradually came into the hands of Dutch civil servants and their Moluccan assistants. The assistant resident of this region was supported roundabout 1920 by two Dutch civil servants who held the rank of *gezaghebber*, a district officer of comparable rank but without the qualifications of a *controleur*. One of them was directly accountable to the assistant resident in Fakfak, while his colleague was sent off to Babo. They were in charge of Moluccan assistants

in Kaimana, Kokas, Inanwatan and Misool. The whole set-up was supported by a police force made up of 160 men armed with carbines. According to the assistant resident, it was too small a force to control this extensive region effectively, but he had no other option except to work with it. Actually, we can say very little about the effectiveness of the administration in this area that was so close to the Moluccas. One could measure this by examining the extent to which it was able to extract taxes, but no data are available on the subject. What we do know with certainty is that there were about twelve hundred so-called government subjects residing in this area, and that most of them originally came from the Moluccas. In addition, an unknown number of Chinese and Arabs also lived there.[26]

Let us now shift our attention to North New Guinea, a region that had already established early contact with the rest of the archipelago through the Tidorese *hongi* and the Biak raiders, traders and blacksmiths. The Dutch also had a long history of contacts in this region, as is already evident from the voyage of the Geelvink. When the DEIC fell into decline, private traders took over its role. The first Protestant missionaries arrived here in 1855 and set about proselytizing their religion from Manokwari. Yet this did not mean that the Dutch drive to civilize the local inhabitants made much progress instantly, after the administration established itself in the area almost half a century later. Certainly, the ambition was there, as might be read from the administrative set-up they had in mind. At the beginning of the 1920s, when his colleagues in West and South New Guinea only had a few district officers with the rank of *controleur* at their disposal, the assistant resident in Manokwari could boast of seven such officials, on paper at least; on paper, because the only posts occupied were those in Sorong, Manokwari, Hollandia and the Schouten islands (Bosnik). Assistant resident Krom, who wrote his final hand-over report for his successor in 1924,[27] had no illusions about the reach of his authority. It extended as far as the islands and part of the coastal area, but he knew very little about the inland territories. The few reports that had been compiled stated that headhunting was still being practised everywhere. There was a sharp contrast between the more or less pacified coastal areas and the interior. This was even the case on the relatively small island of Biak, where during his term of office harsh measures were needed to suppress the ongoing headhunting raids. The coast was calm but the old practices still continued further inland. In actual fact, there was anything but peace and tranquillity in some of the coastal areas as well, particularly in the case of the Waropen in the eastern coastal area of Geelvink Bay.

In these parts the situation was further complicated by the activities of the bird hunters who were active in the area. These were mainly traders from

Ternate and adjacent areas, who used Papuans to hunt for them and then proceeded to give them the arms and ammunition they required. The reward for this was a bit of money, some beads and tobacco. The administration was not in favour of this and opposed it as best it could. Not only did this result in weapons being circulated and all the associated risks that this implied, but it also dislocated family life as the men were often absent for weeks at a time. An additional complication was that these foreigners or *amberi*, for the sake of the hunt and the trade associated with it, cultivated contacts with selected tribal chiefs, who as a result gained a dominant position over their neighbours. When the Protestant missionary, D.C.A. Bout visited the Waropen coast in 1925, he reported that those in charge of the larger *kampungs* carried out slave raids on a massive scale among the population of the smaller settlements. The freedom of these prisoners could be bought back with tobacco, sago and liquor. As these goods had to be bought in from the foreign traders on the coast, the interests of both these chiefs and the amberis became closely intertwined, which was definitely not beneficial for the local inhabitants. In Bout's view, the vast majority of the population would welcome a more active involvement by the administration. This is exactly what happened. Afterwards, this inhospitable region began being visited more regularly by the Protestant missionaries and local teachers (gurus) from the Utrecht Missionary Association from its outpost on Serui, which was located on the nearby island of Japen.[28]

Despite the sombre remarks that feature regularly in government reports, significant progress was made in only a few decades throughout the Dutch governed parts of New Guinea. By the end of the 1930s, a basic system of government had been installed in most places along the coast. A very effective device was the formation of relatively small-scale local resorts or *districts*, through which Moluccan assistant administrators were given their own areas of authority. Contacts were intensified through regular patrols from the larger administrative centres. This was especially true in West and North New Guinea. A survey of government and police personnel from 1938[29] reveals that, during that time, there were 15 Dutchmen and approximately 60 Moluccan government officials stationed on the Dutch part of the island, who depended upon more than 400 field officers and government police, supported by 200 police officers from the district police force. Only the latter were Papuans who had undergone a brief training course on Ambon; the rest came from the Netherlands and Indonesia, primarily the Moluccas.

The above survey also reveals that South New Guinea's place in the government hierarchy on the island had slid right down since the days of Kroesen. It had lost its status as an independent *afdeling* (division) and was now changed to an

onderafdeling (sub-division) of Tual (the Key islands), governed by a Dutch *controleur*. The weak government set-up and the relatively strong presence of the army and the police show that the emphasis here was still on patrols. The participation of the Papuan inhabitants was also much less than in the North, which can be ascertained from the absence of the district police force. The most striking acquisition was the establishment of an outpost in Upper Digul, where an internment camp had been built in 1927 for thousands of exiles who had been brought there on the orders of the Governor General, following communist uprisings on Java and Sumatra. This location on the river Digul, which was called Tanah Merah, was specially selected because it was the most isolated place in the whole of the Netherlands East Indies. The fact that it was surrounded by hundreds of kilometres of impassable jungle and malaria-infested swamps and populated by tribes who had little or no contact with the administration, made it the ideal location. Whoever ran away did not have the slightest chance of reaching the coast alive. That does not mean that the place was a death-trap. It was a rigidly ordered society with ranks and stations, in which 'well-meaning individuals' were given the freedom of movement they needed and were allowed to arrange for their wives and children to be brought over. Nutrition and healthcare were of a reasonable standard. The most difficult things to cope with were the years of separation and the absence of any clear guidelines to end this enforced seclusion. People were stuck in Upper Digul not on the basis of any legal verdict, but as the result of a government measure that could be issued or withdrawn arbitrarily.[30]

One consequence of setting up this place of exile was that the administration could use it to look for further contacts with the interior. Up until then, the inhabitants of this area, particularly the Muju, had come into contact with the outside world via the bird hunters. Papuans who had been hired as helpers had visited Merauke and dozens of them had also ventured even further into the archipelago as far as Ambon and Macassar. These worldy-wise and linguistically adept individuals often managed to secure a position for themselves as village heads. In addition to this, the first missionaries also penetrated into this area during the 1920s. With the establishment of the outpost in Tanah Merah, these contacts could be expanded further. To that end, the commander of the military detachment in Tanah Merah was appointed as interim *controleur*. After this, military patrols began travelling back and forth throughout the area, clamping down heavily on the frequent bouts of headhunting that were still commonplace. In 1935, a government post was established in Ninati (later transferred to Mindiptana), and staffed by a government assistant and a few policemen. This led to scores of larger villages being formed, each one of which was governed by an appointed village head, who could avail himself of all the equipment that the mission could supply.[31]

On the subject of European government officials, the 1938 set-up does not differ that much from the way it was around the 1920s. However, the expansion of the number of districts on the next level, which were mainly governed by Moluccan officials, is certainly striking. The number of these posts had risen fast after the appointment of the energetic B.J. Haga as *resident* of the Moluccas in 1935. Yet the broader expansion can be read from a later overview that shows the posts in Babo (1920), Muting (1924), Dempta (1926), Hirai (1932), Sausapor and Kimaam (1937), Kebar (1938), Wareni (1939) and Hattam (1940).[32] The establishment of outposts in the Kebar (mid-Bird's Head) and the Wissel Lakes also merits attention. Nine infantry brigades were quartered in the middle of Bird's Head and Manokwari, each one with the strength of twenty men. By New Guinean standards, they were a force to be reckoned with and a sign that the administration was now actively penetrating the interior. Closer acquaintance with these rather densely populated areas also drove up estimates of the total number of inhabitants living in the Dutch part of New Guinea. In the 1930 census, the figure of 320,000 Papuans was settled on for the entire area.[33] Ten to fifteen years later one was gradually beginning to conclude that a figure of one million was probably closer to the mark.

This is how, during the years leading up to the Second World War, New Guinea was explored bit by bit and gradually brought under control. When war did break out, the process was still far from complete. Less than half the area had been visited with any regularity by the civil service, the military or the police; the rest was still largely unknown. It was a far flung corner of the world, where each year thousands of heads were still being severed and cannibalism was the norm in many areas. Government interference was minimal and incomparable with the intensity with which it was carried out on Java and most of the other parts of the Indonesian Archipelago. Between 1919 and 1922, the region had been a separate residency for a while with Manokwari as its principal town. Most of those involved were of the opinion that this was overly ambitious and so the island was brought once again under the authority of the resident of the Moluccas. Somewhat later, Javan local and regional councils were introduced, which provided for some form of civil participation in the runnning of the administration. Linked to this, midway through the 1930s, reforms also took place on the islands outside Java, the so-called Outer Provinces or *Buitengewesten* of the Netherlands Indies. The first steps were taken towards creating island provinces with a certain degree of autonomy and self-governance, which would increase in time. One of these provinces was to include the entire eastern part of the Archipelago under the name of the *Gouvernement van de Grote Oost*, or 'Government of the Great Eastern Territory', to be governed from Macassar.

This met with resistance from the resident of the Moluccas, B.J. Haga, who lobbied for his region to be elevated to the status of a separate provincial government in itself. He believed that the interests of the primitive area of New Guinea would be better represented within this smaller Government of the Moluccas, administered from Ambon.

The planning staff at the Department of the Interior in Batavia thought otherwise and stuck to its own plans.[34] In 1936, the residency of the Moluccas, now including New Guinea, was made part of the newly formed Government of the Great Eastern Territory, as a result of which many matters could now be dealt with in Macassar. It was a development that not only was against the wishes of Governor Haga, but also clashed with the ideas that prevailed in the right wing of the *Volksraad* or People's Council, the proto-parliament of the Netherlands East Indies. There was continuous speculation here about New Guinea becoming a separate colony of the Netherlands, apart from the Netherlands East Indies itself. We will come back to this later. For now, it is important to conclude that these ideas were far removed from government practice and that these ambitions could be pushed to one side by the Batavia authorities without much fuss. New Guinea did not become an independent colony of anywhere but instead, through the resident in Ambon and the governor in Macassar, remained loosely tied to the government in Batavia. In addition to this, the island still retained its now nearly completely ineffective link with Tidore. Moreover, the funds set aside for it in the yearly Indies budgets were very limited. So, seen from an administrative perspective, New Guinea was an underdeveloped part of the East Indies state. This special feature was acknowledged in 1937 by Governor General Van Starkenborgh when he granted permission for East Indies law and jurisdiction to be applied flexibly in the region.[35] This proved Haga to have been right after all and it was now acknowledged at the central government level that many of these regulations were unsuitable for this primitive and still only partially explored region.

The Dutch part of New Guinea stood out in many respects from the rest of the Netherlands East Indies. On the other hand, it bore a strong resemblance to the eastern part of the island as far as the nature and physical stature of the local inhabitants were concerned. After the First World War ended, the area that had belonged to Germany became a British mandated territory of the League of Nations. In 1949, the governance of this mandated territory was merged with that of the older British colony of Papua. Together they were to form the Territory of Papua and New Guinea (TPNG). From the beginning both areas were governed by Australia in the name of the British. The situation there was in many respects different from the Dutch part, as large sections of the interior

were suitable for human habitation and it seemed relatively easy to prospect for gold. There was also a ready supply of adventurers from the motherland, Australia, who were prepared to try their luck here. By the 1930s, the mining industry was already quite well developed.

From an administrative perspective, the similarities were more striking than the differences. As in the Dutch part, these territories too were only administered elementarily, with a small number of Europeans organizing matters concerning the Papuans. Yet even in this respect, there were a few striking differences. The first was that John Hubert Plunkett Murray who had already arrived in British New Guinea (Papua) in 1904, governed the area in his capacity as governor from 1907 right up until the Second World War. This translated into a greater degree of continuity than existed in the Dutch part. It is also important that Murray put forward ideas which he later went on to implement and that these were viewed with interest, both then and later, by civil servants from the Dutch area. The basic premise was that no external workforce other than the Australians could be allowed entry. This was a local version of White Australia politics which was being implemented in the motherland. It had important repercussions with regard to the issue of employing indigenous people. Unlike the situation in the Dutch part, where Moluccan civil servants occupied lower and mid-level positions in both the government and police force, here one had to call upon the Papuans in person. As a result, a Royal Papuan Constabulary quickly evolved and played a more important role than the Papuan District Police Force on the other side of the 141st meridian. Afterwards, experiments with local advisory councils were carried out. Although at the time this was more in theory than in practice and the initiative remained completely in the hands of the, for the most part only elementarily trained, Australian 'patrol officers', it nevertheless promised to be an interesting form of modern colonial administration, fine-tuned to the needs of primitive regions.[36]

Other than this, Dutch interest in their eastern neighbours remained purely platonic. Both territories were linked directly to their respective metropolitan powers through administrative channels. This situation gave no scope at all for discussions at the local level and there was, as yet, no need for direct discussions via the governments in London and The Hague.

The Protestant and Catholic Missions

In both halves of the island, it was not only the colonial administration which played an important role, but the Protestant and Catholic missions too. The Dutch part was further ahead in this respect in that the first Protestant missionaries had already settled there as early as 1855. This action was spearheaded

from 1862 by the Protestant Utrecht Missionary Society (*Utrechtsche Zendings Vereeniging*, UZV), whose members included people such as the philanthropic clergyman O.G. Heldring and his professional associate, Nicolaas Beets. The latter had won acclaim in his youth with a collection of amusing parodies on student life. When he became established as a clergyman he was appointed Poet Laureate, in which capacity he did not shy away from writing edifying verses about important events in history. On the occasion of this initiative he promptly delivered a text illustrating how the boggy swamps and gloomy forests of this far-away island would finally see the light of the Gospel.

The first Protestant missionary activities on New Guinea were initiated by a clergyman from Berlin called Gossner, who was inspired by the notion of 'working missionaries'. The idea was for ordinary men and women to settle down among the local inhabitants. They would have to share in the work and use this to try to cultivate a position of trust within the community. The formula might have been successful in the working class districts of European cities, but it was not quite as appropriate for New Guinea's sago-based economies. It soon became clear that a few adjustments would be necessary. The two missionaries, Carl Ottow and Johan Geissler, who settled on the tiny island of Mansinam in 1855, close to what was later to become Manokwari, thought it wise to set themselves up as merchant traders. The local inhabitants were familiar with this phenomenon, at least. Missionary-traders were quickly followed by missionary-farmers. The UZV missionaries considered education to be of paramount importance and the missionaries they sent abroad had been specially trained for this. Scores of these people were sent overseas from that time on. They included a father and son (J.L. and F.J.F.) van Hasselt, who between them were active in this area for almost sixty consecutive years (from 1863 until 1931). Despite all their attempts to fit in, these missionaries were besieged by problems associated with rampant illnesses, huge distances and a mutual lack of understanding. For many of them, their adventure ended in some form of personal tragedy. The church community grew painfully slowly at first. When the administration established itself in Manokwari in 1898, no more than 260 Papuans from the area had been converted to Christianity. While their presence was undoubtedly a boon for the new administration, it did not mean that the coast was safe by any means. It was only when the administration was more firmly established that the missionary work was given an extra impetus. In the proceeding years, it expanded its area of activity to the Wandamen coast, the islands in Geelvink Bay (particularly Biak and Japen), Hollandia and the MacCluer Gulf. Windesi in the throat of the Bird's Head evolved into an important missionary centre.[38] In 1938, the number of Protestant christians had risen to 60,000 and continued to grow at an exponential rate. Estimates for 1942 set the figure at 130,000![39]

This growth mainly occured in correlation with the expansion of the administration. The missionaries themselves attributed the slow start to the lengthy time it took for the seed of Evangelism to finally put down roots in this exceptionally unusual soil. The explanation for the subsequent expansion was sought in the enthusiasm of the Biak and Numforese people for travel. They had ensured that news about the mission's activities was disseminated widely, far beyond the places where they had settled. Likewise, the significance of the medical care provided by the missionaries should also not be underestimated. In 1908, the efficacy of a vaccination campaign to combat a smallpox epidemic made a huge impression. It was also very important, in addition to this, that by setting up an administration it was now possible to attract teachers and evangelists from the Moluccas and the Minahassa. Not only could these people bridge the gap with Papuan society more easily, but there were also vast numbers of them available. Moreover, education was funded by the government. In this way, missionary work and activities related to education could be organized on a larger scale. All sizeable villages were provided with a schoolmaster or *guru*, which was in itself a powerful motive for the smaller communities to merge together so that they could become larger units. All these things ran parallel with what we have already noticed about the administrative service. Due to the presence of these gurus, New Guinea could benefit from a development that had already been set in motion several generations earlier on the Moluccas and in the Minahassa. This was not all. An important milestone was reached in 1924 with the foundation of a training college for Papuan schoolmasters in Miei which was soon to flourish under the leadership of I.S. Kijne, an energetic and competent educationalist. Each year, several hundred young Papuans followed this vocational training, through which the seed was planted for the creation of an elite group that would be able to look beyond the borders of the tribe. During the years preceding the war, its first students were already playing an active role in both educational and missionary work.

The Roman Catholic mission was the first to make an appearance on the south coast. This was a direct outcome of the fact that a Catholic mission post had been stationed on Tual, the principal town of the Kei islands, as far back as 1882. It served as a natural base for the work on New Guinea. A first attempt at this was carried out by the Jesuit priest Le Cocq d'Armandville, who has been described as a romantic, chivalrous character. He threw himself into his work with extraordinary zeal, and is reported to have succeeded in baptizing 64 people on this coast within only a few days of arriving there. Despite this, his expedition to the Fakfak area was not a success. He died in April 1895, within less than one year of arriving there; capsized with his prau, beaten to death by the local inhabitants or a mixture of both: opinions are divided on this.[40]

A more well-prepared attempt was made in 1905, shortly after the administration had established itself in Merauke. Before the first missionaries set off, a New Guinea prefecture was created which would also include the Catholic mission on the Kei islands. The Dutch branch of the Congregation of the Holy Heart (*Mission Sacré Coeur*, MSC), which operated from Tilburg in the Netherlands, was given the task of carrying out Catholic missionary work in this area.[41]

Despite receiving the support of the local administration in Merauke and the leadership of the energetic prefect, Father M. Neyens, this attempt initially had little impact on the Marind. Their experiences were the same as those of the UZV in Manokwari. During the first few decades, these foreign guests were unable to gain any foothold at all. Seemingly, the presence of the administration alone was not sufficient argument for the Papuans to convert to a new religion, and a lengthy incubation period was necessary. When he left in 1915, Neyens could point to a significant rise in the number of Catholics on the Kei islands and Tanimbar, but on New Guinea the result was extremely poor. At the time, there were stations (missionary posts) in the two locations on the south coast where the administration had established itself: Merauke and Okaba. Together, they could account for approximately one-hundred-and-fifty baptisms of people who were on the point of dying (*in articulis mortis*). The much greater headway that was made on Kei was attributed to the local population being very responsive to this new religion because it corresponded with their own customs and religious ideas. A form of monotheism existed here, while the norms and values were highly compatible with those of the Ten Commandments. In the eyes of the Catholic missionaries, the Alfur was a sort of would-be Christian. This was certainly not the case with the Marind, however.

It was only in the 1920s that the work of the Catholic mission finally began to develop. It extended its area of activity with settlements on the desolate Frederik-Hendrik Island and along the banks of the major rivers of the Southern coast, including the Muju, Digul and the Utumbuwu (Agatz.). Alongside this, outposts were also established in the Mimika region on the west coast of New Guinea, while after 1935 the Wissel Lakes area also came within its reach. At the end of the 1930s, there were approximately 11,000 Catholics on New Guinea, spread over the following areas:

South New Guinea	4,707
Mimika	4,187
Fakfak	1,468
Upper Digul	648
Manokwari	232[42]

Even if one takes into account that the growth of the last three posts mentioned above can be attributed primarily to the newcomers who came from outside New Guinea, nevertheless these figures still show a sharp rise in the number of converts compared to the first two decades of the century.

Without doubt, one can also identify a link between this turnaround and the increase in government activity. As mentioned already, from the end of the 1920s, the administration set up a number of posts in the southern territories, in part due to the internment camp being built on the Upper Digul River. Another important point to stress here is that after 1920 the administration initiated more activities to protect the Marind from extinction. This process had been going on for several decades and was mainly put down to the spread of sexually transmitted diseases, although the severe spread of the Spanish flu that affected the whole of New Guinea around 1920 definitely helped to strengthen this process further. In consultation with Governor General D. Fock, a plan was drawn up in which the Catholic mission was allocated an important role. This consisted first and foremost of a systematic vaccination campaign. Just as in the case of the Protestant missionary areas, here too an effective campaign to combat disease formed a powerful motive to convert to a new religion. In addition, the changing style of the administration also played a role. Up until then, the administration, which had been raised in the tradition of respecting local customary law, had been very reluctant to meddle in the day-to-day habits of the local people. This had also limited the potential of the missions. Now the tables had been turned and, with support from the strong arm of the government, the mission could now attack the lifestyle in the separate male and female households which it had abhorred for so long. The inhabitants of the coastal area were forced to move into model villages, where they had to live in family units. The mission was delighted with this operation and, indeed, they were now able to win many converts.

One significant contributory factor was undoubtedly the dynamic figure of Monseigneur J. Aerts, Apostolic Vicar in Langgur, who arrived on the scene shortly after 1920. One of the key pillars of his policy was that the Catholic missionaries in his diocese should adopt a flexible approach towards the phenomen of conversion. After all, Rome was not built in a day. He believed that one should be content with a nominal conversion rate today and leave the rest to future generations.[43] This approach was in sharp contrast to the less compromising piety of the Utrecht Missionary Society (UZV), which generally made high demands before accepting a conversion and turning it into a baptism. It can be noted here that, in later years, the Protestant side also mixed a little water with the wine as far as this was concerned. This did not just take place on the grounds of a gradual increase in understanding the complexity of

the acculturation process. The mounting rivalry between the Protestants and Catholics also played a role, but more about that later. One other important explanation for the Catholic mission's success in south New Guinea after 1920 is that, here too, from that time onwards it was possible to have Moluccan staff, especially ones from the Kei Islands. These Catholic gurus were trained at the residential school in Langgur, and it was precisely during these years that the first batches of graduate students became available for work on New Guinea. The availability of these gurus at this later stage helps to explain the different phases of development between the Protestants and Catholics. After this, the latter were slowly able to catch up.

The presence of gurus and assistant administrators either from Ambon and the Minahassa or from the Kei Islands was the first obvious difference between the Protestant and Catholic parts of New Guinea. Alongside this, the Protestant missionary movement also left its stamp in the form of biblical Christian names. Both the officials of the government and the missionaries only got the wind in their sails after a critical mass of local people had acquired sufficient affinity with their new working environment to be able to sustain themselves there. For both organizational structures, no matter how far they differed in the way they operated and their goals, training local staff was of paramount importance. Besides, the use of Moluccan staff members effectively contributed to diminishing the differences in approach between the Protestant and Catholic missions. The East Indonesian civil servants and gurus, who themselves had only become acquainted with the Christian faith and western civilization one or two generations earlier, carried a lot more of the magical philosophy of their pupils around with them in their mental baggage. On the one hand, it made contact much easier. On the other, it also led to irritation and the tendency to distance themselves from their pupils. In general, they had little patience with them. They made it a habit of constantly uttering condescending comments such as *Papua bodoh*, stupid Papuan, and the sentiment behind it influenced their behaviour. The feelings of irritation were mutual and would eventually have wider implications.

For the time being, as far as the Dutch were concerned, the advantages of involving the East-Indonesian forces far outweighed the disadvantages. Using local staff was one of the core principles of modern colonial government. Having the right level of education was a precondition for being successfully involved. Since the establishment of special schools for children of chiefs in the nineteenth century, a system of state education had evolved in the Netherlands East Indies, ranging from basic village schools through to a number of more developed forms of primary education, and eventually a small number of secondary and tertiary educational institutions.

Alongside this type of education, which was provided directly by the government, the possibility of obtaining government funding for private education also existed. This stemmed from the system that had developed in the Netherlands during the nineteenth century of putting state funds at the disposal of the different church demoninations who wanted to provide education for their children themselves. This door was also open for those who resided in the overseas territories. Aside from the state schools, there were also Protestant and Catholic state-subsidized educational institutions in the Netherlands East Indies. In 1937, the modernist Islamic association called Mohammadijah requested and received funding for the very first time for a secondary school it had set up itself.[44] Funding was given on condition that the education provided fulfilled the quality criteria set by the government. For a primitive region such as New Guinea, this was a problem. The level of education that was given here was equivalent to the simplest form of elementary education in the villages where, according to the rules, part of the costs had to be paid by the community itself. The rules therefore had to be bent, which regularly resulted in heated discussions.

The overriding argument to give a region such as New Guinea priority for special education was a cultural one. In the Muslim areas of Indonesia, state education was sufficient because this religion, in the eyes of the Dutch government, provided enough elements from which a modern society could be built. The animist pantheon of New Guinea definitely did not. Islam had not penetrated further than a couple of places along the coast here. It was also clear that the Dutch government was certainly not too keen about the idea of this particular faith expanding, although opinions did vary on this. Many Dutch people were concerned about allowing Protestant and Catholic missions to venture into Muslim areas, as they feared the resulting competition. This was not an issue in New Guinea. There was real potential for setting up a new society rooted in Christianity here. Catholic and Protestant missions had been present in these areas from the outset and felt entitled to receive support for the education they were providing.

This became a reality from 1898. A few state schools were eventually set up, but these remained exceptions to the rule. They were intended primarily for the children of civil servants who had come from abroad. For Papuan youngsters, special education became the designated path. As soon as the administration had established itself, the Protestant mission in North New Guinea could start sending the gurus over from Ambon. The Catholic mission in the South followed suit as soon as the residential school in Langgur supplied the first batch of school teachers. Of course, this required a certain degree of flexibility with the funding regulations, but all parties concerned managed to live with this. The

education they provided was limited to a form of popular education that took three years to complete. In practice, a double course of six years was more likely to be the rule rather than the exception, as the gurus tended to hold onto the children far longer in order to keep a tight grip on their upbringing. In 1938, a new funding regulation addressed the wish for a simpler form of education, which was cherished by the Catholic mission in particular. They allowed so-called *beschavingsscholen* (acculturative schools) to be funded, where less attention was paid to intellectual requirements than to social attributes. At the beginning of the Second World War, a substantial expansion had taken place in education in those regions that had been brought under the auspices of the administration. The quality had also improved. In the area where the Protestant mission was active on the north coast, 270 schools were created with a total of 17,300 pupils. All of these schools followed the standard model for popular education, as used in other parts of the Dutch East Indies. The education that was given in New Guinea did not progress any further than the first three classes. On the South and West coast, as far as this came within the reach of the Catholic missionaries, there were only acculturative schools. The Catholic mission ran 151 schools there. In addition, there were another 16 schools that belonged to the *Molukse Protestantse Kerk* (Moluccan Protestant Church—MPK) and the mission attached to it.[45] The different set-up between Catholic and Protestant education, and most probably also the difference in openness to Western influence by the inhabitants of North and South New Guinea, was reflected in the ratio between standard schools and acculturative schools. The only type of further education at that time was provided by the residential guru training in Miei run by Kijne, which offered a follow-up course of three or four years.

To round off this part, we have to say a word about the sensitive matter of the divison of the spheres of influence between the Catholics and the Protestants. Under the DEIC, the Protestant Church, the *Indische Kerk* for short, had been the official church within its territory. However, when the DEIC's monopoly came to an end in 1800, there was room for other faiths. In that very same year a vicariate apostolic was established in Batavia by the Catholics. Nevertheless, the latter continued to linger on the periphery of what was a predominantly Protestant colonial context. The Catholic presence grew stronger from the beginning of the twentieth century with the steady influx of Dutch people, many of whom belonged in part to other layers of society than was previously the case. The ongoing process of Catholic emancipation in the Netherlands itself produced greater assertiveness in this group, and the foundation of the New Guinea prefecture was one of the ways in which this was outwardly expressed. This development was viewed with suspicion by the colonial rulers.

There was anxiety about the possibility of tensions within the Dutch community. This was not unfounded, given the rather competitive relations within the Netherlands itself at the time.

Entry to the Netherlands Indies for missionary organizations was arranged through article 123 of the Government Regulations and upheld in article 177 of the general revision of 1925, officially documented as the *Wet op de Indische Staatsinrichting*. Against this backdrop, a lot was left to the discretion of the administration. Viewed from this perspective, more missions working within a given territory was not a desirable option, because it was considered to be ineffective and damaging for European prestige. Providing for some territorial division therefore appeared to be the appropriate solution. In 1912, this was arranged in greater detail in New Guinea, whereby a line running from east to west that went through the Central Highlands would become the dividing line between the Catholic and Protestant spheres of influence.

Although this arrangement was wholly appropriate given the circumstances at the time, it later turned out to be highly unsatisfactory for the Catholics. It threatened to condemn them permanently to the rugged inland area of South New Guinea where, it was becoming increasingly clear, the island's future would not lie. From 1920, the Catholic mission looked as if it was going to pull out. Their eye fell upon the area of Fakfak that bordered with the Catholic mission, but where the Protestants in the meantime had firmly established themselves. They used the rather feeble activities of Father Le Cocq d' Armanville in these parts as an argument to advance his work in this area. This resulted in the Catholics lobbying in The Hague to get rid of the existing regulation and allow complete freedom in this matter. Now, indeed, the regulation of 1912 clashed with the principle of freedom of religious expression, which was embedded in the Netherlands Constitution, so the government had to accept this claim. In 1928, a conference was held on Ambon between representatives of the Catholic and Protestant missions under the watchful eye of the administration. A 'gentleman's agreement' was reached, through which it was no longer necessary to obtain prior permission from the government in order to set up a missionary post, although it did contain a pledge by both parties to respect each other's interests. As might be expected, this regulation resulted in a race in which the primary objective was to occupy as large an area as possible without having to bother about whether or not the higher interests of the conversion campaign would be damaged by this.

The new agreement immediately led to a Roman Catholic Station of the Cross being established in Fakfak, which came as no surprise in light of its previous history which we have described earlier. When the richly populated areas around the Wissel Lakes were discovered, a fresh campaign was initiated from

here. The first priests entered the area that same year. Conversely, the Protestants now turned their attention to the south. This applied in particular to the *Molukse Protestantse Kerk* (MPK), which used to be part of the *Indische Kerk*, and which was founded in 1934 within the framework of a policy to make Indonesian Churches independent. The argument for this jump to the south was that there was a small Moluccan community of government officials and civilians located in Merauke which was entitled to spiritual guidance. Once it had crossed the borderline, the MPK, to the great indignation of the Catholics, carried out missionary work here too.

Lifting the ban on twin missions resulted in increased tensions. In the post-war period the situation became even more complicated with the arrival of American missionary societies. Yet, it did not end in disorder. Despite the inevitable rivalry that ensued, the parties successfully managed to recognize their mutual rights and, in so doing, preserve a modus vivendi. In the end, both parties had a far larger area to practise in than they could actually cope with.[46]

The '*mise en valeur*': business and colonists

As we have seen, New Guinea was brought under government rule primarily for reasons relating to international law. Securing the eastern border of the Netherlands East Indies was the driving force behind setting up posts in Manokwari, Fakfak and Merauke. The religious factor, or in broader terms, the realization that one was on a mission to effectively bring about civilization, also played a role. The Protestant mission got under way before the administration had been set up, but its presence mobilized the move towards government action. This two-way stimulus would continue to play a role in the further development of the island. And then there was the economic factor. Although it is true that this driving force behind the colonial adventure did not play a major role in New Guinea, nevertheless it cannot be ignored completely. After the departure of the DEIC, independent merchants settled in these parts. A lot of trading took place from Ternate in particular, where beads and trinkets were exchanged for various tropical products. The Van Duivenbode shipping company, which was based there, played a key role in these activities. In the mid-nineteenth century it had a fleet of six modern equipped schooners. In addition to this, some fishing was carried out by European and American ships, of which diving for pearls was probably the most important branch of business.[47] In 1891, the KPM opened a monthly connection with the islands' most prominent anchorages. The ships transported all kinds of merchants, which helped the business of hunting for birds of paradise to flourish even more. Protecting this shipping traffic and trade was also one of the reasons for the

government to start intervening more firmly with the course of events on the island.

By the time it had reached this stage, the major Western companies were also expressing an interest. The scientific expeditions referred to earlier not only researched the perpetual snow of the mountain peaks, but also possibilities for mining and agriculture. Oil exploration was the quickest off the mark. As early as 1905, the *Bataafsche Petroleum Maatschappij* (BPM) carried out its first geological survey. Later, the Mining Service of the Netherlands Indies government also became active in the area. One thing and another led in 1935 to the foundation of the *Nederlandsche Nieuw-Guinea Petroleum Maatschappij* (NNGPM), a Dutch-American partnership in which the BPM had a 40% stake. Although oil was drilled at Klamono in the countryside surrounding Sorong, this did not result in any exploitation during the pre-war years.[48] On the other hand, the arrival of American and Dutch personnel kick-started the development of this small town. The oil also led to industry in other areas, including the construction of airports at Sorong and Babo. The drill sites generated work for Papuans from the Bird's Head who earned themselves a good reputation as workers.

Additional developments in the mining sector were stimulated by success in the area governed by Australia, where important finds were made in 1924. On the Dutch side, this led to an international syndicate being set up, called the *NV Mijnbouw Maatschappij Nederlandsch Nieuw-Guinea*, in which the Billiton company owned a twenty-five per cent share. During the second half of the 1930s, this company initiated large-scale systematic surveys. Just as in the case of the oil, this did not result in any immediate profit-making activities. The expeditions that were sent out encountered a lot of resistance from the Papuan population. One important conclusion was that such activities could only be initiated with success if an adequate level of governance had been established in the region. Unlike the NNGPM, the mining company did not begin to invest immediately. However, the information that had been gathered was interesting enough to continue with the research after the war.[49]

Western businesses were especially interested in exploring the potential of New Guinea's minerals. At that point, not much was happening in this area. The Netherlands Indies large agricultural syndicates and the commercial firms had ample opportunities elsewhere in the archipelago and were not looking to expand the zones in which they currently operated. Even more so because New Guinea lacked the necessary infrastructure and, since the first expedition to the interior, it had become clear that the possibilities for plantations were limited due to the nature of the terrain and the indigenous people. Nevertheless, attempts were made to get something off the ground, even with regard to the

latter. The motive behind this was primarily political. A situation had to be avoided in which the Netherlands failed to follow through on opportunities that could be exploited later by others. One potential rival here that stood out above all others was Japan, which managed to secure a strong position for itself in the South Western area of the Pacific Ocean after the end of the First World War, when it took over part of the German colonies as a mandated area of the League of Nations. The economic exploitation of these islands was completely in the hands of the *Nanyo Kohatsu Kaisha* (NKK). Consequently, it provoked a lot of unrest in the Dutch business community and among the politicians when this company began showing an interest in setting up a cotton plantation close to Manokwari. The application was accepted but simultaneously interpreted as a sign that it was time for Dutch entrepreneurs to become active in the region as well. If the Japanese can do it, we can do it too.

This mixture of political and economic considerations was typical of the Dutch interest in this region, particularly in the 1930s. In 1934, a group of businessmen and colonial experts put their heads together. A committee was set up, chaired by the former governor general and lawyer, D. Fock. Scores of commercial enterprises, agricultural concerns and freight companies expressed an interest but, at the same time, they were not prepared to take any risks. They limited themselves to a small contribution, which was primarily intended to stimulate a greater level of participation from the Netherlands Indies administration. The latter in turn refused to commit itself to anything, in order to coax the business community into becoming even more obliging. The outcome was that the *Nederlandsche Nieuw-Guinea Maatschappij* (NEGUMIJ) was set up in 1938 with very little capital. There was no faith in the actual possibilities for business here and the political urgency was ultimately not convincing enough. Aside from a small experiment with rubber planting, no concrete steps were taken in this direction before the outbreak of the Second World War.[50] Despite all this, contacts were made and goals formulated on which one could continue to build after 1945.

The work carried out by the colonization associations was a separate case. Colonizing the land by farmers was looked upon by specialists in the Netherlands East Indies as one of the remedies that could be used to solve Java's economic problems, at least as far as these could be attributed to overpopulation. This led to a policy of systematic emigration of the Javanese to the outer provinces, particularly Sumatra. In Merauke, a colony of several hundred Javanese people was formed, most of whom became involved in rice cultivation. From the 1920s, Dutch citizens living on Java became interested in agricultural colonization too. For these people, who were of mixed Dutch-Indonesian ancestry, a position with the government was the ultimate ideal.

The problem with this was that, increasingly, they were having to compete with members of the workforce who had recently arrived from the Netherlands. A second factor was that a new batch of Indonesian employees now presented itself, many of whom had enjoyed a solid education, and who were now applying for jobs that had previously been looked upon by the Indo-Europeans as their own personal domain. Among the latter, an increasing number was now looking out for alternative livelihoods in agriculture. On Java, the possibilities for this were extremely limited as native ownership of the land was protected by law. There were fewer problems in this respect on Sumatra, just as on New Guinea. There was a surplus of land there, while the sparse population did not seem to be that attached to the idea of land ownership. In 1926, an association for the colonization of New Guinea was established, called the *Vereeniging Kolonisatie Nieuw-Guinea* (VKNG). A second organization was formed in 1930 that fostered some different ideas about the way in which such emigration should be dealt with. It was the *Stichting Immigratie en Kolonisatie Nieuw Guinea* or SIKNG for short. In that very same year, the first groups set off under their own steam to Hollandia and Manokwari.

Sectarianism plagued these organizations from start to finish. Nevertheless, they had the wind in their sails with the emerging economic crisis of the 1930s. The desperation that gripped this segment of the population made many look forward to a new existence on the land. This movement was strengthened by the growing Indonesian nationalism, which in time threatened to marginalize the Indo-European community on Java. Colonization enthusiasts also visited the Netherlands, where they managed to raise interest especially from small farmers in the east of the country. Important forerunners were Dr D.B. Vrijburg and J. Schijfsma, an engineer. A kind of colonization fever evolved, which also garnered interest from political circles within the East Indies. The largest organization of people of a mixed Dutch-Dutch East Indies ancestry, the *Indo-Europeesch Verbond* (IEV), reserved judgement. They wanted most of all to keep a future open to this group on Java. It was different with the *Vaderlandsche Club* (VC), a political party consisting of people from Holland who had found employment in the Netherlands East Indies. The fascist *Nationaal Socialistische Beweging* (NSB), which had a branch in the Netherlands East Indies, also showed an interest in this.

Within the context of the Netherlands East Indies, the *Vaderlandsche Club* was by far the most important of the two. It defended its points of view in public meetings and in the representative council, the *Volksraad*. It gave the matter a special connotation by urging for the ties between New Guinea and the Netherlands East Indies to be cut. As a fifth part of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, it should be placed directly under the government in The Hague.

As soon as the emigration of Dutch people to this region got underway, a separate colony would emerge with a clear Dutch stamp on it. That would strengthen the Dutch position in the archipelago enormously, which was useful with regard to Japan and the rise in Indonesian nationalism. A man of stature like J.W. Meijer Ranneft pleaded in this repect for the recognition of New Guinea as a colony of the Netherlands Indies, governed by a civil servant directly under the governor general and separate from the Batavian departments of general administration.[51] New Guinea fever evolved in this way into an ideology with far-reaching implications. New Guinea should develop itself into the Indo-Europeans' own fatherland. Not everyone was carried away by colonization fever. Sceptics who were acutely aware of the problems that this would bring were more inclined to call it a white elephant.

Important administrators in Batavia and The Hague belonged to this group of sceptics. Experiences with agricultural colonization in New Guinea had been bad from the outset. In addition to this, the government had placed financial cutbacks at the top of its agenda. It did not want to pour money into risky projects. According to P.C.A. van Lith, Director of the Department of the Interior in 1934, research into future possibilities for New Guinea had to wait for better days.[52] Nevertheless, some support did come from the government eventually, even if it was because they felt they had to do something to satisfy the Indo-Europeans, and a few hundred colonists had already settled in Manokwari and Hollandia by this time. Financial support was mustered by reserving part of the proceeds of the Indies State Lottery for this purpose. A Colonization Council was also set up, which served as a platform for consultation between the government and the colonists' foundations. Yet despite all this, the exodus to the promised land was not a success. The distances were too great, the trading opportunities were too limited, the soil was unsuitable, there was an acute shortage of skills and expertise and the colonists' motivation soon dropped to below zero. Occasionally, one of them did manage to carve out a fine life for themselves, but when taken as a whole the entire exercise can be deemed a failure. At any rate, that was how it was viewed by government personnel in New Guinea itself, who could follow developments in the areas were the colonists lived from close quarters. The best results came from Manokwari where, around 1940, approximately 100 colonists managed to keep their heads above water. In Hollandia there were only twelve at that time! The enthusiasm of aspiring colonists was sapped by the lack of success and, moreover, by the end of the crisis during the late 1930s. Yet the leaders did not lose faith. People like Dr W.K.H. Feuilletau de Bruyn and others continued to keep people's interest alive through publications and lectures. Here too, an impetus was given that was still active in the years after the war.[53]

Looking back

In the preceding pages we have given an overview of the administrative, religious and economic situation in New Guinea during the years running up to the Second World War. It is obvious that the consequences of Dutch interference in this area were still very modest. In fact, Dutch influence did not go beyond the coastal areas and a few of the larger islands in Geelvink Bay. Out of an estimated 700,000 inhabitants at that time, 200,000 at the very most were brought under a more or less regulated administration,[54] while no more than half had converted to Christianity. Knowledge about the country and its peoples was still very limited. Some good studies of the languages and cultures of Numfor and Windesi by the Van Hasselt father-and-son team did exist at the time, while a number of other languages, including the Marind, were also being mapped.[55] Moreover, there was a lot of infomation available in the reports written up by the patrols of the police and the civil service. These were of course only accessible to a limited group of people and most of them were lost during the Second World War in allied bombardments on Ambon. A number of military and scientific expeditions also compiled a general inventory of the physical composition of the area. Those interested in a snapshot of the state-of-the-art science at the time in all these areas should refer to the publication on New Guinea, edited by W.C. Klein, which first published by the Moluccan Institute of Amsterdam in 1938. The bibliography by Galis, of which a second edition was published in 1983, provides a fairly complete overview of the available literature up to that year.[56] From this one can deduce that a lot was going on, despite the low priority this area had with the government of the Netherlands East Indies.

By 1940, besides the average intake of people and things, safe areas were created where constant warfare was banned and the first steps were taken to set up a judicial system that more or less complied with norms that were acceptable in the West—and elsewhere in the Netherlands East Indies. Inside the borders of the pacified zones, and just outside them too, the Protestant and Catholic missions had been instrumental in creating a new Papuan society. According to a contemporary account by an expert on the area, it was particularly during the last twenty-five years of this episode that an ordered society sprang up at an astonishing rate from completely wild tribes 'with many capable workers, versatile schoolteachers, nurses, civil servants, writers, craftsmen, and so on.'[57]

Not everyone had looked on these developments without reservations. By encroaching upon centuries old civilizations that were extremely complex and not easily understood, both the adminstration and the mission could inflict irreparable damage. Of course, one could ban practices that the Dutch found offensive, such as vigilanteism, headhunting and cannibalism, but their

removal threatened to dislodge an entire civilization and rendered life for its members pointless. As we have seen, this was one of the issues that occupied the young *controleur* Van Baal. It was a concern that cropped up elsewhere in the colonial world of the 1930s. With the typical optimism of a self-assured civilization, the idea that what they were doing was right, nevertheless, prevailed. Alongside the disadvantages, the advantages of Western intervention were also evident. Simple patented medicines made hideous illnesses disappear like magic from huge areas. Christian ideas about Man's place in the world, and in relation to each other, were placed side by side with the old animistic images and to some extent pushed them out. In the newly established villages experiments with new ways of living together took place around the family homes. Proud gurus gave visitors guided tours around their model villages which had classrooms where neatly dressed Papuan children showed that they could sing Dutch nursery rhymes and demonstrated that they had mastered the three times table. At the meetings organized by the UZV, Papuans from all over the country got to know each other. It was during these meetings that they saw how they could now live in peace and harmony with their neighbours, against whom they tended to be on the point of waging war as a matter of course. Their poignant reaction was also an incentive for the missionaries.[58]

Yet these developments were not without complications. The influence of the schoolteacher alienated children from their parents, while it still remained to be seen whether the knowledge they acquired would last after they returned to their original communities. This concern was justified because the process of social development was not well synchronized. What was one do with Biak, which was by now an almost completely converted area, where all of the men and some of the women under thirty-five years of age were literate but where there were almost no opportunities at all for it to be included in a modern economic way of life? The pre-war generation of Dutch administrators had a deep-rooted fear of raising an unhappy, semi-intellectual proletariat that would be a fish out of water in both the traditional and the modern world. Developments in other parts of the Netherlands East Indies had taught them that this was not a hypothetical worry. Nevertheless, the conviction prevailed that it was a good thing to do and that somehow matters would be resolved. Any other way was out of the question, unless one wanted to transform a living society into a reservation. This—modest—success was primarily due to the positive acceptance of the Papuans themselves. This was certainly not the case everywhere and it was by no means instant, but in most places it was noticeable over time. The demand for civil servants and gurus was always larger than the supply!

The pacification of New Guinea—to use this loaded term—was accomplished with a minimal exploitation of human resources and means. Out of the top echelon of almost 600 thoroughly trained Dutch civil servants in the Netherlands East Indies, no more than twenty were stationed in New Guinea. Aside from them, a comparable number of Catholic and Protestant missionaries were also active. They were all supported by several hundred Moluccan gurus, who left their mark on education, religion and the work of administration. It was a tough assignment for all of them. For the missionaries and their gurus, being stationed at New Guinea had usually been their own personal choice. They often worked in this territory for decades and got to know it inside out. However, this was not the case with the Dutch civil servants. Most of them regarded being stationed at New Guinea as a punishment. Whenever possible, they left after a couple of years. They always lived there without their families or the comforts of good housing, roads, cars and all the other things that made life on Java so pleasurable. And, of course, let us not forget malaria, for which absolutely no cure at all existed in those days. 'The illness gives a bleak outlook on life' observed Van Eechoud once more, 'and nobody in New Guinea escapes from this disease in the long run'. 'Many a plan to hand in a request for a transfer was formulated while a patient lay on his sickbed staring at the rotten beams, the rusty, leaking roof, the *gaba-gaba* walls and the decayed mosquito net, which he had to cover with rags to protect himself and his primitive knocked-up furniture from the rain'.[59] It was a life that involved back-breaking work in an inpenetrable terrain, dealing with incomprehensible people, and very few chances of a sparkling career, that only managed to retain the interest of a few enthusiasts.

Despite all these limitations, faraway New Guinea managed to attract attention in the Netherlands and the rest of the archipelago. This was partly due to the work of a core group of publicists and experts on the country, whose work we encounter in the bibliography of Galis. It had the allure of the unknown, savagery and primitiveness. In addition, the prospect of Indo-colonization on New Guinea during the economic crisis in the 1930s captured attention: not so much because of the attractiveness of the area itself but more because of the difficult position in which this group found itself on Java. Furthermore, in all of the schools in the Netherlands East Indies and in the Netherlands, children were taught to learn maps off by heart, which contributed to the fact that New Guinea was seen as an obvious part of the Netherlands East Indies. For some of them, the sound of their weekly 'Monday's cent' dropping in the missionary tin had a special resonance. And then there was Upper Digul, that drew attention in a distasteful way as a place of internment for Indonesian nationalists. These are the various ways in which New Guinea became a part of the Netherlands

East Indies during the years leading up to the Second World War, but the ties with the centre of the archipelago were weak and of an unusual nature.

Last but not least, there were the Papuans; the focal point of the administration, the missions, and science. It was in this way that the modern world came within the reach of the inhabitants of the coastal regions, and their willingness to accept it was far greater than had been the case around the turn of the century when the first administrative outposts were set up in Manokwari, Merauke and Fakfak.

Chapter 2

The Shock of War

West New Guinea during the Second World War

The first four decades of the twentieth century were the halcyon days of the colonial regime of the Netherlands East Indies. The external borders were undisputed and Dutch interests had been embedded in the legislature which, in turn, was being put into practice on a day-to-day basis by representatives of the government, the army and the business community. In the upper echelons of all these sectors, one would encounter Dutchmen who had been educated at institutions in the Netherlands that focused on practical matters relating to the Netherlands East Indies. A development policy was initiated for the benefit of the indigenous people, which resulted in them obtaining higher levels of education and playing a greater participatory role in the work of the government and the economy. The development of Indonesian society as a whole was hindered by an exponential rise in the population, which gobbled up a large part of the newly acquired wealth. Nevertheless, an Indonesian elite had emerged and was becoming increasingly aware of itself. This group, which consisted of tens of thousands of individuals, gradually began to realize that, eventually, it would have to take over the leadership role from the Dutch. Although this was never denied by the Dutch in principle, they were nevertheless strongly inclined to think that it would simply never happen. Large sections of the community had not yet been affected by the new developments, and it would be a long time before this was likely to occur. Until then, the Dutch were indispensable. This attitude was reinforced by their own sense of self-importance and their tendency to believe that the existing relationships would last forever. This was expressed in half-baked fantasies about a vast Netherlands East Indies empire, permanently governed by the Netherlands. All this led to a strain in

relations with the indigenous national movement, whose ideal vision for the future was an independent Indonesian state. The Dutch tended to avoid any discussions about this issue as far as possible, as illustrated by their dismissal of the Sutarjo petition that had been adopted by the People's Council in 1936 and which requested a meeting to be held of representatives of the entire Dutch realm to draw up a roadmap for the future. The existence of the internment camp at Upper Digul was the most striking, but also the most painful, outcome of these two conflicting proposals for the future of the Netherlands East Indies.

New Guinea followed these developments, but from a considerable distance. The colonial machine had only made an appearance in a couple of places along the coast, and even then in dribs and drabs. As we have seen, at the end of the 1930s there were hardly any signs of an indigenous elite emerging from the local population as yet. Furthermore, New Guinea's contribution to the colony's economic performance was null and void. Attempts to stimulate at least some level of economic development through the Negumy were mainly politically motivated. At the very best, one could expect more from oil. Consequently, no active welfare policy was implemented here, as was the case in some of the more developed parts of Indonesia. From an economic perspective, Papuan society was, with its limited material needs, self-sufficient and in its own opinion quite affluent. Food, clothes and shelter were not an issue. The government's main contribution to the areas that had been brought under its control was that it preserved the peace. Its other activities were limited to providing medical care through a couple of hospitals, some government doctors and a few effective medicines which officials working in the field would carry around with them. Education and enhancing the indigenous population's cultural development were delegated in their entirety to the missions, which in turn could rely on the government for financial support.

There was certainly a desire for more, as can be deduced from some of the contemporary remarks made about modern colonial rule. The restraint of the Dutch government was mainly dictated by a shortage of funds. Financing the development of the Netherlands East Indies was funded almost entirely from its own resources. Where the contribution of New Guinea was negative, there was little money available. On top of this, a more intensive approach would be more costlygiven the condition of the terrain and the primitiveness of the society. Securing the eastern border of their sphere of influence had been the main motive for Dutch activity on the island right from the early days of the DEIC. Around 1940, this premise was just as relevant.

From the perspective of religion, New Guinea's position was comparable to that of some parts of the Moluccas, although it lagged behind the latter by at least a century. Here too, the Protestant mission had been active throughout

the nineteenth century and had either established or reinforced the Christian faith. Due to the length of time, difference in approach, and historical background, results there had been much greater than in New Guinea. In later years, the island was able to reap the benefits of this by having recourse to a steady stream of gurus, government assistants and policemen. This brought New Guinea closer to the Moluccas than to the rest of Indonesia. In actual fact, this was the sequel to an existing situation. Then and later, geography exerted an influence. New Guinea was in many respects a colony of the Moluccas, in which during the twentieth century the Ternatans and Tidorese had been replaced by the Ambonese and the Keiese.

Much would change after 1940, not only for the Netherlands East Indies, but also for New Guinea. The first half of the new decade was marked by the Second World War. The German assault on the Netherlands on 10 May 1940 immediately generated a great deal of tension. The colonial regime maintained its position of independence, but speculations about unwelcome 'protection' were rife. This was followed on 7 December 1942 by the war with Japan and the subsequent occupation. The population suffered severely under a harsh Japanese military regime and the Dutch part of it was decimated. It was also a time in which Indonesian nationalist aspirations secured a firmer grip on the minds of many. The proclamation of an independent Republic of Indonesia came on 17 August 1945, two days after the capitulation of Japan. The refusal of the Netherlands to accept this *fait accompli* resulted in a serious conflict, which was resolved at last with the almost complete military and administrative withdrawal of the Netherlands from Indonesia. On 27 December 1949, the Netherlands transferred sovereignty to a federal state, the Republic of the United States of Indonesia. Only the western half of New Guinea was excluded from this agreement, albeit on condition that a solution would have to be found for it within one year.

The situation in the Netherlands East Indies during the first four decades of the twentieth century followed a set pattern. It bore a striking resemblance to events that were unfolding in the colonial territories in Asia which belonged to England and France. There too, in the wake of more intense colonial interference, an endemic groundswell for social and political emancipation had developed, which became especially powerful in British India. A parallel development took place in the large Asian empires of China and Japan which, it is true, had remained out of the West's reach but had nevertheless been affected by its presence. Both countries were keen to take on the West with its own weapons. Japan in particular had impressive results with respect to this. It developed into an economic and military superpower that was able to

negotiate on an equal footing with the Western nations. During the First World War, it had been an ally of England. This was rewarded with heightened influence in the Pacific Ocean region. The German archipelago which was present here to the north of the equator came under Japanese rule in the form of mandated territories from the League of Nations. As a result of this, Japan became a direct neighbour of the Netherlands East Indies. Up until the 1930s, both countries maintained a profitable relationship that benefited both sides. Burgeoning Japanese ambitions and the deteriorating international climate as a result of the onset of a massive economic crisis changed all this. From 1934, Japan began insisting upon having a special economic relationship with the Netherlands East Indies that would weigh heavily in its favour. When this was refused it caused bad blood. With the occupation of the Netherlands, Japan came up with newer and more far-reaching proposals, which amounted to the suggestion that the country come under joint Dutch-Japanese rule. This too was turned down.[1] In Indo-China, a similar turn of events resulted in this French colony being bound over to Japan. The roles had been reversed. The initiative for a stifling embrace now came from the Asian side.

The Netherlands East Indies found itself in an impossible position as a result of war breaking out in Europe and the motherland being occupied. Militarily, it was no match for Japan, however, it was difficult to obtain any pledges of support from potential allies. The British Empire and the United States were the most obvious candidates, but they were reluctant, fearing that the Japanese genie might prematurely escape from its bottle. In the meantime, some matters were dealt with secretly, of course, and so it came to pass that British, American and Dutch staff meetings took place in February 1941. These occurred behind closed doors and did not result in any public alliances. After the occupation of Indo-China, tensions rose. The Netherlands supported the oil boycott imposed by the United States, to underline where its sympathies lay. This was a dubious step, as it intensified pressure on Japan far beyond the measures drawn up by America. After all, no less than twenty per cent of all of the oil used in Japan originated from the Netherlands East Indies. The course was now set. During the first few days of December 1941, when the Americans had abandoned all hope of finding a peaceful solution, they issued firm pledges of support.[2] Following the Japanese assault on Malaya and Pearl Harbour, in the early morning of 8 December local time the Netherlands, which felt implicitly attacked, declared war on Japan. That very same day, Dutch submarines sprang into action against the advancing Japanese fleet. With this, the cooperation between the Allies was translated into concrete action. This also extended as far as Australia, which found itself in the same boat. In January 1942, this led to the creation of ABDA command; a joint venture between the Americans, the

British, the Dutch and the Australians which was meant to ward off a Japanese assault on Southeast Asia. Australia's contribution included, among other things, sending relief troops to Ambon and Timor, where the assault routes from the North to Australia lay.

On the basis of the Singapore agreements, the defence of Southeast Asia, which was referred to as the Malay Barrier in military jargon, was carried out as one integrated operation. The Netherlands had a considerable share in this. Its means of defence were comparable in volume and quality with what the British and Americans had at their disposal at that time and place, certainly after the spectacular British and American losses during the very first phase of the war. Yet, the combination appeared to be too weak. Singapore, the cornerstone of British defence in Southeast Asia, capitulated on 15 February 1942. That same month, Ambon and Celebes fell. Insufficient resources were made available to protect the airfields on South Sumatra and, when the time came, the Dutch naval forces had to cope as best they could without any air protection. After the battle of the Java Sea at the beginning of March 1942, which ended in disaster, there were none of the basic requirements necessary to defend Java effectively. The capitulation of the Netherlands Indies army (Koninklijk Nederlands-Indisch Leger or KNIL) followed on 8 March in Kalidjati. The Japanese attack was rolled out even further and caused yet another string of American and Australian defeats. The last American troops had to vacate the Philippines shortly afterwards, if they had not already been taken prisoner or killed. But the end to Japan's series of successes was close at hand. By May 1942, their offensive became stranded during an attack on Port Moresby, the capital city of Australian New Guinea. On the way there, the Japanese navy suffered heavy losses in the Coral Sea, where it was forced to retreat. When Japan lost its biggest aircraft carriers one month later at Midway, the end point of the expansion had been reached. The withdrawal would follow. For the time being, that was cold comfort. Halfway through 1942, Japan ruled Southeast Asia and Oceania from Burma to deep into the Pacific Ocean. All of the Allies had suffered heavy losses during this long string of humiliating defeats. Indeed, out of all the old ABDA partners, the Netherlands was the worst off because, with its main territory in Europe and Asia occupied by German and Japanese forces, it no longer had any reserves.

Aside from a few remote locations, the whole of the Netherlands East Indies was now occupied. The island of Timor was one exception. Only the western half of it was Dutch territory; the other half was governed by Portugal, a country suspected of sympathizing with the Nazis. As both Australia and the Netherlands had a strategic interest in the island, the two powers worked alongside each

other to defend it. To accomplish this, a joint Australian-Dutch occupation of East Timor was necessary to begin with. The action against the Portuguese went smoothly enough, but the defence against the Japanese assault was certainly not an unqualified success. The main Allied Forces already had to capitulate by the end of January 1942. Yet, with help from the local population, the few Australian and Dutch units that had been left behind were able to look after themselves until the end of the war, even though most of them had to be transported to Australia in February 1943.

The occupation of Dutch New Guinea took place in April 1942, that is to say approximately one month after the capitulation of the allied troops on Java. The first step in this direction was the occupation of Fakfak and Babo respectively, on 1 and 2 April. Viewed from his base camp in the interior, which bore the name of Prince Bernhard, Van Eechoud described the sequence of events as follows: 'from 11 April 1942, the radio stations on the north coast began going off the air in quick succession. On 20 April, Hollandia announced that a battleship had been sighted and then fell silent. By this time, Fakfak had disappeared too'. Only the broadcasting channels of Merauke, Digul, the Wissel Lakes and his very own Bernhard camp were still on air at this point.[3] It was plain sailing all the way for the Japanese. There was absolutely no organized resistance to speak of. Hardly any measures had been taken to defend the region. At the beginning of January, a battalion of troops (circa 200 men) was dispatched to Babo and the MacCluer Bay to protect the oil installations, but the actions that ensued were limited to destroying the machinery and stored supplies. The main body of the Dutch military presence on the north coast consisted of a KNIL squad in Manokwari, which came to just over seventy professional soldiers, supported by around sixty reserves from the group of East Indies Dutch people who had settled on New Guinea as colonists. A similar-sized unit was quartered in barracks in Merauke. As soon as the Japanese arrived, Manokwari's military force retreated to the interior of the Bird's Head to provide a type of guerrilla resistance. Under the leadership of Captain Willem Geeroms and, after his death, Sergeant M.C. Kokkelink, they managed to keep going until the Allied Forces returned. They were finally rescued from their isolation on 18 April 1944 by a Dutch intelligence unit, which had been dispatched specifically for this purpose. The unit had shrunk in the meantime from 150 to fifteen men. Its actions were limited to small pinpricks: the struggle to survive had superseded everything else, and they had very little to show for it. From a military perspective, the Dutch garrison which had remained in Merauke was more important. The region had been passed over because, in April 1942, the Japanese attack had immediately switched to the Australian part of the island. The Japanese occupation, therefore, remained limited to a couple of points on the north and west

coast of New Guinea, while parts of the south and the interior remained in Allied hands. After successfully defending Port Moresby, which was situated closer to the east, the greatest danger for Merauke had been averted. The Dutch garrison was reinforced with American troops. At the beginning of 1943, these were replaced by an Australian brigade.

The presence of Geeroms and Kokkelink in the Bird's Head was kept hidden from the Allied Forces until the war was almost over. The group therefore had to manage without any support from Merauke. This was not the case with two government officials who had avoided being taken prisoner and had stayed around in the interior at the head of a small police force. The two in question were the police officer Jan van Eechoud, who had pitched his camp on the Idenburg River after the Japanese invasion, and the *controleur* of the Wissel Lakes, Dr Victor de Bruijn. From their positions they remained in radio contact with the Dutch authorities, which had set themselves up in Australia as the East Indies Commission. Both managed to hold their ground in the Central Highlands with the support of droppings from Australia and Merauke. They were in touch with the local inhabitants and occasionally provided information which was appreciated in Australia. Van Eechoud was flown to Australia later in 1942. The following year, with American support, he arranged for an aerial survey of New Guinea's interior to be carried out in preparation for the Allied Forces' reoccupation of this region. In 1944, when the Americans had advanced far enough to be able to contemplate recapturing Hollandia once again, he was parachuted behind enemy lines with a large group of intelligence personnel to provide support to the invasion force from this inland position. Meanwhile, De Bruijn had continued to occupy his post at and around Enarotali on the Wissel Lakes, during the course of which he received a great deal of support from the local population. He managed to create an effective Papuan security unit, which went on to accompany him on future journeys. When the Japanese arrived at the Wissel Lakes he ventured further inland, as far as the Baliem Valley. Both of these 'knights-errant' in the interior of New Guinea appealed to the imagination of the Papuan people. Victor de Bruijn, in particular, must have struck the surrounding Ekari and Moni as the type of war lord with whom they could fully identify. He was a highly acclaimed figure among them.[4]

When news of their actions reached the Netherlands much later, this enabled the Dutch to put a plaster on the wound they had sustained through the sudden loss of the Netherlands East Indies. In addition to this, their presence had more immediate practical results through the intelligence they provided. De Bruijn's prize catch was a government assistant called Joseph, who at first turned himself over to the Japanese but after he had seen enough in the

territories they occupied, had returned once more to his superior in the interior. Merauke and 'De Bruijn's country' were also the only areas left that were still directly governed by the East Indies Committee, which consisted of East Indies officials who had been dispatched to Australia when Java fell and who had to protect the surviving interests of the Netherlands East Indies. We will meet some of the most important members of this group later on in the sequel to this story. These were H.J. van Mook, the former Director of Economic Affairs in Batavia and Ch.O. van der Plas, who had been Governor of East Java in better times. One was a competent economist with a flair for politics, the other a highly creative government official and expert on Islam. Both had shown themselves to be progressive in their younger years. In the periodical entitled *De Stuw* (The Dam), which was filled with contributions from colleagues from the civil service, they had spoken out cautiously in favour of the emancipation of the Indonesian people. Another member of this group was Abdulkadir Widjojoatmodjo, a Javanese government official who had been sent to the United States just before war broke out to relay information about the Netherlands East Indies situation.

The additional Dutch presence consisted of small army units and some more imposing naval units, which had been sent abroad after Java fell. They were under the command of the East Indies naval commander Admiral C.E.L. Helfrich, who after the capitulation had the remaining land forces placed under his authority as well. At the insistence of the Dutch government-in-exile in London, Helfrich had his headquarters in Ceylon, where the British supreme command in Southeast Asia was stationed. In Australia, there were several hundred soldiers under the supervision of Rear Admiral F.W. Coster, who was second-in-command. During the course of the war this force was expanded to several thousand men, using Dutch recruits who had been taken from all over. They would be employed as soon as conditions allowed. Apart from that, several squadrons of bombers were available to wage war directly. The nucleus of the crew consisted of young pilots, who had been in training at the flight academy on Java at the time of the capitulation and who had completed their education in the United States. In addition to the above, an intelligence organization was put together, the Netherlands *Forces Intelligence Service* (Nefis), which had to try to gather intelligence from the occupied territory. The activities of Van Eechoud and De Bruijn were important for them. Another important organization was *Netherlands Indies Civil Affairs* (NICA); a militarized government organization that immediately after the disembarkation on Netherlands East Indies territory, in the name of the allied commander, would establish contact with the local inhabitants, mobilize them to take part in the war effort and, as far as possible, pick up the reins of government once again. Its

nucleus consisted of young Dutchmen, who had followed a crash course in Melbourne to equip them with the skills to serve as civil servants.

The way back

After the Battle of Midway, the fortunes of war changed. During the second half of 1942, the Australians had fiercely defended Port Moresby and managed to prevent it from falling into Japanese hands. Together with the Americans, they had set up a bridgehead in the eastern part of the island. The Trident Conference, which was held in Washington in May 1943, was important for further actions in this area. It was here that the outline of a strategy to retake the lost territory was drawn up. General Douglas MacArthur, who had been forced out of the Philippines by the Japanese, advocated a massive attack with land forces that would be waged from the north coast of New Guinea and the Moluccas as far as the Philippines and Japan. Apart from the strategic benefits, MacArthur considered this to be of great psychological importance too. Only an American reconquest, and preferably one spearheaded by him, would be capable of restoring American authority, which had been lost in the Philippines. The attack would be carried out in 'leaps and bounds' whereby large concentrations of Japanese troops could be overtaken and, in so doing, isolated. However, there were other options as well. Such was the strategy drawn up by the American navy, which was in favour of a direct naval assault from Hawaii to the heart of the Japanese empire. Opinions were divided in Washington, and so the Combined Chiefs of Staff agreed to implement both strategies simultaneously. In this way, the war became a race between the United States army and navy. MacArthur, as commander of the South West Pacific Area (SWPA), would serve as Commander-in-Chief of the Southern front. It had been easy enough for him to persuade President Roosevelt to provide him with support for this campaign. The loss of the Philippines had shaken America to its very core. This two-pronged approach would bring the Japanese occupation of the area to a dramatic end in the shortest possible time. It had been possible to opt for this expensive approach thanks to America's rapidly growing military might.[5]

As a result of this decision, the staff of the American Sixth Army from Australia was moved to Finschhafen, which is located on the north coast of Australian New Guinea. This place would serve as the starting point of a massive operation in which Hollandia would be the next big target. The place was important because the Japanese had three airfields at their disposal there and because it could serve as a base camp for further advances toward the Moluccas. This meant a huge leap of five hundred kilometres with mobile units, during

the course of which much stronger Japanese units in the intermittent coastal areas would have to be overtaken. In preparation, Van Eechoud, as reported earlier, had been immediately dropped behind enemy lines in January 1944 with a so-called Nefis party called *Bulldozer* and was stationed approximately 150 km to the south from Hollandia. This party contained approximately 70 men and was in charge of relaying information about Japanese movements in the countryside surrounding Hollandia. The airfields there were defended by weak Japanese military units, while even before the great assault hundreds of aeroplanes had been destroyed in surprise raids carried out by the Americans. The actual assault took place on 22 April 1944. It was carried out with overwhelming force and triumphed with hardly any resistance at all from the Japanese garrisons.[6] In fact, the majority of them had fled to the interior two days earlier.[7] Hollandia was transformed into a large-scale base camp. It was a logistically well-planned project, during which camps and warehouses were set up for hundreds of thousands of people and provided with massive quantities of war supplies in only a few months time. Airfields, roads and buildings sprang from the ground as if by magic before the very eyes of the startled Papuans.

From this point onward, great leaps forward were made during the months that followed. Right at the very beginning, on 17 May, a landing was made at Sarmi, where the airstrip was occupied. Biak was conquered after fierce fighting, following a disembarkation on 27 May. Here too a massive airbase was built within a very short space of time. The next target, Numfor, was occupied at the beginning of June and Sausapor on the Bird's Head followed suit one month later. Unfortunately for the Dutch, important population centres such as Manokwari, Fakfak and Sorong were left out. The Americans were in a hurry and wanted to minimize their losses. They pushed forward without a backward glance and reached Morotai on 15 September. This became the third largest allied base camp in a row, and it was from here that the leap to the Philippines was made in January 1945. So, the base camps on Hollandia and Biak played an important role in recapturing the Philippines. All in all, an impressive display of technical and organizational prowess that far exceeded anything that had ever been seen in this area before. The speed of the assault was much greater than originally anticipated.

At the time of the landings in Hollandia, Van Eechoud in his Bulldozer-camp south of the town had to deal with thousands of Japanese soldiers who descended on his camp after fleeing to the South and the West when the airfields had been recaptured. The main direction in which the Japanese exodus headed was Manokwari which was not yet occupied by the Allied Forces. For the rest, the interior was swarming with Japanese troops who had come from

the Australian part of the island. They too hoped to be able to escape via Manokwari. It turned out to be a major tragedy. Not only did the Japanese kill a large number of Papuans, but the reverse was also true. Gradually, as the Japanese troops began to find it increasingly difficult to survive in the jungle, the roles began to reverse so that eventually the hunter became the hunted. The hunt was stimulated by the Nefis and the Nica, who had accompanied the Americans during their advance. On Biak, where Abdulkadir Widjojoatmodjo led the Nica team, he promised to give 50 cents for the ear of one living Japanese person and 25 cents for the ear of a dead one. This was not intended as an act of vengeance; instead there was a more practical military objective behind it. Indeed, the Americans had only occupied a limited area and it was therefore quite feasible that the Japanese would return after the Americans had left. For the remaining Netherlands Indies units it was, therefore, vital to kill them or take them prisoner as quickly as possible: the selected fee indicated a preference for the second option. The operation was successful because the Japanese were not well-liked by the Papuans. The ears came in by the bucket-load and were painstakingly logged. This macabre form of book-keeping recorded the dwindling chances of a Japanese come-back.[8] Then, in Hollandia hastily assembled Papuan units were trained, which left for Manokwari to collect the remaining Japanese troops and take them into protective custody.

New Guinea under the Japanese occupation

In 1942, the Japanese occupation of North and West New Guinea was carried out by the Second Army, which had set up headquarters in Manokwari. The Japanese troops remained in tight-knit groups and did not venture far into the interior. The presence of De Bruijn made it necessary for them to set up a post in Enarotali on the Wissel Lakes. They did not venture outside this area, with the exception of a few minor raids. On the south coast they got as far as Kokonao on the Mimika River, which was occupied during the course of 1942. There were a couple of skirmishes later on with the Allied Forces, but nothing more than that. During the defence of New Guinea, Japan focused on air defence, for which it set up a network of airstrips along the entire length of the north coast.

The Japanese military administration was carried out exclusively with an eye to military operations. The few Dutchmen on the island were taken away at the very outset to Kampili internment camp in the North Moluccas and from there to the camps in the South Celebes. The Protestant mission, which upon the arrival of the Japanese practically monopolized these parts, was hit hard. Not only were the Dutch missionaries interned, but the gurus who originally came

from East Indonesia were prevented from carrying out their work. The Japanese used them as odd job men and, whenever it suited them, chased the local people from their homes to make way for the building of defences.[9] Many people retreated back into the interior to escape the Japanese. Corporal punishment, raids and requisitions were standard practice in the occupied zones. The Papuans were used as labourers to build airstrips and everything else associated with this. As there were not enough of them, the Japanese also had to call upon Javanese forced labourers or *romushas*. Upon their return, the Dutch encountered several hundred such people there, most of whom were completely emaciated and on the brink of death. From their stories it was clear that initially, there had been thousands of them.[10] Out of all the Dutch colonists on Manokwari, only about a dozen were still alive in 1945. Japan's draconian treatment had taken its toll on everyone.

The war in the north made a profound impression on the Papuans. As in other parts of the Netherlands East Indies, the Dutch fell off their pedestal here as well. Missionaries and government officials who had swanned around like miniature gods, were rounded up, more often than not by their own staff, on the orders of the advancing Japanese. They disappeared over the horizon in no time at all. Some comfort could be derived from the guerrilla campaign that was still being carried out further inland by Kokkelink, de Bruijn and Van Eechoud, but the loss of prestige was undoubtedly considerable. Yet no widespread desertions took place. Of course, the political map of the interior showed a changeable picture but, on the whole, Van Eechoud and De Bruijn had no reason to complain about the cooperation they received. There were also no cases of mass disappearances on the coast, although the story there was a little more complex. Here, one had to deal with a genuine occupation in which Japanese coercion and control was much greater. An additional complication came in the form of the messianic movements which took place during the time of the occupation, which in principle were opposed to everything that came from outside. These movements have been documented quite well and will be discussed in more detail later. It is important to note here that, despite this basic attitude, they generally displayed a positive attitude towards the Allied Forces. As far as everything else is concerned, there are practically no sources about the history of the occupation of New Guinea. There is, however, an eye-witness account by a Swiss couple who stayed behind in Hollandia and, as subjects of a neutral country, were able to continue working under the Japanese. In their experience, the Papuans had stood by them during every conflict with the Japanese. They were full of praise for their loyalty.[11] After the capitulation there was no doubt at all about this, except in a few cases where they had good reason to fear the return of the Dutch. This was the case, to quote an example that just

happened to have been documented, in the Fadji kampong behind Hollandia, where in 1943 the local people had murdered several policemen who had violated their women. When the Nica arrived in Hollandia in 1945, the population of Fadji—fearing they would be punished—stated that they wanted to have nothing at all to with this organization and even sent a delegation to deliver a formal declaration of war.

On the whole, the Allied Forces, including the Dutch, had nothing to complain about with regard to the cooperation they were given by the Papuans. In a number of cases, this enthusiastic readiness to help hunt down Japanese soldiers on the run can be explained as an attempt to compensate for earlier demonstrated acts of servitude towards their regime. This was certainly the case with some of the Moluccan policemen and government assistants. This brings us to the more general problem of the position of the East Indonesian officials in the administration, the Protestant missions, and the medical services. At the very beginning of the invasion they had been summoned to work for the Japanese. The cooperation they provided corresponded with the orders they had previously been given by the Dutch. Indeed, a government has to proceed as usual with its day-to-day affairs, even during an occupation. This turned out to be different in practice than originally anticipated, because the Japanese military administration focused solely on the military tasks at hand and attached very little importance to the demands of day-to-day governance. It had been made practically impossible for the work of the missions to be carried out, which had a disastrous impact on education. Gurus and government assistants were commandeered to supply human resources and food for the Japanese army. This had placed a great strain on their relationship with the local population.

As we have seen already, the relationship had never run smoothly. From the moment the Moluccans had been brought in at the beginning of the century, their contempt for the Papuans was set in stone. The tension this caused was intensified by the fact that their Papuan students had been given preferential treatment by the missions and the administration. The goal had been to eventually replace the lower and middle level positions with Papuans. Despite these complications, the Moluccan officials and gurus were greatly appreciated by the Dutch for their highly efficient manner. The Papuans viewed this differently, certainly after what they had experienced during the Japanese occupation. Following the withdrawal of the administration and the Protestant mission, many had completely reverted back to their old lifestyle. This applied particularly to the area of jurisprudence, where taking the law into one's own hands became standard practice once again. The layer of new civilization was still only wafer thin.

This had forced the remaining Moluccan officials to retaliate with vigour. In doing so, they could console themselves with the argument that it saved an undisciplined population from harsher Japanese reprisals. In addition, the Moluccan civil servants had been thrown off balance by the far-reaching events of war and occupation. The rules of a regular society had become unhinged. Many were horrified at the humiliating defeat of the Dutch regime and no longer wished to identify with it. This was expressed in disdain and contempt for the Dutch and a determination to take advantage of the opportunities offered by the new masters. Through their new identification with the brutish and egotistical Japanese regime, these gurus, civil servants and policemen lost many of the few remaining grains of sympathy that the local population still had for them. The Japanese example, where harsh corporal punishment and executions became the order of the day, proved contagious. In this way, many of the Moluccan gurus and administrators ended up in the same position as the members of the indigenous civil service on Java, who also had to work for the occupying power. At the end of the war, large numbers of Papuans stated that they no longer wished to have anything to do with these '*amberis*'. The prevailing view of the returning Dutch administration was that the majority of them had crossed the line and ought to be replaced.[12]

During the Japanese occupation of New Guinea, there was an overall return to the customs which had only recently been abandoned. This was expressed, among other ways, in the resurgence of messianic movements, which had never really gone away and which now sprang up again in a number of locations along the North coast. The most spectacular among them was the koreri movement in the Biakkan sphere of influence. The main character was the mythical figure of Manseren Mangundi, who had left the country in the past due to an unfortunate misunderstanding, and had taken all the knowledge of the world with him. Having arrived in the western countries, he became the source of all their prosperity and power there. Upon his return to the land of the Papuans, the roles would be reversed. Even after the establishment of the Dutch administration and the Protestant mission, there were still prophets (konoors) who foretold his coming and, in so doing, managed to mobilize large crowds. The tell-tale signs that accompanied this included pigs being slaughtered and crops being destroyed, because people would no longer need them in the Utopian state that was close at hand. This fact alone meant that such movements posed a danger to the structure that had been set up by the foreigners. They were ideologically opposed to them, because the structure they had brought to bear would have to perish when all the relationships were reversed. Indeed, the Papuan would become white and the European would become black, along with all the

repercussions that that would bring. In practice, it was the Moluccan '*amberis*' in particular who were always being scapegoated. Besides, it is not possible to paint a completely accurate picture. Elements of Christianity mixed effortlessly with aspects of the local traditions. The koreri was never monomorphic and was constantly appearing in many different shapes at any given time.

Right up until war broke out, these types of activities were continuously being stopped just in time by the administration and the mission. With the disappearance of Dutch rule, such movements developed simultaneously in two locations. One had its focal point in Biak, where it managed to mobilize thousands of people both there and on the islands dotted around Geelvink Bay. The movement had already begun before the war broke out as a result of an appearance made by the prophetess, Angganitha Menafaur, who bestowed the title of Golden Queen of Judea upon herself. Later, she was assisted by her aid Stephanus Simopyaref, who had been imprisoned for murder: in the Papuan world of that period, imprisonment was often effectively the road to greater knowledge of the world and to greater prestige. Around the same time, a similar but totally unrelated event in the vicinity of Hollandia was set in motion by a preacher called Simson.

Both movements heralded the onset of a new world, one in which the Papuans would finally receive their rightful due. At first this expressed itself in a series of individual actions. The core nucleus of the Biak movement consisted of the direct followers of Angganitha, who proclaimed a message of peace and purity, which paved the way for the possible return by Manseren Manggundi. The group dressed themselves completely in white, abstained from eating any form of pork, spoke in tongues (glossolalie), used song and dance as a form of expression, and adopted a pacifist stance. Aside from this, there were also more proactive individuals and groups who preferred to use magical powers to push through the changes that were anticipated. At first, it was the actions of specific individuals from the group that attracted attention. In his well-documented study, Kamma sketches hilarious scenes, which were repeated hundreds of times in many variations in the hotspots of the movement. There were men who stationed themselves on top of the roofs of their houses and flapped their homemade wings up and down for days on end. By so doing, the Papuans would once again master the art of flying which had fallen into the hands of the Westerners when Manseren Manggundi left. Some made radios from cans and pieces of string and telephones, which they attached to their ancestors' graves. They hoped that this would bring them into contact with the dead. Others set to work with a spade and shovel, in search of oil treasures.

There were collective actions too, carried out by large groups, and that was far more dangerous. Stephanus revealed himself during the early days of the

occupation as the leader of a militant movement. He gave himself ostentatious titles and, under him and his 'generals', a whole army was gradually put together which fought against the kampongs and people who were unwilling to cooperate. They had it in for the amberis in particular. All of this was accompanied by the return of the long-forbidden dances and magic rituals, which fuelled their spirits. The army acquired the name *Tentara America-Blanda* or AB (American-Dutch Army), which indicated that people sided with the Allied Forces. This inclination was further accentuated after several American soldiers, who had escaped from the Philippines on a small boat, had called in at Biak. In the stories, MacArthur, who would attack from the east, would be looked upon as an incarnation of Manseren Manggundi. At a gathering on Wabruk island in June 1942, Stephanus gave precise instructions on how to organize the army, the navy and society in general. It is worth noting that this gave the movement a clear political and nationalistic dimension. The koreri flag, which had been revealed by Manseren Manggundi to Angganitha in a dream, was unfurled. This was shaped like an upside-down Dutch flag, with a white morning star (Sampari) on the blue part. The whole of the Dutch part of New Guinea, from Gebe to Hollandia and Merauke, would be placed under the protection of this flag. All of New Guinea's tribes were allowed to contribute soldiers for the AB army. Amberis who did not wish to take part would be thrown into prison. Official positions were shared to complete the political structure and Angganitha was recognized as Queen. She was given the title 'Woman of the Peace', because the wars between the different tribes had come to an end and, henceforth, all of them would live in peace.

The first goal was to liberate Angganitha, who in the meantime had been incarcerated by the Japanese. This entailed an assault against the mighty Japanese army, which was something that Stephanus was afraid of, but was urgently asked for by the Papuan leaders who had gathered in Wabruk. The AB army and its generals would not be held back, and so half-way through 1942 an expedition set off, determined to liberate Manokwari and the Bird's Head. They encountered a small Japanese military unit that had been sent out to deal with anything that was out of order. After a series of skirmishes and negotiations, Stephanus was captured, brought to Manokwari and, together with Angganitha, beheaded. The Papuan army continued to be active in the years that followed, under the leadership of its remaining generals. In August 1943, plans were drawn up to liberate the whole of New Guinea. Now, more than ever before, the politico-military goal clearly emerged. All this resulted in a new series of battles with the Japanese during the course of which, if we are to believe the sources, hundreds and perhaps even thousands were killed.

Despite this shift in emphasis, one can conclude that basic features of the former movement were retained during this phase. The koreri had been transformed as a result of circumstances, but remained a hotchpotch of various attributes borrowed from both the past and present. The politico-military ideal took on modern, even nationalistic characteristics, in which the Biakkers would figure as liberators of New Guinea. They relied on magical potions and clubs to wage war, which would change into guns as soon as the assault got underway. Manseren Manggundi began to assume the shape of MacArthur in the minds of many. Mixing up different cultural elements in this way is not unusual. On Java, a little while later, all manner of warring parties armed with primitive weapons, but sporting lucky *djimats*, would throw themselves into battle against well-equipped English, Dutch and Japanese soldiers. Just like their colleagues on New Guinea, they too were prepared to defend their way of life against foreign invasive powers. Both cases can be described as containing an element of nationalism. The koreri was the first sign of Papuan nationalism in which the borders of the clan or tribe were transcended. The AB armies were not very effective, due to their primitive nature and habitual in-fighting. As illustrated earlier, the profound individualism of the Biakkans made effective cooperation impossible. At the end of 1943, the movement was suppressed by the Japanese with relative ease.[13]

During the years in which the dream of the Koreri mobilized the Biak people, similar, albeit less extreme, developments took place elsewhere in New Guinea. We have already mentioned the Simson movement in the countryside of Hollandia, which ended in 1943 with the execution of its leader.[14] It can also be reported that the Biak koreri did not succeed in settling on the mainland. The attack on Manokwari was halted by the Japanese with very little effort. On the other hand, during the war years, two power-hungry characters, the brothers Barend and Lodewijk Mandjatan, managed to build up a strong position in the hinterland of Manokwari and forged bonds with many small communities. They were able to do this because of the absence of the Dutch and, likewise, because the Japanese were nowhere to be seen in the area, either. They based this authority not only on heroic deeds against the Japanese and supporting the Dutch cause, but also on a shrewd matrimonial policy and by twisting existing myths about the origin of the universe in their favour.[15] Here too, traditions, sometimes used in a business-like fashion, played a role alongside elements from the new era. As a result of Dutch penetration during previous decades and under pressure from the war, the Papuans in the north were stirred into action.[16]

The end of the war produced new dramas. The final stage of the occupation in particular placed a heavy strain on people. Later, groups of fleeing Japanese

appeared in the interior and it became open season. Suddenly, it was possible to go on headhunting expeditions at the request of the Dutch; an unprecedented sensation! And this coincided with the arrival of the Americans with their overwhelming contingents of manpower and supplies. In earlier years too, the arrival of Dutch ships laden with people and goods was looked upon as a phenomenon of mythical proportions. As elsewhere in Oceania, this had led to the cargo-cults where the arrival of new ships was eagerly awaited. What was now being presented, however, went beyond anything else that had gone before. It was noticed at once, that a significant portion of the American army consisted of black people, who were nevertheless indistinguishable from the whites in both their attire and their behaviour. The blacks did indeed give orders to the whites here, as had been told by the koreri. It left an indelible impression. Furthermore, the Americans were not miserly. Working for them brought ample rewards and there was an abundance of food and clothes, for the Papuans as well. The Americans also made lavish promises, and individual soldiers told the Papuans that, when they pulled out, everything that was left behind would be for them. It seemed as if the Messiah's promise had come true, but in another form. It was, therefore, a crushing disappointment when the penny-pinching Dutch later took over these bases, which they had bought for next to nothing, complete with all the supplies that were stored there. Years later, all along the coasts of New Guinea, people were still eagerly waiting for the return of the American troops.

This just about wraps it up for the north of New Guinea. In Merauke, which was located in the south, things evolved differently. Against all expectations, the Japanese failed to turn up there in 1942 and, after the Battle of the Coral Sea, the town and its surrounding areas were reasonably safe from a Japanese occupation. Despite the inflated military presence, governance could proceed as normal here. Because the administrative centre of the *afdeling*, Tual, was occupied by the Japanese, Merauke and the surrounding areas were governed by an assistant resident during the war, who reported directly to the Dutch authorities in Australia. The first one was Captain S. Spoor, who would quickly acquire a reputation in his capacity as Head of the Nefis and would go on to become Commander of the Armed Forces in the Netherlands East Indies during the years of conflict with the Republic of Indonesia.

The Upper Digul post, with its internment camp for Indonesian nationalists, also remained in Dutch hands for the duration of the war. During the course of 1943, the majority were transferred to Australia, where they were detained anew. This applied to over five hundred people, including women and children. After arriving in Australia, some of them were employed by Dutch

agencies that had established themselves there and were desperate for staff. The group as a whole also came into contact with Australian communists, who saw in their presence interesting possibilities to take action against the Dutch colonialists. Both situations were destined to create problems for the post-war years.

Finally, it can be concluded that the history of the southern parts of New Guinea during the war years was intrinsically different to that of the north from yet another perspective. Unlike the Protestant mission in the north, the Catholic mission was able to continue its work more or less uninterrupted here. Although, admittedly, losing Tual had been a blow because no new gurus could be recruited from the training college there.

The restoration of government under Van Eechoud

With the arrival of the Americans, the Nica were given the responsibility of governing the new territory. That is not to say that the organization could instantly take charge of the whole of western New Guinea. It was too small for this and too dependent upon the American armed forces, which only occupied very limited areas. Nica squads were positioned in Hollandia, Sarmi, Biak and Sausapor. These were small units led by a Commanding Officer Nica (Conica) with his staff, assisted by scores of policemen and soldiers. The core consisted of a small team of Dutch military officials, the majority of whom had followed a crash course in Melbourne in how to be a government civil servant. They were all young people, barely in their twenties, who had often been recruited from outside the East Indies region and who had no, or at best very limited, experience of government. Their bible was the Nica Manual, a stencilled handbook containing the most important information about how the Nica organization had been founded, its war-time responsibilities, the most important administrative particulars and technical tips on how to survive in the jungle. It was written for circumstances that were completely unknown to the authors when their fingers were busy tapping away on the typewriter keys. The Nica was intended, first and foremost, to act as a lynchpin between the Allied Forces and the indigenous population. It was responsible for recruiting personnel for the American armed forces, looking after people during evacuations, removing the Japanese as long as they posed a military risk and, later, rounding them up. On top of this, the Nica was the forerunner of the new civilian order. This immediately led to administrative responsibilities for the areas taken over by them, very often in circumstances in which far-reaching decisions had to be made. As the manual offered them very little solace here, governing became a matter of improvisation more than anything else. Outside the proper Nica areas, in places like

Fakfak and Kaimana, no government official was seen at all until the middle of 1946. There these tasks were, for better or worse, fulfilled by a government doctor or policeman who had returned on their own initiative. Nevertheless, a start was made in this improvising manner to return to a more or less regulated system of government.

At the head of this apparatus was the Sonica, or Senior Officer Netherlands Indies Civil Affairs to give him his full title. His position was never very clear. The East Indies authorities based in Australia were of the opinion that whoever held this office was their official liaison officer with the Commander-in-Chief of the American army, so that they themselves could have direct control over the Nica squads. The Nica was therefore also registered within their organization as the Netherlands Indies Civil Administration. This was a different matter in practice, as the Americans had always looked upon the Nica as a military unit dealing with civil affairs that fell directly under their authority. Within these parameters, the Sonica was the commander who was directly responsible for the special Nica units under their own Conicas. More often than not, actions were carried out based on this interpretation, although successive Sonicas kept in touch with the Netherlands East Indies representatives in Australia whenever this was necessary or possible.

The first Sonica was Colonel C. Giebel, an officer who had been captured and made prisoner-of-war in the Netherlands in 1940 and who was subsequently incarcerated by the Germans in a large internment camp in Colditz for officers of the Allied Forces. He eventually managed to escape to London and, from here, he was sent to Australia, where he was an important asset to the small Dutch community there. In mid-May 1944, just a few weeks after the Americans landed, he arrived in Hollandia, where Van Eechoud and his men had been trickling in gradually from their camp in the interior. The Nica were part of a mobile army and so the bulk of the personnel had to accompany them to the new locations that had to be occupied. This also applied to the commanding officers. After just one month, Giebel advanced further towards Morotai with the American army. After the eastern parts of Indonesia (called the Great East, for short) had been liberated, he evolved into the most prominent Dutch authority figure in those parts, again on grounds that could be officially contested. The colonels J.M.R. Sandberg and C.C. De Rooy successively bridged the following months to August 1944. The position of Sonica in Hollandia was then taken over by Colonel Abdulkadir Wijojoatmojo. When Abdulkadir also had to move on in July 1945, the baton was passed to Jan van Eechoud who, out of all his predecessors, had the most hands-on practical experience of New Guinea.

After the capitulation of Japan on 15 August 1945, the Americans were in a hurry to leave. On 15 January 1946, their last units departed from Hollandia. Formally, the government of the Allied Forces was kept on in the Great East until July 1946. This was just as long as the military government remained on New Guinea, in which Van Eechoud as Sonica eventually achieved the rank of lieutenant colonel. Afterwards, the civilian regime was reinstated throughout the whole of the Great East and Van Eechoud acted as officiating resident. Because, for practical reasons, Merauke had also been added to the conica area in 1944, his residency included the entire area of western New Guinea. Without any apparent discussion, the acting lt. governor general of the Netherlands Indies, H.J. van Mook, had in the meantime already chosen Hollandia as the principal town of the soon-to-be-formed residency. All the barracks, airfields, harbours and supplies left behind by the Americans were located here, while Manokwari, which had suffered terribly as a result of the war, did not have anything to offer.

Jan van Eechoud, who has been mentioned here on many occasions already, was a young man from the province of Limburg in the southern part of the Netherlands who, following a rather nondescript career on Java, had ended up as police commissioner on New Guinea in 1936. What was experienced as a punitive transfer for some, would turn out to be his destiny in life. New Guinea, where few rules stood in the way of taking the law into one's own hands, was the place where he could realize his full potential. We have already encountered him in his capacity as scout and jungle explorer both before and during the war. In addition to this, he had also displayed a great interest in the life of the Papuans and their country. He was irritable, severely critical in his judgement of others, head-strong and ambitious. Moreover, he was firmly convinced that the Dutch were fully entitled to interfere in Papuan society, the primitive aspects of which he knew only too well.

During the months following his arrival in Hollandia, he also visited other parts of the north coast and developed plans for the future implementation of authority once the military phase had come to an end. He set this down in writing in an official memorandum dated 25 September 1944[17], in which he painted an excessively grim picture of what had been done for the country before 1942. He presented himself as the man who could make a better job of it. The memorandum was intended to act as an impetus for a new policy that would strive to ensure that the country would not gradually fade away into oblivion again after the war ended. He was fiercely critical of the East Indonesian civil servants, the '*amberis*', who 'vexed the Papuan in lots of ways and, with their absolute contempt for him, considered him to be barely human, humiliated him, and obstructed his development'. That judgement was harsher than necessary and

completely overlooked the debt the country owed to many of these Ambonese, Keiese and Manadonese. It is a glaring example of Van Eechoud's characteristic tendency to exaggerate. Nevertheless, in light of the experiences of the war years, one can sympathize with his proposal to replace as many of them as possible with Papuans. He also intended to prove that the Papuans' trust in the Dutch, rightly or wrongly, had survived the war. The overall tone of his memorandum was to trust in the capacity of the Papuans and their right to take their destiny in their own hands, although of course under Dutch supervision. Constructing the new Papuan society would have to take place from the bottom up. The kampung had to be selected as the smallest unit of government, even though it was not originally an indigenous body. It was from this basis that the circles in which a certain degree of self-government was possible had to be slowly expanded, making as much use as possible of the existing structures. The fact that this approach would result in a variety of forms in different areas did not matter. In addition, absolutely everything should be done to create an upper echelon of Papuans who would be capable of ruling their own people. The seeds for this were already present as a result of the pre-war policies of the Protestant and Catholic missions.

This memorandum was written in 1944, at a time when other tasks took precedence. Yet despite this, the thoughts he had committed to paper continued to preoccupy him and he went on to elaborate them further in two more detailed accounts in 1947.[18] When taken together they sketch an outline of the policy that would be followed until 1962. What stands out is that he pays a lot of attention in his accounts to experiences acquired in colonial Africa. In his view, these were more relevant for the circumstances in New Guinea than those within the more refined administration in the rest of Indonesia. Van Eechoud's remarks were not without influence. They must have appealed to Van Mook as well, who had already got to know him in Australia. This also explains his appointment to resident afterwards, something that was unique in the history of the elite corps of the Indies civil service, the *Binnenlands Bestuur*. Indeed, here was a police commissioner, who had not been to university in either Leiden or Utrecht, propelled without so much as a by-your-leave to the second highest rank of the corps. Later events reveal that this outsider's meteoric career did not sit well with many of his colleagues. This undoubtedly contributed to the fact that later, in 1950, the position of governor, which he had come to consider his innate right, slipped from his fingers.

Van Eechoud was ambitious, and not just on paper. Part of his plans were carried out immediately. In 1944, he created a *Papoea Bataljon* (Papuan battalion) to provide support to the small Nica detachment. At its core was a group of people who had accompanied Victor de Bruijn on his odyssey through

the interior during the war years. The unit received a complement of approximately 650 men and fell immediately under his command. He ensured that equipment and food rations were always extremely sober, so that the gap between these people and the rest of the population would not become unnecessarily wide, and they marched with bare feet. Amongst others, the battalion was successfully deployed in 1945 for the occupation of Manokwari and Sorong after the Japanese had been disarmed there.[19] At that time, the battalion was the mainstay of the Dutch military presence on New Guinea where, other than that, only an occasional KNIL company was stationed.[20] Nevertheless, it fell out of favour the following year, and not just with Van Eechoud. The reason for this was that, when the Americans left, the battalion was assigned directly to the KNIL and was dealt with as such in terms of how it was treated, clothed and fed. They were given shoes, beer and much better pay.

In Van Eechoud's opinion, this is what sent the Papuan soldiers completely over the top. They became arrogant, demanding and unruly. According to him they were not to blame for this, because these primitive people could not cope with luxury and were openly exposed to every suggestion that emerged from their new environment. The spectre of resistance towards the Dutch, which at the time was active in large segments of Indonesia, fell into this category. In November 1946, a plot involving members of the Papuan battalion was uncovered in Sorong.[21] A local riot in Sarmi in April 1947, in which several drunken soldiers caused mayhem in the town, was the last straw. The battalion was dissolved in July of that same year. The event left a bitter taste in Van Eechoud's mouth, as it represented the breakdown of an important experiment. In his opinion, those in charge of the army and the administration bore full responsibility for this, as they had interfered with issues in his territory against his wishes. He let them know this too. The matter got so out of hand that Van Eechoud was summoned to Batavia, where he was forced by the Director of the Department of the Interior, C.J.H.R. De Waal, to take back what he had said. It was a sequence of events that was typical of Van Eechoud and which did not do much to ingratiate him further with the authorities in Batavia.

His firm conviction that the instruction of the Papuans had to remain in the hands of one single individual, namely himself, is revealed in the accompanying correspondence. Indeed, the Papuans should not be allowed to be transferred anywhere outside New Guinea 'before they have become a balanced people in terms of their development, so that other races do not look down upon them.'[22] Elsewhere, he warns in no uncertain terms about Papuans who have already been 'outside' and who would probably have picked up wrong ideas. This sort of thing should not be attributed to a newly established political conviction but, here too, to the gullibility of the primitive individual. The tone

of a concerned father-figure echoes throughout, one who had not without reason been given the title 'bapa papua', the father of the Papuans, by his pupils. It was the 'babuist' (nanny-like) attitude that had been typical of the civil service in other areas too, and which had already met with increasing criticism from Indonesians during the pre-war years. Given the time and place, this attitude was still completely acceptable and justifiable for the tiny top layer of the Papuan world. This applied to other fields of European intervention too. As we have seen, the education standards developed on Java tended to hamper rather than enhance education. Improvement came in the form of a decision taken in 1938 by Governor General Van Starkenborgh that allowed for a certain degree of flexibility when these standards were applied in New Guinea. New Guinea would be able to develop its own standards, which in the education sector had resulted in the institution of a *Beschavingsschool*. Indeed, Van Eechoud had wanted to achieve the same thing with the creation of his Papuan battalion, but he was thwarted in his efforts by the fact that the KNIL did not wish to deviate from its own standards.

As for the police, Van Eechoud insisted on having a New Guinea 'standard' too, even though he did not use the word explicitly. For all practical purposes he advocated the creation of an effective and cheap policing system. Before the war, there had been a well trained and equipped *Veldpolitie*, the sum total of which amounted to around four hundred individuals, mainly Moluccans. As we have seen already, there had also been two much more elementary types of police force, the *Bestuurspolitie* and *Landschapspolitie*, each one consisting of around 250 Papuans. These did not usually do any actual police work but made themselves useful by relaying messages; no mean feat, given the enormous distances in these parts. When the war ended there were problems across the board with the Moluccans within the police force too. To begin with, it was necessary to send some of them home because of their behaviour during the war. In addition, the majority at any rate first wanted to go back to the Moluccas after their long absence from house and home. The immediate outcome of this was that the human resources available for New Guinea were halved. Going back did not go smoothly, not only as a result of the political circumstances, but also because there was an urgent need for manpower in the rest of the archipelago in the areas that were governed by the Netherlands.

These staffing problems had been anticipated beforehand. In 1944, a Police Academy had already been set up in Merauke, in order to make a police system instantly available during the first phase of reconstruction in the Netherlands East Indies. The academy was later transferred to Hollandia. In 1947, the strength of the police force in New Guinea, now called the *Algemene Politie* (General Police) once again came close to what it had been in 1938. Papuans

were still not included among its core members because they did not meet the educational requirements. Yet Van Eechoud also strove here, in keeping with his overall approach, for a swift Papuanization, but this was obstructed by the problems that had arisen with the Papuan battalion. Changing the members of the pre-war subsidiary Papuan police forces into full-fledged agents had not been that obvious a move. The work they carried out had been too far removed from actual police work to justify this. The majority were now appointed as 'orderlies', a title that was more in line with their function.

Nevertheless, the need for a genuine Papuan police force that could play an active role in opening up the interior was still desperately felt. In order to deal with this on a grand scale, it had to be cost-effective or, in other words, carried out on a New Guinean level. It was therefore desirable that these agents could live on what was provided locally, so that they would be able to manage without porters. The market for this type of personnel had been ruined through the vicissitudes of the Papuan battalion with its demands for high salaries and rice as a main staple in their diet, as a result of which they needed porters whenever they went on expeditions. Only after its dissolution in 1948 could the first four contingents of a new Papuan police force be created.[23]

Human resource problems also affected government activities as a whole. For the time being, it was not possible to initiate the heightened activity strongly advocated by Van Eechoud. The influx of new Ambonese personnel that was needed for this failed to take place. Van Eechoud began to miss them now, and the sharp anti-amberi tone vanished from his correspondence. After all, they had produced some excellent civil servants and the improvement of their moral attitude towards the Papuans was primarily a question of proper information and training. When his requests for new people fell on deaf ears, he finally had to conclude, with some regret, that Ambon seemingly no longer aspired to the privileged position it had achieved throughout history, and that it would be necessary to look around for candidates from other sections of the population.[24]

Eventually, the situation stabilized itself, although there was still a desperate shortage of clerical staff in particular. With the transfer of sovereignty in Indonesia in 1950 and the concomitant new exodus of Indonesian personnel and influx of Indo-Europeans to New Guinea, the situation changed. By the beginning of 1948, the situation was at any rate normalized to such an extent that most of the government posts that had been established before 1942 were occupied once more, albeit at the lowest level of capacity. At that moment, a formal reorganization had taken place for the newly formed residency of New Guinea. This confirmed Hollandia's position, which it had acquired for itself as the principal town of the entire residency. The town had also become the

primary location for the division (*afdeling*) of North New Guinea, which now contained the sub-divisions of Hollandia, Sarmi, Biak and Japen (including Waropen as far as Nabire) and the Lake Plains (Meervlakte). With this, the division encompassed the largest part of the North coast and Geelvink Bay. The old principal town of the district, Manokwari, which had not yet recovered from the destructive Japanese and American bombardments, had been more or less added as a sub-division to the division (*afdeling*) of West New Guinea, which now comprised the whole of the Bird's Head with Sorong as its principal town. The situation on the South coast had changed inasmuch as the Mimika territory had been added to the division of South New Guinea, which also comprised the sub-divisions of Merauke and Tanah Merah. In all of these *afdelingen* (the post of the Assistant Resident) and *onderafdelingen* (controleur), a more ordered administration had once again returned to the coastal areas. In addition to this, Van Eechoud created a new district called Central New Guinea, which comprised the vast highlands. It was more of a programmatic gesture than an administrative reality. The area was under the supervision of the Resident of Hollandia, which at least allowed this small town to reinforce its claim to the first league among the New Guinean centres. Indeed, the choice of Hollandia was partly determined by the fact that it provided the best links with the highly populated, but as yet ungoverned, valleys of the Baliem and the Wissel Lakes.[25] Thus, some degree of order had been achieved, while after that point material conditions improved too. The arrival of extra ships and more and better radios made the administration less reliant on having to make interminable journeys on foot, where it was necessary to walk for hundreds of kilometres to gather even the most basic administrative data.

During the pre-war years, the term of office for European personnel had always been brief. Van Eechoud himself, who by 1948 had already been in the area for more than ten years, was a major exception to this rule. A couple of months to two years maximum tended to be the rule of thumb. This is why the quality of governance remained inadequate, because the complicated structure of the society indeed required an intimate knowledge that had to be acquired primarily in the field because no suitable literature on the subject was available. He was therefore no fan of the traditional indologists who had an academic background, but instead preferred energetic high-school graduates who could begin immediately after following a brief training course. In addition, Van Eechoud's agenda listed issues such as improved working conditions for European personnel, linked to six-year terms of office at the very least. It is clear that here his own career served as the model for the new government officials. The plans would have to wait until after 1950 before they could be realized when, as a result of the collapse of the Indonesian employment area for

Europeans in civil service, a placement in New Guinea began to be viewed in a different light. Yet a core group of highly dedicated, young civil servants who would continue to eke out their time there had already gathered together under Van Eechoud. These included the likes of Raphael den Haan, Rob Meyer Ranneft, Piet Merkelijn and Frits Sollewijn Gelpke.[26]

In conclusion, the issue of Papuanization played a role here too. This would be a long, drawn out affair, because it could not be seen separately from the whole picture, particularly with regard to education. Nevertheless, an important stimulus was given to this area too during this period. Right in the beginning, in 1944, Van Eechoud set up a temporary crash course in public administration for Papuans in close consultation with Abdulkadir in Hollandia. The institute was intended to accommodate prominent youths who had been unable to complete their education during the war. It offered a two-year course that was followed by 17 students, many of whom we will meet in the sequel to this story. They included Marcus and Frans Kaisiepo, Lucas Rumkorem and Nicolaas Jouwe.[27] After 1949, the training of Papua civil servants was placed on a more permanent footing with the establishment of a training college that earned itself a reputation under the name of *Opleidingsschool voor Bestuursambtenaren* or Osiba (Training School for Civil Servants). It offered courses that lasted between four to five years, which were alternately spent in the classroom and in hands-on training programmes. Until its dissolution in 1962, its courses were followed by about 125 students altogether. Alongside secondary school subjects, disciplines such as political science, ethnology and law were placed on the curriculum.

As in the administration and the police force, there were staffing problems in the education sector too, and these were most serious in the north and west, which had been more heavily afflicted by the war and the occupation. Immediately after the war ended, everything was quickly cobbled together with a quick spit and polish to get things up and running, during which widespread use was made of unqualified personnel. One very special creation of the Nica was the Papuan Institute, which admitted groups of young people with no, or very few, formal qualifications. The idea was to prepare them for various positions in the community. Seemingly, it did not last for very long, as afterwards we stop reading anything about it. Restoring the regular primary schools with a three-year curriculum was more important. In the beginning, most of the work for this was carried out by the government. It was only in 1947 that the corporate bodies of the missions had recovered sufficiently to take over this task. We also have at our disposal the first complete overview for that specific point in time.[28] The total number of pupils following the three-year junior school

trajectories, the acculturative schools and the more 'intellectual' village schools came to approximately 25,000 individuals. The Protestant denominations accounted for around 14,000 of these, while the Catholics of the congregation of the Sacred Heart combined with the Fransiscans accounted for more than 8,000. From the perspective of creating an elite, it is important to know that 744 gurus, 266 of whom were Papuans, taught at these schools. These figures still indicate a strong Moluccan presence.

The figures do not vary that much from the pre-war figures, despite the fact that the Protestant mission had not yet returned to its old level. This also applied to secondary education. Each of the different religious orders had its own form of secondary level education, which are referred to in the statistics as *Vervolgschool* (VVS). Those of the Protestant mission were by far the largest. After the old school in Miei was closed down in 1942, it was established once again in 1944 in Joka near Hollandia. In 1948, both the Protestant mission and Van Eechoud alike seriously considered raising the standard of this school by offering longer courses, for example. Van Eechoud and the Protestant missionaries alike wanted the residential institute in Joka to function as a cultural focal point, where young people from all over New Guinea would meet each other and forge links that would bind them to the region for the rest of their lives. Education should be set up in such a way that it would nurture solidarity. Joka was destined to become the Oxbridge of New Guinea, where the omnipresent tribal differences would be overcome. This was an important issue in light of the strong chauvinism that was present everywhere, not least among the Biak people, who were keen to retain their eminent position as the most developed group.

It is remarkable that no traces of rivalry with the Catholic missions are encountered in the reports of these discussions between Van Eechoud and the governing bodies of the Protestant mission. Given the past history, it was indeed highly possible that allowing the Protestant Joka to have such a central position would not go down very well with the Catholics from the south. Similarly, these developments did not fuel the suspicion with which Van Eechoud, himself a practising Catholic, was viewed by the predominantly Protestant Netherlands East Indies administrators. The available facts show that creating solidarity among the Papuans was an absolute priority for Van Eechoud and one that far outweighed any religious rivalries.

Linked to this, it should also be mentioned that the negotiating partner in this matter was no longer the old *Utrechtsche Zendingsvereeniging* (UZV). During the post-war years, it was no longer capable of dealing with the work on New Guinea on the scale that was required. Various missionary societies had been brought together under the auspices of the Dutch Reformed Church in an

organization, called *Verenigde Zendings Genootschappen* or VZG (United Missionary Societies), which was managed by the board that was situated at the centre for missionary training in the town of Oegstgeest, near Leiden in the Netherlands. The former headmaster of Miei, Kijne, served as its Regional Supervisor on New Guinea and was also in charge of Joka. In this way, with all the changes that were taking place, here too a thread of continuity was clearly present. Van Eechoud and Kijne not only worked well together in practice, they shared the same underlying concerns too.

In the end, they chose to wait a while before taking any further steps. The boarding school on Joka was all very well, but one should not be too hasty about training a Papuan elite. In light of the level of civilization throughout the society as a whole, that would only present problems. Both therefore opted to expand widthwise, by lengthening the duration of the existing elementary school teaching to four years. This would cause less upheaval than the random establishment of secondary schools which would stir up regional chauvinism and cultivate a group of people for whom there would be no work.[29] This approach was in line with the policy followed in the old Netherlands East Indies, although there it had been impossible to keep tight hold of the reins for reasons of political opportunism. There was no need for this yet in the New Guinea of 1948, and there was absolutely no sense of urgency. Those who have faith do not make haste.

Echoes of the revolution

From a governance perspective, the Van Eechoud era was a time of improvising with limited resources. It was only after 1947 that governance and education slowly began making their way back to the pre-1942 situation. In addition to this, new ideas were developed for more methodical development and more intensive governance in the future and the first steps were taken to implement this. For Van Eechoud, the development of the Papuans was key, but this would have to take place carefully and with a lot of forethought so that it would not lead to their being uprooted. The measures to be taken would have to fit in with their world and appear to show the greatest respect for their culture. The idea was not to create new Westerners, but rather Papuans who had gained a new harmony with the world around them. Consistency was therefore of paramount importance. Whatever was begun, would have to be seen through to the end, otherwise 'detribalism' would follow: reverting to a past with which one no longer felt any true affinity. And there was no sadder or more dangerous human being than a savage who had been uprooted! This thought remained at the very heart of the policy that was implemented, even after Van Eechoud had

left. It was also responsible for the fact that he could not make opening up the valleys of the Wissel Lakes and the Baliem a high priority, despite his heartfelt interest in these regions. This should only be taken on if one was absolutely ready for it.

The focus was first and foremost on restoring law and order in the areas one intended to govern. This did not lead to any major problems. Nevertheless, during the early years, rumours about conspiracies and attacks against the Europeans cropped up quite regularly in the larger population centres of New Guinea. The administration and the police tended to react disproportionately to this. All this can be explained by the uprooting caused by the war which had just ended, the extremely weak level of organization on the part of the Dutch and, last but not least, events in the rest of Indonesia. The declaration of Indonesian independence on 17 Augustus 1945 also had a substantial impact on this distant island. The issue did not seem relevant to the vast majority of the Papuans. However, it was a different story altogether for all the Indonesians from the other parts of the archipelago who had been settled there for years or who had come to New Guinea in the wake of the war and the liberation. With Indonesian independence within reach, in principle everyone had to make a choice. That is not to say that everyone was immediately able to do so. Uncertainty prevailed, and unexpected chops and changes were everyday occurrences. The power of the local administration was an important factor in this unstable situation. The more this improved during the course of 1947, the more the unrest ebbed away. At the same time, most of those who were passing through in the wake of the war simply disappeared, as a result of which the Papuans once again had to deal exclusively with the Dutch and Moluccan officials, missionaries, and teachers.

As our story reveals, during the course of the war, Papuan society in the coastal areas was severely disrupted. The departure of the Americans heralded the beginning of normality. As early as October 1945, administrative authority was once again formally transferred to the Dutch by means of a proclamation. A few months later, as soon as the last American units had left Hollandia and Biak, the KNIL took over the military bases and the goods that had been left behind. For the Papuans in these areas, this meant the end of the gravy train that the American presence had come to represent for them. As we have seen, koreri and cargo-cult appearances continued to pop up on a regular basis. They could still wield their influence, more or less as an undercurrent in the tide of modern day paradigms. Inevitably, the paradigm of the 'kemerdekaan', the new freedom that was beckoning Indonesia, was part of this.

As Marcus Kaisiepo indicated afterwards, the message about the Indonesian Proclamation of Independence only reached the pupils of the government

school in Hollandia a few days later via the radio. At the time, it was instantly dismissed by this small elite group.[30] Undoubtedly, in times to come the radio represented the most direct source of information about the course of the decolonization process in Indonesia for the small group that had access to it. It was passed on to the Papuan inhabitants via the intermediary of the diverse Indonesian migrant groups, the *amberis* or *pu-anim*, as they were referred to in the south. During the post-war years, there were several thousand of them present in New Guinea. We have already seen that the position of many Moluccan gurus and government assistants had become problematic as a result of their attitude during the occupation. Nevertheless, they continued to remain indispensable. This group viewed developments within Indonesia with mixed feelings, as did the Menadonese soldiers. These were professional soldiers from the KNIL who had been interned by the Japanese during the occupation. They were the first troops over which the returning Dutch administration on New Guinea in 1944 wielded power.

In the wake of war and liberation, other groups of Indonesians came to the island as well. After the internment camp in Upper Digul had been closed down in 1943, some of the inhabitants stayed behind in Merauke. Approximately two hundred 'die-hards' were transported to Australia with their families and sheltered in camps there. From here, they saw their chance to recreate their nationalistic ambitions, due in part to the support they were given by the Australian communists. Furthermore, there was a substantial group of stranded KPM crew members in Australia, who had become entangled in a labour conflict with their employers that began to take on political overtones. The demand was equal pay for European and Asian crew members, which was something the company did not want. They too were put up in work camps, of which Van Eechoud himself had been in charge for a while during the time he spent in Australia. It was an experience which he did not look back upon with any real pleasure. In his opinion, it would have been more appropriate if the Dutch institutions had adopted a more conciliatory approach towards these people. As they were pressed for personnel, the Dutch who were present in Australia had made use of the Indonesian exiles wherever possible. There were some well-educated people, particularly among the ex-Digulists, who wanted to do their bit for the war effort to help the Allied Forces. Dozens of them followed the Nica to New Guinea during the course of 1944. It was a small, but very politically aware group, which anxiously followed developments on Java. Of course, at the time of the proclamation, they were fierce supporters of the Republic, which shaped their national ideals.

The next batch of temporary migrants came to New Guinea soon after larger areas of Indonesia were occupied by the armies of the Allied Forces. From here,

hundreds of people were transported to Hollandia and Merauke to follow improvised police and naval training courses. Among them were many Javanese and Sumatrans. Moreover, the group of Javanese Romushas encountered on New Guinea was larger than originally thought. No firm data exists, but the random figures that are available suggest that there were several thousand of them. After all the horrors that had been endured, they were highly receptive to the idea that Indonesians should shape their own destiny. The ex-Digulists found them to be a willing audience. The Republican voice was significantly strengthened with the arrival of Dr G.S.S.J. Ratulangi and a number of his associates. The Menadonese Ratulangi had earned his spurs before the war in the nationalist movement as a journalist and was appointed governor of Celebes by the Republic following the proclamation of independence. His position was not easy, because at the same time, the Dutch administration had re-established itself in the area, with help from Australia. For security reasons he was exiled, together with seven of his associates, in June 1946 to the small town of Serui which is situated on Japen island in Geelvink Bay.[31] This no doubt put the minds of the Dutch administrators in Macassar at ease. In the skies of New Guinea, Ratulangi beamed like a brilliant star that shone the light of the revolution into gloomy areas. On Serui he had plenty of opportunity to do this. He was brought there as the result of a government measure, not as the result of a punishment imposed by a judge. Consequently, he and his companions were able to move around freely and managed to make their voice heard without entangling themselves with the law-courts. For Van Eechoud, Ratulangi's presence in his area of jurisdiction was a thorn in his side and he repeatedly insisted that he should leave.[32] Ratulangi eventually left after the Renville Agreement had been signed in 1948.

All these ex-Digulists and other Republicans ensured the broadcasting of the Republican message. They found an audience among the Indonesian migrant groups in the coastal areas, particularly the former Romushas. Of course, they also turned their attention to the Papuan population. They could fall back on the historically contestable proposition of three hundred years of Dutch domination. Whenever the Papuans were subsequently asked where they now stood after those three hundred years, they fell silent with shame.[33] Another tactic involved the endlessly repeated promise that under the Republic there would be an end to all discrimination. Moreover, everyone, even a Papuan with only three years of basic education, would be able to become a resident or governor; a tantalizing thought for members of a group of people who knew that they were right at the bottom of the social ladder created by the Dutch administration.

To complete the picture, it should be mentioned here that aside from these Indonesian migrants, New Guinea also provided shelter to two more groups of

temporary inhabitants at this time. Firstly, there were the Japanese, who after their capitulation, were clustered together in a number of places. In the entire area of the Great East, 180,000 Japanese military personnel were encountered. Significant concentrations of 8,000 or more people could be found in Manokwari, Sorong, Hollandia and Biak.[34] On the whole, they behaved extremely cooperatively and never failed to carry out the tasks they had been assigned. Nor did they need a lot of supervision. As a result, in Sorong, 250 men from the Papuan battalion had no trouble at all guarding 12,000 Japanese. On Biak and in Hollandia the Japanese were the best workers on the military bases that had been taken over from the Americans. During a fire among the army supplies on Biak, Japanese prisoners-of-war sprang into action on their own initiative and were able to avoid a more serious outcome. Unlike on Java and Sumatra, where the Japanese furtively supported the Republic, they did not play any political role at all on New Guinea. The assumption seems to be justified that this was not only because of the absence of a strong nationalistic movement here, but also due to the fact that the Japanese were actually beaten by the American army here.

After 1946, the island sheltered one more group of unusual guests. Several hundred former Dutch supporters of the Germans during the occupation of Holland had been brought to New Guinea to sit out their sentence. They were assigned to a working battalion on the airbase on Biak. Van Mook had opposed their arrival because it would reinforce New Guinea's reputation as a place of exile at a time when it had in fact been decided that the internment camp in Upper Digul would not be resurrected. It was of no avail. In practice, however, their presence did not lead to any problems. When a serious conflict broke out on Biak in 1948, to be described in greater detail later on, they defended the puny Dutch positions with the help of a few hastily distributed weapons. During the course of 1950 they returned to the Netherlands. From a political perspective, this group played no role whatsoever.

The first post-war years were characterized by incidents, rumours and plans to seize power that provide us with some insights into the role that the different groups in society played. To begin with, they were mainly limited to Hollandia, Merauke and Biak, and took place predominantly during the final months of 1945 and 1946, when the Republic got a foothold on Java and there, in its name, unleashed a wave of violence, the '*bersiap*', against the Dutch and all those who supported them. The Ambonese and Menadonese in particular were targeted. Both groups were well-represented on New Guinea.

In Hollandia, the bersiap on Java led to a great deal of tension. The Javanese who were present in the city, which included a large group of recruits from the

local Police Academy which had been set up temporarily, identified with the Republican cause and turned against the KNIL company of Menadonese troops who were based there. The latter had continuously shown themselves to be fierce supporters of the Dutch cause and they were now especially anxious because they feared that their wives and children on Java were in great danger. When, under these circumstances, a large consignment of weapons went missing from an army depot, rumours immediately began to spread about an impending Javanese coup on 15 December 1946. This resulted in action being taken by the administration whereby the Menadonese battalion was sent in. They acted harshly—too harshly in Van Eechoud's view, because there were needless fatalities and injuries. For him, the matter was particularly painful because the prime suspect was his 'anak mas' (golden boy) Sugoro, an ex-Digulist in whom he had absolute faith and whom he had appointed as Director of an improvised Management Training Course for Papuan students. At first Van Eechoud found it exceptionally difficult to believe that Sugoro was guilty, but he became convinced of it later on. Sugoro disappeared into custody, but to no avail. In July and December 1946, new plots were unearthed in which he played an active role. The explanation for this is that the dilapidated prison could not stem the free-flowing traffic of the outside world. In 1947, all of the Javanese and Sumatrans were taken away and tranquillity once again returned to Hollandia.[35]

In Merauke, it was the former Digulists who managed to keep the administration in a constant state of tension. Originally, the proximity of Australia and the presence of an Australian garrison played a role here. The wildest rumours began to circulate about imminent actions against the Dutch and their associates, although it is uncertain whether there were any real grounds for them.[36] The Digulists found an audience for their plans among the former KPM members who were present, along with the pupils of the temporary school for sea cadets. This emergency training course included sixty Javanese students who expressed their sympathy with the Republican cause. A few hundred Javanese farmers who had spent dozens of years planting rice in the flat hinterland of Merauke became caught up in the conspiracy. The chosen solution was to strengthen the garrison with Menadonese and Ambonese soldiers. In total, three military companies were based here. In January 1947, every Javanese man, woman and child, 632 individuals in total, were transported to Java by ship.[37]

This took the pressure off. Nevertheless, a remarkable incident should be mentioned here. It had to do with Biak, where on 14 March 1948 a potentially large-scale assault was uncovered. The occupation of the airbases and the supplies located there would form the springboard for an attack on the Dutch

throughout the whole of New Guinea. The attack failed at a very early stage, but a Dutch telegraph operator was killed in the process. Although this could not be proved, there were indications that the culprits should be sought in Macassar and Serui, which was situated close to Biak; where admittedly the group around Ratulangi had been released on those exact days, but where strong Republican sympathies still remained. It is certain, at any rate, that an important role in this was played by Joseph, the Moluccan assistant administrator whom we have already encountered as De Bruijn's confidant during the latter's war-time excursions into the interior and who was once again his close colleague on Biak. Following his arrest, his eyes filled with tears when he was forced to admit that the plan had included killing his friend De Bruijn as well.[38]

These incidents, rumours and preparations to seize power led to scores of sentences made by hastily assembled, temporary war tribunals. The harshest punishments were meted out in Hollandia, where apparently the danger had been greatest. In Sugoro's case, a life-sentence was given. But the reason for the tension was not solely political. Most of the migrant groups harboured serious grievances about the poor care they received and the long wait they had to endure before they were sent back to their homes. The panic reactions must be attributed to the instability of the society, in which each small group had to find its own way and the Dutch administration did not have enough resources to maintain law and order.

A few Menadonese companies played an important role in all of this. As everywhere else in the Great East, they represented the mainstay of the returning Dutch regime on New Guinea too. Now they were spurred on by the hardships they had suffered in the Japanese camps and anxiety for their families on Java. They were also driven by a feeling of being discriminated against. They knew their worth and wished to be treated accordingly. On 7 December 1942, Queen Wilhelmina of the Netherlands had promised equal treatment to all races in her well-known radio broadcast. As had been the case with the KPM-personnel, it irked them too, tremendously, that they were not instantly placed on an equal footing with regard to salary, food and divisions of rank with their European colleagues. Under these circumstances, a law-abiding attitude could easily flip into reverse. So it was that, on the evening of Saturday 23 February 1946, a massive party was held in Hollandia for the men from the Menadonese 173e KNIL company. Everything was 'decorated in red-white-and-blue and orange. Fiery speeches were made about being loyal to the Queen, and the Wilhelmus [the Dutch national anthem] was sung at full throttle.' They did not utter one word of the Indonesian anthem, the 'Indonesia Raja', which was also allowed in these unsettled times. One would think that there was no danger to

fear at all. Yet this was immediately followed by a few highly charged days caused by the insensitive behaviour of a few Dutch officers during an incident involving stolen clothes. An investigation that was initiated cautiously within the company led to a massive outcry, because it was felt that the group's honour had been besmirched. The resulting conflict could only be resolved through endless dicussion. The situation was even more precarious because, during that same week, a similar series of incidents in Menado, their home-base on Celebes, had even led to a temporary take-over, during which Menadonese soldiers took their Dutch officers prisoner. The event had unmistakable Republican overtones, because part of the more politically developed Menadonese began to worry about their future and made overtures to the Republic. The reports about this dramatic incident provoked the wildest stories in Hollandia and Merauke. There were tales of air raids and murders, and killings in Menado. To add fuel to the fire, a Javanese male nurse, a former Digulist, started a petition in support of the Republic, for which he also seemed to find a willing audience among many Menadonese. For Van Eechoud, the event gave sufficient cause to submit a request for the three Menadonese companies to be replaced by one single European company.[39]

According to reports written by the Dutch administration, Papuans had also been involved in the different incidents. This mainly involved members of the Papuan battalion. As has already been explained, this eventually led to the whole battalion being dissolved. Yet this involvement remained the exception rather than the rule, and Papuans were seldom at the forefront of activities. According to Van Eechoud', in all these cases, 'it was largely the foreigners who instigated them or carried them out. Papuans were only occasionally seduced into taking part and when they did so, it was usually only half-heartedly.'[40]

The facts that have emerged give no reason to challenge his viewpoint. Yet a brief note can be jotted down in the margin here. A lot of people must have known about the preparations that were being made for the uprising on the important island of Biak, without it being noticed. It was only afterwards that it dawned on Dutch officials that, on the morning of that fateful day, they had seen women and children leaving the airbases, evidently intent on finding a safe sanctuary away from danger. The police gradually unpicked all the facts by combining these signs with the embroidered accounts of individual Papuans. The failure of the undertaking can largely be attributed to half-hearted cooperation among the conspirators, who fell into a panic after the first actions were carried out. Nevertheless, the man who murdered the telegraph operator was a Papuan. Although the attack was actually concocted by a Moluccan called Joseph, it was carried out in collaboration with a small group of Papuans and with the knowledge of a section of Biak society. Although Papuans may only

have been tempted into carrying out such actions on the odd occasion, and even then only half-heartedly, after what took place on Biak the government came to the conclusion that the Biak people would have gone along with the outcome if this had been detrimental to the government.[41]

These wild actions ran parallel with a more ordered political life. This tied in with the developments in Indonesia, particularly the discussion that was going on between the Dutch and the various Indonesian parties (to be covered in more detail in the next chapter). For the time being, it is important to know that, in 1946, agreements were made between the Dutch and the Indonesians concerning a federal set-up of the new Indonesia, in which the different areas of the country would be given varying degrees of independence while the sum of the parts would be brought into some sort of federal union. This resulted in a conference being organized by Lieutenant Governor General Van Mook in June of that year in Malino in the South Celebes. Representatives came together from the non-Republican parts of Sumatra and the Great East to exchange ideas about how the programme could progress. During the conference preparations, the Dutch organizers took it for granted that two Papuans should be among the twenty-three participants. They would be just as strongly represented as, for example, the Minahassa or the South Moluccas.[42]

This delegation was later reduced to a single individual. The Biakker, Frans Kaisiepo, was selected to be sent. He played his role in Malino with verve, but his demeanour was ambiguous. The main thrust of his statement was that New Guinea wished to cooperate with the Netherlands and Indonesia in constructing a framework for government and the education sector. This announcement was followed by a tirade against the Moluccans, stating that 'the people' did not wish to share the same residency with them. In addition, the links that still existed with Tidore had to be severed immediately and he opposed the name 'Papua', which according to him in the Tidoran language was synonymous with 'slave'. It had to be replaced with 'Irian', a word from the Biak language.[43] At a later stage in the conference, he went back on these statements. He informed the meeting that he had now realized that New Guinea was too small to assume that it would be able to take on the same position within the realm as Surinam or Curaçao and that this was why an alliance with the South Moluccas suited them best. This was a statement that concurred with the wish cherished by the people living on the Moluccas for a Great Molucca, a *Maluku Raya*, that was part of the Indonesian federation. Evidently, Kaisiepo saw things differently after a remark made by Lieutenant Governor General Van Mook, who believed that the component parts of the federation would have to be strong if the whole was to be feasible.[44] With his revised statement, Kaisiepo had placed

himself more in step with the government. When he returned to Biak he was hauled over the coals, because the anti-amberi mood was still very much alive there. The result was that a little while later he campaigned for the reverse programme: separation from Tidore and the expulsion of all Ambonese from New Guinea. Controleur De Bruijn subsequently took the matter in hand. He contributed to a demonstrative reconciliation between the Ambonese and the Papuans, which led to the establishment of the *Partai Kaoem Boeroeh Maloeka* (PKBM) on 29 September 1946. This Moluccan Workers' Party was supported by the Ambonese civil servants on Biak. Although it was a worthwhile gesture, this new organization did not achieve a great deal. At any rate, they were incapable of preventing the Biak uprising.

At around the same time, in November 1946, the *Komite Indonesia Merdeka* (KIM) was set up in Hollandia. The goal was an independent Indonesia, but formulated in such a way that it was in accordance with the Linggadjati Agreement, which had just been signed between the Netherlands and the Republic. The initiative for this had been taken by several people who came from different parts of the archipelago. Dr Gerungan, a Menadonese female doctor, whom Van Eechoud held in high esteem, was appointed Chair. The Papuans, Marthen Indey, Nicolaas Jouwe and Corinus Krey also played an active role in the KIM. One hundred and fifty people were present at the inaugural meeting. According to the minutes, fifty of those present threw themselves behind the principles of the new party with a show of hands.

The KIM instantly became politically active. It insisted on the Linggadjati Agreement being signed and vehemently opposed the Dutch interpretation of it, which bestowed a special status on New Guinea. In addition, they wanted to take part in the conference in Den Pasar, where the federal state of East Indonesia would be created. With this, the KIM turned against the movement that had then been set in motion by the Dutch for the separation of New Guinea from Indonesia. The KIM made its wishes known by sending telegrams to Van Mook. All of this was a source of great consternation for Resident Van Eechoud. Such matters only turned the heads of the Papuans.[45] To his relief, the KIM quickly collapsed after Gerungan left in March 1947. The account does not indicate whether the resident had a hand in her departure, but it was certainly likely.

In addition to Hollandia and Biak, Serui was also the scene of some action. It was one of the first places where Christianity had taken hold and it had established an important training school for village teachers. Up until then, its inhabitants had shown no trace of political activity. Yet relations here were somewhat different compared to the rest of the Schouten Islands. The Japanese army of occupation had behaved more humanely here, as a result of which the

local people had had different and more positive experiences of it. Because of this, the anti-amberi attitude was less developed here than elsewhere. Against this backdrop, it is understandable that Ratulangi and his supporters were given a warm welcome here.[46] They managed to convince the people of Serui that New Guinea's future was with Indonesia. Mythical interpretations played a role in this. Just like Japan, Indonesia too had managed to take over the secret of Western knowledge. The Dutch (*Blandas*) were therefore no longer needed for this.

In January 1947, a Papuan nurse called Silas Papare founded the *Partai Kemerdekaan Irian Indonesia* (PKII). Even before the war, Silas Papare had been a man of authority and through his occupation had been a link with the Western world. He was good at his job and loyal to his superiors. This was evident both during the war and immediately afterwards, when he was a highly valued staff member of the Nefis. It was under his leadership that the evacuation of 1,500 Romushas from the Bird's Head had taken place under the very noses of the Japanese. Van Eechoud had originally wanted to send him along with Frans Kaisiepo to Malino, but he changed his mind because of his overly outspoken anti-Amberi attitude. With this, he not only distanced himself from the majority of the Serui people, but also clashed with the government's policy of reconciliation. Probably this rejection was partly responsible for his conversion to the PKII. The establishment of the new party did not lead to a disturbance of the peace, although a couple of minor demonstrations did indeed take place with the red-and-white Indonesian flag and the Merdeka salute. The PKII's actions were mainly confined to expeditions around the church building and reading nationalistic messages from the pulpit. Things calmed down here after a couple of months when Silas, in good koreri-style, began to take on the airs of a prophet. That enabled the government to take a more forceful stance 'with the consequence that after only a few days there was no trace left of the entire action.'[47] Nevertheless, a pro-Indonesian group remained active on Serui, even in later years. Silas Papare left shortly before the transfer of sovereignty to Indonesia, where he became a key figure in the actions that were taken from here against the continuation of Dutch rule in New Guinea.

In the account presented here of the years of war and revolution on New Guinea, a few Papuans who played some role in it have been mentioned. In such a way, they managed to combine traditional elements with new knowledge and blended them into something new and effective—at least for a while. We saw this in the demeanour of Angganitha, Stephanus and the koreri generals. This was all part of an ancient tradition, but their behaviour also contained clearly recognizable elements of Christian influence, of modern organizational structures and eventually of a budding Papuan nationalism too. The rise of

Lodewijk and Barend Mandatjan as powerful men in the Arfak region also shows a mixture of traditional and modern. They fit completely within the tradition of the Melanesian 'big man'. Nevertheless, they carved out their position by turning the pro-Dutch sentiments of the local inhabitants during the war to their advantage. Afterwards, they managed to increase their power even further by cunningly using misinformation to persuade large groups of their countrymen to give the name Mandatjan as their clan name for the census that was carried out at the time. The resulting prestige with the Dutch was effectively transformed by them into greater influence among the Papuans. It was without doubt a success story, which can be put down to making clever use of the tools at hand.

It cannot be denied that Barend and Lodewijk Mandatjan had political acumen,[48] but they belonged in essence to the traditional world of the Papuans. They were uneducated people, who had obtained their knowledge of the modern world in a haphazard fashion. Up to a point, Silas Papare also belonged to this group. He had accumulated his knowledge mainly through his practical experience as an assistant to the Dutch government doctor, where he had shown himself to be a hard-working and creative student. Alongside them, there was a growing group of individuals who had advanced a little further into the Western world through the agency of a modern education. This group consisted of scores of pupils who had attended secondary school in Miei before the war or, in a few cases, the government school in Manokwari.

In fact, this group was a little bit bigger because before the secondary school was built in Miei, roundabout the end of the First World War a few Papuans had followed the guru training course in Depok on Java. The most promising pupil from this group was Johan Ariks, who, would step forward as a political figure in the near future. In this category we have already listed the names of Lucas Rumkorem, Nicolaas Jouwe, Frans Kaisiepo and his cousin Marcus who, in his capacity as government assistant on Biak during the war, had helped the Japanese administration to suppress the koreri. He was also valued by the new regime, but evidently not enough for him to be entrusted with the mission to Malino. This brings the number of prominent 'moderns' to five. Taken more broadly, Van Eechoud estimated the size of this group to be a few dozen individuals.

The political actions of this group were weak and tended to be carried out without any conviction and deployed erratically. Fragments of a mythical streak were still present. Yet they were the expression of a more widely existing sentiment. The experiences of war and occupation, the news about the state of affairs on Java and, despite everything, the growing number of educated individuals, had changed something. "It seems that in practically every area of New

Guinea the young people among the Papuans have become politically aware, albeit to varying degrees. More extraordinarily, this is expressed on all sides in the form of a longing to be consulted in all matters and decisions concerning the interests of New Guinea and associated with this region of Indonesia." wrote Van Eechoud in his memorandum from 1947 mentioned earlier.[49] We can make a brief annotation here that this only involved the coastal areas that already fell under the administration and then primarily the larger locations. The old situation still held sway on the largest part of the island. It is sobering to read in contemporary government reports how cannibalism and headhunting were still common practice throughout the interior and how in the hinterland of Merauke, the administration, as in 1903, was still puzzling about the issue of how it could prevent headhunting raids from reaching the Australian territories. Even with these limitations, the question still remained about what should happen with the island, now that history in the rest of Indonesia had turned a new corner. Frans Kaisiepo's problem in Malino was absolutely genuine, and one can imagine that he did not have an immediate answer. To weigh up the pros and cons accurately, a knowledge of the state of affairs in the rest of the archipelago was of the utmost importance, but the contribution of the Papuans to this had so far been marginal. It would stay that way too. How it fared in practice is explained in the next chapter.

Chapter 3

New Guinea as a Bargaining Tool

Indonesia becomes independent

The nationalists take the helm

In the previous chapter we saw how pre-war relations gradually recovered on New Guinea during the years 1945–1950. The effects of both the war and the revolution on Papuan society had been quite limited. The administration and Protestant missionaries established themselves once again in their old locations and, despite the upheaval caused by the war, a small, westernized elite continued to evolve steadily. It was in the light of this that the Papuans continued to look towards the Netherlands. Meanwhile, in the rest of the archipelago, history took a different course. Of course, that had everything to do with a different history, a different set of principles, and more extensive penetration by the West. A nationalist movement had already taken shape here during the first few decades of the twentieth century and in 1945, with the collapse of Japanese power, it seized this historic opportunity to obstruct the return of Dutch rule. On 17 August 1945, two days after the capitulation of Japan, Sukarno and Mohammed Hatta proclaimed the independent Republic of Indonesia. It managed to hold out during the coming years and, at the Round Table Conference in The Hague, the Netherlands accepted this fact by formally recognizing the independence of Indonesia. On 27 December 1949, the transfer of sovereignty took place.

On the journey towards this point, the Republic had been helped by the fact that, during the final months of its rule, Japan had made preparations for the

establishment of a semi-independent administration. The English, who because of their allied status had been entrusted with reoccupying the Western half of the archipelago, arrived quite late in the day. While New Guinea had already been brought into the Allied Forces' sphere of influence once again in 1944 with an overwhelming show of American force, the first meagre British units of occupation only arrived on Java and Sumatra in October 1945, a whole six weeks after independence had been declared. In the meantime, the new regime had promulgated a constitution which stated that Indonesia would be one single, unified state in the form of a Republic. Details of how it was to be divided up were set out in a separate resolution. Based on this, on paper eight *daerahs* or provinces were created, each under its own governor. These were respectively West, Middle and East Java, Sumatra, Borneo, Sulawesi, Maluku and the Small Sunda Islands.

The selection was made after preliminary talks had been held. The form and extent of the future Indonesian state were discussed by a committee that had been set up towards the end of the war by the Japanese military governor (Gunseikan) Yamamoto. It was instructed to 'explore possibilities for the creation of an independent Indonesia that would be a link in the chain of countries of the 'Great East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere'. This committee, known as the *Badan Penyelidikan Usaha-Usaha Persiapan Kemerdekaan Indonesia* (BPUPKI), consisted of sixty-six Indonesian members and eight Japanese members. At the inaugural meeting, which took place on 28 May 1945, they signed a declaration stating that the members were aware of the unfavourable war situation for Japan, but that the Indonesian people emphatically rejected any return of Dutch rule. A task force under the (acting) chairmanship of Professor R. Sutomo proceeded to compile the first draft of a constitution that could be submitted to the Gunseikan on 15 June. This was later discussed and amended during the main meeting of the BPUPKI. On 18 August 1945, in other words after the capitulation of Japan and the Declaration of Independence were known, this matter was discussed in more detail and approved by a smaller 'committee for preparations for independence', the *Panitia Persiapan Kemerdekaan Indonesia* (PPKI), which had been created by the BPUPKI and which subsequently drew up detailed regulations for the construction of the state. Sukarno and Hatta were elected as President and Vice-President of the Republic of Indonesia, respectively, and were also entrusted with setting up and leading a presidential cabinet.[1]

A start was then made with taking over the administrative apparatus. All of this was done with the silent cooperation of the Japanese military administration. During the course of September, the first Indonesian combat groups were formed, which partly consisted of members of the now disbanded Relief Corps

of the Japanese army, and partly of volunteers who organized themselves on their own initiative in many different locations. With the arrival of the Allied Forces in October and the anticipated recovery of the Dutch administration as a result of this, these groups turned against the Dutch en masse both inside and outside the internment camps. The Ambonese, as well as anyone else who was suspected of harbouring pro-Dutch sympathies, also fell victim to this '*bersiap*'; a wave of fury and carnage that lasted until the beginning of 1946 and in which thousands of people perished. With great difficulty, the British army managed to stop this movement with the help of hastily assembled small Dutch units and, last but not least, Japanese troops who came to feel the pressure of the bersiap as well.

As it was not possible to suppress the violence without the cooperation of the Republican leaders, in the opinion of the English commander in Southeast Asia, Admiral Lord Louis Mountbatten, the battle against the bersiap went hand in hand with a certain degree of recognition for their position. In this way, a correlation between fighting and negotiating came into play, which resulted in the Republic being recognized as a political fact. On the Dutch side, the reins of leadership had been entrusted to Lieutenant Governor General H. J. Van Mook, who was forced to play along. Indeed, he hardly had any weapons of his own at his disposal and relied on the English for absolutely everything.

On top of this, he and his staff were fully aware that the force of nationalism had risen sharply during the Japanese occupation and that this would have to be taken into consideration, no matter what. While the bersiap raged in every corner of Java, the first contacts were made there with the Republican leaders. At the same time, Dutch rule was being re-established in large areas of the Great East, in Borneo and in some parts of Sumatra. This could take place with the bare minimum of resources, and the Australian units who were still present in this region provided effective support for this. The Americans, as far as the Netherlands East Indies was concerned, had pulled back into New Guinea and Morotai and were concentrating on disbanding their military organization there.

Political relations in the Netherlands

The prospect of entering into talks with the Republic was greeted with fierce opposition in the Netherlands, which had only recently emerged from the German occupation and was not in the slightest way inclined to recognize the differences between Sukarno and the Dutch collaborators in the Netherlands during the period of occupation. This was also the case with the Dutch in the East Indies, who had suffered greatly during the war and who linked Sukarno inextricably with their demonic Japanese oppressors. Furthermore, they were

the direct victims of a bersiap that was carried out in the name of the Republic. Besides, Sukarno's position was even being contested by the Indonesians themselves. Here too, there were groups who believed that he had linked himself too closely with the Japanese occupier and that a change of guard would be welcome. This prompted Sutan Sjahrir to step forward, a Sumatran socialist who was much more highly thought of by the Dutch. Sukarno's position was reduced to that of a formal head of the state only, and the limited governing power that the Republic had came into the hands of a cabinet led by Sjahrir. After consulting with him, Van Mook subsequently took new initiatives. From this position, both of them managed slowly to get a grip on the chaotic situation at hand. The first draft plan for a federal Indonesia lay on the table at the end of 1945.

Up until November 1948, Van Mook continued to be the main architect of Dutch policy with respect to Indonesia. Due to the different points of view of Batavia and The Hague, he had almost continuously to force this through against the wishes of a Dutch government where the majority believed that he was rushing things too fast. In post-war Netherlands, the Roman Catholic-Socialist coalition was in power. The successive Cabinets of Schermerhorn-Drees (June 1945-July 1946), Beel (July 1946-August 1948) and Drees-Van Schaik (August 1948-March 1951) were founded on cooperation between the socialist-oriented *Partij van de Arbeid* (PvdA) (Labour Party) and the *Katholieke Volkspartij* (KVP) (Catholic People's Party). With respect to most of the issues associated with the reconstruction of the Netherlands, both parties were on fairly good terms with each other. The Indonesia policy was a more touchy subject in which the Roman Catholics generally preferred to follow a more conservative line than the socialists. The most influential KVP politician at this time was C.P.M. Romme, the KVP party leader in the Dutch Second Chamber of Parliament and political editor of the most important Catholic newspaper, the *Volkskrant*. With respect to the Indonesian issue, he had a fundamentally conservative attitude, but as a politician he was prepared to take the interests of the coalition into account. He did not have to worry about dealing with any real resistance from his party. Even during his term of office as Prime Minister, his own fellow party member, L.J.M. Beel, certainly had to consider the wishes of 'the sphinx of Overveen', as Romme was sneeringly referred to after the town in which he lived.

The other wing of the coalition was dominated by Willem Drees, an intelligent and prudently cautious politician. He too was the unmistakable pivotal figure in his party, even though in relation to his policy concerning Indonesia he continuously had to deal with a left-wing faction that criticized his reticence which was based on coalition interests and his own insights. This group

consisted of journalists, Members of Parliament (MPs), and active party members and included the following: Frans Goedhart, G.J. van Heuven Goedhart, Jacques de Kadt and the influential Calvinistic vicar, J. Buskes, who was a keen advocate of mixing socialism with Christianity.

As the combined forces of the KVP and the PvdA commanded a substantial majority in parliament, the coalition could function relatively independently with regard to the opposition. The core of the opposition consisted of both the Protestant parties, the *Anti-Revolutionaire Partij* (ARP) and the *Christelijk Historische Unie* (CHU), which during the pre-war years had almost continuously been at the centre of successive cabinets. In those days, they had made their mark firmly on the Netherlands East Indies policy and they bitterly regretted the fact that this policy, especially during these critical days of insurrection in the Netherlands East Indies, had now been entrusted to the socialists and the Catholics; groups which in the past had been critical towards or aloof about the colonial administration. If the power of their convictions had not already driven them to it, this particular situation certainly sharpened the intensity of their critique of government policy. A figure of authority in this circle was P.S.J. Gerbrandy, who had been the Prime Minister of the Dutch government in exile in London during the war years and who never failed to let his characteristically nasal voice be heard in parliament at critical moments.

The Cabinet also met with opposition from an entirely different quarter, namely the Communists, who were united under the Dutch Communist Party called the *Communistische Partij Nederland* (CPN). This party insisted on swiftly severing all ties with Indonesia. Although, with its ten seats, the CPN initially enjoyed a prominent position in parliament, this plan was far removed from the main lines of Dutch policy, which was geared towards delaying the revolutionary process by hook or by crook and maximizing any remaining influence that the Dutch might have there. On the other hand, it was because of divisions within the opposition, with its diverse actors such as the CPN on one side and the conservative Protestant groups on the other, that the Roman Catholic and Socialist coalition were able to have a free hand in this respect for many years. Likewise, very few serious criticisms were made by the Liberal camp either. The left wing of this formerly important group had been swallowed up in the Labour Party (PvdA), while the part that remained was incapable of showing any real teeth in practice.

Under these circumstances, a prominent role was set aside for the Indonesia experts who belonged to the KVP and the PvdA. In light of its past history, the KVP had a very thin sprinkling of this genre of policymaker. It is true that it could take pride in having such a figure as Max van Pol, who had represented issues relating to the Netherlands East Indies for years in the Second Chamber of Parliament and was very knowledgeable about them. Nevertheless, he

himself only had a limited amount of authority. There was also Ch.J.I.M. Welter, who used to be an important East Indies Dutch civil servant and Minister of the Colonies, who was now totally committed to working towards the restoration of Dutch rule in the Indies. After originally representing the KVP in the *Eerste Kamer* (First Chamber) of the *Staten Generaal* (Parliament), he ran in the 1948 elections as an independent candidate, which provided him with a seat in the *Tweede Kamer* (Second Chamber). He only had limited influence over KVP policy because Romme was not prepared to be dictated to by Welter.

In the face of these two rather marginal figures, the PvdA commanded more important personalities. In this regard, we should think of the likes of Willem Schermerhorn, the first post-war Prime Minister of the Netherlands, who would go on to play an important role in Indonesian politics. He was an advocate of a *personalistic* form of socialism that tried to build a bridge between the ideas of socialism, Christianity and Liberalism. In his Indonesia policy too, he was characterized by the wish to reconcile contrasting views, in which his desire for modernization was persistently blocked by feelings of doubt and conservatism. Just to clarify, there is no reason to attribute this to intellectual or moral weakness on the part of Schermerhorn, but to the complexity of the situation and the gravity of the decisions that were about to be made. The realization of this is typical of Dutch policy for this period.

These traits can also be found in the two most important Indonesia specialists of the PvdA, J.H.A. Logemann and J.A. Jonkman, who were successive Ministers of Overseas Territories in the Cabinets of Schermerhorn-Drees and Beel. Both had extensive experience in the Netherlands East Indies. Together with Van Mook, in the 1930s they had played a leading role in *De Stuw*; an organization of high level East Indies Dutch civil servants who wanted to campaign for a more extensive emancipation of Indonesian society. As far as both Jonkman and Logemann were concerned, they still wholly supported this point of view, but they had great difficulty reconciling it with the Indonesian demands of that time. They were ideally suited to Van Mook's ambition to build a bridge between the 'decent' Republicans and Indonesian groups that wanted close collaboration with the Netherlands. Although they found it difficult to follow Van Mook on his political escapades, they were still prepared to take responsibility for them and defend them before other ministers and parliament. This is how Van Mook could continuously depend on sufficient backing from The Hague for the main lines of his policy until the end of the Beel Cabinet.

The federal response

Due to the inequality in development in the different parts of the archipelago, a genuine schism came about in 1945 between Java, most parts of Sumatra and

the outer regions. The revolution was raging on both of the main islands of the archipelago, while the other areas had been largely brought under Dutch rule once again. Following on from this, Van Mook developed a way of dealing with it that complied with the federal line. He considered the idea of creating a general framework, consisting of one overarching structure, namely the Dutch realm as a whole, and a federal construction solely for Indonesia. Within the Indonesian federation he was aiming for an opportunity for home rule for the constituent regions if they were ready for this or, more realistically, if they were in a position to insist on this. With this, almost by default, he immediately set foot on Hendrik Colijn's territory, the ARP statesman who in the years leading up to the war had defended the formation of island provinces as a way of keeping Indonesian nationalists out of the power vortex. For political reasons, Van Mook was not interested in becoming too closely associated with this conservative predecessor.

Alongside their similarities, there were also notable differences. Under Van Mook's administration, work on creating autonomous units in Indonesia was carried out with great energy and drive. The difference was that they would no longer be provinces, but federal states. Alongside this, he focused heavily on creating a central government, in which the Indonesian element would be strongly represented. That was certainly not based exclusively on his own preferences. Although Van Mook undoubtedly had more sympathy for the legitimacy of the demands of Indonesian nationalism than Colijn, who died in 1944, ever had, circumstances also lent themselves to this. During the years that followed, the Republic developed from its chaotic start into a force to be reckoned with, that appeared to command massive support both at home and abroad. Moreover, nationalism seemed to be a viable force in the areas controlled by the Netherlands as well. It was only by coming up with a generous offer that the Netherlands could ever hope to satisfy these partners. Van Mook was constantly aware of this, which explains why he was in such a hurry. This is where the key difference lay between Batavia and The Hague, where the day-to-day pressure was not felt as much and personal doubts carried more weight.

Doubts from The Hague concerning Van Mook's policy were primarily to do with reforms that became necessary to the structure of the kingdom. These doubts went beyond Van Mook as an individual. Even before the war, this aspect had been the subject of discussion between leading individuals in the Indies and the Netherlands, and was now more prominently in the foreground. The Netherlands clung onto keeping the Kingdom as an entity that operated independently on the world stage, with a firm Dutch grip on the entire economic policy, defence policy and foreign policy. Van Mook quickly began thinking in terms of cooperation that would provide more space for initiatives

from the constituent parts. On the basis of this notion, a discussion was initiated with Sjahrir at the end of 1945. This led to the *Hoge Veluwe Conferentie* in April 1946, when Van Mook travelled to the Netherlands with a Republican delegation for consultations about a package of proposals that had been brought from Batavia. These meetings did not produce any immediate results, because the Dutch government rejected a settlement in the shape of a treaty. At that point, equality between both partners was a taboo subject as far as the Netherlands was concerned. That also applied to the proposal to recognize Sumatra as part of the Republic. Not only would that jeopardize major Dutch and international economic interests, it would also give the Republic a dominant position within Indonesia. At that time only a few people in the Netherlands were prepared to accept the idea.

The Hoge Veluwe Conference was not a success, but it did force the Dutch government to accept the need to think seriously about reforms that were considerably more far-reaching than it had originally contemplated. For Van Mook, the end of the conference marked the beginning of a campaign to gain support for his federal plans in the outer provinces and among the minority groups in Indonesia who had, up until now, viewed his actions with suspicion. When this campaign succeeded, he would also possess an instrument with which he could exert pressure on the Republic, where powerful opposition existed to any move that did not start from the complete recognition of its sovereignty over the whole of the archipelago. He therefore organized a series of meetings, the first one of which was held in July 1946 in Malino, a holiday resort in South Celebes (South Sulawesi). At this meeting of representatives from Borneo, the Great East and the reoccupied parts of Sumatra, each of whom had been appointed by the Indies government, Van Mook presented his plans to a captive audience. It resulted in the decision to make preparations for the creation of two federal states to begin with, namely Borneo and the Great East. The earlier Government of The Great East, which now came to be called either the state of East Indonesia or *Indonesia Timur*, was set up at a meeting in Den Pasar in December 1946. The Balinese ruler, Tjokorde Gde Rake Sukawati, was appointed as President while his son-in-law, Ide Anak Agung Gde Agung, became Minister of the Interior. This state would rapidly develop into a rather effective cooperative ally in the far-flung regions of the Eastern archipelago.

Things did not move as quickly in Borneo. There the biggest handicap for Dutch politics was the fact that the most important areas in the South, Bandjermasin and the Hulu Sungei had enjoyed a good sea link with Java, and that the Republic had immediately gained a strong foothold there. Whether a Borneo state would ever be possible depended on the outcome of the dispute

with the Republic. In the meantime, it was decided at the beginning of 1947 to find an interim solution. A *daerah istimewa*, which is a kind of self-governing province, was set up in West Borneo and led by Sultan Hamid II Alkadri, a KNIL officer who maintained good relations with the Dutch regime. A similar arrangement was set up for the Riau archipelago.

With these conferences in Malino, Den Pasar and West Borneo, a start had been made with organizing the federation that Van Mook wanted. In addition, in October 1946, a meeting took place at Pangkal Pinang on Bangka. There, representatives of the Arab, Chinese and Dutch minorities were given the chance to air their grievances and allow themselves to be convinced by Van Mook of the inevitability of his plans. This meeting did indeed increase the support base for his policy. The price that had to be paid for this was that New Guinea made its debut as a political issue in post-war Indonesian policy, as we will soon see. Nevertheless, the outcome of all these conferences was that, for the time being, shape and direction was given to those parts of Indonesia ruled by the Netherlands. Van Mook and his associates expected that, in this way, an alternative could be offered for the Republic with its obstreperous supporters. Through the federation, the Netherlands would show that it was serious about granting autonomy and that cooperation was more rewarding than dogged resistance.

In this way, the stage was set that would determine the big picture for the coming years. There was the Republic on one side, which claimed that since the proclamation of 17 Augustus 1945 it had the right to represent the whole of Indonesia. On the other hand, the Netherlands argued that developments in the outlying provinces revealed something else, while it also cast doubt on whether the Republic did indeed represent the wishes of the people of Java and Sumatra. The goal of the Netherlands was to place this Republic on as humble a footing as possible in an Indonesian federation in which the Netherlands also had several fingers in the pie. The prospects for this improved during the course of 1946 because the supply of troops from the Netherlands finally got underway. At the end of the occupation by the Allied Forces in November that same year, the Netherlands had an armed force of more than one hundred thousand men at its disposal in Indonesia. This was partly made up of soldiers from the *Koninklijk Nederlands-Indisch Leger* (KNIL), although a larger portion consisted of conscripts from the metropolitan landforces, the *Koninklijke Landmacht* or KL. It was the first time in its colonial history that the Netherlands had had to call on conscripts to protect its interests overseas. In addition, the *Koninklijke Marine* or Royal Dutch Navy managed to direct sufficient small-scale materials to the Netherlands East Indies waters to arrange for the Indonesian sea areas to be patrolled effectively.

Linggadjati; talks and clashes

For Van Mook and his followers, the federal form of government as discussed in Malino seemed to offer the best solution to the problem of governing the heterogeneous Indonesian archipelago. Aside from this, it was also a way of getting the Republic to come to the negotiation table. The altered military situation and the pending departure of the British had the same effect. Many people on the Republican side dreaded being left behind on their own with the Dutch and their new army, while the British firmly insisted that something should at least be arranged by the time they left. A new round of negotiations was set in motion in 1946. In order to pick up the thread that had been broken after the Hoge Veluwe Conference, the recently sworn-in Beel Cabinet sent a heavy-weight delegation to negotiate in Batavia. It bore the historic name of *Commissie-Generaal,* after the mission that was sent out to the Netherlands East Indies in 1816 to re-establish Dutch authority there, following the end of the French era and the English interim administration. It was led by Willem Schermerhorn, who had recently stepped down as Prime Minister. This heavy-weight set-up demonstrated not only the importance that the Netherlands attached to the affair, but also that there was a strong reluctance to give Van Mook too much of a free hand in the negotiations. In practice, however, the initiative generally stayed with the latter, although the value of the Commissie-Generaal cannot be ignored. The renewed discussions led to talks in the West Javanese mountain village of Linggadjati from 11 until 13 November. The Agreement that was brokered there was signed two days later in Batavia.

Despite the efforts of the Commissie-Generaal the outcome of this draft settlement was that the balance was tipped more towards the reality of the East Indies at that time than towards the wishes of the Dutch. Linggadjati only worked because the Commissie-Generaal buckled on two issues where the government at Hoge Veluwe had stuck to its guns. The Republic was recognized as the de facto power on Java, Madura and Sumatra, while the chosen form of the settlement at least gave the semblance of equality to the Republic, which it was begrudged at Hoge Veluwe. Indeed, the Dutch government and that of the Republic of Indonesia hereby committed themselves to present an agreement to their respective members of parliament and people's representatives, in which

> (Art. 1) the Dutch government recognized the Republic of Indonesia 'as *de facto* asserting authority over Java, Madura and Sumatra'.
>
> (Art. 2) they would work together 'for the swift establishment of a sovereign, democratic state founded on a federative basis, called the United States of Indonesia (VSI)'.

(Art. 3) these United States of Indonesia would include 'the entire territory of the Netherlands East Indies, on the understanding that, should the population of any part of the territory, after consulting with the remaining parts of the territory, indicate through democratic channels that it does not wish to, or is not yet willing to join the United States of Indonesia, then a special relationship could be set up for that part of the territory with these States and the Kingdom of the Netherlands.

(Art. 4) 'The constituent states of the United States of Indonesia [would] be the Republic, Borneo and the Great East, without prejudice to the right of the population of any part of the territory to indicate through democratic channels that it wishes to have its place within the VSI arranged on a different footing'.

(Art. 6) both governments would 'work together in order to further common interests to create a Dutch Indonesian Union, in which the Kingdom of the Netherlands, comprising the Netherlands, the Netherlands East Indies, Suriname and Curaçao, is transformed into the afore-mentioned Union, entailing the Kingdom of the Netherlands, Surinam and Curaçao on the one hand and the United States of Indonesia on the other'.[2]

After the Agreement was signed on 15 November 1946, the Commissie General travelled to the Netherlands to obtain authorization from the government and parliament for ratification. It would run into fierce opposition there. After all, not only had they 'given away' Sumatra, they had 'squandered' the sovereignty as well. The commission had no defence against the latter. The Republic would not have settled for anything less than sovereignty for the United States of Indonesia. One could only comfort oneself with the fact that there was still the Union and that within the federation the other states that were planned would provide the necessary counterbalance. Furthermore, it had not been said that the Republic would, in actual fact, also include the whole of Java and Sumatra with the creation of the United States of Indonesia. In the eyes of the Commissie General, Articles 3 and 4 provided sufficient leeway to ease important areas away from it. After all, they could indicate through democratic channels that they wished to organize their relationship with the Netherlands or the United States of Indonesia on a different footing. As long as the belief prevailed that the population of Sumatra in particular would not choose for the Republic en masse, all was not lost.

This and many other issues led to fierce discussions in the Netherlands. To make Linggadjati acceptable within the Cabinet and before parliament, a detailed explanation was added to the Agreement by the Commissioner

General and Minister Jonkman along the lines detailed above. It was on the basis of this that it was finally accepted through the approval of a motion in the Second Chamber, which was submitted by the party leaders of the two ruling parties, Romme and Van der Goes van Naters. The government was allowed to sign this document, but only in compliance with this explanation.[3]

The Commissie Generaal was not the only body that viewed the Agreement as taking one step back in order to move two steps forward at a later date. In the Republican camp, exactly the same view was held. There was a lot of resistance there towards the idea that one would have to sacrifice one's sovereignty in return for that of a United States of Indonesia that had yet to be created. In addition, they too had pinned their hopes upon Articles 3 and 4 of the Agreement and the expectation was that this would help them to expand the Republic throughout the whole of the archipelago. In this way, the unitary state could still be realized. Under this condition, the Agreement was finally accepted by the acting parliament of the Republic through a motion from Manai Sophian, who came from South Celebes.[4] Thus backed by double-dealing home fronts, both delegations got the chance to speak and make efforts to come up with an acceptable way of phrasing the Agreement. That turned out to be impossible. The Linggadjati Agreement was finally signed on 25 March 1947 without any interpretation; but with the proviso from both parties that they would only be bound to it as far as their own interpretations went.

It should not come as a great surprise that with so many different points of view, it proved impossible to agree on how the Agreement should be implemented in practice. The Republic in particular did not like the idea of agreeing to the Dutch demand immediately to disband its army, the *Tentara Republik Indonesia* (TNI). In fact, this caused a stalemate that would last until the middle of 1949. In practice, Linggadjati resulted in two intensive rounds of negotiations, during which both parties tried to reach agreement about the establishment of the Indonesian federation and the Netherlands-Indonesian Union. Both rounds of negotiations were accompanied by continuous guerrilla activity on the part of the Republican army and the Dutch defence tactics linked to this. Both rounds were halted by large-scale Dutch military operations that were officially recorded as 'Police Actions'. All this was to make it clear to the outside world that the Republic was not a state but, on closer analysis, a rebel organization within the Kingdom of the Netherlands. The first military action took place between 21 July and 6 August 1947, the second from 19 December 1948 to 5 January 1949. In both cases, the military balance seemed to come out in favour of the Dutch army. In the first action, it did not have a great deal of difficulty occupying large areas of Sumatra and Java, so that only a skeleton-Republic remained in the area immediately surrounding Yogyakarta in Middle

Java and parts of Sumatra as its territory. During the second action, this Yogya area was also occupied.

Nevertheless, these successes were only of limited value as the Republican troops who were scattered over a wide area managed to organize themselves with increasing efficiency into guerrilla units. Moreover, despite their euphemistic label, the Dutch 'Police Actions' led to repercussions in the international political sphere. When the British army pulled out in November 1946, for one brief moment the Netherlands became the master in its own house again, discounting its awkward relationship with the Republic. This changed after the First Police Action. The action had to be curtailed in response to a directive from the United Nations Security Council. The Netherlands and the Republic were explicitly invited to continue negotiations, for which a Good Offices Committee (GOC) was placed at the disposal of both parties. A Belgian, an American and an Australian served on this committee. Admittedly, its authority was limited—the Netherlands fought tooth and nail against arbitration—but the weight of the United States in particular made itself felt. It was partly through the agency of the GOC that negotiations were resumed after the first action had ended.

This led to the Renville Agreement of January 1948 which used the weakened position of the Republic as well as the Linggadjati principles as its main premise. Based on its wording, the Netherlands no longer felt bound to follow the Linggadjati Agreement to the letter and during the next stage of the negotiations interpreted it more freely in accordance with its own ideas. During these negotiations the GOC found itself in a difficult position as the Netherlands did not want to be dictated to by the committee. The second action was pushed through in total disregard of an American proposal for mediation. In doing so, the Netherlands forfeited the sympathy of Washington. After a turbulent session of the Security Council in which the Dutch negotiator, J.H. van Roijen defended, albeit with a great deal of difficulty, the Dutch position, a resolution was passed on 28 January 1949 through which a new committee was created that would have greater powers. This United Nations Committee for Indonesia (UNCI) would be able to issue independent advice based on a majority consensus. This more powerful committee would play an important role in the run-up to the Round Table Conference in The Hague, during which the conditions of partition between the Netherlands and Indonesia were drawn up.

A poker game between Bandung, Yogya and The Hague

The years 1947 and especially 1948 were caught up with federal policy. New states were established in the areas that were captured from the Republic by the First Police Action. Most of them remained weak constructions, in which the

key players kept a keen and watchful eye on the development of the conflict between the Netherlands and the Republic. Nevertheless, it was the West Javanese state of Pasundan in particular, along with the Negara Sumatera Barat in the hinterland of Medan, that were important. All the states gradually banded together to form a united front. After consulting together in Bandung, the leaders of these states drew up a document in July 1948 that became known as 'the Bandung Resolutions'.[5] It contained a blueprint for the immediate formation of an Indonesian transitional government, in which Indonesians would take over the helm from the Dutch. This was the beginning of a third direction in Indonesian policy. The key player in all of this was Ide Anak Agung Gde Agung, who was also achieving great success at this time as Prime Minister of the state of East Indonesia.

As a result of these developments, politicians in the Netherlands were increasingly gaining more faith in the feasibility of the federal option and became more and more convinced that the Republic, either voluntarily or by force, would have to adapt itself to this model. Echoes of this are also clearly heard in discussions around the parliamentary elections of July 1948. They led to a slight reinforcement of the conservative element within Dutch politics. The main reason for this was that the liberals under P.J. Oud and D.U. Stikker had broken away from the liaison with the Labour Party (PvdA) during the run-up to these elections. This led to the creation of the *Partij voor Vrijheid en Democratie* (VVD, Party for Freedom and Democracy). At this point, the VVD entered the elections with the slogan 'Have you also had enough?' and 'It's time for a change, of course!' It earned the liberals two seats in parliament. The same spirit existed within the KVP, which had to contend with the fact that an outspoken conservative in Indonesian politics, Ch.J.I.M. Welter, had left the party and was now competing with his own political party. The result of the elections was a defeat for the Labour Party (PvdA) and a narrow victory for the KVP which, with thirty-two seats, continued to be the largest party in parliament.[6] The Drees-Van Schaik Cabinet that was subsequently set up, was once again of the Catholic-Socialist stamp, but strengthened by the cooperation it received from the VVD and the CHU which, from a colonial perspective was traditionally conservative.

For Indonesian policy, the appointment of this new Cabinet signified a clear shift to the right. The KVP was allocated the post of Overseas Territories, where Romme's youthful confidant, a young lawyer called E.M.J.A. Sassen, served as Minister. Van Mook's seat had been reserved for ex-Prime Minister Beel at the early stages of the Cabinet's formation, and he would hold it under the title of *Hoge Vertegenwoordiger van de Kroon* (HVK, High Representative of the Crown). With VVD party member D.U. Stikker in Foreign Affairs and the

CHU party member W.F. Schokking at the War Office, it was clear that the Republic would get very little leeway in the subsequent rounds of negotiations. The counterbalance would have to be provided by Drees, who served as Prime Minister. Relations within his party were just as fraught. The policy that was being implemented was criticized, and this would ultimately lead to the Party Chairman, Van der Goes van Naters, stepping down at the end of the year.

The reason behind the 1948 elections was that it had been clear for some years already that the constitution would have to be amended with a view to the change in relations towards Indonesia. This applied primarily to Article 1, in which the territory of the Kingdom of the Netherlands was described as consisting of the Netherlands, the Netherlands East Indies, Suriname and Curaçao. One practical problem was that changing the constitution was a time-consuming procedure that required interim elections, while the proposed changes would have to be voted upon by both the former and the succeeding parliament and accepted by a two-thirds majority. In fact, the new constitution had to be in effect at the moment that a further agreement in Indonesia could be submitted to parliament. The wording of the new constitution therefore had to be as broad as possible, so that any agreement that would result from the negotiations that were still ongoing could remain within the terms set down by it. Such terms were formulated in the proposal for the 1948 revision of the constitution. In the new Article 1, the kingdom was reduced to the 'Kingdom New Style', which consisted of the Netherlands, Suriname and the Antilles. Relations with Indonesia were dealt with in the newly added Article 208[7]. This article sketched the outline of the anticipated Dutch-Indonesian Union. This was realized using carefully worded terms that corresponded with the Dutch perspective. Under this arrangement, parliament could decide on the basis of a two-thirds majority whether an agreement that was finally concluded actually met these conditions.

By calling the 1948 elections, the Dutch government anticipated a transfer of sovereignty as laid down in the Linggadjati Agreement. In its opinion, this step was clear proof of its own sincerity with regard to honouring the Agreement. In his declaration of policy at the time of the installation of the new cabinet, Drees stated that the government was aiming for a transfer of sovereignty in the short term. The date of 1 January 1949, as stipulated in the Linggadjati Agreement, should still be kept in mind. One day later, during discussions about this matter in the Second Chamber, he added an important footnote to this. He stated then that the (federal) government structure had to go ahead 'even if, God forbid, we do not manage to reach any viable agreement with the Republic that can actually be implemented in practice.'[8] The government strove to build its

own model of Indonesia, while it was up to the Republic whether or not it wished to be part of this. Under these auspices, discussions with the Republicans and Federalists had to be resumed during the second half of 1948, although neither party had much faith in a positive outcome.

The path was indeed not strewn with roses. Negotiations with the Republic lasted far into December, for which Ministers Stikker and Sassen respectively travelled to the Republican capital, in order to reach a modus vivendi. In this, however, they were not successful. In the meantime, discussions had already taken place with the Federalists about forming an interim government based on the so-called *Bewind Indonesië in Overgangstijd* (BIO) decree, which set the rules for the administration of Indonesia for the period of transition up to the transfer of sovereignty. Ideally it had to be done together with, but if necessary without, the Republic. The failure of the Stikker-Sassen missions prepared the way for the latter option. When both ministers had come to the conclusion that direct agreement with the Republic was impossible, the Second Police Action followed. The BIO decree, though proclaimed that same day, was to remain an empty promise, as the Federalists preferred to bide their time and wait for the outcome of the military and diplomatic encounters that followed.

During this operation, Yogyakarta was taken. Nevertheless, even at this point it was still not possible truly to derail the Republic. It stood for a military and moral force that was impossible to obliterate, partly due to the international support it received in the United Nations. The Security Council acted at once and met on 24 December for the first time. Defending Dutch policy was entrusted to the former minister and diplomat, J.H. Van Roijen, who had to be content in the end with the aforementioned resolution of 28 January 1949, in which the UNCI was set up. This resolution, which was drafted by the Americans, opened the way to renewed negotiations with the Republic. These were subsequently held in Batavia by Van Roijen himself. Upon his insistence, the Netherlands scaled down its demands considerably, and this resulted in the Van Roijen-Roem Agreement of 7 May 1949.[9] The Republican leaders would have to be allowed to return to Yogyakarta and take part in the Round Table Conference in The Hague, where they would sit at the table on an equal footing with the Netherlands and the Federalists.

Meanwhile, from the moment the resolution was passed, it had become increasingly clear that this would place the Federalists in a weak position. They decided not to lie down and resign themselves to their fate. Before the Round Table Conference had even begun, they organized an Inter-Indonesian Conference (31 July-2 August) with the Republic, during which they gave their consent to their Republican opponents on a large number of essential points.[10]

During the RTC (23 August-2 November 1949) the Federalists and the Republicans were already working as a closed front, as a general rule. The outcome of this discussion resulted in an Agreement, in which the main points of the Linggadjati plan could be easily discerned. Any Dutch guarantees that the federal structure outlined in the Agreement would continue were out of the question. The Republic of the United States of Indonesia came into being at the time of the transfer of sovereignty on the 27 December 1949. It was replaced just six months later by a single state that was called, simply, the Republic of Indonesia. The Dutch-Indonesian Union that had been set up simultaneously became a weak construct that would disappear completely from the stage after a couple of years.

Claims on New Guinea

The Republicans' wishes

In the political and human drama that unfolded in Indonesia after 1945, the leading roles were played by the Republic, the Netherlands and the Federalists. In addition to this, external forces also steered events at critical moments. The question that has to be asked now is how did New Guinea, and the Papuans, fit into this whole? As far as the Republic was concerned, the position of Western New Guinea had already been discussed in detail in the committee that had laid the foundations for the new state, the BPUPKI. We should also realize that these negotiations took place during the months of June and July 1945, at a time when New Guinea and the Moluccas had been occupied for over a year by the Allied Forces and Tarakan and Balikpapan had already been recaptured. The Japanese empire was on its last legs, though a reading of the reports of the committee's meetings does not indicate this. The tone adopted by the speakers towards the Japanese was one of extreme politeness filled with conviction that there would be a final victory. The explanation is of course that the bulk of the Netherlands East Indies was still in Japanese hands at that point and that members of the BPUPKI were indeed Indonesian nationalists, but had been selected in such a way that they would be acceptable to the Japanese regime. Among them, Sukarno, Hatta, Mohammed Yamin and Professor Supomo unequivocally called the shots. The vast majority of the members came from Java or Sumatra. The only Ambonese member was the medical doctor, Latuharhary, who as leader of the Sarekat Ambon can be included in the pre-war national movement. The participants from East Indonesia included, among others, Dr Sam Ratulangi, whom we have already encountered in a different context. No Papuans were part of this meeting.

Undoubtedly, one of the speakers who stood out most at the committee meetings was the multi-talented lawyer Mohammad Yamin, who aside from his other accomplishments, was a successful author of a number of works about the history of Indonesia. With this, he had traced the roots of the nation to the ancient Javanese kingdoms that existed before the arrival of the Europeans.[11] In competition with Sukarno, he now formulated the ideological foundations of the social system that would become more widely known as 'Pantja Sila', the Five Pillars. We get to know the most prominent author of the Republican constitution, Professor Supomo, as a man who managed to generate appreciation for the importance of the basic principles of leadership, as put forward by Mussolini and Adolf Hitler. In accordance with the Japanese Shinto-teachings, the state was seen as a family that could blossom under the leadership of a powerful monocratic force. The new constitution, not surprisingly, also carried traces of these ideas.

On 10 and 11 July 1945, the BPUPKI devoted a special session to the desired size of the Indonesian state. The draft issue of the constitution, which the Supomo committee had already submitted a month earlier to the Japanese military administration, was probably the main starting point for the discussions. According to Mohammed Yamin's account, in Article 1 of this draft the territory of the new Indonesia was unequivocally equated to that of the former Netherlands East Indies.[12] A large number of members did not like this at all. Yamin dealt with matters most thoroughly and presented five options to his audience. Based on the situation in hand in which Japan was no longer lord and master in the Eastern part of the archipelago, his bottom line was the former Netherlands East Indies area minus the areas where there was fighting, namely Tarakan, Morotai, Western New Guinea (which he called Papua) and Halmaheira. However, he stated that he had every confidence that Japan would quickly drive out the enemy here, so that they would be able to be added to the main territory. He considered Papua in particular to be important in relation to this. Even though it might not be part of Indonesia from an ethnological or physical point of view, it certainly belonged to the historical '*wanderungsgebiet*' of the Indonesians. In order to bolster his argument further, he alluded to the bonds that had been forged through the internment camp in Upper Digul and pointed out that, at the time when the name Indonesia was first coined, everyone there had without any doubt included New Guinea in this.

In the sequel to his argument, he made it clear that, in his view, the British and Portuguese territories in the archipelago also ought to belong to the new Indonesia. He went so far with this that he not only named Portuguese Timor and British Borneo, but Malaya as far as the Thai border as well. As far as his aspirations for these areas are concerned, he could appeal to the unity of the

people and civilization with the rest of the archipelago. One should not, in his opinion, feel constricted to the coincidental entity of the Netherlands East Indies, which had ceased to exist when it was conquered by the Japanese. Nor were the loyalties that had already been formed a match made in heaven. What mattered was what one actually wanted, and it was now up to the BPUPKI to articulate this. He finally summed up his argument in a few words, stating that we constitute, 'not a state that already exists, but a state for a future people!'[13]

Yamin's personal preference was for the largest territory imaginable. Sukarno also leaned in this direction. This speaker appealed to the power of divine will, as could be construed by looking at the map. One could clearly see the Indonesian archipelago spread out on it as a complete entity, and 'as such it is completely obvious that it forms one single entity. Therefore, I shall express my view at this meeting that an independent Indonesia should also include Malaya and Papua. We are not the heirs of the Dutch!' Without paying any attention to the remarks made by Yamin about the military situation at that moment, he added that Nippon was in control of the entire area and that one could therefore do business with the empire concerning this. With respect to the Papuans, he was of the opinion that they most certainly lacked any political insight, but that not only the geography but also the history indicated that they belonged to the entity. Was it not true that they were cited in the works of Prapantja, the chronicler of the Kingdom of Modjopahit?[14] So much for the big shots. The reactions of the remaining members were more down to earth. Kahar Muzakhar, who at a later stage was to become the leader of the Darul Islam, did believe that the Papuans belonged to Indonesia 'even though they are very different to us'. Even if they were a little darker than the rest of the population, their country represented a source of wealth and such an inheritance should not simply be thrown away.[15]

Against the backdrop of this impassioned plea from the expansionists, the speech made by the sober-minded Hatta was a veritable anti-climax. He argued that the previous speakers had struck a far too imperialistic tone and that, as far as he was concerned, the territory of the former Netherlands East Indies ought to suffice. Indeed, it was certainly big enough. He had found the scientific arguments made by Yamin which asserted that the Papuans in fact belonged to the same race as the rest of the Indonesians, to be the least convincing of all. Hybrid forms could be found all over the place in the East of the archipelago, but this should not be used to justify absorbing the Papuans into Indonesia without questioning it. The fact that the Japanese now offered the freedom of *To Indo* which, in his opinion, was no different to the former Netherlands East Indies, was an established fact that ought to be accepted. He himself firmly believed that the Papuans had the right to decide their own fate. During the first few

decades, Indonesia would not have sufficient means at its disposal to educate them to a point where they would be capable of this. He preferred, therefore, to leave it up to Nippon, which fought so bravely against Western imperialism. His proposal was to opt for the borders of the former Netherlands East Indies, but to preferably allow someone else to take care of Western New Guinea. As a good Sumatran, he argued conversely that Malaya should definitely be included in the new Indonesian state, although he also made this conditional on the inhabitants articulating this desire themselves.

All in all, it was a spectacular argument for the right to autonomy, which only found support from the Muslim leader, Hadji Agus Salim. The latter urged all those present not to start arguing now about the size of the new state.[16] Salim shared this concern with several others, including the former member of the *Volksraad*, Sutardjo. Consequently, after some discussion, three options were formulated and immediately voted on. When the time came, a clear majority (thirty-nine out of sixty-six votes) voted for Yamin's Great Indonesia option. The Dutch East Indies option received sixteen votes, while Hatta managed to gain six votes for his hastily formulated proposal, in which the Indonesian state would consist of the Netherlands East Indies minus New Guinea, but with Malaya added.[17]

These were all interesting options that would stir up Southeast Asian politics in the decades to come. For the time being, however, they only had a very limited impact. After the meeting ended, the chair of the council offered the Japanese governor a summary of the results, in which it was indeed confirmed that the council had chosen the Great Indonesia option. This was, however, not included in the draft constitution. This was partly because important Republicans argued that there was no place for this type of issue in the constitution. Perhaps it was also because the proposition was less well-received by the Japanese. During their visit to Field Marshal Terauchi in Saigon, on 13 August, Hatta and Sukarno confined themselves at any rate to the statement that the territory of the future Indonesia would limit itself to that of the Netherlands East Indies. Shortly after this, on 18 August, so after the Japanese capitulation and the declaration of independence, the issue was placed on the agenda of the first PKKI meeting. At this point, the text of a constitution had to be hurriedly finalized. A description of the territory and its constituent parts was missing here as well. In response to an enquiry from one of the members, Iwa Kusumasumantri, about where the description of the territory was, Sukarno answered that this type of issue did not belong in a modern constitution and proceeded to refer to the discussion he had had with Terauchi.

A small committee was assembled at this point which put together a proposal for the further division of the state into eight provinces, all of which lay

within the boundaries of the former Netherlands East Indies. This was adopted without any further discussion. By mentioning the province of Maluku in this, one can assume that nothing other than the former residency of the Moluccas was meant, to which New Guinea had also belonged. Indeed, at the same time, Latuharhary was appointed by the Republican government as Resident of the Moluccas. For the time being, he would in fact not get to take up his post.[18] As we have seen, New Guinea and the Moluccas had returned to Dutch hands once again.

Malino and the Moluccan Commonwealth

After negotiations between the Netherlands and the Republic had got underway, and certainly with the creation of the Negara Indonesia Timur (NIT) in December 1946, the Netherlands was confronted with the question of how New Guinea should be incorporated into the federation. The basic principles for the decisions that had to be made could be found in pre-war politics. Despite the aspirations of the *Vaderlandse Club* and the colonization associations for a second Netherlands in the tropics, on an authoritative level this had remained confined to the administrative reforms of 1936, in which New Guinea was incorporated in the Government of the Great East as a component of the Residency of the Moluccas. Under the interim government of the Allied Forces, this region, together with Borneo, had been placed under the command of the Chief Commanding Officer Nica, C.C. de Rooy, whom we have already encountered. With the departure of the British from Macassar on 15 July 1946, a civil administration had to be set up, in which the already existing plans for a federation had to be taken into account. The main person responsible for this was the Director of Internal Administration W. Hoven. In a memorandum dated 27 May 1946,[19] he observed that a resurrection of the pre-war Government of the Great East would indeed be the most practical measure from an administrative perspective. This way, one could seamlessly link up with the administrative institutions that had been built before the war. Nevertheless, he questioned whether this represented in all respects the best starting point for the subsidiary state to be set up, under the drastically altered political conditions of the time.

On the whole, this large territory contained many different races and tribes that had little in common. It was, for instance, extremely difficult to find a common denominator for Hindu Bali, Muslim South Celebes and the entirely or partially Christian regions of Manado, the mid-Moluccas and Timor. Religion, economic interests and cultural institutions varied from island to island and, as far as Celebes was concerned, even within its constituent parts. And then there was still New Guinea, which was unique in almost every aspect and was still in the first phase of being rooted in the colonial state. There was still no such thing

as a Papuan elite that had seen a little more of the archipelago and had formed an opinion about it. In addition, those living on New Guinea had mixed experiences with their Indonesian administrators and teachers, some of which were not always positive.

The strongest ethnic entity in the area was the Ambonese. Many of them wished to maintain the former residency of the Moluccas, including New Guinea. Other voices in their midst called for this to be expanded with Ternate, Timor, Flores and Sumba into a 'Moluccan Commonwealth' that would form an independent component of the Kingdom of the Netherlands or, possibly of the Indonesian federation that was going to be created. The most outspoken champion of this latter vision was R.J. Metekohy, who propagated his ideas through the *Perkoempoelan Kebangsaan Maloekoe* (Association of the People of the Moluccas)[20], which was located on Ambon. Within these circles, stories of anti-Amberi sentiments on New Guinea were dismissed as being instigated by the Javanese.[21] The Dutch administrators watched his behaviour with great interest. It was indeed plausible that such an expanded residency of the Moluccas—Ambonese politicians would very quickly start referring to it as a Moluccan Commonwealth or a *Maluku Raja*—would be transformed into a semi-independent state. Yet Hoven was not keen on the idea. He was still wondering whether such an Ambon-centric unit on New Guinea would provoke too many defensive reactions, not to mention the issue of how the left-over fragments of East Indonesia would then have to be organized. After a great deal of deliberation, he came up with no other option than the reestablishment of the Government of the Great East, which included the former residency of the South Moluccas with New Guinea as one of the constituent parts or *daerahs*. That would surely be the most practical solution for organizing that multitude of often small communities scattered over a vast area. This solution also meant that Macassar would remain the most prominent political hub in the Eastern parts of the archipelago. This option kept the link with Ambon intact for New Guinea but within the larger entity of East Indonesia.

The plans for the federation came up for extensive discussion only one month later at the conference in Malino, where Van Mook exchanged ideas about this issue with representatives of every corner of the outlying provinces that had once again come under Dutch rule. Besides, the discussion focused more on the principles than how it would be implemented in practice. The principle of an Indonesian federation was adopted without much discussion, as was the vision of organizing East Indonesia and Borneo into separate federal states. The delegation from the South Moluccas lodged no objection to this. How these large entities would be further subdivided also came up for discussion. As we have seen in the previous chapter, New Guinea was represented by

Frans Kaisiepo at the conference, where he was accompanied by Victor De Bruijn. Together with the representative of the Dayaks, the group that found itself in a position comparable to that of the Papuans, he expressed his fear that the smaller entities would become dominated by the larger ones. Therefore, he asked for future autonomy in New Guinea and vehemently opposed the prospect of joining hands once more with the Ambonese in a single residency with the Moluccas. The Papuans wanted their own residency to begin with, but eventually a self-governing federation of New Guinea would have to be realized. The conclusion, therefore, has to be that the idea of a Moluccan Republic was wasted on Kaisiepo.

As reported, he distanced himself from this point of view during the second term, now wielding the argument that New Guinea was too small for such an independent position and ran the risk of becoming isolated as a result. That conformed with Van Mook's way of thinking and perhaps that of De Bruijn as well, in which the question arose whether this civil servant initially had a tight rein on Kaisiepo. Furthermore, it is not too far-fetched to suppose that in the second instance Metekohy exerted some pressure on Kaisiepo. That would have been easy enough since he was also present at the conference as the representative for Ambon. It is remarkable that the programme of the latter's *Perkoempoelan Kebangsaan Maloekoe* bore strong similarities with the *Partai Kaoem Boeroeh Maloeka* (Moluccan Labour Party) which was set up shortly afterwards in Biak under the supervision of De Bruijn.

The final conclusion of Malino was that the concept of an Indonesian federation won the vote and that further talks would be held about creating the component states of Borneo and the Great East. Although a separate position for New Guinea had briefly come up for discussion, it was quickly dismissed.[22] Nevertheless, this did not mean that it had been removed from the agenda. The strength of anti-amberi sentiment, as commented upon by Van Eechoud and many others, was certainly an important factor here. Statements made by Kaisiepo also express an awareness of a unique identity. We can see here the first claim to autonomy made by the Papuans. We can also ascertain that Frans Kaisiepo received no support in Malino from either the Dutch or the Indonesian representatives who were present. It is also striking that during the course of making his anti-Moluccan statements he was apparently out of step with his companion, Victor De Bruijn. This is also indicated by the fact that he introduced the term *Irian* without having the appropriate authority to do so. According to Van Eechoud, who observed this behaviour with displeasure, it had been an expression of Biak chauvinism. At subsequent conferences, Papuan representatives were no longer present. In the opinion of the Dutch, this group lacked any suitable people to represent it. The verdict on the first

Papuan representative was also inherent in this statement. Frans Kaisiepo would remain on the sidelines for the remainder of the Dutch era. It was only much later, after Dutch rule had come to an end, that he got the opportunity to taste revenge. In 1964, he was appointed as the second governor to the Indonesian province of Irian Barat.

The Indo-European option and the Papuan cause

Despite this false start, Frans Kaisiepo's suggestion for a separate place for New Guinea had not been dispensed with just because he had disappeared from the scene. Due to the substantial delay in development with regard to the rest of Indonesia, as well as the ethnic and cultural differences, there was widespread hesitation about simply going ahead and throwing it indiscriminately into the Indonesian melting pot. This is evident from a debate that took place in the Dutch parliament in January 1946, during which the first steps towards developing a new policy with respect to Indonesia were discussed. In response to the suggestion of implementing a wide-scale national vote in Indonesia, both the left and right-wing factions agreed that this would not be an option for the Papuans or other inhabitants that were at a similar stage of development. The then Minister of Overseas Territories, Logemann, was of the opinion that a different approach would be preferable and that this need not have immediate and far-reaching consequences.[23] This point of view was more or less shared by the Resident, Van Eechoud, who was directly responsible for governing Western New Guinea. His efforts were, from the beginning of his appointment, clearly oriented towards a resolute policy for the emancipation of the Papuans, in which they would have to be protected against influences from the rest of Indonesia. However, in his opinion this certainly did not imply separation as a matter of course. That would depend on later developments. As long as there was to be a genuine bond between the Netherlands and Indonesia, then New Guinea would have to remain part of Indonesia.

Van Mook shared this way of thinking. When an invitation arrived from Australia in October 1946 to participate in a conference with the other ruling colonial powers in the Southwestern part of the Pacific Ocean, it received mixed reactions from Dutch circles. The Australians intended to discuss preparations for a Committee for the South and Southwest Pacific, where practical administrative matters could be discussed on a regular basis. It seemed like an attractive proposition and Minister Jonkman certainly appreciated the suggestion. Van Mook was less taken with the idea. His negative experiences with post-war Australian politics certainly had something to do with this. Yet he was also weighing up the fact that Netherlands New Guinea had few ties with the Melanesian world and would have to rely on the rest of Indonesia to take care

of its economic, medical, social and cultural needs. Such talks would only be worthwhile when New Guinea was separated from the Netherlands East Indies, but that was not on the agenda as yet.[24] At Jonkman's insistence, Van Mook demonstrated nonetheless that he was prepared to take a step in this direction by accepting a position as observer at the first meeting of the South Pacific Conference. The minister, however, was not easily swayed. When the conference opened in Canberra in February 1947, the Netherlands became a regular member and remained so until 1962.

This discussion reveals the beginning of both an East Indies Dutch and a Dutch point of view with regard to New Guinea developing, in which the high-ranking officials in Batavia had more of an eye for the cohesion of Indonesia as a whole. Jonkman's attitude was undoubtedly influenced in part by the fact that something was indeed simmering on the New Guinea stove. The possibility of giving the area a special position was now being taken more seriously than it had been a few months ago. This has to be attributed in the first place to the discussions on the Linggadjati Agreement, which had opened the prospect of a sovereign Indonesian state within the next few years. Another reason was the mounting activity of the colonization associations. As we have seen in the first chapter, Indo-colonization before the war was set in motion as a result of the threatened social and political position of the East Indies Dutch who were living on Java. The experiments during that period had not been very successful and the remaining core group of colonists in Manokwari had perished during Geeroms' guerrilla war in the Bird's Head. Nevertheless, the dream of New Guinea as a retreat for the Indo-Europeans continued to beckon, kindled by the circumstances of war and revolution. The future of the 'Indo' was now well and truly at risk. Indeed, the bersiap was first and foremost directed at him. If one wished to remain a Dutchman under Dutch rule, then a new place to live would have to be sought on New Guinea.

This feeling had already prevailed in the internment camps where most of the KNIL prisoners-of-war had to stay together for months on end, even after the Japanese defeat, because no place could be found for them on Java which was in a state of rebellion. A lucid account of this can be found in a report by the Public Information Officer, D. van der Meulen, who visited a number of these camps on Borneo and in Siam. Early in 1946, after the first plans for the federation had been made known, the *Grooter Nederland Actie* (GNA) was set up from this quarter. This was an organization of Indo-Europeans who campaigned for a Dutch homeland to be established on New Guinea that, alongside Suriname and Curaçao, should be incorporated into the Dutch realm as a separate constituent. The organization received support from the likeminded *Nederlandsch-Indische Bond van Ex-Gemobiliseerden en Geïnterneerden*

(NIBEG), which was set up by former prisoners-of-war and in which the 'totoks' (white people who had been born and raised in the Netherlands) had the upper hand. Their actions signified the resurrection of the plan of action preached by the *Vaderlandse Club* before the war. The key figure in this GNA was Captain C.T. Berg of the KNIL. Together with F. Rijken Rapp, who belonged to the IEV, he would remain particularly active in the coming years and would harass the Dutch authorities with petitions that pushed for the realization of their ideal.[25] It comes as no surprise that the pre-war *Vereeniging Kolonisatie Nieuw-Guinea* (VKNG) of the engineer J.H. Schijfsma, expressed its delight with the activities of the GNA. During the course of 1946, other groups also joined this company, in both the Netherlands East Indies as well as the Netherlands.

In the coming years, these groups would increasingly operate as a closed shop and would submit joint petitions and requests to anyone who would listen. It was in this spirit, that the VKNG and the GNA organized a well-attended public gathering on 18 January 1948 in Batavia, where the *Nederlands-Indische Pensioenbond* (the Dutch-East Indies Pension Association), the *Nederlandse Nieuw-Guinea Vrouwenbond* (Dutch New Guinean Women's Union), the *Vaderlandse Club* and the NIBEG were present and passed a motion which favoured the New Guinean homeland. At the same time, representatives from these associations made themselves heard in the Netherlands too, supported by local organizations such as the *Stichting Nieuw-Nederland*, the *Stichting Nederland Overzee*, the *Studiekring Nieuw-Guinea* and the *Comité openlegging Nieuw-Guinea door Politieke Delinquenten*.[26] This last body was not insignificant, because it was partly through its actions that soon afterwards several hundred former NSB members were sent over from the Netherlands and were placed in work camps on Biak.

In the Netherlands, the colonization associations could also count on finding a warm and sympathetic ear among influential old colonials, such as J.W. Meyer Ranneft, W.K.H. Feuilletau De Bruijn and Ch.J.I.M. Welter. The first two in particular had been active in this area even before the war, while Feuilletau De Bruijn now served as the GNA's representative in the Netherlands. At first there was exceptionally little interest on the part of Dutch politicians in their plans. There was only a passing reference made to them in the report compiled by a parliamentary committee under the leadership of M.J.M. Van Poll, that visited most of the reoccupied areas in March 1946,[27] and even then it was only as an example of what not to do.

At the beginning of 1946, this issue apparently did not yet have the attention of the members of parliament and the government. The problem of the Indies-Dutch population and the attention this generated for New Guinea became

accentuated during the course of 1946 when it became more clear that political reforms would go much further than was originally planned. With this, New Guinea gradually became a political issue. The turning point in this development was the conference at Pangkal Pinang in October 1946.[28] It took place in the wake of the conferences at the Hoge Veluwe and Malino. At Pangkal Pinang, the 'minorities' were consulted, that is to say the Chinese, the Arabs and the East Indies Dutch. The latter were represented there by pre-war political parties in the Netherlands East Indies, such as the *Indo-Europees Verbond* (IEV), the *Vaderlandse Club* and the *Christelijk Staatkundige Partij* (CSP) (Christian Political Party). In addition to the above, the recently created NIBEG and the GNA were also invited. Van Mook hoped with this conference to gain support from these groups for his plans for a federation and home rule. The conference was also urgently needed to quell the public grumblings of the East Indies Dutch population in general. It offered an opportunity to explain why a speedy restoration of Dutch rule had failed to take place immediately after the end of the war and why a conciliatory approach towards the Indonesian fight for freedom was unavoidable. The new relationships would demand a more compromising attitude from the Dutch in Indonesia, even to the point of working alongside people like Sukarno, who had collaborated with the Japanese during the occupation.

The discussions at Pangkal Pinang had an undercurrent of bitterness and resentment. Many speakers expressed their dissatisfaction with the slow and highly fragmented recovery after the Japanese capitulation and at the lack of attention that was given to the interests of the Dutch residents. In this respect, there was indeed a general disillusionment about the fact that the government seemingly did not need this group. The bitterest taste came from the judgement made by the NIBEG representative, Professor W.F. Prins who spoke of 'the apparent diffidence of our rulers, when they were saddled with much greater numbers of survivors of the Japanese scourge than they had ever anticipated'. At least, one would have to be granted certain rights as a minority in the new Indonesia that was to be built. For the Indo-European, the possibility of emigrating to Brazil or New Guinea was a key issue. For these more often than not coloured people, there were hardly any other options, given the racial policy of major immigration countries such as the United States and Australia. Anyone with a dark skin would not get in. The IEV officials were of the opinion that the government should now generously comply fully with the wishes of the New Guinea colonists and requested a wide-scale approach from the government. Somewhat optimistically, it was suggested that as a result of the activities that would be set in motion, the Papuan population would also be able to catch up.

All these points were stressed forcefully by Captain Berg of the GNA, who no longer confined himself exclusively to the interests of the Indo-Europeans, but argued that the country should be just as open to the prospect of emigration from the Netherlands and other parts of Europe, where massive streams of refugees were searching for a safe haven. Working closely with the Dutch colonization associations had seemingly paid its dividends here. All these plans were listened to approvingly by those present and set down in a motion that was adopted without a ballot. In it, it was observed that 'part of the conference is of the opinion that New Guinea must be recognized as having a special political status, which is separate from Indonesia, within the Kingdom'.[29] The formulation made clear that those who submitted the motion did not dare to take it for granted that all those present would want to put their signature to this final section.

Van Mook exuded an air of detachment, but at the same time did not oppose the motion. There was so little, after all, that one could offer these groups. He therefore responded by stating that, although the government was not impervious to their wishes, he could nevertheless do very little under the present circumstances. He promised, at any rate, to talk to the minister about further investigating the possibilities of colonization and opening up the region.[30] Although a certain degree of scepticism could be detected in his words, Van Mook would abide by this promise. Yet, at that time he apparently was no firm proponent of the idea of having New Guinea break away from the Indonesian context. In a note to his staff written on 21 October 1946, he commented that such a thing was conceivable in certain situations 'but in the current climate it would probably be preferable not to proceed in that direction too visibly and also to avoid the semblance that we are working towards this.'[31] It did not come over as being completely resolved, and a lot would still also depend on the circumstances.

A few weeks later, after the the Linggadjati Agreement with its promise of a sovereign Indonesian federation had been signed, the situation had changed. Van Eechoud was summoned to Batavia for a discussion with Van Mook and Hoven about the different options for granting a special position to New Guinea. Van Eechoud's voice can be clearly heard in the minutes. The population was more numerous than originally thought and was adamant that it did not wish to come under the jurisdiction of the Indonesians without supervision from the Dutch. Besides, there was still a heavy task at hand in so many different areas, for which funds and expertise were needed. It would be an irresponsible act to incorporate the territory into the Negara Indonesia Timur, which directly lacked both. Therefore, a separate status was necessary within the Kingdom or the Union that would facilitate the continuation of Dutch direct

rule. The relations with Indonesia would have to be regulated in a separate agreement. The report was wired by Van Mook to The Hague on 27 November, as a suggestion for further discussions with the Republic about the implementation of the Linggadjati Agreement.[32]

Passing the Papuans from player to player

Dutch moves

Immediately after the Pangkal Pinang Conference had ended in October 1946, the time had come for negotiations with the Republic. These led to the meeting in Batavia on 15 November, at which the draft agreement that had been negotiated a few days earlier in Linggadjati was signed. It is worth noting that during the negotiations New Guinea did not come up for discussion. Articles 3 and 4 on the extent and structure of the United States of Indonesia, which had set the door ajar for a special place for the regions that wished it, were at the time of the negotiations predominantly viewed by Schermerhorn and his associates as relating to Sumatra.[33] They informed The Hague that by applying these rights it would still be possible to release Sumatra from Java, as a result of which it would be possible to have a more balanced federation in the future. However, in the Netherlands the link with New Guinea was instantly made. There, the need was felt to immediately record the commitments made at Pangkal Pinang in an agreement with the Republic, and to some extent with good reason. After all, Linggadjati not only dealt with the incorporation of the Republic into the federation, but also with relations within the federation and its relationship with the Netherlands. In Malino and Pangkal Pinang, the Netherlands had been able to discuss matters on its own terms. Serious negotiating would be required with the Republic; by far the strongest party on the Indonesian stage and quite capable of drawing up its own pre-conditions. But for the same reason the outcome of these negotiations would bind all the other parties as well. It was therefore inevitable that the Dutch government considered the Agreement with the Republic as the centre piece and wanted the results of former discussions to be woven into it.

New Guinea was placed on the political agenda in the Netherlands after the first drafts of the Agreement had reached the government in The Hague. This took place on 11 November, the day the Commissie Generaal arrived in Linggadjati. At that time in the Netherlands capital the Pangkal Pinang reports were fresh in people's minds as well. Thus, at the subsequent cabinet meeting, the participants asked themselves on what grounds a region such as New Guinea, where a referendum was not possible, could have a special place within

the kingdom or the federation. In addition, they also wanted to know what the IEV and the Indo-European people thought of these plans.[34] This request was cabled that same day by Minister Jonkman to the Commissie General. It was asked in particular to alter Article 3 in such a way that New Guinea too would be able to acquire a special status, despite the fact that its inhabitants could not be considered capable of expressing an opinion on this issue. Although Schermerhorn states in his diary that he discussed the issue with the Republican delegation,[35] no trace of this can be found in either the minutes or accompanying correspondence. He later admitted, also to the Republican delegation, that indeed this did not happen.[36] Nevertheless, this did not prevent him from wiring a cable through to The Hague on 14 November, after his return from Linggadjati, stating that the Commissie Generaal would willingly consider such an exception for New Guinea.[37] Jonkman was clearly satisfied with this response. It contained a more positive tone than he was accustomed to from Schermerhorn, even though he was fully aware of the fact that the text of the Agreement still did not contain a single word about it.[38]

Apparently Jonkman believed that something could still be done about that, but it would only be possible if the Agreement was reopened and further negotiations about it could be entered into with the Republic. That, however, was out of the question in the opinion of the negotiators, due to the extremely volatile situation in the archipelago. Both Van Mook and the Commissie Generaal believed it to be of paramount importance that the Agreement was signed as quickly as possible, before the outbreak of widespread violence rendered further discussion futile. For the Dutch, the only option left was to try to interpret the Agreement in such a way that one could recognize oneself more easily in it. This was most certainly the view taken by the Commissie Generaal which, immediately upon its return from Linggadjati, had begun to explain to the suspicious East Indies Dutch top-level civil servants and military that the Agreement was a lot better than it appeared at first glance. Once back in the Netherlands, it continued along the same track and demonstrated right away that it was quite prepared to commit its thoughts on this to paper in an explanatory memorandum. After further discussions in the Cabinet, Jonkman also articulated his own opinion about the matter in a policy statement which he delivered in the Second Chamber on 10 December. Both papers offered the House such a lot to hold onto that it adopted a motion on 20 December which was submitted by both parliamentary leaders of the coalition; Romme and Van der Goes van Naters. In it, parliament declared that it agreed to the signing of the Linggadjati Agreement on condition that it contained the commentary provided by the Commissie Generaal and the government.[39] With this, the phenomenon of the 'dressed up' Linggadjati was a fact.

The explanatory memorandum and the government statement covered all the important aspects of the Agreement. One can therefore ask what these had to say about the New Guinea issue. Painfully little, as far as the memorandum was concerned. In it, the Commissie General homed in on the question relating to the exact moment when the population of 'any territory' would be able to make the choices intended in Articles 3 and 4 for its place within the new system, but it was hard for them to deny that that this would have to take place in a democratic fashion, as was plainly written down in the text of the Agreement. Here lay the heart of the problem, as the Cabinet had concluded already, and the Commissie Generaal could do little else than admit that the logical application of these articles could be problematic 'for an area such as New Guinea'. Consequently, if one wanted to organize matters differently, the only viable option left was to continue negotiating with the Republic.[40] To the relief of the members of the Commissie General, Van Mook took their side, as had become clear already after his talk with Van Eechoud on 27 November. It only remained to be seen what the Indonesians would make of this.

As it now stood, this commentary did not provide the firm commitments Jonkman had requested and which the Commissie General had so lavishly promised him. In his own policy statement, the minister therefore could do little else than express the wish 'that in the spirit of Articles 3 and 4, New Guinea would also be able to acquire its own status with respect to the Kingdom (new style) and the United States of Indonesia, even though the indigenous peoples might still find it hard to voice their opinion'. Rather inconsistently, but quite understandably in light of what had gone before, he added there in the space of one breath the possibility of opening it up 'for a greater number of Dutch settlers, primarily East Indies Dutch, who wish to live under their own system of government.'[41] This is how the preoccupations of the colonization enthusiasts at Pangkal Pinang and the Commissie General became seamlessly intertwined with each other by the right to autonomy in the Dutch government policy statement of 10 December 1946. When all is said and done, all the explanatory memorandum and government policy statement did was to articulate a wish. That may have been a contribution to the politico-psychological process that the Commissie General wished to achieve by means of the Agreement, but it was certainly not yet a statement to establish a new constitutional relationship.

East Indonesian aspirations

The fact that this interpretation would cause problems in Indonesia soon became apparent at the conference in Den Pasar on Bali where, from 7 until 24 December, the creation of the new state of East Indonesia was discussed.[42] It was not the Republicans who spoke here, but Indonesians who wished to work

together with the Netherlands. Even so, the statement made by the Dutch government on New Guinea was certainly not appreciated by them, no more than its immediate application in the model for the layout of the new state that lay there to be judged and which would go down in history as the Den Pasar Settlement. In Article 1 of this document, which was prepared under Hoven's authority, it was stated that this state would include the territory of the former Government of the Great East region 'barring a later decision about how the territory of the current Residency of New Guinea would be divided up'. In the supplementary commentary it was declared that New Guinea had not been grouped with East Indonesia, because arranging its constitutional position 'was itself a problem that is being dealt with separately'.

Five speakers opposed this argument, among them the Sultan of Tidore, Zainal Abidin Alting, who referred to the historical rights of the Sultanate in this area. Ide Anak Agung Gde Agung pointed out that, during the Malino conference, the Papuan representative Kaisiepo had in fact pushed for an amalgamation with the South Moluccas, and therefore with East Indonesia. This was a rather simplistic representation of the facts, given that Kaisiepo's position chopped and changed throughout the conference. What cut more ice was his remark that the reservation for Dutch colonists that Jonkman wished for was at odds with Kaisiepo's comments about the wish of the Papuans to be their own masters. However, he did not make an issue of it on this occasion and heeded the argument put forward by the government that New Guinea was a liability that the future *Negara Indonesia Timur* could ill afford at the moment. As an interim solution, he proposed that it be brought under the federal government as a 'territorium'. After the various speakers had ventilated their feelings, three motions were put forward, all of which were aimed at keeping New Guinea in East Indonesia and within the federation. The most tersely worded motion came from the delegate from the Minahassa, E. Katoppo, who wished to see this idea instantly included in Article 1 of the Den Pasar Settlement. After a fierce debate, these proposals were replaced by a motion brought forward by Nadjamuddin Daeng Malewa, which contained an important element of compromise. Although, here too, it was recorded in writing that New Guinea belonged with East Indonesia, there was no immediate pressure exerted to change the article in question. Nadjamuddin and his associates confined themselves to expressing the wish that the possibility of joining New Guinea to East Indonesia would be explored further. This motion was accepted with only two votes against. One can deduce from this that those taking part in the Den Pasar Conference were firmly convinced that New Guinea belonged with East Indonesia, but as yet they were also prepared not to force this issue.

In his response, Van Mook partially followed Anak Agung's line of argument. He went into great detail about the backwardness of the region and the massive amount of work that still had to be done there. With an implicit reference to Kaisiepo's presentation, he went on to declare that up until now it had not been possible to appoint a good representative for New Guinea and that he did not want to settle for a sham delegation representing this region. Time was needed to gauge the feelings of the population. In addition, he also touched upon the strategic importance of New Guinea, which had come to light during the Second World War and in doing so he also underlined the importance of this region for Indonesia as a whole. In the midst of his argument he did, however, ease off on one key issue. He had originally argued from the position that he considered it fairer 'not to unite a population from such an—essentially non-Indonesian region—to an Indonesian state.' Should one wish to make a separate 'territory' of it then it could be linked to the United States of Indonesia, the Dutch-Indonesian Union or the Netherlands itself, as one saw fit.

This non-committal approach was not appreciated and, in the face of fierce resistance from the conference delegates, Van Mook distanced himself from it during the discussion about the Nadjamuddin motion. He now used this opportunity to state, 'that it certainly was not the government's intention to exclude New Guinea from Indonesia, but rather to explore in depth how it ought to be incorporated.'[43] At the end of the conference, Article 1 of the Den Pasar Settlement was amended accordingly to reflect this. While it had originally only stipulated that a decision would be made later regarding the allocation of the territory of the current residency of New Guinea', the following words were now added to it: 'and its relationship with the State of East Indonesia and the future United States of Indonesia'. Although a shrewd politician would be able to argue that this did not by definition exclude a direct relationship with the Netherlands, it must nevertheless be concluded that neither Van Mook's explanation nor the adjusted text of Article 1 of the Den Pasar Settlement had made such an operation any easier.

Immediately after the meeting in Den Pasar ended, the development of the federal state of East Indonesia, the *Negara Indonesia Timur*, began in earnest. It acquired a formal structure with a central government and representative bodies in the centre and in the sub-divisions (daerahs). Van Mook could issue the legal proceedings that were necessary for this on the basis of the special prerogatives granted to him during the war, which were stipulated in paper D65 of the Statute Book. This took place against the wishes of the Dutch government which felt as if it had been ignored on this occasion. They had only been informed about all the important aspects after the event. Even an occasion as important as the statement about New Guinea was not dealt with at all in the

Cabinet. This was not just because other matters demanded all the attention, but also because the information needed from Batavia for this took a long time to materialize. It was one of those cases, from which many people in the Netherlands concluded that Van Mook was a 'runaway horse' that would have to be brought to a halt as soon as possible. This was also the main reason why, on later occasions, the government did not consider themselves bound by the terms and conditions of the Den Pasar conference concerning New Guinea.[44] It placed itself in a weak position here, because even the decisions of the Lt. Governor General that had been issued under emergency law had been made in the name of the Queen and had taken place under the responsibility of the Minister. Jonkman, however, let it all pass whilst sticking to the viewpoint of the government declaration of 10 December on various occasions.

Apart from these inconsistencies in Dutch policy, the question of New Guinea's place within the new frameworks that were going to be created continued to attract attention in East Indonesia. It soon became apparent that Metekohy and his fellow-combatants, who supported a Moluccan Commonwealth which included New Guinea, did not have the strength to play an important role in this. In Malino and Den Pasar, the representatives of the government in Batavia had shown that they were not keen on implementing the project of a Greater Moluccas, a *Maluku Raya* as a separate state. The message must have got through loud and clear, because according to the official proceedings of the Malino conference, Metekohy did not even attempt to undertake anything in this direction. A second reason was undoubtedly because his plans had been dismissed out of hand by the Sultan of Tidore who was not at all keen on forging a union in which the assertive Ambonese would be in command. Thirdly, elections for the South Moluccan Council which had taken place in September had already resulted in an overwhelming majority for the teacher Pupella and his political party called *Partai Indonesia Merdeka*, the Indonesian Freedom Party. As the name indicates, this was a party with obvious leanings towards Indonesian nationalism that valued the federal connection in particular as an opportunity to link up with the Republic. The inhabitants of the Ambon islands appeared to be less blatantly pro-Dutch than had been thought until now: an experience that one also had in other parts of East Indonesia during the elections for the regional councils. For Van Mook this was a positive matter, since it strengthened his ideas for a federation and the hope that, together with the outlying regions, the Republic could be led, in this way, to a course that was acceptable for all.[45]

'Ambon's other half', as the Australian historian Chauvel called this pro-Indonesian faction, would make itself known in the coming years. That is not

to say that the traditional Dutch and Orangeist factions would allow this to drive them from the scene. As far as they were concerned, these developments represented a reason to organize themselves more efficiently, in which they were supported by important factions, especially among the Ambonese people who were living on Java. One important organization in connection with this was the *Persatoean Timoer Besar*, the 'League of the Great East'. These groups still cherished the hope that the Moluccas, including New Guinea, would become completely separate from Indonesia. According to their way of thinking, New Guinea was important because they speculated that the supposed economic potential of that island would enable an independent Ambon to cope on its own without the rest of Indonesia.[46] Through their apparent inability to exercise influence via the representative bodies, these 'separatists' focused in practice on 'extra-parliamentary action'. They managed to gain support for this from conservative movements in the Netherlands and the Netherlands East Indies, who saw in this an opportunity to shape their opposition to the Dutch government's policy regarding Indonesia which they believed to be too weak and indulgent.

In the Netherlands East Indies, their separatist activities were watched with interest by a considerable number of army and naval officers. Those who did not do this in accordance with their own personal convictions, did so on the grounds that one should take into consideration the strong sympathies for this among the large numbers of Ambonese in the military. In the Netherlands, supporters of Ambonese separatism could be found among the same people who dedicated themselves to Indo-colonization on New Guinea. They enjoyed the special attention of Lieutenant-Admiral Helfrich, who was promoted to Commander of the Naval Forces upon his return to the Netherlands.

When the East Indonesian state and the federal policies increased in strength, there was little room left to turn the ideas about a Greater Moluccas into reality. Even if its most outspoken supporters on Ambon could manage to muster a majority in the local council, it would still not enable them to exercise much influence on East Indonesian politics. This was determined in Macassar, where the line that had been adopted in Den Pasar was followed. One year after the conference, in December 1947, the preliminary representative body of the Negara Indonesia Timur which had been set up since then, discussed relations with respect to New Guinea in great detail. The debate was concluded with a Pelengkahu motion which once again repeated the position put forward in Den Pasar and urged for the swift amalgamation of these parts with East Indonesia.[47] A similar attitude was also adopted by the government of the state, which during this time was involved in negotiations with the central government in

Batavia about an agreement in which the reciprocal relations would be laid down. At the insistence of President Sukawati, it was stated in the provisional agreement that if New Guinea would ever be absorbed into the larger framework of a federal state, the claims of the Negara Indonesia Timur would take precedence over those made by any of the other states. This qualification was accepted without much protest by the Dutch because it did not exclude other options.[48] Yet with respect to the way in which this issue was handled, we see a difference in opinion between the Minister and Van Mook, who was inclined to take the wishes of East Indonesia more seriously than Jonkman did. Despite Den Pasar and Van Mook's statements, precedence continued to be given in the Netherlands to Jonkman's wish to grant New Guinea its own unique status which he had expressed on 10 December 1946.[49] It is therefore hardly surprising that these different views occasionally led to some awkward exchanges between the policymakers in Batavia and The Hague.

Republican reactions

In the preceding sections of this chapter it is explained how, with the start-up of the federation, the handling of the conflict in Indonesia was determined by the interaction between unequal powers such as the Republic, the Federalists and the Netherlands. Moreover, we have noticed that in Dutch circles there was always a marked difference between the type of approach adopted by Batavia and The Hague respectively. The issue of New Guinea's status had its own place in this, as was clearly demonstrated by the statements made by Jonkman and Van Mook. The parliamentary debates and the resulting statement of Jonkman of 10 December had also created a bone of contention in relations between the Netherlands and the federal state of East Indonesia which it had set up.

New Guinea also disrupted relations with the Republic. It was, after all, one of the aspects on which the Netherlands had wished to interpret the current Linggadjati Agreement further. After the Romme-Van der Goes van Naters motion had been accepted, the Commissie Generaal had very little choice left other than to try to persuade the Republican negotiators to accept these interpretations. When the latter refused point blank to do so, the 'basic' agreement was finally signed by both parties in keeping with their own respective interpretation of it. During the discussion that accompanied this, the emphasis was initially more to do with the principle than the actual content of the issues that were in dispute. In so far as can be construed from the minutes of the discussions and the papers that were exchanged, the Dutch side placed more importance on the preconditions regarding New Guinea than was the case with the Republic. This subject was only referred to in passing by their representatives. This occurred particularly in speeches made by Sukarno, in which he defended

the proposition that the entire country, from Sabang to Merauke, belonged to the one single, unified state of Indonesia.

Such statements inevitably irritated the Dutch, who interpreted them as a refusal to acknowledge the terms that had been laid down in the Linggadjati Agreement.[50] They were also at loggerheads with the resolution the Linggadjati Agreement contained to work together to create an Indonesian Federation. For Republican politics, Linggadjati was a means, not an end. Sjahrir too, the man who more than anyone else on the Republican side had dedicated himself to realizing the Agreement, openly proclaimed that one should not see it as an eternal law for relations between the Netherlands and the Republic, but rather as a phase in the struggle for independence. One single state was, and continued to be, the ultimate goal. This objective was explicitly recorded in the motion put forward by Manai Sophian, a representative for Celebes who was living on Java, in which the Republican parliament accepted the Linggadjati Agreement on 5 March 1957. Here, New Guinea was explicitly referred to as one of the regions that had to be incorporated into the Republic of Indonesia as quickly as possible.[51]

Manai Sophian had intended his motion to act as a counter-move against the motion of Romme and Van der Goes van Naters, through which the Dutch parliament had accepted the Linggadjati Agreement. It was in fact an anti-federalist manifesto that was carried through by acclamation at the plenary session. In his commentary, Sophian had made clear that he was rather offended by the fact that the leaders on Java and Sumatra had shown so little interest in the struggle for freedom in the outer regions. We should set great store by his judgement, particularly as far as New Guinea is concerned. During the next few years, the region hardly played any role at all in the remaining negotiations between the Netherlands and the Republic. Other issues took precedence. The region only came up indirectly in a discussion between Hatta and Stikker in November 1948, at a moment when both negotiators made a final attempt to avoid the Second Police Action that seemed imminent at the time. Hatta used the meeting with Stikker to make a point that he had aired years beforehand in the BPUPKI, namely that he was not interested in New Guinea because it did not belong with Indonesia. Stikker set great store by this statement. It prompted him instantly to conclude that this region could be reserved for the Netherlands. The lack of interest displayed on the part of the Republic was an argument that would be bandied about in the coming years and contributed significantly to the hardening of the Dutch position with regard to New Guinea. It would turn out to be an underestimation of the meaning of Sukarno's statements and of the position of the Republican MPs at the time when the Manai Sophian motion was passed. Even those who did not know the region, which

applied to most of them, were sensitive to the symbolic significance of New Guinea as the furthest tip of the Indonesian fatherland.

Two Dutch pickets

New Guinea and the Decree on the Government of Indonesia during the Period of Transition

After his talk with Hatta, Stikker was pleasantly convinced that the Republic would give the Netherlands a free hand as far as New Guinea was concerned. As a result, he had no objections to putting it on record that there was no need now to hand over the region to the Negara Indonesia Timur.[52] It was a significant remark that said much about the way he interpreted the internal political relations within Indonesia at the time. After all, it was not only the Republicans with whom the Netherlands had to deal. From 1947 onwards, considerable headway had been made with the federal experiment. Apart from the Negara Indonesia Timur, a string of larger and smaller federal states had been formed on Java and Sumatra under the supervision of the Dutch. In the second half of 1948, the leaders of these states had made clear that they wanted to have a say in the future of the country as a whole as well. References were made earlier in this chapter to the *Bandoengresoluties* of July 1948, in which they had laid down their ideas on a tripartite working relationship between the Netherlands, the Republic and themselves. These had been discussed more thoroughly in a series of conferences both with and without the Dutch, held in the city of Bandung, the capital of the state of Pasundan (West Java). The New Guinea issue had figured prominently in these discussions.

The direct cause for the discussions with the Federalists in Bandung had been the amendment of the Dutch constitution, which laid down the minimum conditions on which the Netherlands was prepared to accept the transfer of sovereignty, mentioned in the Linggadjati Agreement. One article provided for the situation that would arise when 'any part of Indonesia" would not wish to join the VSI. Here, it was laid down that, in such a case, its relations with the VSI and the Kingdom would be arranged separately 'in as much harmony as possible with the basic principles of this Chapter.'[53]

It was a lavish interpretation of Articles 3 and 4 of the Linggadjati Agreement which left all options open for separation from Indonesia for whichever part would like to make use of it. It was certainly relevant for New Guinea as well. This resulted in an immediate response from the federal leaders who gathered in Bandung in July 1948 for an internal discussion on the implications of the new constitution. With regard to New Guinea, they stated in Article 1 of their

'Bandung resolutions', mentioned earlier, that: 'the free and sovereign United States of Indonesia ... will include the entire territory of the Netherlands East Indies, without prejudice to the provisions laid down in Article 3 of the Linggadjati Agreement.'[54] The phrase 'without prejudice to' is of great significance here because it implied that a democratically enforced right to autonomy was only possible internally, that is to say within the context of the Indonesian state.

The Federalists did not wish to consider, even for a single moment, the notion of an external right to autonomy, including the freedom of a specific area to choose to have a direct relationship with the Netherlands. This also applied to the inhabitants of New Guinea. Even if this area were to be given a special status, then this would always have to be within the framework of the United States of Indonesia (USI). This was in accordance with the statements made by Van Mook at Den Pasar, but clashed with the statement made by Minister Jonkman.

The latter's successor, Sassen, who took up the position in August 1948, did not leave it at this. The opportunity to make his position clear on the subject presented itself during the formulation of the BIO Decree, which contained an arrangement for the preliminary administration of Indonesia during the time until the transfer of sovereignty. Many of the Governor General's powers would be transferred to a Federal Interim Government (FIR) which was mainly made up of Indonesians, while the remaining local Dutch authority would be exercised by a High Representative of the Crown (HVK). In actual fact, this BIO Decree contained the ideal image that the Dutch had of the new federation. In October 1948, a large delegation of representatives from the federal states travelled to The Hague in order to consult with the Dutch government about this. The delegation was led by the Prime Minister of the Negara Indonesia Timur, Ide Anak Agung, and included a number of East Indies Dutch civil servants who had carried out most of the preparatory work.

The main architect of the BIO Decree was K.L.J. Enthoven, one of Van Mook's dedicated associates. In accordance with the beliefs of the latter, the formulation of Article 1 of the Bandung resolutions had been adhered to in the BIO Decree. However, in a separate article (21), leeway had been given for the decision regarding the status of the territories to be made by the Cabinet. This was not sufficiently water-tight in the eyes of the party chairmen of the KVP (Romme) and the CHU (Tilanus), who at that time had a tight hold on the Indonesia policy. We will not go into the discussions that followed in The Hague with a fine toothcomb here, as they are of a rather technical nature. The sentiment was clear, nevertheless, and its effect was that in the final document the possibility of making an exception of New Guinea was

indisputably recorded. The text (article 65) that was documented there read as follows:

> 'the King can, after consulting with the FIR, for as long as the population of any part of the territory is not yet capable of expressing a view about the relations which this territory shall enter into with the Netherlands and the United States of Indonesia, determine that the authority over this territory based on directives given by the King will be executed *by both the HVK and the FIR* in mutual agreement'.[55]

This was a compromise between both points of view, in which 'the Bandung camp' had mixed the most water with the wine. Indeed, via 'the directives given by the King', the Netherlands would have the final say in the framework that had been proposed. On the other hand, Enthoven and his colleagues who had come over from Batavia were also satisfied, as everything still depended upon the cooperation of the new Indonesian authorities. However, this definitely did not please Minister Sassen. He was afraid that Anak Agung, whom one might consider the rising star of the interim government, would get too great a say in the future fate of New Guinea. This is why he came in right at the end of the debate, at a point when everyone believed that the matter had long since been done and dusted, with the proposition to replace the words that had been underlined with the following: '*through the HVK or otherwise jointly through the HVK together with the Federal government.*' This turned everything upside down again, as it would enable the HVK to act on his own, if he so wished. According to Sassen, it was meant to impress upon Anak Agung and his associates 'that we definitely intend to let it depend on the attitude of East Indonesia as well whether or not the authority over New Guinea should or should not be exercised together with the federal government'. This amendment was met with fierce opposition from Drees and Joekes, who believed it was important to grant your supporters a small victory once in a while. The matter was brought back onto an even keel later on, with support from Beel and Stikker, so that the document had to be sent for a second time to the Queen for her signature, as the hasty Sassen had already presented his own draft to her to be signed.[56]

An immediate consequence of the BIO Decree being adopted was that a new ruling now had to be compiled for the administration of New Guinea as a joint foster child of both the HVK and the FIR. The draft for this arrangement entitled 'New Guinea During the Period of Transition' (BNGO) was completed at the beginning of 1949. The Resident of New Guinea would have two superiors, and the financial burdens and rewards would be shared equally between Indonesia and the Netherlands.

The removal of Tidoran home rule on New Guinea

During the discussions about the BIO Decree, the Dutch government also took action on another issue. In order to understand this, we must first transport ourselves far back into the history of the area. To be able to implement the BIO Decree in full, it would first be necessary to terminate the contractual relationship that still existed with Tidore. Officially, the North and West of New Guinea were still part of its territory, as stipulated in a settlement with the Sultanate in 1909. However, in this settlement it was also stated that the government could annex these areas whenever it wished to do so. There had been no need for this during the years leading up to the Second World War. The administration could be carried out directly by government officials in these lands, while the status of being part of the Sultanate provided the practical advantage that it made them less tied to the legislation for the directly administered parts of the East Indies. Since the return of the Dutch under the Nica in 1944, the Western half of New Guinea was in fact administered as if it were one single Dutch Residency. This state of affairs was confirmed after the administration of the Allied Forces in the Great East ended in July 1946. The most obvious descendent in the Sultan's lineage, Zainal Abidin Alting, was indeed elevated at the time to Sultan of Tidore, but the actual power of ruling over New Guinea had remained in the hands of the Dutch Resident. He was also informed at the time that he should realize that New Guinea could be formally withdrawn whenever the government saw fit.

Ever since then, the departments in The Hague and Batavia had periodically focused on this issue, especially in connection with the growing number of incoming petitions and demands from the colonization associations. Formal home rule for an Indonesian Sultanate would complicate the direct link with the Netherlands which these organizations wished for. With the adoption of the BIO Decree by the government, the general feeling in Batavia as well as in The Hague was that the knot should be finally cut. By December 1948, a proposal for this was already being processed in Batavia. Thereupon, the administrative procedure of separation was set in motion. This went completely against the wishes of Anak Agung and the Sultan of Tidore, the latter arguing that he had not fully understood the information relayed to him at the time he assumed his duties. It was to no avail, and the separation went ahead on 8 July 1949. Because at that point it was unclear in Batavia whether the Radja Ampat Islands were also to be included in the separation, the decision about this would depend upon an investigation carried out by a committee. The result was that in December 1949, a few days before the transfer of sovereignty it was decided implicitly to include the Radja Ampat Islands in the New Guinea residency.[57]

Up until the end of the nineteenth century, the link with Tidore was held onto by the Netherlands as an extra guarantee for Dutch sovereignty over New Guinea. In the twentieth century, this had an explicitly administrative significance in as far as it provided the lightweight Dutch administration with a legal basis. With the post-war developments, that held out the possibility of a more intensive application of governance and perhaps a separation from the rest of Indonesia too, it had lost its meaning. New Guinea would have to manage without Tidore. There are few signs to indicate that anyone on the island regretted this. It was a different story with the Sultan. Henceforth, Zainal Abidin was bent on revenge.

The discussion about these governmental and political issues was thwarted by the drastic events that took place in Indonesia shortly after the BIO Decree was adopted. On 25 December, the Second Police Action was deployed. Dutch troops occupied the main part of Java and Sumatra and the most prominent Republican leaders, including Sukarno and Hatta, were imprisoned by the Dutch. For a moment it looked as if the Netherlands had definitely won hands down, and that it would be able to proceed with organizing the structure of an independent Indonesia according to its own preferences. That idea was short-lived. The Indonesian main force withdrew and managed to develop effective guerrilla tactics. The UN Security Council subsequently became involved with the issue and imposed a cease-fire that came into effect on 6 January 1949. Another blow for the Netherlands was that the Federalists, when they were given the choice, refused to take sides against the Republic. Another round of negotiations was looming on the horizon which, to all intents and purposes, as the facts illustrated, did not bode well for the Netherlands. Following the adoption of the UN Security Council's resolution of 28 January 1949, the Netherlands had to do everything possible, no matter what it took, to reach an agreement with the Republic.

This resulted in Minister Sassen standing down on 11 February, which coincided with a crisis in the KVP. Minister van Maarseveen, who also came from this party, then took office as the new man for Overseas Territories. The months that followed were spent in a tireless tug-of- war about the conditions on which the talks would be resumed. The Dutch position was determined in particular by the question about the length of time that one was prepared to sustain a hopeless guerrilla war, against an international opinion which was not favourably disposed towards the Netherlands. This phase ended with the Agreement between Van Roijen and the Republican diplomat Mohammed Roem on 7 May 1949. It decreed that the Republic would take part in the Round Table Conference in The Hague, during which additional arrangements would

be made concerning the transfer of sovereignty before the end of the year. By this stage, a transitional phase was now out of the question. The BIO Decree and the Government Ruling on New Guinea in the Period of Transition associated with it had now become meaningless. The future of New Guinea now awaited the decisions that would be taken at the Round Table Conference.

Chapter 4

Separation from Indonesia

Minister Van Maarseveen steps into the limelight

Minister Sassen had returned his portfolio for Overseas Territories on 11 February 1949, because he had been unable to generate sufficient support in the Cabinet for his policy of confrontation with regard to the UN Security Council. The latter had ordered the Netherlands, in its resolution of 28 January, to release the Republican leaders, allow them to establish themselves in Yogyakarta once again, and resume discussions with them about transferring sovereignty in the short term. Sassen believed that this would mean abandoning his efforts to ensure that the decolonization of Indonesia would take place in a manner that was acceptable to the Netherlands. Although there was a general feeling of disappointment within the Cabinet about this United Nations resolution led by America, a significant majority nevertheless believed that the Minister's harsh policy would not have achieved the desired result either. This is why Sassen's departure did not result in the fall of the Drees government, as he had hoped. Another KVP Minister, J.H. van Maarseveen, was prepared to take over the vacant portfolio and in this way save the Cabinet.

His gesture was not appreciated by Romme who in many respects agreed with Sassen. The powerful party leader of the KVP had to capitulate, in fact, when it became apparent that the other cornerstone of Catholic policy, Beel, who as HVK held the reins in Indonesia, after weighing up all the pros and cons appeared to be willing to go along with Van Maarseveen. With this, the phase of gradually giving in to the demands of the Republic was set in motion and led to the transfer of sovereignty on 27 December 1949. During that year, Van Maarseveen operated with single-minded determination and constantly remained in contact with Prime Minister Drees and the Minister of Foreign

Affairs, Stikker. A crucial role was set apart for Ambassador Van Roijen. As a skilful negotiator, he prepared the ground for most of the final decisions. He did this initially in his capacity as chairman of the negotiating team in Batavia and later on as one of the pivotal players at the Round Table Conference which was inaugurated with a ceremonial meeting on 23 August in the Ridderzaal in The Hague.

Van Roijen, who, as Minister of Foreign Affairs in the Schermerhorn Cabinet, had been immediately confronted with the Indonesia issue from 1945 onwards, had always presented himself as an advocate of a gradual and tempered decolonization process. During the months preceding the Second Police Action, he had been very pessimistic about any remaining possibilities to accomplish that goal. It would already be difficult enough, as he himself put it, to get 'Indonesia on the right track and provide it with the most feasible organization under the given circumstances'. He had strong reservations about using force to achieve this, even though at the time he did not rule it out completely. He did, however, mention to Sassen on this occasion that if one did decide to embark upon this course of action, then one would have to see it through right to the end.[1] After a stop had been put to the main military operations, he did his utmost to use delaying tactics in the Security Council to create the space that was needed to force through the solution pursued by the government. With the passage of time, he was indeed one of the first to reach the conclusion that it was not only international relations that did not afford the Netherlands sufficient room for this, but that the military situation too was becoming far worse than the military authorities in the East Indies cared to convey. The choice was between the Republic and absolute chaos. Afterwards, in his capacity as a negotiator located in Indonesia, he did not refrain from acting on the basis of that insight and sometimes went beyond what The Hague was willing to give. In that respect, his position had a lot in common with Schermerhorn's and Van Mook's in an earlier period. He could always count on Van Maarseveen's backing to have his proposals accepted by the Cabinet. This solid teamwork was one of the most important contributory factors towards the, all in all, reasonable success of the Round Table Conference (RTC), which made an orderly transfer of the administration possible and saved Dutch rule in Indonesia from ending in chaos.

Romme looked upon Minister van Maarseveen's actions with a disapproving eye, even though he defended the latter's policy in parliament. In actual fact, he had very little choice in the matter because the CHU, which had become a ruling party with the installation of the Drees Cabinet, was not prepared to put its newly won position at risk. The KVP would only be able to recruit an alternative majority with support from the ARP and the CPN, a rather unlikely alliance that would certainly not implement the policies that Romme wanted. The majority of the KVP ministers also did not wish to follow Romme.

Consequently, he had to make do with what he had, but he did not like it for a moment. He considered Van Maarseveen to be a rude and not altogether trustworthy man.[2] Others described him as a slick lawyer. There is something to be said about this characterization. Van Maarseveen's behaviour was typified by a large dose of pragmatism. Drees had every reason in the world to go easy on him. His readiness to take over the baton from Sassen saved his cabinet from falling. On top of this, Van Maarseveen was an experienced politician who had been a member of nearly every post-war cabinet. He was well-informed about the Dutch East Indies issue, without being too bogged down by earlier policies or East Indies Dutch sentiments. As a result of his bold intervention on 11 February 1949 he had relegated Romme to the sidelines at a decisive moment, while managing to retain sufficient support for his actions from the KVP party in the Second Chamber, both then and later.[3] This enabled Drees to make the political readjustments that were felt to be necessary both by himself and Minister Stikker of Foreign Affairs.

Van Maarseveen played a prominent role in managing the New Guinea affair. In contrast to his conciliatory policy with respect to the Republic, he quickly became a staunch supporter of severing New Guinea's bonds with Indonesia. During the days of discussions about the BIO Decree, he had given no sign of having any problems with the idea of a joint administration between HVK and VFR. In the months that followed, he would quickly change his mind. Soon after his appointment, he scribbled a short note in the margin of a departmental memo, stating that New Guinea did not belong with Indonesia and therefore the transfer of sovereignty should not be permitted to extend as far as this region.[4] The Cabinet meeting of 21 March 1949 presented, in this respect, a spectacle of perfectly synchronized teamwork between Van Maarseveen and Drees. Both of them unreservedly adhered to the same position and the Prime Minister piled things on even more thickly by arguing that it would have been better to have 'adopted a clear stance regarding the position of this region from the very beginning'.[5] This clashed with the BIO Decree which both gentlemen had been responsible for getting off the ground and which had aimed for a type of joint administration for the interim period up until the transfer of sovereignty. In fact, during the ensuing months, Van Maarseveen did not dismiss the idea completely, although he firmly believed that in this type of set-up the Netherlands should have the lead. In this respect he now wondered whether they had not been too confident at the time of the formulation of the BIO Decree about the possibilities that were still open for the Netherlands to retain a strong position in Indonesia in the long term. When this option vanished over the horizon with the acceptance of the Van Roijen-Roem Agreement,[6] he put

his final reservations to one side. This took place during the Cabinet meeting of 7 June 1949, at which Beel was also present. Here he went to great lengths to defend the argument that Indonesia had no moral entitlement to New Guinea, while the Netherlands would be able to offer the region more attractive opportunities for development. Furthermore, in his view it was right that the Netherlands held onto a pied-à-terre in the East in order to take care of any problems that people living in the United States of Indonesia who were well-disposed towards the Netherlands might have. Finally, retaining New Guinea's harbours would also be important for the Dutch shipping companies. Although all these arguments were valid to some extent, when taken in isolation not one of them could be considered decisive enough against the wider backdrop of the interests involved in the transfer of sovereignty in Indonesia. Although in this discussion he did not mention the fact that obtaining a parliamentary majority in favour of transferring this region would be no easy matter, it would certainly have been at the back of his mind. To date, no shred of evidence has been found in the archives indicating that any firm agreements existed with regard to New Guinea during the negotiations on the transfer of Sassen's portfolio. It was at any rate a matter that had to be discussed at the Round Table Conference (RTC).[7]

On 22 June, upon the insistence of the Netherlands, New Guinea was formally placed on the RTC agenda. This was done in the face of emphatic protests from the Federalists and the Republicans articulated by Hamid II Alkadri and Mohammed Roem, who finally only agreed to this according to the terms of their own view that New Guinea was an integral part of Indonesia.[8] Van Maarseveen was not bothered at all by this. When he was in Batavia later that month for discussions, he turned out to be an avid supporter of retaining New Guinea. On 27 June he defended the position against a group of high-ranking East Indies Dutch civil servants, the majority of whom had sat on the *Studiecommissie Nieuw-Guinea* (New Guinea Research Committee) which had been set up by Van Mook and which had in fact published a rather negative report about the island's economic potential. The minister's behaviour met with fierce opposition, particularly from H. van der Wal, Chair of the committee and also Director of the Department for Internal Affairs and P.J. Koets, Head of the HVK Cabinet. In their opinion, opening up the region would be very expensive and would not yield a great deal, not to mention the political dangers it would bring to future relations with Indonesia if this position was adhered to. Van Maarseveen did not allow himself to be fazed by this and insisted that the research that had been carried out so far into the region's mineral wealth had not yet been sufficient to be able to state anything with any certainty. He had high hopes for oil extraction in particular. One should take a

gamble! He casually pushed the political argument to one side. Neither the state of East Indonesia nor the United States of Indonesia was capable of developing the region. Provoked by Koets, he put forward the proposition that the Netherlands would be more morally responsible if New Guinea was kept out of the transfer, than it would be if the region were handed over to Indonesia as a colony.[9]

In this frame of mind the minister returned to The Hague and on 6 August the Dutch government published an announcement in which it stated that, at the RTC, it would retain New Guinea as part of the Kingdom of the Netherlands.[10] Van Maarseveen felt supported in this by the opinions of the former governor general of the Netherlands East Indies, Tjarda van Starkenborgh Stachouwer who, as an expert on Indonesian affairs and authority on international relations, held a lot of sway in conservative circles. Van Starkenborgh believed that a change could be detected in the American position which could offer new perspectives for the New Guinea issue in particular. Although little of this trickled through to the outside world, Van Maarseveen's position precipitated a severe conflict between him and the diplomat Van Roijen, who had also returned from Indonesia at the time the government was making its announcement. In Yokyakarta, he had talked with Sukarno at great length about this matter and Sukarno had pointedly distanced himself from Hatta with regard to this. In this respect, he certainly did not represent the view of the government, according to the President of the Republic. He had referred to himself on this occasion as 'A New Guinea fanatic' and had issued a warning to Van Roijen that the matter represented a dangerous obstacle to the success of the RTC. This remark was taken seriously by Van Roijen, but he failed to convince Van Maarseveen of this, let alone persuade him to change his mind. High-ranking Dutch civil servants in Indonesia mentioned in their letters home that the affair had reached such a fever-pitch that Van Roijen had threatened to resign. That did not happen in the end, possibly because other important players hinted that it could do no harm to play for high stakes on this issue in order to have some bargaining chips at their disposal during the negotiations. Names such as Beel, C.L.W. Fock (Secretary to Drees), W.F.G. Jongejan (Chair of the Council of Entrepreneurs for Indonesia), Van Starkenborgh and Welter were mentioned in association with this.The latter in particular was afraid that, by setting the stakes too high in order to hold onto New Guinea, Van Maarseveen would jeopardize future economic cooperation with Indonesia. Apparently, nobody at all felt completely at ease with it.[11]

Shortly before the opening of the Round Table Conference, the Second Chamber assembled for a public debate about the proposals that the Cabinet

would use when it entered into negotiations. The mood in parliament regarding the policy that had been followed up until now was extremely critical. The rapid succession of events following the beginning of the Second Police Action had largely taken place without their involvement and, furthermore, there was very little reason for gratification. The initial objectives drawn up by government had not been accomplished and this had become crystal clear from the statements made by Van Roijen and Roem, which were later integrated into the truce agreement and the agenda of the Round Table Conference (RTC) of 22 June. The Republic would return in a strong position and had clearly been able to set its own stamp on the negotiation agenda. The Second Chamber felt as if it had been confronted with a *fait accompli*. The Labour Party (PvdA) was the only party on which the government could rely for unconditional support. All of the other government parties continued to have serious reservations about the correctness of the policy that was currently being implemented. The opposition, however, had no doubts about it whatsoever. It was, as former Prime Minister Gerbrandy had expressed it on 17 May in the Second Chamber, always wrong to make a pact with the Revolution, even if this was done on the insistence of mighty America.[12]

Van Maarseveen had always staved off the attacks by pointing out that the Cabinet had followed the most feasible path under the circumstances and that it had actually managed to stick to its guns on a number of key points. Nevertheless, it had not come out of it completely unscathed. Dutch diplomats in Batavia had failed to bargain successfully for a separate representation at the Round Table Conference for representatives of separatist groups on Sumatra and elsewhere, who were planning to claim the right to home rule as stipulated in the Linggadjati and Renville Agreements. Van Maarseveen could not find any grounds to argue against this, other than that the Dutch government still had to safeguard the interests of these areas. This applied 'a fortiori' to New Guinea, with respect to which the parties had reserved their position. This statement was a clear sign that, vis-à-vis parliament, keeping New Guinea would act as a consolation prize to compensate for the forced and complete withdrawal across the board.

This ploy was even more conspicuous in the public meeting that took place on 16 and 17 August. It was not without significance, because at that moment most of the delegations from Indonesia had already arrived. From their vantage points in the public tribunes, the Republicans and Federalists could now have a sneak preview of what they could expect at the forthcoming conference. Of course, this session was a play-back of all the complaints that had been previously aired in parliament. It was not unexpected, therefore, that the three Protestant parties put forward proposals to hold onto New Guinea. More

striking was the fact that the Liberal (VVD) party leader, P.J. Oud, expressed his unequivocal support for them. If the local population on New Guinea was not in a position to determine its own fate, then Dutch sovereignty should continue to be maintained there. Under no circumstances, he stated, should New Guinea become a pawn to be bartered with in discussions between the Netherlands and Indonesia 'because that would mean switching its colonial status from one to another'.

It was an important statement, not so much because of its content but more because of the fact that it was now not only the Protestant Parties and the single party representative Welter, but the Liberal Party too which had expressed its support, through its spokesperson, for separating New Guinea from Indonesia's territorial assets. Together, they accounted for thirty two of the 100 votes available in parliament. One of the arguments used by Minister Van Maarseveen on various occasions was that it was a foregone conclusion that the two-thirds majority, which was necessary for an agreement reached at the Round Table Conference to be accepted by parliament, could only be achieved if New Guinea was excluded from the transfer.[13] In light of the political relations at that time, that is a plausible interpretation. Nevertheless, one has to ask whether this would still have been the case had the Cabinet, and Minister Van Maarseveen in particular, not thrown this particular bone before parliament beforehand with the statement of 6 August. When all is said and done, that same parliament would accept that the right to self-determination, which had been nurtured so painstakingly during the discussions about Linggadjati, had been formulated in such a way that it would be impossible to apply it in practice. This was done based on the realization that rejecting the Agreement would have unacceptable consequences for both the Netherlands and Indonesia. It is therefore quite plausible that, with a less inflexible position with regard to keeping New Guinea, parliament would have been just as likely to concede.

Yet one cannot be certain about this. In 1946, the government had made an exception for New Guinea when interpreting the Linggadjati settlement, in which the arguments for Papuan self-determination and a homeland for the colonists would overlap seamlessly with each other. In the arguments of 1949 this was certainly the case, and Van Maarseveen had even managed to add a couple of new arguments. The combination seemingly produced a potent brew, which made quite an impression. Something else was added, and it was Schermerhorn who pointed this out during the public debate in parliament. He too defended the validity of these arguments, which he considered to be completely correct and rational. Nevertheless, he did not pull any punches about the fact that something else was brewing in the Netherlands that weighed more heavily. For many it was primarily a sentimental matter, whereby keeping New

Guinea would help to compensate in a small way for losing the Dutch East Indies. As it stood, a solution in the form of a compromise would be difficult to reach.[14]

This is certainly a valid argument and was explored in great detail in 1966 by the political scientist Arend Lijphart in his study *The Trauma of Decolonization.* Among other things, we find there detailed accounts of all the little societies and organizations in the Netherlands that devoted themselves during this period to holding onto New Guinea. At the end of his book he states 'that Holland's stubborn refusal to abandon New Guinea was motivated exclusively by subjective and irrational factors'. These he lists as 'the search for national self-esteem, feelings of moral superiority, egocentric altruism and profound resentment towards Indonesia'.[15] This is very recognizable. A sense of frustrated chauvinism, feelings of being misjudged, and suspicion towards the new Indonesia were continuously simmering beneath the surface of all Dutch deliberations and actions during this period. In this sense, one can also go so far as to concur with Lijphart's conclusion. Nevertheless, his phrasing left a lot to be desired and most certainly overstepped the line with the use of the word 'exclusively'. We detect in this a rather disproportionate reaction to the Marxist dogmas that Lijphart opposed, in which economic gain is the only objective driving force in the history of the human race. Upon closer examination, it would appear that the differences between objective and subjective in history are in fact less exclusive. We have more success when we interpret his position more freely in the more flexible paradigmata of cash and conscience. Seemingly, in Lijphart's view it was the vicar who played a dominant role in the Dutch policy on New Guinea and the merchant did not figure in it at all. The arguments that were put forward in parliament are matters of conscience: the right to self-determination for the Papuan and the fate of the poor Indo. One can argue about the rationale behind approaches to these problems. There were certainly grounds for concern about the future of the Indo-Europeans, even if solutions other than mass-migration to the barren New Guinea were plausible. More can also be said about the significance of the Papuans' right to autonomy too. It is the main theme of this book. Nor is it possible to separate the policy that was being followed from the frustrations and preoccupations of the Dutch. We will come back to this in more detail later on.

First of all, let us see whether the merchant did indeed play no role whatsoever. Lijphart formulated his argument within the framework of a scholarly debate about the significance of the economic factor in human behaviour, which had been expanded upon by Hobson and Lenin. Lijphart believed that, in the case of New Guinea, he had found a textbook example of a colonial issue in which the 'objective', that is to say the economic factor, played absolutely no

role at all. At first glance, this does seem to have been the case. The Dutch East Indies business community were not at all keen on a New Guinea adventure. The deciding factor in this was the position of the Chair of the Council of Entrepreneurs for Indonesia W.F.G. Jongejan, who during his discussions with Van Maarseveen made it clear to the Minister in no uncertain terms that the Indonesian business community did not want this. What is quite remarkable here is the stoic reaction of Minister Van Maarseveen, who stood his ground and insisted that holding onto New Guinea would also be highly profitable. He was, it would seem, privy to a higher body of knowledge than that which was at the disposal of entrepreneurial managers. A study of the sources from which the Minister obtained his information reveals that this was indeed the case. We arrive at an expertly executed lobbying campaign in which colonists, Papuans and the Resident of New Guinea managed, through interactive teamwork, to build up the pressure required which had a significant effect on the Minister's position, and with this the course of Dutch policy.

The covert hand of Hollandia

The discussion referred to above which Minister Van Maarseveen had with several Dutch officials in Batavia on 27 June marked an important turning point in the development of his position towards New Guinea. For him, the economic potential of the island had become the primary consideration. The visible pretext for this discussion was a report written by the *Studiecommissie New Guinea* (Research Committee for New Guinea) which had been published two months earlier in Batavia but had not yet reached The Hague. Van Maarseveen had apparently only learned of it after his arrival in Batavia. The report was written on the insistence of the colonization associations, which saw it as the first step towards fulfilling the promises made by Van Mook at the Pangkal-Pinang Conference. The course of events had been rather unsatisfactory up until now for these associations. The political prospects for disentangling New Guinea from its connection with Indonesia were still uncertain while, in practice, the small-scale studies that had been carried out after 1946 on the possibility for agricultural colonization had produced very few results. The only real development was that the buildings and locations near Hollandia and Manokwari, that were freed up with the departure of the Japanese prisoners-of-war in 1946, were made available by the government for colonization. No more than sixty colonists had availed themselves of this opportunity, thereby illustrating that the impulse to colonize was primarily of a political-psychological nature. As in previous years, in January 1949 a major meeting was once again jointly convened by all the colonization associations in Batavia. The GNA board member,

W.Ch. Kooderings Clemens, delivered a speech at the meeting in which he dealt with the issue of 'Living under one's own system of government'.[16] The contents of the speech offered no fresh perspectives, but the title underscored the inner resistance towards the new Indonesia.

Colonization on New Guinea was a thorny issue for the Dutch authorities in Indonesia. Van Mook was faced with a dilemma caused by developments in Pangkal Pinang and Den Pasar. Whatever solution he decided to choose, it would always bring him into conflict with one of the parties involved. At one end of the spectrum stood the Dutch minority groups, who were hoping to have their own niche in an environment governed by the Netherlands, at the other end there were the spokesmen of the state of East Indonesia, who were scavenging for arguments to draw New Guinea towards them. It was hard to find a feasible compromise, certainly as long as the conflict with the Republic had not yet been resolved. For the sake of doing at least something, the East Indies Dutch government decided in 1947 to establish an official Board for Transmigration and Emigration that offered possibilities for policy co-ordination and discussions with the colonization associations. In addition, in 1947 a special Office for Transmigration and Emigration was created at the newly established Department of Social Affairs in Batavia. Its tasks included exploring the potential for prospecting in New Guinea and opening it up. Indeed, the office did manage to come up with some ambitious plans, but achieved very little in terms of concrete action due to a lack of funds.

Discussions in the board led to the conclusion that further research would be necessary before any expensive measures could be initiated to open up New Guinea. This must have been an attractive thought for Van Mook because it would enable him to put off making a difficult decision for quite some time. Partly at the insistence of the combined forces of the colonization associations, he decided on 15 March 1948 to set up a 'fact-finding committee' that would collect firm data 'which would be of decisive importance in determining the future status of New Guinea'. H. Van der Wal, whom we referred to earlier, became Chair of this Research Committee. The nine remaining members included A.Th. Bogaardt, who as Deputy Director of the Ministry of Social Affairs was directly responsible for the work of the Department for Transmigration and Emigration, the New Guinea experts G.J. Held and Van Eechoud, and the Head of the Mining Industry Office in Bandung, G.J. Wally. The Negara Indonesia Timur was represented by two school inspectors, a medical doctor and a civil servant.

The committee did publish its report well over a year later and, as we have already seen, it had a sobering impact. The Papuan people did not form a cultural or political entity and were incapable of making their voice heard through

a democratic process. Possibilities for agricultural colonization were limited while, apart from petroleum, no other mineral deposits of any importance had been uncovered. Perhaps further prospecting would eventually yield positive results, but this would be very costly to implement. The only fact that the committee could state with absolute certainty was that the government that was entrusted with taking on New Guinea would have heavy financial burdens to carry for many years.[17]

This sober tone stemmed from the original briefing to report only that which was absolutely certain, which turned out to be very little. The composition of the committee also had a lot to do with it. Bogaardt was indeed a person of high standing in the colonization community but this was at odds with the fact that the report was written during the heyday of federal politics. As mentioned earlier, the defensive position of top-level officials in the Netherlands East Indies towards the idea of severing the connection between New Guinea and Indonesia was reinforced because of this. Van Mook in particular was prepared to do anything to ensure that nothing at all stood in the way of his most promising protégé, the Negara Indonesia Timur. The success of the federation would, in his view, best serve the interests of the Papuans and the Indo-Europeans, and close colleagues such as the classics scholar Koets, the expert in constitutional law Enthoven, and the Interior Affairs man Van der Wal, were in complete agreement with him. There were serious doubts in these circles in particular about the usefulness of the colonization concept. This was a source of irritation in Dutch-Indonesian relations and, moreover, kept the Indo away from the only possible place for a positive future that should lie within Indonesian society.

This point of view found support within the board of the *Indo-Europees Verbond* (IEV), which before the war had represented practically the entire Indo-European community and in which Enthoven played an important role. Now, with the Round Table Conference (RTC) on the horizon, the question of whether those Dutch citizens of mixed origin who had been born and bred in the Netherlands East Indies would be prepared to accept Indonesian citizenship became more and more acute. On 26 August 1949, the Executive Board of the IEV met in The Hague, to be present at the opening of the Round Table Conference that was to take place the next day. On that occasion it sent forth an urgent recommendation to its members back home, to stay in Indonesia and accept citizenship of the new state. For most it was a bitter pill to swallow, and it reinforced the exodus from the organization which had already begun some time earlier. Many of its members and followers had already fallen under the spell of the colonization associations, and for them it was now decision time. Within one month after the exhortations of the IEV, its membership fell from eight thousand to around half of this, while that of the colonization associations

rose to around the sixteen thousand mark.[18] The latter must have felt that their day had come. They had not allowed themselves to be held back by the grim results of the Research Committee and had continued to organize demonstrations. In addition to this, a furtive campaign had been initiated by those in charge of the GNA on Java. Its impact was magnified by the activities of Van Eechoud, who observed the developments in Batavia and The Hague with interest from Hollandia.

For Van Eechoud, his work in the Research Committee had been a mixed blessing. His relationship with Van der Wal was poor because he had had first-hand experience of Van der Wal's constant preoccupation with how the Indonesians would feel about whatever was being done. For Van Eechoud, some special position for New Guinea was still at the top of the agenda, without this having to mean a complete separation from Indonesia. The BFO option of a joint administration, as worked out in the draft resolution on the administration of New Guinea in the time of transition, was completely acceptable to him, on condition that it would be set up in such a way that the departments in Batavia would not have any direct control over the region. As far as the work of the committee was concerned, he had always had the feeling that a higher power had pressured it into holding back. He had been content with this because that way no desires would be triggered on the Indonesian side. Nevertheless, he found it necessary in September 1948 to engage in some counter-campaigns. At that time he entered into correspondence with Romme and J.P. Bannier, the latter of whom was attached to the Ministry of Overseas Territories as a representative for the Netherlands East Indies administration in The Hague. Through them, he could approach both ministers of that department, that is to say Van Maarseveen and the minister without a portfolio, L. Götzen, who was more active on the technical side. He also corresponded with Meijer Ranneft, who had a vast network of relations in official circles in The Hague. This network also included W.K.H. Feuilletau de Bruyn who, in his capacity as representative of the GNA in the Netherlands, was the spider at the centre of the web of the colonization associations there.

Van Eechoud's main goal was to prevent the report's findings from being taken too literally, as a result of which attention for New Guinea would wane. On 16 March 1949, before the report of the Research Committee appeared, he produced his own counter report. This was his 'Memorandum concerning the Economic Future of New Guinea' which he circulated in a few select circles. The purpose of this memorandum and the correspondence that accompanied it was to convince everyone that although it was true that very little had been confirmed in writing as yet, there was ample reason to believe that areas

such as agriculture, forestry, and fishing all offered sufficient potential for colonization. The same was true for extracting minerals. It was already clear that oil offered favourable prospects because the NNGPM had resumed its activities after the war. Furthermore, there were strong indications that bauxite was present in the Cyclops mountains.[19]

These letters paid off. The recipients reacted by expressing their interest and, by April 1949, Van Eechoud already had occasion to discuss the matter at great length with Beel, who for his part seemed interested and requested additional information on conditions in his residency. Contact with the HVK became a lot easier due to the fact that Beel was a distant cousin of his. After that, he was able to get more done in Batavia. This led to increased activity from the Mining Industry Service of the East Indies government, albeit the director, Wally, appeared to be only mildly pleased about this. Nevertheless, in June, two geologists were sent to New Guinea by the service, at the request of Van Eechoud, in order to conduct exploratory activities on the Cyclops Mountains. He had heard from the Americans that during their construction work there in 1944 they had found distinct traces of minerals. Whilst in Hollandia, the geologists stayed in the Resident's house. This was the same house that had been built for MacArthur in 1944, but which had been relocated later on to another part of the town. It was from here that the geologists carried out their research in the surrounding mountains. The bauxite findings seemed disappointing, but results in other areas were spectacular. At the site where MacArthur's house had originally stood they came across a thick layer of highly concentrated nickel ore. Elsewhere they found rich samples of chrome and splendid marble. When evening fell, they swapped riveting stories with each other about it. Their host listened to all of this with interest and swiftly relayed news of it by letter to his contacts in The Hague. The most important information was contained in a letter to Bannier dated 4 July 1949. The message it conveyed was clear: 'Be aware of what you will be doing if you let go of New Guinea; you will be squandering great opportunities'.

This stream of messages had a visible impact on Van Maarseveen's position. In his line of argument during discussions with members of the Research Committee on 27 June in Batavia we recognize Van Eechoud's counter report, a copy of which had possibly come into his possession earlier on, before it was officially published. Moreover, there can be absolutely no doubt that the letter to Bannier on 4 July about nickel and chrome in the Cyclops Mountains also reached the Minister. Just to be on the safe side, Minister Götzen had been briefed separately on the contents of the letter by his personal friend, the eminent engineer C. van Konijnenburg, who was in charge of winding up the American bases in Hollandia and at the time was entertaining plans to open a

shipyard in Hollandia. In this missive, Van Konijnenburg expressed his admiration for Van Eechoud as an individual and marvelled at the opportunities offered by New Guinea. 'This beautiful country is hardly given any attention at all in Batavia, and yet Götzen you will see that with New Guinea our homeland will be compensated for the losses of the last few years'[20] These messages reached The Hague well in advance of the Cabinet decision of 6 August. The speculations about great treasures appeared to be coming true. They could only have reinforced the opinions that had already been forged by Van Maarseveen and Götzen.

Alongside these exploratory ventures into nickel and chrome, attempts were also made in other areas to exert influence from inside New Guinea and Java over government policy in The Hague. Here too, Van Eechoud played an important role, although the initiative generally came from elsewhere. It is true that the aspiring colonists did not get their way with the report of the Research Committee for New Guinea, but they had many more cards up their sleeve. In his government policy statement of 10 December 1946, Minister Jonkman had made a link between the preparations for the Papuans' right to self-determination and the interests of the colonists. At the end of 1948 news about the BIO decision did not go down very well with the leaders of the colonists' associations on Java, because this could represent an important impetus for a permanent alliance with Indonesia. In order to nip this in the bud, the GNA leaders C.S.H.J. Defares, F. Rijken Rapp, P.A. Blaauw and H.A. Fischer, decided that they would now actively involve the Papuans in their plans.

For this, they contacted Johan Ariks, the senior figure among the developed Papuans. He had been the primus inter pares of the first and only class of Papuan students who in 1914 had been sent to the training college for religious instructors in Depok on Java. He had shown himself to be a good student there, as well as an accomplished sportsman and gifted musician on the piano and organ. As a result of problems of a socially interactive nature with the other, mostly Javanese, pupils who refused to look upon the Papuan students as equals, this experiment was abandoned after a few years. The training of a Papuan elite was continued later by Kijne at his boarding school in Miei, where Ariks had built up a good reputation as a teacher, with both the Dutch as well as the Papuans from the Wandamen area and the Geelvink Bay. He was also spotted in Hollandia, which became apparent when in 1947 the young student Nicolaas Jouwe managed to collect several thousand guilders in a short space of time which enabled Ariks to undergo urgently needed medical treatment in Batavia.[21]

It was at the instigation of leaders of the GNA that Ariks began a campaign in October 1948 from Manokwari in which he opposed the joint administration

aimed for in the BIO resolution. He made objections to the Queen about this on behalf of 51 'tribal chiefs from New Guinea'. It was written confirmation that the citizens of New Guinea wished to have a place within the Kingdom of the Netherlands, directly under the crown. In effect, this was the view of the colonists. Similar texts were forwarded through the GNA to the government in Batavia and to all the important ministers and chairmen of the main political parties in the Netherlands. The campaign received a lot of coverage on Java in the press and through the radio. At the GNA's expense, Ariks then travelled to Batavia where he was received on 10 February 1949 by Koets, on behalf of Beel who was absent at the time. On this occasion he handed him the above-mentioned resolution, which he himself had signed as the 'authorized representative of the Irian people'. In the months that followed he continued to make himself heard, among other things by categorically dismissing press releases from Japan that reported that the Japanese government, supported by the Americans, was contemplating a mass emigration of Japanese people to New Guinea. A campaign was subsequently launched by the colonists in Manokwai in which the the Second World War hero, Kokkelink, strongly condemned the statement made by Hamid II Alkadri and Mohammed Roem, in which they announced on 22 June that they would only be able to agree to have New Guinea placed on the Round Table Conference agenda if this was preordained by a written statement that the area in their view ought to be part of the United States of Indonesia. This move was immediately supported by Ariks with a telegram to the government in Indonesia in which the Papuan cause was placed on an equal footing with that of the colonists by their 'official representative'.[22]

In the Netherlands, both Van Maarseveen and Drees had shown an interest in Arik's actions from the outset and were wondering whether it might not be advisable to invite Ariks to the Round Table Conference. This was held at bay by Beel with a reference to a report by the New Guinea Research Committee in which the inability of the Papuans to express themselves was mentioned. With this, he was partly following the advice of Van Eechoud who, with respect to the action carried out by Ariks cum suis, had behaved rather aloofly. When asked about this, he had explained that with the 51 tribal chiefs little else could have been meant other than the two war lords, Barend and Lodewijk Mandjatan. "They have several hundred supporters who without doubt do not have the faintest idea about even the simplest of issues. Indeed, it is the tribe of Barend and Lodewijk that is called upon whenever, 'contrary to the New Guinea that is taught in school or which carries out technical activities, the aspect of New Guinea that is still wild has to be demonstrated to visitors'. Their reactions to the action carried out by Ariks were based upon 'emotions that could be easily swayed and not on any insights whatsoever.' This is exactly why these types of

initiatives were dangerous, because it would be easy enough for the opposition to pull 'the same trick'. Nevertheless, Van Eechoud was prepared to admit that it was possible to deduce from the petitions that 'the Papuans who lived in the vicinity of Manokwari had a positive attitude towards the Netherlands and the colonists'.[23]

The detached position adopted by Van Eechoud in February 1949 can be attributed to his unwillingness to lamely toe the colonists' line and his anxiety about having to chart a course with only the unstable compass of Papuan goodwill to guide him. On top of this, at that particular moment he had no objections to the joint administration projected in the BIO decision with a Dutch finger clearly in the pie. Furthermore, it would have been valuable to him not to annoy top-level officials in Batavia unnecessarily with the issue, as they did not care about colonists at all and men like Enthoven scornfully referred to the 'democracy à la Ariks'. In Van Eechoud's opinion, the arguments he had put forward in his memo could do the same and work better and more safely.

This position started to change as the BIO option began disappearing into thin air. Certainly after the Van Roijen-Roem Agreement it was clear that the transfer of sovereignty would take place in the short term under the terms of which the Republic would have more to say in the future Indonesian state than the Netherlands cared for. Not only did Van Eechoud's position (and that of the Cabinet in the Netherlands) change towards New Guinea as a result of these developments, but there began to be some signs of movement in the Papuan world as well. The entrance of Johan Ariks on the political stage had come as a surprise there, but his appearances could count on increasingly widespread support. 'It was obvious that Uncle Ariks was increasingly being seen as the man who could be deemed to be the true representative of New Guinea,' according to the Public Relations Officer, P. Merkelijn. Another reason for a certain degree of political awareness among the Papuans during this period was that one of them, Joenoes Mallo, had returned from Holland where he had taken part in the coronation celebrations of Queen Juliana in his capacity as representative of the Papuans. The event had made an indelible impression on him. He was in fact the first Papuan who was able to assess the differences between the Netherlands and Indonesia based on his own observations. It had become clear to him that the Papuans had more to win from holding on to an alliance with the Netherlands than with furthering their relationship with Indonesia, and upon his return he conveyed this view to anyone who was willing to listen.

Another reason for the political mobilization of the Papuan people was that in March 1949 the sultan of Tidore, Zainal Abidin Alting, visited all the key locations in New Guinea. During the preparations for the implementation of

the BIO Decree for New Guinea (the BNGO), it had become clear to him that this would be hard to reconcile with his formal status as home ruler of this region. Alting's trip was therefore a last ditch attempt to strengthen his claim to New Guinea. The visit provoked irritation among the Papuans, who had bad memories about that particular relationship and certainly did not wish to relive them. He therefore received an exceptionally frosty reception wherever he went.[24] Finally, the reservations about New Guinea's position at the Round Table Conference which Hamid II Alkadri and Roem had openly expressed on 22 June had made a bad impression on a much larger audience than just Johan Ariks alone. A demonstrative counter-attack was initiated by Nicolaas Djoeara Jouwe, a former pupil of the academy for public administration who was, at the time, Secretary of the committee of tribal chiefs in the Tobati coastal area near Hollandia. This group of people was particularly outraged at the step taken by the sultan, and were delighted to leave it up to their more refined Secretary to articulate it on their behalf. Jouwe knew how to deal with it. Shortly after the war, Van Eechoud had sent him off to Sorong to help guard the Japanese prisoners-of-war. A year later, he was entrusted with a special assignment from the Resident which involved gathering statements from the heads of the Raja Ampat on whether they wished to maintain the formal existing ties with Tidore. A resounding 'no' was the answer and Jouwe had been able to return to Hollandia with piles of statements to that effect. For Van Eechoud this information was important at that particular time to prepare for the proposed separation of Tidore.[25] In 1949, the initiative served as the model for resisting a return to Tidoran rule in the other areas of North New Guinea where home rule was still formally upheld.

After a subtle hint in that direction, Jouwe requested and received leave from the Resident at the end of June to conduct a tour of duty through these areas in order to gauge the mood of the people living there. Although it was very important for Van Eechoud to allow this operation to be a Papuan initiative as far as he was able, he appointed the Dutch Public Relations Officer, Merkelijn, to the mission as well, just to be on the safe side. Together, they visited a series of locations in the following order throughout the month of July: Hollandia, specifically the boarding school in Joka, the Tobati coastal region, Biak, the Wandamen region and Serui. All in all, these were the most developed parts of New Guinea, where the Protestant missionaries had been active for several decades and the majority of the local population was literate. It was only in the last place mentioned in the above list, where a pro-Indonesian mood had prevailed since the Ratulangi era, that Jouwe made no headway at all. At a gathering by the *Partai Kemerdekaan Indonesia Irian* (PKII), organized under the leadership of Silas Papare, it was determined that the representative for Irian

would be Karubuy, a Papuan who resided in East Indonesia where he campaigned to join the federal state. According to reports, by that time he had already gone to Yogyakarta. If it were necessary to send an additional Papuan representative to the Round Table Conference, then Silas Papare would be their chosen candidate. Jouwe also encountered opposition in one of the Wandamen villages. In the other areas, he gained massive support for his argument in favour of continuing with the Netherlands, peppered here and there with some of Mallo's stories about his astonishing experiences in that country. The mission returned to Hollandia with piles and piles of signed petitions, the gist of which was to demand that New Guinea must stay with the Netherlands and that Ariks was allowed to speak at the Round Table Conference on behalf of the signatories. In a separate report, Merkelijn stressed the fact that this was an accurate reflection of the feelings of the Papuans from the North coast.[26]

Indeed, Merkelijn too supported the view that, generally speaking, Papuan society was not capable of making a responsible political judgement. Along with Enthoven, one can therefore question the democratic value of the exercise. Jouwe's information, which was usually delivered in church, was certainly not meant to elicit a choice in favour of Indonesia. In contrast to this, he had been given very little opportunity on Serui to express any alternative point of view. Papare had concluded the meeting there with little ceremony and with a statement about a divine revelation which he had had 'in which he had seen an opening in the heavens and a multitude of people clad in white shouting: "Merdeka! Merdeka!" From this opening a massive ladder was dropped, down which a celestial messenger descended towards him, saying: New Guinea must be joined to the Negara Indonesia Timur!' So, definitely clear advice on how to vote there. Moreover, during his own tour of inspection, the Sultan of Tidore had similarly urged the people to choose for East Indonesia—and with this for Indonesia as a whole, for which he drew a blank on a massive scale. When one considers that Tidore's reputation was actually very bad, then this made the sultan the worst person imaginable to argue Indonesia's case to the Papuans. This was also Kijne's view, the man who more than anyone else had worked longer and more intensely on educating and moulding Papuan youths. To shape this judgement, he sought explicit advice from the teacher at his school in Joka, Baldus Mofu, whom he trusted. In this man's opinion, there was some affinity between the Papuans and the Christians from East Indonesia, despite their loathing of the Amberis. This would favour joining the VSI, while maintaining strong ties with the Netherlands to act as a counter-weight against Indonesian arrogance.[27]

For a considerable length of time, this option could count on support from Van Mook and his officials. It had been rejected unequivocally from the very

beginning by the colonization associations and, after the Van Roijen-Roem Agreement, could rely less and less on receiving any support from the Dutch government. In Van Eechoud's eyes, Jouwe's operation looked respectable enough to be able to use in his up-and-running nickel and chrome campaign for the continuation of the existing administration on New Guinea. It could serve to provide the Dutch government with idealistic arguments which, he believed, would be more useful in the outside world. He therefore got in touch with Ariks and Blaauw and furnished them with instructions on how to play the matter as effectively as possible from now on. Ariks was subsequently sent back to Batavia with all the petitions that Jouwe had collected, so that he could now put himself forward as the authorized representative of the Papuans with good reason. Against all the rules and regulations, Van Eechoud instantly forwarded transcripts of the petitions to Bannier in The Hague, to give them something to think about.[28]

Just before his departure to Batavia, Ariks and his companions made an ingenious move, which had the required impact in The Hague. Through the GNA representative in Hollandia (Fischer), Rijken Rapp was briefed in Batavia about the strengthened position of Ariks, which also indicated that if the Dutch did not fulfil his wish for a separate status for New Guinea he would knock on Australia's door for help. This communication about Arik's overtures towards Australia was instantly relayed by Van Rijken to his contact person in The Hague, Feuilletau de Bruyn. The result was that the latter could present himself at the Cabinet of Prime Minister Drees on 1 August 1949 where he read out the recently arrived telegram to his cabinet advisor, C.L.W. Fock.[29] In light of the fact that Australia's interest in this region had also been made evident through other channels, Fock took the matter seriously. That same day he reported to Drees that one should no longer beat about the bush and that a decision about New Guinea should be made once and for all. He entered into discussions with the secretary general of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, H. Boon, who had expressed his opinion about this matter earlier and had compiled a list of all the different options. Boon also had in his possession a recent memorandum from Van Mook, who had in the meantime become a private citizen, in which he had outlined his own preference. The different options suggested by Boon were:

a. That New Guinea would have a special status outside the VSI.
b. That New Guinea would have a special status within the VSI.
c. That New Guinea would fall under the trusteeship of the UN (with either the Netherlands, or the Netherlands and Australia, as trustees).
d. That New Guinea would become part of the state of East Indonesia.

At the initial discussions it became evident that Van Mook's preference was still for solution (b) which corresponded with promises he had made earlier in Den Pasar. The Foreign Affairs man, Boon, showed himself to be in favour of solution (c), because a trusteeship might be easier to sell in the international arena. And yet, after further reflection, he too had to admit that option (a) was the most attractive one. After all, the continuation of the existing connection with the Netherlands in a form that was more in step with the modern age was the solution par excellence for the future of New Guinea. Not only was the Netherlands much better equipped than the future VSI to bring about development in this backward region, but it was also the solution that the vast majority of the Dutch people were hoping for. He placed this in the context of the Biblical passage: "keep what you have, lest someone take your crown." That was definitely the personal preference of Fock too, who advised Drees to go for solution (a) and then to see what would come out of the negotiations. This viewpoint was shared by Boon's superior, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Stikker.[30] This was also the gist of the statement that appeared a few days later, on 6 August, in which the government declared that its position at the Round Table Conference would be to maintain a direct link with New Guinea.

It is obvious from Van Eechoud's correspondence with Bannier that the chain reaction set in motion from Hollandia round about 1 August had, to a large extent, been his work.[31] The timing of the operation was excellent and news of Ariks' interest in possible overtures towards Australia touched a nerve in The Hague. Rijken Rapp's telegram arrived at a point when the conflict between Van Maarseveen and Van Roijen about New Guinea's position was heating up. One can conclude that this intervention was followed by the government adopting a position that was the best that the lobbyists could wish for right across the board from Hollandia to The Hague. Their sense of triumph is also reflected in the public statements they made during this period.

Nevertheless, one should ask how far this was a straightforward case of cause and effect here. After all, for some time now, Dutch policymakers had been toying with these ideas, which had initially been planted in their heads by Fock and Boon. It is highly plausible that even without these interventions from Hollandia they would have arrived at exactly the same conclusion. Boon's argument that the vast majority of the Dutch population were not keen to detach themselves from New Guinea is absolutely correct, as demonstrated by the parliamentary debates and the poll that was conducted a little later.[32] Here, the painful farewell to the colonial empire, the trauma of decolonization, certainly played a role and the ministers too were swept up by this sentiment. Nevertheless, this did not eradicate the fact that the Netherlands diluted almost every agenda item at the Round Table Conference, except the one about New

Guinea. Two other reasons can be identified for this. It was one of the few agenda items where the Republicans were more or less powerless. The region was firmly in Dutch hands and there were no political problems. The Netherlands had made a pre-condition from the very beginning and was very keen to act on it. This in itself would represent an explanation for what in fact happened next. One can, nevertheless, conclude on the basis of the documents that the interventions from Hollandia played a genuine role in the decision-making chain, and that the content of the communications contributed to the hardening of attitudes. The arguments contributed by Van Eechoud were pivotal to Van Maarseveen's defence of the position he had taken, and one can conclude that they played a role in the process of forming an opinion. The communications about copper and nickel and the manoeuvres by and with Ariks touched The Hague at a moment when choices had to be made, and actually accelerated the process.

It is less clear how far each of the key players was prepared to stick with the first option on Boon's list, or how far this option was considered to be a concession that could be traded in, when it came to the crunch, for advantages in areas in which the direct interests of the Netherlands were at stake, namely in the financial and economic sector. From the communications that are available one can deduce that many of the actors in the Dutch camp, including Drees and Stikker, would have been game for this. Developments at the Round Table Conference would show whether this was in fact true across the board.

The Round Table Conference

The Round Table Conference (RTC) was a massive conference lasting several months that attracted more than 250 delegates and advisors who were involved in one way or another. The parties that participated included the Netherlands, the Republic and the Federalists. For the record, this large entity was divided into numerous committees and sub-committees, in which various agenda items could be discussed on different levels. The chairmanship lay in the hands of Drees, who managed the Dutch delegation primarily from inside the Cabinet. The nucleus of the negotiators was formed by the central committee, on which the most prominent leaders of the delegations had a seat. For the Netherlands, this was Van Maarseveen, Stikker and Van Roijen, for the Republic, Hatta, Leimena and Mohamed Roem and for the Federalists, Hamid II Alkadri, Anak Agung and Suparmo. The conference was also attended by the three members of the UNCI and their staff, who lent a helping hand whenever necessary.

Parliamentarians who sat on the so-called 'Committee of Nine Men' also participated in the work of the Dutch delegation. This was meant to be a way of

binding parliament in advance to the outcome of the negotiations, but they had little leeway. The political relations called for caution and the Van Maarseveen-Drees duo kept tight hold of the reins. As far as New Guinea was concerned, Van Maarseveen in particular showed that he was determined to stick to the basic premise that had been selected. The trade-off formula, to which those in the government who still had doubts clung, was wasted on him. Besides, he felt invigorated by the support of the Second Chamber and the fact that the Australian government had let it be known through different channels that it backed the Netherlands in this matter. In his opinion, the Netherlands could afford to play for high stakes on this point with little risk of the conference grinding to a standstill on the issue. This was one of the points he stressed at the Cabinet meeting of 5 September, at a moment when the negotiations had already been going on for several weeks. He encountered powerful support for this from the Socialist Finance Minister, P. Lieftinck, who argued that giving up New Guinea would not be a responsible act towards the East Indies Dutch community, the Netherlands, and the area itself. Prime Minister Drees endorsed this point of view, but let it be known that he still wanted to hold onto some room for manoeuvring.[33] Less resolve was shown in the sub-committees by the liberal, G. Vonk and the socialist, Logemann. Both pointed out the dangers that a tunnel-visioned policy would have for the Dutch business community in Indonesia as well as the costs that would go hand-in-hand with developing New Guinea. Jonkman too, who now took part in the discussions in his capacity as an MP, revealed the cautious side of his nature and toyed with the idea of an interim solution by involving the Union. At any rate, he rejected a policy of hanging on to New Guinea unconditionally.[34]

With a divided Labour party that showed little strength of purpose in its actions, and the support of the religious parties and the Liberal party, Van Maarseveen had to use his position as Deputy Chair and Minister to play his hand as hard as he could. Later, Van der Goes van Naters was to complain to Drees that the Labour party members in the delegation had not been given enough scope to express their reservations about the New Guinea policy and that the matter had been largely decided without any preliminary consultation by Van Maarseveen who rigidly stuck to the procedures. The remark would seem valid given the sequence of events. Nevertheless, Drees did not have much patience with his complaints and pointed out to him that the other parties, namely the Republic and the BFO, had followed the procedures just as rigidly.[35]

The Dutch objective at the Round Table Conference with respect to New Guinea was made known in the government statement of 6 August 1949 and later fine-tuned in the document that the Netherlands took with it to the

negotiations. This was the draft of a charter for the transfer of sovereignty. The first two articles of this draft were as follows:

Article 1

(1) The Kingdom of the Netherlands hereby transfers, subject to the terms of this Charter, the sovereignty over Indonesia to the United States of Indonesia and recognizes the latter as an independent and sovereign state.

(2) The United States of Indonesia accordingly accept this sovereignty on the basis of the terms of their preliminary constitution, which is attached to this Charter.

Article 2

The Kingdom of the Netherlands and the United States of Indonesia understand that the area listed as the region of New Guinea in the Indonesian (i.e. Netherlands East Indies) Statute Book of 1946 no. 17 is not included in the transfer of sovereignty over Indonesia.[36]

This text left nothing to chance. It was a clear shot on the part of the Dutch to keep New Guinea out of the transfer of sovereignty without any further ado. The ball was instantly thrown back from the Indonesian side in the discussion about Article 1. According to the Van Roijen-Roem statement issued on 7 May, a discussion would take place at the Round Table Conference about 'the unconditional transfer of real and complete sovereignty to the United States of Indonesia'. In the eyes of the Republican delegation this had now been marred by the addition of the words 'subject to the terms of this charter'. This was even more disturbing because this article represented the key clause of the Agreement that was to be concluded. The proposal was, therefore, to delete the words in question and to insert the word 'complete' before 'sovereignty'. An extra addition was that the new state should be called 'the Republic of the United States of Indonesia'. This was a proposal that the Federalists had accepted in advance.[37]

This reaction too left little to the imagination, and the section about the name that was to be given created a not so subtle indication of where the sore point in the new relationship would lie. Nothing much could be done about this from the Dutch side. The remark by Van Roijen was clearly made with the power of attorney from the Dutch government. Moreover, it was up to the representatives of the new state to decide which name they wished to continue with from now on.

It was clear that this amendment would have consequences for most of the items on the conference agenda. They also heralded the attack on the Dutch

position regarding New Guinea. The strategy was now to move the issue of dealing with this matter as far back as possible on the agenda; a move in which Van Maarseveen was stealthily supported by the Australian representative in the UNCI, T.K. Critchly, and Mohammed Hatta. It was especially important to deal with the matter of the debts first, which from the outset had been seen, along with New Guinea, as the thorny issues.[38]

The conference programme offered a lot of scope for informal discussions in the corridor. The subject only really came up on 6 October in an informal meeting, at which the Nine Men were also present. During the meeting, a separate debate got off the ground in which the immediate past was scrutinized. The Indonesian delegates referred to the text of the Linggadjati Agreement itself, which had not mentioned anything about New Guinea, while the Dutch tried to shift the focus towards the discussions that had followed later on. Of course, Den Pasar was also referred to in this context. Here, Van Mook had promised that the region would continue to be linked to the Indonesian federation. The Dutch negotiator J.H. de Pont made Anak Agung indignant by saying that Van Mook was just a civil servant to whom the government did not feel bound. It was remarkable that Jonkman, who bore responsibility for all of this as Minister, remained tight-lipped throughout. He found himself in a rather awkward position, because he had been the person, after all, who had not corrected Van Mook at the time and had therefore sanctioned him. However, he was not prepared to utter a single word in his defence. The Republican diplomat, Roem, was in a far more comfortable position. He could once again content himself with simply referring to the text of his agreement with Van Roijen, adding that the term 'complete', which had been used in it, referred to the actual terrain as well. The matter was later referred to a sub-committee which did not get much further than repeating the familiar arguments.[39]

While discussions on this issue ran aground, furtive activities were taking place behind the scenes to break through the impasse. From the Australian side, spontaneous appeals were sent to the Dutch government urging them not to submit to the wishes of the Indonesians and to postpone the decision for at least the next ten to fifteen years. The State Department, meanwhile, made weak suggestions for a solution based on a trusteeship. This is why Minister Stikker initiated a campaign to gain widespread international support for this type of interim solution, in which he lobbied for a UN trusteeship for New Guinea with the Netherlands as the trustee. On 16 October, he forwarded this suggestion to the Dutch ambassadors in London, Washington and Canberra, urging them to lobby the governments they had been assigned to for support in an effort 'to keep New Guinea out of the transfer of sovereignty and to hold off a definitive decision about control over this area until after the Round Table Conference

has ended'. Moreover, he showed that he meant business with this, especially as he had the impression that the Republic was not actually interested in New Guinea and that it was mainly East Indonesia that was pushing for this.

The close contact he had with Hatta at this time revealed itself in an observation he made in the same telegram that Indonesia was not merely a continuation of the former Netherlands East Indies, but that it would eventually consist of all the territories that belonged together based on geographical and racial considerations. He wisely left out the international consequences of that argument. The steps that had been taken on his orders were listened to attentively in the three capital cities mentioned above. The reactions to the idea of a trusteeship were absolutely positive and it transpired that both the Foreign Office and the State Department had already been in communication with each other about this.[40]

Several attempts to break through the impasse with an interim solution were also made at the time by the parliamentarians who were involved. Van der Goes urged for a condominium, in which an independent Netherlands and Indonesia would have joint control over New Guinea. This was not far removed from Romme's idea at the time which was to place New Guinea under the guardianship of the Union. In actual fact, both ideas were an extension of the BIO formula that was already considered over and done with by those who were adept in the Indonesian matter. To the great relief of Van Maarseveen, who was not at all keen on these types of interim solutions, these suggestions were also rejected by the Republic. Nor was he thrilled by the communications from Washington, in which Deputy Minister Dean Acheson's thoughts seemed to lean towards a joint-trusteeship between the Netherlands and the VSI. Like Drees, he believed that all forms of shared responsibility would result in confusion and an inability to govern and, ultimately, in an invitation for foreign arbitration. He simply wanted to hold onto New Guinea and see this formally recorded in no uncertain terms.[41] The amendment of article 1 had upset the apple cart, but the battle over article 2 had yet to begin.

The need for clarity came when the end of the conference was in sight in the last week of October, because it had been agreed beforehand that the conference could not last for more than two months. Apart from which, the Indonesian delegations wanted to go home. The most high-profile figures from both the Republican as well as the Federal camp were in The Hague and they were undoubtedly anxious that they might lose their grip on the home front if they were to stay away any longer. On Sunday 23 October, the day on which it had been agreed that the Round Table Conference would end, the leaders of the delegations gathered together for lunch at the private residence of Minister Stikker. Matters that were still outstanding were discussed, during which it

appeared that a solution for the debts was close at hand. New Guinea continued to be the only issue that was still undecided. Van Maarseveen explained in detail once again that a transfer of the sovereignty over New Guinea would not be agreed to in the Netherlands, while Anak Agung argued the same with respect to East Indonesia. Hatta provided some leeway by repeating once again that he personally attached little importance to the transfer of sovereignty over this region, but that the extremists would latch onto this and use it to fight against the settlement.

When Maarseveen gave an account of this gathering the following day at the Dutch Cabinet meeting, he appeared to be cautiously optimistic. Despite the arguments that were bantered back and forth, he still believed that the Indonesian side would submit to an exclusion of New Guinea. This prompted a renewed plea from Stikker about the advantages of a trusteeship which was subsequently quashed by Van Maarseveen and Drees who stated that the Indonesians had no interest at all in a Dutch trusteeship. However, Van Maarseveen did put forward an important suggestion on this occasion that in exchange for maintaining complete sovereignty, the Netherlands would commit to 'not transferring this to a third state, while consultations will be held with the VSI before any changes will be made to the governance of this region'. The Minister appeared to be satisfied with the positive outcome. Now that the ruling over the issue of the debts was in sight, the Netherlands would no longer have to make any important concessions in order to hold onto New Guinea. Enough concessions had already been made, in his opinion. The end of the conference was approaching and the clock was ticking.[42]

The finale came with the meetings of the central committee on 29, 30 and 31 October. Anak Agung opened with the offer of transferring sovereignty over New Guinea to Indonesia while retaining some Dutch involvement in its administration. This was dismissed by the Dutch as being utterly non-negotiable, albeit that Van Maarseveen now counteracted with the declaration which was discussed earlier in the Cabinet. With this, the matter did not progress a single step further and the only solution would be an intervention from outside. The most obvious solution would have been for the UNCI to come with a recommendation, but none of the parties were prepared to request this out of fear that they might end up being bound to the final outcome. The Australian, T. Critchley, subsequently came with an informal proposal on behalf of the UNCI. The essence of this was that the residency of New Guinea would remain under the administration (Government) of the Netherlands for one more year, after which a solution to the issue of its political status would have to be found through negotiations.

With this proposal, which was in keeping with the suggestions previously made by Stikker to Canberra, London and Washington, there was finally some movement in the matter. A lively discussion ensued about the question of whether such a proviso should or should not explicitly state that sovereignty must be transferred immediately or that it should stay with the Netherlands until further notice. Agreement could not be reached on this sensitive point, but the different convictions began to gel more closely with each other when, on 31 October, Anak Agung 'with an aching heart' brought a document to the table in which the Federalists, in principle, accepted the postponement of the transfer by one year. With this, a breakthrough was reached, even though it was followed by another passionate debate about the wording that was employed. In addition, the Dutch showed that they were prepared to accept the proposal, 'on condition that it continues to remain clear that New Guinea would not be included in the transfer of sovereignty'. The complete text of the charter of transfer finally read as follows:

Article 1

1. The Kingdom of the Netherlands transfers the complete sovereignty over Indonesia unconditionally and irrevocably to the Republic of the United States of Indonesia and by doing so recognizes the latter as an independent and sovereign state.
2. The Republic of the United States of Indonesia accepts this sovereignty based on that which is stipulated in its Constitution, which as a draft has been brought to the attention of the Kingdom of the Netherlands.
3. The transfer of sovereignty will take place on 30 December 1949 at the very latest.

Article 2

With respect to the residency of New Guinea, the following has been agreed:

a. in view of the fact that it has not yet proved possible to reach a consensus of agreement between both parties concerning New Guinea, as a result of which the differences remain,
b. in view of the desirability of closing the Round Table Conference with a positive outcome on 2 November 1949,
c. in view of the important factors that must be reviewed in the solution to the New Guinea issue,
d. In view of the limited research that could be initiated and completed as yet on the problems that are connected with the New Guinea question,
e. in view of the difficult task, which will face those taking part in the Union, and

f. in view of the determination of both parties to hold onto the principle of resolving all differences which could arise or exist later by peaceful and reasonable means,

that the status quo of the residency of New Guinea will be maintained, providing that the question of the political status of New Guinea will be determined by negotiations between the Republic of the United States of Indonesia and the Kingdom of the Netherlands within the time-span of a year after the transfer of sovereignty to the Republic of the United States of Indonesia.

In combination with Article 1, in which the unconditional and irrevocable transfer of complete sovereignty was recorded, this was still a phrase that lent itself to two different interpretations. Van Roijen therefore immediately had a note made in the accompanying minutes that this meant that the sovereignty remained with the Netherlands and that nothing had been agreed in the event of no agreement being reached after that year. Sultan Hamid was the only one who confirmed this statement.[43] Dissatisfied with this, it was finally set down in writing in one of the exchanges associated with the agreement, upon the insistence of the Dutch delegation, that the wording in Article 2 of the Charter, that read 'the status quo of the residency of New Guinea shall be maintained' meant 'with the continuation of the authority of the Kingdom of the Netherlands over the residency of New Guinea'. In the official English translation this text read as follows: 'through continuing under the Government of the Netherlands'. This was ratified on both sides.[44] On closer analysis, this formulation did not provide a decisive answer either as the word 'sovereignty' was deliberately avoided. Here too, as was often the case in the dispute between the Netherlands and Indonesia, differences in opinion blocked the way to arriving at a wording that was one hundred per cent conclusive. Anyway, the direct result was that this presented the Netherlands with the opportunity to continue governing the disputed territory and the conference could be closed.

Players from the side-lines

From the moment that New Guinea was placed on the Dutch political agenda, that is to say from the very first discussions in cabinet about the draft settlement of Linggadjati in November 1946, it was linked to two issues: the problematic implementation of the right to self-determination by the Papuans, and the request from the colonization associations for a safe refuge for the Indos. These issues continued to be politically relevant. In addition to this, the economic and military-political arguments were also raised in passing. The

priority of self-determination and Indo-colonization was also emphatically expressed in the parliamentary debates that preceded the Round Table Conference. Both themes amounted to the adoption of a moral position, in which the responsibility of the Netherlands towards the Papuans and the East Indies Dutch was at stake.

Now the issue of the right to self-determination was of course not exclusively linked to the Papuans. First and foremost, the whole decolonization dispute was centred around it. Focussing on the separate regions, it was brought to the table for the first time by Schermerhorn and his companions, who hoped thus to find a solution to the issue that was still dragging on in 1946 of who would rule on Sumatra. Considerations relating to power politics and those of a moral nature were closely intertwined in this. In actual practice, during the coming years most of the attention related to this would be directed towards Christian groups in the Minahassa, in the Moluccas and on Timor. These were important recruiting places for the KNIL soldiers, who could find themselves in a tight spot if the Republicans became the dominant power. In that respect, their position was comparable to that of the Indos. As the prospects for a Republican-dominated, nationalist Indonesia gradually became more real, these groups increasingly turned their attention towards the possibility of separating from Indonesia. Out of the different separatist organizations, we have already seen the Perkoempoelan Kebangsaan Maloekoe of Metekohy, which advocated separation from Ambon and the surrounding islands of the federal state of East Indonesia, and wished to include New Guinea in this as well. New organizations followed later, such as the Perkoempoelan Timur Besar (PTB), which cast its net wider and included Minahassa in its plans as well. The movement had its origins in naval and military circles, and was discretely supported by the Dutch military and naval commanders in Indonesia, who did not wish to offend their personnel. These separatist organizations were based on Java, even though they usually had a considerable number of supporters in their 'home countries'. In the Minahassa itself, activists were working for the reconstitution of the area as a 'Twelfth Province' of the Netherlands Kingdom (*Twapro*). Because these organizations were embedded in the framework of East Indonesia, which of course wanted nothing to do with them, it was hard to estimate the power of these separatists.

The official Dutch policy had always been to keep these separatists at arm's length as much as possible. The economic potential of the territories in question was limited and the future of their inhabitants lay in Indonesia itself. Their continued involvement in the administration and the army, in an independent Indonesia as well, was an extra guarantee to ensure that a climate that was favourable for the Netherlands would be sustained there. The various petitions

and appeals for Dutch support from this quarter were therefore constantly being turned down, although the fact that they were entitled in principle to practise the right to self-determination was acknowledged.

After the Second Military Action the call for the right to self-determination gained a renewed relevance. New territories on Sumatra and Java were being occupied at the time by the Dutch army, where the first steps to create new federal states were being forced to go ahead. These 'states' were feeble constructions that would have little or no chance of survival without protection from the Dutch. Furthermore, there was also the more developed federal state of Sumatra's East Coast which had already been created after the First Police Action, but was having to contend with strong counter-movements. When the return of the Republic was within sight, following the Van Roijen-Roem Agreement, an initiative was set in motion to give both old and new separatists a chance to further develop themselves by exercising their right to self-determination. In the Dutch political arena, this was first instigated by Romme, who felt increasingly frustrated by the way events were unfolding. In 1949, he theorized about external home rule for parts of Sumatra, that is to say separating these territories from the federation.[45] Of course, this stemmed from feelings of acute rejection of the Republic. In actual fact, this brought the right to home rule once again to the matter of who should rule Sumatra, which had provided the impetus in Linggadjati for the wording of Articles 3 and 4 of the Agreement that was drafted there.

During the run-up to the Round Table Conference, the question was raised whether, and in what form, these separatists should have a seat at the Round Table Conference. Mindful of the possibility of parts of Sumatra and East Indonesia becoming separated, neither the Republicans nor the Federalists cared to enter into this. From the Republican side, halting any further creation of a federal state on Sumatra had been one of the conditions for accepting the Van Roijen-Roem Agreement. After a lot of discussions that went back and forth continuously, a compromise was finally reached whereby the separatists were allowed to have a seat in a group called *Special Interests*. They would only be allowed to make their opinions known at the conference if this was requested by all the delegations. Further agreements on this were only made after the Conference had already started in The Hague.

As was to be expected, the separatists in The Hague had no chance of success with the Indonesian parties. When, in October, the matter was tabled for discussion at the relevant sub-committee, the Twapro and PTB representatives refused to turn up, stating that they had travelled to The Hague as full-fledged participants, while it had not been made clear to them what a 'special interest' signified. The Round Table Conference was, therefore, no longer relevant for

them. They spent the rest of their time in the Netherlands lobbying conservative groups, and were strongly supported in this by the Committee for the Preservation of the Unity of the Realm; the *Comité Handhaving Rijkseenheid.* The Sumatran delegations tried to get a foot in the door at the conference, but were blocked by the unwillingness of the Indonesian delegations to discuss their case. It was, as one Republican negotiator remarked to them during the conference, a great pity that this type of discussion, which was about problems between fellow-Indonesians, had to take place at the Round Table Conference at all.[46]

The result was that, henceforth, the separatists' interests at the Round Table Conference had to be championed by the Dutch delegation, but the elaboration of Articles 3 and 4 of Linggadjati that was worked out here remained extremely thin. In principle, this would become a case of the Republic of the United States of Indonesia that would include rules in its constitution for this. The only thing that was formally recorded concerning the internal right to home rule in the Transition Agreement was that 'the populations of territories, which were indicated by the Government of the RVSI on the recommendation of the UNCI or another United Nations body,' would hold a referendum under the supervision of the United Nations on the issue of whether it wished to become a separate federal state. With respect to the external right to home rule, the Agreement stated under Article 2 that a federal state which would not accept the definitive constitution, would have the authority to negotiate about a special relationship with Indonesia and the Kingdom of the Netherlands. This offered the separate groups in East Indonesia and Sumatra very few prospects of realizing their wishes. In order to become a federal state, one must first of all find a way to obtain permission from the United States of Indonesia to hold a referendum. If one wanted more, then one would have the authority to negotiate this, nothing more nothing less. It would require very special circumstances to loosen the ties with Jakarta under these kinds of rules and regulations.

The *Minorities* category was a group that Jonkman in his statement of 10 December 1946 had linked directly with New Guinea. During the Pangkal Pinang conference, it had consisted of Arabs, Chinese and Dutchmen in Indonesia. For the Round Table Conference, only the East Indies Dutch were still prepared to go around under this flag. Lovink, who succeed Beel as HVK in June 1949, defined them as Dutchmen firmly rooted in Indonesia 'who not only worked and lived here, but also expected to die and be buried here'. The colonization associations were represented in an eight-member delegation by J.J. Verboom, P.A. Blaauw and J.E. Schijfsma. In real terms, their experiences at the Round Table Conference hardly differed at all from those of the category

known as Special Interests. At the beginning of the conference they were given a brief 20-minute audience with the Dutch delegation to make their wishes known. The list contained requests relating to social concerns, pensions and citizenship, with an added plea at the end to hold onto New Guinea for the purpose of Indo-colonization.[47]

The discussion about the latter met with the same resistance from the Indonesian delegations that their colleagues from Special Interests had met. It was an Indonesian internal matter that had no place at the conference. The list of remaining issues was drastically reduced and only superficially discussed. The result was that representatives of the Minorities also spent most of their time in the Netherlands lobbying through the friends of the Unity of the Realm, who made a last desperate attempt during these days to stave off the imminent danger of the transfer of sovereignty. For the first time since the 1930s, when they both played a role on the board of the Fatherland Club, Verboom and Feuilletau de Bruyn once again took action shoulder to shoulder. They gave lectures throughout the country in which the subject of New Guinea in particular was placed high on the agenda. A wonderful moment took place on 18 September when the representatives of the New Guinea groups were received by Queen Juliana at the palace in Soestdijk. They handed over two petitions in which the wishes of the East Indies Dutch for a new homeland were once again expressed in powerful terms. The result of all these activities is of course hard to measure, but the government was afraid that it would have an effect on the parliament session, which would ultimately have to approve the findings of the Round Table Conference with a two-thirds majority. Unlike the 'Special Interests' group, they did not end up returning to Indonesia empty-handed. It is true that the social chapter of the Round Table Conference was disappointing, but they had no complaints as far as New Guinea was concerned. As we have seen, the Dutch delegation was at their beck and call on this point.[48]

No Papuans were invited to the Round Table Conference, not even in the category of Minorities or Special Interests. Their participation was not considered necessary by Minister Van Maarseveen because this would seriously affect the a priori that they were not yet mature enough to practise the right to self-determination. As a small concession, towards the end of the conference a handful of prominent Papuans were finally invited to visit the Netherlands. On Van Maarseveen's insistence, great pains were taken to ensure that only individuals who would adopt a positive demeanour towards the Netherlands were sent. Furthermore, their trip should not be linked in any way to the RTC. The result was that, at the end of October, Van Eechoud, accompanied by Johan Ariks, Nicolaas Jouwe and the Biak Public Information Officer, Marcus Kaisiepo,

arrived in The Hague.[49] In light of the instructions and the time of arrival, the effect of this on developments at the conference could not have been significant. It was primarily a matter of interested politicians being able to get to know these last-remaining subjects from the East. They could now see with their own eyes that the Papuans were different to the rest of the Indonesian people and hear with their own ears that these people did not wish to be part of the new Indonesia. Viewed from the perspective of the administration on New Guinea, it was a good opportunity to, once again, enable several Papuans to get to know the Netherlands, and kindle their enthusiasm for it. In this respect, the Ariks mission was most definitely a success. However, their presence did not have any perceptible influence on the RTC proceedings.

Arguments, circumstances and motives

Looking back at the content of the last two chapters, we can conclude that in 1949 New Guinea was kept out of the transfer to Indonesia by a very special combination of factors. The arguments used on the Dutch side were the Papuans' immaturity to practise the right to self-determination, the colonization of (East Indies) Dutch people, future economic benefits, and military-political perspectives, of which the emphasis clearly rested on the first two. None of Indonesia's other territories where the issue of separation played a role offered the same set of opportunities. In addition to this, there were at least three special circumstances which made separating New Guinea from its connection with Indonesia discussable when viewed from the Dutch perspective. The first had to do with the special nature of the country and its people, which made Western New Guinea stand out completely from the rest of Indonesia. Unlike Borneo, for example, no sultanates were settled in coastal areas that were gearing themselves towards Java. Tidore itself had not been a significant factor and the Revolution had made less headway in the land of the Papuans than in any other part of the archipelago. The second factor was the special international position. During the Second World War, Australia had felt the strategic importance of this area and in the ANZAC Agreement with New Zealand both countries had silently drawn this area into their defence zone. Up until 1949, the Australian government had implemented a policy that had worked very much to the advantage of the Republic. It was only during the course of that year that it began to fully grasp the fact that the Netherlands was actually going to pull out of Indonesia. This meant that Australia would acquire direct territorial borders with a turbulent Asian neighbour. Under these circumstances, a Dutch buffer on Western New Guinea seemed an attractive alternative. From the end of August, utterances to this effect regularly pushed their way through

various channels into the Netherlands, where they served to boost the spirits of Van Maarseveen and the other ministers who wanted to cling on to New Guinea. Such a prospect of international support was unheard of for any other part of Indonesia.

Despite the strength of these arguments and the special circumstances, holding onto New Guinea would not have been possible had it not been for the resolute, bold actions of Minister van Maarseveen. In this respect, the effect of the hidden hand of Hollandia was no small factor. The impression created by this that an economic interest would certainly be served by holding onto New Guinea was not lost on the minister. In addition, the argument he himself liked to use was also genuine, namely that it was necessary to keep New Guinea to persuade parliament to agree to the transfer of sovereignty. Yet we should not lose sight of the fact here that parliament had previously agreed to the joint-administration in the BIO Decree and that the Minister had already planned the course he would follow well before the parliament session in question. He himself had offered the consolation prize of New Guinea on the first meeting of the Second Chamber. Without his actions, the reaction of the house could have been different.

All things considered, excluding New Guinea from the Round Table Conference was a pyrrhic victory in which none of the factors mentioned could have been missed. A pyrrhic victory too, because it only meant a truce for one year and that according to a formula that left the opposition party enough room to interpret it however it wished. The latter would always be able to fall back on this in the future.

Many shared the fear that this was tantamount to holding the good working relationship within the Union to ransom in advance. This was especially the case within the Labour Party in the Netherlands. On this occasion, the party was dragged along by its ministers, who were stuck in an age-old political dilemma: how to choose the lesser of two evils. There were divisions within the Liberal party on this issue too, and even within the CHU. These developments were viewed with dismay from Batavia. Since Van Mook's actions at the Den Pasar conference there had always been a difference between an East Indies and a Dutch position in this matter. Following Beel's departure in June 1949, the East Indies position was definitely ruled out as a political factor. The initiative during the negotiations was taken over lock, stock and barrel by the diplomat Van Roijen and, after the relocation of the negotiation circus to The Hague, by the Dutch Cabinet. The VFR remained behind as the guardian of the former Dutch East Indies, which was to be succeeded by the new Indonesia as far as possible, according to the view in Batavia. This is why little sympathy could be found among its Dutch and Indonesian department heads for the plans for

colonization or for the actions of the separatists, which aimed to separate Ambon and Minahassa from the main body. In the final months of that year, the Netherlands East Indies army managed, with great difficulty, to suppress a separation movement in Minahassa that had been initiated by Menadonese soldiers. Similarly, in Ambon a separatist movement was nipped in the bud thanks to the personal advice of high-ranking East Indies civil servants.

Batavia was totally opposed to giving up New Guinea too. From the perspective of this city, New Guinea still represented the eastern flank of the colonial state. The idea of creating a new Netherlands East Indies there, in miniature format, as Van Eechoud was now proposing to the Dutch politicians and the colonists, did not appeal to them in the slightest. The visit from Van Maarseveen in June 1949 had therefore certainly shocked them. At the end of September, when the talks about New Guinea were scheduled to start, the Acting Federal Government (VFR) held a special session about this issue. Once again, mention was made of the exorbitant costs involved to develop the area. If the Netherlands genuinely wanted to do something for New Guinea, this could only be accomplished in close collaboration with the Indonesians. The rulers of the outgoing Netherlands East Indies were unanimous in their opinion that the success of the Round Table Conference should not be put at risk because of this. Lovink instantly cabled the results of this discussion to Van Maarseveen, in which his personal opinion was that the attitude of the minister was completely narrow-minded and unreasonable. The addressee was totally unmoved by all of this. He was already familiar with such remonstrations from Batavia and had already made up his own mind. After the Round Table Conference had ended, the conclusion drawn by the VFR was completely at odds with that of the Dutch government. The findings in Batavia were that the RTC had been something of a success, but that it had failed abysmally as far as New Guinea was concerned.[50]

The VRF thus represented the feelings of the upper echelons of the Dutch community in the East Indies, who saw their business and personal interests being placed in grave danger by these developments. This was not the case among the majority of the Indo-population. There, a feeling of powerlessness prevailed, which gradually increased as the date of the transfer of sovereignty drew closer. Various accounts feature reports of growing panic and increasing numbers of people wishing to emigrate to New Guinea.

This difference in opinion resulted in the collapse of the IEV, which had successfully served as the representative of the Indo-European community after the war. The breaking point was the issue of whether the organization should advise its members to opt for Indonesian citizenship when the time came. In its

statement of 26 August, the Executive Committee had openly argued for the pro-Indonesian point of view. They argued that the overwhelming majority of the Indo-Europeans 'were now convinced of the need to change to a new attitude to life'. It realized, that it would have to fight shoulder to shoulder with the Indonesian leaders for the happiness and prosperity of the Republik Indonesia Serikat, because 'such a battle was worth fighting for the Indo-European who stayed behind as a citizen of Indonesia.' This pathetic appeal certainly did not touch the hearts of the majority of their followers in Indonesia. It resulted in widespread protests. The board of the local branch of Great Batavia, for instance, wired a response to the leaders in The Hague saying that this might apply to a segment of its members, but that there was also a large group that simply wished to remain Dutch and who were prepared to chance their luck in New Guinea if it was no longer possible to do this in Indonesia. These members voted with their feet. At the beginning of 1949, the number of IEV members was still at around the 14,000 mark, but by the end of the year this had fallen to a couple of thousand at most. After the Round Table Conference ended, the Union had practically ceased to exist as a political organization.

The initiative was now completely in the court of the colonization associations. Their joint membership base had in the meantime increased to 16,000, and their meetings attracted thousands of followers. Stories were circulating about people who had simply upped sticks and left for New Guinea, taking all their worldly possessions with them, including a consignment of cut wood for a new house.[51] In addition to this, more organized activities took place too. On 31 December, the first group of 550 colonists arrived in Manokwari. In the months that followed, another 2,500 disembarked in the harbours of the promised land to carve out a new life there.[52]

In The Hague too, the decision to hold onto New Guinea was viewed at the Ministry for Overseas Territories as the promising start of a new era. New regulations would have to be drawn up for the administration of the area, decisions would have to be made about matters such as the police, postage stamps and currency, while the supplies for the new country would also have to be looked into thoroughly. The Cabinet dedicated a few meetings to this during the days preceding the transfer of sovereignty, the minutes of which betray an atmosphere of dedicated effort.[53] It was finally possible to begin the trusted work of a practical and constructive administration once again. One could finally do this once more without having to consider the arrogant Republicans, who in the preceding years had thwarted and frustrated all the plans drawn up by the Dutch for a positive future. The Netherlands had a wretched time behind it, but now at least New Guinea offered it the chance to show once again how things ought to be.

This is purely an impression, but its relevance jumps out when one reads the publicly accessible sources from this time. This brings us finally to the underlying psychological motives behind Dutch efforts to keep New Guinea. Lijphart, the political scientist mentioned earlier, dealt with this matter at great length in his standard work about the trauma of decolonization. The Dutch people had experienced great difficulty with the way in which the Indonesian affair had been handled. They felt hurt by the distrust and enmity on the Indonesian side and there was a profound indignation about the continuous violence from the Republican regular and irregular forces against the Dutch allies. It had required a supreme effort to accept this Republic as an equal partner. A sense of profound indignation also prevailed about the attitude adopted by the international world, particularly the United States of America, which refused to understand the good intentions of the Dutch and succumbed, in a cowardly fashion, to the violence and the cheap slogans of national independence. The Netherlands had wanted to offer Indonesia freedom, but in a sound and structured way and based on a respect for each other's interests. They did not dwell on their own faults, and it had been very hard to bid farewell to the Realm, which for a section of the citizens represented the essence of the Dutch identity. One now had to return to the status of a small homestead on the North Sea, as the activist Gerretson sneered scornfully. A survey conducted by the NIPO in November 1949 reveals that only twenty-one per cent of those interviewed agreed with the findings of the Round Table Conference, while thirty-three per cent expressed their disapproval of it. Almost half of the interviewees abstained from making a judgement, but there is certainly no reason to interpret this as tacit acceptance. At the final parliamentary session on 6 December there was also little enthusiasm for the agreement that had been reached. That the consequences of rejecting it would be unacceptable was clear to everyone who knew the political realities. Nevertheless, the two-thirds majority that was required was just reached with an almost calculated margin in both the Upper and the Second Chamber, by which this result also took on the appearance of a protest. Under these circumstances, the battle for New Guinea was an act of resistance and the expression of a longing to rescue something from the East Indies mayhem.[54] Yet that is no reason to dismiss the combination of motives and circumstances mentioned earlier as irrelevant. Without their relevance, the sentiment would not have been able to vent itself in this way.

Chapter 5

Locking Horns

The Netherlands and Indonesia in the 'status-quo' year

As agreed at the Round Table Conference, 1950 would be the 'status quo' year in which a solution would have to be sought for the dispute about West New Guinea. The outcome of this was, of course, influenced by the positions that had already been adopted on both sides. In addition to this, developments on the domestic front in the Netherlands and Indonesia also played a role, as did the reciprocal relations between both countries which had now been placed on an entirely different footing than before.

Internal politics in the Netherlands was not fundamentally changed by the transfer of sovereignty. The Drees Cabinet continued to govern steadily. There were, however, some shifts in emphasis that were caused by developments in the relationship with Indonesia. One of the questions relating to this was 'What is to become of New Guinea?' There was no obvious solution for this. From the very outset, Van Maarseveen and Drees wished to hold onto it and were not in favour of even discussing the matter of Dutch sovereignty.[1] This was, therefore, the policy line of the Cabinet while the Department of Union Affairs and Overseas Territories worked quietly in the background on preparations for the continuity of the Dutch administration. So it was that, on 20 June 1950, Minister Van Maarseveen successfully defended a draft budget in the First Chamber of parliament for the administration of New Guinea during the next three years. The minister responded to the Labour Party (PvdA) question of whether it would not be wiser to talk about the upcoming year by pointing out that this would be futile 'since the government was firm in its resolve that New Guinea should also remain under Dutch sovereignty after the year in question'.[2]

However, this choice was not unanimous. Some objections were raised by the Catholic party (KVP), albeit only a few in the beginning. The Member of Parliament (MP) Th.M.J. de Graaf was the only one who carefully placed a question mark behind the policy advocated by Van Maarseveen. The latter, however, could count on the support of the Roman Catholic mission on New Guinea.[3] Doubts in Catholic circles would exude from the confines of the Catholic University of Nijmegen at a much later stage. In the Liberal party (VVD) the voices of dissent were heard immediately. This party found itself increasingly torn between its two largest branches in Amsterdam and Rotterdam. In the capital of the Netherlands, which hosted many large businesses operating in Indonesia, the feeling had taken hold during the final year of the struggle for independence that it would be better to give in to Indonesian demands in order to safeguard Dutch business interests. This implied a policy of 'surrender' with regard to New Guinea. Stikker, the Minister of Foreign Affairs and former President of the Heineken Brewery, was their man. Opposition came from the Rotterdam branch, where the interest in the Indies was less significant, thereby making it easier for a more nationalistic viewpoint to emerge. The Mayor of Rotterdam, P.J. Oud, who was leader of the VVD in the Second Chamber, was the spokesman designated to represent this point of view. He managed to keep the MPs from his party on his side.

From the beginning, the PvdA had been more openly divided, the most obvious manifestation of which was the endless quarrelling between Drees and the leader of the parliamentary group of his party in the Second Chamber, Van der Goes van Naters. The latter, together with the *Parool* group, had always advocated a more conciliatory approach towards the Republic as it represented the vanguard of Indonesian nationalism, after all. This line, therefore, would be continued with regard to Indonesia's claims to New Guinea too. There was widespread support for this view among MPs from his party, including the former ministers and Christian-Socialists Schermerhorn and Logemann. The latter in particular was sympathetic to the doubts that preoccupied the leaders of the Protestant mission, where holding onto New Guinea was seen as a potential threat to its interests in Indonesia. However, for the party as a whole, Drees's vision proved to be the decisive one. Like Oud, in 1950 and for the better part of the following decade, he was able to impose his ideas on the party, despite reservations expressed by some of his fellow party members. In these circumstances, Drees could point out the importance of continuing with the 'Roman-red' coalition, which made it inevitable for the socialists to adopt the Catholic party's position with regard to New Guinea. What mattered to Drees, personally, was the fact that he was convinced that during the conflict in Indonesia his opponents had been acting in an underhand way. This applied to both the

Indonesian adversaries and the American allies. In his opinion, the Republicans had sabotaged every agreement, and the Americans were to blame for Holland not being able to implement a better decolonization policy and for leaving its supporters in Indonesia in the lurch.[4] These things were to continue in the years to come. Meanwhile, this view was widely shared.

This is why the moral overtone that was so typical of the earlier policy with regard to Indonesia also resonated in Dutch politics after 1950. The most striking example of this was the dismissive attitude that was adopted towards an Indonesia, which once again was not sticking to the agreements that had been made. Moreover, the moderating intermediary in the form of a Netherlands Indies government, which until then had served to some extent towards keeping the policymakers in The Hague aware of Indonesian realities, had now become less of a force to be reckoned with. The subsequent High Commissioners in Jakarta, H.M. Hirschfeld (until August 1950), A.Th. Lamping (until January 1953) and W.F.L. Graaf van Bylandt (until March 1956), also failed to step into this void, although not for lack of trying. With this, the chasm between Indonesia and the Netherlands widened rapidly. The implementation of the cooperation within the framework of the Union did not materialize, not only because of Dutch grudges, but because of the lack of interest from the Indonesian side as well.

Initially, responsibility for implementing policy lay almost entirely with the Ministry for Union Affairs and Overseas Territories. It was and remained a working department, focused on the technical implementation of decolonization in Indonesia and the administration of the West Indies and New Guinea. This department was certainly not advocating a different New Guinea policy. Compensation for this could have been found at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which had played an important role in formulating the policy towards Indonesia and would do that even more intensively after the transfer of sovereignty. However, it proved unable to swim against the tide under the wavering and politically weak Minister Stikker. Although Stikker managed to fly a few kites, we shall see that one by one they eventually crashed to the ground.

Meanwhile, quite surprisingly, the Dutch business community in Indonesia flourished after the transfer of sovereignty. After years of war, unrest and revolution, the companies were finally going full steam ahead again. On the whole, this was pretty successful, despite the fact that security did not return immediately to all of Java and cooperation with the new authorities had to be built from scratch. This process was helped by the outbreak of war in Korea, which led to soaring prices for Indonesian products on the world market, particularly for rubber. The Dutch investments in the former colony still proved profitable. However, this did not have much impact on the policy followed by the Dutch

government, which displayed a remarkable dichotomy between practical interests and sentiment, resulting in its blowing hot and cold with regard to the former colony. A negative attitude dominated the politic sphere. It was prompted by the frustrated policy of decolonization as recorded in the *dépit* worded by Drees, but this was not the only reason. Actual developments contributed their share as well.

In 1950, a number of processes were set in motion in Indonesia which would determine the look and feel of the state in the coming decades. The first was the replacement of the Dutch civil servants by Indonesian officials in the central departments. On the Dutch side, it had been hoped that this would be a lengthy process, during which the knowledge, experience and spirit of the Indies administration could be transplanted into its successor. In practice, this was only the case up to a point. Sure, the apparatus had been largely Indonesian up to the level of middle management even before the war, but beyond this level almost every position had been held by a Dutchman. In 1950, approximately 16,000 Dutch officials were working in Indonesia, around the same number as before the war. Further Indonesianization was slowed down by the decolonization conflict, which hampered or even stopped the influx of Indonesians into the government apparatus.[5] After 1950, this Dutch quota was soon put to one side.

From the memoirs of the Indies official Van Heekeren, we can see how this happened in practice. His beautiful residence in the Batavia suburb of Menteng was confiscated by a high-ranking Indonesian, but fortunately there was room in the smaller living quarters on the Oranjeplein, which was named Taman Slamat Rijadi soon afterwards. An Indonesian supervisor arrived at the office and from that moment onwards Van Heekeren never laid his hands on important documents again. A second and third desk was shoved into his room, which were occupied by persons whose tasks were unclear to him. Under these circumstances, there was no point in staying on and a few weeks later the family left. Most people did not succeed in leaving so soon, but within two years more than half had already gone.[6] From a human perspective, one could not expect any other course of action. The Indonesians had fought for their place in the sun for years and when they finally got the chance to have it they were not about to give it up to the *Belandas*. Within a couple of months, the crew of the government ship had changed considerably. It was only in the more technical departments, especially in finance, that Dutch officials managed to hang on a bit longer.

This series of events caused a clear, although not an outright, break with the past. The continuity was not only expressed by the number of resident

Indonesian officials from the Netherlands Indies administration, but also in the procedures that were followed, in the legal and organizational framework, and in the style of administration. Transplanting these matters succeeded to some extent, but went hand in hand with a loss in efficiency. The most striking feature of the new situation was the massive expansion of the number of officials, which was accompanied by increasing difficulties in paying them and inherent corruption. The latter was particularly rife in the army, whose main source of finance had been self-imposed levies from the revolutionary period onward. It now saw its operational area extending quite considerably. Contributions were required from the Chinese, the remaining Dutch entrepreneurs and, in increasing numbers, from the population as a whole.

After the transfer of sovereignty, the new Indonesian leaders were confronted with the need to create a new normality after years of war and revolution. The scattered parts now convened for the first time without the guiding hand of the Indies government. Power was in the hands of the independent Indonesian federal state, the *Republik Indonesia Serikat* (RIS, *United States of the Republic of Indonesia)*, which had been hastily cobbled together in December 1949. Within the federation, the old Republic of Indonesia, which had led the Revolution against the Netherlands between 1945 and 1950 and was now reduced to a federal state, was nevertheless the strongest factor. Within the Cabinet of the RIS its former leaders occupied important posts. Sukarno was now President of the new federation and Hatta and the Sultan of Yogya held the important posts of Prime Minister and Minister of Defence. On the other hand, the federal leader, Anak Agung, occupied the equally important post of Minister of Internal Affairs in this Cabinet. It seemed a happy combination of political weight and administrative prowess. The Hatta Cabinet governed in consultation with a hastily formed parliament, which was made up of representatives with limited powers who had been chosen or appointed by the parliaments of the federal states. The representation of the political parties under this system was accomplished mainly on the basis of estimates. The strongest position was held by the Masjumi, which consisted of both the traditional Muslims from Central and East Java as well as the usually more modern-minded fellow believers from Sumatra and other parts of the outlying districts. The largest competitor was the PNI, the representative *par excellence* of modern nationalism. Then there were the smaller factions such as Sjahirs' socialist PSI, the Protestant Parkindo, the Partai Katolik and the Partai Sarekat Islam Indonesia (PSII).

For the Republik Indonesia Serikat, longevity was not on the cards. Within six months, on 17 August 1950, the federation was replaced by a unitary state, the *Republik Indonesia,* that needed a new constitution. This left the main

hallmarks of a parliamentary democracy in place, with an even better position for parliament. Under both constitutions, the state was set up as a multi-party democracy based on the Dutch model. The role of the president was limited to that of a Head of State without any direct administrative authority, who enforced proposals for law with his signature and whose only real job was to form a new cabinet.[7]

The creation of the Republik Indonesia Serikat on 27 December 1949 was the result of a protracted decolonization conflict in which the Republicans had been at loggerheads with the representatives of the federal states, which had come into existence under the supervision of the Dutch. It is true that they had obtained a prominent position within the federal system but, all in all, their former Republic was now no more than one part out of the sum of sixteen. Many Republican politicians, military personnel and administrators in Yogya were not satisfied with this outcome. This disaffection also had an idealistic overtone: they viewed the federation as something that had been imposed upon them by the Netherlands and wanted a unified state that would hark back to the old Republic which was founded in 1945. They found themselves in an expedient position to bring this about. Their people were the nucleus of the new government and of the federal armed forces which consisted of the former TNI soldiers and a complement of some tens of thousands of KNIL soldiers.

Almost immediately after the transfer of sovereignty, the Yogyan Republicans launched the attack on the federal states. West Java ended up in a direct line of fire because an attempt to seize power had been made there in January by the former KNIL captain, Raymond Westerling. It is only possible to give a very brief account of the story here. During his KNIL career, Westerling had acquired a dubious reputation as a leader of commando units that had developed an effective, albeit extremely heavy-handed, anti-guerrilla strategy. This was employed during the suppression of the resistance on South Celebes at the end of 1946 with the full knowledge and support of the army leadership and the East Indies government. In time, they eventually found this approach too gruesome and Westerling was subsequently expelled from the service. In the guerrilla year of 1949, the former captain had set up his own fighting force in West Java. It is possible that he did this with the full knowledge of the authorities of the federal Pasundan State, while the KNIL leadership simply allowed matters to run their course. So many private armies were set up in those days, financed by private concerns but assisted with the supply of equipment and training by the official army. So far, the organization can be seen as a sort of local volunteer corps, directed against the TNI which was trying to control the area.[8] After the transfer of sovereignty, Westerling refused to accept the new situation and

continued with his preparations to drive the TNI units out of Pasundan and perhaps out of other states too. In the wild fantasies of panicking Indo-Europeans and fellow combatants from the Netherlands, the very name Westerling quickly took on mythical proportions. For them, this was the last ditch attempt to resist the oncoming Javanese flood. In the previous chapter we saw that echoes of this could still be heard for a long time afterwards as far away as distant New Guinea.

During the first days of January, Westerling was already complaining loudly, but he could get very little done. His most significant action was a sudden attack on Bandung during the latter part of the month in which the TNI garrison was chased into the barracks where approximately eighty of their soldiers were killed.[9] Westerling's tiny army was made up of couple of hundred former KNIL soldiers. The bulk of the KNIL and KL soldiers had remained passive, although many of them secretly admired Westerling's boldness. The coup attempt was quickly stamped out by the Dutch army command which went on to arrest the perpetrators. After the complete failure of a subsequent assault on Jakarta which followed on from that, Westerling went into hiding for some time, after which he was evacuated from the country with the help of the Dutch government. This was done against the wishes of the Dutch representative (HC) in Jakarta, Hirschfeld, who because of this felt as if he had been made a complete fool of in front of the Indonesian government.[10] The Netherlands did not want it to end up as a lawsuit in case it led to the South Celebes affair being raked up, alongside the matter of the arms deliveries to Westerling in 1949. On top of that, it was probable that there were enough people on the Indonesian side who would not appreciate a public discussion about Westerling's contacts. There are still many unanswered questions, even in the wake of the extensive study carried out by Jaap de Moor. It was at any rate clear that it was an unfortunate affair that placed an exceptional strain on relations between the Netherlands and the young Indonesian state. However, the action was a gift from heaven for the Republican unitarians.

Following the suppression of the Westerling coup, a series of arrests were made by the Indonesian authorities, sometimes with, but more often than not without, proof of complicity. One of those arrested was Hamid II Alkadri, who used to be a loyal federalist and was now a Minister without a portfolio in the federal government. Aside from the fact that he had occasionally spoken with Westerling, not much more could be held against him, but this in itself was deemed sufficient to place him under arrest.[11] The assault sparked off a series of actions against the federal states. Pasundan was the first victim, the rest followed over the next few months. The same pattern could be discerned every time. First came the street actions, supported by the police and the army

commanders. Then came the turbulent meetings of the local council, which always led to a motion insisting that the state joined the Republic. Generally speaking, the federal state cabinets did not resist and within a few months the entire process had been completed. On 17 August 1950, the unified state had become a reality.[12]

As far as the Republicans were concerned, these events validated the argument that the entire Indonesian population wanted one single unified state. Undoubtedly, a widespread longing for this had certainly existed, but unadulterated intimidation also played a role here. Most of the federal structures would only have had a chance of survival with support from the Dutch military machine. That was in the process of being completely disbanded during the first half of 1950 and did not have any more say in the matter. As a result of this, the end of the federal states did not come as a complete surprise, although many had hoped it would turn out differently. The rules of the game for implementing internal or external home rule, which had been agreed to at the RTC, offered no solution. The result was that segments of the non-Republican population in the outlying districts got the impression that both as a result of, and following the transfer of, sovereignty they had been deprived of the right to develop their own identify any further. It was therefore no wonder that these developments strengthened the feeling among many in the Netherlands that they had failed to safeguard the right to self-determination.

The state of East Indonesia that bordered on New Guinea had been the jewel in the crown of the federal experiment. It had shown itself to be the most vigorous and lively of all the states and took longer than all the others to dissolve. The disbandment of the KNIL played an important role in this. Menado and Ambon were the recruitment areas of an important part of the post-war KNIL. The commitment and dedication of these soldiers to the Dutch cause had been great, and the transition to the new order bitter and dangerous. At the RTC, Hamid had still thought that, during the transition to the new army, the KNIL would be incorporated as a whole and would be stationed in East Indonesia, but no trace of evidence can be found of this in the agreements that were made. After the transfer, several attempts were made on the Dutch side to ensure that the influx of TNI troops to East Indonesia could at least take place gradually. The Dutch high commissioner, Hirschfeld, in this respect even thought that he could count on the promises of the Indonesian minister of Defence, Sultan Hamengkubuwono IX of Yogyakarta. In practice, things turned out differently. In April 1950, some TNI troops were indeed directed to Macassar, which sparked off a great deal of tension. A rather obscure story is linked to this in which the East Indonesian Head of State, Sukawati, first opted to rely on the KNIL for support but later on, when faced with the will of Jakarta, decided to

cut his losses. The dissolution of East Indonesia became a reality on 26 April 1950 and the KNIL, which was still present there, was placed under heavy guard.[13]

Events in the capital of East Indonesia triggered a revolt in the Moluccas. Separatist movements that wanted to break with Indonesia had already been active there since 1946. Their supporters were mostly found among groups of ex-army personnel. Their organizations had only managed to carve out a modest place for themselves in the elections for the local council, but they made themselves more visible during the course of 1949. The arrival of several hundred Moluccan commandos from the KNIL, who had been sent to Ambon in anticipation of their transfer to the federal army, constituted a welcome reinforcement for the separatist groups. After the attempt at resistance was crushed in Macassar, the East Indonesian minister, Chris Soumokil, arrived there intent on action. One thing and another resulted in the proclamation of a new state, the Republik Maluku Selatan (RMS), on 24 April, that wished to find a place for itself outside the union with Indonesia. Of course, the Indonesian government was definitely not in favour of this. After a couple of failed attempts at mediating on the part of both the Dutch and the Indonesians, the military build-up in October was so far advanced that the assault could be launched. This led to a series of bloody operations with huge losses, particularly among the Indonesian troops. Towards the end of the year, the revolt was nevertheless largely suppressed. Meanwhile, the resistance dragged on for years on Ceram, where the leaders and the commandos who started it had taken refuge.

The uprising on Ambon also affected the Moluccan troops who had stayed behind in Indonesia. The unrest in Macassar lasted for several more months, in which the safety of the KNIL units that were barracked there and had not yet been transferred to the new army was a reason for the continuous skirmishes. In fact, the tension rose to such a pitch in August that Hirschfeld thought it necessary to send a battleship, which had not yet been transferred, to the town to cover an evacuation of the troops and the remaining Dutch. This violation of the sovereignty of the new state, even though it was caused by an emergency situation, was difficult for the Indonesian government to stomach. Nevertheless, the troops that had been evacuated from Macassar could be transported to Java, where they were given a temporary Dutch army status. This group of around 4,000 soldiers went on steadfastly refusing to be transferred to the federal army, which was perfectly understandable in light of the revolt that had exploded on Ambon. Taking them to Ambon was impossible at that precise moment, although even after the revolt had been suppressed they still refused to go there. Nor did they wish to be demobilized on Java. They were supported in this by the self-proclaimed Ambonese leader Aponno, who had successfully lobbied in

The Hague for the Moluccan cause and received support there from the colonial-conservative groups who set up the foundation *Door de Eeuwen Trouw*, or 'Loyal throughout the Centuries', for this purpose. Likewise, New Guinea was not considered as a destination either, because the Dutch government was reluctant to increase the tensions around that area. The end of the story is that they were brought over to the Netherlands with their families in anticipation of quieter times at the beginning of 1951. This happened after Aponno and his supporters instigated a court order in which the Dutch judge found that a demobilization on Java or Ambon was unsafe. This was completely against the wishes of the Dutch government which indeed contested the court order, but eventually respected the legal verdict. When time began to press on, an agreement was concluded between the Netherlands and Indonesia to bring them over to the Netherlands temporarily with the intention that they would be able to return at a later date. The Dutch government subsequently arranged for all of them to be placed on board ships and brought over to the Netherlands in anticipation of happier times ahead. This was the beginning of the Moluccan presence in the Netherlands, which would regularly complicate relations with Indonesia even more in the years to come.[14]

But these Ambonese were not the only group to enter the Netherlands during this period. We have already seen how the exodus of Dutch civil servants got underway during the course of 1950. The same thing happened in the other sectors. Among them there were not only people who had been born in the Netherlands, but also large numbers of Indo-Europeans who were born and bred in the Netherlands East Indies. Tens of thousands of them took on Indonesian nationality, but the vast majority of them refused to give up their state identity and with it also the possibility of falling back on the Netherlands. All this to the great displeasure of the Dutch government, which nevertheless created an apparatus to guide the relief effort along the proper channels. One important moment was the creation of the Ministry of Welfare during the new cabinet formation of 1952, which was set up specifically for this purpose. The exodus had got underway immediately in 1950. Between that year and 1957, in total, around 140,000 individuals left Indonesia. By the end of 1963, the number had increased to more than 200,000. With this, practically the entire Dutch segment of the previous 'mixed' East Indies Dutch community disappeared.

This evacuation contributed towards a change in Indonesian society which went far deeper than the number of those who had left would suggest. The question of what exactly constituted an Indonesian identity was still valid afterwards. In colonial times this was perceived to be the sum total of the entire indigenous population of the Netherlands East Indies. This profile was further refined during the struggle for independence, although not everyone played an

equal part in it. For the leaders of the new state, the existence of an Indonesian nation was an *a priori* fact. This nationality was not considered to be racial, even if Javanese dominance was a factor that was hard to overlook. Indonesian nationalism had found a strong sounding board in many parts of the archipelago, particularly in the Sumatran Minangabau, which had provided many republicans from the early days. According to the teachings of the new state, there was room for all groups within the nation. So it was, that *unity in diversity* became Indonesia's motto.

Yet it was clear that a great deal would have to be done before this would also be realized in people's hearts and minds. The unity was not yet perfect and the need to strengthen it became a powerful motive for creating a single state. This certainly applied in Sukarno's case, for whom creating and strengthening a new concept of the nation was a high priority. New Guinea played an important role in this as both a test case and a unifying force. Both during the RTC and after it, Dutch politicians had comforted themselves with the statements made by the Sumatran Hatta, for whom this distant island in the East was not so important. As we have seen, that was already the case during the constitutional meetings of the Republic in 1945, but he did not get enough support for a consensus. Sukarno, on the other hand, had made no secret of the fact that he would not countenance any form of compromise on that issue. He did this in a speech immediately after the transfer of sovereignty and elaborated upon the theme in greater detail in the address he delivered eight months later on 17 August 1950, to mark the first time the Indonesian state was able to celebrate its anniversary in freedom.[15] Both then and later, he continuously repeated that Indonesia extended from Sabang all the way to Marauke. In his opinion, the borders of the Netherlands East Indies represented the minimum girth of the Indonesian state. Whoever doubted this was potentially opening the floodgate to additional claims from the numerous communities and political entities on which the former colonial state was built. The states' right to self-determination, which the Dutch had persistently argued for, had been incorporated in the RTC agreements, but it had been formulated in such a weak way that one could get away scot-free with ignoring it. New Guinea, on the other hand, was an entirely different matter because an explicit exception had been made for it at the RTC. Nevertheless, this region had also been part of the Netherlands East Indies and therefore belonged to the Indonesian state. Yet the Dutch were still there and were not in a hurry to leave. In his speeches and presentations, Sukarno strove for national unity, but unity based on the territory of the colonial state was his prize assignment. From the moment he was appointed to his current position, he had been banging the New Guinea drum, and he would go on doing so with stubborn regularity.

For Sukarno, New Guinea was not only a test case for a feeling of national unity, it was also a means of securing power. In 1950 he started off as constitutional President, but one with great personal prestige. In the years to come he managed to strengthen his position against the wishes of the more senior politicians, especially against that of the military leadership. It was here that he encountered his most important rival, a modern trained officer called Abdul Harris Nasution. Both men represented two worlds. Nasution strove for the rationalization of the army, and with this for the modernization of the state. For him, this was the continuation of a policy that had already been set in motion in 1948 under Hatta's leadership. This was supported by the PSI, the Christian parties and large segments of the Masjumi. Resistance to this came from the countless men who were unable to forget the passion and freedom of the years of revolution. They had difficulty returning to a more ordered existence that had alarmingly little to offer them. This was not a clear-cut rift that ran through society, but it could be sensed time and time again. The Australian historian, Feith, referred to this as a difference between the administrators who were aiming for an ordered society, and those who aspired to solidarity, for whom the clarion calls of the revolution possessed magical properties that could bind the nation together and set it to work.[16] Sukarno, who had a natural flair for using rhetoric and playing upon the emotions of the masses, was the obvious candidate to take the lead.

The history of the decolonization as an international process has shown that such differences are common after a struggle for independence has come to an end. This was certainly the case with Indonesia. The country did not find the road back to order and regularity an easy one, and encountered an obstacle in the shape of Sukarno on it. He continued to cling to the rhetoric that had made him so popular, and driving the Dutch out of West Irian remained one of its main themes. This was of crucial importance, both for the consolidation of his position as well as the creation of modern-day Indonesia. A concept of a nation, encapsulated in commonly accepted symbols, is necessary for the survival of a state as a functional entity. But a thriving state also needs orderliness, professional management, and material wealth to exist. Sukarno had no interest in such matters. At the close of the first decade of independence, Sukarno's position was strong, but the country was in economic ruin.

New Guinea in cold storage

The status of West New Guinea was to come up for discussion in 1950, but for the key players on both sides the outcome was already clear. Just before the Round Table Conference, the Drees-Van Schaik Cabinet, as relayed by Van

Maarseveen, had clearly stated that holding on to New Guinea would be the objective at the negotiations. This had taken place in the discussion paper of 3 August 1949 and in the closed and open parliamentary sessions of that same month. For their part, both of the Indonesian delegations had committed themselves to a diametrically opposed point of view. The outcome was an emergency measure, recorded in the Charter of the transfer of sovereignty. In Article 1, the complete sovereignty over Indonesia was unconditionally and irreversibly transferred, while Article 2 stated that the status quo of New Guinea would be maintained with the proviso that the issue of the region's political status would be determined through mutual consultation. This was an exercise in ambiguous phrasing, because it was not completely clear whether New Guinea was excluded from the transfer of 27 December 1949 and whether the sovereignty afterwards still lay with the Netherlands. With a little bit of good will, one could derive from this that only the administration of this region was still in Dutch hands, while the matter of sovereignty had already been decided upon. At the conference, the efforts of the Dutch diplomats had been directed towards ensuring that their own interpretation was officially recorded, but they had not been successful. The best they had managed to achieve was to have a small note attached to the official papers in which both parties acknowledged that maintaining the status quo meant 'with the continuation of the authority of the Government of the Kingdom of the Netherlands'. The word 'sovereignty' had not been acceptable, despite fierce insistence on the part of the Dutch. Verbal communications from the BFO diplomat, Hamid II Alkadri had confirmed that what was meant here was in fact what the Dutch wished for, but that the way in which it was formulated had been kept deliberately vague in order not to hurt the Republicans unnecessarily. That was diplomatic rhetoric for the fact that the Indonesian side had not wished to bind itself a fraction more than necessary and wished to retain some leeway.

In turn, the Dutch government henceforth adopted the position that all this indisputably confirmed that New Guinea still remained under its sovereignty. Yet, to the irritation of Van Maarseveen, during the defence of the RTC agreements in both houses of the States General, there were influential members who expressed serious doubts about the accuracy of that interpretation. This applied in particular to the discussion in the First Chamber on 2 December 1949. The anti-revolutionary, H.J.W.A. Meyerink and the liberal A.N. Molenaar believed that both articles as well as the note that had been attached to them were worded in such a way that arguments could just as easily be derived from them for a position that was contrary to what the government wanted. The discussion was nipped in the bud by Van Maarseveen with the argument that it threatened to weaken the Netherlands' position

internationally. It was a clear indication that even the most prominent negotiator involved in the agreement was aware of its shortcomings. This becomes even clearer when we realize that the new United States of Indonesia accepted the transfer on the basis of their draft constitution, which included an article (Article 1) that stipulated that the state consisted of the whole of Indonesia, which according to the Dutch constitution, as amended in 1948, was no less than the former territory of the Netherlands East Indies.[17] This is why doubts remained on the Dutch side. Even in 1954, Governor Van Baal confided in Minister Luns that, in his opinion, the Netherlands had been wrong about the issue of sovereignty and had to rely on the quality of its administration to defend its position. This shocked the Minister, who instantly set a civil servant to work to explain that the completeness of the sovereignty that was transferred concerned its content and not its operational area. For lawyers and politicians this was, and continued to be, a bone of contention, but the Dutch position was by no means unassailable.[18]

It was with these deficient materials that one had to proceed after the transfer of sovereignty. The terms of the Dutch position in this were of course primarily a cabinet matter, but given its thorny nature Drees and his associates sought as much backing as they could from parliament. To begin with, they argued from the position that a change in New Guinea's status quo could only take place on the basis of a two-thirds majority in parliament. Given their point of departure, that was a logical position. Such a majority was necessary because the enabling act of 1948[19] had only acknowledged the authority of the government to transfer sovereignty on these terms. If one had started from the position that this had only been a transfer of government, then such a profound step would not be necessary and everything could be arranged by law, that is to say with an ordinary majority in parliament. The political preference generated its own judicial argument here. Since the government had in fact adopted the position that it still had sovereignty over New Guinea, a political reality was created that seriously restricted its freedom of movement. This line was mapped out by Drees and Van Maarseveen without any display of doubt. They initially received effective support for this from the representative of the third party in the Cabinet, the Liberal Minister Stikker. This was immediately apparent during the first Cabinet meeting of 1950, when Sukarno's cutting New Year speech had just been delivered in which he declared that New Guinea should be transferred before the end of the year and in which he had even alluded to preparations for a guerrilla war in that area. Stikker considered these statements to be totally unacceptable. He too believed that the basic premise had to be that the Netherlands would retain sovereignty for the time being.[20] This defensive attitude towards the Indonesian desiderata would only become more pronounced

during the next few months as a result of developments in Indonesia which, on the whole, were interpreted in the Netherlands as evidence of bad faith. There was little sympathy for Hatta's argument that his government could do little else than provide some guidance in processes that were difficult to control.

The irritation that had been generated by the dissolution of the federal states, together with the events on Ambon, hindered a positive disposition towards the new Union partner and reinforced the inclination to hold onto New Guinea. A certain shift in argument can be detected in both the Cabinet and parliamentary discussions. The phenomenon of Indo-colonization, which had played a role at Linggadjati and the Round Table Conference, disappeared entirely from the political agenda after the fiasco of the first colonizations in Manokwari. The economic possibilities that had attracted Van Maarseveen so much continued to hold their appeal, even if it was with some reservations. According to Stikker, the businessman, one should start off by making small investments and then waiting to see what came out of them. In the internal debates, the strategic importance of the region in possible conflicts in East Asia was referred to regularly. Yet this was never seen as a decisive argument, but rather as bait to arouse the interest of the Great Powers. These fish, however, were not biting.

After 1950, the definitive argument used by Dutch politicians to defend holding onto New Guinea was, and continued to be, the Papuan's right to self-determination. This argument commanded a great deal of respect in international circles because the right to self-determination in article 73[E] of the United Nations' charter was explicitly mentioned as the starting point for governing territories that had not yet been considered for home rule. From 1950 onwards, the Dutch government reported annually to the United Nations committee that had been set up for this purpose, about the policy it implemented on the island. In the uncertain situation in which they found themselves it was better to pull out all the stops to strengthen their own position.

Of course, the question of where the boundary lay between argument and the hidden agenda remains. Considerations such as those of prestige, coupled with resentment about how the decolonization process had progressed, played a role as we were even able to observe in the case of a rational and moderately minded man like Drees. However, this is not a conclusive explanation for the actual behaviour of the vast majority of Dutch politicians. Already during the discussion about the interpretation of the Linggadjati Agreement in November and December 1946, New Guinea had been referred to by the Cabinet and parliament as a territory that would be considered for the application of the right to autonomy over time. The main argument for this had been the Papuans' lack of maturity to make political choices. This remained the case, both then and

later. Striving for the right to self-determination was not only a useful political argument, it also addressed the more profound notion of the Netherlands' international responsibility.

As we have seen, it was not only the sovereignty over New Guinea that was only weakly realized in the RTC agreements, but also the right to self-determination by the constituent parts of Indonesia. Here too, the basic premises employed by the Dutch and the Indonesians had been diametrically opposed to each other and the outcome was hugely ambiguous. The result was that this entitlement could only be granted when Indonesia explicitly agreed to it. The Oud motion, on the basis of which the RTC agreements were accepted by the Second Chamber in December 1949, did not bring about any change at all in this. The house could emphatically insist on upholding the right to self-determination, but this could hardly be interpreted differently from what was stipulated in the text of the RTC agreements. The Dutch government did not have a leg to stand on here either and when the federal states collapsed it had to stand by powerless and watch how this right, which was so greatly cherished, went up in smoke. Knowing full well that the practical and legal possibilities were limited, on 15 May 1950, the day of the disbandment of the federation and the inauguraton of the unitary Indonesian Republic, Van Maarseveen notified the Indonesian government of the fact that the government and parliament in the Netherlands attached great importance to the principle of self-determination. To this the question was added of how that right could be realized within the framework of the unitary state.[21] In the Second Chamber, this quickly led to a motion by the Liberal leader Oud, who was of the opinion that the government had abandoned the principle. This motion was emphatically interpreted by Drees as a motion of no-confidence, which if accepted would lead to the fall of the Cabinet. The result was that Oud only received support from the opposition parties, supplemented by that of a few party members. Romme, who was anything but a friend of Van Maarseveen, actively supported the Cabinet. For the Minister, Stikker, this manoeuvre by the political leader of his own party was both an unpleasant experience and an omen.[22]

With the defeat of the Oud motion on 26 May 1950, the house acknowledged the limited power of the Dutch to impose their own ideas on Indonesia with regard to the right to self-determination. Afterwards, it became clear that in the case of the Ambonese uprising too this right offered nothing to hang onto. Attempts by the Dutch to call for intervention by the UNCI met with heavy resistance from Indonesia and so this also led to nothing. In the Netherlands, this was experienced as evidence of the deficiency of the agreements that had been made and as a failure to support its former partners in the decolonization

conflict. In parliament, most of the fireworks were set off by Oud, Welter and the ARP leader Gerbrandy, when the latter even insisted on military intervention. This was rejected by Minister van Maarseveen without much explanation. The main objection was that the Netherlands had already transferred the entire sovereignty (minus New Guinea) and that the government did not consider itself authorized to take military action.[23]

The end of the federal states and the stalemate with regard to self-determination in the case of Ambon provoked irritation in the Netherlands and reinforced the desire to keep New Guinea, where there were more opportunities. For the Papuans, practising the right to self-determination was elevated above the level that had been explicitly recorded in the RTC agreements. One could fall back on Article 2 of the Charter, which in any case gave the Netherlands enough leeway to formulate its own line of argument once again

According to the agreement, New Guinea would have to be on the agenda within the year. The designated place for this discussion was the Conference of Ministers of the Union, two of which were held in 1950: one in April and one in November. These meetings were mainly devoted to financial and economic matters and could be concluded reasonably successfully. What was important was that, in April, the Netherlands committed itself to Indonesia once again with a substantial loan of 280 million guilders that had been lent on lenient terms and conditions. In addition to this, all kinds of ongoing affairs were discussed, including the setting up of a Dutch military mission, which would make a significant contribution towards training the Indonesian military over the next few years. To avoid ruining the atmosphere, it was agreed on this occasion that a separate conference would be held about New Guinea.[24]

The preamble to this New Guinea Conference swallowed up practically the whole of 1950. A joint committee was set up to take care of all the preliminary preparations. The Dutch selected a number of civil servants with an academic background, in which Van Baal acted as Secretary. Indonesia, for its part, involved politicians and had the Greater Indonesia ideologue, Mohammad Yamin, at the vanguard. Another prominent member was the Ambonese physician, Latuharhary, who as a politician had a long record of service in the Indonesian national movement and could act as a representative of the East Indonesian people. During the months of May and June, the committee paid a visit to New Guinea. This trip must have given the members the impression that most Papuans were not keen to be joined with Indonesia. Without any doubt, this was encouraged by the local Dutch administration, but anyone examining the detailed reports would find it hard to escape the impression that this was reality. Yamin did, however, receive support from several leading

figures of the disbanded pro-Indonesian groups on Serui and elsewhere, the PIM, the Pidros and the PKII, which in their own words had each numbered several hundred members in their heyday but, other than that, did not manage to get a firm foothold. Within the committee, the members did not behave like a team seeking consensus. The Dutch experts emphasized the special nature of New Guinea compared to Indonesia from a cultural, biological, linguistic, geographical and historical perspective. Yamin for his part left no stone unturned to show that the island had had close links with Java since the days of Modjopahit. The result was therefore not a joint report, but a number of documents that were related exclusively by the fact that they were distributed in a single, sturdy cardboard box. With this, the committee did not make any contribution towards solving the dispute which had arisen.[25]

While the experts were at work, the politicians from both parties jumped the gun as far as the results were concerned. Sukarno continued to follow the course he had set himself on 1 January 1950 and mentioned New Guinea whenever it was fortuitous. He would continue to do this in the years to come. The highlights continued to be the speeches that were delivered on the anniversary of the proclamation of Independence (17 August) and the Day of the Armed Forces (10 November). In 1950 on Independence Day, he declared that a huge battle would ensue if Irian were not returned to Indonesia that very same year. The threat of violence was clearly articulated here and some of the preparations in Indonesia pointed in the same direction. On the Dutch side, the first shot was fired by Van Maarseveen during the discussion of Oud's motion of no-confidence on 26 May. As already demonstrated, he had to reject the motion relating to the federal states' right to self-determination, but he had also pointed out that New Guinea offered him the opportunity to stick to his guns. He added a double-edged promise with it. The first was that the government would remain 'immovable' on its position that New Guinea should continue to be under Dutch authority even after the status quo year had ended. Actually, this was a new factor, because the minister in his defence of the RTC agreements before parliament in December 1949 had only presented the interpretation that was favourable for the Netherlands, without drawing specific conclusions for an ensuing policy. His words came as an unpleasant shock to the Socialists and Catholics who had been hoping for a modicum of flexibility. The same thing applied to his second statement, namely that the government would give the Second Chamber the opportunity to express its opinion before entering into negotiations with Indonesia. He repeated these statements a little while later in the First Chamber. In combination with the pledge that had been made earlier about the need to have a two-thirds majority in the case of transferring sovereignty, the government had completely tied itself to parliament.[26]

At the end of September 1950, New Guinea came up for discussion in parliament once again as a result of the publication of the report from the joint committee and the approaching New Guinea conference. This occurred in three meetings of the Second and First Chamber, respectively on 28–29 September and 12 October. These took place behind closed doors to promote a candid and uninhibited exchange of opinions. It did not help to generate any new insights. The upshot was that all the parties more or less consented to endorse the earlier statements of Minister van Maarseveen. The parties on the right, especially the ARP, now gave the full weight of their support to the government. Only the representatives of the PvdA appeared to have reservations about the government's bold language. In this respect, both Van der Goes van Naters and ex-Minister Jonkman wondered whether the Netherlands would in fact receive sufficient international support for such a policy. Schermerhorn, at any rate, urged for reasonable suggestions on the part of Indonesia to be taken seriously. After a few reassuring explanations from behind the Cabinet table, the government obtained parliament's unanimous blessing. With this, the essentials of Dutch policy for the next few years had been determined.[27]

Outrage at developments in Indonesia provided a factual explanation for this consensus in parliament. Yet one should ask oneself to what extent this was also the result of deliberate manipulation on the part of the government. Within the PvdA, and therefore also within the Cabinet, opinions were divided. In the Cabinet there was an obvious awareness that enthusiasm in the Netherlands for New Guinea was quickly cooling off now that people began to realize what a burden this would bring for the future, while for the time being there was very little return from a business perspective. This, amongst others, formed part of the conclusion of a report about public opinion in the Netherlands that was personally authorized to be sent to members of the Cabinet by the Director of the Dutch Central Intelligence Service, T. Einthoven.[28] The reservations it generated were sometimes unreservedly brought forward at the Cabinet meetings during the course of these next few months. This was illustrated by the Ministers Joekes and Lieftinck when they expressed serious doubts about a comment from Drees, that young people in the Netherlands would be opposed to the transfer of sovereignty there. In their opinion, there were no grounds whatsoever for this viewpoint, to which Lieftinck added a sneering remark that the construction of the Moerdijk canal would provoke stronger reactions from the younger generation than any decision that was made concerning New Guinea. Alongside doubts about the wisdom of the policy, anxiety about the high public and military expenditure also played a role for Lieftinck.

In reaction to this, we can see attempts made by Drees and Van Maarseveen to strengthen support for the course that had been determined. On a number of

occasions prior to the parliamentary debate in September, Van Maarseveen tested the water with the Protestant parties, who now detected the government's resolve in the New Guinea affair which they had sorely missed in the case of Ambon. Any extra credit that could be gained with parliament was always welcome. In addition, it was best not to disturb those who already had their doubts any further and sometimes the government could provide a helping hand with this. One interesting example of this is the Cabinet discussion about the dissemination of a memorandum written on 19 July 1950 by High Commissioner Hirschfeld in which he strongly urged for a bargain to be struck with Indonesia as far as New Guinea was concerned in order not to jeopardize major Dutch interests in Indonesia.[29] The High Commissioner obtained support for this from the Dutch-language press in Indonesia which still wielded influence, but which felt threatened by Van Maarseveen's robust language and the Indonesian reactions that followed. Hirschfeld was convinced that the Netherlands still had promising opportunities in Indonesia, and that this should not be squandered now on a futile adventure with New Guinea. It was a well-reasoned and therefore dangerous argument for those who were still undecided. At the insistence of Drees in particular, the Cabinet therefore decided not to submit the document to parliament. Following a discussion with Romme, chairman of the Parliamentary Standing Committee for Affairs of the Netherlands-Indonesian Union, it was subsequently decided that parts of it could be written down in a government document that would then be presented to the committee members only.

This is exactly what happened. The importance of the operation became clear when, after the parliamentary session ended, it was noted that parliamentary opinion was no longer strongly in favour of retaining New Guinea, and that the government's policy line could only be retained because Members of Parliament simply did not have access to the same information as the government. Withholding information from parliament was in this case an essential element of the tactic used by the Cabinet. One has to conclude that Van Maarseveen and Drees had deliberately wanted both houses to take a strong stand and had had a hand in achieving this. Under these circumstances, it is not necessary to elaborate upon the fact that Drees was not at all pleased with Einthoven's initiative to send his memorandum about public opinion directly to the Cabinet members without discussing this beforehand. The Chief of Intelligence received a stiff dressing down. Fortunately for the Prime Minister, those ministers who did have reservations allowed themselves to be convinced by the argument that the Cabinet had publicly committed itself and could not do anything else.[30]

A nagging doubt remained, however. In November 1950, with the New Guinea Conference looming on the horizon, the voices emanating from the

business community in Indonesia that urged for greater indulgence were louder than before. Stikker too, who up until then had given his complete support to the line followed by Van Maarseveen-Drees, began to show signs of having doubts. This also preyed on the conscience of the vice premier, the Catholic J.R.H. van Schaik, who commented in the tranquillity of the Trèves Hall that it would, at any rate, be incorrect to assume that parliament, when all was said and done, would oppose a transfer of New Guinea to Indonesia. In his opinion, parliament's dismissive attitude could be primarily attributed to the fact that it was less informed than the government, so that a well-documented argument from that side would definitely make an impression and have an impact. The same position was also defended by Joekes. What is remarkable is that Drees never challenged the truth of this, but limited himself to remarking that the government could no longer deviate from the course that had been set. The value of these observations on the position of parliament was recognized implicitly by Van Maarseveen when he threatened to step down if the discussions were to continue in that direction. That was an effective argument for Drees. 'New Guinea' was not worth a cabinet crisis that would endanger his Socialist-Catholic coalition.

However, the VVD Minister, Stikker, in turn began to play a public cat-and-mouse game with the idea of stepping down, without actually turning his words into deeds. He was also in an awkward position. If he showed his hand it would trigger a serious crisis within both the Cabinet and his own party, through which he would have little to win in either case. This sequence of events allowed for only one conclusion: Van Maarseveen and Drees remained completely behind the policy that was outlined prior to the RTC and managed to impose their will on those who still had doubts, such as the Labour ministers Lieftinck and Joekes in particular and eventually Stikker too. The position adopted by Van Schaik also shows that it was brewing in the KVP as well. Going from the adage that it was impossible to alter the course that had been set, Drees and Van Maarseveen personally created a position of parliamentary pressure, which they used later on to hide behind. Practical objections were dismissed out of hand. They put forward the suggestion that there was no need to think that things would necessarily turn out badly and that it was highly probable that Indonesia did not wish to be in a state of conflict with the Netherlands. 'We just have to wait and see which way it goes', as Drees remarked on the eve of the New Guinea Conference.[31]

Meanwhile, the date for the opening of the New Guinea Conference had been fixed for 7 December 1950. The Dutch delegation was led by Van Maarseveen. As an aid to the negotiations, a memorandum had been prepared by N. Blom,

an official from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which summed up no less than ten possible solutions.[32] These covered the whole spectrum of choices between transferring and holding onto sovereignty, with or without some form or another of joint or international supervision or rule. From the exchange of ideas within the Dutch Cabinet it had already become clear that only a very small number of them would be considered for discussion.

Given the diverse points of view of both parties, it should come as no surprise that the conference proved to be an uphill struggle. The activities during the sessions did not get any further than delivering a few speeches and exchanging some memoranda, while the real work had to be done in the corridors. One aspect that was particularly significant for the course events would take was that on 4 December, shortly after the Indonesian delegation had arrived in the Netherlands, Drees was visited by his fellow party member Van Randwijk[33] who was able to inform him of the plans that the Indonesians had brought with them, with the wish for the transfer of sovereignty at the top of the list. On top of this, he received a letter from the chair of the faction of his political party in parliament, Van der Goes van Naters, which indicated that the majority of the party was prepared to support this, subject to certain conditions. Drees instantly dug his heals in, but the event made it clear that, one way or another, he would have to contend with strong internal opposition. When Drees went on to bring the issue up for discussion in the Cabinet it can be concluded that the Dutch negotiators were already fully aware of Indonesia's plans before the actual negotiations had even begun.

The first substantial step was a brave speech by the Chair of the Indonesian delegation, Mohamad Rum, at the opening ceremony of the conference on 7 December. He had been the first Indonesian High Commissioner in The Hague and now served as Minister of Foreign Affairs of the unitary state of Indonesia. He was optimistic. If a solution could be found for the dispute about New Guinea then all the major differences of the RTC would be solved, through which the conditions would be created for better and more constructive cooperation. As Van Randwijk had explained already, the proposal he put forward was based on a transfer of sovereignty to Indonesia in which opportunities would be created for the Netherlands to participate in the social and cultural development of New Guinea. In a separate document, these were further elaborated upon in seven separate items. They included, among other things, guarantees for the continuation of the work of the Catholic and Protestant missions on New Guinea and free access for Dutch citizens and capital to the territory.

The leader of the Dutch delegation, Van Maarseveen, who already knew what was brewing instantly opposed the first part of the proposal, pointing out that since the days of Linggadjati, the Netherlands had persistently and

emphatically taken the position that New Guinea should not be included in the transfer of sovereignty to Indonesia. Cooperation, however, was most definitely something that could be discussed.[34] In fact, this lay at the heart of the Dutch counterbid which was placed on the table on 14 December. Sovereignty and the practical day-to-day administration would remain in Dutch hands but, for the rest, Indonesia would get the opportunity to spread its language and culture, while a period of free advice would precede the practice of the right to self-determination. In addition, the proposal contained plans for the creation of a jointly assembled New Guinea board that would supervise the Dutch administration. To dispel the concern expressed earlier by Indonesia, namely that Dutch New Guinea would constitute a threat to Indonesia's weak eastern flank, the Netherlands government now declared that it would no longer allow any anti-Indonesian Indonesians to enter, at which the members of the RMS in particular sprang to mind. The practice of the right to self-determination would be restricted to the Papuans.

Both proposals contained an opening for practical cooperation, but the emphasis on both sides was on maintaining their own original position. Nevertheless, this was not the whole story. During a subsequent discussion on 12 December, Van Maarseveen explained that Rum's proposal, quite apart from the principle objections, had also come at an exceptionally unfortunate time given the current disorder in Indonesia where the, until recently, well-governed state of East Indonesia in particular had been plunged into absolute mayhem. He went on to declare bluntly that the threats that Dutch people living in Indonesia were currently exposed to as a result of the dispute about New Guinea did not encourage his government to make concessions either. Such threats would be repeated on every possible occasion, so that the Netherlands would remain permanently open to blackmail. If Indonesia did decide to follow this path after all, stated Van Maarseveen, then it would not be at all worthwhile for the Netherlands, 'to make concessions that would delay this development only temporarily at the very most.' This was a clear response to the argument that was put forward by Indonesia, then and later, that the Netherlands ought to humour the proposal of well-meaning Indonesians, in order to avoid accelerating the process of radicalization that was already going on in their country. Rum did not respond to this but aimed his arrows at the Dutch interest in the right to self-determination. He was clear and to-the-point about this: this right was only recognized for the entire Indonesian population and not for its separate components, even if it was only because it was impossible to establish the criteria that had to be met before the people of New Guinea would be mature enough for self-determination.

These candid words were not the end of the debate. It was also hard for the Dutch Cabinet to leave it at this, in light of the pressures they also experienced

internally and the opposition within the Labour Party. The exchange of views continued the next day in a private discussion between Rum and Van Maarseveen, in which both showed each other a little more of what they each had up their sleeve in the strictest confidence. According to Van Maarseveen's account, it transpired that Rum was personally in favour of a solution that had been previously discussed within the Dutch delegation, in which the sovereignty over the contested area would rest with both the Netherlands and Indonesia, but the actual administration, including the police and military forces, would be allocated to the Netherlands. This could then be under the supervision of the joint New Guinea board that had been announced in the Dutch proposal. Van Maarseveen indicated that such a proposal did have a chance of succeeding in the Dutch parliament, as long as it was proposed by Indonesia.[35] On 14 December, the discussion was continued on the sidelines in which Joekes and Leimena were also involved. In addition, Van Maarseveen now suggested that the already operative system of Conferences of the Ministers of the Union could also be used to supervise the activities of the Dutch administration.[36] From the subsequent course of events, one can tell that Rum did not succeed in persuading his delegation instantly to discuss this furtive proposal about a shared sovereignty. With this, the discussion was closed. To sum up, the first part of the conference ended with the Indonesian demand for a transfer of sovereignty and the presentation of the formal Dutch proposal of an undivided sovereignty residing with the Netherlands, but with the administration under the supervision of a jointly assembled New Guinea board. Rum left afterwards on 18 December for Jakarta to discuss the formal proposal as well as the suggestions that had been made in private by Van Maarseveen.

In the Netherlands, the presentation of the main proposal and the contingency plan that involved shared sovereignty was accompanied by fiery discussions in the Cabinet, in which the Standing Committees for Affairs of the Union of the First and Second Chamber were regularly involved. Here, the discrepancies within the Cabinet and parliamentary factions clearly revealed themselves. The PvdA Minsters Lieftinck and Joekes were prepared to go to great lengths to rid themselves of the problem. They even seriously considered the possibility of a complete transfer of sovereignty to Indonesia under certain conditions, as had been requested by the chairman of their parliamentary party. When suggestions of this kind were rejected out of hand by Drees, Lieftinck came up with the idea of declaring instant sovereignty for New Guinea, which would be linked to a protectorate treaty in which there would be a role for Indonesia as well. This clever alternative was also brushed aside instantly by the Prime Minister with the comment that talking to the Indonesians was so difficult

because they immediately brought everything out into the open. It was an expression of irritation that was justified by a multitude of facts, but one that also betrayed the underlying attitude of the Prime Minister. After the experiences of the previous year Indonesia had become, in his eyes, once again an unreliable negotiating partner whose credit had become so stretched that one would not add a single penny more to it.[37]

Others shared this view, and with his theory of the promises made to parliament, he managed to keep his own people, both inside and outside the Cabinet, under control. Things did not work out this way for Minister Stikker, who had a strong personal preference for a compromise but realized that he would not be given any room for this from the parliamentarians of his own party who were led by Oud. In these December days, he toyed with the idea of wangling a postponement in order to get away in one piece with passing the fateful date of 27 December 1950. Suggestions along these lines had been made during the last few months by the Netherlands embassies in London and Washington, while from Indonesia it was reported that important politicians such as Prime Minister Djuanda, Rum and Hatta had quite liked the idea. He received no support at all for this idea in the Dutch Cabinet. Both the supporters and opponents of a hard line policy wanted the affair to be dealt with once and for all.[38]

So much for the the internal debate in the Netherlands. For those who still held out hope for some form of compromise, Rum's return on 23 December was the beginning of an anticlimax. In Jakarta he had made no headway at all regarding a compromise. To the relief of many people in the Netherlands, he had a counterclaim with him that constituted a rejection of the formal position adopted by the Dutch. He was only empowered to discuss the set-up of a conference in preparation for the transfer of sovereignty in mid-1951. Sukarno had postponed the deadline that had been agreed for this by six months, which was quite a concession from his side. As was to be expected, this proposal was completely unacceptable to the Dutch Cabinet, but it did not want to let negotiations slip from its fingers without a further effort. Indeed, just as it looked as if the conference was going to fail, it decided to present the contingency plan which consisted of the shared sovereignty that had been discussed earlier with Rum, but in a form in which supervision of the administration could be assigned to the Union. A further suggestion was to call on assistance from the UNCI or another international intermediary. To gain more backing, these suggestions had first been presented to the Parliamentary Standing Committee for Affairs of the Union, whose members sacrificed their Boxing Day to discuss it. There, the first proposal seemed to be acceptable to the PvdA and KVP representatives alike, but the second met with serious doubts from the latter. They were afraid, as a result of earlier experiences, that this would inevitably lead to

the transfer of complete sovereignty. All of this created an even bigger wasp's nest for Minister Stikker. Although these contingency plans were certainly acceptable to him, he could be sure that the most important man in his party, Oud, would never permit this. This is why he advocated an immediate recess of the Cabinet at the session that was held later that day. That would secure the postponement he desired, so that there would be time to safely pass the date of 27 December. A second, and certainly just as important, advantage was that the next cabinet would not be bound to the pledges that had been made to parliament and would therefore have a free hand to take far-reaching decisions. When it became apparent that his fellow-ministers were not at all keen on this and were speculating about continuing to govern without the VVD, he finally agreed to the half-baked compromise whereby Van Maarseveen would present his complete proposal to the Indonesian delegation, but that Stikker would not be present at this and would delay his request to resign for one more day.[39]

It turned out to be a superfluous exercise. The proposal for sovereignty to be transferred to the Union was dismissed out of hand by the Indonesian delegation, while it did not consider itself authorized to call in the UNCI. During the closing session on 27 December 1950, Rum gave a more detailed explanation of the Indonesian position. The transfer of sovereignty to the Union would place Indonesia on an equal footing with the Netherlands, through which both would end up in a colonial relationship with the area. An elaborate argument, in which the underlying motive was without question that in the structure of the Union, where all parts were equal, and with it the actual administration remaining in Dutch hands, Indonesia would not have an overruling voice under the proposed organizational set-up. It is debatable whether this would have turned out to be the case in practice because Indonesia would certainly have had a firm premise for expanding its claims even further. That applied even more to the idea of an international committee. However, the political relations in Indonesia did not allow any compromise. Sukarno at any rate was not prepared to do this. After stating that there were possibly no grounds available for this proposal in the RTC agreements, Rum finally placed the deciding argument on the table, that the conference must be terminated because Sukarno had announced in his speech of 17 August that after the year 1950 came to an end, none of the parties would be bound to the special position of West Irian that had been created during the RTC. The conference ended with Rum's speech which stated that Indonesia had taken the position that New Guinea formed part of Indonesia's territory, so that the continuation of the status quo (continued Dutch rule) was now taking place without its endorsement.[40]

The Netherlands, for its part, maintained the proposal for further negotiations under international supervision. This route was closed off by Prime

Minister Natsir in a statement he made to the Indonesian parliament on 3 January 1951. Indonesia did not want any negotiations other than one based on the transfer of sovereignty, not even if these were to be attended by a third party. On top of this, he confirmed the statement made by Rum that the right to self-determination was not of special relevance to the Papuans, because that right had already been enforced for them together with the rest of Indonesia, that is to say on 17 August 1945. It was an uncompromising position that would make fruitful discussions impossible during the next decade. Yet, it is worthwhile to establish here that there was still some inconsistency in the Indonesian position. Where on the one hand both Rum and Natsir had adopted the position that New Guinea belonged to the territory of Indonesia, which could not really mean anything else other than that Indonesia had sovereign rights there, Natsir was still asking for further negotiations based on the transfer of that same sovereignty. The answer to this was given by Rum in a discussion that took place in early January in Jakarta with the newly arrived Dutch High Commissioner A.Th. Lamping. Rum indicated that the Republic felt insecure on this point, and did not want to run the risk of having to comply with the binding decisions of any international authority. At least there was something left to discuss in the future, but it was cold comfort for those who had hoped for some workable solution from this long-awaited conference.[41] To all intents and purposes it had been a failure.

It was certainly experienced as such by the Indonesian negotiator Rum. In his conversations with Lamping after his return to Jakarta he also made it clear that after he had left The Hague on 17 December, he had expected that during his interim stay in Indonesia the Dutch position would change and new possibilities would open up. Here he had evidently been speculating about a possible split in the Cabinet. Initially, he had still been hopeful that the profitable relationship between Indonesia and the Netherlands would continue. Now that this was not the case, he had to conclude that the relations between both countries had reached a point where the paths would continue to diverge from each other.[42]

The latter proved to be prophetic and in many respects it cannot be denied that Rum possessed an acute political awareness. His assessment of Dutch political realities was not unrealistic either, but based upon an overestimation of what both Van der Goes van Naters and Stikker were able to bring about. Without a conciliatory attitude from Indonesia, even they could not achieve anything. The Dutch Cabinet had sailed very close to the wind with the two last proposals. It had gone much further with this than it believed was feasible on the grounds of the Boxing Day discussion in the Standing Committee for Affairs of

the Union. Certainly, after Indonesia rejected both proposals the government could not bank on its actions being welcomed by parliament, which had been misled by the government. The latter certainly now had something to explain in parliament.

Between 18 and 24 January, the Second Chamber met to review past events. Here, not only the Government, but the Labour Party MPs too found themselves in an awkward position. The latter was due to the fact that the party chair, Van der Goes van Naters, not only defended the actions of the Cabinet, but openly went one important step further. As soon as Natsir's statement had become known on 3 January he had organized a press conference in which he made his earlier gesture of 4 December publicly known, through which the Labour Party in parliament had informed the Prime Minister, before the negotiations had even begun, that a solution was only possible based on a transfer of sovereignty in which a share in the administration was retained.[43] He now maintained this position in parliament, which implied that he was also prepared to make a compromise on the issue of the right to self-determination. With this, he did not adopt an isolated position in the party, because even Drees had let it be known in the Cabinet in the last few days that he wanted to be free of New Guinea, as long as this could be handled decently, and that he considered the emphasis on the principle of the right to self-determination exaggerated. He could say this with impunity in the Cabinet. This did not apply to Van der Goes who pontificated about it in the newspaper and openly in parliament. He received a torrent of flak from his entire party, which refused to negotiate on the terms dictated by Natsir and Van der Goes. For the latter, this was a good reason to stand down as chair of a parliamentary party that confined itself henceforth to defending Cabinet policy.

With this, they went a step further than Romme, who stuck to his position of 26 December and admittedly accepted the proposal regarding the Union on behalf of the KVP, but rejected intervention by the UNCI. In addition to this, he turned against Natsir with the argument that Dutch responsibility was not compatible with the transfer of New Guinea to Indonesia. He wanted to ensure that sovereignty, when the time came, would be transferred to the Papuans. Van Maarseveen defended the policy that had been followed and regretted the fact that the issue had become so disproportionately inflated at the emotional level. The correctness of this was demonstrated by the actions of the VVD and the ARP, supported by individual members of the CHU and the KVP. Here, developments had been followed with increasing exasperation. A clear statement that the Dutch position with regard to keeping New Guinea had been established beyond dispute would have been helpful. All this led to tearful appeals about the lost empires, in which little old ladies were quoted as being

overjoyed that at least New Guinea had been kept for the Netherlands. And now that spineless government had shown that it wanted to give even more away. In order to pin the government even further down to the position he required them to be in, Tilanus put forward a motion in which he asked the House to adhere to the following:

- that New Guinea is not part of Indonesia.
- that Indonesia can make no legitimate practical or moral claim to New Guinea.
- that the sovereignty over New Guinea belongs to the Netherlands and should remain so, until the population of that region at a time when it is capable of exercising the right to self-determination will be able to decide itself on its political status.
- that, in that case, the sovereignty over New Guinea will depend upon the outcome of a public referendum that will be held in the event of this.

This motion received just under one third of the votes and was therefore easily rejected. Nevertheless, this fact indicated that the Cabinet's room for manoeuvring in the future was limited since this voters' bloc would be able to block almost every future proposal. In addition to this, Oud also sprang into action with a motion in which parliament was asked to express its disappointment at the fact that the government had relinquished the position it had stated earlier without any prior discussion. This motion was also thrown out, but the VVD parliamentarians gave it their unanimous blessing. The rift between the Minister and his party was obvious with this. Stikker could do little else than acknowledge that he no longer had the support of his party and had to step down. This announcement also gave the remaining ministers cause to throw in the towel. The Drees-Van Schaik Cabinet had fallen on the New Guinea issue, even though the parliamentary historian Maas rightly indicates that this was only one in a whole series of differences which had emerged with the passage of time in the relationship with the liberals.

The Cabinet crisis took place on 24 January and lasted until 17 March when a new Drees Cabinet with more or less the same composition was formed. The most notable difference was that Van Maarseveen returned to the Ministry of the Interior and his fellow party member L.A.H. Peters became responsible for Affairs of the Union and Overseas Territories of the Kingdom. With regard to New Guinea, this was expressed in the form of a statement that went a long way towards doing justice to the wishes articulated by Tilanus and Oud. The essence of this was that in the eyes of the States General no discussion with Indonesia

was possible on the basis of the transfer of sovereignty requested by Natsir. No cabinet would therefore be able to do anything other than adopt a waiting position and keep a close eye on developments. Should the Cabinet, as a result of altered circumstances, wish to bring about a change in the status of New Guinea, then it would 'in light of the unique significance that this issue apparently has for the people's representatives, have to enable parliament to make its opinion on this known in advance.' This statement confirmed the policy that had been followed up until this point, in which the government hid behind parliament in advance. In addition to this, the statement about 'the unique significance' of New Guinea was not devoid of cynicism for parliament. Like Pontius Pilate, the Cabinet washed its hands of any guilt. Using the metaphor of those times, New Guinea was 'put into cold storage' because the government declared itself powerless to pick up the broken thread of the negotiations at the point where it had been left hanging, namely with Van Maarseveen's offer of 26 December 1950, without a drastic shift in party relations. This Dutch perspective represented the counterpart of the policy proclaimed by Natsir. Back and forth, all flexibility vanished from the negotiating positions. Both camps were clinging to opposite perspectives which had been embedded in the texts of the Round Table Conference in ambiguous terms, but were now publicly and pointedly formulated.

For Stikker, the outcome of this crisis was the exact opposite of what he had anticipated. In December, he had wanted to create space by means of a crisis for a government that could act with a broader mandate. Because the chance of this happening was very slim, he had allowed himself to be persuaded by his colleagues to adopt the rather ignoble ploy of staying away during the transfer of a proposal that he supported, but which he could not justify to his supporters. The crisis of 24 January had become almost inevitable because of this and his return in the second Drees Cabinet can only be explained by his personal ambitions and the importance he placed on other aspects of foreign policy. Right up until the end of his term of office as Minister in September 1952, he left the New Guinea policy predominantly to his fellow colleague for Affairs of the Union and Overseas Territories, L.A.H. Peters and to the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, N. Blom.[44]

Looking back at the trajectory of the New Guinea Conference, it can be summed up as follows. Initially, the Drees-Van Schaik Cabinet adhered outwardly to the firm line that had been followed since the beginning of the Round Table Conference, thereby ignoring the fact that the Netherlands did not succeed in recording its viewpoint indisputably in the agreements that were made there.

Under external and internal pressure, this firm line was temporarily breached during the New Guinea Conference with the covert proposal to transfer sovereignty to the Union and, if necessary, to enter into further talks under the supervision of the UNCI. The opportunity for a breakthrough which this provided in fact ran aground due to Indonesia's refusal to join in the quest for an interim solution. When that became clear, the Cabinet had the rule book thrown at it by parliament in no uncertain terms and a route back to the original path had to be traced. With the government announcement of March 1951, the Netherlands was once again back at the point at which it had stood one year beforehand with Van Maarseveen's statement, in which the government had made known its intention to develop New Guinea according to its own ideas. The key to deviating from this line fell into the hands of parliament in the form of the 'cold storage formula'.

This policy was continued by the consecutive Drees Cabinets. The Prime Minister enjoyed the comfortable position of being able to reject every suggestion for change by referring to relations in parliament. Yet the government also had its own obligations. Had it acted with more insight regarding the statement of March 1951, it would never have issued it in the first place. One must conclude that this complied with its own wishes, but that it was keen to share explicit responsibility for it with parliament. This position cannot be dissociated from his own vacillations. Although there were calls for another policy from all the major parties, especially the Labour Party, Drees did not respond to this, despite the fact that he also expressed his own reservations in private about the wisdom of the policy that was being followed.

These doubts explain the temporary deviation from the Cabinet's position during the New Guinea Conference. Afterwards, the possibility of an interim solution had vanished. The dogmatic Indonesian position was certainly also to blame for this. If the Indonesian Cabinet had responded to some form of joint administration on New Guinea, this would have left the path wide open for further Indonesian interference with developments on that island. In light of the findings of the deliberations in the Parliamentary Standing Committee for Affairs of the Union it is also likely that the Dutch Cabinet would have obtained a standard majority for this in parliament. Additional negotiations, based on the transfer of sovereignty, as desired by Natsir and which Van der Goes was prepared to accept, however, went a step too far. In order to retain the support of parliament under these conditions, a price had to be paid in the form of falling back upon the original premise.

The inability to do business with Indonesia was a constant factor throughout. There was a complete lack of trust across the board and this manifested itself most acutely at the point where the highest principles were at stake. The

Papuans were now becoming increasingly caught in the clutches of higher principles. For the time being, they would benefit from them considerably.

The Supomo mission

After 1951, relations between the Netherlands and Indonesia entered a new phase. The hurdle of the status quo period had been surpassed, but with the result that New Guinea had only now become a matter of real conflict. The Indonesian blockade against New Guinea which immediately followed this did not bring anything new and the Dutch administration on the island was increasingly able to cope with the resulting problems. The country continued to develop separately from Indonesia through a special umbilical cord that linked it directly with the Department of Overseas Territories in The Hague. The available budget rose steadily and work was methodically carried out on building a new infrastructure. The military threat from Indonesia did not have to be taken seriously for the time being. A systematic public information campaign directed towards the Netherlands kindled the interest of the population in this late-colonial project, and a NIPO survey in the mid-1950s revealed that 57% of those interviewed supported a continuation of the Dutch administration there.[45] In Indonesia, the exodus of the Dutch was well underway. The ships departed, stuffed to the gunnels with people for whom the old Netherlands East Indies was a thing of the past. Nevertheless, a stream of travellers was also observed heading in the opposite direction.

The Dutch business community in Indonesia had survived the shock of the transfer of sovereignty and was enjoying prosperous times. These continued until 1956, and in many sectors the turnover and profits were actually higher than before the war. Yet, relatively speaking, the importance of this for the Dutch economy decreased due to the remarkable growth in other sectors. In the Netherlands, trade and industry flourished. This development could already be discerned in 1948 but it gathered momentum in the years that followed. The main reason for this was the change in America's occupation policy with respect to West Germany. Since then, the road had been cleared for a German reconstruction to keep the country outside the influence of the Soviet Union. It had an immediate effect upon the Netherlands, which saw a speedy revival of its economy as well. The importance of Indonesia in the national income declined from an estimated 14% in the pre-war years to a modest 3% at the end of this period.[46]

The result of this was that the Dutch policymakers realized that they were less dependent on developments in Indonesia. It made them less susceptible to the prospect of being blackmailed by reprisals from that side. Moreover, the new

European politics that had been set in motion with the establishment of the West European Union and the European Community for Coal and Steel stimulated the imagination. In addition, the deepening of the cold war with the Soviet Union reinforced the importance of the North Atlantic Treaty Alliance and with it the bond with the United States of America. The pre-war policy of neutrality, which after 1945 had been continued up to a certain level in the policy towards Indonesia, had been almost completely abandoned now. All of this combined caused a shift in focus for the Dutch economy and foreign policy. The Netherlands became more European and Atlantic. That is not to say that the ties with Indonesia and the maritime orientation associated with this were simply abandoned, but their reduced importance did eventually come to be reflected in the policy that was implemented in practice.

In Indonesia a process of radicalization, which had already been set in motion in 1950, was taking place in internal politics. It reflected itself in the rapid succession of different cabinets. The political parties were divided according to religion, socio-economic principles, and their level of radicalism with respect to the transformation of relations within society. Resistance to the remnants of the colonial structure was the driving force behind this. In this respect, the parties governed by religious considerations represented the conservative element as a rule. These were the Masjumi and the Nahdatul Ulama (NU) which broke away from them in 1952. The former was the party of the more modern-minded Muslims who were mainly found in the larger cities and the outlying districts. The NU attracted its supporter base from the traditional spiritual leaders (*ulamas*) and their followers in Middle and East Java. Both of the Christian parties were more strongly represented in the outlying districts, although they also had important centres on Java. From a policy perspective, these parties could often be found in the same niche as the PSI, the moderate socialist party styled along modern Western lines in which Sutan Sjahrir still played an important role. A more radical policy was pursued by the much larger PNI. At the top of this party there were many intellectuals who had been groomed in the modern-day West, but often they had become stuck in the radicalism of their youth, in which fighting against colonial domination had been the main priority. Now that independence had been achieved they found it hard to distance themselves from this bone of contention. The relics of the colonial era were visible everywhere in the continued presence of a large Dutch group, their dominant position in the economy and, last but not least, in the continuation of Dutch rule over New Guinea. President Sukarno, despite being a constitutional President who stood above the parties, was one of them.

In their resistance to the remaining Dutch influences, Sukarno and his colleagues were supported and cheered along by many of the more radical factions, which had their roots in the broad underbelly of society for whom the years of war and Revolution had only served to further undermine their precarious existence. Here we find the Muslim PSII and the different more or less communist factions, the most important of which was the PKI. Although it had been muzzled for a while following the Madiun affair, it managed to successfully climb back up again. The communists could make use of the national proletariat's desire for land reform here. This was initially directed towards the areas of land that had been reserved under the colonial regime for Dutch enterprises, but soon focused on that of the more wealthy farmers too who were, as far as Java is concerned, represented mainly in the NU. The PKI also had a lot of influence within the trade unions, most of which were represented in the umbrella organization known as the SOBSI.

As a rule, these parties and unions displayed very little organizational or ideological coherence. At the upper level the leaders, more often than not based in Jakarta, knew how to form a united front, but they only gave a limited amount of leadership to the organizations underneath them. These were splintered in most cases, with the actual power residing in the hands of local big shots and small bosses (called *bapak* or father) who managed to secure the loyalty of their followers by granting them favours. This 'bapakism' manifested itself in the form of an idealized leadership, often with some surprisingly practical aspects. This phenomenon was particularly evident in the armed forces, which had emerged during the Revolution from spontaneous amalgamations of groups of youths around people who had natural leadership qualities. There was a reaction against this from a small group of officers, who often had a KNIL background. They were striving to have the armed forces reformed, whereby the loosely organized mass army of the revolt would be reduced in size and transformed into a modern, effective and not too large armed force. This aspiration for 'rationalization' had already begun during the Revolution, but had not been carried through at the time. After 1950, it was picked up once again. One exponent of this group was the Sumatran Abdul Harris Nasution, who at the time of the transfer of sovereignty had been the commander of the armed forces on Java. From a political perspective, he could still count on the full support of Hatta, who had been both Prime Minister and Vice President alongside Sukarno during the first six months of independence. He continued in this last position even after he stepped down as Prime Minister in August that year. Hatta had a lot of supporters among the Masjumi and the PSI. In the face of the increasingly radical Sukarno, he represented the forces that strove for the modernization and stabilization of Indonesian society.

The 1949 constitution, which was drawn up during the Round Table Conference, was replaced after the proclamation of the unitary state in August 1950. The provisional constitution that came in its place had scrapped the federal states. In addition, the parliamentary system was retained and fine-tuned. The Round Table Conference agreement had been that elections would be held in the short term, after which a Constituent Assembly would also be elected to provide a definitive constitution. These agreements were maintained in the provisional constitution of 1950, even though it became clear that a lot of time would be swallowed up with the preparations for the election. That affected the position of parliament. Under the constitution of 1949, parliament had occupied a weak position, because in the pending time of transition a strong executive was deemed necessary. Parliament's powers were strengthened with the changes made in 1950. It could now dissolve the government, which enabled a parliamentary system that could act according to the Dutch model. Up until the elections, which would finally take place in 1955, Indonesia had to make do with an appointed parliament.

Initially, the Masjumi dominated the succession of coalitions that followed, but after 1952 the PNI started to step into the foreground. Under this configuration, Sukarno only had a limited amount of power as constitutional head of state with no direct ruling powers. This meant a serious step back with regard to his position during the years of the Revolution and the fight against the Dutch, and he found it very hard to accept this. The rapid turnover in cabinets under the 1950 system had a positive influence on his position when he received a lot of welcome leeway by appointing the person in charge of forming a new government. On top of this, the high expectations that large sections of the population had with regard to his leadership had not disappeared. Given the unstable relationships within the young state, these were frequently called into play. In this way, he increasingly managed to wriggle out of the limitations of his position by acting as a mediator between rival factions. As usual, his traditional eloquence helped to boost his popularity among large sections of the Indonesian population. On his travels through the archipelago, he knew how to work the crowds that flocked to see him and whip them into a state of euphoria. His activities abroad enhanced his fame with the man-in-the-street. New Guinea and the continuing power of the Dutch were familiar and favourite themes for him, which he knew how to bring across to the general public in an animated way. He kept on hammering away at this, and in so doing transformed it into an important political factor. It was in this context that he announced, on 17 August 1951, to the displeasure of the Cabinet in The Hague that, by keeping New Guinea, the Netherlands had broken the agreements made at the Round Table Conference. It sat there now as an occupying force.

Under these circumstances, the dissolution of the Union was demanded. His statement ended with the usual appeal to continue fighting until Indonesia was whole, from Sabang to Merauke. He accepted the accolade of being known as the troublemaker of West Irian with pleasure.[47]

Sukarno's speech reinforced the already existing tendency to take extreme action against the Dutch state and its people. Moreover, far from being countered by spokesmen from the central government and political parties, they were often endorsed by them. They were a useful distraction from the frustrated expectations of a golden future, which had been supposed to materialize with independence. These frustrations were felt most of all by the former members of the non-commissioned guerrilla units and by the surplus troops from the army, who were now being threatened with dismissal because of the 'rationalization'. By showing that the Dutch danger had not yet been averted, they hoped to prove that their existence was still necessary. During these activities, the supposed link between the Darul Islam and the failed Westerling coup in January 1950 was gleefully taken advantage of. Rumours persisted that the Dutch were in collusion with these passionate and violent combatants for a Muslim state: a bizarre suggestion, which can at best only be defended by the fact that the Dutch plantation owners on West Java, in front of everybody else, had been exposed to extortion at the hands of the gangs of Darul Islam. Nevertheless, speculation about this kept tensions high. Within this context, a series of arrests took place after the end of 1953, during which 32 Dutchmen were imprisoned on charges of being members of a so-called Netherlands East Indies Guerrilla Organization or NIGO, a name that was only heard for the first time on this particular occasion.

The direct cause of these arrests was the release and dispatch to the Netherlands of six Dutchmen who, after being accused of taking part in the Westerling coup, had already spent almost three years in detention without trial. The initiative for the new wave of arrests came from units of the Mobile Brigade, a state police force trained along the same lines as the military which would also make itself known in later years wherever high-handed operations were concerned. The action prompted a series of show-trials that would continue to stir up the masses until far into 1957. A low point came when the Dutch businessman L.N.H. Jungschläger, who had been arrested on the basis of a fabricated story, was sentenced to death. The case acquired an extra sting when stories began circulating about the maltreatment the prisoners had received in order to persuade them to make the desired confessions. In Indonesia, these events were the springboard for an intensified anti-Dutch campaign in the national press. In the Netherlands, they had the opposite effect and reinforced the image of an Indonesia that had plunged into chaos and lawlessness.[48] In

Labour circles too, which had up until now given Indonesia the benefit of the doubt, patience had finally run out. This had already begun with the visit of the journalist, Frans Goedhart, to Indonesia in the Autumn of 1952. His fluently written travelogue, published under the title *Een revolutie op drift* (A Revolution Adrift) served to confirm this negative image. In parliament, it was the voice of Jacques de Kadt who, as a critical observer of the radicalization in Indonesia, drowned out the far milder tones of Schermerhorn and Van der Goes van Naters.

This is how a unique internal dynamic and political logic exerted its influence on both sides and led them to withdraw to their own positions. Yet on both sides, the Cabinets were still obliged to discuss outstanding issues. The failure of the New Guinea Conference of 1950 had led to grim reactions in Indonesia. By way of a reprisal, the attack was now launched over a broader front. The first step was the speech given by Prime Minister Natsir on 3 January 1951, which was mentioned earlier, in which he listed acceptance of the principle of transferring sovereignty over New Guinea as a condition for further talks with the Netherlands on this issue. He also made it clear that he wanted to get out of the other RTC agreements, by which he meant the Union in particular. As a follow-up to this, a Special Government Committee was set up and ordered to come up with proposals that would transform the special ties between both countries into normal international relations. The jurist Supomo, whom we have already encountered in his role as the main architect of the Indonesian constitution of 1945, was appointed Chair. He was assisted in his new task by, among others, the veteran of the preceding New Guinea talks, Mohammed Yamin. Their report was ready in June 1951. The authors had confined themselves to doing away with the Netherlands-Indonesian Union and the agreements associated with it. In the periodical *Mimbar Indonesia*, Supomo explained that the Union should at any rate be terminated, independent of the issue of how one should proceed with the matter of New Guinea. Rightly or wrongly, the Indonesian people viewed the Union as an extension of the colonial connection, which was detrimental to the sovereign status that had been so painstakingly acquired. According to Supumo's explanation, this had been accepted as a concession to push through the recognition of sovereignty at the RTC; now that this had taken place, people would miss this institution like a hole in the head. The committee was not alone in this view. When his report was published the Natsir Cabinet was already replaced by that of his fellow party member, Sukiman, but he too let it be known that the Union would have to be replaced by a standard international agreement. To sweeten the pill for the Netherlands, he qualified this by saying that it would probably result in better cooperation.[49]

Despite assurances from Supomo and Sukiman that, one way or another, the Union would have to disappear, the Indonesian authorities did not allow any misunderstanding to remain about the fact that the desire for this had been fuelled even more by the position adopted by the Netherlands at the New Guinea conference. How far circumstances in Indonesia did not permit any other attitude is a question that cannot be answered with any certainty. At any rate, it is a fact that 'New Guinea' was an obvious instrument for the Indonesian government to use to increase the pressure on the Netherlands on the matter of the Union. When Supomo arrived in the Netherlands in the second half of August in 1951 for an informal discussion about the pending talks, he also made it clear that Indonesia not only wanted to be rid of the Union, but also insisted on having its claim to the *de jure* sovereignty over New Guinea recognized. In the Netherlands, large groups, also within the Dutch government, took this act as new proof of an Indonesian mentality that knew how to appreciate the freedom provided by the RTC, but not the spirit in which the agreement had been concluded. The question about how far Indonesia had been in a position on that occasion to arrange matters according to its own wishes was a sensitive subject. The Dutch were not inclined to think so, and felt that they were the ones who had already given in too much. It was an argument that was constantly being put before government by the parties at both ends of the political spectrum.

The Dutch negotiators assumed a detached and aloof demeanour during these informal talks. While the Cabinet was not particularly thrilled by Supomo's visit, it nevertheless did not wish to send him straight back home.[50] Besides, there were also some advantages in linking the Union to the New Guinea issue. It offered a means of defence against the salami tactics that were carried out on the Indonesian side, particularly by Yamin, whereby Indonesia would first rake in the disbandment of the Union only to demand the next portion, that is New Guinea, with renewed audacity. Furthermore, this link provided Dutch negotiators with the opportunity to stop amendments to the other RTC agreements from being rushed through, by adhering to a position towards New Guinea that could be well defended. The willingness to do this was there, although the urge to break open the recent, ceremoniously concluded agreements made an unseemly impression. When looked at in the cold light of day, the agreements made at the Union conferences of 1950 could also have been arrived at through a standard international consultation. The Union was an empty shell and would remain so. 'New Guinea' on the other hand was a tangible project, while there was barely any room for negotiation on this issue for the successive Drees Cabinets after the acceptance of the 'cold storage' concept. The High Commissioner, Lamping, who had been made responsible for the

preliminary talks in Jakarta, therefore instantly suggested combining the issues and linking a concession with regard to the Union to an Indonesian premise to let the New Guinea issue rest for a couple of years.

This was how the Dutch government reacted too, albeit in a rather watered down way. In the Netherlands, Minister Stikker declared that he was prepared to enter into talks about reviewing the Union, while the Dutch High Commissioner in Jakarta did not miss any opportunity to point out to all those taking part in the discussion that a new arrangement such as this must be given the chance to succeed. One should not instantly undermine the cooperation by coming forward with the New Guinea issue. By his own admission, he found a sympathetic audience for this with Vice President Hatta, Prime Minister Sukiman, and his Minister of Foreign Affairs Achmad Subardjo. On the other hand, he also had to report that the same Subardjo was busy sweet-talking the Americans on the matter of supporting an action against communism, which might also persuade them to come to a compromise on the New Guinea issue.[51]

Furthermore, a new component came into play with the preparations in the Netherlands for revising the constitution. This had become necessary on a number of points due to Indonesia's separation. The amendments were prepared separately based on each different subject, and in the summer of 1951 an interim proposal lay on the table in which New Guinea was presented as part of the territory of the kingdom. The proposal would be presented to the Upper and Second Chamber later that year in the form of a bill. For the first time ever, this area was also emphatically referred to here as *Netherlands* New Guinea. Besides which, this subject was linked to a proposal to determine a further ruling on the judicial position of this area by law on the basis of a two-thirds majority vote, which kept open the possibility of separation without having to change the constitution. In this way, there was some flexibility, even though many in the Cabinet wondered why it had then been deemed necessary to employ the name Netherlands New Guinea. Would not West New Guinea have been a more sensible choice? No logical explanation was given at the meeting, as a result of which one can conclude that this choice of name did in fact represent a future goal.[52]

On 10 November 1951, the deliberations about reviewing the Union formally began on the Indonesian side. This took place with a memorandum offered by Sukiman to the Dutch High Commissioner. As was to be expected, this contained a proposal to discuss the Union and New Guinea combined. With respect to the question of sovereignty, this memorandum revealed an important shift. Unlike Natsir, who in his statement of 3 January still worked on the assumption of a transfer of sovereignty, which in principle implied the acceptance of the Dutch idea of continued sovereignty, Sukiman was now arguing for the

opposite. In the document, carefully crafted words were used to explain that in the opinion of the Indonesians, West Irian had been included in the transfer of sovereignty. In addition, only the authority exercised by the Dutch government was to be maintained for one year on the basis of the status quo regulation of Article 2 of the Charter. Now that this year had passed without any solution being found, this no longer took place with the approval of the Republic of Indonesia, as a result of which the description in the Dutch constitution would have to be viewed as a hostile deed. In order to safeguard good relations it was therefore important that the Irian issue would be on an equal footing alongside the matter of the Union in the pending discussion. The Indonesian Prime Minister secretly informed Lamping that linking them both together in this way had become unavoidable because the proposed review of the constitution in the Netherlands had been greeted with great hostility, particularly among the PNI. The latter had demanded that the Union should be unilaterally terminated and received backing for this from the PSII and the left-wing parties, as a result of which Masjumi's position in this matter was undermined. An alternative to this would have to be identified very quickly. The arrival of a mission led by Supomo could therefore be expected in the short term.

In keeping with his earlier position, Lamping advised the government to begin talks using this as a point of departure. All the more so because, according to his assessment, the wording that had been chosen was quite moderate and a refusal from the Dutch side to comply with this would be playing right into the hands of the opposition.[53] One can go on to conclude that he believed that some relaxation of the Dutch New Guinea policy would be desirable, but that was not how the Dutch government saw it. During the preliminary talks in the Cabinet, Drees pointed emphatically to the back burner formula, as a result of which the government was no longer at liberty to bring the options that had been discussed at the New Guinea Conference to the negotiating table, such as shared government or even shared sovereignty for New Guinea. The government therefore made it absolutely clear to Indonesia that it saw no benefit in including a second issue on the agenda. It finally submitted to this on condition 'that it does not expect that an agreement can now be reached concerning this problem because the basic assumptions on each side are too far apart from each other'.[54]

After the delegation led by Supomo had arrived in The Hague, talks began on 11 January 1952. As might be expected, both parties were able to agree on a large number of issues relating to the abolition of the Union, but the discussion about New Guinea reached a stalemate on the point of sovereignty. Stikker brought an interim solution to the negotiating table in the form of a proposal to bring the dispute to the attention of a competent legal body. This was discussed

at great length on Sunday 3 February 1952 at the personal residence of Minister Stikker. Aside from the host, the gathering included the two ministers Drees and Peters and the Indonesian negotiators Supomo, Yamin and Zairin Zain. Yamin was due to be sent home for bringing out an interim report and communicating the Dutch proposal. Supomo indicated, however, that he did not expect anything to come of this because public opinion in Indonesia needed more tangible results. He therefore argued in favour of taking the sovereignty 'in suspense' and in the meantime appointing an Indonesian governor with an Indonesian-Dutch administration under his command. That did not go down very well. Drees raked up the entire past history again. He pointed out the position of the States General in this matter and the fact that because of the vehement anti-Netherlands voices in Indonesia, particularly that of Sukarno, the chance of obtaining a two-thirds majority to change New Guinea's status was smaller than ever. The appointment of an Indonesian governor was completely unacceptable, in his opinion, because this would imply an altered status, and thus an acceptance of Sukiman's proposition.

The tone of the discussion became exceptionally caustic when Drees proceeded to inform all those present that any aggressive assault by Indonesia on New Guinea would have no chance of success. The only possible effect this could have would be to drive the Netherlands into the arms of Australia, and that would certainly not bring a solution for the dispute closer to hand. Conversely, Zain argued that the Indonesian Cabinet would fall if these talks failed, which would tip the centre of gravity of Indonesian politics further towards the left. The Netherlands ought to give in by way of a sacrifice in the struggle against international communism. Little imagination is needed to hear echoes here of the talks that were held by his superior in Washington a little while earlier. What is certain is that with this the deliberations reached an impasse. The meeting was suspended.[55] Nothing more was said about New Guinea, but the Dutch offer remained to resume talks about the Union and various ongoing issues. We can conclude that the Supomo mission represented the touchstone and confirmation of the significance of the back-burner formula, which excluded every discussion on this issue. We can also conclude that it was Drees who defended this position with the greatest resilience and determination.

Ali Sastroamidjojo's offensive

After the failure of the Supomo mission in February 1952, all was quiet on the New Guinea front for several years, at least as far as the immediate relations between both governments were concerned. Elections and cabinet crises on

both sides regularly held matters up. In Indonesia, Sukiman's Cabinet was replaced by that of Wilopo which, similarly, did not last that long. This last cabinet was based on a rather uneasy alliance between the PNI and the Masjumi, which had held onto the reins after the unitary state had come into existence. During this period, the Nahdatul Ulama broke away from the Masjumi. As the former had its followers almost exclusively in Central and East Java and the Masjumi were also strongly represented on Sumatra, the faithful from Java and the outlying districts threatened to end up in two different camps because of this. Afterwards, there was a radicalization in the political spectrum in which the PNI and PKI were able to play a more prominent role. The watershed was the appointment of Ali Sastroamidjojo's Cabinet in August 1953, which consisted of the PNI and the NU and was backed by the PKI; three parties that were based mainly in Middle and East Java. Ali was a PNI-man of the old school who had studied in the Netherlands and had many friends there, yet exhibited a very defensive attitude towards Dutch politics.

Under his administration, which was characterized by rising corruption and instability, the viciousness of the anti-Dutch actions increased. All of this was accompanied by crass remarks made by Sukarno, the main gist of which was always that the Revolution would continue until New Guinea too would be returned to the bosom of Ibu Indonesia. The approaching elections, the first since independence had been gained, played a role in this. They prompted a lot of activity from the communists, in particular, who managed to gain a substantial lead over the more moderate socialists of the PSI. True to their elite position that educating the masses should precipitate political mobilization, Sjahrir and his associates conducted a very lukewarm campaign.[56] The consequences would become clear when the results were made known in September 1955. The PSI scraped together a meagre 5 representatives in a parliament that consisted of a total of 257 seats. On the other hand the communists, who could now occupy 39 places, were looking at a massive victory. The Masjumi and the PNI balanced each other out with 57 seats each, while the NU had managed to place 45 delegates in parliament. The smaller parties, such as the PSII (8), the Parkindo (8), and the Partai Katolik (6), also deserve to be mentioned. It was a result that did not rule out the possibility of a workable majority, but the communists had gone back to the pre-Madiun era and the prospect of intellectuals and civil servants from the PSI playing a moderating role had diminished considerably.[57]

The Netherlands also experienced a shift in political relationships, but not on such a spectacular scale. Three months after the breakdown of the talks with Supomo, in June 1952, regular elections were held which produced a minor victory for the PvdA and a small loss for the KVP. Both parties now emerged

equally strong, with each one entitled to 30 out of the 100 parliamentary seats. The result was a continuation of the Roman Catholic-Socialist coalition, but one in which the Protestant parties now participated in every aspect. The AR and the CHU, which together were worth 21 seats, contributed two ministers each. Minister W.J.A. Kernkamp (CHU) made his entrance into the Ministry of Overseas Territories. The VVD, which was no longer needed to help the coalition to obtain a majority, was left out. Oud immediately objected to the predominantly left-wing bias of the prospective Cabinet, while the discrepancy between him and Stikker over which policy should be carried out with respect to Indonesia made it impossible for the latter to return as Minister of Foreign Affairs. The derailed Cabinet minister moved to the diplomatic corps, while the post of Minister of Foreign Affairs was shared between the independent financier J.W. Beyen and the diplomat and KVP party member J.M.A.H. Luns. Beyen became the actual Cabinet Minister and Luns, as Minister without portfolio, was second in line. The areas in which they operated were based on voluntary work agreements that were reasonably clear-cut. Beyen was to handle European affairs, while the rest of the world fell to Luns. This also included relations with Indonesia, in their full magnitude, because 'Affairs of the Union', which were rather limited in scope, had been taken out of the Minister of Overseas Territories' portfolio. Minister Kernkamp could therefore focus fully on the administrative problems of the West Indies and New Guinea.

The choice for Luns had been Romme's work. A contributory factor was the fact that the KVP's defeat could be largely attributed to the votes won by Minister Welter's dissident faction, which had been a zealous advocate in parliament for a more conservative policy regarding Indonesia ever since the 1948 elections, and which now returned to parliament with two seats. Seemingly, focussing on the same direction was in the interest of the KVP and Romme believed he had found the perfect man for this in his fellow student from Amsterdam University, Luns. The New Guinea programme of the new Cabinet endorsed the line that had been followed in the preceding years. The back burner formula was retained but, at the insistence of the religious parties, the task of educating the Papuans was emphasized more.

The arrival of Luns set a new tone at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. He was a self-assured diplomat, who had followed the decolonization in Indonesia at a distance from London and New York. He had done so with disdain as he thought the Netherlands had buckled far too often under foreign pressure, and needlessly too. He had very little regard for the actions of Van Roijen and Stikker in particular. In 1949, he had corresponded on this subject with Romme, who became quite taken by him as a result.[58] He was a domineering figure with a good sense of humour which he liked to share with others. As

minister, he was particularly fond of his prerogatives, which would eventually lead to blockades particularly in response to his policy towards Indonesia. Both he and Drees quickly learned to appreciate each other, and to such a degree that those around him (see the diplomat, Van den Beugel) occasionally had concerns about this. Luns dispelled any remaining doubts that Drees might have with regard to the hard line that was to be taken with Indonesia. Luns for his part could always turn to father Drees for support and advice regarding the tricky field of domestic policy, which he avoided for the rest of the time as much as he could. His relationship with Beyen was often an uphill struggle. As far as that was concerned, his true golden age only dawned with the formation of the fourth Drees Cabinet in 1956, when he was given the entire portfolio. The cooperation with Drees lasted until the end of the Roman Catholic-Socialist coalition. Luns's term as minister was far from over with the departure of Drees in December 1958. He would remain at the Foreign Office until 1971.

The new minister might have had a strong view about relations with Indonesia, but when he came to office the Eastern crescent was still *terra incognita* for him. In order to improve upon this, in the year following his appointment he embarked upon a fact-finding mission through his new area of jurisdiction together with his colleague from Overseas Territories, Kernkamp. On this trip, alongside India and a string of other countries, they also visited Indonesia. It also led to the first collision with Sukarno, who did not wish to receive him on that occasion. In the Indonesian press this was put down to irritation at the fact that the minister was only passing through Indonesia and had not intended it to be the final destination of a special visit. That would have been a rather disproportionate reaction from Sukarno's side, in light of the fact that this had not been the case with the other countries that were visited either. A more deep-rooted reason for his reaction would have been that Kernkamp visited New Guinea too, while the next stop on the journey would be Australia. For Sukarno there were certainly sound reasons to keep an eye on the relationship between the Netherlands and that particular country with a little more interest than usual. Following his frosty reception in Jakarta, Luns however could only have been strengthened in his view of Sukarno which had already been confirmed, namely that it was impossible to do business with him.[59]

The above deserves some explanation concerning the point about international relations, which will be explored in more detail in the next chapter. The governments of the United Kingdom and the United States had so far cautiously kept the conflict that was brewing between the Netherlands and Indonesia over ownership of New Guinea at arm's length. This was not the case with Australia. During the years of the Indonesian Revolution, that particular country had

been very aloof with the Netherlands, but a visible turning point became apparent during the course of 1949. As we have seen, Canberra had given clear hints that it wished to keep the Netherlands in New Guinea. This change of heart became more clearly visible after the elections at the end of that same year, which brought the Conservatives to office. Under the leadership of Prime Minister R.G. Menzies, the country embarked upon a more pro-Dutch course. The attitude adopted by his Minister of Foreign Affairs, Sir Percy Spender, in this respect even bordered on being irritating in the eyes of the Dutch. During the first months of 1950, when the Dutch government was having immense difficulty in maintaining workable relations with Indonesia, he already urged it loudly to stick to its guns with regard to the New Guinea affair. He made no secret of the fact that if the Netherlands were to let go, Australia would certainly be ready to take that area under its protection. In the opinion of the Dutch this was becoming too much of a good thing and Spender was kept at a distance, including among other occasions during a visit to the Netherlands in August 1950. They pointed out to him that this conflicted with the commitments made to Indonesia by Van Maarseveen during the Round Table Conference, that the Netherlands would never hand over New Guinea to a third party over Indonesia's head.[60]

Three years later, Australia's intentions were genuinely appreciated, and in this way an atmosphere of mutual benevolent interest continued to prevail. Luns's visit to this distant ally in 1953 was therefore a logical step, but it was equally logical that this was viewed with suspicion by Indonesia. Nevertheless, the tone was set and for his part Luns did his best to get as much as he could out of the Australian hand he had been dealt. A seemingly insignificant event was that during this period in the Foreign Affairs Annual known as the *Jaarboek van Buitenlandse Zaken*, New Guinea was classified under Australia. The alteration was obvious enough to catch the attention of the Indonesian government. The combination of these two events was reason for the newly formed Cabinet of Ali Sastroamidjojo to make the pertinent statement that every connection with New Guinea from other powers was considered illegal and incompatible with friendly relations.

For the time being, there was not much reason to worry about in Jakarta, because during this visit Luns and his Australian colleague did not go beyond exchanging informal expressions of support. Moreover, Indonesia was quite capable of building up an international position of its own, and Ali Sastroamidjolo was working hard on it. Indonesian foreign policy was bent on isolating the Netherlands, and in the end it it was quite succesful in this. Although the Netherlands continued to participate in the rather apolitical cooperation in the South Pacific Commission, it was excluded from participating in

other international platforms in this part of the world. This applied to the collaborative alliance with the Commonwealth countries known as the Colombo Group as well as the South East Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO) which was founded in 1954 and in which Americans played the first fiddle.[61] Indonesia was becoming an important player in the international sphere, and the outside world had to make allowances for this. This was most evident at the *Afro-Asian Conference* of 1955 in Bandung, where a large number of countries from Asia and Africa had been invited by Indonesia to come together to discuss a joint policy with respect to the growing antithesis between the Soviet bloc and the Western Alliance under the leadership of the Americans. Indonesia appointed itself as the leading member of the Group of Non-Allied Countries that wished to embark on a middle course between the two power blocks that held the world in their grip. It also appeared to be capable of exploiting these meetings directly for its own purposes. This manifested itself in a resolution that was accepted by a general ballot in which the policy of the Netherlands concerning New Guinea was condemned harshly as an outdated act of colonialism.[62]

While the Bandung conference expressed its views about colonialism and New Guinea, the issue of reviewing the Round Table Agreements had become relevant again. This matter had been put on hold for a while following the return of Supomo, although that is not to say that Ali Sastroamidjojo was not interested in it. The government statement issued immediately upon his appointment in August 1953 makes this patently clear. One of his first things that he had done was to set up a West-Irian Bureau, which was given the responsibility of stimulating people's interest in West Irian through a variety of mass campaigns. It was a continuation of an earlier organization, the *Badan Perdjuangan Irian* which was originally set up in 1949, and which had the same mission and objectives as the other militant organizations from that era. They were to push forward until they were behind Dutch lines and, once there, assume responsibility for organizing the fight for freedom. Two military units were created for this goal, consisting primarily of Papuans who lived outside New Guinea. These were the Cendrawasih (Bird of Paradise) Battalion and the Silas Papare Batallion. The name of the second unit already shows that Papare, who emigrated just before the transfer of sovereignty to Indonesia, played an important role in this organization. These units had carried out a few small-scale minor infiltrations prior to the establishment of the West Irian Bureau, but they were planning to do a lot more now. The formal support they were now given by the government meant that new actions could be set up more effectively.

Public information and propaganda were high on the agenda. Furthermore, politicians and activists with great kudos in the struggle against the Dutch were

members of this organization, while the Prime Minister himself was in charge. The organization was formally established on 4 March 1954 by Sukarno, who was applauded on the occasion by Ali Sastroamidjojo as 'the true representative of the struggle for West Irian to be returned to the territory of Indonesia'. Sukarno himself ended his speech with the statement that fighting for West Irian was not only the duty of every Indonesian but, much more than that, it was 'in effect, making a stand against the rape of justice and humanity'. How far this was actually the case, only time would tell. For now, it was important that the actions of the bureau resulted in protest marches in the cities and the creation of paramilitary units that would remain on stand-by for further action. One of the first things they did was carry out a raid in the area of the Etnabaai near Fakfak in October that same year with two vessels under the leadership of the Papuan fighter Dimara. During this, the Dutch policeman Van Krieken, who was not paying attention at the time, was overpowered and kidnapped.[63]

Aside from the operations of the West Irian Bureau, Ali Sastroamidjojo had many more strings to his bow, by contemplating a combination of international action with direct negotiations with the Netherlands. He was well equipped for this. The new Prime Minister understood the relations within the Netherlands, but was also up to date on international relations; a subject about which he had amassed a great deal of knowledge, among other things through his term as Indonesian Ambassador in Washington. His first move was in the bilateral sphere. The Netherlands had made it perfectly clear following the appointment of the new Cabinet that they had no wish to engage in further talks. Despite this, Ali Sastroamidjojo put forward a proposal on 24 March 1954 to resume discussions about New Guinea.[64] One can see this as an expression of a wish to finally place mutual relations on a new and more realistic footing, or equally as part of a plan by Ali Sastroamidjojo's government to place the dispute about New Guinea before the United Nations General Assembly that same year. A Dutch refusal to enter into a direct discussion about this would provide Indonesia with a stronger position in New York.[65] In March 1954, both options were still open to Ali. In his memorandum, he observed that the unresolved issues of the Union and Irian were obstacles that stood in the way of improving relations. On the subject of Irian, the memorandum adopted the position that the Netherlands only had to acknowledge Indonesia's sovereignty over that island, after which agreements could be made about the remaining Dutch interests there. It was also proposed that, along with New Guinea and the Union, a review of the financial-economic agreements made at the Round Table Conference could also now be placed on the agenda. Indonesia or Switzerland were proposed as possible venues for the discussion. The latter was not an unreasonable proposition as the previous rounds had all taken place in

The Hague and, besides, there was very little enthusiasm on the Dutch side to travel to Jakarta for these mandatory talks.

The Dutch reaction came as no surprise. The gist of it was that improving relations was considered to be of paramount importance and they were quite happy to discuss most of the issues, but that the door was firmly closed as far as New Guinea was concerned. This last point was clarified by Luns in an elaborate address to the Indonesian High Commissioner in The Hague, Susanto. It showed a marked difference with the indignant and defensive arguments used by Drees on such occasions, or Stikker's desparate search for unrealistic interim solutions. Luns acted in a confident manner. He came with a romantically coloured historical exposé in which he did his best to place New Guinea within the context of the Netherlands' rich overseas history. Indonesia had been part of that, just like New Guinea, and the latter was now due for a complete make-over before being released. That was the reason why it was pointless to discuss it now, although it was certainly possible to deal with other issues. He proceeded to drive his partner in this conversation into a more advanced state of shock by elaborating in more detail how Indonesia was incapable of executing such a pedagogical operation itself. In relation to this, the minister then proceeded to launch into a tirade about the poor treatment of Dutch detainees in Indonesia, the fact that Dutch language radio broadcasts in Indonesia were no longer aired, and other items which had made it into the Dutch press of late. All in all, it underlined the fact that the Netherlands was not keen to engage in any high level discussions.[66]

This position was in clear contrast to the haste that was demonstrated by Susanto, which indicates that the Indonesian side wanted to conclude the talks with the Netherlands as soon as possible in order to be in time for preparatory steps in the United Nations. Indonesia wanted to have discussions in the short term and without any further preliminary talks. The Dutch government finally agreed to this and this is how the Conference got underway on 29 June 1954, without any prior discussion taking place about the agenda. The Indonesian delegation was led by the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Sunario, while his colleague Luns led the Dutch one. During the inevitable discussion about the agenda which could not be put off any longer, Indonesia immediately brought up the three familiar points. The discussion about New Guinea quickly dried up as the Dutch rigidly stuck to their refusal to utter a word about the matter. This was instantly written down by Sunario in a memorandum, which cleared the way to having it dealt with at the United Nations. One might suppose that the Indonesian delegation's main goal had been achieved with this. The step towards this was announced shortly afterwards by Sukarno in his annual speech on Independence Day. Agreement on the two remaining agenda points

could be reached fairly quickly, and was formally recorded in two policy documents about the abolition of the Union and a new arrangement for cooperation at both the financial and economic level. The conference ended on 19 July 1954. After that, it took one more year for the protocols to be dealt with in the Indonesian parliament. Although Ali Sastroamidjojo was committed to having them ratified, he failed to get them accepted, which was yet another sign that demonstrated the weak position of the Cabinet.[67] In the meantime, the refusal of the Netherlands to discuss New Guinea had paid some dividends for Indonesia. In September 1954, the first discussion about the New Guinea issue was held in the political committee of the United Nations General Assembly. It proceeded to give a green light for further discussion in the plenary meeting of that body later that same year.[68]

This series of events reveals that, with respect to New Guinea, the Indonesian Prime Minister was working along the lines of both bilateral and international discussions. The emphasis was on the international approach. That was already apparent from his comments in which he had declared all contacts of third powers with New Guinea as being contaminated. This did not lead to any tangible results just yet. It also applied to him bringing the New Guinea issue to the attention of the United Nations. During the discussion that took place in the General Assembly in December 1954, Indonesia received insufficient support for a resolution that would force the Netherlands to engage in further talks. Yet, having it accepted as an agenda point at least represented a confirmation of the Indonesian position that New Guinea was not a legal dispute but a political one. This issue is dealt with in more detail later on in a different context. However, it is certainly useful to point out at this stage that the first attempt at internationalization ran aground as a result of opposition from the European countries as well as most of the Latin American countries, while the United States remained aloof.[69] This created a pattern for subsequent actions, and these would be better prepared on the Indonesian side. The motion that was adopted at the Afro-Asian Conference in Bandung in April 1955 served as the preamble to the second round in the United Nations. On the initiative of the states that were represented there, West Irian was once again placed on the agenda for the General Assembly of December that year.

The success of the Afro-Asian conference, although certainly a piece of good luck for the Cabinet of Ali Sastroamidjojo, turned out to be particularly beneficial for Sukarno's position. The internal struggle between the parties had continued, in the meantime, and was accompanied, as per usual, by an acrimonious mud-slinging campaign against the Netherlands. We have already mentioned the actions carried out by the West Irian Bureau, the kidnapping of

Van Krieken, and last but not least the trials that were just getting off the ground against Dutchmen accused of being affiliated with the NIGO, out of which those against Jungschläger and Schmidt attracted most attention. In the opinion of the level-headed High Commissioner W.F.L. van Bylandt, these had nothing to do with a normal judicial process; they were political processes targeted against Dutch people in general. A salient component of this was the constant intimidation to which a lawyer called H.A. Bouman was personally subjected. He was responsible for defending Jungschläger and others, but was prevented from carrying out his work properly. Afterwards, he was not given an exit visa, which forced him to leave the country through the back door. As a result of these actions, the East Indies Dutch in particular, who were living in and around the major cities, felt as if they were being backed into a corner. The trials confirmed that the intimidating actions they were exposed to on a daily basis were approved of by the authorities. An anxiety psychosis began to develop amongst them, which led to a growing exodus.[70] All these events were reported at length in the Dutch newspapers, but most of all in the *Telegraaf*, in which the injustice that was taking place in Indonesia was fiercely criticized. The equally harsh protests against the Netherlands by the Indonesian representatives at the United Nations added more fuel to the flames. An exceptionally large degree of annoyance was precipitated by remarks made by the Chair of the Indonesian delegation in New York, Abu Hanifah, who, in his speech at the General Assembly in 1954, had referred to the vulnerable position of thousands of Dutch citizens who, as a result of continued Dutch stubbornness, would increasingly find themselves at risk of becoming potential victims of attacks from all sides.[71] Not only could this be read as a warning, it could also be interpreted as a threat of reprisals. This was a sinister message against a backdrop of show trials and continuous actions on the street against groups of Dutch people. In the Netherlands, irritation about this was expressed in the press and in parliament, where they clung tenaciously to the conviction that they were right about New Guinea.

In Indonesia, developments were in fact only partly controlled by the government. Meanwhile, sections of the army, various government services, private organizations and individuals all continued to do as they wished. Ali Sastroamidjojo's position was not strong because the large Masjumi party did not support him and there was a great deal of internal rivalry between his supporters. The commotion around the elections and the deteriorating economic situation may have served to broaden support for the anti-Netherlands actions, but they did not automatically strengthen the position of the Prime Minister. As mentioned earlier, the success of the Bandung Conference was attributed more to Sukarno than it was to him. His cabinet fell right after the conference

ended. The direct cause of this was the fact that the army refused to accept the appointment of the Commander-in-Chief of the Army by the Cabinet. This was an old grievance in the Republican regime, where a lot of value was attached within the armed forces to the Japanese tradition of making such an appointment a matter for the army to decide. On top of this, one should not forget that the appointment which the Prime Minister wished to push through was largely determined by the interests of the PNI, as a result of which he had managed to turn the entire army leadership against him. The coalition, which was led by him, lost its support base through this. The result was the formation of the Burhanuddin Harahap Cabinet, which was prepared to accept the army's *fait accompli*. In October 1955, General Nasution, who had been relegated to the sidelines earlier after a clash with Sukarno, was appointed once again as Chief of Staff of the Indonesian armed forces.[72]

In the Cabinet headed by Burhanuddin, the Masjumi were once again in the lead, supported by the NU and the most important smaller parties, namely the PSI, the PSII and both Christian parties. This turned the situation in Indonesia into a mirror image of that in the Netherlands: both countries were ruled by a coalition of religious parties and moderately socialist parties. The PNI was temporarily banned from the circle of power. The line-up was immediately positive with respect to the Netherlands. Nothing changed with regard to the main outline of the policy framework, but the tone was friendlier. That was also the case with New Guinea. Indonesia would continue to fight for it, but the Cabinet also expected that it would be able to negotiate on this. This 'campaign of reasonableness' was conducted by the former Prime Minister of the federal state of East Indonesia, Ide Anak Agung Gde Agung, who was now Minister of Foreign Affairs. We should remind ourselves that he had been the one who had stuck his neck out at the Round Table Conference for the New Guinea issue. If he were to succeed now in bringing that territory into the Indonesian sphere, that would signify gaining a great deal of prestige, not only for him but for all the pro-Dutch groups. Soon after his appointment, he made it known that he wanted to resume negotiations about outstanding issues with the Netherlands.[73]

The prospects of dealing with this successfully were not good from the start. They dropped even more when the results of the first general elections for a new parliament, held at the end of September 1955, were made known. The Masjumi did not emerge from the ballot box as the largest party but instead had to share first place with the PNI. The rise of the PKI also meant a strengthening of the powers that were aiming to continue with the Revolution, which would drive both the President as well as the PNI further in this direction. The dramatic result for the PSI, on the other hand, indicated that the group of intellectuals that had been educated in the Netherlands enjoyed very little support.

Burhanuddin Harahap's Cabinet had no hold over the army or the judiciary. It had to submit to the appointment of the Commander-in-Chief of the Army and could exert very little influence over the issue of releasing the imprisoned Dutchmen or improving procedures in the judicial process against Jungschläger and Schmidt. The PNI in the meantime did not accept its banishment from the hub of power and feverishly sought out its allies. It found them among the PKI and in Sukarno who made it clear to the government, in both his words and his gestures, that he wanted to have nothing to do with these negotiations. In mid-December he made his position publicly known by arguing in a speech to a mixed crowd in Surabaya that the fight for West Irian would definitely not be decided in The Hague, but in Indonesia.[74]

On official grounds, Burhanuddin and Anak Agung could maintain that this was irrelevant given the constitutional position of the President, but this was more wishful thinking than reality. So it came to pass that the Nahdatul Ulama party and the PSII party, both of which participated in the Cabinet, refused to make negotiators available for the delegation which had to talk with the Dutch. The other government parties were not sure either. Consequently, it was hard to persuade the important Minister of Finance, Sumitro Djojohadikusumo of the PSI, to leave for Geneva. This was partly because the Chair of his party, the political tightrope walker, Subadio Sastrosatomo, was constantly asking himself whether participating in the discussion with the Netherlands after the crushing electoral defeat would actually turn out to be of benefit to the party. After a lot of pressure, Sumitro arrived together with the Catholic minister Kasimo as late as January 1956 in The Hague. Both were highly respected in Dutch circles and were looked upon as cornerstones of the collaboration. Yet Sumitro did not feel any profound need to reach an agreement. Not only did he share Subadio's doubts about the expediency of the talks from the perspective of party politics, he also questioned the need for a new agreement on his own field of expertise. The existing financial and economic agreements from the Round Table Conference did not hamper him in any way because its implications had already been adapted to the practical situation. His rule of thumb was that the less that was regulated, the better it would be for Indonesia. If negotiations had to take place after all, then a deadlock in the financial and economic area was perhaps the best outcome because this would give Indonesia a completely free hand. Finally, the appearance of Sumitro and Kasimo halfway through the conference was conveyed to Anak Agung by them as a gesture of goodwill to the outside world, as a 'stunt' to prevent the blame for its failure landing on Indonesia's doorstep.[75] This pragmatic attitude was in stark contrast with that of Anak Agung. Although he sympathized with Sumitro from a political perspective, this politically-minded jurist was hell bent on completing

the work of the Round Table Conference and moulding relations with the Netherlands into thoroughly worked out formulas. The endless internal discussions within the Cabinet about whether or not to continue with the negotiations would remain a disruptive factor right up until the end of the conference.

The campaign of reasonableness was, all in all, launched with weak troops. This factor meant that the politicians on the Dutch side were less inclined to grant concessions to this group as long as one could assume that they would fall into the lap of their opponents. For Anak Agung and his supporters this attitude of his old friends was no doubt a painful experience. The Dutch did not feel any great need to engage in negotiations once again, and certainly not about the issue of New Guinea. The old irritations had not disappeared and on top of that the clumsy way in which the protocols signed by Sunario had been left hanging in the air had made a bad impression. Faith in the willingness of Indonesia to honour agreements, which was not strong to start with, had been weakened even more by this.

The Geneva Conference

The talks that were not welcome in the Netherlands finally took place in Geneva at the Maison de la Presse at the suggestion of Indonesia. Before they commenced, discussions about the agenda were first held in The Hague at the suggestion of Anak Agung. He hoped that this would prevent New Guinea from being immediately left out of the proceedings, as had been the case during the discussions with Sunario. This indicates that he did indeed attach importance to a directly negotiated result on this issue. It also makes clear that he did not wish to play the game primarily via the United Nations, even if the handling of this in the pending December meeting had already been initiated by Ali Sastroamidjojo.

The agenda meetings resulted in a *common statement* that was issued on 7 December 1955. In *the first two* items of this document it was recorded that the conference would deal with the replacement of the Sunario protocols about the dissolution of the Union and the replacement of the financial and economic agreements of the RTC. Item 3 announced the discussion of 'certain issues relating to New Guinea, under the understanding that each party maintains its own position with regard to the sovereignty'. Finally, item 4 allowed for other matters to be discussed, 'which by either party are deemed important for the relationship between both countries'. Under the last item mentioned above, the Dutch side had contemplated discussing the treatment of Dutch detainees in Indonesia from the start.[76]

Minister Luns would be the most important negotiator on the Dutch side,

whenever necessary seconded by his fellow ministers of the Treasury, the Justice Department and Economic Affairs. The organization lay in the hands of the government commissioner for Indonesian Affairs, Blom. Just in case, the Dutch Cabinet had immediately made the reservation that New Guinea would remain exclusively a cabinet matter.[77] The Indonesian delegation consisted of the ministers Anak Agung, Leimena and Mohamad Rum with, as mentioned earlier, Sumitro Djojohadikusumo and Kasimo joining this group later. Apart from this, both parties were aided by a number of advisors. The indispensable Silas Papare acted as an advisor to the Indonesian side, which made him the only Papuan present in this group in Geneva.

Item 3 is, of course, particularly interesting for our theme. Luns had refused to discuss this matter in any shape or form at the talks with the Sunario mission. This had been the Dutch opening bid again at the discussions on the agenda, but the opposition was not game for this because Anak Agung wanted to score on this issue in particular. It was added after Indonesia had released the aforementioned police officer, Van Krieken. After removing this thorn from the Dutch flesh, Drees had declared his willingness to accept New Guinea as an agenda item, by which he was thinking of an exchange of ideas about various practical matters, such as the supply of Indonesian personnel for New Guinea.[78] Of course, the idea that with this formula one could thwart a new round of discussions at the forthcoming General Assembly of the United Nations also played a role. Minister Luns too was not keen on a repeat performance of the fierce Indonesian attacks which had taken place during the sessions of the previous year.

Indeed, the Netherlands succeeded with this item. After the Geneva agenda was accepted, in New York a further discussion of the New Guinea issue was halted as a result of a resolution stating that the result of the bilateral negotiations had to be awaited first. It goes without saying that this was accompanied by the fervent wish that these would be successful.[79] The Netherlands was allowed a free rein, while the Council apparently was not offended with the reserved way in which the subject had been put on the agenda under item 3. From his perspective, Anak Agung could also see the outcome as a success because West Irian had been placed on the agenda of the General Assembly of the United Nations once again.[80]

The Geneva talks started on 10 December, immediately following Anak Agung's return from New York. When looking at the conference as a whole, we can discern three episodes during which discussions were held at a ministerial level. These were the periods from 16 until 19 December, from 5 until 7 January and a final phase from 7 until 11 February. The days in between were dedicated

to lower level delegation discussions, lobbying activities, and talks with the home front. It is hard to get a firm grasp of the course of events. At the opening and closing sessions, the discussions were mainly informal and no minutes were taken with the exception of a few meetings to discuss the progress that had been made. We have to make do with telegrams, a couple of reports and Luns's report in the Dutch Cabinet.[81] Fortunately a series of intercepted telegrams, exchanged between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Jakarta and the Indonesian delegation in Geneva from 23 December up to and including 6 February, could be used to reconstruct this. The Dutch intelligence service managed to lay their hands on these via contacts with the Indonesian delegation. These offered a lot of insights into the Indonesian tactics that were applied and, especially with regard to the weak position of the Indonesian negotiating delegation and the hindrance it experienced from Jakarta, where increasing pressure was felt to quit. Externally, all parties were thrifty with their information. Public reporting limited itself on the Dutch side to a couple of press statements and a slick survey of the documents that were exchanged with some verbal commentaries for the States General.[82]

The key to understanding the sequence of events in Geneva is the weak position of Anak Agung outlined above, coupled with the unwillingness of the Dutch government to wheel and deal with regard to the New Guinea issue. As far as the former is concerned, it was already problematic that Minister Sumitro only arrived in Geneva on 4 January, so that no concrete matters could be resolved on the financial and economic issues during the first round of negotiations. This attitude hampered Anak Agung's freedom to manoeuvre to a large extent. He only had some elbow room on the matter of the Union, and the results of the meeting with Sunario could be copied here largely unchanged. With regard to everything else, the focus of the entire first phase was mainly on sounding out each other's positions.

This certainly applied to New Guinea, about which Anak Agung was careful not to reveal his hand straight away. In their joint statement of 7 December, both parties made it publicly known that they had agreed to discuss practical issues relating to New Guinea under point number 3 of the agenda with the additional provision that both parties would maintain their position with respect to the subject of sovereignty. Yet the tug-of-war here continued. During the first informal talks after the inaugural meeting on 10 December, Anak Agung confided in his colleague Luns that his delegation was realistic enough not to start asking about the transfer of sovereignty over New Guinea during the pending discussions, but that he would still have to touch upon the status quo of this area from time to time whenever practical matters came up for

discussion.[83] In actual fact, he had much heavier ammunition up his sleeves. He was carrying instructions from the Indonesian government in his pocket which stated that he had to try to establish in the text of the final declaration at the end of the conference, that West Irian had been discussed 'in accordance with the United Nations resolution'. In addition to this, he was commissioned to agree with the observation that a solution was not possible at this particular moment, on condition that both parties expressed their willingness to 'continue efforts to come to an all-round solution for the West Irian dispute, whenever one of the parties specifically requests this'. This was also the content of a draft resolution which he submitted to the Dutch delegation on 17 December. This went quite a bit further than the raw observance of the agenda and explicitly left the door open for a possible resumption of negotiations about the sovereignty issue in the future. Furthermore, as a contribution to resolve practical problems (item 4), the Indonesian side put together a complete programme to open up New Guinea to Indonesian cultural influences. Through education and the work of the Moluccan Protestant Church, the country should be granted access to the territory of New Guinea.[84] Because Anak Agung did not assume that the Netherlands would accept these issues without external pressure, the ambassadors of England, Australia and America in Jakarta were immediately summoned on his request to convene with the Prime Minister in order to ask for their support for these proposals. He himself contacted the ambassadors of these countries in The Hague. The Indonesian message at all these meetings was that if the delegation in Geneva did not succeed with this issue, this would result in Indonesia making overtures toward Russia.[85]

Heavy artillery, therefore, which did not come to much avail. Engaging the ambassadors, which was organized by Anak Agung, led to nothing more than friendly words and expressions of sympathy for Burhanuddin Harahap's Cabinet. It was completely lost on the Dutch Cabinet, which supported Luns unconditionally on the matter of sovereignty. During the informal discussions he rejected the Indonesian claim to the sovereignty of New Guinea saying that it was not possible for any Dutch government 'to agree to this point at the present time'. This was recorded in a report that was wired to Jakarta by Anak Agung. Some days later, on 23 December, Minister Luns added a little extra by stating in the Second Chamber that he would not budge 'one inch' with regard to New Guinea from that which was laid down in the agenda.[86]

The progress of the negotiations was of course also raised in the Dutch Cabinet, where they were particularly alert to the issue of New Guinea. The delegation, which was under the leadership of Luns, was therefore not authorized to make any move at all without consulting the home front first. At its meetings, the

repeated attempts made by the Indonesian negotiators to bring up the issue of sovereignty for discussion were a source of extreme annoyance. Moreover, the ministers had learned with great displeasure of the proposals that were linked to the Indonesian draft agreement that would allow the spread of Indonesian cultural influences. These were rejected out of hand, particularly by Minister Kernkamp who was responsible for governance over New Guinea. He could see little else in this other than an attempt to make the country ungovernable. The rumour began to circulate that Indonesia had two thousand educationalists waiting on stand-by to man the New Guinea education machine. This was hard to reconcile with the firm resolve to continue with the Dutch administration for the coming years. The Indonesian proposal for a '*pénétration pacifique*' therefore had to be rejected. For the same reason, the council was also not in the slightest bit impressed with furtive suggestions from 'a mediator', in which we recognize the hand of Stikker, who had discussed different models of joint administration with the Indonesian delegation. Although some ministers were still receptive to this, the majority under the leadership of Drees instantly gave this short shrift. Interim solutions which had still been open for discussion in December 1950 were now a thing of the past. The Netherlands continued to stick to its position and the commitment to be allowed to bring up the issue of sovereignty for discussion that Indonesia longed for was not open to discussion.[87]

It was against this backdrop that, on 4 January 1956, the Dutch delegation assembled under the chairmanship of Luns for the beginning of the second round of ministerial discussions in Geneva. In actual fact, the negotiations had become deadlocked on most of the points. Only the matter of the Union had been almost finalized. Before any results could be given from the perspective of financial and economic affairs, it was necessary to wait for Sumitro who was due to arrive in Geneva later in the day.[88] And of course there was the matter of New Guinea. It had already been made clear to Anak Agung, meanwhile, that his proposal of 17 December and the suggestions to go in peacefully that were linked to it would have absolutely no chance of success in the Netherlands. In a private exchange of thoughts with Jakarta, the Indonesian negotiator had indicated that he would be happy to settle for slightly less, by which he had in mind a repetition in the final statement of the formula, used under item 3 of the agenda, because that way at least the door remained open to return to this at a later date.[89] When the Dutch delegation learned of the obliging attitude of the opposition by means of the intercepted telegrams, they arrived at the formulation of an 'ultimate concession' in their internal discussion of 4 January. It did not progress any further than a vague formula in which nothing more could be said other than that 'the parties have had a preliminary exchange of ideas on

different aspects of the New Guinea issue, which shall be continued on a diplomatic level'. It was not much, but perhaps it could serve some purpose.[90]

In the days that followed, the talks were resumed at ministerial level. The matter of the disbandment of the Union was now agreed upon. Furthermore, with the arrival of Sumitro it appeared that a partial breakthrough might also be possible on the financial and economic front. When the Indonesian minister arrived in Geneva, the preliminary talks had already ended and most of the extra baggage could be sorted out within a couple of days. The fact that this worked was partly due to the good relationship between Zijlstra and Sumitro, who knew each other from their student days in Rotterdam.[91] Within only a few days they came up with workable drafts regarding the continuation of operations carried out by the Dutch business community based on the same lines of the earlier Sunario protocols. In essence, these were the RTC regulations relating to the financial and economic opportunities, but devoid of some of the more impractical provisos. The Indonesians could live with this and the final outcome also satisfied the Dutch negotiators because it secured the core interests of the Dutch business community in Indonesia. Yet their happiness was not complete. The main bone of contention continued to be the question of a Dutch demand for international arbitration in the event of a conflict. It is true that Sumitro had partially retracted his objections to an agreement in the financial and economic sphere, but he dug his heels in on this point. Based on earlier remarks made during the discussion with Anak Agung, one may conclude that the idea behind this was that Indonesia would always have a lot of leeway with respect to implementing an agreement without international arbitration. For Luns, who was familiar with this line of thinking through the intercepted telegrams, this was all the more reason to stand firm. Embedding this type of agreement in international law was not unheard of, while faith in Indonesian jurisprudence had now reached rock bottom in the Netherlands. Consequently, this issue of arbitration was taken very seriously by the Dutch delegation.[92]

A breakthrough on the issue of a final declaration on New Guinea, as proposed by Anak Agung in his draft resolution of 17 December, also failed to materialize during the subsequent negotiations. A heated discussion developed around this subject in which the Dutch stubbornly refused to submit to a slightly revised draft resolution from Anak Agung, in which the reference to the United Nations had been removed, but the possibility of coming back to the issue of sovereignty at a later stage had been left open. The possibility of the negotiations breaking down at every level hung in the air as a result of this, which is something for which Sumitro in particular was bracing himself. He based all this on an Indonesian Cabinet decree of 30 December, but this

appeared to be less severe than he had thought.[93] In a desperate attempt to at least reel in what had already been achieved Anak Agung, after consulting with the delegation and with Jakarta, managed to get permission from Burhanuddin to make do 'at the very worst' with the actual confirmation of a '*deadlock*' with regard to the issue of West Irian, without agreeing to continue with the negotiations at a later date.[94]

Now, at the conference, drafts were drawn up for a final declaration in which both the Dutch and Indonesian versions stipulated that the negotiations about agenda item 3 were postponed until further notice. That, in the eyes of Burhanuddin, was better than the absolute minimum that was required. The shoe in fact pinched in another area. In the Indonesian document it only said that negotiations were held about agenda item 3 of the joint statement of 7 December, while in the Dutch version it had been added that this took place 'with both parties maintaining their position with respect to sovereignty over West Guinea' as stipulated in Article 3.' A certain level of sensitivity for diplomatic subtlety is required to discern a substantial difference here, but for the Dutch delegation it was clear that in their own version it was expressed more effectively that no text could be accepted 'that gives the impression that sovereignty over New Guinea had been discussed'. Indeed, this would imply that it could be dealt with again after the adjournment. On the basis of the experience so far, it was in fact to be expected that Indonesia would interpret the agreement in this manner.[95] Luns therefore also rejected a new Indonesia formula which left the issue even more unresolved, but from which it could nevertheless still be construed implicitly that discussions on sovereignty had indeed taken place. As he put it in a cable to The Hague 'it should be the case that an outsider cannot and will not ever derive from a chosen formula that the Netherlands has committed itself to talk about sovereignty at a future date'.[96]

That sums up everything with regard to the main differences in opinion after the second part of the conference had been concluded. The matter was deadlocked on the issue of arbitration regarding the financial and economic agreement and on the issue of New Guinea, while there were also some outstanding Dutch demands regarding matters relating to the treatment and defence of detainees. With respect to the latter, Anak Agung could not make many promises due to the lack of cooperation from the home front, although there was a chance that he might be able to exchange a number of Dutch prisoners for Indonesian infiltrators who had been picked up by Dutch patrols during operations on the west coast of New Guinea. Both sides refrained from having any extensive discussion about the comparability of the status of both groups of prisoners, so there seemed to be some light at the end of the tunnel for this

matter. Another point under discussion was the case of the lawyer, Van Empel, who was ready to take over the defence of some of the prisoners before the high court in Jakarta from their previous lawyer, H.A. Bouman, but was refused entrance to the country.[97]

After the discussions of 7 January, both delegations issued a joint statement to the outside world in which they expressed their need to confer with their respective governments on the results that had been reached. With this statement, it was also noted that consensus could still not be reached on some important issues that were still outstanding. It was added that 'as the number of these issues decreased, it became harder to reach an agreement on the ones that were left'. It was a complicated way of saying that they were about to tackle the hot potatoes and that they did not want to burn their hands on them.[98]

In the meantime, Anak Agung's main concern had become that the Cabinet, despite Burhanuddin Harahap's positive attitude, would not be able to sign what the delegation had raked in. The threat of the delegation being recalled had been in the air since its arrival in Europe and the Indonesian negotiators in chilly Geneva often felt pressured more by the home front than by the opposition. Yet they did not want to return empty handed. In Anak Agung's opinion there was too much at stake. Not only did he believe that the agreements which had been reached on the financial and economic issues and regarding the Union were of real importance to Indonesia, but he had reason to fear in particular that the failure to reach an agreement on these issues would lead to unilateral action against Dutch interests in Indonesia, which would in turn damage Indonesia's international reputation and give a free hand to the radical forces within the country. It was a fear that held sway in government circles, especially with regard to the Masjumi, and which was shared in full by Anak Agung.[99] To keep fighting on all fronts was all that he could do now.

Initially, Anak Agung had thought that a couple of days would be enough for a brief interval after 7 January, but it would take one full month before the concluding discussions could take place. His first action was to send a telegram that same day to Jakarta, in which he painted a rosy picture of the results that had been achieved so far. The financial and economic arrangements were about to be settled, and on the issue of New Guinea the last obstacles could now be removed. The tenor of the document was that the Dutch felt pressured and would accept the Indonesian proposals in the end.[100] After sending this telegram, he left for London for a brief visit with Prime Minister Anthony Eden and his Minister of Foreign Affairs, Selwyn Lloyd. This visit was agreed on earlier and was now quite expedient as he could at any rate try to garner English

support for his policy.[101] Rum left for The Hague to lobby there for the good cause, while the remaining members of the delegation were ordered to use their influence on the home front.

In the weeks after 7 January there was a constant flow of telegrams from all the members of the delegation to their fellow party members and to the government in Jakarta. In these, they pledged to leave room for further negotiations. Even Sumitro rose to the occasion: on 8 January he cabled the PSI chairman Subadio Sastrosatomo that the agreements that had been reached were fine and could be signed. He also nonchalantly omitted the fact that these 'agreements' on a number of essential issues were merely Indonesian propositions that had not been taken on board by the Dutch delegation. His additional remark is especially noteworthy, namely that signing the agreements that had been reached on the Union, as well as the financial and economic agreements, was essential from a business point of view, and that the government could always delay signing to put pressure on the Dutch for further concessions regarding West Irian.[102] In The Hague, where Luns set eyes on this telegram, Sumitro's outpourings were read with resentment. It was the umpteenth proof, yet again, of Indonesian duplicity. The Dutch minister could console himself with the thought that it was to no avail. Despite its appealing portrayal in Anak Agung's telegram, the results of 7 January did not go down that well in the internally divided Cabinet. On 13 January, the ministers of the Nahdatul Ulama and the PSII resigned and three days later the members of the delegation were ordered to return home for further discussions. Sukarno was spearheading the resistance to further negotiations. Failure for Anak Agung's mission hung in the air.[103]

At the same time, this Indonesian chief negotiator returned from London where he had tried to turn up the pressure on the Netherlands even more in order to coerce Luns into accepting his more broad formulation of the final statement concerning New Guinea after all.[104] He promised Selwyn Lloyd not to utter the words 'New Guinea' for five years, nor to bring the matter before the United Nations if the Netherlands just wanted to accept a formula 'which would establish that the discussions on this agenda item had been held and were postponed'. Although the English government had made it known to Ambassador Stikker on several occasions that it did not want to interfere in the negotiations between the Netherlands and Indonesia, Selwyn Lloyd deemed it worthwhile to order his ambassador in The Hague, Paul Mason, to relay this message to Luns. This, indeed, seemed to be an interesting addition to the concepts that were discussed in Geneva, but it did not touch upon the heart of the matter. Consequently, Luns replied that 'the Dutch government is willing to accept a formula which makes it clear to any objective outsider that the

Netherlands had not been prepared to talk now or later on the issue of sovereignty, despite the fact that we know full well that Indonesia will misuse such a formula'. He considered the proposal to be inadequate as it did not refer explicitly to the Dutch position with regard to sovereignty. As is apparent from his report, the minister added that such a promise would not be of much use, since New Guinea one way or the other would certainly be brought before the United Nations that year, while the political life of Anak Agung was rapidly ending. No further comments were made from the British side, so this part of Anak Agung's plan of action was concluded without any results.[105]

Back in Geneva, Anak Agung immediately tried to salvage what he could. On 14 January, he issued press releases to confirm the impression to the outside world that an agreement had practically been reached on 7 January which was now just waiting to be signed.[106] The government in Jakarta was also surprised once more by the upbeat image of the situation, which indicates that Rum's lobbying activities in The Hague with the Labour Party, some members of the Catholic Party and Luns himself had paid dividends, so that there was a good chance here that the contested issues could be resolved in accordance with Indonesia's wishes. Anak Agung stated that the Netherlands was in a tricky position because of his tactics and strategy. It had made huge concessions which it could no longer back out of without risking severe consequences. He adopted Sumitro's tactics in his explanation to Burhanuddin: the delegation wished to be granted the authorization to sign the package of proposals which it had offered as they now lay there. If the Netherlands accepted that, the battle was won, while the Cabinet could always come back on it by stipulating further conditions. If the Netherlands refused, then the blame would fall on their shoulders. To lend even more weight to it, this stance was recorded in a common resolution of the entire delegation.[107]

Burhanuddin made grateful use of these reports. In Jakarta, all of the party leaders were informed about this and the NU in particular was placed under pressure because the demand to withdraw the delegation 'regardless' of the results was voiced most loudly from their corner. At any rate, the direct result was that the Cabinet did a U-turn regarding its decision. Ten out of twelve parties in government submitted to the arguments put forward by the delegation and approved the document described by Anak Agung as 'the results of the conference'. On 19 January, the message arrived in Geneva that the Harahap Cabinet had given permission to go on with the conference after all and to make the best of it. However, the call to withdraw the delegation had not been silenced in the speech-making political circles in Jakarta.[108] It was of the greatest importance to Anak Agung that the Netherlands would act swiftly now, but Luns did not show much willingness. When the Indonesian delegate Kwee

visited him in The Hague on 20 January to insist on a continuation of the discussions, he saw this primarily as a good opportunity to point out that an agreement had been a long way off on 7 January. In addition, he made it clear that he did not care much for the prospect of being presented with a delegation at the next meeting which had nothing more to offer than what he had already dismissed on a previous occasion.[109] In the days that followed, messages from Jakarta arrived which seemed to indicate that there was some scope for leeway in the Indonesian negotiation position.[110] This seemed to be confirmed by a visit from Kwee and Utojo to Drees on Sunday 29 January, during which they asked for Dutch counter proposals on the issues that had been left hanging on 7 January. Contrary to the specific instructions from Jakarta only to sign what had been cabled, they apparently spotted an opportunity to negotiate. Drees kept both diplomats at bay with the remark that one could hardly send a Dutch delegation to Geneva to sign an ultimatum. His counter proposal was quickly to arrive at a final statement which would confirm that an agreement was still a long way off.

That, however, was a little too abrupt. His Indonesian guests did not agree with this proposal and when Drees mentioned the visit at the Cabinet meeting the next day he also had to face his fellow party member Mansholt and the AR Minister Zijlstra. They were of the opinion that normal talks should be resumed first from the point at which they had been left on 7 January. An additional incentive for this was that Anak Agung could now come up with some concessions with regard to the detainees. The lawyer Van Empel would get his visa at last. Moreover, a proposal could be made to exchange 14 Dutch prisoners for 23 Indonesian infiltrators who had been taken into custody in New Guinea. Although this would have to be settled outside the framework of the delegations, it represented a windfall for the negotiations. Anak Agung had already discussed a similar concession with his hosts during his visit to England and had conveyed to Burhanuddin that he expected that, by doing so, he could apply English pressure on the Netherlands. Luns, who was aware of this, considered this to be a dangerous development. Even more so because Anak Agung had made it known in his internal discussions with Jakarta that admitting Van Empel to Indonesia did not mean that he would have access to the defence, because this had to be decided by the court. It seemed as if a new stage in the blame game had been reached. To underline this, a stream of press releases from Jakarta made it clear that, on the Indonesian side, one was actively working towards attributing the deadlock in the negotiations to the unwillingness of the Netherlands. In order to turn up the pressure a little more, Anak Agung made it known on 3 February from Geneva that he would leave for Rome the

following day if the Dutch were not willing to negotiate. For Luns, all these issues combined were sufficient indication that he needed to act and so he set off the following day for Geneva.[111]

Under these circumstances, the members of the Dutch delegation who stayed behind in the city did not have high expectations that the discussions would be resumed. From Blom's pencilled notes, one can gather that they thought it would not last longer than a day. It really came down to a formal closure of the conference with a joint final statement that would save face for both parties. Anak Agung apparently expected more. When Luns arrived, he was visibly extremely relieved that his ultimatum had achieved the desired effect. It is not clear what his optimism was based on. It had required considerable effort on his part to obtain authorization for the discussions to be resumed and he had not made any progress beyond offering his own report of 7 January to his Dutch opponents to sign on the basis of 'take it or leave it'. However, Burhanuddin had shown himself to be a bit more accommodating to Van Bylandt in Jakarta. A written request from the High Commissioner to clarify the questions that remained had not been answered but, after insisting for a long time, a spokesman of Burhanudin had finally been content with a vague announcement that the answer should be left to the delegations. When questioned, the official explained that his Prime Minister would like to see a positive result, because this would strengthen his position at the forthcoming formation of the Cabinet. In this, he counted on the support of 18 minority seats in parliament, while the cooperation with the Netherlands, according to his judgement, was still valued within the Nahdatul Ulama.[112] There is no indication that Anak Agung was familiar with the contents of this conversation. The outcome was that he only wanted to talk about 'clearing up possible misunderstandings' at the start of the third Ministerial round of negotiations.

In an attempt to show that he wished to be candid and upfront, Anak Agung confessed his difficulties on the home front during a private lunch meeting with Luns on the first day of the conference. His Dutch colleague, who was already informed via press releases and secret channels, was not impressed and appeared to be mainly interested in the subject of the arrests, on which he wanted binding decisions instead of vague promises. It also hurt that Van Empel could now get a visa, but that both partners in the discussion were well aware of the fact that this did not mean that he would be granted access to the defence by the court. This discussion took place against a sinister background, because earlier that same day a protest of about one hundred youths had taken place before the high court building in Jakarta, where they had demanded the death penalty for the accused Schmidt. The public prosecutor had made an appearance outside, where he praised the protesters for their efforts and

promised them that their request would be seriously considered. In addition, a parliamentary session took place in Jakarta that same day, where Burhanuddin now also publicly stated that the Netherlands had to learn to live with the results of '7 January' and that the delegation knew what to do if the Netherlands was not prepared to do this. The Prime Minister spoke in response to a series of critical questions that were posed by the PNI member, Abdul Moeis, about the proceedings in Geneva. He applauded the significance of the agreements of 7 January and attributed the Dutch hesitation to sign these to their desire to return to the old relationships. From the discussions of Van Bylandt with Minister Sardjan and Burhanuddin we can deduce that the Prime Minister had to find a middle way between his wish to conclude the negotiations in an acceptable manner and that of a suspicious opposition, which was hell bent on degrading its opponent. His tone towards the Netherlands was as friendly as it could be under the circumstances, and at the end of his speech, Burhanuddin expressed the hope that, with this, the anxiety psychosis of the interpellators vis-à-vis the Netherlands would be taken away and that Anak Agung had not conducted a policy that could jeopardize the state and people of Indonesia.

These events in Jakarta showed that it was impossible for Anak Agung and his supporters to make any concessions to what in fact were the Indonesian propositions of 7 January, which were now being peddled, without further ado, as the outcome of joint negotiations. However, the ensuing talks lasted longer than the Netherlands deemed appropriate and, according to Anak Agung, they proceeded to focus themselves fully on the question of arbitration.[113] No substantial headway was made on this matter. Some variants of how it could work in practice were discussed, but the original positions were not relinquished by either party. The pressure on the Indonesian delegation was expanded during the conference because the parliamentary backing of the Cabinet was caving in even further. A message arrived at the Indonesian High Commission in The Hague on 11 February which stated that President Sukarno was to appoint a person from the PNI to form a cabinet on 1 March. The Indonesian Commission immediately relayed this highly confidential message to the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which in turn enlightened the Dutch delegation in Geneva. The days of the Cabinet were now numbered and, that same day, Harahap informed Van Bylandt that it was not politically possible for the Indonesian government to accept an arrangement regarding arbitration that went beyond what had been proposed by the Indonesian delegation on 7 January. He added that the government would have to consider a more radical stance should the delegation return empty-handed from Geneva.[114]

In Geneva, where Anak Agung had been previously aware of this government decision, the moment of truth had arrived. For the Netherlands it was a

question of 'take it or leave it', not only on the matter of arbitration but undoubtedly about the other points too if they were still to be raised, with New Guinea at the top of the list. At the end of the day, the Netherlands still adopted the position that an agreement could only be signed if consensus had been reached on all four agenda points. Of course, this was out of the question now that even the dispute about arbitration had not been resolved. After he informed Anak Agung of the fact that concessions with regard to arbitration were out of the question, Luns concluded that the wording was too divergent and that agreement was impossible. His opponent could do nothing other than confirm this. In their declarations during the closing session in the great hall of the Des Bergues hotel, both parties concluded that the negotiations had run aground. Anak Agung extensively summed up what had been achieved and what was still left hanging. Of course he did not omit the fact that the Dutch delegation had refused seriously to contemplate the Indonesian proposals with regard to New Guinea. Yet, in the joint final statement the failure was solely attributed to the conflict on arbitration, which can be interpreted as an attempt by both parties to marginalize the stalemate.[115]

There are a lot of wild stories in circulation about the failure of the conference. Rumours about intercepted telegrams led to shady debates in the literature. The central pivot is formed by a claim by Luns that he had led Anak Agung into a trap in the final round, in which he had been able to make use of the fact that he had knowledge of the correspondence between the Indonesian delegation and the government in Jakarta. The latter was indeed the case, which undoubtedly strengthened the bargaining power of the Dutch and must have given Anak Agung a rather strange feeling from time to time. The classic story, as recorded by Michel van der Plas by word of mouth from Luns, reads that during the closing session of 11 February, he granted all the Indonesian wishes that had been stated previously with a grand gesture, knowing full well that Anak Agung had been instructed to refuse everything. Consequently, the Indonesian minister, based on his binding instruction, would have to dismiss this unequivocally, which would prove Indonesia's unwillingness to negotiate beyond any doubt. This series of events is unlikely, even if only because Luns did not leave the Indonesians holding the baby at a time when it could have been politically favourable. Actually, Luns himself stated in his report that was wired immediately after the conclusion of the meeting to The Hague and Jakarta, that the conference had failed because 'the Indonesian delegates refused to accept an agreement on arbitration'. His own reports, and those of Van Bijlandt, supplemented with an exchange of telegrams between Anak Agung and his home base, offers opportunities for a better reconstruction and enables us to reveal

this account as one that belongs in the category of tall stories of the type that Luns was eager to tell.

There is more that points us in this direction. In the fictional account, an order from Sukarno himself to put a stop to the meetings is mentioned. As we have seen, the President's aversion to the negotiations can indeed be deduced from the public and secret accounts that are available. The report of Van Bijlandt from Jakarta is abundant testimony to this. A telegram which clearly bears his name, as Luns put it, was however not present in the collection that Blom meticulously kept together. On top of that, one has to agree with Anak Agung when he says that Sukarno was not formally authorized to give such an order. Therefore, it is rather improbable that things did happen that way.[116]

Technically, the conference failed because the parties could not, or would not, agree on the issues of arbitration and New Guinea. It should be noted that the Netherlands could have at least compromised a bit further and without too many objections on the issue of arbitration: something that was urged by both the High Commissioner as well as the representatives of the business community. The Dutch government, headed by Luns and Drees, did not wish to do so. The responsibility demonstrably rests on its shoulders, a fact which cannot disappear in a puff of smoke as in a fairytale. However, we should not underestimate the strategic element in their choice. If an agreement on the issue of arbitration had been reached, the negotiations would almost certainly have ground to a halt on the issue of New Guinea. The Netherlands was, after all, resolutely unwilling to enter into a discussion on content with Indonesia. In Geneva, Anak Anung was not even granted the most modest helping hand in this respect. Just like the missions of Supomo and Sunario, the government clearly wanted to convey the fact that they did not wish to hear another word on the matter. It was the reaction of an angry father towards a whingeing child. The question was whether this could be kept up.

However, there is another side to the coin. It is worth taking note of Anak Agung's complaint to Burhanuddin on 8 January 1956, that discussions about the practical issues under agenda item 3 were doomed to fail because the game of musical chairs regarding the sovereignty started all over again whenever New Guinea was mentioned.[117] Indeed, the core of the business at hand centred around this for both parties. Moreover, there was the blatant refusal on the Dutch side to discuss under item 4 the cultural cooperation described by them as a *pénetration pacifique*. Yet it did not happen, and it seems unlikely that there would still have been a possibility for the realization of some form of cultural cooperation which implied the presence of great numbers of Indonesian teachers on territory administered by the Dutch. Agreements on this would not have

prevented the fall of Burhanuddin and its implementation would certainly have led to extreme tension between the Netherlands and Indonesia. Relations had changed since 1950 and there was a lack of trust on both sides. Moreover, the Netherlands had now taken the education of the Papuans into their own hands once and for all, and did not want any disruption of this self-imposed task.

The accompanying discussions in Indonesian circles prove that the issues at hand in Geneva were mainly of rhetorical value there. Agreement with the Netherlands was not the main issue, but rather an asset in the internal struggle for power. An agreement that would not touch upon the heart of the matter or postponed it to a faraway, unspecified future date would not have stopped the radicals from taking further action. Further developments revealed what had been more or less hidden up until then. Subsequent decolonization should not happen gradually, but quickly and completely. A complete Dutch surrender was Indonesia's primary goal from now on.

The Cabinet of Burhanuddin Harahap had done its utmost to reach an agreement with the Netherlands. This policy was mainly supported by the Masjumi and both Christian parties, tentatively supported by the PSI, NU and PSII and implemented against the will of Sukarno, the PNI, the PKI and a number of small radical parties. Burhanuddin stayed on this course, even after the withdrawal of the PSII and the NU on 17 January. On 7 February, which was the eve of the last round of negotiations in Geneva, he had still vehemently defended this in parliament. On this occasion he had rejected the hard-line politics with regard to New Guinea which the opposition craved, 'because this would not be feasible under the current circumstances'. According to the Prime Minister, government policy was based on the reality that the Netherlands in fact had complete control over New Guinea and that the super powers supported Dutch sovereignty over that area. In his opinion, the position of the Netherlands had increased in strength since 1952 so that it could afford to declare that there was no conflict anymore.[119] The underlying reason for this view was that Burhanuddin was convinced that an agreement with the Netherlands was the only way to maintain a pro-Western course. Because 'when that failed the dogs were out of the kennel', as his fellow party member Sardjan told the Dutch High Commissioner Van Bylandt at the same time. The communists, the President and other forces waited for an opportunity to deploy an anti-Dutch policy, and not just for high level political reasons. They were also longing to confiscate the wealthy Dutch possessions. A few days later, Burhanuddin confirmed the accuracy of this communication to Van Bylandt.[120] At that moment, the time when something could be achieved through talks was over. To Anak Agung and Burhanuddin, 'Geneva' had been

a desperate attempt to turn the tide. The closing speech made by Leimena expressed their fears. In the last meeting of both delegations in Geneva, this Ambonese politician stated that he was deeply impressed with what was looming on the horizon. Failure would have consequences of such a nature that he almost dared not put them into words. 'I say this as a personal friend, Christian, a friend of the Netherlands, and a government representative.'[121] Anak Agung returned home an embittered man. He had squandered his last shred of credibility by betting on the Dutch horse once again. A few years later he disappeared into prison, together with Sutan Sjahir and Mohammed Rum, on trumped-up charges of conspiracy against Sukarno.[122]

Chapter 6

Direct Rule from The Hague

A new system of government

We rounded off the preceding chapter with an account of the failed Geneva conference. This created an even greater rift between Indonesia and the Netherlands, which will be discussed in the following chapters. Meanwhile, since the end of the Round Table Conference, the Netherlands had ruled western New Guinea directly and framed its own policies for the Papuans. These policies were dependent on higher-level political decisions, but developments in the field also played a role. The two processes were interactive and can, in fact, only be analysed in their mutual dependence. This is the point, therefore, at which we should review the course of events in the island, from which we temporarily took our leave in chapter two.

On 27 December 1949 two carefully co-ordinated ceremonies took place in Amsterdam and Batavia. In Amsterdam, Queen Juliana signed the act of transfer of sovereignty to the Republic of the United States of Indonesia. According to Clause 1 of the Charter ratified thereby, the transfer was total, unconditional and irrevocable. At the same time, the palace in Batavia, which now bore the name Jakarta for the Dutch as well, was the scene of the actual transfer of government. According to Article 2 of the said Charter, the area to which this applied was that of the former Netherlands East Indies, minus the residency of New Guinea, for which a solution would have to be found within the next year via negotiations between the two parties, now facing each other as equals. The immediate consequence of this was that Van Eechoud at the same time issued a proclamation in Hollandia informing the inhabitants of the now former residency that they had become the inhabitants of the Dutch-administered *Gouvernement* (Province) of New Guinea, 'the general

government of which is to be exercised by the Governor as representative of our revered Queen'.

These events in The Hague, Jakarta and Hollandia ushered in a new phase in relations between the Netherlands and Indonesia. It would not deliver what the supporters of a new form of co-operation had imagined, for which both the Netherlands and Indonesia were to blame. The Dutch had difficulty in suppressing their old reflexes and expectations with respect to Indonesia, and anything different provoked disappointment and resentment. All things considered, Indonesian feelings ran deeper, however. In the Netherlands, feelings with respect to Indonesia soon became less intense when it became apparent that the country was able to keep its head above water on the world stage without the slightest difficulty even after the loss of its largest colony. In Indonesia, the aftermath of the struggle for independence continued to influence the attitude of the new state. This struggle had, after all, taken place on Indonesian soil and had inflicted the deepest wounds there. In addition, the Indonesians obviously had had a keener sense of the crisis of identity that went hand in hand with the rise and spread of the new nationalism. Furthermore, in the Netherlands decolonization did not lead to any drastic change in the existing internal balance of political power. The Drees-Van Schaik Cabinet continued to rule on peacefully after 27 December 1949. In Indonesia, things were different. There the winning party now faced the huge task of reorganizing the country with limited resources. In the creation of a new balance of power, revolutionary fervour and the role played in the struggle for independence proved to play an important part. This to a large extent explains the continuing acerbity of the attitude of important Indonesian groupings towards the Netherlands. Under these circumstances the Union was an obvious non-starter. This gave rise to a massive exodus of Dutch nationals working and living in Indonesia, the last big wave leaving the country in the first months of 1958.

The Netherlands could do little about this course of affairs other than express its disapproval and deal as effectively as possible with the influx of their repatriates from Indonesia. The resultant feelings of resentment without any doubt exacerbated existing Dutch unwillingness to find a solution, together with the Indonesians, to the disagreement about New Guinea that had arisen at the Round Table Conference. On the Indonesian side, New Guinea increasingly became a major factor in anti-Dutch agitation. In the years between 1958 and 1962 this threatened to develop into a serious international conflict that was to be fought out by military means. The conflict finally ended on 15 August 1962, when the two contending parties concluded an agreement, under the auspices of the United Nations in New York, which provided for the transfer of

the contested region to Indonesia. This put a definite end to the period of Dutch rule of western New Guinea.

These developments will be discussed in greater detail in the remainder of this study. In the present chapter, internal developments in the island in the period 1950–1962 will be described. It is impossible to treat these in isolation from Dutch relations with Indonesia, however. Roughly speaking, three distinct periods can be distinguished here. In the first year following the transfer of sovereignty the situation remained reasonably open, as the term in which some sort of arrangement was to be worked out, agreed upon at the Round Table Conference, had not yet lapsed. The failure of the New Guinea Conference in December 1950 clinched matters to some extent, but failed to deliver a solution. The Netherlands acted as it saw fit, but Indonesia did not relinquish its claim to the area. This led to the Indonesians' putting increasing pressure on the Dutch to decide to hand over the area. Initially the Dutch did not take this very seriously, and appeared to be prepared to pay the price of deteriorating relations with Indonesia. As far as New Guinea was concerned, Dutch policy was directed at a determined, though not precipitate, development of the region. When, from the end of the 1950s onward, it became increasingly clear that a military conflict with Indonesia might be a serious possibility, something of a shift took place, both in international political relations and in Dutch resolution. The Dutch response was an attempt to accelerate the process of educating the Papuans, with a view to enabling them to decide their own fate. At the same time, Dutch politics revealed a clearer wish to share responsibility for the island with other powers. Besides the term 'right of self-determination', 'internationalization' became one of the magic words with which the Netherlands tried to hold back the tide.

In New Guinea itself, reactions to the establishment of the new regime in 1949 were mixed. Especially in the larger coastal towns in the west, which had a population of several thousand Indonesians, events were watched with some scepticism. This was the case also in Serui, on Geelvink Bay, where since the days of Ratulangi Indonesian nationalism had taken root. But for the rest we may safely take civil servant Merkelijn's word for it where he observes that there was phenomenal joy among the Papuans.[1] We should hasten to make the obvious reservation here that this only applied to those living in areas under Dutch rule, who had some idea of what was going on. It was nevertheless an important factor, as what was at stake was the foundation for a modern Papuan society that was to be built here. For Van Eechoud, too, this was a great moment. His joy was mixed, however, and with good reason. At that particular point in time, he had just returned from The Hague, where he had accompanied Ariks, Jouwe and Kaisiepo on their reconnaissance tour. While there, he had been in contact

with the necessary members of government and officials of the Department of Overseas Territories, though these contacts had remained fairly limited. For example, he had not been asked for an opinion on the new principles of government. Although he had been able to talk to Van Maarseveen about his own position, the results had been disappointing. Van Eechoud had taken it for granted that in the new situation he would be the head of government in the region that had now been prised loose from Indonesia. Van Maarseveen had initially been in favour of this, too, but had later received mixed advice about it. In light of the afore-going, it should come as no surprise that Van Eechoud's candidacy was not supported by the higher Indies colonial officials who were still running the show in Batavia in the last weeks of 1949. Among them he had always had a reputation for high-handedness, while his knowledge of administrative procedures had not been above criticism. They did not fail to make this known to The Hague.

Of his three Papuan companions on this journey, Jouwe and Kaisiepo had argued forcefully in favour of '*bapak*' Van Eechoud's appointment. For them there was no conceivable alternative. Nevertheless Ariks, the *primus inter pares*, held the opposite view. In Jouwe's opinion, this was due to Ariks' contacts with the Protestant mission headquarters in Oegstgeest, where the Roman Catholic Van Eechoud was not exactly highly thought of. His appointment met with opposition from the department and Cabinet as well, where his 'inadequate education' was deemed a sufficiently strong argument against. He had, after all, originally been an ordinary chief of police, instead of an academically trained *Binnenlands Bestuur* official. Eventually the choice had fallen on S.L.J. van Waardenburg, who had been a close associate of H. van der Wal at the political reform bureau in Batavia since the 1930s. As such, he was also Van Eechoud's immediate superior during the final years of Dutch rule in Indonesia.[2] Van Waardenburg was a man with an impressive knowledge of all the ins and outs of the Batavian bureaucracy, now in the process of rapid dismantlement, but with very limited experience in the field. His experience of New Guinea was restricted to an official tour of inspection of the region in 1948, which had culminated in an extremely negative judgement of the Resident's abilities as an administrator. Van Waardenburg was praised by everyone for his great integrity. For Van Maarseveen the arguments put forward by his department had evidently been decisive, and in December the former chief of police had returned to Hollandia a bitter man, although he had not given up all hope of a comeback. He signed the proclamation as acting governor.

The separation of West New Guinea from Indonesia called for a new administrative arrangement. This was introduced on the basis of a new enabling act, which

was passed by the two houses of the States General in the final days of December.[3] The latter stipulated that Dutch administration would be continued on the basis of the legal regulations and administrative rules applying to Indonesia up to then, as far as these were applicable under the changed circumstances. The new conditions were formulated in the *Bewindsregeling van Nieuw-Guinea* (Rules of Government for New Guinea).[4] It had become a lengthy document, not only as a result of the bureaucratic predilection for small details, but also because Van Maarseveen wanted it to embody some kind of a programme which the Netherlands might present to the outside world without embarrassment. It provided, for instance, for local advisory councils, while the seventy-second and last article even announced some sort of a representative body for the whole of the territory. This was the New Guinea Council, half of which was to be made up of 'indigenous, non-Dutch subjects'. In view of the actual situation in the country, this obviously referred to Papuans, although the concept clearly was way ahead of its time. It was not till 1961 that a council of this kind materialized, but even then this came about under pressure of the international situation rather than inspired by the conviction that the Papuans were ripe for it at that point.

At a lower level, some experiments in organized consultation of the population were conducted prior to this. In 1952 an advisory council for the North New Guinea administrative region was created, the majority of the members of which were Papuans. A few years later, in 1955, similar councils were formed in a number of carefully selected districts and in the larger coastal towns. On that occasion the *Kankain Kankara Biak*, comprising the assembled clan heads, which had been introduced by *Controleur* De Bruijn back in 1948, underwent some modernization as well. It could hardly be said to be a democratic institution even in later years, but in any case it made itself regularly heard and satisfied the needs of time and place.

In other places, too, various *controleurs* experimented with advisory councils of their own making at the village or district level. Doubtless the main use of these councils was that they provided an opportunity for disseminating government information, but in the governor's view also for sounding out the people's wishes regarding the structure and delimitation of slightly larger demographic units. There was not really any question of the Papuan community exercising pressure for the extension of this system of councils. The opposite was true of the advisory councils in the larger towns, in particular that of Hollandia, whose Dutch members had a tendency to interpret these councils in terms of modern municipal councils that should have control over their own budgets. The governor did not want to hear of anything of the sort, fearing that if councils had this control, the small group of Europeans in the towns would appropriate too large a portion of the available budget.[5]

All in all, these local councils in the first years of the new regime should be regarded primarily as experiments, which were more significant as evidence of a democratic attitude than of any corresponding practice in reality, even though they did have some relevance as training schools in modern government. Quite a different matter, and certainly something of more immediate importance, was the Council of Department Heads, instituted in 1950. The heads concerned were those in charge of a number of general administration departments, who had to take over tasks that in the old situation had been performed by the various departments in Batavia. Initially, due economy had been practised in the creation of such departments, and no more than four had been brought into being. Van Eechoud became the first head of the Department of Internal Administration and Justice. Then there was a Department of Economic and Technical Affairs (DETA). Its head was a very powerful man, as in the next years a complete infrastructure of roads, homes and government offices had to be put in place. In addition there were the Department of Finance and the multi-functional Department of Health, Social and Cultural Affairs. By 1954, the central organization had evolved to the extent that there were then eight general government departments in existence.

The heads of these departments were the ordinary members of the Council of Department Heads. Its extraordinary members were the commanders of navy and army units attached to New Guinea, and the public prosecutor. The secretarial duties for it were performed by a government secretary. The council was essentially an advisory body to the governor. As long as the New Guinea Council, intended as a co-legislative body, was not yet formed, its role was played temporarily by the Council of Department Heads. So it was customary, for instance, for the governor to leave the meeting whenever there were new decrees on the agenda. This represented a symbolic recognition of the principle of the division of powers accepted in Dutch constitutional law. In February 1951 an Indigenous Affairs Office was established, which was headed by the earlier mentioned official, Dr. J. van Baal. This office was primarily intended as a research centre, to which straightaway a number of anthropologists were appointed. They were J.H.M.C. Boelaars, K.W. Galis, and our old friend J.V. de Bruijn, who was sent off to Leiden for a year first, however, to learn the ropes of the profession from Professor J.P.B. de Josselin de Jong. Van Baal was additionally appointed to the post of Director of Education. He furthermore became chairman of an expert body bearing the name Indigenous Education Council. It was composed of representatives of the missions, complemented by various civil service specialists. Here subjects like education, language, health care, housing and labour relations were discussed at great length at meetings stretching over several days, which were held at irregular intervals. All in all, it

was a rather aloof body, which only possessed advisory powers and in which the missions put themselves forward as representatives of the people. Initially Nicolaas Jouwe was its only Papuan member. The Council of Department Heads frequently took offence at its pronouncements, and viewed it as a sectarian rival. As a rule its recommendations were wide-ranging, but took a long time to crystallize even partially into concrete policy. Under Van Waardenburg, the Indigenous Education Council met several times.[6] Under Van Baal, who as governor appeared to have little appreciation for the recommendations of this body, which up till then he had chaired with a certain degree of conviction, it was never convened at all. It only met again after Platteel came into office as governor in 1958. It then had the more ambitious name Indigenous Development Council bestowed on it, to indicate that it had broadened its scope. It now was allowed a larger Papuan membership, including the vice-chairman of the synod, the Reverend Mr. Rumainum. After meeting a few more times, it was discontinued in 1961, when the New Guinea Council was finally established.

Like the former governor general of the Netherlands East Indies, the governor of New Guinea was in charge of the general administration on behalf of the queen. As a counterbalance to any potential absolutist tendencies on his part, the department heads were appointed by the Crown, while the governor, though chairman of the Council of Department Heads, only had an advisory voice in this body. Under these circumstances, an energetic department head might accomplish a great deal. Thus the first DGSCA succeeded as early as 1951 in having a modern psychiatric hospital constructed in Hollandia—for which there was no staff—while there was an enormous backlog in the construction of homes and offices. Van Waardenburg was not much inclined to interfere. The easiest way for the governor to preserve his independence was by keeping the frequency of this council's meetings as low as possible, at the expense of co-ordination between the various resolutions it passed. In the long run, better overall administrative co-ordination was achieved as set patterns became more firmly embedded in daily practice, and also as a result of the fact that the two later governors had greater authority than that which Van Waardenburg could boast.

Not only were the upper administrative levels in Hollandia reinforced in 1950, as a consequence of the change of status of the area, but also an important upgrade of the regional administration took place. As a result of the conversion of the residency of New Guinea into a *gouvernement*, it had become necessary to raise the status of the three former administrative divisions, implying a significant promotion for the assistant residents, who were now in charge of the administration of these. Henceforward they were entitled to style themselves

'resident' of their respective districts, without these areas immediately being granted the status of a former Netherlands East Indies residency. The co-ordination of the various branches of the administration, for which in the East Indies situation the Resident had been responsible, for the time being remained in the safe hands of the central administration in Hollandia.[7] The head of the department of internal affairs and justice was the most obvious person to perform this task, though the governor and the other departmental heads might likewise maintain direct contacts with the residents. Hence this, too, was a measure that generated much uncertainty. As a result, it would take time for practicable procedures to evolve.[8]

The *Bewindsregeling* created a miniature Netherlands East Indies, with its administrative headquarters in Hollandia showing decided similarities to that in former Batavia. It was headed by a governor, who was in charge of the organization as a whole. He was responsible first and foremost for the protection of the indigenous people, and towards this end could decide matters of life and death for his subjects. He was also supreme commander of all army and navy units stationed in New Guinea. Even so, his powers were more limited than those of his predecessor in Batavia. Under the provisions of its Constitution of 1925, the East Indies government enjoyed a considerable measure of independence vis-à-vis The Hague, which in essence was a corollary of the fact that it was able to pay its own way. Poorly equipped, underdeveloped and destitute New Guinea did not have a hope of attaining anything like this position. The revenues from the taxes it could impose independently were far outstripped by the needs of the administration. Financing took place on the basis of a 'government grant', which constituted a separate item on the budget of the *Ministerie van Overzeese Rijksdelen* (Department of Overseas Territories) annually. It was initially set at ten million guilders, but gradually increased to fifty million in the 1950s, to rise to about 83 million at the end of the Dutch period. As a result of the separation from Batavia and Macassar, some of the tasks performed there up to then were relocated to Hollandia, though the bulk shifted to the department in The Hague. In The Hague there was not only availability of cash, but also greater expertise in virtually every field. The Hague, for instance, prepared the laws and regulations with respect to salaries, taxes, and import and excise duties. The department there also took care of the acquisitions for the administration in New Guinea and maintained necessary relations with the business and academic world.

In The Hague the *Ministerie van Overzeese Gebiedsdelen* (Department of Overseas Territories) was continued after 1950 as that of *Uniezaken en Overzeese Rijksdelen* (Union Affairs and Overseas Territories). When in 1952 Union affairs were transferred to the Department of External Affairs, the words

'*Uniezaken en*' were dropped from the relevant former department's name. At the formation of a new cabinet in 1956, this *Ministerie van Overzeese Rijksdelen* was re-christened *Ministerie van Zaken Overzee* (Department of Overseas Affairs). Three years later, this melodious name was dropped as well. The department lost its independence, and its various divisions were accommodated within the *Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken* (Department of Internal Affairs). These vicissitudes notwithstanding, the organization in The Hague displayed considerable stability in its personnel. The core of this was comprised by two sterling officials detached from the East Indies administration, Messrs B. Krijger and A.M. Kottier. They were practical men of action, who provoked the successive governors' irritation as well as inspiring their appreciation.[9] The latter could always be sure they were under close scrutiny as well as guidance. After the loss of the capital of the East Indies, New Guinea became the foster-child of The Hague.

Notwithstanding the assertiveness of his officials, in the department in The Hague of course the show was run by the minister, who maintained direct relations with the governor. In Hollandia, there were three successive governors in the period until 1962, namely S.L.J. van Waardenburg (who took office on 8 February 1950), J. van Baal (24 April 1953), and P.J. Platteel (1 May 1958). They served under five successive cabinets in the mother country. The Drees-Van Schaik Cabinet, which had been responsible for the transfer of sovereignty, was followed from March 1951 onwards by three cabinets headed by Drees alone. Then, between December 1958 and May 1959, there was a short-lived cabinet headed by Beel, followed by that led by the KVP (Catholic People's Party) member J.E. de Quay, which served out its full time until 1963. The office of Minister of Overseas Territories and so on was first occupied by the KVP members Van Maarseveen (until 15 March 1951) and F.H. Peters (until 2 September 1952), both of them assisted by the independent minister without portfolio L. Götzen. Then followed the CHU (Christian Historical Union) members W.J.A. Kernkamp (until his death in July 1956), C. Staf (until 14 February 1957), and G.Ph. Helders (until 19 May 1959), and, finally, the KVP member Th.H. Bot. The latter was not an independent minister, but as state secretary was an adjunct of the minister of the interior, E.H. Toxopeus, a prominent member of the VVD (People's Party for Freedom and Democracy).

All the cabinets in this period were coalition cabinets, made up of ministers from the PvdA (Labour Party), the VVD, and the religious parties. Initially the latter were all KVP or CHU members, but after the second Drees Cabinet took office in September 1952, the neo-calvinist ARP also shared in the duties of government. This was a broad coalition, whose instability was the result

primarily of differences of opinion about socio-economic issues. With regard to overseas affairs, the Protestant parties were most vociferous. In the turbulent days of the Indonesian struggle for independence they had been mostly in opposition. Now, in the final days of colonial rule, they were able to make up for lost time. From September 1952 till May 1959 the CHU furnished the ministers for overseas dependencies, while the post of governor, after the independent (though Protestant) Van Waardenburg stepped down, was entrusted to members of the Calvinist Anti-Revolutionary Party. Van Baal, before taking office, had been a member of parliament for that party for a short time, while P.J. Platteel had an unequivocal affiliation with the party of the Calvinist comrades as well. When it came to diehard tenacity, these CHU and ARP representatives were hardly outdone by the KVP member Van Maarseveen, under whom the transfer of New Guinea had been vetoed. They were nevertheless not insensitive to the changes of the times, as later practice was to show.

In the term of office of each, emphasis was placed on a different issue. Where under Van Waardenburg-Van Maarseveen most attention was given to laying the foundations for a more ambitious style of government for New Guinea, under Van Baal-Kernkamp the consolidation and systematic improvement of this government was the most important question. The chief features of government policy with respect to the Papuans were caution and a strong desire to tackle only those problems that the politicians were sure they could handle. This changed in the final year of Van Baal's governorship, but more especially under Platteel-Bot. The aim then became to emancipate Papuan society at a faster pace. This was partly a consequence of the internal dynamics of the process of growing political awareness, now that it had been set in motion, but to an even greater extent of shifts on the international stage, which put increasing pressure on Dutch policy. These changes in the political constellation will be dealt with in the following chapters. First, I will give an outline of developments in New Guinea under the rule of its three successive Dutch governors, Van Waardenburg, Van Baal and Platteel.

Regaining momentum under Van Waardenburg

On Van Waardenburg's arrival in the territory he was sent to govern, there was great uncertainty about the political future of New Guinea. Minister Van Maarseveen let no opportunity pass without making it clear that it was to come under the Dutch flag, it is true, but reports from Indonesia prompted a different conclusion altogether. There, Sukarno in the very first days of his presidency of the new state launched a campaign for the return of New Guinea to the

bosom of his country. The resultant uncertainty was greatest in the first year, in which according to the RTC (Round Table Conference) agreements the fate of the region was to be decided. It was a year of great tension in Indonesia, characterized by, among other things, the rapid collapse of the federal system and insurgencies by former KNIL (*Koninklijk Nederlands-Indisch Leger*, Royal Netherlands East Indies Army) soldiers, culminating in the Westerling affair and the Ambonese rebellion. The resistance of the Republic of the South Moluccas (Indonesian: Republik Maluku Selatan, abbreviated as RMS), proclaimed in Ambon on 25 April 1950, was smothered in blood in November of that year, but small RMS units were to continue the struggle against Indonesia from the nearby island of Ceram for years. These events naturally made a deep impression on Moluccan personnel in New Guinea and exacerbated anti-Indonesian feeling all round. Rumours that the Netherlands was prepared to consider a compromise solution fuelled suspicions and incidental panic attacks, particularly among the Indo-European section of the population. Emotions were calmed a little by the failure of the New Guinea conference between the Netherlands and Indonesia in December 1950, but unrest continued because the problem had not been solved. The possibility remained that in the event of an unexpected shift in either internal politics or international relations, the Netherlands might be prepared to enter into further negotiations.

Under these circumstances, Van Waardenburg had to set up a new administrative apparatus that would be able to take over the tasks of Batavia and Macassar in the shortest possible time. In the process, the residency, with its uncomplicated organization, had to be converted into an independent administrative unit. Van Waardenburg had a few senior officials of the East Indies administration, who had been transferred to New Guinea, at his disposal to help him with this. They included C.J.H.R. de Waal, like Van Waardenburg a high official of the department of internal affairs in Batavia. He had taken an important part in the framing of the laws for the constituent states created in Indonesia after 1946. In New Guinea, he acted as unofficial advisor. To facilitate the adequate performance of the new duties springing from the running of the general administration with which the governor had been charged, a governmental secretariat was established, which was headed by J.C. Baarspul, likewise transferred from Batavia. For the performance of the duties with respect to finance, road and home construction, communications, mining, education, agriculture, forestry and fisheries, hitherto carried out in only a rudimentary way, the relevant independent departments prescribed by the *Bewindsregeling* had to be set up. These, too, were for the greater part staffed with personnel transferred from Indonesia. Local government for the time being continued to be exercised by the *Binnenlands Bestuur* officials who were already present in

New Guinea, but the corps was soon supplemented with a number of experienced East Indies colonial officials recruited from the Netherlands, such as J. van Bodegom and H. Veldkamp. The Residents of North, West and South New Guinea were based in Hollandia, Manokwari and Merauke respectively.

The creation of the new administration, with its much further-reaching ambitions than those of the old residency, required manpower, housing, roads and supplies. The problems involved were closely interrelated, where delays might occur in one area if no progress was made in another. Housing in particular constituted a bottleneck in Hollandia. The post-war residency capital was geared to the accommodation of just a few hundred Europeans who were prepared to put up with fairly primitive conditions. Most of them lived in shacks or sheds. After 1950 Hollandia needed to offer room to much larger groups of personnel from the Netherlands or from the towns and cities of Indonesia, where people as a rule were more demanding. The little town was in fact no more than a conglomeration of American army barracks, widely separated from each other for military reasons. It extended over a distance of forty kilometres. Its main nuclei were Hollandia-Binnen (Downtown Hollandia), lying between Lake Sentani and Jotefa Bay, and, further to the north, old Hollandia town on Humboldt Bay, extended with a series of American goods yards where the centre of the new town would come to lie, with the districts of Hollandia Buiten (Exurban Hollandia) and Noordwijk. Hence transport was the second dilemma. Poor roads and a serious lack of adequate means of transport and housing constituted a well-nigh insuperable problem. Initially construction could only take place in a piecemeal fashion, as the necessary infrastructure was lacking and imports of materials from Indonesia had stopped. The first professional building contractor did not arrive from the Netherlands until 1952. Construction of the first two hundred new homes in Hollandia was completed in the course of the next year, but this was just a drop in the ocean. In that same year, 671 families arrived from the Netherlands and 900 from other countries, and these all had to be housed somehow.[10] Things improved from that time onward, however, and by the late 1950s the major problems had been overcome. By that time, newly arriving officials could be certain of proper accommodation.

Aside from the question of housing, that of staffing posed problems in New Guinea from the start. After the transfer of sovereignty in Indonesia, there was a mass exodus of lower- and middle-ranking personnel from New Guinea, especially of police employees, who left for Indonesia for a variety of reasons. Most did so from idealistic motives, along with the expectation that they would have better career opportunities under the changed conditions there. Fear of reprisals in Jakarta if they continued to work for the Dutch provided an

important ulterior motive. The Indonesian authorities did, in fact, pursue a policy of discouragement in this respect. This was obvious from, among other things, the hassles over the issue of visas to Indonesian personnel wishing to return to New Guinea after a period of leave. The oilfields in Sorong were particularly hard hit by this.

In principle of course this problem was easy to solve by recruiting Dutch civil servants who had become redundant in the East Indies colonial administration. For them an appointment in New Guinea provided an attractive opportunity to continue working in the tropics. Provided they had sufficient ability, they were welcome here. In the case of the fairly small group of higher- and middle-level personnel, it was possible to arrange things smoothly via personal and official contacts between the various departments in Jakarta and Hollandia. Here it should be noted that for the higher echelons, the department in The Hague soon took recruitment of this kind of staff in hand. Former East Indies colonial servants from then on preferably arrived at their new work destination via a detour to the Netherlands. For the lower ranks, the situation was more chaotic. The run on New Guinea was badly organized, and it took a long time for everyone to be assigned to their appropriate place. As was mentioned above, mass migration to New Guinea started in the latter days of 1949 with the unregulated immigration of colonists. After the first group was put ashore by the *Waebalong*, more soon followed. By the end of 1950 their number had risen to three thousand. The majority disembarked in Manokwari, where no preparations whatsoever for their reception had been made and eventually the government arranged some sort of shelter. A superintendent was appointed and some technical support provided. These migrants also received a little help from the small group of colonists who had settled there after the war. On the whole, however, migration once again proved no success. The world of the colonists was one of penury and improvisation. The economic possibilities were limited. The large distances to the centres of consumption, the small scale of the scheme and the lack of resources and know-how on the part of those involved made the organization of exports of agrarian products on anything like an adequate scale impossible. The step to larger-scale methods was never taken, while very little came of the influx of farmers from the Netherlands as well. Only a few individuals were prepared to take the plunge, and these then got bogged down in the restrictions of small-scale farming. After a few years the situation stabilized to the extent that a few dozen farmers were able to make a reasonable living by growing fruit and vegetables for the larger population centres, in particular Manokwari and Hollandia. A few hundred families were indirectly dependent on market gardening for work. The rest eventually found employment in the towns, especially in the public service and the connected technical departments.[11]

In addition there was a need for manual workers from the very outset in 1950. The Papuans were not used to coolie labour and had no inclination to do this sort of work either. To meet the enormous demand for labour in road and home construction, the *Dienst voor Economische en Technische Aangelegenheden* therefore proceeded to recruit several hundred Indo-Europeans in Jakarta. In the long run, this number swelled to a thousand. This scheme was a qualified success. These people did not have the necessary skills, either, and, because they had grown up in war- and revolution-torn Batavia, were not used to discipline. They were moreover hired to do work at which they would have turned up their nose in Java. Their position was furthermore aggravated by a serious shortage of women from their own group and by the lack of any prospects of getting their relatives to come over from Java. High expectations of this had been raised at the time of their recruitment, but seeing there were no facilities for the accommodation of these extra people, Van Waardenburg saw himself obliged quite soon after their arrival in Hollandia to issue a statement to the effect that nothing would come of this the first five years. In view of the increasingly alarming stories about the position of the Indo-Europeans in independent Indonesia, this did not help to boost morale among these so-called 'Deta boys'. All in all, they were a restless group leading a miserable existence in the few barracks in which they had been herded together. Certainly this development was in stark contrast to the ideal of a new home country for the Indo-Europeans in New Guinea.[12]

In conclusion, the development of the military apparatus gave rise to mass immigration and administrative complications. In the final weeks before the transfer of sovereignty to Indonesia, a military apparatus of its own had been hastily improvised for the new *gouvernement.* Van Eechoud had asked for marines, to be supplemented with a new battalion that was to be made up of ex-KNIL personnel. In accordance with his anti-*amberi* philosophy, he had urged for the dispatch of European personnel, and no Ambonese, Menadonese or Timorese. This was not immediately possible, however, in view of the situation in Java and the current replacement schemes. As an alternative, therefore, one of the last battalions of the *Koninklijke Landmacht* (Royal Dutch Army) to arrive in Indonesia was sent on directly to New Guinea.[13] These Dutch soldiers did not stay long, however, and had gone again after a few months. Following this, KNIL servicemen flowed in in rather an irregular stream. The result was that the New Guinea command comprised a little under a thousand troops, mainly Indo-Europeans, at the end of 1950. They were accompanied by thousands of women and children. The army moreover brought a large quantity of goods with it for this expedition to the unknown. Most of these people and the bulk of the material were accommodated in freestanding barracks taken over

from the American Seventh Fleet. As these were army property, there was little to object to here. As a result of this move, however, a considerable portion of the available accommodation was now no longer available for the much-needed civilian personnel. One might therefore well ask with Van Eechoud what the use of all this was, the more so as the troops were concentrated for the greater part in Hollandia, where there was no question of any military threat, while almost none went to Sorong, where the chances of unrest were appreciably higher as a consequence of the high percentage of Indonesian personnel and the proximity of Indonesia.

All in all, the influx of these public servants, colonists, labourers and troops represented a substantial reinforcement of the Indo-European element. According to the statistics for 1953, there were approximately 8,500 European men and 4,500 women in New Guinea in that year,[14] most of whom were probably of Indo-European extraction. This was quite a high number, even though nowhere near the tens of thousands the colonization societies in Java had hoped for. A further special addition was that of a unit of Westerling's small army, the *Angkatan Perang Ratu Adil*, or APRA, consisting of Ambonese ex-KNIL soldiers who had taken part in the KNIL's assault on Bandung in January 1950. These men, who had behaved as cold-blooded murderers there, had not been handed over to Indonesia but had been court-martialled by the Dutch. A group of 300 had been transferred to New Guinea in mid-1950 to serve out their sentence. On their arrival here, neither the civil administration nor the army appeared to have either the necessary prisons or sufficient authority to enforce this, however. Hence the offenders were free to come and go as and where they pleased and posed a permanent threat to whomever they did not like. Their leader, Lieutenant Titulay, was a man one definitely needed to treat with respect in the small community of Hollandia. He and his cronies were regular visitors to parties in the officers' mess. They constituted a political risk factor, especially during and after the RMS rising, with which they sympathized. Van Waardenburg felt uneasy about them and urged for reinforcements. Towards the end of the year a company of marines was sent to New Guinea at last in order to maintain security and uphold Dutch authority.[15]

This was an anything but superfluous measure. In contrast to the situation in the former Netherlands East Indies, in New Guinea the Moluccan group constituted a definite risk factor. The rising in Ambon had had a strong impact on these people and reinforced their critical attitude towards the Dutch government, which had done nothing to restrain Indonesian actions there. Both the APRA group and the remaining Ambonese included many supporters of the Maluku Raya ideology, which aimed at merging the Moluccas and New Guinea into a single unit. Under the post-1950 circumstances this Maluku Raya could

be conceived as an independent state, but also as an autonomous unit within a Dutch or Indonesian federation. The Moluccan group remained large even after the 1950 exodus. There were at least four to five thousand male Moluccans in the territory in all.[16] They occupied all kinds of positions in the public service. In West New Guinea in particular, 75% of the district administration's personnel, military and police cadre, teachers and clerks were of Ambonese or Kei provenance, the great majority of whom, according to an official report of 1954, were pro-RMS.

It is difficult to establish at this juncture to what extent these people supported the uprising. What is certain is that at critical moments Radio Sorong, which was staffed by a few of them, played a role of sorts. RMS supporters in the Moluccas themselves, in fact, regarded New Guinea as a safe retreat. Moreover, after the rebellion was quashed, small groups of refugees regularly landed on the coasts of New Guinea. Prime Minister Wairisal arrived here in 1951, followed a year later by J. Manusama and scores of others. On arrival, they had to swear an oath that they would abstain from all political activity. But this had only moderate success, with Manusama soon after his arrival appealing to his followers in the Netherlands to continue the struggle and to try and gain international recognition. The RMS supporters in New Guinea were bent on acquiring arms and ammunition. Of course this was unacceptable, if only for fear of fuelling suspicions that this Dutch bastion posed a threat to Indonesia in its eastern backyard, which were all too apt to be expressed in any case. The Bird's Head projects deep into the eastern part of the archipelago, and from some spots Indonesian territory was only within half a day's sailing distance. The threat of a Dutch-Moluccan alliance at any rate was a useful argument in Indonesia's aggressively anti-Dutch propaganda. To give as little encouragement to this as possible, the principal leaders, after a brief stay in New Guinea, were transferred to the Netherlands, where they further fanned the flame of the RMS ideal among the Moluccan community. There, too, New Guinea continued to be an important link in the perceptions of Moluccan activists, supported by Dutch individuals who had banded together in the *Door de Eeuwen Trouw* (Forever Faithful) foundation. To nip in the bud any suspicion that the Dutch government condoned this, a number of Ambonese political organizations in New Guinea were banned.[17] Furthermore, for the Dutch the idea that 'Maluku Raya' need not by definition be anti-Indonesian was unsettling. Ratulangi, too, who had died in Java shortly before the transfer of sovereignty to Indonesia, had shown himself to be far from averse to federalist solutions for the position of East Indonesian minority groups.[18] Propaganda in favour of this formed part of the standard repertoire of Indonesian Radio Macassar broadcasts aimed at New Guinea, which touted Maluku Raya within the borders of Indonesia as a viable option.[19]

For other reasons as well, army reinforcement was anything but superfluous: soon after the establishment of the new *gouvernement*, news spread in Hollandia that Indonesia was preparing to infiltrate the area and was recruiting volunteers in Macassar and elsewhere to this end. In this connection, the name of Silas Papare, who had fled to Indonesia shortly before the transfer of sovereignty and was now beginning to play an important part in the Indonesian counter-offensive, was frequently mentioned. The first landing of Indonesian infiltrators took place in Gag, a tiny island in the extreme west of the Raja Ampat group, in 1952.

Thus Van Waardenburg faced a raft of problems with respect to housing, staffing and security from the moment he arrived. All these problems were compounded by the breakdown of existing communications and the cessation of normal supplies. Immediately after the transfer of sovereignty, New Guinea had become a foreign country to Indonesia, so that all existing restrictions on exports had automatically come into force for it as well. The Indonesians were not in the mood to take this lightly, either. After the failure of the December 1950 New Guinea Conference, all communications were broken off.[20] As a consequence, everything went wrong with the provisioning, which gave rise to acute shortages of even the most essential commodities in the towns of New Guinea. As most Dutch firms doing business in Indonesia had little inclination to burn their fingers by trading with New Guinea, only the house of Hagemeyer was prepared to continue to engage in this. Nigimij, a subsidiary it set up especially for this purpose, started operations in 1950. In South and West New Guinea the worst of the problems had been overcome by the end of that year, but on the north coast, where the principal Dutch settlements were located, this took longer. The air link between Jakarta and Biak was terminated after the transfer of sovereignty, over against which, however, the Dutch airline KLM (*Koninklijke Luchtvaart Maatschappij*, Royal [Dutch] Airlines) received permission to commence a regular service between Amsterdam and Biak via Manilla or Tokyo at the end of 1951.[21] Up to that time, air traffic had only been possible by means of direct charter flights to Singapore or Australia using navy and military planes. The shipping company KPM (*Koninklijke Pakketvaart Maatschappij*, Royal Packet Boat Company) experienced similar problems. Regular shipping to Indonesia stagnated in the course of 1950. The company did keep a few ships in service in New Guinea waters, while it was also still possible to sail direct to Singapore from Sorong. Ocean-going vessels of the *Stoomvaartmaatschappij Nederland* (Netherlands Steamship Company) and the *Koninklijke Rotterdamse Lloyd* (Royal Rotterdam Lloyd) called at the larger ports in New Guinea at irregular intervals. In addition, the government

possessed a fleet of small craft, reinforced from 1953 on with the arrival of a number of specially constructed coasters for local transport.

The overall effect of the post-1950 developments in any case was the deterioration or total breakdown of communications with Indonesia, which in the long run was compensated by the opening of communications with other parts of the outside world, in particular the Netherlands. One consequence of all this was that imported articles became scarce and expensive right at the outset in 1950, giving rise to a high price level. This, in combination with the existing shortage of labour, resulted in a steep rise in wages. Matters were made worse by the spending spree the army indulged in, buying goods in large quantities at small local markets. The upside of this was that it provided an attractive source of income for those colonists who were prepared to work. Their locally grown produce was worth a fortune and was sold at hastily set up small shops. The effect of these developments for the Papuans in and around the towns was that they became accustomed to high wages, which had a negative impact on exports of indigenous commodities like copra and crocodile skins. After the transfer of sovereignty the rupiah was introduced in Indonesia, which initially had parity with the Dutch as well as the New Guinea guilder, introduced at the same time. Whereas the two latter remained linked, the Indonesian rupiah subsequently followed its own course. In September 1950, when the exchange rate of the Indonesian rupiah had slid to half its original value, prices of basic foodstuffs in Hollandia were higher on average, measured in Indonesian currency, than those in Bandung.[22]

These would have been trying times for any governor. They certainly were for Van Waardenburg, who as a desk-bound administrator had little practical administrative experience. His problems were compounded by the presence of Van Eechoud, who was now a subordinate. As head of the Department of Internal Administration and Justice he now at best rated as second in command within the local administration. He had difficulty in accepting this, and tended to blame his new boss for everything that went wrong. And this was not without good reason. Van Waardenburg partly owed his new function to the fact that he was highly conversant with the rules of the East Indies administration and the accompanying style. With him, an element of East Indies dignity made its entry, which contrasted sharply with the unsophisticated, down-to-earth approach that had been the trademark of Hollandia in Van Eechoud's days. There was now a special vice-regal standard fluttering outside the 'palace' as a symbol of the new dignity of the occupant's office. At receptions given by the highest dignitaries in the land, from now on formal dress was obligatory, though this was most uncomfortable in the tropical heat of the town. Van Waardenburg furthermore stood on his prerogatives vis-à-vis Van Eechoud.

All this was of little use to him, however, in a situation where Van Eechoud was still assured of the sympathy of the majority of the old hands and of the Papuans. Gossip and cliquishness were rife, which made for a tense, strained atmosphere. In addition, Van Waardenburg was an upright, decent official, who scrupulously followed all instructions from The Hague, where Krijger and Kottier were now laying the foundations for their new realm, to the letter. The decisions the latter made from the huge distance separating the two countries were not always the most practical under the given circumstances. The improviser Van Eechoud, with his vast knowledge of local affairs, could have played a useful role here if proper consultation with his governor had been possible, but apparently this was asking too much of both of them. Van Eechoud in particular was consumed by jealousy, and he made no secret of this. It was unacceptable to him that Van Waardenburg excluded him as much as he could from matters of general policy, and insisted on a punctilious performance of the duties with which he had been charged. Van Eechoud persevered in his concern with general policy issues, with which he had been entrusted for so long. Hence he was incapable of winning the desirable and achievable influence within the sphere assigned to him.

In this situation, unstable as it was to begin with, Van Eechoud's presence was more than Van Waardenburg could stand. The latter feared, with reason, that his second in command would sideline him as soon as he saw his way clear. This seemed likely to happen in December 1950, in fact, when Van Eechoud departed for The Hague for a period of leave. Exactly on whose initiative this took place is not clear from the available data, but for Van Eechoud in any case it was a golden opportunity to inform the minister about the chaotic conditions under the rule of his vacillating superior. He gave a detailed account of the situation in a memorandum of 27 January 1951. In it he voiced biting criticism of the governor's decisions with respect to construction, housing and the allocation of equipment and manpower. He furthermore suggested that under Van Waardenburg, Indies Dutch individuals were systematically favoured at the expense of the Papuans.[23] Moreover, he made no secret of his view that he could do the job better than his boss for half the money. It was an undisguised application, but he had not reckoned with Van Waardenburg.

The latter had meanwhile been informed by the minister of the contents of the correspondence of a Westerling supporter whose case was under investigation at the department of justice, which had been intercepted in The Hague. It revealed that Van Eechoud had allegedly maintained contacts with the Westerling group, which had attempted in various ways to involve him in its conspiracy, over the past year.[24] These were wild fantasies, and it is not clear whether Van Eechoud also took them seriously, but they were grist to Van

Waardenburg's mill. What mattered to him was that Van Eechoud had made hardly flattering comments about him in this correspondence. It all steeled the governor in his already formed resolve to prevent his director of *Binnenlandse Zaken en Justitie* from ever returning to Hollandia. In this he could count on the support of Nicolaas Jouwe, who was in The Hague for the New Guinea conference at the time. Jouwe, who had much appreciation for Van Eechoud, nevertheless felt it incumbent on himself to inform the governor in writing, at the latter's request, of the numerous insinuations about his person that Van Eechoud had spread in the residency. As far as the governor was concerned this furnished incontrovertible proof of Van Eechoud's twisted mentality, marked by efforts to avoid direct confrontation and to achieve his goal by all sorts of devious means.[25]

It was an unkind judgement on Van Eechoud's character, which left his undeniably good qualities entirely out of consideration. Even so, it did contain an element of truth. Kijne, too, who had got to know him well, thought he was a political hothead. For Van Maarseveen, who was in something of a quandary over the affair, there was little for it but to support his governor.[26] Van Eechoud was not allowed to return to Hollandia, and for the period until his retirement was put on reduced pay. He killed the time by lecturing and brooding about the possibility of a glorious reinstatement. From 1953 he was secretary of the *Nieuw-Guinea Instituut* (New Guinea Institute), an organization set up on the initiative of the Amsterdam and Rotterdam chambers of commerce in an attempt to get something off the ground in New Guinea.[27] It seemed just the right job for this man of nickel and chromium, but his heart was not in it. Basically the education of the Papuans was his raison d'être. He died in New Guinea, in the course of a visit to his former post undertaken on his own initiative, in 1956.

For Van Waardenburg, Van Eechoud's departure came as a great relief, even though his remaining term in office was no success either. Some sort of normalization did take place, however. He himself was of the opinion that the beginning of 1952 was the point at which matters took a turn for the better. The budgets for 1950, 1951 and 1952 had been rushed jobs, full of provisional items. They had not, in fact, been submitted to parliament in The Hague, as they could not stand the test of criticism. As a result the governor had had his hands more firmly tied by the decisions of the department, which was now directly responsible for this, than would otherwise have been the case. In the first round of preliminary discussions about the budget for 1953, in February of the preceding year, Van Waardenburg expressed the hope in the *Raad van Departementshoofden* that things would go better from now on. Better planning

would make it possible for human and financial resources to be put in better balance with each other.[28] This did, in fact, happen eventually, but Van Waardenburg was not able to take the credit for this development. A few months later, in May 1952, Kottier visited the colony and returned with a scathing report that supported Van Eechoud's observations. He had found an inefficient General Secretariat, which made it impossible for the governor to get round to the actual tasks for which he had been appointed owing to the inadequate preparation and preliminary discussion of documents. For most departmental heads the work was beyond their capabilities, and there was insufficient contact between the centre and the colonial officials in the field. These, in turn, were transferred too frequently, so that they had no opportunity of establishing good relations with the people, while they passed on too little of what little knowledge they had gained as a result of poor reporting. Furthermore, there was a group of disgruntled East Indies immigrants who felt betrayed by the government, was not very productive economically, and was driving up prices. Kottier likewise had little good to say about the technical departments. The taxation department was efficient, it is true, but showed so little flexibility in the performance of its tasks that newly established small businesses were getting into difficulties. The system of import and excise duties was not geared to the new situation, and there was inadequate agricultural counselling and information, while the forestry department was suffering heavy losses.

The above is just a random selection from a long list, to which the following may also be added. The vicar apostolic of Hollandia, Monsignor A. Cremers, had been successful in getting Van Waardenburg by rather devious means to give him permission to establish a Roman Catholic high school in predominantly Protestant Hollandia. It was the only institution of its kind in New Guinea, and if there was a need for an institution like this at all, it should have been a public school. The affair culminated in a collision with the Protestant mission, which via its headquarters in Oegstgeest made its displeasure known to the minister. Matters did not become any better for Van Waardenburg when this became the subject of a bitter polemic in the Dutch press.[29]

We may conclude that in mid-1952 a more extensive administrative apparatus was developing, which was active in a wider sphere than before, but was still too ill adapted to the new situation. There was a great deal of improvisation, but too little co-ordination. The work moreover had to be done with over-hastily recruited staff of dubious competence. At the time of the exodus from Indonesia, postings in New Guinea had been attractive to civil servants, as this offered them an opportunity of continuing their career in the tropics and of further building up rights in the connected superannuation scheme.

Nepotism had been rife.[30] A cynic might suspect that Van Waardenburg's own appointment had been an example of this.

One may well wonder how much Kottier should have held himself to blame for this situation. The department had been closely involved in the establishment of the new administration and had constantly forced its own views, which were not always consistent with the colony's real needs, on Van Waardenburg, insecure as he was to begin with. Both Van Waardenburg and his successors had justified cause for complaint here, the difference being that the former did so in private, while his successor, the ambitious and self-confident Van Baal, did not omit to tell anyone prepared to listen to him about it with due emphasis. Under his administration as well, most budgets would fail to reach parliament, according to him, in line with the department's intention of keeping as tight a grip as possible on the state of affairs in the colony. For Van Waardenburg, the end came in the autumn of 1952, and everyone drew their own conclusions. To Kottier it was clear that it was time for a new man behind the wheel, and he had little difficulty in persuading the new Minister of Overseas Territories, W.J.A. Kernkamp, that he was right. Van Waardenburg was recalled to the Netherlands for a period of leave, and there took the honourable way out by tendering his resignation.

In retrospect the balance of the Van Waardenburg period was not necessarily as negative as many in the Netherlands and New Guinea believed it to be at the time of his retirement. He had had limited room for manoeuvre as a result of the impossible situation consequent upon the sudden creation of the new *gouvernement*, while subsequent developments in Indonesia had been more negative than initially anticipated. Perhaps he could have done better if he had had the advantage of a more resolute management of affairs with more experienced personnel, but these had been lacking, while the material possibilities were limited. Even so, a start had been made, and the cart was slowly but surely jolting into motion. Shortly before his departure, Van Waardenburg outlined his plans in detail. New Guinea would have to be made economically and financially independent. For this, not only a strong development of Western business, but also a greater ability on the part of the indigenous population to hold its own economically was a pre-condition. This was wholly in line with the policy previously pursued in the Netherlands East Indies. The same was true for his admonition to observe caution in the process. For the time being, the government should restrict itself to the further development of the area already under its rule. There was no need for any leaps in the dark. Even in the extension of the government apparatus restraint would have to be practised. It was more important to make more efficient use of the available manpower. Conditions had meanwhile stabilized sufficiently, in his view, for a more effective

development policy to be feasible. In particular with regard to extension of the infrastructure there was no lack of ambitious plans, even though the shortage of housing, manpower and resources continued to act as a brake on their realization.[31]

New Guinea society of 1953 was quite different in many respects from that prior to the region's detachment from the Indonesian context. Then, the number of Europeans had come to no more than a few hundred; in 1953 this was 13,000, including over 4,500 females. The majority of them were East Indies Dutch. This group was dominant in every level of European society. In the working class there were the Deta boys. Then there were the colonists of Indonesian provenance and the small shopkeepers in the towns. They were now also occupying an important position in the army and the civil service. Besides these Indo-Europeans, there was a small but growing group of Dutch immigrants. They included a portion of the former staff of the military base that had stayed on after the liquidation of American army supplies. As far as regional dispersion was concerned, the Dutch were concentrated mainly in Hollandia, while Biak, Sorong and Manokwari boasted about a thousand Dutch males each. There is a marked difference to be observed here with the distribution of the Moluccan group. By far the greater majority of Dutch citizens lived in the north, in particular in and around Hollandia. The not much smaller group of Moluccans and other Indonesians were settled mostly in West and South New Guinea, with the towns of Sorong, Bintuni, Fakfak and Merauke as the principal centres.[32]

Although after the 'gathering pace' under Van Waardenburg many more Dutch subjects were living in New Guinea than before, their numbers had remained far behind those the leaders of the colonization movement in Java had hoped for in 1949. The ideal of a new home country for the Indo was still alive, particularly among the lower social classes, but it was clear that it could not be realized without outside help. Accordingly, we can observe efforts on the part of this group to merge with various other groups, the Papuan as well as the Moluccan ones. It was an unstable group, which had not yet found its niche in society. According to police and administrative reports from the period, this volatility was reinforced by the fact that these immigrants had become isolated from the broader East Indies clans that had formed their social context in Java. The same reports also noted the emotionality of these people, and further expressed the opinion that their reliability with regard to the Dutch cause was limited. Their disappointment at the Dutch attitude to the Indonesian revolution, which in their view was far too weak, was too deep for this. A loser does not inspire loyalty. In addition, the immigrants reproached the Dutch government for clinging to the nineteenth-century agrarian law principle of debarring

non-indigenous groups from land ownership in New Guinea as well. The upshot of it all was that the Indo remained an alien in his new home country, too. When in the course of the 1950s emigration from Indonesia got off the ground, it was directed at the Netherlands and other parts of the Western world. At the end of the decade the group of Indo-Europeans who had fled to New Guinea gradually also joined these emigrants. It even so continued to form the nucleus of the administrative apparatus in New Guinea until the end of the Dutch period. An important focus for these people was the *Nieuw-Guinea Verbond* (New Guinea Association), founded at the outset in 1950, which together with several trade unions promoted their interests. Even though New Guinea failed to become the home country of the Indies Dutch refugees, their presence here was most important for the development of the country. Together with the Moluccan groups, they provided the core of the staff for government and business and thus made the gathering pace possible.

Two Calvinist comrades in power

The new man after Van Waardenburg's departure was Van Baal, who in those years was a rapidly rising star in the New Guinea firmament. In him, academic and administrative ambitions competed for priority. He had spent most of his pre-war years as an administrator among the Marind-Anim of South New Guinea, who had become the subject of his Ph.D. thesis. As a legacy of his youth in the Calvinist environment of Scheveningen, he had developed a marked sensitivity to the subject of the significance of religion in the life of man, which influenced his view of the Papuan societies with which he came into contact. This encouraged an integralist view of human culture, the seeds for which had been sown during his time as a student of the Leiden anthropologist J.P.B. de Josselin de Jong. His dealings with the Papuans were dominated by the dilemma of the impossibility of changing elements in one sphere of human existence without affecting the whole. It was a view that made him hesitant about imposing new rules on people on how to live their life, although he was, on the other hand, convinced that it was the right of the developed Western world to do so in the case of the primitive Papuans. His reservations concerned not so much the principle as the practical application. The Papuans should not be unnecessarily deprived of the pleasures of feasting and dancing, even if these had sexual undertones that conflicted with the morality of the missions. The same applied to the consumption of the alcoholic beverage called *sagoweer*, or beer, even though this sometimes engendered excesses. He was particularly irritated by the zeal of the priests in the south of the island, whom he was wont to compare with the Jesuits in eighteenth-century Paraguay, who had endeavoured

to impose their brave new world on their uncomprehending disciples whip in hand, as it were. Undoubtedly his Protestant background predisposed him to be more easily annoyed by Roman Catholic than by Protestant attitudes in this respect, though it marked his basic attitude to the Christian religion in general. The anthropologist in him was inclined to suspect the missionaries of both religions of lack of respect for the Papuans' own values, even though he had no intention of pleading in favour of the preservation of these himself.

In addition to all this, he was an energetic, self-assured man, who formed his opinions independently and was not afraid of radical changes of strategy where he felt that this would make it easier to achieve the goal set. As in his approach to religion, he was also sensitive to the inconsistencies in Indonesian political developments. In the final years preceding the transfer of sovereignty to that country he had been assistant resident in Bali and Lombok, where his main task had been the supervision of the transition from the old colonial administration to the ideally more democratic system of the new federal state of East Indonesia. Though this transition had been quite successful in some places, he had not failed to notice that in many others, such as Bali and Lombok, it had resulted in a re-feudalization of society. The urge for independence did not by definition imply the all-over realization of modern Western views. This fact frustrated him most of all, even more than the obligation to renounce the colonial world, in the way he felt about the phenomenon of decolonization. For him, as for his contemporaries in the administration, it was all going too fast, and with too much violence and too few guarantees for the wellbeing of the people. Hence he had no qualms at all about the continuation of colonial rule in underdeveloped New Guinea for an indefinite period. Here was a chance to show what had been done wrong in Indonesia and should be done better and more thoroughly in New Guinea. There was no need for too much haste in this respect, either. Van Baal felt this way not because he was unfamiliar with Sukarno's alarming speeches, but because he was convinced that Indonesia would be unable for a long time to take a hard line and would eventually tread more warily out of self-interest.[33] In this respect, he showed himself to be a rational administrator who, when all was said and done, had no eye for political passions in a society in which power was no longer a self-evident prerogative, but had to be won the hard way by every available means by whoever wanted it or wished to keep it. He was not the only Dutch person, both at home and in Indonesia, to feel this way. The Dutch in Indonesia had been quick learners, as the facts showed. Van Baal took a little longer, and one would not be doing him an injustice by suggesting that his stance was partly influenced by the prospect of the continuation of an interesting career as administrator overseas.

He had renewed his orientation towards New Guinea in 1950, when he was appointed secretary of the Dutch delegation at the *Nieuw-Guineacommissie* (New Guinea Commission), which in accordance with the resolutions of the Round Table Conference had to advise the Dutch government on the political future of the region. In the month of May of that year this took him to Hollandia, where Van Waardenburg asked him to become the head of the projected Office for Native Affairs. It was an understandable request, given Van Baal's academic background and ambitions. Van Baal himself later felt there was another factor responsible for it. In Van Baal, Van Waardenburg would have a New Guinea expert of repute, which would enable him to tread less warily with respect to Van Eechoud, whose presence he was even then beginning to experience as oppressive.[34] Van Baal eagerly accepted the offer and occupied the post till the end of 1952. One of the areas for which he was responsible was education, while as chairman of the Indigenous Education Council he was in charge of the formulation of government policy with respect to the Papuans. It was a task he performed with gusto and ambition. In addition, the function offered him a good insight into the possibilities and limitations of the general administration, as he was charged with the task of drafting the annual report to the United Nations, for which statistical material relating to the region was systematically brought together for the first time ever. He also managed to secure himself a high profile at the annual meetings of the Research Council of the South Pacific Commission and in the United Nations commission in Geneva and New York monitoring the developmental progress of areas still under colonial rule. As head of the Office for Native Affairs he was responsible for expert input with respect to New Guinea there. Thus within a short space of time Van Baal gained a degree of administrative authority that Van Eechoud could not even have dreamed of, so that it was not surprising that he attracted attention in the Netherlands. The scholarly CHU leader, Professor W.J.A. Kernkamp, as a fellow-member of missions to the United Nations, had conceived considerable appreciation for him. This led to a brief spell as member of parliament for the anti-revolutionary party at the end of 1952, and subsequently to his appointment as governor of New Guinea. This was at the time when Kernkamp, who had meanwhile become Minister of Overseas Territories, decided not to let Van Waardenburg, then under serious attack, return to his post in New Guinea from his Dutch furlough.[35]

Van Baal assumed office at a favourable moment, in April 1953. The formation of the second Drees Cabinet in a sense had been a turning point in Dutch politics. During the formation process, the idea that New Guinea would remain a Dutch responsibility, with self-determination as the ultimate goal, had been clearly formulated.[36] Van Baal was free to act at his own discretion, receiving his

minister's full backing. This set the tone for the following years. In New Guinea itself, too, a new situation arose. In Indo-European circles the ideal of the homeland was fading, while unrest among the Moluccans had decreased after the failure of the RMS revolt. Within the small circle of prominent Papuans, Nicolaas Jouwe put forward the view that all groups had a certain interest in each other's presence. To him, the presence of a fairly significant group of Indies Dutch implied not only a welcome reinforcement of the available labour potential, but also a guarantee of permanent Dutch involvement in his country. Minister Kernkamp held the same view, as was to be inferred from his speech at a meeting of the Council of Department Heads during a visit to Hollandia in July 1953. Although the education of the Papuans admittedly had come more into focus as an objective of Dutch policy, this need not necessary lead to the creation of an exclusively Papuan society, according to him. The decision about the future of the country would have to be taken in due course by the collective citizens populating the country at that point in time, and not exclusively by the autochthonous element.[37] The Christian historical thinker had not given up the old ideal of a mixed society for New Guinea even after the debacle in Indonesia.

As far as the bureaucrats in The Hague and the minister were concerned, there was a slight change in the relationship with the colony after the changing of the guard in Hollandia. They could no longer be sure of the unconditional compliancy that had been customary in Van Waardenburg's time. This led to irritated exchanges of letters and visits, in which the underlying grievance was invariably a reciprocal reproach of infringement of each other's competence. The preparations for the annual budgets constituted a source of this kind of discussion. Van Baal was a man of authority, who did not unquestioningly comply with all the signals from The Hague, but who did not want his subordinates to get in his way in his area of jurisdiction either. The official style in Hollandia became more informal than it had been in Van Waardenburg's time, but in practice the governor held a tighter grip on affairs. As a member of parliament, he had voiced criticism of the *Bewindsregeling* and of the administrative set-up to be distilled from it already at the end of 1952. After he took office as governor he acted accordingly, against the wishes of Kernkamp. His dissatisfaction concerned in the first place the relationship between the departmental heads and the governor. Appointed by the Crown though these heads might be, this did not mean they could do just as they pleased, as far as Van Baal was concerned. He yoked them more firmly to his cart, appealing to his responsibility for the general administration, which the *Bewindsregeling* had imposed on the governor. He did, on the other hand, provide for the reinforcement of this upper echelon in the New Guinea administration by extending the number of departmental heads. So the departments of education and of construction were given

a separate head each. Then again, he demonstrated his *Binnenlands Bestuur* antecedents by strengthening the position of the Residents vis-à-vis the central administration by giving them the responsibility for co-ordinating the work of the various departments in their respective areas of jurisdiction. In line with the intensification of the administration, he created a new residency, that of Geelvink Bay. Suiting the action to the intentions expressed by Van Waardenburg in his swansong, he set to work in a methodical manner. The three-year plan launched in 1954 constituted the touchstone of his conduct of affairs. As a result of growing prosperity in the Netherlands, there was now more money available for staff increases in the various government departments and for contracting out major projects. The government grant for New Guinea doubled to 57.5 million guilders in the first year of his governorship. Contrary to what had been the case in the first years, the local government succeeded in actually spending this amount; it was a sign that the administration was getting off the ground.[38]

On the whole, the Van Baal era was a period of calm for New Guinea, only disturbed by the governor's sometimes problematic relationship with The Hague and with the missions. The distance between the latter and the local government increased in this period, even though practical co-operation remained intensive, in particular in the field of education, where the two parties were after all thrown back on each other. A startling incident was the resistance to the encroachment of government and the missions that flared up among the inhabitants of the Obano Valley near the Wissel Lakes. In reaction, the governor took resolute measures—even harsher than was necessary, as we may infer from the comments of the greatest specialist on the area, Victor de Bruijn.[39] This author also cast doubts in his memoirs on Van Baal's efforts with regard to the development of democratic institutions in the colony, while others criticized his restraint in the promotion of education. All this will be discussed in more detail later. Here, let us observe that this criticism was invariably expressed in a later period, when the situation in New Guinea was viewed from a different perspective. Even so, it confirms the idea of an administrator who desired change, but was determined not to let matters get out of hand. One may say that he was successful here, setting aside the censorship affair, which will be dealt with later, and as a result of which the circumstances in which he took his leave were not so pleasant after all.

A relaxed farewell was certainly not granted his successor, P.J. Platteel. He, too, came from a Calvinist background and was a former Dutch East Indies colonial official with field experience. He had taken his Ph.D. degree, on the basis of a thesis entitled *De grondslagen van de constitutie in Nederlands-Indië* (The

foundations of the constitution in the Netherlands East Indies), with Professor C. Gerretson, who headed the conservative Indologists Training College in Utrecht. The thesis was a typical product of the 'Utrecht school', focused as it was on the constitutional history of the Netherlands East Indies, with a marked accent on source publications and with modest personal interpretation by the young scholar. An individual stamp was provided by Platteel's concern to place developments in Dutch thinking with regard to colonial administration at the time of the restoration of the Kingdom of the Netherlands in 1814 in an international context, be it in a very restrained manner. In this connection he showed definite appreciation for the young Dutch radical Dirk van Hogendorp, though he was quick to point out that the latter had mainly developed his particular political concept because he had failed to get rich quickly under the old system. Little imagination is needed to detect an echo of the voice of his master in this sarcastic comment.

Platteel, too, had enjoyed the dubious pleasures of Japanese internment after a short administrative career in the pre-war Netherlands East Indies. After that he had resumed this career in Java. The speed with which he made his career was an indication that he possessed acknowledged administrative ability. As early as 1948, at the age of 37, he rose to the position of Resident of Besuki. Here he remained an adherent of the historical legal school, which offered him some scope within the ARP as well. Much of what he said had a strong moralistic undertone. Like Van Baal, he found it difficult to reconcile himself to the course taken by decolonization, but differently from his predecessor, he was unable to accept this as an inevitable development. Memories of the unfulfilled promises to those Indonesians who had supported the Netherlands in those critical years continued to haunt him. After the transfer of sovereignty to Indonesia, he left for the Netherlands, where he devoted himself to social work, rising to the position of director of the Municipal Department of Social Affairs in The Hague. Social work had to be carried out in New Guinea too, and the Anti-Revolutionary Party found a welcome candidate in him when the governorship in Hollandia fell vacant after Van Baal's departure. He was appointed to the post from 1 May 1958.[40]

In his new function, he proved himself a practical and experienced administrator, who was loyal to but at the same time critical of The Hague. He and the Deputy Minister for overseas territories, Bot, formed an effective partnership after the latter's entry into office in September 1959. Although what he did was under strong pressure of events, he managed to avoid conflict as much as possible by remaining professional at all times. His administrative period was characterized by good teamwork in the Council of Department Heads, while he showed himself prepared to co-operate with the recently reorganized

Indigenous Development Council. He lent his unstinting co-operation to the creation of the New Guinea Council, and was later to express the opinion that his contribution to this was the most important event of his administrative career.

The period of his governorship was a period of change from the very outset. At his accession, the mass expulsion of remaining Dutch subjects from Indonesia took place. It furthermore coincided virtually seamlessly with General A.H. Nasution's successful military suppression of the uprising in the outlying provinces of Indonesia, in which the Indonesian army proved an effective instrument. This experience made a military solution of the conflict over New Guinea a realistic option for the Indonesian president. Platteel's period in office, as well as that of the De Quay Cabinet, which began in 1959, was coloured by the mounting military threat from this quarter: Dutch government policy was gradually adjusted in tune with this reality, irritating as it was for the Netherlands.

Under these circumstances, an exodus of Indo-Europeans from New Guinea took place as well. With the increasing threat from Indonesia, the option of an Indo home country in New Guinea lost its last bit of lustre. An extra stimulus was the fact that the reception of refugees in the Netherlands now was infinitely better organized than in the early 1950s. Thus two thousand private individuals with Dutch citizenship left the country in 1960, contrasted with an influx of a thousand individuals. A similar development took place in the Indonesian segment of New Guinea society.[41]

As a result of this, the development policy with respect to the Papuans now gathered speed. The time perspective Van Baal had been given during his period in office had shrunk from an indefinite period to a matter of a few decades. From the latter's private notes it is clear that he believed New Guinea might become independent by 1980, finally, but he hardly dared mention this in public. Bot, shortly after taking office, publicly presented a ten-year plan that assumed independence would be achieved by 1970 and that the effective administrative transfer would follow within two years of that moment. The time perspectives that were a corollary of this shrinking horizon made drastic policy reversals with regard to education and administration necessary. This, too, will be discussed in more detail below. For the moment, it should be noted that Platteel dealt with these matters resolutely, although right until the curtain was about to fall he continued to believe that things would not actually come to this. On the other hand, he was not a man to take unnecessary risks. This is typified by the fact that he started making preparations for an evacuation at the beginning of 1962, at a time when the Dutch government refused to hear of any such thing. The reason was that he did not want to run the risk of a repetition of

events of twenty years previously, when Dutch women and children in the Netherlands East Indies had landed in Japanese prison camps in large numbers after being admonished by Governor General Tjarda van Starkenborgh to stay on in order to show solidarity with the Indonesian people. Platteel could do without a repetition of this gesture, which in his experience at the time had been downtright melodramatic. The Hague did not thank him for it.

For the sake of the Papuans' education

In relations with the Papuans, the missions had of old played a key role in New Guinea. In chapter two above, we saw how in the first years after the Second World War the missionaries more or less returned to their former posts. A phase of restoration of devastated churches and schools, and of reinstatement of former and recruitment of new personnel set in, in the main ending in 1948. Then a period of further expansion along the lines laid down earlier commenced, culminating in a quantitative, but eventually also qualitative change. All these developments were stimulated by wartime experiences as well as by the international situation, which had changed in the meantime. A consequence of it all was the emergence in 1950 of a new constellation that in many respects marked a break with the pre-war period.

Changed conditions in Protestant circles

In New Guinea, the domain of the *Utrechtse Zendingsvereniging* (Utrecht Protestant Mission Society) had been particularly hard hit by the war. Admittedly the number of registered faithful had not dropped sharply (from 130,000 to 125,000), but the disorientation among them was all the greater, while relations between them and their Ambonese *gurus* were often seriously disturbed. Even so, there was some positive news as well. People had had to stand on their own two feet, and had survived it, which had fostered a growing self-confidence. In the long run, anti-*amberi* feeling had subsided as well, and from 1948 on the Ambonese *gurus* started returning. In that year alone, over a hundred of them did so. Besides, the war had had certain consequences for the attitude of Dutch Protestant mission workers, who while in captivity had had time to reflect on a new approach. Even before the war, it had been deliberate mission policy to work towards independence for the local churches. These would not have to integrate with the Dutch Reformed Church, but would become independent churches within a well-organized regional structure. It was the Protestant mission's response to the political developments in Indonesia, characterized as these were by growing nationalism and a strong urge for independence. Churches of the kind intended had been established in

the Batak area and the Minahasa, while in Ambon the earlier mentioned Moluccan Protestant Church had been created.[42] After 1950 these churches had been incorporated into the loose organization of Indonesia-wide synodical consultation. In New Guinea, the ecclesiastical organization had not progressed as far. On the whole, the missionary phase had not yet been left behind. Even so, the possibility of emancipation of the churches here was taken into account from the end of the war onwards. This was the case at the Protestant mission conference held in Batavia in August 1946, at which the outlines of the new policy were drawn up. Here New Guinea was represented by Kijne. On that occasion it was intimated that in principle an independent church was in the offing for this region as well. Certainly now that Indonesian independence had to be reckoned with in the short term, an independent position of the Indonesian churches offered the best guarantee of these being able to hold their own in the new state. In this respect there was a clear difference with the strategy of the Roman Catholic Church, which had every confidence that even after the withdrawal of the colonial government it would be able to count on political cover from the universal church.

Acceleration of the cadre-forming process was a prime condition for the success of this project. Up until then, training of Papuan assistant ministers had been restricted to the course offered at the residential school in Miei. After the rout of the Japanese in 1944, the training course was continued in Joka, on Lake Sentani. In addition, Papuan students were now sent to do advanced courses outside New Guinea. As a result, by as early as 1950 nine assistant ministers, including seven Papuans, had secured a position as minister. Two years later F.J.S. Rumainum returned as a theology graduate from the theological training institute in Macassar. The number of adequately trained Papuan clergy in the following years increased rapidly, thus laying the foundations for the ecclesiastical independence the church authorities aspired to.

A new post-war development in the Protestant churches was the emergence of an ecumenical spirit, strengthened by the practical necessity to combine forces, limited as these were. In the missionary field, this resulted in the merger of a variety of Dutch mission societies working in different areas in Indonesia and elsewhere in the world. The work of the *Utrechtse Zendingsvereniging* in 1950 became an integral part of that of of the mission of the *Nederlandse Hervormde Kerk* (Dutch Reformed Church). Later, the Anabaptists and various groups of a more rigid Calvinist persuasion, operating under the epithet *Gereformeerd*, also joined the new syndicate. So it was possible for the Anabaptist Missionary Society as early as 1950 to take over the mission fields of the *Utrechtse Zendingsvereniging* in Teminabuan and Inanwatan. The co-ordination of all these activities was placed in the hands of the *Raad voor*

de Zending (Missionary Council) in Oegstgeest. Some prominent personages here in the 1950s were K.J. Brouwer and Dr. G.P.H. Locher. The latter was secretary of the *Raad voor de Zending voor Indonesië en Nieuw-Guinea* (Missionary Council for Indonesia and New Guinea) from 1953 onward. In New Guinea, Kijne and Kamma were key figures, acting as field supervisor and principal of the boarding school in Joka in turns. Their efforts were directed to a more intensive working of the field in which they had been active before the war. This resulted in, among other things, an expansion of the number of parishes and of the umbrella organization of the *classes*, particularly in the environs of Nimboran and Manokwari. New missionary posts were created as well, in which the Moluccan *gurus* played a key role, as of old. On the whole, Malay was the medium of communication. As a result of the rise in the number of Dutch nationals, additional Dutch-language parishes sprang up in Hollandia, Sentani, Biak, Manokwari, Sorong, Fakfak and Merauke. These parishes, especially that in Hollandia, came to have an important voice in the conduct of affairs in Protestant New Guinea after 1950 on account of their relative prosperity and of the direct relations with those in power enjoyed by their members. They were made up of temporary or permanent immigrants, and were in a position comparable to that of the parishes of the Moluccan Protestant Church on the west coast and in Merauke, where a sizeable group of Moluccans had lived and worked of old. From there, the MPK carried out missionary activities in the Digul district, where the Calvinist mission (including the Article 31 sect) became active after 1956 as well.

The path to an independent ecclesiastical organization was cleared via the annual Protestant mission conferences, which had already been held in Manokwari before the war. After 1944 they relocated to Hollandia along with the administration. Initially only Dutch ministers participated in these conferences, but from the early 1950s on, Malay-speaking members were admitted as well. Here closer co-operation constituted a perennial subject of discussion. An important meeting took place in Serui in 1954, to which representatives of various Protestant educational institutions and mission societies were invited as well. At this meeting, which came to be known as the *Voorsynode* (Preliminary Synod), it was resolved in principle to proceed with the creation of the *Evangelische Christelijke Kerk van Nieuw-Guinea* (ECK; Evangelical Christian Church of New Guinea). The latter finally came into being in Hollandia in 1956. Its members were the *classes* (regional divisions) and parishes of the Dutch Reformed Church and of some of the more orthodox Calvinist groupings. The local organizations of the *Molukse Protestantse Kerk* were excluded here, on account of complications in their relationship with the mother organization in Indonesia.

This emancipation process marked the changeover from external evangelization to the internal development of an autonomous church. Initially the leaders of this Evangelical Church of New Guinea were manifestly still Dutch, with Kamma as secretary general, who a few years later, however, was succeeded in this capacity by the Reverend F.J.S. Rumainum. Its principal task was the consolidation of the Protestant religion on the north and west coasts of New Guinea. Missionary work in the interior was left primarily to a number of non-Dutch mission organizations, of which more will be said later. Even so, the Evangelical Church undertook some activities here, too, particularly after the government started pursuing a more active expansionist policy in this region, as a result of which some of the Dutch and non-Dutch staff of this church settled in the interior. In co-operation with the *Rheinische Mission* (Rhenish Mission), it established a mission post in Wamena, whence missionaries penetrated deeper into the Baliem Valley, in 1956. The initiative for this was taken partly by Papuan preachers in the service of the Evangelical Church of New Guinea. The actual work in the highlands was carried out with the aid of local staff, and made only slow progress. The chief obstacles here were the ubiquitous language problems.[43]

The arrival of the American and Australian missions

While the Dutch Protestant mission was consolidated on the north and west coasts, various American and Australian missionary societies focused on the Central Highlands. The previous history of this development goes back to the discovery of the Wissel Lakes and the Baliem Valley in 1937–38, in which the American millionaire Archbold played a prominent part. These events had drawn a great deal of attention in the United States, including mission circles. Here was one of the last great untouched wildernesses, densely populated by savage tribes who knew nothing about the Gospel. This jolted the Christian and Missionary Alliance (CAMA), which had by then been working in the Netherlands East Indies for a few years, into action, sending a few of its missionaries to the Wissel Lakes area. For a large part of the Japanese occupation these managed to keep their heads above water in Enarotali, founded by Van Eechoud, whence they penetrated further into the interior. In 1943 these posts had to be abandoned owing to the approach of the Japanese, but their missionary Einar Mickelson was back in Enarotali again in 1946.[44]

After the war, a combination of factors led to increased American and Australian interest in this region. It was stimulated by the personal acquaintance made with New Guinea by many Americans and Australians during the war. Furthermore, the international position of the Netherlands had weakened considerably, so that involvement of a number of friendly countries was

welcome in this area. In the third place—and this became an especially important point after 1950—it was clear that the small size of the home base was putting limitations on the rate at which the Dutch missions were expanding. All in all, this provided The Hague, too, with strong enough motives not to refuse foreign missionaries desiring to shift their operations to New Guinea and presenting themselves with some regularity, admission without good grounds. In the long run, it induced the government to proceed to bring the interior under Dutch rule sooner and more emphatically than was desirable for personnel and logistic reasons.

Up to 1950, few noteworthy developments took place. Mickelson and his wife continued to do their work and the parish remained restricted to a few dozen persons. Then one of Mickelson's associates went on a spectacular trip to the Baliem Valley through the highlands together with the colonial official J.R. Meijer Ranneft. Typifying the restraint still observed by the administration at the time, it gave them a chance to look at the promised land, but not to enter it, like Moses in the book of Exodus. The rule denying missionaries access to areas outside Dutch rule was strictly enforced. This attitude changed after the Catholic mission also began to show an interest in the Baliem region and made this evident inter alia by questions by KVP politicians in the Dutch Second Chamber. As a result, the CAMA was given permission in 1954 to set up a post in Baliem. After the New Guinea government for its part two years later established an administrative post there (Wamena), other societies from Australia and North America penetrated the area as well. The Roman Catholic mission also entered the stage, followed by two Calvinist missionary societies from the Netherlands. Solicitude for the salvation of the only recently discovered Dani, Amungme and Moni people was assuming remarkable proportions.

All in all, there were a few dozen missionaries active in various places in the Central Highlands at the end of the Dutch period. It was typically groundwork, with attention focused primarily on getting together enough suitable local staff to take evangelization on a larger scale in hand in the long run. Thus a network of scripture schools sprang up. In order to maintain this network of mission posts and scripture schools, generous use was made of aircraft, in which connection a special air service of the joint missionary societies, the Missionary Aviation Fellowship (MAF), was indispensable. The construction of an airfield was the first job undertaken by every newcomer, the government as well as the missions. The activities of these 'evangelicals' were not restricted to the Central Highlands, but also extended southward, where the Roman Catholics had been entrenched of old. This was the case in the Mimika and Asmat districts, as well as in other places scattered along the coast. Finally, we should mention the

Seventh Day Adventists, who founded churches of their own in all the larger towns of New Guinea from 1949 on.

Although through mutual consultation major collisions were avoided, the missionary scene had now become very variegated.[45] This had been made possible by the total elimination of the system of mission reserves, as far as it was still in operation, in 1952. The initiative for this was taken by the Catholics, who were particularly interested in further penetration of the Bird's Head and parts of the countryside surrounding Hollandia.[46]

A new place for the Roman Catholics

After 1945, Protestants and Roman Catholics alike resumed their pre-war activities as best they could. Continuity with the pre-war period was strongest in the Roman Catholic mission, as its organizational core in Merauke and the institutions it had there had been able to continue their work during the war years. As a result, it was in a position to commence with the restoration of its mission posts in the countryside along the west coast as early as 1944. From 1947 on the supply of new staff from the Netherlands got underway. They were for a large part Franciscan priests and nuns, who were better educated than their predecessors, so that they were able to perform a wider range of duties. This resulted in both a quantitative and a qualitative expansion of residential schools and educational, medical and social work institutions.

Like the Protestants in the north, the local Catholic organization also became increasingly independent, be it of course within the structure of the Roman Catholic universal church. After its detachment from the Indies context, Merauke in 1950 became the seat of a vicar apostolic, while in Hollandia an apostolic prefecture was established. In 1954 the status of a vicariate was conferred on the latter as well, with two years later Mgr R.J. Staverman being enthroned as bishop there. There were then two bishops in New Guinea. Ten years later, in 1960, the Bird's Head was separated from Hollandia and likewise set up as a vicariate in its own right. In 1966 these efforts were crowned with the conversion of the whole of western New Guinea, meanwhile rechristened Irian Barat, into an independent archdiocese, headed by an archbishop in Merauke. The administrative centre of the archdiocese meanwhile had shifted to Hollandia, then known as Sukarnopura. Here also the pan-Papuan theological college was established in 1968.

All in all, the post-war years showed a striking spread in church activities. Aside from the fact that the Roman Catholic mission had clearly been unhappy about its exclusive confinement to the more primitive south well before that, a number of other reasons for this may be pointed out. In the wake of post-war developments, Dutch personnel for government and business were entering

New Guinea in much larger numbers. A proportion of these were Catholic and claimed the pastoral care to which they were entitled. Furthermore, this influx was directed particularly at the new administrative and oil-producing centres. After Hollandia in 1945 became the official capital, the presence of the Catholic Church there became essential for the spiritual welfare of the newcomers as well as for the maintenance of relations with the new—and, after 1950, so much more powerful—local government. The stream of air traffic, too, shifted to this town. The airline from Biak to Sentani was the main aviation artery in New Guinea, while Hollandia offered the best connections with the Central Highlands. For its own missionary work, the Roman Catholic church focused particularly on Arso, to the south of Hollandia.

In the oil-producing region, the former centre of Babo had been annihilated during the war in 1942. It was not rebuilt after 1945, oil drilling being relocated to Sorong. This small town in 1947 counted 12,000 inhabitants, including many Roman Catholics from Kei. The place, in fact, became the centre of a Catholic campaign extending along the coasts of the MacCluer Gulf into the Bird's Head, where the mission penetrated as far as the Kebar region and the hinterland of Manokwari, the place from which the Protestant mission had first begun its work in the nineteenth century. In addition, missionary activities extended along the south coast, with Fakfak as a focus of attention, as of old. After that, the drift to the interior recommenced. In 1949 the Catholic mission returned to Enarotali, where the CAMA had been active again for a few years. As for the American missionaries, progress in the work in the interior for the Roman Catholics, too, was slow and difficult. Enormous cultural obstacles had to be overcome. This was true especially for the Mimika and the nearby Asmat area on the south coast, where around 1954 Agats became the administrative and religious centre. From that time onward, some progress was made. An important factor in this was the introduction of a special mission air service, Associated Mission Aviation, which made regular communications with Agats and the Wissel Lakes possible.[47]

In spite of this intensification of the work of the Roman Catholic mission, the latter still came in second place as regards both numbers and training level of the graduates of its schools also in this later period of Dutch rule over New Guinea. This was compensated for by its fighting spirit and assertiveness—a reflection of the spirit of triumphalism prevailing among the Roman Catholics in the Netherlands, who were extremely pleased with the results of Catholic emancipation over the past century, which among other things made the KVP the largest political party in the country at the time. It was most strikingly personified by Monsignor A. Cremers, who arrived in New Guinea in 1947 and became the vicar apostolic of Hollandia in 1954. The Protestants, who barely

tolerated Catholic competition on the north coast, were stung by the mere creation of this vicariate. Many Roman Catholics, for their part, experienced the fact that the majority of government officials, including those in the south, were from Protestant backgrounds as a permanent disadvantage. Then again, the latter took umbrage at what they regarded as a fixation on outward ceremony and overbearing dirigisme on the part of the priests.

Hence mutual relations were marked by a certain testiness, with the quandary of the dual mission, which had been permitted since the settlement of 1928, remaining a focus of attention. The implementation of this arrangement had been attended by numerous problems, but rarely any major accidents, as usually there seemed to be a practical solution at hand. This was the case now too, even though the situation was not rendered any the less complex by the increasing number of rivals entering the fray. As was clear, since all the various missions were now swarming in all directions, a certain degree of mutual interspersion became the normal thing. There were Catholic mission posts in the Protestant north, particularly in the area surrounding Hollandia and extending towards the Australian border, while the Protestants were annoyed at the Catholic penetration of the MacCluer Gulf and Bird's Head areas. The activities of the Moluccan church in Merauke and Fakfak, in turn, were a thorn in the side of the Roman Catholics. The Anglo-Saxon missionary societies, supplemented by Dutch missionaries as well as missionaries of a variety of denominations, had settled in the interior, both in the Wissel Lakes districts and in the Baliem Valley and the surrounding highlands. The headwaters of the major rivers in the south, the Mappi and the Digul, were chiefly, but not exclusively, Roman Catholic territory. What is more, the administration tended to condone this situation, even though the missionary fervour of the various societies often obliged it to take more urgent and vigorous measures than it felt for administrative reasons to be desirable or possible. Relations between 'Hollandia' and the Catholic Church improved considerably when the fiery Cremers in 1957 was replaced by the more affable Monsignor R.J. Staverman.[48]

Education

After 1950, too, the missions were responsible for education in New Guinea, receiving government subsidies towards this end. At the beginning of the period under discussion, by far the great majority of the 524 village schools was still run by the mission of the Dutch Reformed Church and its close associate, the Moluccan Protestant Church. The obvious body for liaising between the administration and the missions was the Indigenous Education Council, in which both were well represented. Educational matters were a regular topic of discussion there. This was the case at the very first meeting of this body in May

1951, where a proposal for a subsidy was tabled, accompanied by a memorandum on education drafted by its chairman, J. van Baal. The latter here drew a rather idealistic picture of education in village communities. The matter gave rise to a heated debate between representatives of the different missions about the training of future teachers. Taking the existing practice and the pedagogic theories underlying it as its point of departure, the Protestant mission wanted to integrate teacher-training colleges into the existing trajectory of village schools and the *Vervolgscholen* (VVS, follow-up schools) offering facilities for more advanced education. The three taken together would make for a nine-year curriculum, with boarding school facilities only being provided for the VVS and teacher training colleges. The Catholic mission wanted a single, integral six-year training course, to be offered in its entirety in a residential school environment. Though this might be more expensive, it did provide more opportunity for the children to grow up away from the parental environment. At the same time, it would be more practical, considering the low standard of tuition at the village schools in its area and the long periods pupils generally spent there, so that these were unable to supply suitable candidates for the schools for more advanced education in time. In the ensuing debate, particularly the pedagogic argument of the undesirability of selecting children as young as six for future careers was advanced. Although the Catholics were given some latitude in this connection, the view defended by the Protestant missionary Kijne was finally accepted by the administration. In 1960, there were five Village Teacher Training Colleges scattered in different parts of the region, which offered courses to about five hundred trainees.[49]

The above debate was part of a series of disagreements on a variety of subjects, and was attributable to the differences in point of departure and method and the existing rivalry between representatives of the two groups. These concerned mostly the fields of education and health care. On the other hand, the Indigenous Education Council provided the two adversaries with ample opportunity to form a united front vis-à-vis the government in defence of their joint interests. This was the case at this council's third meeting, in 1953, where the missions managed in mutual consultation to raise the hackles of their former chairman, Van Baal, recently installed as governor, with a proposal to start offering a five-year course at the Village Teacher Training Colleges immediately. This was an attractive idea to the missions on account of the qualitative and budgetary advantages it promised. Van Baal was of the opinion, on the other hand, that the council, otherwise than intended, here was acting as an interest group on behalf of the respective missions, while implementation of this proposal would cause serious stagnation in the supply of new teachers for several years.[50] For the remainder of his term as governor, accordingly, he kept

this body at arm's length and arranged matters in direct consultation with the leaders of the ecclesiastical associations. As a general rule, there was pressure not only from the Indigenous Education Council however. The Dutch parliament, where both rivals had people representing their interests in the religious parties, definitely also exercised an influence here.

Collisions like the above would sometimes lead the governor to yearn for a strengthening of the position of public primary education, for which only a few schools in the larger towns catered. Never at any time did this become a matter for serious consideration, however, and when one school inspector sent to him made a serious attempt in this direction, he was promptly sidelined. The fact aside that such a reversal of policy would never be approved by the Dutch parliament, the argument that in the land of the primitive Papuans education should include a prominent cultural component remained decisive for the colonial administrators. And such a component could only be provided by the missions. Islam was mostly ignored in this connection. At the first meeting of the Indigenous Education Council, Jouwe raised a complaint that the Muslim population of West New Guinea was wholly dependent for education on the missions. It was forwarded to the Resident of the district concerned, but little was done about it. The group in question was only a tiny one, after all.[51] The problem was solved by some mission schools excluding religious instruction from their regular curricula, while in the larger towns the government schools might offer some sort of alternative. The Muslim secondary school requested by Jouwe in any case did not eventuate.

The formal curriculum for by far the great majority of Papuans was very limited. The duration of the course offered by the subsidized village schools was fixed at three years, even though in practice most pupils took considerably longer to complete it. The desirability of extending it to four years or longer was admittedly acknowledged in the Indigenous Education Council too, but such a four-year course was only introduced in a few places at the end of the Dutch period, the simple reason being that there were not enough teachers available. Instruction beyond the elementary level could be enjoyed at the follow-up schools, the leaving standard of which was comparable to that of primary schools in the Netherlands. As was said above, there were a few six-year primary schools on the Dutch model in the administrative centres, but these were chiefly intended for the children of imported Indonesian and Dutch personnel. In 1950 there were eight such schools, four of which used Malay as medium of instruction, while the other four used Dutch. There was little growth as regards student numbers observable in this entire system of primary education. Between 1950 and 1958 the number of village school students remained stable at around 25,500, which in turn was not much more than the number of pupils

ten years before that. Student numbers at the schools at the next level in that same period rose from 1,500 to around 2,300. A sharper increase occurred only after that. In just a few years, by 1961 the number of village school students had risen to over 33,000, with a further projected rise to 38,000 in the following year. To this may be added the approximately 6,000 pupils of the type B primary schools introduced in 1955, which offered a qualitatively better kind of education. The number of students at the follow-up schools rose from 2,627 in 1961 to a projected 3,675 for 1963.[52]

The principal reason for this stability, particularly for the statistical stagnation between 1950 and 1957, was that areas in which the missions had been active before the war boasted a relatively high density of educational institutions even then. Only in the later 1950s did anything like an effective expansion of the administration and the missions in the interior take place, though this did not necessarily lead to the immediate introduction of regular education. In addition, the responsibility for such education in these areas lay largely with the American and Australian missionary societies, which were not interested in the forms of education officially developed for New Guinea. They preferred the establishment of elementary scripture schools, which had only a limited capacity for the development of intellectual skills. They furthermore had little or no interest in the Dutch language and preferred to stick to English. As a result of all this, education remained largely restricted to the coastal areas also in the last decade of Dutch rule, so that the number of children exposed to Western education one way or another increased only slowly.

Nevertheless, there was another reason for this stagnation. The most prominent policymakers in this period evinced definite conservative leanings, which can be traced back to their experiences with the colonial administration in the former Netherlands East Indies. There the nationalist unrest from the 1920s onward was generally believed to be to a large extent attributable to the emergence of a group of semi-educated intellectuals for whom there was insufficient employment in local society. Though it may not have been considered fashionable to say so explicitly, the idea played a constant role in the background. In addition there was the more socially acceptable colonial-didactic argument, as used by Van Baal and the then director for education, H. Kroeskamp. This was that Western education was an element that was inimical to traditional society. Hence it should not be too zealously imposed upon this society, for fear that it might provoke strong negative reactions. That was also why it was necessary to ask parents for a material contribution towards their children's education. This way, education would only be provided where it was desired, so reducing the chances of its acting as a destabilizing element in society that would set children against their parents. It was partly also for this reason that restraint was

observed in increasing the number of schools for education at the next level, whose capacity was, and continued to be, adapted to that of the schools for more advanced education at the next level again. The idea was as old as colonial educational policy itself, but re-surfaced in its full glory in the 1955 education by-law.[53]

This by-law even so was not an exclusively conservative product. It also provided for adaptation to a more complex society, caught up in a process of modernization in which the towns were growing larger and in the countryside, too, more children were exposed to Western ways of life. An example of such non-altruistic adjustment was the plan to push back the phenomenon of the *beschavingsschool* (acculturative school), with its limited ambitions as regards intellectual development. Instead, there was to be a new classification into three school types, adapted to the needs of more or less primitive areas and of urban districts.[54] Furthermore, there was an unmistakeable overall improvement in the standard of education to be observed in the 1950s. In 1950, thirty-five per cent of the teaching staff of the indigenous schools was unqualified, while at least sixty per cent of the teachers of the acculturative schools did not meet any kind of standard at all. The duration of the course at these schools in practice was, in fact, much longer than prescribed, while even at the better schools in the larger towns the number of pupils repeating classes came to more than half. There were only two teacher training colleges, which in 1950 turned out twenty-five graduates all told.[55] Ten years later the number of teacher training colleges had risen to five, with a combined 500 students in all. A remarkable experiment was the school established by the teacher N. van der Stoep in Tiom, in the West Baliem Valley, in the mid-1950s. Here trainee teachers from the coastal areas were given crash courses to prepare them to teach in Dani, the language of the Central Highlands. The expansion in teacher training resulted in a sharp decline in the number of unqualified teachers, and a correspondingly steep increase in the number of Papuan teachers. There was also a marked drop in absenteeism, so that in later years this did not deviate much from what was usual in the Netherlands. An indication of the improvement in the quality of education was that government supervision was eventually stepped up.

As noted above, the number of students of the schools for higher education slowly rose from 1,500 to 2,300 during Van Baal's governorship, his palpable restraint notwithstanding. This increase was necessitated by the need to meet the growing demand for better educated young students for the professional training and higher education courses. On the basis of these figures, we may assume that the annual number of students completing courses at the twelve institutions for higher education at the end of the 1950s came to around 500. The slowly developing local society, with its growing need for trained Papuan

personnel, required public servants, police personnel, teachers, preachers and nurses. In addition, there were a number of institutions offering other types of education, such as intermediate-level technical colleges and domestic science schools, as well as longer or shorter vocational training courses. In this category we may also include the various religious training and nursing courses and the specialized courses for a variety of government functions.

For most of these courses, the VVO (embracing the village and follow-up schools) provided adequate basic training. This was generally true for nursing and teacher-training courses, though for a number of them the standard was raised somewhat in the period under discussion. This was made possible by experiments with a *Primaire Middelbare School* (PMS; junior high school), also known as *Papoea Mulo*. This three- (and later four-) year PMS offered a course of general secondary education with Dutch as language of instruction. In addition, there was a Dutch-style *Mulo* (*Meerder Uitgebreid Lager Onderwijs*, intermediate-level secondary education) in Kota Baru, near Hollandia, while for children in Sorong a comparable school had been set up with aid from the local oil company. Also in 1951, Monsignor Cremers' *Hogere Burgerschool* (HBS; a high school for the 12–18-year age group) was opened, which for all practical purposes, from the point of view of both funding and leaving standard, may be equated with a *Mulo*. Some improvement was observable in later years. The PMS, as its nickname indicates, was intended for Papuan children. The other institutions were chiefly attended by children of immigrant Dutch and Moluccan personnel, although eventually a few dozen places here were allocated to Papuans. These four institutions in the first few years provided the total package of general education beyond the primary school level. Here, too, efforts to make up lost ground were not started until 1958, as a result of which by 1960 there were seven PMS and five *Mulo* schools, in addition to the HBS. There were then over a thousand pupils attending these thirteen schools, including 331 Papuans. The latter had to rely primarily on the PMS.

All this laid the foundations for more advanced or tertiary education facilities. The obvious first step was to upgrade the administrative college set up by Van Eechoud in 1945. Its standard had meanwhile improved considerably, and the number of students had grown to around fifty. In 1953 the college was christened *Opleidingsschool voor Inheemse Bestuursambtenaren* (OSIBA; Indigenous Public Servants Training College) and a PMS or *Mulo* education became the mandatory entrance requirement. The subjects taught provided a combination of general and specialized secondary education, the specialist subjects being indispensable for practical work in the administration and jurisdiction. The two- to three-year course included intervals of practical work. After its conversion into an OSIBA, the number of its students dropped to

around thirty. This drop may be attributed to the higher entry requirements and the competition with a few other specialized professional training institutions, whose admission requirements were just a little lower. These included the theological college, established in Serui in 1954, of which Kijne became the first principal. This college offered a nine-month course, which attracted between forty and fifty students annually. As the standard of education rose, higher education in the Netherlands now also came within the reach of Papuan students. In the mid-1950s, accordingly, the first students set out for the Netherlands to further their education there. Their number eventually rose to around forty a year, some of whom did academic courses. One of the latter was Frits Kiriho, whom we shall come across again later.

All in all, there were around two thousand Papuans doing some course or other beyond the level of the six-year village and follow-up schools at the end of the period of Dutch rule—a figure corresponding quite neatly with the annual number of students completing the VVO course. Graduates of the administrative and theological colleges came to form the upper stratum of the new elite destined to take over the running of the country from the Dutch in due course. This elite was comprised of a few hundred, or, depending on where the boundary is drawn, even a few thousand Papuans. Its members were fully aware of the huge gap separating them from the traditional environment of their parents and were proud of the place they occupied in the world. Because admission to higher education was restricted, they were assured of a good future. For them, education was a modern-style *koreri*, and they knew they were indebted to the Dutch for it. The large majority of them, in fact, had a positive attitude towards their Dutch teachers. Anyone reading the collective reports of OSIBA students in those years will be struck by the sincerity of their feelings of appreciation.[56] They gave regular expression to these even at that time. On 27 December 1954, the fifth anniversary of the region's existence as an independent *gouvernement*, for instance, fifteen hundred young Papuans staged a demonstration in front of the governor's residence in Hollandia to show their allegiance, with similar events taking place in other towns. At that time there was all the more reason for this, as an Indonesian proposal for intervention in the conflict with the Netherlands had failed to secure the required majority in the United Nations General Assembly. The fact that a discussion about this had taken place at all nevertheless provided cause for anxiety. In the following years more actions of this kind occurred, under increasingly depressing circumstances.

In this connection it should be noted that these teachers for their part showed great devotion in their attempts to make a success of this remarkable project of lifting a primitive people to a level at which it would be able to hold

its own in the modern world within a short span of time. The enthusiasm and devotion observed by Van Eechoud among his small team of public servants in his time were also motivating the teachers involved in this late flowerer of the Dutch colonial world. The colonial staffs had overcome the moral hangover of the first years following separation from Indonesia with the arrival of new personnel with new ambitions.[57] At the end of the period, in 1960, there were over two thousand teachers giving instruction to 53,930 students. At the higher levels of education, the teachers were virtually all Dutch. In the different forms of elementary and more advanced education, 1,400 teachers were employed, of whom well over half were Papuans, with the remaining positions being fairly evenly divided between Dutch citizens and Moluccans. These figures show that most of the work was done by Papuan teachers, who were now considerably better trained than their predecessors at the time Dutch rule first began re-gaining momentum.[58]

Criticism of developments in education in Dutch New Guinea was voiced in 1963 by Paul van der Veur. The gist of his comments is pithily summarized by the adage 'too little too late'.[59] This is difficult to deny: the Netherlands was obliged to let go of New Guinea at a time when the 'process of education' was still in full swing and there was still plenty of room for continuation and intensification. From what was said above it is more than clear that under Van Baal little haste was made with this, and deliberately so. This was partly because the available infrastructure and personnel imposed obvious restrictions on what expansion was possible. Furthermore, 'caution' was the watchword, and no one so much as even thought of setting up a large-scale educational programme using staff from outside within a short space of time. Fear of blunders was stronger than any sense of urgency. When such a sense finally did come to be felt, there appeared to be room for acceleration after all, as may be inferred from the figures. Even so, the old principles were not thrown overboard after 1958, either, even though a considerable expansion of education in breadth and depth appeared to be possible within their parameters. The existing infrastructure was more conducive to this than a few years before. It was now also possible to concentrate more on the creation of a small upper echelon. This at the same time made the existing contrast with the situation in Australian New Guinea, where all attention remained focused on elementary education and almost nothing was done at the levels above that, sharper. In that region a much larger percentage of Australian personnel was employed at every level, in fact, as a result of the close proximity of the mother country and of greater confidence about the future. As developments there and elsewhere were to show, even this proved no guarantee for a successful decolonization. The time factor, which came to be pressing for the Dutch from the aforementioned year

onward, was soon enough to make its influence felt in the Australian part of the island as well. Where both were concerned, in fact, the lack of sufficient preparation for the departure of the colonial master was more an outcome of international developments than of any internal dynamic in the two halves of New Guinea.

Language policy

The discussion about the speed and depth of the process of educating the Papuan people consistently revealed both a didactic and a political component. The same applies to the choice of medium of communication in education and, consequently, in the administration. It was a classic problem, which earlier had played an important role in the deliberations about Dutch East Indies educational policy, the premises of which had also determined the course for New Guinea up to the moment of separation. In the course of these, invariably a preference had been shown for the use of local languages in elementary schools. In large parts of Java, this had not been a difficult choice. Javanese was a sophisticated language spoken over a large area. In more fragmented and smaller language areas, as a rule Malay was adopted as the medium of instruction. It was the lingua franca of the coastal regions and of the lower and middle administrative echelons, and was in the process of developing into modern Indonesian. Only at the upper educational and administrative levels had Dutch been the medium of communication. No serious consideration was ever given to the possibility of making the entire region of the Netherlands East Indies Dutch-speaking, even though interest in Dutch was on the increase among the Indonesian elite, as it opened the way to status and a career.[60]

As a result of that same policy, Malay had become the most widely used language in education and administration in New Guinea. Here there was too much fragmentation of the local languages for these to play any kind of role in levels beyond that of the village schools. There were over two hundred of these languages, and only in exceptional cases were any of them spoken over wide areas. The exceptions were Biak, spoken in parts of the north and west coasts, Ekari as spoken in the Wissel Lakes area, and the Dani language of the Baliem region. Yet, in these regions, too, the number of speakers was nowhere higher than 60,000, while geographical fragmentation was becoming rife here as well. Initial attempts by the Protestant mission to introduce Biak outside its actual home region had met with stiff opposition. Over against this, Malay here, too, was the language of the coast. It had been introduced here by Ternatan traders as early as the nineteenth century, and its influence had grown strong with the arrival of Moluccan and Keiese government employees and teachers, who as a matter of course used their own language, which after all was the medium of

communication of the administrative apparatus of which they formed part. Before separation from Indonesia, Dutch had played hardly any role at all outside the small Dutch administrative circle and the tiny group of Papuans closely associated with it.

After separation, this changed. The influx of large groups of Dutch speakers from Java and the Netherlands altered the linguistic map of the larger centres. The conflict with Indonesia and the related determination to find another direction for West New Guinea provoked an opposition to Malay that had not been found in the Indies context. Consequently the choice of this language was no longer an obvious one. This became evident in an acrimonious debate, which, again, took place at the first meeting of the *Raad voor de Volksopvoeding*, in May 1951. This was, after all, the only available forum for the discussion of subjects of this kind, while this particular problem had been awaiting attention for a year. Hence the sparks started flying at the outset.

The debate was opened by the colonial official Dr. H.K.J. Cowan, who pointed to the desire of the Papuans themselves to switch over to Dutch. So the very first morning after separation, he and his colleagues had been greeted by the Papuan departmental heads with a well meant 'good morning, sir' in Dutch, instead of the familiar Malay '*slamet pagi*'. This had clearly been a deliberate political choice on the part of the latter, whereby they wanted to give expression to their desire for West New Guinea to remain under the Dutch flag also in the future. This, according to Cowan, should be taken seriously. The introduction of Dutch as the official language would furthermore have the practical advantage that, as the modern Western language that it was, it provided much wider scope for the expression of thoughts and feelings, while a knowledge of this language gave access to the whole body of written knowledge of and about the modern world. Malay should be left to die a slow death, while Dutch should be universally introduced with the greatest possible speed, especially in the newly opened up areas. Cowan's comments were heartily endorsed by the only Papuan member of the council, Nicolaas Jouwe, who thus aligned himself with the members of the indigenous elite in the former Netherlands East Indies, for whom Dutch had been the ticket to higher status. At the same time, Jouwe was giving expression to the pro-Dutch political line of which he was, and would remain, one of the principal proponents.

Objections were raised by Kijne. These were of a pragmatic nature, being that Dutch was, after all, no easy language and Malay was already widely accepted. He moreover had doubts about the appropriateness of a resolution for the introduction of this language from a political, practical and cultural point of view. Indonesia would, after all, remain West New Guinea's biggest neighbour, no matter which way you looked at it, and in this case linguistic

unity was a great advantage. Hence Malay should be accepted forthwith as the common language of the people, and the gradual introduction of Dutch for the higher-educated classes stimulated alongside it. Without saying so in so many words on this occasion, Kijne at the same time was giving implicit expression to the desire of the Protestant mission not to let the ties with the Protestant churches in Indonesia become any looser than was strictly necessary.

The outcome of this discussion was a recommendation by the council to strive to introduce Dutch as the official language and to commence with this at the *guru* training colleges. In line with Cowan's recommendation, Dutch should be introduced in new areas as much as possible as soon as these were opened up, and the Malay phase skipped. The Roman Catholic mission that same year linked up with this idea with a proposal for opening a Dutch-language residential school in the Wissel Lakes district. For practical reasons, the application for a subsidy for this was rejected by the Council of Department Heads, a little more cautious as it always was,[61] but the tone was set. It signified an unmistakeable reversal of policy with respect to the course formerly pursued in the Netherlands East Indies. It was a policy that could count on warm support in the Dutch parliament as well. Van Baal, in his memoirs, uses the word 'understandable nationalism', the objections he raises in this connection clearly being of a later date. We find the policy reflected with far fewer reservations in the ideas of his director for education, H. Kroeskamp, who from 1953 on made a major contribution to the discussion.[62] Under his leadership, efforts were made to introduce Dutch in the schools for higher education and the *guru* training colleges, as a result of which this language was set to dominate the entire higher level. The policy eventually came to nothing, if only for lack of time to achieve the desired results. The immediate effects were obvious from the large number of students who had to repeat classes at the *guru* training colleges and schools for higher education, however. Malay was not to be ousted just like that, the determination of the Dutch authorities notwithstanding.

Paul van der Veur was convinced that this was one of the factors that had an inhibitive effect on the expansion of the educational system. When one looks from some distance at the picture presented by that system, one can only agree with him. In the initial phase at any rate, getting students of the follow-up schools to gain some fluency in the Dutch language, under the guidance of a *guru* whose own knowledge of that language was extremely inadequate, was a well-nigh impossible task. Kroeskamp had undoubtedly had the example of Manado and the Moluccas in the nineteenth century, a subject about which he knew a great deal, in mind here.[63] This should have made him realize that the (partial) introduction of Dutch in those areas had taken many decades. His proposal indicates that he was confident that New Guinea would be granted the

same amount of time. The most astonishing thing is the ease with which the Dutch ignored this time factor. The incongruity in historical development between the two areas became more than obvious at the introduction of the *Nieuw-Guinearaad* in 1961. Here the tiny apex of the upper class of New Guinea society—who had enjoyed the best education the country had to offer—was gathered together for the first time. Yet, although one or two delegates used Dutch, Malay became the regular medium of communication of this council, so that no one needed even to think of having the minutes of the proceedings translated into Dutch.

The hesitations of big business

The account given here so far of developments in Netherlands New Guinea following the gathering pace in 1950 might lead us to forget that for Minister Van Maarseveen the economic motive played an important role. Thanks to Van Eechoud, his imagination had been fired particularly by the prospects of nickel and chromium mining. After 1950 he was still in office and able to exercise an influence as minister for over another year. Cost-effectiveness was the oldest demand of colonial rule, and The Hague had not forgotten this. As far as Van Baal was concerned, this aim was personified by his greatest opponents in The Hague, Messrs Krijger and Kottier of the New Guinea office of the department. These two gentlemen were, in fact, particularly zealous in the pursuit of this objective. Van Baal was able to respect this in itself, provided they showed some consideration for the governor at the same time. Van Baal's quip about this in any case has the merit that it underlines the fact that relations with the Western business world since Batavia had dropped out of the equation had come to be chiefly in the hands of The Hague.

As I demonstrated in chapter two, big business in the pre-war years had shown little interest in New Guinea. Admittedly the large companies in the Dutch East Indies had organized themselves in the *Negumij*, but this had been prompted by political factors. Their participation mainly had a symbolic intent. Although some research had been done in the field of ore mining, this had never led to any break-through. Only oil extraction had made an effective start, laying the foundations for further post-1945 activities.

The oil industry was self-sufficient, as will become apparent later on. In every other area, the initiative obviously lay with The Hague. Here Minister Jonkman had been busy since 1946 with the preparations for an expedition that was meant to pick up the thread of geological exploration, which had been broken in 1942, again. In the former year the Netherlands New Guinea Exploration Committee, chaired by Admiral F.J. Heeris, was created. In it the Business

Council for Indonesia was represented, as well as the mining industry. The academic camp was represented by the *Koninklijk Aardrijkskundig Genootschap* (Royal Geographic Society), as of old, besides the various university professors in the fields of soil science, geology, mineralogy, and forestry. The projected expedition did not materialize at the time, as the East Indies government had plenty of other things on its hands and uncertainty about the future status of the region dampened all initiative. After 1950 the situation changed to the extent that the authorities were no longer dependent on the East Indies government, though in the little palace in The Hague where the Business Council had its headquarters the East Indies business world continued to play first fiddle. It was interested first and foremost in safeguarding Dutch investments in Indonesia and was little inclined to burn its fingers in New Guinea. This was apparent at the very outset, in 1950, when the big Indies firms showed themselves unprepared to take importing and exporting in this region in hand and were only too happy to leave this to the house of Hagemeyer by way of the specially created *Nieuw-Guinea Im- en Export Maatschappij* (New Guinea Import and Export Company).

This *Nigimij* was to dominate trade with New Guinea for the next few years. The same was not true of the other brainchild of the Dutch business world, the *Negumij*, founded in 1938. In the first years following the war it had kept very quiet.[64] The original reason for its existence, to act as a barrier against Japanese economic penetration, had gone, while the overwhelming majority of the participating companies had little sympathy for the Dutch government's New Guinea policies. The report produced by the *Studiecommissie Nieuw-Guinea* (New Guinea Study Committee) in 1949 had been written in their spirit and was far from providing any stimulus at all. The urgings of the Department of Overseas Territories to do at least something came up against a brick wall of passive resistance. This was the case when, for example, the board member K.W.J. Michielsen was summoned to the department at the end of 1949 for consultation with Krijger, Van Eechoud and the newly nominated governor Van Waardenburg. These gentlemen tried to convince him that Indonesia had no rights at all to New Guinea, and that the next move was now the *Negumij*'s. Their arguments fell on deaf ears, however. A year later, just before the start of the December 1950 New Guinea conference, some of the members of this group even seriously considered a demonstrative disbandment, but this proved too drastic a step for the majority. The only positive action taken by the *Negumij* in the following years was to get experimental planting in Ransiki underway again—which eventually it gave up for lack of funds in 1960. Thereafter the experiment fizzled out slowly. There was no faith in the project and the participating companies were busy safeguarding their own interests or

relocating to more lucrative areas, of which New Guinea definitely was not one. One may justifiably assume, therefore, that there was a continual communications breakdown between most of the East Indies business world and the bureaucrats in The Hague. The secretary of the Business Council in 1950, J. van Oldenborgh, described his principal opposite number in the department, Minister Götzen, as a man with whom no business-like discussion was possible. The senior official Krijger, for his part, described the entrepreneurs as a bunch of bunglers with no idea of lobbying. Matters remained thus for the time being,[65] until in 1957 the entrepreneurs themselves proceeded to take action via informal groups like the '*groep-Rijkens*' (Rijkens group) in an attempt to induce the politicians to adopt an attitude more congenial to their interests.

Apart from this, there were few attempts to speak of on the part of organized business in the Netherlands to arouse interest in New Guinea. The sole initiative in this connection was the establishment of the *Nieuw-Guinea Instituut* by the Rotterdam and Amsterdam chambers of commerce, mentioned in passing earlier. The latter was wholly dependent on an annual grant of five thousand guilders from the department, however. The principal, and actually only, fruit of its labours, in fact, was the *Vademecum voor Nieuw-Guinea*, which appeared in 1955. If one wanted to be cynical, one could view this institute as a project to provide employment for the sacked Van Eechoud, who, an expert on New Guinea though he might be, was anything but an enthusiastic promoter of the interests of business. The most active interest in the work of the institute from the business camp was shown by the *Hollandse Beton Maatschappij* (Dutch Concrete Company), which succeeded in securing numerous contracts from the New Guinea government in precisely that period. Its participation was not much more than a gesture, however, as this company was quite capable of taking care of its own affairs without the intervention of this institute.[66]

To the extent that anything happened at all, this concerned initiatives by private entrepreneurs and government reactions to these. They were almost without exception ventures in the fields of logging, fishing and mining. Consultations on mining were carried on virtually exclusively with The Hague, while in discussions about logging and fishing the government in Hollandia as a rule was also involved. Both Hollandia and The Hague were eager to strengthen the economic basis of the colony. In addition there was invariably also a political motive at work here. If the Netherlands wanted to demonstrate that it was capable of pursuing an effective decolonization policy, it would also need to be able to tap the necessary resources. In addition, foreign investments in particular were politically important, as this way it would be possible to give friendly nations a share, and hence an interest, in the administration of

New Guinea. Such foreign interest was shown particularly by the United States of America, Japan and Australia. The Dutch were still not very enthusiastic about Japanese participation. Besides old reflexes, fear of an underhand 'deal' with the Indonesians played a part in this. A risk of this from the United States was not to be entirely dismissed, either. The American occupation of Japan had given rise to a joint American-Japanese interest in the rapid reconstruction of that country and its inclusion in the anti-communist bloc. Such an alliance was not without certain economic overtones. It was at odds with Australian wishes. However, having discovered the strategic importance of New Guinea during the war and showing itself more fearful than the Netherlands of a potential resurrection of the slain Asian giant, Canberra was prepared in principle to support the Netherlands in New Guinea after 1950, provided this country kept the Japanese at bay there.

Illustrative of the situation were the discussions conducted at the Department of Overseas Territories with the American canning firm Van der Camp from 1953 on. The latter wanted to fish the seas around New Guinea with the aid of Japanese employees. The department did not object to this, on certain conditions. Once it had won this point, however, Van der Camp stepped up its demands, now bidding for unlimited use of Japanese manpower and materials. Thus the company was starting to look more and more like a Japanese than an American company. Van Baal, resolute as always, felt that if it came to that, the Netherlands might as well do business direct with the Japanese and put its old traumas behind it. This initially placed him in rather an isolated position vis-à-vis the department, until it gradually became clear that the American-Japanese consortium was only interested in tuna fishing, in which New Guinea's interest would not go much beyond the establishment of a small-scale trans-shipment facility on the north coast. All parties concerned thereupon soon lost interest in the matter. In this and similar cases, both American and Japanese interest turned out when it came to the crunch to be quite limited and, insofar as there was any interest at all, this came from candidates who were not very serious.

Logging in New Guinea was naturally problematic because of the impassability of the terrain and the wide dispersion of useful timber species. Foreign interest in this industry accordingly was negligible, and it was not until after 1958 that a few logging applications were received. One of the firms concerned was the Australian company PDC, which planned to start operations using Japanese personnel. It soon turned out that this company, too, was acting as a front for Japanese interests. The Australian government adopted a negative attitude, but the New Guinea administration was not uninterested. In addition, some interest was shown by several individual Papuans, in which connection the names of Womsiwor, Jouwe and Wajoi may be mentioned. They managed

to get something off the ground, in fact, but it remained a small-scale venture, which was dependent on a number of small dealers in Okinawa. Large-scale Japanese logging was directed at Indonesia. This country was not keen to see any Japanese activities in New Guinea and was quick effectively to discourage these.

The most serious candidates for logging were the Australians, but they, too, only showed any real interest from 1958 onward. Then it became clear that nothing was to be expected from them, either, unless the Netherlands created the necessary facilities to make logging cost-effective. This would require substantial investments, and when these were not forthcoming, interest soon waned again. The same problem presented itself in the case of a number of Dutch entrepreneurs. So little or nothing came of all these initiatives. Lumbering was and remained the domain of the forestry department of the *Dienst Economische Zaken* (Department of Economic Affairs) in Hollandia. Virtually the entire yield was for domestic use, with the sawmill in Manokwari proving very useful in this respect. In addition, a load of timber might occasionally be sold to a Japanese dealer from Okinawa.

Hence little business was done in timber and fish. Only in minerals was there some activity. Oil was the oldest and only form of Western big-business in which anything was happening at all. Drilling had been resumed at the end of the war, with the headquarters being moved from Babo to Sorong. It was a world entirely apart. It took care of its own imports, housing, roads, food supplies, schools and even radio broadcasts. The people involved in it were listed in a separate category in the statistics. In 1953, a good year for oil, it employed 562 European, 3,556 Papuan and 1,818 Indonesian males over eighteen years of age in West New Guinea, aside from a large number of women and boys just under that age. In all, there were almost 10,000 employees registered under the NNGPM (*Nederlands-Nieuw-Guinea Produktie Maatschappij*, Netherlands New Guinea Production Company) colours. The oil producers' imports exceeded what was brought into the country via the *Nigimij* to meet the needs of the whole of the remainder of the colony. The industry enjoyed considerable tax benefits for its operations. Exports were completely duty-free, over against which a company tax of forty per centwas payable, which in 1950 was good for an amount of 460,000 Dutch guilders, making the NNGPM the local government's biggest taxpayer by far. Also in 1950, it accounted for sixty per cent of total exports, which figure rose to eighty five per cent in 1955. The significance of these figures should not be over-stated, however. Annual government grants covered half, and eventually even substantially more, of the annual budget, which in the years between 1953 and 1960 increased from 90 to 144 million. In

actual fact, the immediate proceeds from oil barely covered expenditure on the industry via the budget of the department of mining. Oil was important as a promise for the future and as proof of American interest, sixty per cent of the NNGPM being in American hands. This company moreover proved useful as a supplier to the local government of ships, aircraft and all kinds of equipment that was not available in the latter's own stores.

At the end of the status-quo period, the NNGPM's prospects seemed good. The company desired expansion of the oilfields exploited by it, permission for which was received from the department after the usual bargaining. The latter was particularly keen in this connection to ensure that exploration was followed up with exploitation. The possibility of over-exploitation and speculation was always its chief worry, and this applied to concessions it granted in every field. After all, it was allocating a huge area of twenty-five million hectares. Following this, yields increased steadily, until they started dropping again after the boom year 1955.[67] The most obvious explanation for this decline is that the wells in two of the three fields exploited were running dry. By the end of the 1950s, yields had halved and the company decided to cut back its activities further. Only after 1967 would yields increase again, deriving from finds made during explorations conducted in the Dutch period. All this admits of only one conclusion, namely that under the mounting political tension of the later 1950s and during the uncertain period following this, the management evidently deemed it inadvisable to rush in to make new investments, and kept its cards close to its chest.[68]

Besides oil, dry mining attracted the department's attention. Van Maarseveen had not succumbed to the lure of nickel and chromium for nothing, after all. The reports on nickel in the Cycloop Mountains put out by the department of mining in Bandung at Van Eechoud's promptings in 1949 attracted the attention of the *Oost Borneo Maatschappij* (OBM; East Borneo Company) immediately upon their appearance. This company, engaged in coal mining in the Netherlands East Indies since the end of the nineteenth century, presented itself at the Ministry of Overseas Territories in The Hague in the course of 1950. Here Krijger and Kottier listened attentively to its representatives, although they expressed the view that it might be better not to undertake any steps for the time being and to wait till the end of the status-quo year prescribed by the RTC agreements. It was good policy not to offend Indonesia unnecessarily, but also not to draw that country's attention to the mineral potential of the island and so stimulate its greed. A third reason for their lack of enthusiasm was the fact that they were keen to see some American participation in the project and also wished to await the reaction of the much more cash-rich Billiton Company, which had likewise been informed of the research results.

At the end of the status-quo period, the OBM turned out actually to be the only company to react. The Billiton Company acted in accordance with the general principles of the East Indies business world. The tin mining industry evidently was loath to take risks and to put its strong position in Indonesia unnecessarily on the line. The upshot of it all was that a long series of negotiations about the conditions on which mining might start now took place with the OBM. The company had secured the support of the NHM (*Nederlandse Handel Maatschappij*, Dutch Trading Company) and of the Rotterdam shipping agency W.H.M. Muller. The negotiations initially were difficult, not only because the NHM adopted a hesitant attitude, but also because the OBM, in the view of the departmental officials, indulged in rather nonchalant negotiating methods. The negotiators from The Hague moreover wanted to await the results of a study commissioned from the technical university in Delft. Furthermore, they had got in contact on their own initiative with the Canadian nickel giant INCO, though unsuccessfully. Meanwhile, the OBM had commenced talks with the Sumitomo ore processing company in Japan, to which the nickel would have to be exported. It further maintained relations with American companies, and undoubtedly also with the government of Indonesia, where it retained substantial interests in mining in Celebes until 1958. The intentions underlying this behaviour were clear, as J.M. de Wit has observed in his Nijmegen MA thesis: the OBM was hedging against political risks and did not want to be exclusively dependent on the Netherlands government.

The American parties with which the OBM sought, and in the event managed to establish, contact were the United States Steel Corporation (USSC) and the Freeport Sulphur Company, both of them major players in their field. The first contacts were established in 1955. The officials of the department now again, as was their custom, focused all their attention on guarantees against over-exploitation and speculation and for the processing of the ore mined in New Guinea itself. The American partners, for their part, sought to obtain safeguards against political risks from the Dutch government, which had no simple answer to this. As a result, and also because of various technical difficulties, the Dutch government did not sign a contract with a newly created company, the *Pacific Nickel Mijnbouw Maatschappij* (Pacific Nickel Mining Company), in which the OBM, the latter's Dutch partners, and the USSC held a share, until 1962. This consortium was to engage in nickel and cobalt mining in the Cycloop Mountains near Hollandia and the Raja Ampat archipelago.[69]

Simultaneously with this, a development that was to prove of great future importance took place. In the course of the nickel and cobalt negotiations, the

OBM had given increasing attention to the possibilities of copper, gold and silver mining in the Carstensz Mountains. In 1960 it surveyed a rock formation there, spotted earlier in 1936 by J.J. Dozy and A.H. Colijn during their expeditions to the Carstensz Mountains, when they had aptly named it the Ertsberg (Ore Mountain). It now explored this mountain seriously together with Freeport. Both companies were enthusiastic about their finds here. As Freeport reported to the American State Department, this mountain proved to be 'the largest above-ground outcrop of base metal ore in the world'. At last New Guinea was beginning to look like the El Dorado Van Maarseveen had dreamt of. However, the political uncertainty was a problem, now that the Netherlands was obliged, under Indonesian pressure, to make plans for the internationalization and short-term independence of the region. Representatives of Freeport Sulphur now came to take personal stock of the situation at the relevant department in The Hague, where the deputy minister for New Guinea, Bot, tried to put their minds at ease. The Dutch government was not interested enough, however, to offer financial guarantees against political risks. Even so, the OBM and Freeport Sulphur in October 1961 jointly founded the *Zuid Pacific Koper Maatschappij* (South Pacific Copper Company), in which the Americans had a small majority interest.

Further progress in both nickel and copper mining was hampered by political developments. One should pause here to wonder how much American politics with regard to West New Guinea were influenced by reports of rich deposits of minerals in the area. The State Department was informed of the existence of such deposits by both Freeport Sulphur and the *Oost-Borneo Maatschappij* and the Dutch government. Research conducted in the State Department archives for the purposes of the present study did not turn up anything to confirm that this may have influenced American decision-making in this respect, however. What we are able to establish is that at the moment of the transfer of sovereignty over New Guinea, plans for the large-scale exploitation of the area's rich mineral resources were in place. Above, we put forward the suggestion that this may have been the case with regard to oil as well. There was one factor that put a spanner in the works here, however. Under Sukarno, no foreign companies were allowed into the country. These companies resumed their activities here only after Suharto's accession as president of Indonesia. Then copper mining in particular, in which Freeport now played a key role, produced spectacular results. In the initial phase, the OBM also was still involved, and thus was in a position to wind up its affairs in a satisfactory way. The big winners were the Americans, however, in whose hands exploitation of the Ertsberg has remained ever since.[70]

A development project under the colonial flag

The three governors in charge of the administration of New Guinea from 1950 onward had years of practical training in the colonial service in the Netherlands East Indies behind them. They had witnessed the final years of Dutch rule while in active service here and were apt to think in terms of the decolonization model applied there. According to this, the government's primary duty was to ensure that a sound economic basis was laid, which would make existence as an independent nation possible. Its second task was to educate the people and to modernize the government apparatus so as to bring it more or less into line with the norms and expectations current in the Western world in this respect. Only then could there be question of a gradual withdrawal of top Dutch administrators. This, in the special case of New Guinea, was explicitly made contingent upon a procedure whereby the people would be enabled to decide their own future. There was now less speculation on the Dutch side about a permanent tie of the kind emphatically specified for Indonesia in the Union construct of the RTC agreements. The miscarriage of the latter had given rise to the assumption that equally little was to be expected of an artificial construct of this kind for New Guinea, while the changing international-political constellation made it clear that a credible act of self-determination would also be welcome to the Netherlands. In actual fact, it was the only way of relieving the Netherlands of the exclusive responsibility, accepted in 1950, for the welfare and the protection of this area without losing face.

For most of the 1950s this did not seem likely in the short term, even though, as we saw above, Van Baal at the end of his governorship privately began to take the possibility of independence in 1980 into account. His speculations had scarcely any consequences for his policies in practice, however. As with Van Waardenburg, his highest priority was the creation of a better infrastructure as a starting point for economic and administrative development. By far the largest part of the annual budget was spent on this. The most frenetic construction activity occurred in Hollandia. After the large construction companies moved in, the untidy little township developed into a modern tropical town with decent housing and adequate public amenities. Bungalows were built for the Dutch newcomers entering the country in droves, while the model village of Hamadi was laid out for the Papuans. For the government, construction of a new palace with administrative offices was completed in 1957, while the rickety timber hotel building was replaced by a modern edifice.[71] The development of Manokwari, Sorong and Merauke lagged far behind that of Hollandia, though there, too, the better facilities were placed at the disposal of the administrative departments, while education and health care were also given improved

amenities. As far as communications were concerned, road construction remained restricted to a few small projects in and around the administrative centres. Most of the emphasis was on air and shipping links. A series of airfields for military and civilian use was constructed in the interior as well as along the coast. Especially important was the civil airport of Biak, Mokmer, which had been adapted for the accommodation of the then largest planes. It was New Guinea's chief link with the outside world. From here, there were regular flights to Sentani, the airfield of Hollandia, and to other towns. In 1954 a small KLM subsidiary, named *De Kroonduif* (The Crested Pigeon), was set up to take care of local air traffic. In the interior there were also the mission air services. In shipping, the KPM was active and, after being ousted from the remainder of the archipelago in 1957, was able to devote itself without complications and with adequate materials to the task still in hand in New Guinea. On Van Baal's accession, the first new coasters arrived, raising coastal shipping to a higher level. The administration had modern official ships placed at its disposal, and the governor was gladdened with the arrival of a comfortable craft for tours of inspection, the *Oranje*. Of special importance for the business of administration were the improved radio and telephone communications, whereby it was now possible to reach all of the larger outlying posts. This spelled a reduction in the number of endless treks on foot, which had dominated life in New Guinea until the 1950s. In every town that qualified for this, port facilities were improved, with the construction of a dry dock in Manokwari for ships of up to 6,000 tonnes forming the climax. Also in Manokwari, a modern sawmill was built with government funds.

Farming by Dutch Indies immigrants had remained insignificant. The first moves for this had been made by pressure groups active mainly in Java long before the transfer of sovereignty to Indonesia. These had managed to arouse some sympathy for their cause among Dutch politicians with a guilty conscience with respect to their fellow-countrymen who were in danger of being abandoned. These politicians were motivated by a fairly widespread, though rarely deep-rooted, feeling that the Indos should not be denied the right to a new home country in the tropics. In addition they were impelled by a sly sort of ulterior motive springing from the realization that Indo-colonization might be used to advantage to throw a spanner in the works of Indonesian unity. The colonization associations had been successful in pushing through their ideas in this connection partly by capitalizing on these feelings, but had failed to live up to expectations. The groups of immigrants had been too small and too ill prepared to achieve anything much. Subsequently, they had come to occupy an increasingly marginal position in the policies of the different governors. Under Van Waardenburg, these had been restricted to a few measures for emergency

relief, while the prospects of family reunion were virtually nil. Then followed a slow process of integration in the new society of New Guinea, followed in turn by the exodus to the Netherlands and elsewhere, which got properly underway in 1958. The historian Hans Meijer[72] and others have accused the Dutch government of duping the colonists with the ideal of the native country as a convenient argument, which it dropped as soon as this no longer suited it. From the afore-going it may be clear that this is a slightly exaggerated view. As Meijer himself points out, in fact, the colonization argument had been of marginal importance in the decision-making process in The Hague, while migration was not encouraged in practice by the authorities either in Batavia or in The Hague. The only thing one might reproach them with is failure to rule the scheme out as an option at the outset.

As a consequence of these developments, the Indies group declined in importance in the course of the 1950s, while the increasing size and complexity of the administrative apparatus and the businesses dependent on it stimulated the arrival of new immigrants from the Netherlands. The situation was characterized by the creation of a new category of Dutch civil servants, the Administration Officials. The trainees here were young men who had completed high school in the Netherlands and had subsequently been crammed in a one-year crash course in Hollandia for a career in the colonial civil service. New Guinea was attracting many new personnel in other fields as well, the majority without a Dutch East Indies background. This trend was reinforced with the arrival of large groups of Dutch military personnel from 1957 on. Hence by the end of our period a much more distinctly Dutch society had developed. The figures for the end of 1960, that is, before the arrival of larger military reinforcements, show a total of over 16,000 Europeans, 10,783 of them males over eighteen years of age. One does not need a strong imagination to identify the society as a male dominated one, most of the members of which were planning on only a temporary stay. This conclusion is confirmed by the constant coming and going of thousands of individuals, including 434 incoming and 357 departing Dutch public servants and their families. New Guinea for them was not a country of permanent settlement, but only of temporary residence.[73]

In this world, in which there never was or would be any such thing as a vested Dutch interest, the Papuans were the focus of all attention. The first two governors had concentrated their efforts primarily on a cautious social and cultural integration of the Papuans in the modern world and a strengthening of their economic position. Administrators and mission workers concerned themselves in their daily dealings with the people with such matters as education, food supplies, life style and health. They further strove to develop Papuan

exports for the world market. Among indigenous products, copra and crocodile skins occupied pride of place. The total proceeds from these were limited, however. The returns on copra, the most lucrative indigenous product by far, in 1960 were well over 3 million guilders, and on crocodile skins 1.8 million, with backward South New Guinea being a leader in the supply of both. This was a sector on which people did not pin their hopes for the future, in fact.[74]

For the people's further development a two-pronged approach was adopted. In the first place there was Kotter's The Hague prong, with its ideas of large-scale farming and industry based on large-scale investment. Under the given circumstances, the Papuans were mainly to be assigned the role of labourers. This form of development in actual fact remained restricted to the oil industry. Mining failed to get off the ground, uncertainty about the political future of the area being an important factor responsible for this. Equally little came of the plans for the development of plantation agriculture. As opposed to Java, New Guinea's coastal areas lacked a class of small farmers willing or able to provide labour. Then there were the huge distances from potential markets and the lack of suitable arable land to contend with. These were the same problems as those partially responsible for the miscarriage of the plans for large-scale logging and fishing.

Kottier's lack of success then gave the policy advocated by Van Baal a chance. It was aimed at the formation of an indigenous class of farmers as a basis for an independent existence for the people. Without this, the indigenous population would only become a bunch of dissatisfied, envious idlers, ready to nationalize foreign capital as soon as they saw their way clear. It was, in short, a very topical lesson on an old Netherlands East Indies theme. Improvement of farming was the primary task of the administration, which with the aid of the relevant specialist departments provided information and advice wherever needed. Particular consideration was given in this connection to the promotion of cacao growing, which seemed promising. Animal husbandry was not forgotten, either. An interesting example of this is given in civil servant R.A. Gonsalves' memoirs. Barely had the administration set up a post in the Baliem Valley, than the first experiments with the introduction of small horses, cattle and various crops were started. Most of these attempts failed as a result of the enormous cultural differences. An apt illustration of the latter is the introduction by the government of 'white swine' for breeding purposes among the local population. These animals were fatter than the local ones, as a result of which meat production would increase. This is what happened in the peripheries of the larger centres, in fact, but in the interior things went wrong. Here the white pigs upset the familiar order, which gave rise to disease, quarrels and inconvenience. The effects of these experiments were very limited, in fact.[75]

In addition there were more systematic special welfare projects—development projects in the modern sense, with long-term funding, concrete production targets, and modern techniques. They were co-operative in design, it being hoped that this would immediately give the participating farmers the feeling that they were working for the good of their own community. In this connection Koembe and the Nimboran were shining examples. The one involved the construction and improvement of an extensive system of polders for mechanized rice farming near Merauke, the other a large-scale agricultural project aimed at raising a variety of products near Genjem, to the west of Hollandia. Both had their roots in Van Eechoud's period, but were energetically carried through by his successors. Here, too, the end result was meagre. Although both enterprises yielded interesting results, they would only be able to keep this up provided they remained under a tight Dutch management. The social effect was that they turned the Papuans taking part into coolies on their own land. With a view to raising the latter's production level, an agricultural experimental station with an affiliated training centre was set up in Merauke around 1960. Both institutions were funded by grants from the European Economic Community.[76]

This indicates not only that agrarian development projects were continued after Van Baal stepped down, but also that New Guinea had meanwhile landed in more international waters. The background to this was growing European co-operation and the rise of development aid as an international project on the one hand, and mounting Indonesian pressure to induce the Netherlands to change its New Guinea policy on the other. As a result of the latter factor, the emphasis from the moment Platteel came into office came to lie wholly on an acceleration of the development of the society in every field. The shifting prospects for the future exercised due influence on education, Papuanization and democratization. Education was discussed in an earlier section of this chapter, and democratization will be dealt with in a following chapter. It was possible in any case to establish that education in the course of the 1950s underwent both a quantitative and a qualitative expansion, which made for an increased availability of Papuan workers. Good use was made of these, too, and more and more so at the end of the Dutch period. With regard to employment, we have already seen that the NNGPM in 1953 had at least 3,500 Papuans working for it. After a steep rise in the following years and a drop in the later 1950s, the number of Papuan workers in the oil industry was back to about the same level in 1960 as a result of developments in the oil industry. By then, however, the total number of Papuan employees in the administration and private business had risen to around 16,000. Experiences with these employees were on the whole positive, and it was noted that Papuan workers quite quickly learned how

to use modern machinery. Their integration in the mainly government-supported Western sector was the chief outcome of the development activities undertaken so far. Alongside this category of day labourers doing unskilled work, there was a slowly growing group of Papuan public servants in permanent employment, holding government jobs as clerks, labourers, policemen or hospital attendants. Their number rose from around 1,300 in 1956 to 5,400 at the end of the Dutch period, by which time they no longer occupied a position exclusively at the foot of the social pyramid. In 1960 there were 76 Papuans working with the *Binnenlands Bestuur* as qualified assistant administrators, a few dozen of whom occupied an independent position as district head. From their midst the replacements for the then departing Dutch local administrators were chosen in 1962. The other departments also included a few hundred of these persons in positions at what may be qualified as the middle and lower middle level. Together with the approximately 700 teachers, this brings us to a little under a thousand individuals, who at the end of the Dutch period formed the crystallizing Papuan elite, which slowly but surely expanded as a result of the progress in education.[77] The tiny Papuan elite of 1950 had by1962 acquired a wider basis.

Territorial extension of the administration

So far, all this sounds like a true success story: western New Guinea had made a big leap forward on the international stage in the twelve years of continued Dutch rule and, setting aside international developments to be discussed later, it looked as if a society capable of holding its own on that stage might evolve there in due course. We should make the reservation here, however, that this development had been mainly restricted to the coastal areas, which until the end of the period described here constituted the Dutch administration's principal sphere of activity. There were nevertheless some advances in this respect as well. Between 1950 and 1958 the number of individuals brought under Dutch rule remained constant at a little under 350,000. As in so many other areas, however, the figures here, too, subsequently started to rise. Five years later, a further 120,000 Papuans had been added to the statistics as being under colonial rule, while an additional 71,000 individuals were classed as being 'under administrative influence'.[78] Now that we are talking statistics anyway: of these Papuans under Dutch rule 300,000 were registered as Christians. For the remainder the old ideas had not yet lost their attraction. Beyond this zone of the new culture there were, at a rough estimate, another 200,000 persons for whom contact with the West was still a thing of the future. These lived mainly in the vast inland areas in the eastern part of Dutch New Guinea, especially along the upper reaches of the rivers.

As far as these 'blank spots' on the map are concerned, the administration until at least 1958 felt caught between necessity and powerlessness. It is interesting in this connection to read the record of a discussion in the Council of Department Heads on 10 March and 19 April 1951. The subject was expansion of the area under colonial administration. Everyone agreed about the necessity of this, but was put off by the thought of the costs. In addition, the fact that such an expansion would impose a permanent burden on the remaining administrative and educational facilities, which for New Guinea as a whole were still in process of construction, provided a strong argument against. Once started, there was no going back, as otherwise the population already affected would become a victim. The conclusion of these deliberations was that administrative intensification in areas that had already been placed under Dutch rule was preferable to the opening up of new areas.[79]

It was cautious advice, which nevertheless was at odds with the Dutch responsibility for the development of New Guinea that was so loudly proclaimed to the outside world. This led Van Baal to slightly adjust the totals of the population figures negatively in his reports to the United Nations, thus making the number of those not under Dutch rule a little lower! This political aspect became more and more important the bitterer the conflict with Indonesia grew. After all, how could one insist one was ruling an area in large parts of which one had never set foot? It was the same problem as at the Berlin conference more than a century earlier, but now transferred to the interior.

In this phase of Dutch rule over New Guinea it was the Americans who had to be especially considered. As we saw above, the American missions sought to set themselves up in the Central Highlands of New Guinea via air routes. The Dutch government did not feel it was in a position to prevent this, but got the uninvited guests to sign a statement that they were doing this at their own risk and would make no claim to Dutch protection if they got into difficulties. Meanwhile, the chances of this happening had become high, the more so as these missionaries to a large extent did as they pleased, without paying much heed to Dutch counsel. The feared incidents did not fail to take place, in fact, and in 1952 two American missionaries were murdered in the interior, while the Dutch administration could do nothing about it. The chances of a repetition were high, moreover. A few years later, in 1954, the CAMA established some mission posts in the Baliem Valley. Security at these scattered posts, mostly staffed by a missionary couple with a few assistants, left much to be desired, and acts of violence occurred regularly. It was indeed debatable whether the Dutch government could so easily shirk responsibility for the missionaries admitted to its territory.

Administrative expansion therefore remained fairly high on the agenda in Hollandia, and as the staffing situation improved, actions followed. A gradual increase in the number of administrative posts was provided for in Van Baal's 1953 plan of work. In the years following, colonial officials were posted to the Waropen coast and the Mimika area. In the Asmat area, where the Catholic mission had been active for some time, Agats became the administrative centre. The next step was conferral of the special status of 'Exploration Domain' on the eastern part of the Central Highlands in 1954, which was then administered as such from Hollandia. Two years later the first post was established here, in Wamena, whence the rudimentary occupation of the entire Baliem Valley followed. From here it was possible to link up with the Muju area, which had been under colonial administration from Merauke and Upper Digul since the 1930s. Here a separate administrative sub-district, with Mindiptana as capital, was created in 1955. It extended along the border with Australian New Guinea.[80] The majority of Papuans in the category 'under administrative influence' was to be found in the areas to the north of this. These measures were followed by further explorations in the Eastern Highlands, where Raphael de Haan was appointed extraordinary commissioner. De Haan was a colonial official with an excellent reputation, who as an OSIBA teacher was popular with students and fellow-teachers alike. The last Dutch act in this field was an ambitiously conceived, large-scale expedition to the Sterrengebergte (Starry Mountains) in 1959, which in reality boiled down to an old-fashioned survey of the inhabitants and their physical environment, in which the *Koninklijk Aardrijkskundig Genootschap* played an important role, as always.[81]

These activities were not without certain risks. The new forms of jurisdiction and administrative coercion, as well as the first assault on their identity by the missions, provoked regular reactions from the Papuans. Most of these could be nipped in the bud through resolute counter-action, but some of them escalated into major incidents. Thus a reversal was experienced in the Asmat area when in April 1956 a headhunt took place without any warning in the tiny village of Ajam, in which a few score heads were taken. Until not long before that, this would have been a fairly usual occurrence in that area, but since then the administration and the mission had both become convinced that the danger of this had passed. As to the immediate motive for this particular action, these two organizations had different views. The administration believed that a clumsy move on the part of a Papuan mission assistant was to blame, while the mission felt that the thoughtless admission by the administration of a cinematographic expedition intent on capturing the rugged interior with its head hunters on film was responsible.[82] Both explanations are plausible and both may be true. Soon

after that a much more serious reversal was suffered in the valleys surrounding the Wissel Lakes, an area that had been exposed to the work of the administration and the missions for much longer. It was the Obama rebellion mentioned above. It all started with an attack on a mission post in which a policeman from Biak and an Ambonese *guru* with his family were killed, the church set on fire, and a newly arrived plane destroyed. The uprising thereupon spread over a wide area. Victor de Bruijn, the Wissel Lakes expert, was dispatched there forthwith to find out what had got into his Ekari. His conclusion was that the honeymoon with the West was over. The administration had tried to assert itself here by means of harsh measures against the local warlords and against a style of jurisdiction that was at variance with the new morality. The resentment provoked by this had been aggravated by a swine disease that was attributed to the white swine introduced as part of the stockbreeding programme. The Ekari had seen their world collapse little by little and, when a leader capable of organizing the resistance came forward, had followed him. The administration, police and marines took three months to restore peace and order, in which process they did not shrink from using violence, on the orders of the governor. The number of Papuan deaths came to at least a hundred.[83]

This uprising in the Wissel Lakes area was easily the largest-scale reaction to the penetration of Dutch influence in the period under discussion. Similar incidents took place when the Baliem Valley and its hinterland were opened up, but these were much smaller in scale and more concentrated in individual actions. Of course, this area was still in the very first phase of Western penetration, in contrast to the hinterland of Enarotali, where this process had started about fifteen years earlier.

Nevertheless, soon rumours about bloody warfare among the Dani, who had organized themselves into military alliances, spread from the Baliem area, on which the CAMA had descended in 1954. The effect of these stories, whether or not intended by the missionaries, was to induce the Dutch administration to enter the area. Two years later the first colonial official, the *controleur* F. Veldkamp, descended on the area with instructions to construct a small airstrip and establish contact with the local people. Because he adhered strictly to his instructions, all this was accomplished in relative peace. His successor, *Controleur* R.A. Gonsalves, who entered the scene in January 1958, was more ambitious in his approach. This was partly a question of personality, Gonsalves being an energetic, assertive man. Furthermore, his superior, the Central Highlands Resident in Hollandia, had given him a vague brief, interpretable as an encouragement for further expansion of the administration's sphere of influence. This, after all, had been the usual way of doing things in New Guinea for the past half a century, and there was no good reason to expect anything

different now. Thus the young Gonsalves in January 1958 set about sorting things out by the tried old methods, protecting the weak, punishing what he perceived to be misdemeanours, prohibiting warfare, and enforcing peace agreements. All this he did in very direct personal contact in what was a very small world. This way a large area, with a radius of a few days' walk around Wamena, was placed under Dutch 'administration' by extremely limited means. A year after his arrival, he was able to add around 30,000 Dani to the category of Papuans brought 'under administrative influence' in the statistics. The violence used in the process had generally been restricted to a few slaps, though in a few cases more severe corporal punishment had been meted out. The firearms at the disposal of Gonsalves and his policemen were used mainly as a deterrent.

Restraint certainly was the norm. And this was essential, in view of the very limited number of staff available for punitive raids, which was mostly about six, including the *controleur*. Even so, sometimes random shots might be fired. This was the case, for instance, during a patrol in November 1959, when the *controleur* was cornered by some Papuans pursuing him and at a given moment fired a shot that fatally wounded the leader of the group. This in itself was not exceptional in the practical reality of New Guinea, though pacification attempts now were much more peaceful than before and there was less scope for violence. So when the Gonsalves case came to the attention of the attorney general, G. von Meijenfeld, recently arrived from the Netherlands, the latter found this cause for prosecuting him for abuse of power. The case was eventually dropped by order of Platteel, who regarded this as a violation of the authority of the administration by the public prosecutor. The two responsible politicians in The Hague, Minister Toxopeus and Deputy Minister Bot, fully agreed. After all, the applicability of the principle of the separation of powers in the colonial context had its limits.[84]

Even so, one wonders whether Gonsalves might not have achieved the same result with less force. The underlying problem was that he had been sent on patrol with only a handful of men, which made taking risks much more dangerous. This was considered a genuine problem even at that time. At the beginning of the administrative expansion, Van Baal had asked for more police personnel than were available at that point, so that a few dozen extra policemen would have had to be trained, for which there were no facilities. To wait for this in the view of the department in The Hague would have amounted to politically unjustifiable delay. This question had led to a serious falling-out between Van Baal and Minister Helders already in 1957. Under Platteel, who was in a greater hurry, Hollandia took this kind of objections less seriously, although the workers in the field thought differently about this.[85] The international motive was

undoubtedly pressing, and the authorities could not afford to let American missionaries be molested at a time when American support was more important than ever. It was furthermore clear that failures should not be tolerated, both for administrative and for international political reasons. In the eyes of the outside world this would be a sign of weakness, and every trace of resistance against Dutch colonial rule would be branded by the Indonesian government as a political act that justified its liberation operations. All reports of this to the outside world should be suppressed as much as possible. All in all, the authorities were reasonably successful in this. In fact, only the Baliem affair was given wide press coverage and was played on by Indonesia in the manner indicated. This strengthened the desire to effectively gag the attorney general as swiftly as possible. International considerations tipped the balance more than before.

So the final years of the Dutch presence in the archipelago resounded with the echoes of a long history of pacification, in which the *klèwang* (Indonesian, short sword) and the carbine spoke the last word. In practice this was the exception rather than the rule, however. The colonial officials in the field usually managed to achieve their ends by means of persuasion, bluff and tact, whereby they succeeded in turning the Papuans' curiosity to their own advantage. Furthermore, the technical wonders at their disposal, from aeroplanes to medicines, constituted forceful arguments in themselves. In the third place, successful pacification was also experienced by the people themselves as a blessing, which led them at least to tolerate these officials. In the relationship between the administration, the police and the local population there was sufficient flexibility to evolve a 'modus vivendi' that was acceptable to all parties concerned.

The Dutch New Guinea administration under Van Waardenburg, Van Baal and Platteel represented a curious form of colonial rule. In the Indonesian context there had always been a tendency to weigh economic benefit against ethical objective. In concrete reality this had distilled into, for instance, the BB (*Binnenlands Bestuur*) official's dilemma about whether the limited volume of water available for irrigation should go to the Javanese peasant or to the sugar refinery. There was no need for this kind of judgement to be made in New Guinea. The colony had never been a paying concern economically, and few Dutch people, except for a small group of government officials and businessmen, expected it ever to become one. Ethical ideals thus had free rein, and this was stimulated by the international context. There, too, the successful development of the Papuan world was an important criterion for acceptance of this late colonial experiment. Netherlands New Guinea under its three governors was, first and foremost, a development project under a colonial flag.

Chapter 7

The Dispute in an International Perspective

The hounds are loose

When the negotiations in Geneva on 11 February 1956 were broken off, all chances of an agreement between the Netherlands and Indonesia, if there ever had been any, went up in smoke. Actually, the cards had already been dealt before that owing to the irreconcilable standpoints on New Guinea on both sides.[1] In Geneva, the Netherlands could perhaps have made a few concessions on the point of arbitration, but even then the bomb would have blown up on the New Guinea issue anyway. Immediately after the end of the conference, the Indonesian prime minister, Burhanuddin Harahap, drew the only conclusion possible under the circumstances. He announced to the Dutch government that Indonesia was calling off the Union and would subject the other RTC agreements to a review.[2] This provoked outbursts of joy in the radical press in Indonesia, but the prime minister was not given the credit for this bitter victory. President Sukarno refused to sign the bill submitted by Cabinet. As a result, this ritual act was not performed till a few months later, after Ali Sastroamidjojo had come into office for the second time, on 20 March 1956, as leader of a cabinet bearing his name. It was the first, and for a long time the last, parliamentary cabinet in Indonesia based on the results of free elections. According to the planners at the time of the RTC and the drafting of the constitution in 1950, this should have provided the starting point for a genuinely democratic Indonesia. For anyone who might have expected this, it was a bitter disappointment. The Ali Sastroamidjojo government was a broad coalition in which the Nahdlatul Ulama and Masjumi parties participated, besides the PNI.

These parties were uneasy bedfellows from the beginning. For the whole year of its existence, the Cabinet was plagued by internal dissension. The course of the first Sastroamidjojo Cabinet, characterized by a flexible attitude to more radical groups, including the PKI, was resumed in all respects. This had implications both for internal conditions and for external relations.[3]

Relations between Indonesia and the Netherlands immediately experienced the effects of the revocation of the Union. For a start, diplomatic relations between the two countries at the high commissioner level would obviously have to be terminated. Burhanuddin had agreed to the Dutch proposal for a continuation of relations at the ambassadorial level, but this was repudiated by his successor. The two parties therefore settled for an attaché-ship, though Sukarno's right-hand man Ruslan Abdulgani later found even this too much. In his opinion, relations would have to be 'nameless', hovering somewhere in between a 'non-state of war and a non-normal situation'. As the protocol did not provide for this, an interim attaché was decided on. As a result, at the opening of the first elected Indonesian parliament the Netherlands was represented at this humble level by the diplomat D.G.E. Middelburg, who was seated next to his colleague from Brazil.[4] Another political consequence was the creation in 1956 of the Indonesian autonomous province of West Irian, covering the territory of what still was Netherlands New Guinea. Ternate, which together with Tidore had of old been the gateway to the New Guinea region, was to be the seat of government. This was a demonstrative confirmation of the Indonesian proposition that sovereignty was vested in it alone, and no one else.[5]

In addition, all ongoing anti-Dutch actions were continued. These were directed first and foremost at the Jungschläger case, which had entered a decisive phase. As the street had requested, a death sentence had been demanded and imposed. It was only not carried out because the victim had a heart attack and died in the final phase of his trial. Barrister Van Empel, sent from the Netherlands, got no further than the public gallery and eventually was obliged to return home empty-handed. The defence of the second principal defendant, Schmidt, was thereupon entrusted to the classical scholar Mieke Bouman, who thus came to occupy the place that had fallen vacant after her husband, the attorney Bouman, had left the country for security reasons. When the case came up for trial in September, she gave a long address to the court, which according to outsiders contained a withering indictment of Indonesian legal proceedings. When she had finished, she had to leave the court building via a backdoor to avoid the furious mob outside, which had followed the proceedings inside via loudspeakers. The whole affair provoked bitter exchanges of letters and furious tirades in the streets and the press. The excitement died down

after Schmidt was sentenced to fifteen years' gaol. The other prisoners were secretly released the next year, with Schmidt following as the last in 1959.[6]

The first year after the annulment of the RTC agreements, Dutch business continued to enjoy its usual profits and pay its taxes. The scrapping of the financial-economic RTC agreements caused it little difficulty. These had not had much significance anyway, seeing that Indonesia had concluded trade treaties with its other trading partners on the basis of a most-favoured nation clause. As Van Bijlandt and the representatives of Dutch business had expected, they were able to manage without these agreements.

An attack on the position of Dutch business was not a simple matter for the Indonesian government, in view of the extent of its own interests. The bulk of Indonesian imports and exports were handled by Dutch companies. Although Ali Sastroamidjojo pursued a deliberate policy of discouragement where Indonesian government spending was concerned, the effects of this on the whole were limited. Matters seemed simpler in the field of finance. In August 1956 the debt obligations acknowledged at the RTC were repudiated. The moment for this had been chosen with a good sense of political timing, namely in the middle of the international commotion about nationalization of the Suez Canal. Besides a desire to frustrate the Netherlands, the measure was prompted by an acute shortage of foreign exchange. Of the four billion guilders agreed on at the RTC, at that point approximately 500 million had been paid off.[7] The refusal to pay the rest was defended by, among others, Sumitro Djojohadikusumo, claiming that it was an unjustifiable debt, as it had been run up during the Indonesian struggle for independence. It was a disputable claim, as a sum equivalent to the expenditure for this had been immediately deducted from the total amount of the original debt in 1949. Sumitro must have had first-hand knowledge of this, as he himself had been one of the principal Indonesian negotiators during the discussions. Now that political expediency dictated otherwise, this Rotterdam-educated economist was only too ready to come up with a different story altogether.[8]

Later historiographers have sometimes argued that the Indonesian standpoint was defensible, as the country had already had to pay so much.[9] It is an argument that fits in with the prevalent post-1960 trend in historiography, characterized by compassion with poor Indonesia, which was still being exploited by neo-colonials even after the demise of colonialism. From an unbiased point of view, the argument is spurious, however. The loans had been contracted by a frugal Dutch East Indies government for necessary infrastructural investments at the time. Helped by a reasonably sound economy and high inflation, independent Indonesia up till then had had no difficulty in paying them off, essential as this was for the country's continuing creditworthiness.

Budgetary adjustments and international consultation should have provided an appropriate solution for any problems arising after that, according to the rules of the game. Now deferment of payment threatened to make Indonesia an international outcast. At least, that was how the Dutch Cabinet assessed the situation, expecting serious repercussions from the step taken by Indonesia. As it turned out, it was an exaggeratedly romantic view of international relations and the position of the Netherlands. Here, too, political considerations exercised due influence. The damage for Indonesia remained limited, as in the shadow of Nasser's actions, the cold war and the spirit of anti-colonialism, the government of the United States of America declined to take any action in this matter. Luns failed from the outset to accomplish anything at the NATO meeting at which he attempted to gain international support for building up anti-Indonesian pressure. Indonesia was able to take out a 55-million-dollar loan previously allocated it by the IMF without much further debate—something that would have been impossible without America's approval.[10]

Later, too, both the United States and a number of European countries continued to extend loans to Indonesia, particularly for arms supplies deemed politically or commercially necessary. The United States government urged Indonesia to reach some sort of financial settlement with the Netherlands in due course, it is true. This is what actually happened, in fact, after relations between the two countries were re-established. In 1966 they came to an arrangement whereby Indonesia committed itself to acknowledging part of its debt to the state of the Netherlands and to private Dutch citizens, and to redeeming this over a period of thirty years. The portion of this due to the state came to 12% of the original outstanding debt.[11] From an objective point of view this was a far from impressive outcome. Even so, in 1966 it was a satisfactory enough arrangement, as it formed part of an overall normalization of relations between the two.

Matters had definitely not progressed as far as this in 1956, however. After Indonesia in the summer of that year cancelled its debt obligations, further actions were expected from this country. There were constant calls for such actions in the Indonesian nationalist press, in fact, whereby the New Guinea argument was always conveniently to hand. For the time being, however, the Indonesian Cabinet had other matters to attend to. In a climate of progressive radicalization, some drastic changes in the internal balance of power took place. Ali Sastroamidjojo drew support from the first genuinely elected parliament. At the same time, a constituent assembly responsible for drawing up a new constitution for the young state had been formed, likewise on the basis of general elections. This procedure had been agreed at the time of the Round Table Conference, and the relevant stipulation had been included in the

provisional constitution, on the basis of which sovereignty had been accepted. The articles in question had likewise been written into the revised constitution of 1950, which provided for the creation of the unitary state. In nature and design, this constituent assembly should have been a stepping-stone to the further development of democracy in Indonesia, but in reality things turned out differently.

The constituent assembly was inaugurated on 10 November 1956, but the deliberations here were difficult and laborious. This was partly due to differences in political views between the Muslim and the secular parties, though this was far from the only cause. Further democratic development was also opposed by Sukarno, who was bent on strengthening his personal influence. For him, as well as for Ali, the political legacy of the 1920s and 1930s, in which the leadership principle played a key role, was important. It had also provided the essence of the ideas of Supomo, the father of the 1945 constitution. In reality, politics now ran along the lines upon which they had operated in the past. Sukarno surrounded himself with a circle of confidants. Even before the opening of the constituent assembly, on 28 October, he had called in a speech for the parties to be 'buried'. Subsequently he had unveiled his '*konsepsi presiden*', or presidential concept, of guided democracy. Here he was basing himself on exaggeratedly romantic notions of Javanese village democracy and the principle of '*musyawara*', whereby consultation has to continue until general consensus is reached. New life had been blown into this philosophy by the Taman Siswa movement, which had been the pride of the pre-war nationalist movement. It was a fine ideal, which in practice was totally compatible with the leadership principle. President Sukarno received strong support for his views from a few radical parties, such as the Partai Murba, which had little to expect from elections. More ambiguous was the attitude of the PNI, the NU and the PKI, which, though they owed their strong position to elections, on the other hand had a certain affinity with Sukarno's notions. In practice, parliament and Cabinet seemed to confirm the truth of his thesis that the formula of election by a majority vote was unsuitable for the Indonesian people precisely for this reason. Parliament let go of the reins without much protest, and the constituent assembly was eventually dismissed in 1959 without achieving its objective. Arbitrary interference from above, aggressive power-broking from below, an incompetent bureaucracy, and corruption at every level of society did the rest.[12]

This environment offered the PKI a favourable climate in which to strengthen its position. It was this party in particular that organized actions against Dutch citizens, Dutch business and the Dutch position in West Irian. It furthermore inveighed loudly against Masjumi, which it accused of plotting with the imperialists. Economic chaos and low pay further led to actions by

individual army units against members of Cabinet. The latter were as a rule confronted by General Nasution, who had been rehabilitated under Burhanuddin and had since made a comeback as chief of staff of the Indonesian armed forces. Although no friend of Sukarno's, he tried to humour the latter as much as possible. This way, he managed to remain in power for the next few years and to build up a position somewhere midway between the president and the government. Initially his grip on certain army units was still fairly weak, but the first signs of a 'new order' were becoming visible.

A growing headache for those in power in Jakarta was the increasingly sharp contrast between the Javanese areas and the outlying regions. As in the Dutch period, the greater part of the national income was earned outside Java and spent in Java. This was not a new phenomenon in itself, therefore, except that the ratio had risen to 85%. In return for their contribution, the outlying regions did not receive even the minimal government care to which they were entitled, whilst there was an over-representation of Javanese throughout the government apparatus. The regional disparity was further reflected in the political party system, with the PNI, NU and PKI representing the Javanese areas and the Masjumi the greater part of the outlying regions.[13]

The disparity was also in evidence within the armed forces. Here, however, the tables were turned, with the non-Javanese units having managed to take good care of themselves. Ever since the days of the struggle for independence, they had relied upon the system of self-financing to a large extent and had not abandoned this system since. Where possible, they acted in accordance with it by directly exporting local plantation crops on the basis of barter, thus evading use of the inflated rupiah, which was not very popular abroad. Obviously this provoked counter-measures from the centre, in which Nasution figured prominently. Although he managed to adapt to the new political reality with great flexibility, he was still an advocate of a centrally led and financed professional army. He now tried to impose this principle via drastic transfer schemes, thereby raising the hackles of a number of officers in the outer regions. In December 1956 this led to open resistance in North Sumatra, which as the principal contributor to the state coffers felt most threatened by his measures. In the West Sumatran town of Padang at the same time a so-called Banteng Council was formed, which made its own political demands. Other military units in Sumatra joined it.[14] A similar development took place in Manado, where the regional commander, Ventje Sumual, declared a state of emergency on 2 March 1957. In all these areas, the civil administration was taken over by the military, who wanted to take care of their own affairs and relax the ties with Jakarta. It was no coincidence that these were also the regions in which Dutch federalist policy had taken deepest root. Even so, it was not the

federalist-republican opposition that counted on the personal level. Most of the leading figures of the resistance had a republican background, but were following in the footsteps of the federalist tradition in a broader sense. For the time being their political objectives were limited. They did not demand separation but reform, which might be achieved particularly by the introduction of a senate, giving the regions direct representation in the centre. The political programme of the rebels in East Indonesia was set down in the *Piagam Perdjuangan Semesta Alam*, or Universal Struggle Charter, the aim of which was completion of the Indonesian revolution. Their actions became known by the name *Permesta*, after the title of this document. For its implementation, they and their Sumatran allies pinned their hopes on Hatta, who had stepped down in December 1956 out of dissatisfaction with the state of affairs in the country and with the conduct of the man who had been his 'twin brother' in power since the days of the proclamation of independence.

The campaign for Hatta's return was unsuccessful, as he was no longer prepared to abide by Sukarno's vague guidelines, which to him had become unacceptable.[15] In March 1957 an Indonesia-wide state of emergency was declared on Nasution's initiative. As a result, the power to govern the country came to be vested in Sukarno as commander in chief of the Indonesian armed forces. Parliament could be by-passed at will, which gave him ample scope for an experiment in the guided democracy he so ardently desired. This way, he created a situation in which he could exercise leadership as he saw fit. It was a strictly personal form of leadership, in which he relied on groups of confidants, which, when necessary, he could play off against each other. The basis of his power was, as always, the support he enjoyed among large sections of the population, as well as his invariable ability to give shape to the need for unity. The new situation offered him all the latitude he desired to indulge his dreams of revolution and mass mobilization. Technically, a Djuanda business cabinet came about, in which Subandrio was minister of foreign affairs. The emasculated parliament was only allowed to play in the sidelines, and had little influence. In its place, a 41-member national council was formed, made up of representatives of so-called 'functional groups'. In this, the PKI had the category comprising peasants and labourers representing it, though other segments of society also had a symbolic place in this group. In the distribution of seats, a representation of the political parties—which had not been dissolved as yet—had been taken roughly into account. This national council offered the army a welcome opportunity to entrench itself in the heart of the political system. It was chaired by Sukarno, but the key role in it was assigned to his right-hand man, the passionate and resourceful republican Ruslan Abdulgani. Like

Subandrio and Djuanda, he was a PNI member. The parties with a large following in the outlying regions, Masjumi and the Partai Katolik, were excluded.

The PKI was not formally represented in the Cabinet, but did have a few sympathizers there. It was the only party to work actively at the grass roots level of society. It devoted itself to furthering the interests of the people by addressing their genuine daily needs, but also pursued more elevated goals such as land reform, the eradication of corruption and, of course, the promotion of guided democracy. As a result, the party continued to gain new followers, as was evident in the results of the regency council elections in mid-1957, where, by winning 34% of the vote in Central and East Java, it became the largest political party.[16] It further strengthened its position through systematic infiltration of the army and of a variety of institutions wielding public power. Of these latter, the *Lembaga Kebudajaan Rakjat* (Lekra; Popular Culture Organization), which eventually all artists were coerced into joining, became famous.

One of the new regime's first tasks was to give shape to the new relationship with the Netherlands. At first, this seemed to be going well. Immediately after his accession as prime minister in April 1957, Djuanda sought to establish contact with the Dutch interim attaché, H. Hagenaar. In so doing, he made it clear that he was aware of the importance of Dutch business for the Indonesian economy and was desirous of a better relationship. He even stated via Subandrio that he was prepared to put the New Guinea question on hold for the time being.[17] This rubbed Sukarno and Subandrio up the wrong way, however, who now started beating the New Guinea drum all the more loudly. In this, they received the wholehearted support of the PKI, the PNI and the trade unions, which turned against the Dutch and their investments in Indonesia. The NU entered the fray as well, possibly in the hope of keeping its own followers out of the line of fire for a little longer. After all, these were for the most part the more well-to-do farmers of Central and East Java, to whose ears the PKI's call for redistribution of land cannot exactly have been music.

Thus the new constellation led to organized intimidation of the dwindling Dutch group. By November 1957 the size of the latter had shrunk to about 45,000 persons, the majority of whom lived in the larger towns and cities of Java. Business had declined markedly already under Ali Sastroamidjojo's rule. The prices of a range of Indonesian commodities on the world market were low, and in Indonesia itself Dutch firms and plantations had to cope with restrictive government measures and strikes. The returns of Dutch companies in Indonesia that year dropped in an absolute sense, cutting short the rising trend that had begun at the transfer of sovereignty. Indonesia's importance for the Dutch national income meanwhile had steadily declined to less than three per cent.[18]

As demonstrated above, in the planning of the successive Indonesian governments an important role in all anti-Dutch actions was assigned to the United Nations. Immediately after the failure of the Geneva conference, New Guinea had again been put on the agenda for the forthcoming United Nations meeting. Indonesia was supported in this by the sixteen Afro-Asian nations that had been represented in Bandung. They proposed the creation of a Committee of Good Offices, which would have to report to the General Assembly. This proposal, though essentially similar to what Minister Van Maarseveen had offered negotiator Roem in December 1950, now was unacceptable to The Hague. Hence it failed in October 1956 to secure the requisite two-third majority. Nothing daunted, Indonesia tabled another motion a year later, on 19 November 1957, which warned the Netherlands to start talking. Its submission was accompanied by a threatening speech by Subandrio, saying that if the motion were rejected again, action 'short of war' would follow. It was to come to the vote in New York on 29 November.[19]

The phasing of the UN round of discussions of 1957 was decisive for the actions on the ground. On 19 September an appeal 'to take drastic measures against Dutch capital in Indonesia' was made in the Indonesian parliament. Two weeks later, the Indonesian Cabinet approved a proposal for the organization of an Irian week. A committee chaired by the minister for information, Sudibjo, was charged with this task. Together with Subandrio, Sudibjo made it plain that this time not only Dutch capital, but also Dutch nationals residing in Indonesia would be targeted by the projected actions. For these, according to a statement to the Dutch attaché of 21 October, 'crossboys', that is, derailed youngsters from the Jakartan underworld, would be called in. Thus on 28 October an effigy symbolizing Dutch colonialism was burnt in front of the attaché's house. This spectacle, which had been announced well in advance, in the Dutch diplomat's opinion proceeded in quite an orderly fashion, but it did constitute the starting signal for a campaign in which Dutch homes and cars were daubed with paint. This was accompanied by destruction of property and looting, but soon also by plunder and arson. The actions started in Jakarta and immediately spread to other large towns and cities in Java. In mid-November demonstrations also took place here and there in the outlying regions, but these as a rule were much more orderly.

These actions were designed to inspire fear. They were deliberately planned, and subsided again as soon as the relevant command was given. That there was more in store was evident from a speech made by Sukarno in Sumbawa Besar on 7 November. In it he threatened that 'we will pursue a course that will astound the world' if the actions failed to provoke a response in the United Nations. Subandrio's rhetoric in the UN was similar in tenor. The second phase

of the campaign began on 10 November with the occupation of the Dutch clubs the Harmonie and the Jachtclub, the Dutch elite's two bastions in Jakarta. Furthermore, car tyres were slashed and Dutch persons were refused service in shops and market stalls and denied admission to cinemas and public transport. All this took place to the accompaniment of loud propaganda and acts of intimidation. Dutch citizens stayed at home as much as possible and Dutch business became worried. On 18 November, Sukarno, back from his trip to the lesser Sunda Islands, added fuel to the flames in a speech in Banteng Square in Jakarta, not only by threatening nationalization of Dutch companies, but also by placing the position of Dutch citizens still living in Indonesia under scrutiny. A few days later he started thinking aloud about blocking visas for travellers to Indonesia, accelerating the Indonesianization process, and repatriating unemployed Indo-Europeans. Total expulsion of the latter apparently was not yet an option at that time, though arrangements for this were definitely made at a conference on 26 November. While the Indonesians proceeded to inventory Dutch possessions, the Dutch started preparing evacuation schemes.

Matters came to a head when the United Nations General Assembly on 29 November once again rejected the resolution desired by Indonesia. Tension in the country mounted after a failed attempt on Sukarno's life in Jakarta on 30 November, in which the president himself remained unscathed but a few onlookers lost their lives.[20] Immediately rumours spread that the Dutch had been behind the attempt. On 1 December a 24-hour strike was staged in Dutch companies, while a landing ban on KLM aircraft was also proclaimed. Shipping was hit by a sudden embargo on all KPM vessels. This company was prepared for this, however, and managed to get most of its ships out of port in time. The measure was an outright act of hostility nevertheless. Subsequently, Dutch citizens were refused admission to the country and the first sit-down strikes in Dutch companies took place. This was followed by an Indonesian order, received by the Dutch diplomatic representative's office in Jakarta on the ominous fifth of December—which has gone down in Dutch history as '*Zwarte Sinterklaas*' (Black St Nicholas day)—for all Dutch consulates to be closed down and all Dutch nationals to leave the country with the greatest possible speed. This piece of harassment of course had the dual effect of making the organization of a hasty departure extra difficult because of the closure of the consulates.[21]

Though carried out by trade unions and street urchins, these actions according to Dutch sources were prepared by Sudibjo's committee. When matters became more serious still, the army took control. On 12 December 1957 Nasution announced that the army would take over the management of occupied Dutch companies. The state of war then proclaimed offered the requisite

legal framework for this.[22] In principle, the running of Dutch companies was left in Dutch hands, but their management was rapidly placed under the supervision of management committees, which thereupon proceeded to take an active hand in the running of these companies. This process was completed for the greater part by the end of December. At the same time the periodical repayments of the 280-million-guilder loan of the first conference of ministers of the Union were stopped.

Further Indonesian intentions may become apparent from an exposition by the military authority of East Java of 1 February 1958. In the first phase, ownership rights and managerial responsibility would remain vested in the owners. This included the duty to pay wages, even if there were no profits. In this period, the management committees were to draw up proposals for nationalization of the companies in question. At the beginning of March, the national advisory council, under Sukarno's personal chairmanship, devoted its attention to this subject and formulated three guidelines. The first of these evinced some leniency towards small businessmen among the Indo-European population. Their shops and workshops might be returned to the owners. This was evidently to be the case where the services of these owners were vital to the community. Public utilities and transport companies would be nationalized, but negotiation about indemnification would be possible. About the future of those other companies that were important for the Dutch economy the council expressed itself in vague terms. These would remain under government supervision until such time as the Netherlands was prepared to hand over New Guinea. Even then their seizure would not be reversed, but at least discussion about compensation would be possible.

As was to be expected, actual developments proceeded in a much less systematic way than outlined here, as the local authorities more than once issued mutually contradictory instructions. The fact that in many places Dutch staff were indispensable, as in banking in particular, had a confusing effect from the start. In these cases, the Dutch employees were invited, or even pressured, to stay on for the time being. To begin with, Indonesian pressure to depart was directed first and foremost at pensioners and the indigent. Towards this end, payment of pensions was stopped. On the other hand, the conditions for staying on were made so burdensome, even for the more affluent, that most of them had little inclination to do so. Staffing levels everywhere were reduced to the barest minimum, and the greater part of the Dutch community started preparing for departure. In the forced sale of their homes and other possessions, owners were subjected to harassment by the military authorities, who exacted generous remuneration for their approval of these transactions. The financial

fiasco was made even worse for those concerned by restrictions on international bank transfers of the meagre proceeds from these sales.

The evacuation process that had now been set in train took about six months. Technically, it was well prepared on the Dutch side, with the handicap of the closure of the consulates being overcome through improvisation, in which the Indonesian Red Cross lent useful support. By June 1958 the greater majority (34,000) of the remaining Dutch had left Indonesia, with the rest following in dribs and drabs.[23] Dutch faces had disappeared from the streets in towns and cities. The typically European neighbourhoods were populated by different inhabitants. For the Indonesian elite, the new freedom had thus become a physical reality as well. For the Dutch victims, it all meant that they had to join the end of the long queue of 300,000 Dutch citizens forced to leave the country in the wake of decolonization. For these very last to depart, too, it was a traumatic experience, which left its mark on the rest of their lives. To complete the entire process, the Indonesian government also formally nationalized all Dutch companies on 31 December 1958.

For the Dutch economy the damage of these Indonesian measures was substantial, but it was tolerable because of the limited significance the former Netherlands East Indies had meanwhile come to have for the national income. Many large companies had reckoned with a development of this kind in their policies for writing off debts of the preceding years and had relocated the majority of their operations elsewhere. Although large individual losses were suffered, the country as a whole got over the damages with relative ease, as other sectors of the economy were flourishing. Even so, the long-term effects of the severance of this age-old lifeline of the Dutch economy continued to be felt for many years. Shipping and shipbuilding were probably the hardest-hit sectors in the long run.[24] For Indonesia the effects were direct and much more deeply felt. From the outset there was a drastic drop in exports and in the balance of payments. Internal communications in the archipelago were disrupted for years, which placed large parts of East Indonesia in particular outside the main stream of the international commodity trade. The country as a whole for the next decade experienced major problems in attracting new investments from international business, which had been frightened off. For the first few years following this, it was hurtling on a collision course towards economic ruin.

The expulsion of the Dutch had political repercussions as well. The economic dislocation aggravated the existing unrest in the country, and so enhanced the communist party's opportunities for improving its position. Another important effect was the strengthening and the growing independence of the armed forces, in particular the army, which put itself forward as administrator of the nationalized companies. More than ever before, the armed forces

had their own resources. This enabled them to attain the status of an economic force, which placed them in a more independent position vis-à-vis the government. In the longer term they developed into a stabilizing element in the state, although this was at the expense of civil liberties. In addition, the army's new economic power offered the military top ample scope for self-enrichment.

And that is not all. The anti-Dutch actions also occupy a place in the wider dynamics of Indonesian society, characterized by a forward push of radical forces, the elite's inability or unwillingness to check this, and, last but not least, the attitude of Sukarno and his supporters. While the ousting of the Dutch was in full progress, the uprising in the outlying regions assumed major proportions. The run on the property of Dutch business, the best parts of which were located in Sumatra, no doubt played a role in this. If local commanders succeeded in keeping the spoils for themselves, their position vis-à-vis Java and Nasution would be strengthened. In February 1958 the colonels in Sumatra formed an alternative government, the *Pemerintah Revolusioner Republik Indonesia* (Revolutionary Government of the Republic of Indonesia), which was immediately joined by the *Permesta* in East Indonesia. In the top of this PRRI, a mix of economists, Sumatrans and Masjumi politicians, we meet with some old acquaintances again. Sjafruddin Prawiranegara, the president of the state bank of Indonesia, was prime minister, while also present here were Sumitro Djojohadikusumo and the former Masjumi prime ministers, Natsir and Burhanuddin Harahap. They demanded new elections and a new business cabinet in the central government, pinning their hopes on Hatta as new prime minister. They were decidedly anti-PKI and were popular with the international business world. As we shall see later, they were covertly supported by the Americans. The whole affair came to nothing, however. Hatta sat tight and the military strength of the colonels turned out to be weak. Nasution managed in a well organized campaign to quash the rising and thus to gain more authority. By mid-1958 the rebellion was quelled for the greater part, even though it was to be another few years before pockets of it in Celebes were suppressed.

These events set the scene for the next episode. The position of the parties had weakened considerably under guided democracy. This was particularly true for the Masjumi, which was contaminated by its affiliation with the uprising. The PKI, whose activism was in tune with Sukarno's mental attitude, was the only party to benefit from the situation. To provide a counterbalance to the growing power of the army, Sukarno now introduced a political reform aimed at strengthening the civilian element. In 1959 the old constitution of 1945, which had since been touted as the key document of the Indonesian revolution, was re-introduced. This resurrection did not receive the requisite approval of the

constituent assembly, whereupon this body was dissolved by a decree issued by the military authorities. This marked the exit of the last bit of the legacy of the Round Table Conference and at the same time confirmed the situation that had arisen meanwhile, whereby power was divided between the army, the PKI and the president, with the latter as a rule being able to tip the balance between the other two in his own favour.[25] Further restrictions were imposed on the parties. Masjumi was banned that same year, together with the PSI and the Partindo. Important leaders of the struggle for independence, such as Sutan Sjahrir and Mohammed Roem, were put behind bars, followed by former leaders from the federalist camp like Anak Agung and by Sultan Hamid II of Pontianak, who had meanwhile been released after six years of imprisonment. The days of empty posturing were over.

The Netherlands played no role in the insurrections in the outlying regions. The rebels' attempts to initiate political reform were viewed with sympathy by The Hague, it is true, but there was little desire among the politicians there to get their fingers burnt by the affair. Sumitro was given a cordial reception in The Hague, but his contacts here were restricted to the bureaucratic level. The only positive Dutch act that can be traced in the records is the advice of the Dutch attaché in Jakarta at the beginning of 1958 not to make too much haste with the winding up of the consular posts in Sumatra for the time being, as one never knew how they might come in handy some time later. In addition, Permesta rebels on the run could be sure of a cordial reception in New Guinea later. What was of crucial importance, however, was that the oil companies in Sumatra continued to pay their taxes into the central coffers, which facilitated Nasution's military operations, among other things. Apparently the companies had little confidence in the success of the insurrection, and rightly so, as we shall see later. Once order had been restored, the Netherlands' role in Indonesia was played out, and the 'Irian' question provided the only remaining point of contact between the former mother country and the now centrally organized post-colonial state, in which the philosophy of fierce nationalism and anti-imperialism set the tone.

In conclusion a few remarks should be made on the following point. From the course of events outlined here, it is evident from the very outset that after the transfer of sovereignty, relations between Indonesia and the Netherlands at every level were called into question. Those with the urge to abolish everything that bound the two countries together were the radical forces that had led the Indonesian revolution from 1945 on. Under the constellation created at the RTC, these had ample scope for further refinement of the relevant policies, basing themselves on techniques developed during the struggle for independence.

The federation dissolved in a matter of a few months, and the projected co-operation in the civil administrative and military fields evaporated with it. These developments were followed at a distance by the dissolution of the Union and the economic position occupied by the Netherlands in Indonesia. In all this, 'Irian' was both a goal in itself and a bargaining chip in the negotiations. Dutch policy-makers by and large always assumed that, though both aspects were important, New Guinea would in the long run be brought up by Indonesia for discussion as an objective in itself somehow. Therefore there was not much sense, in their view, in giving in on this point *a priori*.

On the Indonesian side a diversity of interpretations was given, even at that time. Thus Hatta, in an interview with the journalist Oltmans of 6 July 1957, referred to New Guinea as the direct cause of the revocation of the financial-economic agreement. Anyone taking a close look at the negotiations up to February 1956 must concede that New Guinea invariably played an important role as a tactical argument, in fact, although there were invariably also counter-forces preventing the matter from coming to a head. Both Luns' and Anak Agung's efforts to prevent 'New Guinea' being put forward as the prime cause of the failure of the Geneva conference speak for themselves in this connection. After all caution was finally thrown to the winds after '*Zwarte Sinterklaas*', the leading Indonesian statesmen of the time, Subandrio and Djuanda, indicated in public statements of 21 December 1957 and 27 January 1958, however, that the measures taken accorded with a policy aimed at a loosening of all ties with the former mother country, which would have been inevitable without New Guinea, too.[26] By stubbornly clinging to New Guinea, the Netherlands had at most precipitated matters. Anyone with an eye for the force of the internal dynamics of the balance of power in Indonesia will agree with this view. In this way of thinking, the conflict over New Guinea was a part and not the cause of the estrangement between the two nations.

The superpowers and the place of the United Nations

The anti-Western mood in Indonesia was buoyed and reinforced by similar developments elsewhere in the world. The attack against colonialism, condemned as an evil that needed to be eradicated as soon as possible, had started at the Bandung conference of 1956. The language spoken there was much stronger than that used in the Charter of the United Nations, which in chapter XI speaks of the duty to develop the peoples of colonial areas.[27] In the terminology used now, a separate category in international relations was created, which provided the justification for actions that had thus far been deemed unacceptable by international law. This development was reinforced by the East-West

opposition, in which the Soviet Union was able successfully to present itself as the champion of decolonization in the years to come. To take the wind out of its opponent's sails, the United States often did likewise. In practice, this was evident from the actions of Egyptian Prime Minister Nasser, which in July 1956 culminated in the nationalization of the Suez Canal and the humiliation of Great Britain and France, which were obliged to withdraw their troops from the area under United States pressure. It was a precedent that was attentively watched elsewhere. The European colonial powers had been declared outlaws.

The process continued over the next years. A striking example was the annexation of the Portuguese colony of Goa, which was occupied by Indian forces without any international protest worth mentioning in December 1961. An interesting theory has been put forward by the Nijmegen legal scholar Duynstee, who believed that, though these developments might be in conflict with the traditional legal system, so had once been the right to strike. This had nevertheless eventually found a niche in this system, as it was in harmony with the current balance of power and contemporary sentiments.[28] In the same spirit, anti-colonial actions were increasingly sanctioned via the United Nations. The apogee of this development was the passing by the General Assembly in 1960 of the 'Declaration on the granting of independence to colonial nations and peoples'. In the preceding deliberations, the representative of the Soviet Union had branded colonialism 'the most shameful phenomenon in the life of mankind'. This was strong language indeed, but even Great Britain had been obliged on that occasion to admit that 'independence cannot be delayed until all economic and social problems are solved'. The principles of 'Bandung' were now given a place in the international law canon of the modern world.[29] Although this failed to provide an answer to the question of what to do with a region like New Guinea, the spirit it reflected increasingly strengthened Indonesia's position on the international stage. Between 1954 and 1957, the Netherlands invariably managed to marshal sufficient support in the General Assembly against Indonesian pressure to enter into direct negotiations about the transfer of New Guinea. Whether it would continue to be able to do so in the face of the steadily increasing number of new states was very much open to question, however. At its inception in 1945, the United Nations had comprised 51 members. In 1956 this number came to 80. Six years later it was 110, this increase being accounted for exclusively by new states that owed their birth to the decolonization wave.

This development confronted the Netherlands more and more emphatically with the task of framing policies for New Guinea that took this trend and the conditions to which it gave rise into account without abandoning its 1950 objectives. Dutch thinking about New Guinea in the early 1950s had been

highly introverted. This was definitely true for the officials and politicians in the Department of Overseas Territories. When Minister Van Maarseveen in 1950 explained to parliament why he did not want to give up New Guinea, he used arguments derived from the Round Table Conference, adorned with references to good Dutch intentions in the region. Economic motives only played a role in private, while international relations did not come into the equation either. Even so, the latter were to a large degree to decide further developments. Naturally there was more awareness of this in the department of foreign affairs, where efforts to hold on to the area had always been viewed with doubt. The prominent former minister and ambassador, Eelco van Kleffens, in 1949 had defended the thesis that the Netherlands should not shoulder the task of looking after the interests of New Guinea alone. At that time, as well as later, he pleaded in favour of placing the region under a United Nations trusteeship. This idea was endorsed by, among others, his colleague Van Roijen.[30] Minister Stikker, however, bearing the unity of Cabinet in mind, trod a little more warily. In the summer of 1950 he asked a number of friendly powers, that is to say, Australia, Canada, Britain and the United States, how much importance they attached to continued Dutch rule in New Guinea.[31] Australia was the only country to declare itself openly in favour of a continued Dutch presence. The reactions of the others, though sympathetic, were fairly non-committal. Of Britain, which had to be prepared for what would most probably be contradicting viewpoints by Australia and India, no unequivocal standpoint was to be expected. In Washington the prevalent view was that the Netherlands and Indonesia would have to settle the matter in the framework of the Union. None of the governments in question showed much inclination to commit themselves in this affair.[32] The conclusion to be drawn from this attempt at international fact-finding was that the Netherlands would simply have to fight its own battle. This did not fall on deaf ears with Drees and the great majority of the Dutch Cabinet. Experiences with international interference in the Indonesian question in the preceding years had not been exactly pleasant, and a repetition was far from welcome.

It looked as if expectations in this respect on the Indonesian side were higher. Even so, Indonesia was not exactly keen to have the outside world breathing down its neck, either. It had rejected out of hand the Dutch proposals of the 1950 New Guinea Conference to have the UNCI or the International Court of Justice intervene. The UN resolutions of 1954 and subsequent years moved by Indonesia only stipulated a continuation of bilateral consultation with the Netherlands. After the failure of the Geneva conference and Indonesia's unilateral revocation of the Union and of its debt obligations, however, the possibilities of this were virtually exhausted. Indonesia thereupon pursued a policy of

mounting confrontation. From that moment on, the outside world also concerned itself more resolutely with the affair. The conflict over New Guinea developed into an issue of considerable weight in the following years, as it posed a threat to the precarious balance of power in Asia.

International politics from 1947 on were carried on in the shadow of the cold war. The leading parts in this were played by the United States and the Soviet Union. Mao Tse-tung, chairman of the Chinese communist party, was the leading man in the communist camp in Asia. In 1949 he had driven his rival Chiang Kai-shek, the president of nationalist China, out of mainland China. The latter then only had the island of Formosa (Taiwan), lying off the coast of China, left to him, where he was able to hold his own with American support. Mao Tse-tung at first focused his attention on the conflict in Korea, where after the defeat of Japan civil war had broken out. This had been brought to a temporary halt after the drawing of a demarcation line under the supervision of the United Nations. In 1951, however, the communist troops of the north with Chinese support launched an unexpected attack on the south, ushering in the bloodiest phase of the conflict. This only ended when a new demarcation line was fixed in 1953. On the southern side, this war was conducted under the aegis of the United Nations, with American troops engaging in the bulk of the fighting, though the Netherlands and Australia had also taken a modest part in it.

Settlement of the dispute in Korea had not restored peace to the country, however, while the situation around Taiwan also remained explosive. In both countries, China and the United States confronted each other face to face. Especially dangerous was the constant firing at the tiny islands of Quemoy and Matsu, lying between Taiwan and the mainland, by Mao Tse-tung's gunners. Little provocation was needed for this to explode into a major war. Further to the south, in Malacca, the British had to cope with persistent communist guerrilla actions. In Indo-China the French were fighting their *sale guerre* against Ho Chi Minh's troops. For them the low point was in the year 1954, when, as an alternative to their rather unsuccessful counter-guerrilla actions, they had concentrated their troops in the valleys of Dien Bien Phu in the hope of provoking a regular pitched battle that would prove their superiority. Matters turned out totally differently, however. The French troops were obliged to capitulate, after which America took the lead in the fight against the many-headed communist dragon here as well. In this ominous context, the conflict over New Guinea would soon take on a different, more vicious colour, too.

In all of these conflicts, local circumstances lay at their root and constituted the key motors of the fighting. Moscow and Washington, however, viewed them first and foremost through the prism of the rivalry between their

respective countries, interpreted in dogmatic terms as the conflict between World Communism and the Free West. Because of their enormous influence on the rest of the world, these powers were able to mould reality into a straitjacket of their own devising to a high degree. To them the underlying processes of nationalism and decolonization were of secondary importance. The Soviet Union in 1950 had censured the Dutch transfer of sovereignty to Indonesia as, to the minds of the leaders in the Kremlin, it had proceeded too much in accordance with American wishes. This did not prevent them from playing the Indonesian card without obvious hesitation later, when this suited them in their conflict with Washington. The American stance, too, might or might not favour a colonial status, as the contrast between American reactions in Indo-China and in Indonesia indicated. Whereas in Indonesia Washington had turned against the Dutch, in Indo-China it chose the side of the former colonial master. Even so, there was a basic consonance between the two centres of power. Both Moscow and Washington looked askance at the remaining colonial positions of the West European nations.

Both centres of power achieved their objectives primarily through actions of their own, though America acted by way of alliances where possible. For both, the United Nations General Assembly constituted an important forum. If the worst came to the worst, they could both resort to the power of veto in the Security Council at all times to block undesirable developments. Throughout the conflict over New Guinea, the positions of the principal external players were determined by the priorities of the cold war.

It may not be a bad idea to pause for a while to take a closer look at the United Nations, established in San Francisco in July 1945. Viewed in terms of its moment of inception and its members, it was an organization of the victors of the Second World War. Nevertheless, the underlying intention definitely also was to lay the foundations for a more equitable world order.[33] From its very beginning, it played a role in the decolonization of Indonesia in all sorts of ways. To deal with matters of peace and war, a special body was created, the Security Council, the composition of which changed constantly, though the superpowers were permanent members and possessed the power of veto in it. As we saw in chapter four above, the Indonesian question was dealt with here by the United Nations Committee for Indonesia (UNCI), an executive arm of the Security Council in which Belgium, Australia and the United States had membership. The Netherlands in general had little liking for this busybody, though it came to have some appreciation of it in the final phase of the discussions. The committee even played a key role in the exclusion of New Guinea from the transfer of sovereignty to Indonesia at the Round Table Conference. It was not

immediately dissolved in 1950, but had no significant role to play thereafter. A Dutch attempt to hitch it to the cart of the right of self-determination for Ambon miscarried, particularly owing to the reservations of the United States, which had no desire to become involved in the thorny Ambon affair via the UNCI. Until the early 1960s New Guinea posed no threat to world peace, and hence was not a matter for the Security Council. The subject of involving this council or one of its subsidiary organs did crop up regularly in the discussions of the question, it is true, but then this was more as a theoretical possibility than as a matter of practical relevance.

The principal organ of the United Nations was the General Assembly. Its meetings took place from the end of September to the beginning of December each year. As we saw above, New Guinea came up for discussion here annually on the initiative of Indonesia in 1954, 1955 and 1957. The General Assembly could make recommendations, which were difficult for a country like the Netherlands to ignore, by a two-thirds majority. The United Nations exercised an influence as arbiter of international relations, and hence as principal initiator of international law, outside these meetings as well. The basic principles of this were set down in its charter. At the time of the San Francisco conference, the heyday of the European colonial powers was over. An anti-colonial mood was prevalent in the United States, Russia and China, and was also strongly manifested by representatives of the few Middle Eastern, Asian and African countries that had already been admitted as members. Although this latter group was small, it possessed considerable potential for growth. This circumstance strengthened the tendency to place remaining colonial administrations as much as possible under United Nations supervision, which came to imply permanent accountability to the United Nations Trusteeship Council. The trusteeship system was the direct continuation of the mandate system of the League of Nations, intended at the time as a system for the administration of colonies confiscated from Germany in World War One, of which the north-eastern part of New Guinea was one. The aim in San Francisco had been to extend this system to cover all territories under colonial rule, about which of course the European colonial powers, England, France and the Netherlands in particular, had strong reservations. Australia, on the other hand, had shown itself a keen supporter through Evatt as its mouthpiece. This led to a dispute with the Netherlands, which held the view that a country like the Netherlands East Indies was already on the road towards self-rule anyway, and so was long past the stage of a UN trusteeship. The upshot of this and similar discussions was that the charter distinguished between two categories of colonial territory, namely the 'trust territories' and the 'non-self-governing territories', or NSGT.

The provisions for Trust and NGST territories were laid down in chapters

XI, XII and XIII of the charter. They governed the supervision of the quality of the administration over the inhabitants of non-self-governing territories, though with significant differences in details. Trusteeship was regulated by chapters XII and XIII, which contained concrete directions for the nations exercising the administration of these areas. Actually this provided for a continuation of the system of mandates of the League of Nations, which had been introduced at the end of the First World War. At that time this had applied to territories captured from the defeated enemy, which had effectively excluded the colonies of the allied nations that had won the war. Under the post-1945 United Nations regime, the option to include these on a voluntary basis was left open. The extremely wide-ranging umbrella chapter XI provided for a less far-reaching form of UN supervision, containing no more than a declaration of intent, which applied to all signatories to the charter. According to article 73 of this chapter, they acknowledged 'the principle that the interests of the inhabitants ... are paramount, and accept as a sacred trust the obligation to promote to the utmost ... the well-being of the inhabitants ... and, to this end: to ensure ... their political, economic, social and educational advancement'. Under the letter E of this article, the obligation to report regularly on progress in these areas to the UN secretary general was formulated.

Although this principle applied to the administration of all non-trust areas, it took a long time for the organization of this supervision to be regulated. The process started with a detailed discussion of the question to what extent this supervision was obligatory, what would be its scope, and what might be done with the information thus collected. In 1949 things had progressed to the point where a special committee, the so-called 73[E] committee, was formed, which was empowered to take receipt of and to comment on the information provided. Its first meeting took place in New York in August 1950. As we saw above, the Netherlands immediately participated actively in the work of this committee with regard to New Guinea. The committee issued its first report in that same year. This was to be an annually repeated ritual.[34]

Membership of the 73[E] committee was on the whole anything but onerous. For the Netherlands, placing New Guinea under its wing had a number of advantages. In the first place, it implied international recognition of continued Dutch sovereignty over the area. Secondly, it gave some weight to the publicly declared Dutch intention of promoting the development of the island with a view to enabling the population eventually to exercise self-rule. The obligation to report regularly had the effect of speeding up the process of improving the quality of the administration. Already at the time of writing of the first report, the Dutch observed that New Guinea by international standards was extremely backward in many areas and needed to catch up. The first person to make this

observation was the secretary general of the department of foreign affairs, H.N. Boon, who arrived at the conclusion that the operation might turn out to be very costly and suggested seeking outside help, or else getting rid of the whole affair. His views on the subject were very similar to those of former Minister E. van Kleffens, but were not shared by officials of the Ministry of Overseas Territories, who were of the opinion that the Netherlands had not done too badly here at all. The outcome of the discussion to which this gave rise in any case was the creation of a Dutch committee that was to draw up and implement development plans for New Guinea.[35] Hence UN supervision definitely exercised a certain pressure, with the Dutch constantly keeping comparison with the Australian part of the island at the back of their minds.

Apart from this, the Netherlands exercised considerable restraint in the use of the various possibilities of UN participation. As we saw earlier, Van Kleffens in 1949–1950 toyed with the idea of a United Nations trusteeship for New Guinea. The chairman of the parliamentary PvdA, Van der Goes van Naters, pleaded in favour of a Dutch-Indonesian condominium under the auspices of the United Nations,[36] but his proposal met with little support either inside or outside his party. The Dutch government at the time of the New Guinea Conference in December 1950 was still prepared to accept more far-reaching UN interference, it is true, proposing involvement of the Security Council via the UNCI as a serious option to the Indonesian delegation. It was not supported by parliament, however, so that it was not sorry to see the proposal rejected out of hand by the Indonesian government. Even so, this 1950 position did give the Dutch some advantage in the further negotiations, as then and later this gesture turned out to be useful in proving that the Netherlands had been prepared to reach some sort of settlement with Indonesia. For the rest the government was happy to leave these initiatives for what they were and contented itself with participation in the work of the 73[E] committee. This created goodwill, while at the same time bringing few risks of more far-going international interference with it.

What was more dangerous from the Dutch point of view were the UN General Assembly meetings, at which Indonesia brought up New Guinea from 1954 onward. It was an important forum for mobilizing international interest, a factor that the superpowers also needed to take into account. Indonesia could count on growing support here, though until the end of the conflict it never succeeded in securing the two-thirds majority for its standpoint. The Netherlands invariably received sufficient support from the European and a few Latin-American countries. This support dwindled as decolonization progressed, however. The Indonesian proposal for a resumption of bilateral talks in 1954 was rejected by 34 votes for, 23 against, and 3 abstentions, while in 1957

the same proposal scored 41 votes for and 29 against, with 11 abstentions. This shows plainly how unfavourable the trend was for the Netherlands. The fact that the United States was one of the abstainers on all of these occasions speaks volumes. It was a warning that, if things came to the crunch, the Netherlands had little to expect from this biggest friendly nation.

This brings us to the fact that not only in the United Nations, but also in international relations outside it, the standpoint of a number of states was of the foremost importance. In the first place, these were Australia and India, which as important powers in the region watched developments in New Guinea with an eagle eye. India as a rule sided with Indonesia, even though Nehru regularly showed himself to have strong reservations about the Indonesian mode of operation.[37] Nevertheless, he set the basic tone in 1950 by saying that the Netherlands must disappear from Asia.[38] This was music to the ears of the Indonesian United Nations delegate, Nico Palar. Nehru's position was not devoid of a certain sense of opportunism, however, as vis-à-vis a small country like the Netherlands he could afford to express the anti-Western sentiments which he preferred to keep to himself in his dealings with Britain. His Australian partners in the British Commonwealth did not fail to detect this undertone, however. In Canberra the political pendulum swung between a desire for good relations with close neighbour Indonesia on the one hand and the wish to keep Asia at a distance on the other. Up until 1949 the desire for friendship with Indonesia had prevailed, but upon the virtually complete Dutch withdrawal in 1949, which came as a total surprise after all, the Australian government did a complete U-turn. Now the wish at least to keep the Netherlands as neighbour on the other side of the immediate international border in New Guinea became dominant. Outright annexation of Netherlands New Guinea was another option, however, which the impulsive minister of external affairs, Sir Percy Spender, had no scruples about alluding to publicly immediately after the transfer of sovereignty.[39] It was a policy that envisaged New Guinea as a 'White Australia' barrier against the advancing hordes of Asia. This policy was continued in a more moderate form in the following years under the leadership of Prime Minister J.R. Menzies, who until 1966 headed a series of rightist coalition cabinets. The External Affairs portfolio was taken over from Spender in April 1951 by the more cautious R.G. Casey.

To Britain, this mutually contradictory stance of the two large Commonwealth countries posed a dilemma. It led London as a rule to adopt a scrupulously neutral stand, which in turn resulted in attempts to maintain the status quo—which was to the Netherlands' advantage. To offset this, London adopted an often rather querulous and standoffish tone towards the

Netherlands, which it thought should be taught a lesson in flexibility. The British tendency to mediate in the affair, which on the whole was appreciated by the Dutch, sometimes took some unexpected twists and turns. Thus the British ambassador, Sir Phillip Nicholson, in November 1950 caused Minister Stikker some alarm by proposing Nehru as mediator in the conflict over New Guinea, which was rapidly coming to a head.[40] Of the remaining Commonwealth countries, Canada, under its Prime Minister Lester Pearson, sometimes also put itself forward as a mediator who, though well disposed towards the Netherlands, basically was of little help.

And then of course there was the United States of America, the pivot of all post-war world politics. Power here throughout the 1950s was vested in the conservative President Eisenhower, to whose government Southeast Asia posed a special problem. Before the war, the US had played a limited role in the area. It did have quite significant territorial possessions and military posts here, in particular in the Philippines, but its investments in the region had been modest in comparison with those of Britain and the Netherlands. Its attitude towards the European colonial powers at the time had been marked by a mixture of a sense of common interest, envy and aversion. There was a common interest in that the US also was a colonial power and American companies took an active part in the exploitation of the Europeans' overseas territories. On the other hand, there was a sense of exclusion, although this was difficult to prove under the open door policy pursued at that time. The US furthermore had an aversion to colonialism that went back to the days of the country's own war of independence against the British—an aversion that was easy to activate. During the Second World War, American statesmen had made it abundantly clear that they had no inclination to take up the cause of these colonials. In Roosevelt's ideology, the war was being conducted 'to make the world safe for democracy', to which ideal the restoration of colonial regimes did not seem to offer any contribution.[41] This particular mood was prevalent among a broad section of the population and was also discernible among American troops entering the Indonesian archipelago in 1944. This attitude formed an inseparable element of the American stance on the Indonesian struggle for independence, though initially it had been repressed by the underlying sense of common interest and the need for reconstruction in Europe, for which continued Dutch possession of the East Indies was felt to be indispensable. From 1948 on, however, the rivalry with the Soviet Union was the dominant factor in American foreign policy and brought about a change of approach. The coercive hand of the United States had been perceptible already in the run-up to the Round Table Conference. As regards New Guinea, it had shown some understanding for the Dutch standpoint, though not quite wholeheartedly so. In the

United Nations, it adopted a neutral stance in the Dutch-Indonesian conflict. So it never took any positive action in favour of the Netherlands, as among other things its cool reaction after Indonesia's revocation of its debts to the Netherlands and nationalization of Dutch businesses showed. It was a similar attitude to that adopted towards England and France at the nationalization of the Suez Canal. It all went to show that the presence of European nations east of Suez was no longer welcome to Washington. In this respect the basic tone of American politics was not much different from that underlying Nehru's public statement.

A similar approach was observable in military affairs, though here matters were complicated by the East-West dichotomy and the efforts of a great many Afro-Asian countries to stay out of this—of which the Bandung conference offered an eloquent example. The US nevertheless succeeded in forming an alliance of its own in the peripheries of the Asian area, namely the South East Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), which came into being in Manila in 1954. At that time, it was joined by Australia, New Zealand, France, Great Britain, Pakistan, the Philippines, Thailand and the United States. Although the Netherlands tried from the beginning to take part in the deliberations about this, too, these attempts were invariably blocked by the Americans. It was a telling gesture, as the American Seventh Fleet was the primary power factor in the Southeast Asian region. Dutch exclusion from SEATO was an indication that the United States felt there were more disadvantages than advantages to a Dutch presence in this company.[42]

In conclusion a few remarks should be made about the attitude of the major communist nations. Moscow, after the crushing of the Madiun rising, had taken a dim view of the creation of the United States of Indonesia. In the Security Council it had subsequently voted against the resolution that set the seal on the transfer of sovereignty. Stalin's death had given a little more breathing space, and during the run-up to the Indonesian parliamentary elections of 1955, it had shown some appreciation for the room given the PKI to recover. Then, after the announcement of the results of these elections, Indonesia had again become an interesting option to Moscow on the political chessboard of Asia. Communist China, where Mao Tse-tung had by now firmly established his rule, held the same view, which had all sorts of repercussions in a series of peripheral states, from Korea in the north to the Himalayas in the south. Relations with Indonesia, where there was not only a strong communist party but also a large, relatively prosperous Chinese community with an interest in developments in the mother country, could hardly be a matter of indifference to the Chinese leader.

These underlying motives and attitudes were ultimately decisive for the stance of these countries in the conflict between the Netherlands and Indonesia. This was true both inside and outside the United Nations, in which organization China was not to play any role, as long as its place continued to be occupied by Chiang Kai-shek's nationalist China. This remained the case until the 1970s, when a breakthrough in this respect was forced through on the initiative of American president, Richard Nixon.

Consultations with Australia

Of all the foreign powers involved, Australia had the strongest stake in the future of western New Guinea. With the accession of the rightist liberal Menzies government at the end of 1949 and the transfer of sovereignty in Indonesia in that same year, a remarkable shift in Australian policies with respect to Indonesia occurred. Although Indonesian independence had been desired and promoted by the preceding Chifley Labour government, at the same time Australia felt that 'Asia' should be kept at arm's length, and that some form or other of continued Western administration in western New Guinea might provide an effective buffer. This trend became stronger after Menzies' accession. In the very first days after the transfer of sovereignty in Indonesia, the eager Sir Percy Spender had offered the Netherlands Australian co-operation in the question of New Guinea, not excluding even total annexation of the area. The Australian government was worried about the advance of communism in China and Korea. The country felt directly threatened by developments there and sought to obtain the strongest possible guarantees from the Western powers. This feeling provided the basis for the American defence treaty with Australia and New Zealand, the ANZUS pact, concluded in 1951, as it did also for the creation of the broader SEATO a few years later.[43]

The Australian position offered some welcome moral support to the Dutch government and stimulated it not to give in to Indonesian demands regarding New Guinea. This government nevertheless failed to act upon this encouragement as long as Minister Stikker remained in office. The regulation of direct relations with Indonesia had priority, and this was not reconcilable with Sir Percy Spender's proposals, which had sent something of a shockwave through The Hague. Moreover, past irritations with this southern neighbour had not dissolved at one stroke. The Netherlands distrusted Australian politics and felt little inclination to tie itself down to these, let alone to make itself dependent on them as long as the option of a special Dutch relationship with Indonesia remained open.

After 1951 there was more room for co-operation between Australia and the Netherlands. Australian enthusiasm became less evident, however, when in April 1951 Spender was succeeded as minister of external affairs by Casey. Furthermore, the status quo year had elapsed and the Netherlands had started expressing itself less equivocally in favour of holding on to New Guinea with a view to developing the country under its own steam. A year later the Dutch minister of foreign affairs, Stikker, was succeeded by the duo Beyen and Luns, of whom the latter was charged with Indonesian affairs as minister without portfolio. Joseph Luns had fewer inhibitions with respect to Indonesia than his predecessor, and did not mince his words where he felt that clarity was called for. In a previous chapter we saw how, together with his colleague from Overseas Territories, Kernkamp, he paid a visit to Australia in 1953, when there seemed to be an opportunity of doing business on a more realistic basis. The tables had meanwhile turned to the extent that now the Dutch were keener than the Australians. For the rest, it was a matter of each party feeling its way, with fine speeches and cautious actions. The visit resulted in some vague plans for co-operation at the departmental level, but any decision for further integration of the two parts of New Guinea, as the Dutch guests proposed, was out of the question. Casey was more inclined than Spender to consider Indonesian sensitivities, without abandoning his positive basic attitude towards the Dutch cause.

In practice, the agreements made here led to a number of visits to and fro. To begin with, the governor of the Australian part of the island, the Territory of Papua New Guinea (TPNG), D.M.C. Cleland, in 1955 paid a visit to his colleague in Hollandia, Van Baal. Both sides described this visit as instructive and pleasant. It seemed that both could learn from each other at the local level. What was important was that all of the three times New Guinea came up for discussion in the United Nations between 1954 and 1957, the Australian government supported the Dutch position with conviction, in contrast to its American ANZUS partner, which equally invariably abstained from voting. As, from 1956 on, tensions in Indonesia mounted, Sukarno's West Irian campaign became more strident, and uprisings broke out in the outlying regions, the Australian attitude became more pronouncedly pro-Dutch again. It was even more so when signs of uncertainty were becoming discernible in the Dutch camp, in which connection we should mention in particular the Dutch Reformed Synod's call for reconsideration, which will be dealt with in a later chapter. This was received with disapprobation in Australia, where at precisely this moment a greater need for cover against restless Indonesia came to be felt. An irresolute Dutch attitude was of no use to Canberra.[44] In the debates about the budget for overseas territories in the Australian House of Representatives in

October 1956, the Indonesian claims to Netherlands New Guinea attracted the attention of members of parliament, with the spokesmen of all parties stressing that they were far from pleased with this development.[45] Australia would have to concern itself more actively with the future of the Dutch part of New Guinea, come what may.

In the Netherlands, Minister Luns cautiously continued to embroider on the theme of a Melanesian federation, which had surfaced from time to time in discussions about the future of New Guinea since Van Eechoud's days. So Luns remarked in the Second Chamber on 6 December 1956 that he would regard it as a natural development if increasing contacts between Netherlands- and Australian New Guinea on the one hand and the other Pacific islands, similar in many respects as they were, on the other, were to lead to a growing sense of solidarity, and possibly to political unity, between the inhabitants of these regions.[46] To stimulate this, Australian co-operation was necessary in any case. Australia was not averse to the idea, and advantage was taken of a visit of Dutch Minister Helders to Port Moresby and Canberra on 6 November 1957 to issue parallel Australian-Dutch statements. These included an explicit declaration regarding the responsibility of the governments of both countries to safeguard the inalienable rights of the population, as formulated in the United Nations charter. Realization of the people's right to self-determination was the explicit objective of the presence of both powers in the area. In addition, emphasis was placed on the unity of the island. The Dutch and Australian administrations should both pursue a development policy that took ethnological and geographical affinity into account. These objectives were to be furthered by regular consultation at the departmental level and by posting liaison officers in each other's territories. These practical matters were regulated in a separate agreement of 12 November 1957.

Indonesia, however, was watching these developments with suspicion, and discretion was of the essence. The Australians therefore were disinclined to move too fast. The first article of the Agreement hence read that 'cooperation should take place naturally and without upheaval in the course of the administration of each of the two territories and that it should take place on actual practical tasks carried out in the territories'.[47] Nevertheless, an immediate start was made with the implementation of the Agreement. At the beginning of 1958 both countries posted liaison officers in each other's territories, namely in Hollandia and Port Moresby, the capital of TPNG. Likewise an official from the Dutch Ministry of Overseas Territories was detached to the Dutch embassy in Canberra as attaché. Initially this was the prominent departmental official J.A. van Beuge, who was succeeded a year later by H.C. Smith. Both had regular contact in Canberra with the Australian minister of territories, P. Hasluck, and

his officials. A first Australian-Dutch conference on administrative co-operation was to be held in Canberra, as agreed, in October of that year.

In Australia, this Conservative government policy received the full backing of the Labour opposition. In the Netherlands, too, parliament gave the Agreement its approval.[48] The statement of 6 November 1957 had been issued shortly before the debate on the New Guinea question in the United Nations General Assembly, where Australia once more placed itself squarely behind the Netherlands.[49] The subject subsequently came up for discussion at the summer conference of the Australian Institute of Political Science of 25-27 January 1958. Here the influential principal of the administrative training college, J.R. Kerr, pleaded in favour of the formation of a Melanesian federation as the sole solution to the conflict over western New Guinea. He there and then put forward a few tentative proposals about details of this, such as the introduction of English in place of Dutch and Malay, which were to be worked out further later. He moreover suggested the possibility of training Dutch administrators, including Papuans, in Australia. In addition, he expressed the view that it should be possible to post Australian officials in Dutch New Guinea. The latter idea in particular did not go down well with the Dutch *Departement van Zaken Overzee*, as it smacked of Spender's earlier suggestions for a complete annexation of the Dutch territory. The officials of the Dutch department of foreign affairs on the whole had a more positive attitude to Kerr's ideas than those of *Zaken Overzee*. The proposals hence were a subject of serious discussion among officials of both departments in The Hague, whereby the political aspects were weighed against the administrative ones. The general tendency nevertheless was in favour of giving the Australian proposals serious consideration, even though the practical objections were obvious.[50]

These discussions were of immediate relevance for the agenda of the forthcoming administrative conference in Canberra. The meetings here were to be of a technical-administrative nature. Besides education and language, this agenda included items like communications and health care. On the Dutch side, there was a clear inclination from the outset to extend the co-operation to the domain of politics as well, in which Minister Luns' influence in particular is discernible. In this period of changing moods, he was looking for international support. After all, in precisely these months the exodus of Dutch subjects from Indonesia was taking place, followed by the insurgency in the outlying regions and the debate about arms supplies to Indonesia. From mid-1958 on his prime concern was to try and get the US to exercise restraint in this connection. In this context a joint Australian-Dutch gesture would be welcome. The idea met with some sympathy from Luns' Australian counterpart, Casey, who visited The Hague on his way to the United States in August 1958. On 29 August an

in-depth discussion took place between the two, in which Luns came forward with a proposal for the formation of a pan-New-Guinea Papuan consultative council with a view to giving the Papuan peoples an opportunity to get to know each other. This would be a first step on the road to closer unity. Publication of this plan would constitute a political signal *par excellence* indicating that Australia and the Netherlands were steering the same course. It seemed feasible as well. Casey, who on a visit to Dutch New Guinea not long before this had been enchanted with the area,[51] on his visit to The Hague told Luns he was prepared to look in this direction for ways of giving the co-operation between the two countries announced in November 1957 more substance.

The second part of the talks between the two ministers was devoted to the mounting military threat to New Guinea from Indonesia. They discussed ways of exercising counter-pressure against the tendency of various Western nations, the United States and Britain included, to supply weapons to that country from commercial or political motives. On this point there was close agreement, even though it was obvious that Australian and Dutch possibilities in this respect were limited. Casey further let it be known that his country was dependent on the United States for its defence, so that he was not able to make any commitments with regard to the defence of New Guinea independently. He said he was prepared to discuss the matter in Washington, however.[52]

Thus the proposal for a pan-New-Guinea consultative council was the most spectacular element of these talks. Luns had reason to be pleased with the interest shown in it by Casey. In fact, no more elegant way of giving substance to the joint statement of 1957 was imaginable. It all seemed too good to be true. In the relevant departments in the Netherlands and Australia the enthusiasm of the two ministers was viewed with a certain scepticism, in fact. Indeed, it was not long before a dampener was put on the plan when it became clear that both the Dutch and the Australian departments of overseas territories had reservations about it. For the bureaucrats in The Hague, the proposal came too early, as they wanted to work out their own system of representative councils first. Their counterparts on the other side of the globe lacked enthusiasm because the proposal was in conflict with their ultra-conservative policies with regard to Papuan participation in government in the Australian colony. Australian policy was focused more on broad than on in-depth development, after all. Australia looked askance at the relatively recent Dutch efforts to create a Papuan elite, which it ascribed, not unjustifiably, to the pressure of time to which the Dutch were more and more subject. Australia felt it should distance itself from these efforts, as was made plain to Casey as soon as he was back in Canberra. Besides, the latter's visit to Washington had taught him that no unequivocal promises of support against potential Indonesian military actions

were to be expected from the Americans. Accordingly, he informed his colleague in The Hague on 23 September 1958 that they had better content themselves with less ambitious plans for the time being.[53] Hence the first Australian-Dutch conference was a technical-administrative event in which only matters of immediate interest were discussed. Publicity about it was restricted to a minimum at Australia's insistence.

This Australian reserve notwithstanding, the politicians and bureaucrats in both capitals remained interested in closer co-operation. Thus the new Australian ambassador to the Netherlands, Sir Edwin McCarthy, who arrived in The Hague in January 1959, was instructed to give some priority to dealing with the matter.[54] In Canberra an important role was assigned to the last Dutch governor of Indonesia, H.J. Lovink, who was working there as ambassador. He, too, had become exceedingly enthusiastic in the course of a visit to New Guinea about the constructive work being done there and had fallen under the spell of the notion of a broader Melanesian perspective in which to place developments.[55] On a visit to Menzies on 31 July 1959, he pleaded with conviction in favour of a progressive policy that must lead to independence of the Papuan people all over the island, united in friendship with Australia. As a practical point, he proposed having a map of the whole of the island drawn forthwith, and having it put up on the walls of all schoolrooms in East and West New Guinea in order to familiarize Papuan schoolchildren with the contours of their mother country from early childhood. Such a prospect would give direction and wings to government policy on both sides of the 141° line of longitude. The Netherlands was prepared to co-operate in this, provided the military inviolability of Netherlands New Guinea was secure. This, according to the ambassador, was where Australia had a responsibility, to which it would have to give its all. Menzies showed an interest and expressed the opinion that these were some useful ideas for the television interview to which he was to be subjected a few days later. In the very popular programme *Face the Nation*, televised on 2 August 1959, the prime minister did in fact express the hope that an independent Papuan nation, united in close friendship with Australia, would come about in New Guinea in the future. In that same Australian winter of 1959, Casey expressed himself in similar terms to Lovink. It would be a good idea if Australia and the Netherlands offered a joint prospect for the future of Papua in close consultation. With tact and respect for the principle of autonomy, developments might be guided in the direction of an independent state of Papua embracing at least the whole of the island. Casey showed himself prepared to discuss the matter with Luns at the forthcoming meeting of the United Nations General Assembly in New York, and to try and arouse sympathy for the idea among the Asian and other relevant delegates in informal talks in the corridors.[56]

Thus Australian officialdom had now shown itself to be ready for a more fundamental and public discussion of the future of New Guinea. In the Dutch department of foreign affairs, news of this was received with some scepticism, however. Menzies' statement here was attributed not only to Lovink's powers of persuasion, but also to internal pressure, particularly from the Labour party. Moreover, international developments were stimulating a more active decolonization policy. All this undoubtedly exercised an influence on Menzies and his cabinet, but did not by definition point in the direction of agreement with the Netherlands. It was felt that concern to maintain good relations with Indonesia was an important component of Australian policy as well, while there were indications aplenty that Minister Hasluck of the Department of Territories was dubious about Dutch policy, which was considered too progressive. As the signals from Canberra might soon change to the disadvantage of the Netherlands again, it was important for the Dutch to nail the Australians down to Menzies' statement immediately. Minister Luns agreed wholeheartedly with this.[57]

In the department in The Hague a plan of action was now drawn up. A parliamentary statement in which the minister expressed his emphatic concurrence with Menzies' statement was drafted, with the debates on the department's budget in December 1959 being suggested as a suitable occasion for its release. Furthermore, it was decided to make an attempt to get political co-operation on the agenda for the second Dutch-Australian administrative conference in Hollandia, scheduled in March 1960. In consultation with *Zaken Overzee*, a document for discussion at this conference which was to represent a guideline for further consultations on every point was prepared. It contained all the by now familiar mantras about the unity of the island and its inhabitants and the consequent necessity for Australian-Dutch co-operation. A separate document specified that such co-operation would have to extend to the domain of foreign policy, information and defence as well. Lovink handed these documents over to Menzies and Casey on 27 November 1959.[58] On that occasion he expressed the hope that both documents would serve as political directives for the respective delegations at the administrative conference.

As the sceptics in The Hague had expected, the Australian reactions were anything but enthusiastic. Lovink had kept Menzies and his ministers carefully informed of the preparations for this step. For instance, he had communicated Luns' intention to state his sympathy for the contents of his Australian counterpart's television interview in parliament to Menzies. The latter had made no objections at the time, while Hasluck, too, seemed to be fairly positive about it. Doubts had nevertheless arisen soon afterwards. Casey, on Lovink's visit of 27 November, expressed the hope that Luns' statement in parliament would not be 'embarrassing'. Where the plans were for Luns to make his statement on

9 December, it so happened that this coincided with Menzies' first official visit to Indonesia. This was not a pleasant prospect for the Australian prime minister, who, according to Casey, did not like the idea at all! The Dutch ambassador was further told that the question of more far-reaching co-operation, also in the field of politics, seemed extremely premature and delicate. He was asked to pass the polite request to refrain from mentioning it in his statement on to his boss in The Hague. Menzies personally informed Luns that a television interview was not quite the same as a government policy statement.[59]

So we may conclude that Menzies, Hasluck and Casey felt they had been put on the spot by Dutch zeal, and had realized the possible consequences of the proposed steps for Australian-Indonesian relations too late. Jakarta had looked on the Dutch-Australian overtures of the past years with suspicion, with the joint statement of 6 November 1957 provoking sharp reactions there.[60] These became even sharper when rumours of possible military co-operation between Australia and the Netherlands started circulating in the context of the anti-Dutch campaigns in Indonesia. This was enough for Casey to state emphatically in the Australian parliament, on *Zwarte Sinterklaas* of all days, that co-operation with the Netherlands had no military implications whatsoever and that Indonesian insinuations that Australian troops had already been dispatched to Merauke could be relegated to the realm of fantasy. Yet, on that occasion he also underlined that the Netherlands could count on Australian support in the difficulties it was experiencing in Indonesia and that 'Holland and Australia are two nations on a friendly and intimate footing'. Even so, the Australian Cabinet in the following period did all it could to avoid rubbing Indonesia up the wrong way.[61]

Viewed against this background, Menzies' interview of 2 August 1959 was a very daring deed. It immediately drew a barrage of criticism from Subandrio and the Indonesian press, in fact, while the Australian ambassador in Jakarta was called to account for the prime minister's words. Then Menzies, during his visit to Indonesia, was pressured by Subandrio to publicly distance himself from the Netherlands and its New Guinea policies. This was also the chief topic of discussion during Subandrio's return visit to Canberra, which was concluded with a joint statement on 15 February 1960, the gist of which was that, although Australia recognized Dutch sovereignty over New Guinea, it would not oppose any settlement between the Netherlands and Indonesia that was negotiated peaceably and in accordance with international custom.[62]

Without any doubt this statement was at odds with the attitude Australia had previously manifested in private. It was not until a few months after this Australian-Indonesian *pas de deux*, in March 1960, that the Dutch received the formal response to their overtures. The definitive text of this had been drawn

up after lengthy deliberations within the Australian Cabinet, but marked no change from the former attitude of reserve. What it boiled down to in essence was that it was not yet possible for Australia to commit itself with respect to the political future of the region. The principles set out in the Dutch memoranda were endorsed, but their implementation would have to take place, as specified in the statement of 1957, 'naturally and without upheaval'.[63]

This reply did not come as a surprise in The Hague after Lovink's earlier reports. Luns had meanwhile revised his statement in accordance with Casey's wishes, though not without informing the latter that he was disappointed at this request.[64] Obviously the scope of the second conference on administrative co-operation, which was held in Hollandia from 3 up to and including 9 March 1960, now was much more limited. In the preparations for it, the governors of both areas had intended including Papuans in their respective delegations. This was now blocked by Canberra, and the Netherlands could do nothing other than resign itself to this. The meeting became a purely administrative affair dealing with local matters. As such, it touched on a series of useful topics, but the boundary had been clearly indicated.[65] At the third meeting, which was held in the small TPNG town of Goroka in the second half of August 1961, the Australian retreat was even more plainly evident. Now even all concrete points regarding administrative co-operation with the Netherlands were scrapped.[66] The atmosphere on all these occasions was excellent, but there was no more hope for the intensification of co-operation desired by The Hague.

The principal consequence of this development was that the possibility of an agreement on direct military co-operation between the Netherlands and Australia in the defence of New Guinea was ruled out for good. As we saw above, Luns had argued strongly in favour of this in his talks with Casey of 29 August 1959, pointing out that this was also in the interests of Australia. Although the Australian minister had not denied this, he had also indicated that his country was totally dependent for its defence on support from the United States. Hence it could not commit itself militarily without a guarantee of American help in the event of an attack. There was little to choose between the Dutch and Australian positions in this respect. Whereas Australian staff assessments showed that a Dutch-Australian alliance would be strong enough to fend off the Indonesians in the short term, it was to be feared that the price of this would be too high in the long run.[67] The latter consideration carried much weight with the Netherlands as well. Both Luns and Casey worked hard in the final months of 1959 to induce Washington to give such a guarantee, in fact. The key to the security of Netherlands New Guinea lay in Washington, and Canberra and The Hague were well aware of this.

American guarantees

Post-war American policy was marked to a high degree by the cold war, as we pointed out earlier. What was decisive for the United States' policy with regard to Asia was the course of affairs in China, where in 1949 the communist regime had been established under Mao Tse-tung. The nationalist Chinese of the Kuomintang led by Chiang Kai-shek had been driven back to Taiwan, where they managed to hold out with American support. They were under permanent pressure from their mainland adversaries, however. The conclusion of the war in Korea, which in 1953 led to a division between North and South, was no unqualified success, either. Equally ominous was the French defeat in Indo-China in 1954. The fear that the whole of Southeast Asia would land up in the communist camp seemed justified. The 1955 election results in Indonesia and the strong position of the PKI that had become evident here put that country in the danger zone as well. The formation of the Bandung front and Sukarno's flirtation with Marxist ideas gave extra cause for concern. All of these developments gave rise to a review of American policy with respect to Indonesia, the repercussions of which were also discernible in the policies with regard to New Guinea.

In Jakarta, America had been represented in the first years following the transfer of sovereignty by former UNCI member Merle Cochran. He had played an important role at the Round Table Conference, of which he showed himself to be extremely well aware in his new position as ambassador—a factor which irritated the Dutch and Indonesians alike. Both he and his successors had a keen eye for the importance of President Sukarno. The Americans, used as they were to thinking in terms of a presidential organization, found the strong presidency he was striving after easier to understand than the complicated and tumultuous European multi-party-style democracy which had been introduced in 1949. The slogans of the war of independence as a rule held strong appeal for them. They were moreover tempted by the idea of the new opportunities opened to America by the withdrawal of the Dutch. Speculation about this was reinforced by the consideration that, if America failed to step into the places left vacant, others would be all too ready to do so. All this fostered an understanding for the young state in the United States, which was sometimes apt to turn into undisguised admiration on the part of American diplomats in Jakarta. This was certainly true of John Allison, who was ambassador from 1957 on. It was deftly exploited by Indonesian politicians, who were not unaware of the possibilities offered them by the cold war.

At the State Department, policy was drafted in the first instance by two different desks, with Europe and Asia respectively in their portfolio. For both, the

baseline was determined by the cold war, although its further elaboration was different in each. The 'Europeans' kept a close eye on Russia, while for their counterparts in 'Asia' China was the source of all evil. Each of these regionally specialized desks had a tendency to attach most weight to the views generated by its own field of specialization. In this way, the two reflected the views of the ambassadors in Jakarta and The Hague respectively. Walter S. Robertson, who as Undersecretary of State served beneath the wings of Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, played the role of mediator. Another important role in the formulation of foreign policy was played by the National Security Council, or NSC, of which, besides 'State' and 'War', the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the President were members. In point of fact, it was a council of ministers for foreign policy. It was chaired by the popular Second World War veteran, President Eisenhower. Though deeply suspicious of the 'military-industrial complex' as one of the forces driving the arms race, he was not averse to military action where he saw an opportunity for this. He had prime responsibility for foreign policy.[68] Coincidentally, Allen Dulles, the brother of the Secretary of State, was head of the CIA. The result was that in daily life the shots were called by the two brothers. The principal lines of policy were systematically laid down in NSC documents, which were regularly adjusted. This was the responsibility of a separate secretariat, in which Gordon Mein was the key figure. The results needed the approval of the full council. This procedure was reasonably well observed, which gave American policy a measure of consistency. As regards the American stance with respect to the conflict between the Netherlands and Indonesia, its invariably neutral position had last been formulated in 1955.[69]

From that moment on, developments in Indonesia attracted increasing attention. The results of the elections for parliament and the constituent assembly confirmed the strong position of the PKI, which might be regarded as a first step on the road to a communist takeover via the parliamentary process. Sukarno's alternative of guided democracy seemed viable, but was risky in view of his flirtations with Marxist rhetoric. Robertson derogatorily described his ideas as an 'ill defined political theory' that seemed to be inspired by events in Yugoslavia, the Soviet Union and communist China. American suspicion was immediately aroused by an alarming visit to Jakarta in 1956 by the Russian diplomat Zhukov, followed by Russian arms deliveries and visits by Sukarno to Russia. Fears of a defection to the Soviet bloc were strengthened by PKI gains in the provincial elections in Java in early 1957. Only the deepening rift between Java and the outlying regions gave Washington some cause for hope.

Under these circumstances a special NSC investigative group was formed on 1 August 1957, which on 23 September submitted its report. The tenor of this

was that the United States would do well to support anti-communist forces in the outer regions 'by all feasible covert means'. At the same time, it should try and strengthen the position of anti-communist forces in Java, particularly within the armed forces. In the third place, the military members of the group urged that preparations be made for military intervention in the event that things went wrong. This was one step too far for the officials of the State Department, but the formulation used nevertheless left open possibilities for some preliminary steps in this direction, on condition that not too much publicity was given to this. This created the necessary conditions for an 'undercover operation'. All this was noted down in a draft document registered as 'NSC-Action 1788'. In the preliminary discussions, the plan met with opposition from ambassador Allison in Jakarta, who maintained that Sukarno was not such a bad choice after all and that he needed arms supplies to strengthen his position vis-à-vis radical groups in his country. He vigorously underscored the negative effects of the New Guinea conflict on Indonesian politics. In his opinion, it would be a good thing if America started exerting strong pressure on the Dutch at last to go and sit around the table with the Indonesians and discuss their problems till a solution was hit on. If this line was followed and Sukarno was supported in his claims to Irian, the entire situation would change immediately, and Indonesia would start moving along in tune with American policy without any problem.[70]

In Washington, officials of the European office and the central policy directorates listened to these recommendations with disapproval. Their opinion, too, was that American policy with regard to Indonesia had been too much up in the air for too long. With the further radicalization of the country in December 1957, the actions against Dutch businesses, and the increasingly acute crisis in the outlying regions, it was time to cut the Gordian knot. Towards this end a meeting was called of the heads of the State Department with the CIA on 2 January 1958, at which the three principal themes of the recent NSC document were recapitulated in plain language by John Foster Dulles. America was no longer to do business with Sukarno, but was to support a new, non-communist government in Jakarta. It further had to make sure that it built up a strong position in the outer regions by rendering assistance to whomever whenever it saw fit. Dulles here showed himself to sympathize with the difficult position of the Netherlands. He was particularly worried about the Indonesian threat of nationalization of confiscated property, implying a deviation from the capitalist course by which America, too, might be hit in a later phase. Hence American and Dutch interests evidently ran parallel here. Therefore these plans should be disclosed confidentially 'to friends who might do something about it'. It should at the same time be made clear to these,

however, that this did not mean that the United States would support them in every respect, certainly in the case of their 'West Irian policies'.

Although in this reservation a faint echo of the standpoint of the American ambassador in Jakarta can be detected, there seemed to be little appreciation of the latter's stance otherwise. It was decided during this meeting to replace Allison. He was transferred to Prague, where he could do little harm under the circumstances.[71] At the beginning of March his successor, John Howard Jones, arrived in Jakarta with explicit instructions to repudiate his predecessor's policies. By an unfortunate coincidence, the first Indonesian complaints about secret arms supplies to the rebels, of which nationalist China and its close associate America were suspected, were received at the embassy at precisely this point.[72] The American intervention discussed on 2 January had got off the starting block.

While these developments, painful for the new ambassador as they were, were taking place, contacts with the Netherlands were no more satisfactory from the American point of view. This country showed little inclination actively to support the hard line with respect to Indonesia and remained totally fixated on the one point in which the Americans were least interested, namely New Guinea. On the same day as that of the meeting of the two Dulles brothers, the Dutch ambassador, Van Roijen, called at the State Department for a consultation with Robertson. Van Roijen did not project an image of the pugnacious Dutchman. He pointed out that the Dutch had resigned themselves to the fact that for them, and possibly for the West as a whole, the game was up in Indonesia. His country would stay put in New Guinea, however. Referring to a question as to cause and effect in the sad history of Dutch-Indonesian relations in the past years, raised by many at the time, he put forward the same thesis as that defended by Subandrio, namely that, whereas the issue of New Guinea might have stimulated the process of estrangement, the assault on Dutch interests would have taken place, owing to the stubbornness of the New Guinea fanatic that Sukarno was as well as to the strong position of the radicals, in any case. According to his succinct recapitulation of the affair, 'Even if we gave them New Guinea on a silver platter, another excuse would have been found'. Accordingly, the Dutch had not the least desire to talk to Indonesia about anything, certainly now that this country was blackmailing them with the fate of their fellow citizens in Indonesia.

Although the actions in support of the outer regions could count on sympathetic interest from the Dutch, the latter had little faith in their success. No doubt Dutch experiences in 1950, when the federal movement—excepting Ambon—had let itself be sidelined without much resistance, played a role in this. Van Roijen clarified the Dutch standpoint on a later visit to the State

Department, on 7 February 1958, on which occasion he emphasized that the Netherlands did not wish to create the impression that it wanted to intervene in internal Indonesian affairs, and therefore was opposed to arms supplies to the rebels. As was observed earlier, there is not, in fact, any trace of active Dutch co-operation to be found in the Dutch archives, even on the level of the respective intelligence services. For Jakarta this was a piece of good luck. According to Subandrio, Dutch Indonesian policies in this period were pragmatic and restrained, as was evident from, among other things, the business-like approach to settlement of the KPM affair. The Dutch government was interested first and foremost in keeping the damages suffered in Indonesia down to a minimum. In accordance with this policy, Van Roijen expressed the hope on this visit that it would be possible to discuss ways of filling the vacuum created in Indonesia as a result of the departure of the Dutch with the United States. In any event, allowing it to be filled by the communist nations should be avoided at all costs. In addition, the Netherlands was hoping for understanding for its difficult position from its principal allies in the NATO and European contexts. If any Western countries decided to fill the lacuna, they should couple this with pressure on Indonesia to redeem its debt to the Netherlands. The other point of action was New Guinea. Any concessions here were out of the question.[73]

The message Luns brought to the State Department on a visit on 24 April 1958 was not essentially different, although it was delivered in a more cheerful tone and larded with jokes. The prospects of success of the rising in Sumatra were already fairly poor. The major cause for concern for the Dutch meanwhile was the support the central government in Jakarta was receiving from different quarters. The Russians had promised ships and aircraft; with Japan, negotiations for the supply of ships to replace the KPM ones were underway; and the Italian government had promised delivery of twenty small warships. In the United States, voices calling on the government of this country not to remain behind were heard. This was in line with the second option of the NSC report, which mentioned support to non-communist troops in Java. The Dutch, however, were afraid that Sukarno would benefit from such support, which would hence strengthen the position of the radicals. For it was plain as day that when the time came these materials would be used against them in New Guinea.[74] Henceforth this was a recurrent theme in Van Roijen's and Luns' discussions with their American counterparts in the State Department.

In this fixation on New Guinea, the Netherlands was not alone. Also in the first week of January 1958, Sukarno left the Indonesian capital for a previously planned world trip, during which he was scheduled to visit ten different countries. Rumour had it that he intended the journey to seek recovery for his nerves, which had been badly shaken by events of the recent past, in particular

an attempt on his life. In the opinion of the CIA, the sole objective of the exercise was to procure weapons in East Europe and to seek support for his New Guinea policy.[75] These matters were in fact high on the Indonesian president's list of priorities. In Yugoslavia, he talked to President Tito about arms purchases, to be financed with money lent him by the Russians. In addition he discussed New Guinea in all the capitals he visited. He rounded off his journey with a lengthy stay in Tokyo, both for relaxation and for negotiations about Japanese compensation for war damages suffered by Indonesia. He did not return home till 16 February.

Evidently the deepening crisis in the outlying regions of his country was not making Sukarno nervous. In Tokyo he received a visit from a Permesta delegation headed by Ventje Sumual, who urged the formation of a Hatta cabinet and a withdrawal of the president to a more modest position. This fell on deaf ears, however. The gentlemen were sent home without achieving anything, with Sukarno acting along the same lines as the Cabinet in Jakarta, which rejected an ultimatum to the same effect from the rebels in Sumatra. The immediate result was the establishment of the Revolutionary Government of the Republic of Indonesia, the PRRI (*Pemerintah Revolusioner Republik Indonesia*), in Sumatra and North Celebes. This did not visibly affect Sukarno's conduct or his position, either. Back in Jakarta, he was able to quietly take over the reins again, while Nasution set about fighting the rebels. This was to be the set division of tasks for the next few years. Nasution took care of the unpleasant jobs, while Sukarno devoted his attention to the major questions of the Indonesian state doctrine, the Panca Sila, to neutralism, and, of course, to New Guinea. In all his discussions with Jones, New Guinea remained his chief topic of conversation. This gave Subandrio sufficient cause to point out to the Americans that it would be wise for them to take this personal fixation into account when framing their policies.[76]

The uprising in the outer regions did not turn out a success. Sympathy for the rebels remained limited, and even their fellow opponents of the central government considered they had gone too far by setting up an alternative government, as this carried the risk of a permanent division of the country. In Sumatra, active co-operation was restricted to the areas surrounding the towns of Padang, Pakan Baru and Bukittinggi. Moreover, preparedness to fight on the part of the troops stationed there was slight. The source of the rivalry with Jakarta was located at the top rather than in the lower ranks. Nasution's troops occupied Pakan Baru from the air as early as 18 March. This was an important town because of the presence of a large oil refinery of the American Caltex Company there. A month later the West Javanese Siliwangi division landed near Padang and occupied that city, again without much resistance. From here it pushed

through to Bukittinggi, the alternative government's headquarters, which was taken on 5 May 1958. This virtually eliminated the Sumatran branch of the PRRI.[77] In North Celebes, where Manado was now the centre of the insurrection, people were more prepared to fight. Even here, however, the Permesta under Ventje Sumual's leadership managed to hold out for only a few months. At the end of July Nasution's troops were in control again in every major town, even though guerrilla fighting was to continue for a few years longer. In both Sumatra and Celebes, this was more tenacious than the central troops' initial success had led people to believe. At the end of 1960 even a new alternative government was formed, although this was the last flicker of the resistance. A year later, peace and order had been restored throughout Indonesia.[78]

The course of the rebellion was followed attentively from Washington. The CIA's covert operations, which in reality had started before the formal decision was taken to this effect on 2 January, were conducted from Taiwan and the Philippines. Both of these countries were keen to see the rebels succeed, regarding the latter's success as the sole remedy against a communist Indonesia, as the Philippine president, Garcia, and his Taiwanese counterpart, Chiang Kai-shek, repeatedly and emphatically gave the American government to understand. Furthermore, there were regular consultations on the subject with the British, who provided the necessary facilities from Singapore.[79] In Washington, Eisenhower and the Dulles brothers in particular showed great concern. The operations were for the greater part airborne, with Chinese and American pilots flying the aircraft. To be on the safe side, for the latter task mercenaries instead of regular soldiers were used at Eisenhower's bidding. In Sumatra, American support consisted chiefly in the presence of a few warships off the coast, though these never visibly came into action. The most conspicuous act of foreign intervention here was the dropping of a few cases of ammunition for the rebels just a few hours before the landing of Indonesian parachutists in Pakan Baru. These fell into the hands of Nasution's troops intact, however. Eisenhower himself on 14 April had proposed using submarines to stave off the attack on Padang, but the facts do not bear out the suggestion that these were actually deployed. The Indonesian fleet was able to land without any trouble, after which followed a week of confusion, which seriously frustrated the American adventurers allegedly deployed, as in fact no fighting took place at all and the two Indonesian opposing sides soon sought to establish contact with one another. It looked like a family feud, in which everyone knew everything about everyone else.[80]

The only remaining chance of success after that seemed to be in East Indonesia, where a few larger actions were planned. Eisenhower initially hoped for a successful attack on Macassar, which did not, however, materialize. The

central government troops had an important foothold in Ambon, but air strikes at their positions here had a rather unfortunate ending for the Americans when on 18 May one of their planes was brought down with one surviving pilot. Where up to then there had only been speculations, here at last was convincing proof of American complicity. The pilot, Allen L. Pope, was carried to Jakarta in triumph, where he was brought before a public tribunal, which eventually in January 1959 sentenced him to death. The only remaining straw for the rebels to clutch at now was the island of Morotai, where a few companies of Menadonese took the strategically located airfield at the beginning of May. The enterprise drew much attention from Chiang Kai-shek and Garcia, but it, too, gradually fizzled out. The airfield was recaptured at the end of July, and the remaining Permesta troops fled to New Guinea. There they met with a friendly reception, but were given no opportunity to equip themselves with new weapons. They were, conversely, subjected to detailed questioning by the military and civil intelligence services in New Guinea. As a result, the Dutch got hold of first-hand information about the course of the insurgency, though they did nothing with this. The ministers who read the reports were mainly interested in finding out whether these contained any evidence of Dutch involvement. When this turned out not to be the case, they were able to put the documents aside with a clear conscience.[81]

The ease with which the Indonesian forces were able to put down the rebellion gave rise to a step-by-step review of the American objectives. The initial aim had definitely been the establishment of an independent government in the outlying regions. When that turned out to be unfeasible, ambitions were restricted to exercising pressure on the central government in Jakarta. In imitation of the colonels of the outer regions, the Americans, too, now made attempts to have Hatta installed as leader of a presidential cabinet. These foundered on the obduracy of the former 'twin brothers', however. Sukarno refused to take any step backward on the presidential path he had gone down, and Hatta was not prepared to meet him halfway in this respect. The turning point came soon in the second half of April, when it became obvious that the actions in Sumatra would fail. John Foster Dulles and Eisenhower came to the conclusion that, if the rebels themselves refused to fight, there was no sense in offering help. From that point on, it was a foregone conclusion that America would have to place its bets on another horse. Now the second option of the revised NSC plan of action gained prominence. Support for American policies would have to be sought from the victorious party in Java.

This turnabout was wholeheartedly recommended by ambassador Jones. Not long after his arrival at his new post, he had been won over completely by the

charm of the Indonesian leaders. His recommendations soon began to display a fixed trend. Strong United States support for the military leaders in Java was the only way of keeping Indonesia out of communist hands! As Nasution became more and more successful, Jones came to pin his hopes increasingly on him. Sukarno would simply have to be accepted into the bargain. Jones was encouraged in this view by Subandrio and Djuanda, who both distanced themselves a little from Sukarno, but at the same time let it be known that the country could not do without him and that his co-operation was the best guarantee against communism. Giving in a little to Sukarno's wishes with respect to New Guinea was the most appropriate way to achieve this.[82] This put the ambassador right back on the track followed by Allison before. As more and more reports of CIA actions came in, and certainly after the capture of Pope, the ambassador's Indonesian interlocutors gained an effective means of putting him under pressure. They were able to point out that they had the greatest difficulty in preventing Sukarno from taking rash steps, and that the Americans could only make up for their blunders with generous arms supplies. The rebellion had shown the need for a well organized and well armed Indonesian army. Up till then, only the Soviet Union had shown itself prepared to provide large-scale military aid. The question was whether America could afford to remain behindhand. As was discovered elsewhere in the third world as well in the next few decades, the rivalry between the two superpowers offered countries here excellent opportunities for playing on this to further their own ambitions. Howard Jones' Indonesian hosts did so with great adroitness. They did not fail to point out to him that Indonesian pilots had been receiving training in the use of the scores of MIG fighter jets and the freight planes promised by the Russians since April 1958 in Czechoslovakia. There was more than enough opportunity for getting more Russian aid, although Indonesia preferred to have American equipment. However, if Indonesian defences could not be strengthened one way, they would have to be done so another. The choice was America's![83]

At first, Washington listened to Jones' advice with irritation, but after the Siliwangi Division's successful assault on Padang, better times began for the ambassador. He now received support from the Standard Vacuum oil company, which sent a representative from its operations in Pakan Baru to Washington with the message that it would be advisable to come down on the side of Sukarno and Nasution. It would not be a bad idea to invite the latter for a visit to America to discuss support for building up the Indonesian army. From that moment on, the CIA also began to express itself in more positive terms about the Republican leaders, and even about Sukarno. Despite his flirtations with Marxism, he was not a communist, but a revolutionary leader who managed to combine the different elements of Western and Oriental philosophy

into an amalgam that appealed to the Indonesians. His adventurous life had reinforced the extrovert facets of his personality. He was a person with few inhibitions and not much of an eye for the practical aspects of government and the economy, while at the same time he could brook no one else beside him. He was nevertheless for many the personification of the dream of a strong, united Indonesia. As far as Jones was concerned, this was 'a possible dream', as the title of his later book ran. He felt immediately attracted to Sukarno's ideas on guided democracy. The introduction of such a policy might prevent the elections that had been announced from taking place, and thus thwart the expected communist victory. Nevertheless, Jones had the most sympathy for Nasution, whom he described as a friend of the West.[84] As the oilman had advised, the United States in fact extended an invitation for a visit to the American capital, together with a provisional promise of a programme of military aid, to Nasution at the beginning of May 1958.[85] The change of course was now total, even though the actions in support of the rebels in North Celebes strangely enough also continued for a little while longer. They were now made out in American diplomatic circles to be a lever to induce Jakarta to be a little more compliant. Apparently the United States also had some difficulty in curbing Eisenhower's enthusiasm, as well as that of his Chinese and Filipino friends.

Thus American policy, in the wake of internal developments in Indonesia, displayed some violent swings. The days of paternal sympathy for the young sprig by mid-1957 were over. After that followed a period of about six months in which support for the rebels in the outer regions was the focus of all attention. That was where America's principal practical interests, which had also come to be in the line of fire as a result of the seizure of Dutch businesses, now lay. Besides, there were the perennial hopes that a new balance might be struck in Jakarta via the colonels and the person of Hatta. From May on, another course again was struck, with America pinning its hopes on Nasution's army, and with more or less enthusiasm taking Sukarno into the bargain. In view of the position adopted by the Soviets, as well as of Indonesian priorities, arms supplies to the central government in Jakarta thus became the key to the new policies.

These developments had far-reaching consequences for the Dutch position. The US attitude of paternal benevolence towards Indonesia had produced few advantages, but no disadvantages, either. The choice of course during the uprising, when the Americans at first had definitely angled for Dutch support for the CIA adventure, had been more difficult. The Dutch had backed off then. Both Luns and Van Roijen had had little faith in the chances of success of this, and Dutch fears of burning their fingers had been uppermost. With the arrival

of Permesta fugitives in western New Guinea, a considerable amount of information about the state of affairs had fallen into Dutch hands, but this had been scrutinized mainly for signs of Dutch involvement. Dutch actions had been marked by the desire to avoid provoking Indonesia more than was necessary. The information drawn from the interrogations was not passed on to the Americans, either. After all, there could be little point in letting the latter know that the Dutch were acquainted with the unpleasant details of an operation the existence of which had consistently been denied in public. Dutch involvement in the insurgency had been restricted to keeping a few ships on standby for possible deployment in the evacuation of the remaining Dutch in Sumatra.[86]

The question of how much of a threat the events in the outlying regions posed to the Dutch position in New Guinea came up for discussion during the earlier mentioned talks of Luns and Van Roijen at the State Department on 24 April 1958. The Dutch minister there gave an overview of the available Dutch resources in the event of an Indonesian attack in New Guinea, and qualified these as adequate. He had no problem with incidental infiltrations; if any Indonesians should chance to land here at all, 'they would probably be devoured by the Papuans anyway'! Nevertheless, major problems were to be expected when the fighter jets ordered from Russia, the pilots for which were already being trained in Egypt and Czechoslovakia, arrived. Dulles listened to Luns' words with evident approval, while showing his appreciation for the jokes.

In the course of the conversation, slight signs of uneasiness on the Dutch side were noticeable when Dulles started talking about the desirability of giving the Indonesian central government a little help. He mentioned a consignment of rice, of which there had been talk before, in this connection. To Van Roijen's pointed question, he accordingly replied that the Americans would send no weapons to Indonesia. Van Roijen's unease was nevertheless justified, as the subject of potential American arms supplies had definitely been brought up in the regular consultations between the American minister and his brother at precisely this time, as also became evident to the outside world shortly after that. At the beginning of May, Jones was able to hand over an invitation to the Indonesian government to send a few officers to the forthcoming SEATO naval manoeuvres and weapons demonstrations. Nasution likewise received an invitation for a visit to America, while it was decided at the request of the Indonesians to turn the rice deliveries into arms supplies.[87]

For Luns and the Dutch government, the success of Nasution's troops and the knowledge of the promised Russian supplies had changed the signals to red. In April it had become evident that the supply of around sixty MIG fighters and a similar number of other aircraft to Jakarta was expected any day. Moreover,

the Dutch had to be prepared for the possibility of American aid as a counterbalance to Russian supplies. All in all, this gave them sufficient cause to sound out the possibilities of international support in the event of an Indonesian attack, using up-to-date equipment, on New Guinea.[88]

An excellent opportunity of doing so was provided by the meeting of the members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, held in Copenhagen at the beginning of May. Here the situation in Indonesia was first discussed at length by the Americans and the British in mutual consultation. On 7 May Dulles brought the subject up in the council, illustrating the danger of the communist threat in Indonesia. He described the Soviet arms supplies to Jakarta as a new tactic aimed at keeping dictators like Sukarno in the saddle. It was a form of indirect aggression, against which current international law offered little remedy. At the end of the session he had a brief private chat with Luns, who pointed out the direct threat to New Guinea and expressed the view that he might have said more about the subject more clearly before. He urged the United States to give Indonesia to understand that an attack on Dutch territory would not be tolerated. Dulles did not react to this seriously, but did respond to the jovial tone usually characterizing the conversations between the two gentlemen. He expressed the view that the Indonesians would make a fool of themselves on the international stage if they tried to get up to any mischief. 'It probably won't cause you any problems', he said. Luns rejoined that just a handful of Dutchmen had managed for centuries to keep the Indonesians under their thumb, and this probably would not change in the immediate future.[89]

The above recap of the conversation, made by Dulles himself afterwards, agrees with that given by Luns. A different picture was presented in the press, however. The United Press Agency reported at the end of the meeting that Dulles had allegedly stated that an Indonesian attack on New Guinea would have the gravest of consequences for Southeast Asia as well as the entire Western world. After a panic reaction from Jones in Jakarta, Dulles immediately repudiated this report, saying it was 'obviously ... a fabrication since I made no remarks of any kind regarding a possible Indo attack on New Guinea'. As a result, Van Roijen was instructed to point out to Dulles as soon as the latter returned to Washington that the Indonesians might possibly infer from his denial that America would be indifferent to such an attack. Van Roijen was, in fact, received at the department by Dulles and his brother immediately after the former's return, on 13 May. Here Dulles pointed out that the conversation with Luns had taken place in a jocular atmosphere and that he had not done any such thing as make an official statement on this subject. He reassured the ambassador by asserting that surely by now the Indonesians must realize what America's real position was.

Of course the question is how this tale had come about. In the course of the interview with Van Roijen it became evident that Jones had mentioned Luns as its source. It is not inconceivable, in fact, that Luns leaked a story to this effect in an attempt to get some sort of advantage out of it. Van Roijen, during his interview with Dulles, out of politeness refrained from going into this, while even so sticking to his instructions to try and talk the latter into making a more explicit statement regarding American intervention in the event of an Indonesian attack. Dulles had no desire to be coerced into making any such statement via the detour of a *gaffe* in the press, however. He accordingly parried Van Roijen's request with the argument that internationally this kind of warning was unusual unless there was realistic cause for issuing it. Especially with the Indonesian situation being as delicate as it was, it would be foolish from the American point of view 'to inject at this time the issue of WNG into' it. Van Roijen nevertheless managed to get the American after the interview to make a statement to the effect that, whereas the ambassador had raised the subject of the denial, the United States had no reason whatever to anticipate any such eventuality. If any threat to peace arose, then the United States would have to abide by the Charter of the United Nations, which invariably strove after a peaceful settlement of this kind of conflict. To Van Roijen this seemed rather meagre, but it was the only concession he managed to get.[90]

The Dutch ambassador would soon have more cause for complaint. On the Sunday following his visit to the State Department, rebel planes carried out an air raid on the town of Ambon, killing over a hundred people. On the day after that the American pilot Pope was brought down over Ambon, which seemed to give proof of American involvement. These events provoked fierce protests to Jones from Prime Minister Djuanda and Subandrio. A strong anti-American mood threatened to take the country in its grip, and major 'anti-intervention demonstrations' were announced. Partly in view of the military failure of the rebels in Sumatra and the greater part of Celebes, Dulles now decided to put an end to American support to the rebels across the board. Direct United States involvement in the latter's actions was denied, but Jones was instructed to explain that it was sometimes difficult for America and its allies in the Philippines and Taiwan to stop their citizens from committing rash acts. Now a number of supplies and loans that had long been in the pipeline were pledged to Indonesia without further discussion. These also included consignments of hand weapons and plane parts.[91]

Dulles was well aware at the moment he took this decision that it would cause problems with the Dutch. Confronted with the mood in Jakarta and America's vulnerability to blackmail since Pope's capture, however, he felt that there was no other way out. The predictable result was a slightly more forceful

démarche by Van Roijen on 27 May, in which he showed himself to be perplexed that America, after all assertions to the contrary, was now supplying arms to Indonesia after all. His indignation, whether genuine or feigned, made little difference, however. In contrast to the friendly treatment he usually received, he now met with quite a rough approach. In contradiction to the actual facts, America at first denied that the arms supplies had been promised. It reproached the ambassador that it was unfitting to take official steps on the basis of mere newspaper reports. Then it gave him to understand in no uncertain terms that the Netherlands, all other things apart, had no right to be informed of everything that took place within the walls of the State Department. The United States pursued its own policies, and the ongoing regular consultations did not imply confidentiality. After all this had been said, the tone of the interview changed. Dulles now went on to tell Van Roijen that the Netherlands need have no worries about the American position in the event of an Indonesian attack, now or in the future. In a separate session Van Roijen was assured in the deepest confidentiality that the rapprochement with Indonesia was only an experiment and that, if called for, an entirely different approach was imaginable.[92]

There was no sign of any such different approach in practice, however, and in the next few weeks the path once taken was resolutely followed. The American policymakers in Washington were pushed along here by an offensive from Jakarta, from which city they received daily warnings from the Indonesians via Jones that it was high time for the United States to deliver the weapons at last in order to keep the communists out. Sukarno made no secret of the fact that not only was New Guinea a personal obsession with him, but also that it was necessary for him to gain possession of the territory in order to make the communists toe the government line. These warnings and arguments were invariably accompanied by references to Indonesia's success in quashing the rebellion and to the friendship with the United States that was to be expected if the latter did as Indonesia desired with regard to arms supplies and New Guinea. This even went so far as at one point to lead Eisenhower to wonder in desperation whether the entire rebellion might not have been a deliberate set-up by the Indonesians to trick the Americans: a suspicion harboured by the Dutch ten years previously with reference to the then recent Madiun affair.[93]

In view of the antecedents of the affair, this was rather too fantastic a speculation, and the ultimate conclusion was that the Indonesian warnings had better be taken seriously. On 5 August 1958 Nasution was given a promise of more large-scale arms supplies, including a number of helicopters and ships. As befitted a good ally, America informed Luns of the supplies in general terms, though

saying nothing for the time being about the planes and ships, well aware as it was that the Dutch would regard the supply of this kind of material as a threat to New Guinea. After that a mood of satisfaction prevailed in the State Department. There was consistency in American policy again, and Jones was able to report that Sukarno was overflowing with gratitude. His report created the impression that the United States had gained an ally for life. An extra reassurance for the Americans was a promise from Nasution that the weapons supplied by them would not be used against New Guinea.[94]

A few days later, after Sukarno had delivered his customary 17 August speech, the shine had come off again. As usual, it was a belligerent text, depicting the West as a threat to Asia and praising the communist bloc as the champion of repressed peoples. To make matters worse, Sukarno had announced a deliberate military build-up for the assault on New Guinea. It was plain language, and the people at the 'State' were 'shocked and disappointed'. America's first reaction was to try and restrict the damage to relations with the Netherlands. The Undersecretary of State, Christian A. Herter, felt extremely embarrassed and now started seriously contemplating giving the Netherlands the undertakings Luns had asked for.[95]

There were calls for this from another quarter as well. The Australians, too, had been alarmed by the above developments, feeling particularly concerned about the supply of ships. Prime Minister Menzies made it plain that his government was facing a dilemma. As we saw above, he had for some time been in close consultation with the Dutch, which had culminated in, among other things, the parallel statements of 7 November 1957, in which Australia and the Netherlands declared their intention of co-ordinating their respective policies with respect to New Guinea. Recent events in Indonesia and the American reorientation with regard to that country now led to a speed-up of these policies. In Canberra, Menzies on 27 August informed the American ambassador to Australia that he intended lending open support to the Dutch position in New Guinea. This was desirable if only for reasons of domestic policy, as 'Australian public opinion has been built up to a point where West New Guinea has become [a] symbol of Australian security and use of force by [the] Indonesians would cause violent reactions here'.[96] At the same time, Minister Casey set out for Washington, paying a visit to The Hague on 29 August on his way. As mentioned previously, here he had a lengthy exchange of views with Luns about the form the planned co-operation should take and about the need for an American deterrent to keep Indonesia in line. On 9 September Casey arrived in Washington for a specially convened ANZUS meeting to discuss security matters. It was an excellent opportunity for clarifying Menzies' message once more. Australia would be pleased to support the Dutch, but was afraid of doing so, as

the whole of Asia, including the Philippines—even though its minister of foreign affairs, Serrano, would probably have different ideas about this personally—was bound to turn against Australia as soon as it fired the first shot. American backing was an absolute precondition for a policy of support.

Obviously an Asian reaction of this kind was not exactly an attractive prospect for the Americans, either. Dulles tried to stall a little by suggesting that the Indonesian government's verbal aggressiveness on the subject of New Guinea was primarily intended for the outside world. An actual attack was only to be expected if Indonesia went over to the communist camp. The supply of 'a moderate amount of arms' was the very thing to prevent this. To reassure his Australian guests, he added that, as far as the United States was concerned, this did not mean that it would give Indonesia free rein to carry out an actual attack on New Guinea. Such a thing would be disastrous, 'and we would throw our force against such an attack', for which the support of Congress might be secured, too, one way or another.

This was a strong, be it informal, 'deterrent'. Meanwhile uncertainty was arising in the department as to whether Indonesian assurances of exclusive use for domestic purposes actually excluded an action against New Guinea. After all, Indonesia regarded the Dutch part of New Guinea as part of its interior by definition. To be on the safe side, this thorny subject was not broached at the ANZUS meeting. To take the edge off the dilemma somewhat, Dulles defended Sukarno against Casey, who had dubbed him a fanatic. In accordance with Jones' definitions, Dulles stated himself to view Sukarno rather as 'a schemer, and a smooth and adroit politician'. At the end of the meeting, Casey reiterated that the Australians had been unable to give any positive undertakings in response to the Dutch request for a formal pledge of Australian help in the event of an armed attack on New Guinea. Dulles thereupon came with the surprising rejoinder that he would not have had any objection if they had done so.[97] This is another indication that at that point the Americans were serious about their informal deterrent, while finding it difficult to come out into the open with it.

Casey's visit was the first step in what might well be regarded as a coordinated Australian-Dutch action. It took place the day before the upcoming United Nations meetings. A few days later, on 17 September, Luns also appeared in the American capital, accompanied by the American ambassador in The Hague, Philip Young. His first meeting with Dulles lacked the tritely jocular tone of earlier talks between them. Luns complained bitterly about postwar American Indonesia policies and about the 'gangsters' who were now in power in Indonesia and were misappropriating Dutch possessions. He would have expected the Americans to adopt a tougher stance against this, as in

similar cases in which British or American possessions had been at stake. He further underlined the strategic importance of New Guinea once more, promising Dutch support for American policies with regard to China's position in the United Nations in return for American support for the Netherlands on this point. As American attempts to prevent Communist China replacing Chiang Kai-shek's government in the United Nations and the Security Council had up to then met with little sympathy from the Netherlands, Luns' promise evidently touched a soft spot. Dulles reacted by saying that he would express his point of view with regard to China in this connection in general terms, adding that this would be equally applicable in the event of an Indonesian attempt to attack New Guinea. This was an important detail, as the Americans were lending Chiang Kai-shek's government active support in the defence of the tiny islands off the coast of Taiwan, which almost daily came under communist fire.[98] At a subsequent meeting, on 30 September, the entire New Guinea policy was discussed in detail once again. Luns cabled his general impression that the majority of the top officials of the State Department, and probably Dulles himself, were inclined to comply with Dutch wishes to The Hague on 1 October. He did make the reservation here, however, that Undersecretary Robertson, 'who only thinks in communist and non-communist terms', remained the chief stumbling block.[99]

The issue was likewise dealt with at an ANZUS meeting of 1 October in Washington, at which ministers from Australia, New Zealand and the United States discussed the situation in Asia. Here Dulles observed that the United States would do its utmost to help the Netherlands in the event of an Indonesian attack. He stated that he was not disinclined to give some sort of assurance of this, although of course this would have to be couched in terms that would not give too much offence to Indonesia. The support would be at least logistic, in addition to moral support in the United Nations. Any further possibilities would be dependent on the circumstances of the moment and on the position of Congress. Besides, America would continue its policy of cautious support for Indonesia, among other things in the form of arms supplies. He hoped not only that this might keep the country out of the grip of communism, but also that it might provide the best possible assurance against rash ventures in the direction of New Guinea. Though America would continue its policy of running with the hare and running with the hounds, Dutch interests were now more obviously factored in.

During this meeting of the ANZUS partners, the discussions digressed to the question of what could have taken possession of the Dutch. In general the Americans were uncomfortable with the latter's highly emotional attitude towards Indonesia and associated problems. They could empathize with it up

to a point if they tried, but it nevertheless seemed to them a shaky foundation on which to construct any sort of policy. In reaction to a remark by the suspicious prime minister of New Zealand, Nash, the ANZUS ministers thereupon proceeded to discuss what the Netherlands' concrete interests in New Guinea actually were. Casey observed that he had heard it was pumping seven to eight million pounds into the territory annually, without the least possibility of ever deriving any benefit from it. To Dulles this seemed all the more reason to tread warily: if the interest of the Dutch in the area was insignificant, chances were high that they would not be prepared to defend the island if things really came to the crunch. The danger of their clearing out was far greater than the risk of the Indonesians militarily invading the territory. From the use of the word 'danger' here one may infer in any case that this was not an attractive prospect for the others present at the meeting, either. The end conclusion was that for the time being the Dutch were not only prepared, but also determined to fend off every form of aggression.[100]

After the Australians, Dutch and Americans had finally laid their cards on the table in the month of September 1958, it was possible to clinch matters quickly. In the 30 September interview, Dulles had promised Luns that the Americans would put something in writing and would in any case lend logistic support if that were necessary. Embroidering on this theme in his talks with his ANZUS partners, he had said about this that 'there is no doubt in the world but that if there were such an attack, the Government of the United States would be disposed to be as helpful as possible to the Dutch in resisting such an attack'. Luns had told Dulles in the course of a formal dinner in honour of the American minister at the Dutch embassy in the evening of that day that he was hoping for a sentence to the effect that 'the United States would take all appropriate measures to stem the aggression' in the event of an attack on New Guinea. Dulles had responded that he thought this was going too far. On 2 October Luns, concluding his visit to Washington, called on Eisenhower, on which occasion New Guinea once again was the focus of interest. As far as the substance of the discussions here was concerned, they represented a repetition of the viewpoints articulated earlier by Dulles. Luns was able to travel on to New York with an easy mind after assuring the president that, of little value though New Guinea might be, his fellow Dutch felt they had an obligation to govern and protect the territory. The other United Nations members would simply have to respect this feeling.[101]

The upshot of these hectic weeks in Washington was that ambassador Van Roijen on 8 October was summoned to the State Department to take receipt of a letter for Luns. It contained a draft declaration concerning the American position in the event of the use of force by Indonesia against western New

Guinea. It further authorized Luns to state wherever and whenever it suited him that Dulles had confirmed to him that, if Indonesia should use force against New Guinea, 'the United States, as its conduct has shown, firmly adheres to the principle that force should not be used to effect territorial changes and that the United States considers that this policy is applicable equally to the Taiwan Straits issue and to comparable issues in other parts of the world, including New Guinea'. Luns was expected to add to this, however, that Dulles saw no reason whatever to assume that Indonesia had anything of the kind in mind.[102]

Van Roijen's reaction on reading the declaration was one of considerable disappointment. This was not the sentence Luns had asked for, as it did not make absolutely clear what the United States would actually do in the event of the use of force against New Guinea. Although he appreciated the good intentions behind it, he felt that the minister was not actually saying much more here than that the United States was against sin. Dulles repeated that it was inconceivable that the United States would do nothing in the event of an Indonesian attack, but that this could not be stated in a formal declaration without the president's consent and without Congress' seal of approval. Apparently in his eyes any attempt to induce Congress to make a statement of this nature was inopportune. Van Roijen replied that, without such a formal statement, the voices in the Netherlands calling for a total withdrawal from New Guinea would grow louder. It was a fairly transparent attempt to put responsibility for that area on the plate of the Americans, but Dulles did not fall into the trap. His laconic reply was that such a development would be bad luck especially for the Australians, thus putting the ball in Canberra's court.[103]

This was the absolute maximum of American support for the Dutch position. It comprised an undertaking, couched in general terms, that America would not leave the Netherlands in the lurch in an emergency, with the veiled addition that any support given would in any case be logistic and political. This was not without significance. Moreover, something of a conciliatory tone was discernible where it came to the filling in of the material details. At the Dutch request, a number of offensive weapons were struck off the list of arms to be supplied to Indonesia. For the time being, helicopters and military planes would not be included.[104] As the restrictions only applied for the short term, the most serious disagreement would soon arise about these material details again. In effect, American arms supplies to Indonesia in the next few months assumed sizeable proportions, which strained relations with the Netherlands.

Even so, this statement was decisive for Dutch-American relations in principle for the next few years. It was not without significance, placing American

intentions with respect to the defence of New Guinea on the same level as those with regard to Taiwan, where America's ally through thick and thin, generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, ruled with the aid of substantial American support. The difference was, however, that in the case of China the American president was authorized by Congress to take action if and when he deemed this necessary. He had no such authorization with regard to New Guinea, and it was doubtful if he would receive it if circumstances dictated. Much would also be dependent on the personal attitude of the American members of government at the time. All in all, it was an elastic formula, the details of which could be filled in at anyone's discretion.

Luns for his part did all in his power to derive maximum benefit from his paper deterrent at home; as far as he was concerned, it was an important factor in securing support for his policies in Dutch domestic political circles. Vis-à-vis the United States he kept up his querulous tone, a testiness that only increased as the Americans started throwing their reservations overboard, partly at Jones' urgings, and supplying Indonesia with more and more and heavier and heavier military equipment, invariably with the argument that this was probably the best way of keeping Indonesia out of the arms of the Russian bear, and thus at the same time the strongest possible guarantee for the security of New Guinea.

The practical consequence of the American promises was that it was made clear to the Indonesians that the arms supplied were not to be used against New Guinea. The first instance of this was in an interview between Subandrio and Rusk in Washington in November 1958. On this occasion the American minister pointed to the importance of principles in international relations, saying that he expected Indonesia to refrain from resorting to violence in chasing its territorial claims. Subandrio replied in the affirmative and observed that his government realized that any violence against the Netherlands would also be directed at Australia, and that Dulles could be confident that his country would not be foolish enough to take such a step.[105] Subandrio not long afterwards reiterated this assurance to Menzies in the course of the latter's visit to Jakarta.

These might be encouraging reports for anyone attaching importance to them, but they did not represent a reply to Luns' repeated question about what exactly America's support would amount to in case of a serious threat. More concrete details were not forthcoming from Washington, which argued that there was no need for this, as there was no threat of any attack. Luns did not make much more progress on the point of Indonesian arms purchases in Britain, as both countries pursued the same policy in this respect. A Dutch request to the Americans to send a ship to the ports of New Guinea now and then in order to show the local population that the Netherlands were not alone in the world elicited no response. The Americans now even reacted with some

reservation to Dutch military orders for New Guinea. The Dutch request provoked panicky reactions from Jones, who feared Indonesia would protest. If Subandrio promised that Indonesia would not use the equipment supplied by America against New Guinea, then the Dutch did not have any need for equipment in New Guinea to defend the region against Indonesian aggression. It was a watertight argument, and it impressed the American Joint Chiefs of Staff, who had no wish to see their budding co-operation with Indonesia put in jeopardy.[106]

The attitude of the United States government was, in a word, ambivalent. From the end of 1958 on there was an obvious improvement in that country's relations with Indonesia, where the internal developments were not unfavourable from the American point of view. Although the Indonesian economy was experiencing an increasingly serious downturn and the PKI continued to be an active and important force in Indonesian politics, this was offset by another factor. Thanks to Sukarno's resolute actions, the elections were postponed indefinitely and the policy of guided democracy was re-affirmed. Jones' positive judgement of this was shared, with some reservations, by the State Department, where the view was prevalent that the standing of Sukarno and his Indonesian state in the international order would only increase in the future. Indonesia had the potential to develop into a giant, and that was a factor to reckon with. Examples of this line of reasoning are to be found in the debate about the supply of American passenger planes, Lockheed Electras, on which Sukarno personally had set his heart. The reports from Jakarta all possessed a strong anti-Dutch undertone, which in the long run did not fail to affect practical policy. The promised consultation of the Netherlands about arms supplies to Indonesia gradually decreased, eventually to peter out into mere briefings after the event. This was wholly in accordance with Sukarno's recommendations to Jones, whom he gave the advice that the State Department should not let itself be led by the nose by the Dutch. The desired Electras were delivered, fierce protests from the Netherlands notwithstanding.[107]

Some top American officials continued to have reservations about Sukarno's Indonesia nevertheless. If the Dutch were emotional, the Indonesians were certainly no less so. Dulles found it totally incomprehensible and irresponsible that the latter should be prepared to run up heavy debts to secure arms that would serve no good purpose. Even so, it was important to stay friends with both The Hague and Jakarta. The dilemmas involved were aptly illustrated at a National Security Council meeting in January 1959. Here a revised version of the NSC document outlining future policy was tabled. In the main it was not unlike that of previous years, setting out in detail all the pros and cons of every

conceivable position. Its conclusion likewise was similar to that of five years previously. America would simply have to try and walk the tightrope between the two adversaries without losing its balance, and meanwhile watch out that Indonesia was not manoeuvred into the communist camp. The same policy was adopted for the following period. The deliberations about this, in which various participants clarified their point of view, offer some interesting insights. Eisenhower again wondered in astonishment 'why on earth the Dutch were doing this'. As far as he was concerned, Australia was really the only power with an interest in the matter, while for the Dutch New Guinea was no more than 'a fetish of the old empire'. It must be possible, with a little persuasion, to make the latter change their mind. 'Surely I'll be able to talk our Dutch friends round', the over-confident president asserted. Dulles praised the wisdom of his own policies of the past years, even attributing a useful function to the abortive adventure with the rebels in the outer regions, which, he claimed, had helped to keep Sukarno down a peg or two. His brother in the CIA still thought that the prospects for this were good. The insurrections had not ended completely, and if need be, he was quite prepared to stir the embers. The reservations about Sukarno were shared by the Chiefs of Staff, who, on the other hand, were happy with the friendly contacts they enjoyed with the Indonesian military, which they regarded as the most effective guarantee for good relations between the two countries.[108] What is striking is that there was almost no trace of Jones' enthusiasm in this company, in which there was more appreciation for his presence in Jakarta than for the reports he sent. Sukarno was an unpredictable fellow, primarily driven by personal likes and dislikes and by sentiment, and Jones was just the right person to remain on good terms with him. This was the chief reason for keeping him on in Jakarta till the end of the Sukarno era.

An arms race at the equator

The points of departure

Minister Luns' attempts to obtain international support for the Dutch position in New Guinea took place against a backdrop that was fast becoming increasingly gloomy. In the tense relations between the Netherlands and Indonesia with respect to the possession of New Guinea, the possibility of military action by Indonesia had been taken into account from the beginning. Some of Sukarno's utterances had hinted at this since the early 1950s. In the first years they were not taken too seriously by the Dutch, who did not rate Indonesia's ability to mount a really threatening attack very high.[109] Up until 1955 the organization of the defences of the island remained on the footing decided on in

1949. After some dawdling, a *Koninklijke Landmacht* (Royal [Dutch] Army) battalion made up of former KNIL soldiers had been stationed there, divided over Hollandia, Fakfak and Sorong. The *Koninklijke Marine* (Royal [Dutch] Navy) had a presence in the region with around 350 marines and a few larger ships, supported by a fleet of smaller vessels. It further had a modest air fleet, suitable for reconnaissance and transport duties. The bases for these were the airfields in Sorong and Biak. The strength of this air force in 1949 was set at six flying boats (Catalinas) and the same number of landplanes. The total navy personnel at the end of 1950 came to approximately 1,400. This number was boosted considerably in the next few years. In 1952 the frigate *Van Kinsbergen* was directed to New Guinea, where it patrolled the surrounding waters for the next three years.

In 1954 it was decided to entrust the entire defence of the area to the Dutch navy, which was after all a more mobile force than the army, and also had easy-to-deploy land forces at its disposal in the shape of its marines. Placing the defence exclusively in the hands of the navy made possible a simpler command structure. The number of marines was raised to the strength of a battalion (approximately 950), so that the army battalion could be withdrawn. More warships were set to visit the island. In addition there were plans for reinforcing the air force, with the *Marine Luchtvaart Dienst* (Naval Aviation Service; MLD) Catalinas being replaced with American Martin Mariners, of which fifteen were already on order, the first four arriving in 1955. To handle all this new equipment, the total strength of the navy would have to be brought up to 2,300. At the same time, Governor Van Baal urged for the dispatch of fighter planes to do reconnaissance work. In the Netherlands the navy also possessed a number of Fireflies. Although the stationing of these planes in New Guinea necessitated extra facilities, it was nevertheless possible to station a squadron of these Second World War single-engine propeller-driven fighter planes in Biak in that same year.

With these changes, not only the size but also the character of the military organization changed. From a small force designed specifically for internal policing tasks, it now grew into an organization adapted to defence against external aggression. Its chief task consisted in patrolling the coastal areas by land and sea and air, making grateful use of a simple but effective reconnaissance system. Every coastal village was given two white-painted beams that could be clearly seen from the air, which in the case of danger the population had to position in the shape of a cross that was likewise plainly visible from the air. Thereupon the necessary measures could be taken, and the marines carried to the spot by air or sea. The police was the most appropriate force for maintaining internal peace and order. It employed a considerable number of Papuans, who could be deployed especially in the grey area between defence

and maintenance of law and order. Assistance in apprehending Indonesian infiltrators was an essential part of this.[110]

On the Indonesian side, the armed forces after 1950 found themselves in a difficult transitional phase. The guerrilla army from the struggle for independence had to be transformed into a more modern apparatus, suitable for defending the country against a foreign aggressor and capable of deployment in internal policing as a last resort. Neither its personnel nor its equipment was suitable for this initially. Up to 1958, the necessary Indonesian army reforms received active support from the Dutch *Militaire Missie* (Military Mission) in Indonesia. The presence of this mission represented a mutual sign of confidence and of preparedness to co-operate. Obviously there was always the possibility that at some time in the future the Indonesian army, which by then would have grown stronger as a result, would be more effectively deployed against the Dutch position in New Guinea, but as was mentioned above, the Dutch at first did not attach much weight to this. Even so, this possibility could not be discounted altogether. For the Indonesian military and political leaders, on the other hand, the existence of the Dutch 'enclave' in New Guinea posed not only a political but also a military problem. The RMS rising had made it clear that Indonesian authority was not accepted as a matter of course in the eastern part of the archipelago. The Netherlands had scrupulously kept its distance in this, but the suspicion that it was showing an above-normal interest in developments in the region remained. It was fed by remarks by Ambonese living in the Netherlands and their Dutch supporters. The Dutch had a fairly modern military apparatus at their disposal in nearby New Guinea, which, rather modest in size though it might be, in view of Dutch potential in Europe could easily be brought up to considerable strength. All in all, this gave the Indonesians reason enough to try and offset this to some extent on their side. To this might be added that the wish to annex New Guinea to Indonesia, by force if necessary, was always stronger than the fear of a potential Dutch attack.

This was evident from, among other things, Indonesian efforts aimed at weakening the Dutch position. Towards this end the Indonesians adopted the strategy of the recently ended war of independence, planning to divide their campaign into four successive phases. After a phase (1) of propaganda at home and abroad, they intended proceeding to (2) political infiltration and the formation of cells in New Guinea itself. In phase (3), they would concentrate on contraband arms imports and the dispatch of infiltrators to New Guinea to support already existing indigenous resistance cells there. In phase (4) they might then proceed to open military and political action by means of the armed resistance cells in order to manifest the will of the people to foreign nations.

As had been the case in the history of Indonesian anti-Dutch actions before, the initiative for military operations against Dutch New Guinea was often taken by individuals in the private sector, liaising after a while with sections of the government apparatus. As early as October 1949 the *Badan Perdjuangan Irian* (West New Guinea Task Force) had been formed in Jakarta, as the successor of an earlier guerrilla organization, of which eventually Macassar became the base. Its leaders were the Ambonese Latumahina and the earlier mentioned Papuan Silas Papare. Together with a few support groups, they prepared for the first phases of the struggle. The first tiny groups of infiltrators had been landed near Sorong in April 1950, but these were immediately intercepted. The next small-scale action took place in 1952. The actions had become more systematic two years later when Sukarno set up the West Irian Bureau, in which once again Silas Papare played a prominent role. The chief task of this organization was to participate in the government's political campaigns. The military apparatus lent local guerrilla units co-operation in the execution of operations.[111] The Indonesian navy, besides its base in Macassar, had a number of regional bases in the vicinity of New Guinea suitable for launching smaller actions. The most important one was in Ambon, where after the suppression of the RMS Rising a sizeable garrison had been kept on. In addition there was a post in Geser, in the south-eastern tip of Ceram. Finally, there were some modest naval facilities in Gebe and the Aru Archipelago, all within a short distance of Netherlands New Guinea.

From these places at least four infiltrations on the west coast of New Guinea were staged between 1952 and 1954. The first of these took place on the uninhabited isle of Gag, in the westernmost part of the Radja Ampat Archipelago, lying directly opposite Gebe, in January 1952. Here a few dozen infiltrators landed with a view to undertaking expeditions to the Dutch area. The initiative for this project was taken in Macassar, where the headquarters of the organization responsible were located. Its implementation was simple enough. In Macassar four men with a rudimentary military training were selected and subsequently sent on their way with a minimum of baggage. They had to try and muster further support and means on their way to the area of their operations. After their discovery by Dutch soldiers in Gag, virtually the entire military force in New Guinea had their hands full in rounding up the group for weeks. The infiltrators had spread in all directions across the rugged terrain and could only be tracked down by systematically combing the island. It was an indication that Indonesia was capable of organizing seriously destabilizing actions using scant means. The second lesson to be drawn from this was that Dutch troops could not do their work without the assistance of Papuan policemen, who were at home in the terrain. The third lesson was for the infiltrators themselves. In Gag,

they had retreated to an uninhabited region. Though for them this may have reduced the chances of discovery, it rendered the whole enterprise fairly pointless, as it eliminated all opportunities for political propaganda. Subsequent expeditions hence took place in inhabited areas, but they were easier to abort because of preparedness of the local population to co-operate with the Dutch authorities. This was the case in the infiltration of areas near the villages of Werpigang (May 1953) and Kaju Merah (April 1954), the participants in which were rounded up within a matter of days. After that, the above-mentioned warning system was put in place, which facilitated the quick arrival of Dutch troops on the spot in case of trouble.

This system also proved effective in the larger-scale infiltration of an area near Etna Bay, where on 23 October 1954 a Dutch air patrol discovered that the danger signals were in place in two villages. The attack in this case was better planned and prepared than previous ones. It was organized from Ambon, where by this time a semi-military unit engaged in training infiltrators was based. According to the relevant Dutch reports, the West Irian Bureau had a hand in it. The men sent on this expedition had enjoyed a few months' training and were equipped with heavy arms. Here, too, the core group was fairly small, but gradually grew larger on the way. It was led by the Papuan Dimara, who had appeared off the coast with a few proas hired in Dobo, carrying fifty men, on 21 October. He was spotted by the policeman L. van Krieken, who happened to be on patrol in that area at the time. Although the latter's Papuan companions smelled a rat, the vigilant policeman boarded the strange vessel, where he was taken prisoner. It marked the beginning of a long period of captivity for him, which only ended a year later with his release on the day before the Geneva conference.

On that same 21st October, Dimara followed up his action with a harangue before the assembled inhabitants of the village of Etna, announcing the arrival of ten thousand freedom fighters. He thereupon set out for the interior with his men. Here he intended taking *Controleur* F. Peters, who was on a tour of the area, prisoner and subsequently pushing on to the region around Geelvink Bay, with which he was more familiar and where he hoped to establish contact with sympathizers. Meanwhile, the villagers put the danger signals in place, whereupon the first marines arrived by Catalina on the 24th of October. Once these moved away from the coast, they experienced great difficulty in tracking the infiltrators down. It took them weeks, in fact, to round them all up or kill them. In this, luck and coincidence played a major role. Besides becoming demoralized, the pursued lacked military skill. Thus Dimara and his last few remaining companions were finally captured on 4 February 1955.[112]

Here once again it took a huge effort to round up a relatively small group of infiltrators. At the peak of the action, a hundred marines were occupied in

catching thirty men. The Dutch reports do not mention any effect of the propaganda efforts. As we saw above, the local population tipped off the Dutch military authorities immediately after the landing of the infiltrators in Etna, and this was the rule on other occasions as well. Hence the chances that any propaganda spread by the infiltrators would appeal to the population could not be rated very highly. Anti-*amberi* sentiments were strong, except of course in areas on the south coast harbouring concentrations of immigrants from the west, such as Kaimana. There were large tracts of land in which the population was too sparse for Papuan assistance to be of much use to the infiltrators, moreover. It must nevertheless be conceded that the naval historians Van Holst Pellekaan, Bastiaans and De Regt, who have concentrated on this problem, are right in arguing that larger-scale infiltrations would definitely have caused the Dutch military major problems, provided they were better prepared and executed. It is further obvious from reports of the operations that in all these cases the chase was primarily the responsibility of the marines, who received much help from individual Papuan policemen, though one wonders whether more militarily trained Papuan units might not have been more effective here. As we have seen, the Papuan corps formed in Van Eechoud's days had not been an undivided success, and had therefore been disbanded again a few years later. Probably this kind of unit would have been of more use now, in the so much more stable situation of the 1950s. Mention of the desirability of these was made in a memorandum from lieutenant colonel Nass in 1950, but for the time being the authorities did not make much haste with their introduction. There was no sense of urgency.[113]

The Indonesian military build-up from 1958 onward

The developments outlined above must have made it clear to the Indonesian military authorities that exclusively small-scale infiltrations would not suffice to achieve the set goal. This strategy had proved very effective during the war of independence on the larger islands of the archipelago, where invariably pro-republican nuclei had been present. This had made it possible to lay the foundations for effective guerrilla warfare, which had increasingly tied the hands of the Dutch troops. Even at that time the spread of the rebellion to other parts of the archipelago had not been very successful, however, partly because the Dutch navy had been able to isolate the remoter islands. Under the present circumstances, the ocean was the first line of defence for New Guinea, while, with an efficient reconnaissance system, the chances of intercepting attacking enemy units were high. Moreover, the Papuans had almost no inclination to join the Indonesian infiltrators, but on the contrary, usually turned against them. The Indonesians' experiences in this connection had little effect on their

policies, however. The top echelon mostly discredited the reports of returning fighters and, in the rare cases in which they did believe them, failed to pass them on. For the Indonesians arriving on the island in 1962/63 there was a surprise in store in any case, namely that they were not welcomed as liberators. Even without this information, however, it must have been clear to the policymakers in Jakarta that the infiltrations did not have much effect and needed to be supplemented with a large-scale offensive using modern arms. This was, in effect, the more explicit objective of Indonesian efforts after the collapse of the Geneva conference.

Towards this end the Indonesians had to resort to the use of regular forces. The latter's equipment comprised mainly American-made material left by the Dutch. Further, the Dutch military mission until 1954 had co-operated in training army and navy personnel. The dissolution of this mission had been a political decision in the framework of Sukarno's and Ali Sastroamidjojo's anti-Dutch measures. It had not been welcomed with undivided enthusiasm in army circles, however, as reinforcement of the army was essential for the suppression of a series of internal disturbances. After the quashing of the RMS rebellion in Ambon, the fight against the Darul Islam in West Java and South Celebes kept the army more than busy. Aceh, which during the war of independence had stood on its own two feet, had to be made to toe the line of the unitary state by force. Furthermore, the grip of the central army leaders in Jakarta on the military units in the outlying regions had weakened since 1956, and rebellious colonels here were free to do as they pleased. To these leaders, the need to supplement and modernize military equipment and to train officers and men was obvious. This, in fact, became Nasution's principal task after his comeback as chief of staff in 1955 and his accession as minister of defence two years later. After 1957, fear of Dutch reprisals for Indonesian measures against Dutch interests in the archipelago was also put forward as a reason for strengthening the defences. Support for this had to be sought abroad, with the supplementing, maintenance and expansion of existing weapons systems being of the essence.

Of course there were arms for sale everywhere, but their supply was usually subject to political and financial restrictions. From 1954 onwards, orders for ships and other equipment were placed in various European countries, including Italy, Germany and England. As far as arms were concerned, the Indonesian military leaders preferred American equipment, with which the armed forces were mostly equipped already. Now replacements and spare parts were necessary. Initially American co-operation was received only in dribs and drabs, being restricted to the supply of a consignment of small arms for the police force in 1950 and the training of groups of a few dozen officers and airmen at a

time from 1954 on. In the State Department there was little enthusiasm for more extensive support, partly for fear of giving offence to the Dutch[114] and partly because Indonesia's role as leader of the non-aligned nations at the Afro-Asian conference was viewed with disapproval. The American reservations became manifest during Sukarno's visit to the US in May 1956, among other occasions. Eisenhower was not amused at the Bandung conference and refused to give any undertakings for political support in the New Guinea affair. Arms supplies were out of the question altogether. When the Indonesians tried again over a year later, in July 1957, this attempt met with equally little success, with the State Department backing off from a large order to the tune of a few hundred million dollars that the Indonesians then placed.[115] This state of affairs endorses Kahin and other scholars where they argue that in this period American neutrality worked in the Netherlands' favour.

Sukarno had more success on a visit to Moscow in September 1956. On that occasion the Russians offered him a loan of 200 million dollars, which he might use for the purchase of weapons if he wished. For practical reasons alone, the Indonesian military leaders were anything but keen to accept this, and the actual purchases were at first postponed. Meanwhile American politics distanced themselves from Jakarta further, while Indonesia's need for arms grew bigger. As we saw above, from the end of 1957 American arms supplies and other military assistance went to the rebels. Thus Jakarta was more or less forced to turn to the Eastern bloc for aid. The failure of the Indonesian takeover of the *Koninklijke Pakketvaart Maatschappij* accelerated this process. In January 1958 more detailed arrangements were made with the Russian ambassador in Jakarta, Zhukov. These embraced Russian assistance in making up for the loss of KPM shipping connections, as well as arms supplies. In March the CIA was able to report that the Russians had already delivered ten small merchantmen, while there was also talk of the supply of warships. At the same time, the Dutch and American military leaders were alarmed by reports of Indonesian orders of dozens of light Ilyushin [Il-28] bombers and MiG 15 and 17 fighter jets, which were due to arrive as early as April. The crews for these were being trained in Egypt and Czechoslovakia.[116] Then followed missions to the Eastern bloc for further procurements by General Jani, who to this end visited Poland, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia. In principle the supplies concerned took place on a commercial basis, but in actual fact they were facilitated by advantageous loans. In addition smaller-scale purchases of ships and aircraft were made in West Europe. The total value of non-American loans up to August 1959 was estimated by the CIA at 240 million dollars. By far the greater part of this went to the army, enabling it to purchase 275 armoured and other vehicles plus all kinds of weapons. The Indonesian navy was made happy with four gunboats,

twenty-four smaller ships, two submarines and eighteen reconnaissance planes. The air force received fifty fighter jets, twenty transport planes, and that same number of bombers. The supplies further embraced a wide variety of helicopters, cannon, hand weapons and auxiliary equipment.

The supplies from West European countries and the United States were limited, partly because the Netherlands had vigorously protested against this all the time. It did so again at the meeting of the North Atlantic Council of 6 March 1958, the first to be held after the chain of discriminatory measures against the Dutch in Indonesia and after the outbreak of the rebellion in the outlying regions. This Dutch step took the form of an appeal to each of the members individually to abstain from weapons supplies to Indonesia for the time being. The European allies reacted positively, but the Americans showed a measure of reserve. They considered this a superfluous step and refused to tie themselves down.[117] As we know, they decided to set up a programme of economic and military aid for Indonesia soon afterwards, in the summer of 1958. The other countries thereupon followed suit with more or less enthusiasm.

As we also saw, this change in American policy was a consequence of the failure of the two-track policy whereby the Americans had tried via Jones to keep the central government in Jakarta dangling while meanwhile militarily supporting the rising in the outer regions. It had become clear after Nasution's successes in the second quarter of 1958 that this policy only yielded negative results for the American position in Indonesia. The first sign of change was the conversion of a promised delivery of a consignment of rice worth ten million dollars into one of light weapons. To the outside world these were referred to as 'token' supplies intended to show American 'goodwill' for the anti-communist military leaders, but in private Dulles was already speaking of substantial military aid. Although after that, too, the cash value of these supplies remained comparatively low, their actual volume increased considerably. They took place on extremely favourable terms, with the Indonesians being allowed to pay off dollar loans in rupiah, while in practice sometimes they did not repay them at all. Thus their volume soon assumed a magnitude comparable to that of the Russian supplies. Especially important was the supply of ten advanced Hercules planes suitable for carrying troops and paratroopers.[118]

Most of the American aid went to the army, which was considered politically the most reliable. The navy and air force were put on short rations, as according to the State Department they harboured strong communist nuclei. This had been the case since the days of the struggle for independence, in fact. It should be added here, however, that it was precisely these branches of the armed services that had been hardest hit as a consequence of American support to the rebels. Hence the inclination to throw in their lot with the Americans in these

circles was negligible, which bolstered the tendency to rely on Eastern bloc supplies. The Indonesian navy further possessed ships and other equipment ordered from various West European countries since 1954. On top of this, Britain committed itself to the supply of eighteen Fairey-Gannet-type anti-submarine warfare aircraft around the 1958/59 turn of the year.

The supply of all this equipment got well underway in 1960. By that time the insurgency in the outer regions had petered out, with the PRRI leaders surrendering a year later. This signified a considerable strengthening of Sukarno's position, as well as that of the 'business Cabinet' headed by Djuanda. Subandrio was in charge of foreign policy, but had his hands firmly tied by the president's instructions. At the latter's insistence Nasution was dispatched to purchase new heavy weapons, which by this time could only be destined for the struggle for New Guinea. This once more set in train a game of poker in which the Americans and Russians were played off against each other. In May 1960 Russian President Khrushchev visited Indonesia and on this occasion promised a 250 million dollar loan, while privately giving an undertaking for more military support. Before accepting this offer, Nasution, in line with the military's preferences, paid a visit to the United States. There Herter, who had succeeded the late Dulles as Secretary of State, showed little inclination to offer large arms supplies. Nothing daunted, Nasution thereupon on 28 December set out for Russia, where he did better business. He was offered a 450 million dollar arms loan on easy terms, which he took out immediately. In June 1961 he again travelled to Moscow for a series of purchases. Russian credits had meanwhile risen to a billion dollars at 3.5 per cent interest. The problem for the Indonesian military was no longer how to acquire military equipment, but how to use and man it. Both the American and the Russian credit packages included training programmes. Hence, as a bizarre consequence of the cold war, Russian and American military personnel were actually co-operating in teaching Indonesian soldiers how to handle the ships and planes with which their respective countries had supplied Indonesia, and which were destined for use against NATO partner the Netherlands.[119]

The Karel Doorman*'s odyssey*

Naturally a close eye was kept on these developments by the Netherlands.[120] Partly thanks to the effects of the infiltration of Etna Bay, a stronger sense of urgency on the part of the local authorities in New Guinea had been discernible since 1955. Van Baal at that time had urged for the defences to be straightened out as much as circumstances permitted. His words evinced concern about a surprise attack. He was thinking in terms of calamities, whereby the weakly

defended territory would be cut off from reinforcements from the Netherlands by sabotage by Egypt and the Asian nations located along the lines of supply. The Hague considered this too panicky a reaction, but then, the officials there were not personally exposed to any threat. Nevertheless, the reinforcements were arranged according to plan. The Fireflies, flying boats and ships arrived as promised, while the *Marine Inlichtingendienst* (Marid; Naval Intelligence Service) in New Guinea was put on higher alert.[121]

As developments in Indonesia became increasingly worrying for the Netherlands; the Dutch sense of urgency after the end of 1957 intensified. The anti-Dutch actions in Indonesia and the connection established between these and New Guinea showed that Sukarno was serious. The next year the Indonesian armed forces proved themselves capable of effective anti-rebel operations, and thereafter grew stronger every year owing to foreign supplies. In 1958 the delivery of two corvettes and two frigates by Italy took place, while the agreements with the Eastern bloc did not augur well for the Dutch either. The light bomber jets (Beagles) delivered in that same year had a range covering the whole of New Guinea. Indonesian pilots were receiving training in Czechoslovakia and Egypt, while foreign instructors were sighted in Indonesia. Further supplies were expected in the short term, too. The surprise attack feared by Van Baal in 1955 now seemed to have become a concrete possibility.[122] This was clearly demonstrated in an analysis by the Dutch naval staff of May 1958. In the event of a surprise attack, Indonesia would be capable even at that point of occupying the airfields in Biak and thus cutting off any potential supply of Dutch reinforcements by air. To change this, a drastic strengthening of air defences was essential. Instead of the nine existing, obsolete, propeller-driven Firefly fighter planes, at least thirty two modern fighter jets were needed to intercept in-coming bombers in time. In addition, a similar number of reconnaissance planes and a reinforcement of the ground troops to a strength of 1,200 were necessary. The Dutch wish list further included three large ships, supplemented by radar installations, anti-aircraft guns and a sizeable amount of smaller equipment. The basic assumption underlying all this was that support from America and Australia could not be counted on. The Netherlands had to do the job on its own. The *Comité van Verenigde Chefs van Staven* (Committee of Joint Chiefs of Staff), the highest-level forum for co-operation between the Dutch army, navy and air force, in the main approved these proposals.

The document provoked lively discussion in the council of ministers of May 15, 1958. Luns showed some reserve. Referring to his interview with Dulles in Copenhagen a few weeks previously, he defended the view that the allies should be made to keep their word. In his opinion the threat was not yet urgent, and if

things really came to the crunch, American support could be depended upon.[123] It was quite an optimistic analysis, considering the fairly non-committal nature of his talk with Dulles and of the subsequent interview between the American minister and Van Roijen. The council therefore wanted more certainty and, after further discussion, acted only partially in line with Luns' views. It passed a memorandum, drawn up by the minister of defence, C. Staf, granting at least some of the wishes of the chiefs of staff in the short term. This package comprised a limited reinforcement of the defences of New Guinea with 400 army conscripts and improvement and reinforcement of the airfield defences. In addition the airfields in Biak were to be prepared for the reception of fighter jets. All this did, however, have to be done within the parameters of the amount earmarked for the defence of the realm in the budget, the so-called defence ceiling. To enable the dispatch of conscripts, an amendment of the law was submitted to parliament, which was not passed by the Second Chamber until July 1959.[124]

Most of the plans were immediately carried into effect, however, while the naval staff prepared the ground for the fast dispatch of larger units to New Guinea in case of an emergency. In addition, Luns was sent off to try and wangle more concrete undertakings from the allies. The limited reinforcement had been intended not in the last place to underscore Dutch policy. It was meant to demonstrate that the Dutch were prepared to go to some lengths to defend New Guinea, but certainly did not intend to wage a large-scale war under their own steam. This would only be possible with support from Australia and America, which they regarded as the most obvious allies. In addition Britain was approached. As we saw above, the relevant message was discussed with Casey, Menzies and the Americans in the summer of 1958. The council of ministers was kept closely informed of all further consultations with Dulles about possible American guarantees. On 10 October it was briefed by the deputy minister for foreign affairs, Ernst van den Beugel, on the contents of a statement handed to Van Roijen on 7 October 1958. He was able to add in all truth that Dulles had stated to Luns that, although America could not say in advance what it would do in the event of an attack, he expected 'that the United States in such an event would give logistic support and find other ways of helping us'. Both Van den Beugel and Drees felt that this was the maximum that could be expected as far as American undertakings were concerned. We can observe here that the council of ministers was aware of the extent of the American undertakings, and that the Cabinet as a whole took responsibility for the policies on the basis of these. Hence it is no coincidence that Drees deemed it necessary at this precise time once more to contradict the view aired publicly by Subandrio that Luns was the sole person responsible for the bad relations with Indonesia. The latter's policies were backed by Cabinet and parliament.[125]

This articulation of the credo of unity of policy was one of the Drees Cabinet's last acts on the point of policy with respect to New Guinea. In December 1958 the Cabinet toppled and the era of Drees and his Catholic-socialist coalition came to an end. It was succeeded, awaiting new elections, by an interim government led by Van Beel. Meanwhile Luns continued in office at the department of foreign affairs and was able to carry on with his efforts to marshal international support for an unchanged New Guinea policy.

All such support remained verbal. Both Britain and the United States continued with their programme of arms supplies to Indonesia. At Jones' strong urgings, the State Department approved the delivery of ten modern passenger planes, the above-mentioned Lockheed Electras, which might also be deployed for military purposes. Dutch protests again were of no avail. Dulles did warn Subandrio 'in the most categorical way' during the latter's visit to Washington in November 1958 that the arms supplied by America were not to be used against the Dutch in New Guinea. If they were, his country would find an adversary in America. The position of the British paralleled this. They did not let themselves be dissuaded from the intended supply of the Fairy Gannets that Indonesia had ordered, but Selwyn Lloyd assured his colleague Luns that, if Indonesia should undertake armed action against New Guinea, the British would be 'with the Dutch'.[126] According to the reports, the Indonesian reaction to this was positive. The Australian position was a derivative of that of the other two Anglo-Saxon countries, be it that in this case there was no question of any arms supplies, but only the question to what extent co-operation with the Netherlands would be feasible. Luns, in his discussions with Casey in The Hague in August 1958, had urged for joint staff consultations. Casey had not shown himself to be opposed to the idea, but after it became obvious to him in Washington that the Americans were not to be persuaded to give any positive undertakings of military support to the Netherlands, his government, too, refused to commit itself further. In January 1959 Menzies explained to the Dutch ambassador in Canberra that Australia could not commit itself to military co-operation with the Netherlands if Britain, and especially the United States, refused to do so. After all, Australia was dependent on these countries for the defence of its territory and had to take this fact into account.[127]

Thus after some initial hesitation, Australia, America and Britain in the end in mutual consultation adopted the same line. Their intervention was restricted to giving Indonesia well-meant advice not to use violence, which as a rule the Indonesians accepted as something matter of course. This was the case, for instance, when Menzies tackled Minister Subandrio on the subject in the course of the latter's visit to Australia in January 1959. As we saw above, this resulted in a joint communiqué in which Indonesia ruled out the use of force as

a means of settling the difference about New Guinea with the Netherlands, while Australia stated that it had no objection to any attempt by Indonesia to secure this region via peaceful negotiations with the Netherlands. Whereas the latter may not have sounded too pleasant to Dutch ears, Subandrio could not have expressed himself more unequivocally on the point of the use of force. Nevertheless, there were constant rumours to the contrary outside diplomatic circles, while the three Anglo-Saxon countries showed themselves not insensitive to Dutch reports that a large-scale attack within a matter of a few months was not beyond the realm of possibility.

In order to gain a better insight into the situation, the American and British governments agreed to consultations of their respective intelligence services with the Dutch, in which the British would also act on behalf of the Australians. A top-secret meeting was held in London in January 1959, at which the American, British and Dutch intelligence services arrived at more or less the same conclusion. A large-scale attack was not to be expected in the immediate future, but smaller-scale operations involving around a thousand troops were quite conceivable and capable of being executed. The objective in both cases would be to provoke Dutch counter-operations, so that the New Guinea issue might be dealt with in the United Nations.[128]

These matters came up for discussion at a number of meetings of the Dutch interim Cabinet in January 1959, in which ex-Prime Minister and High Commissioner Beel was once again free to devote himself to overseas affairs in his capacity as interim prime minister. The deliberations bore an undertone of gloom. With the unexpected outbreak of the rebellion in Congo and the consequent Belgian evacuation of the area, the international decolonization process had gained new momentum. Beel evinced great annoyance at the lack of any sense of responsibility on the part of the new Congolese leaders, as well as at the light-hearted attitude with which the British and Americans approached this kind of affair. Reports from Washington gave rise to the assumption that the Americans would want to restrict their responsibility with regard to New Guinea to efforts to keep Indonesia from launching an attack. Hence it was to be feared that in the event of an actual attack on the area, there would be no effective support for the Netherlands at all.[129]

Amid all these speculations and uncertainties, it was important to subject the basis of the defences to close scrutiny. The new minister of defence, Staf, was inclined in principle to stick to the view, earlier adopted by the Drees government, that the Dutch could only conduct an 'all-out war' in defence of New Guinea with direct support from the United States and Australia. He formulated this in writing in a memorandum to the council of ministers of 15 January.

Staf here briefly outlined the uncertainties of the moment. He underscored the importance of help from the allies, combined with Dutch reluctance to build up in peacetime a national war potential in New Guinea that was far in excess of what was available at that moment. He further defended the existing practice of having a few companies of marines on permanent stand-by in the Netherlands, ready to be flown to New Guinea within a matter of a few days if necessary, to be followed by larger naval units kept in special readiness. Even so, the Netherlands had to accept the possibility that it would have to go further than this into account. The Committee of Joint Chiefs of Staff had been busy for a few months calculating the resources required on purely military grounds, hence independently of any NATO ceilings or considerations. It had assessed the strength of the troops needed at 6,000, which would enable a defence operation of up to sixty days. This was the time needed to deliver further reinforcements from the Netherlands, so that this country would be able to go it alone after that as well. As this document was in direct contradiction with the policy pursued so far, it had not been submitted to the council of ministers before. Under the circumstances prevailing at that moment, however, Staf felt that it had to be put on the table at last.[130]

In that same month of January 1959, Governor Platteel was present in the Netherlands. He had drawn up a memorandum outlining the expected consequences of such a possible attack for New Guinea. These were dire. As matters stood, Indonesian troops would be able without much difficulty to land wherever they wanted, even at the virtually unguarded airfield of Hollandia. Then panic would break out among the Indies Dutch, while the Papuans at best would flee into the bush, but in the worst case—which, unfortunately, was equally likely—would turn, looting and murdering, against the European group, deprived of all weapons or other means of self-defence as it was. There was no reason at all to expect that the Congolese model would not apply here. Platteel therefore argued in favour of quick measures. Sufficient weapons had to be supplied forthwith to tide the people here over the dangerous interval between the first assault and the arrival of help from the allies. To this end, more troops were needed to protect Dutch society, to keep the Papuans in their place and at work, and to foil air landings. Furthermore, a number of modern fighter jets might perform miracles. They could cut off the Indonesian advance guard by bombing the few available airfields. This was not only essential militarily, but also important for morale. In addition, the Papuan battalion would have to be resurrected. Even if its military value was not all that great, it was necessary as a politico-psychological measure, as it might help transform existing anti-Indonesian feeling into a positive national consciousness.[131]

Both reports were discussed at a number of meetings of the *Algemene Verdedigingsraad* (General Defence Council). The final round of discussions took place at the meeting of the council of ministers of 27 February 1959. Here Ministers Staf and Luns opposed the extensive reinforcements requested by the *Comité van Verenigde Chefs van Staven.* Luns took the extremely bold position that, since his consultations in Washington and London, he could count on immediate support from America, Britain and Australia. If this were not forthcoming, then it would be impossible to keep up the defence. The implication of course was that in that case the Dutch need not even take the trouble to prepare for this, but no one dared go as far as that. As a result, a fairly vague debate took place on the question of what exactly one needed to defend oneself against, and what was the difference between infiltration and warfare. In the end a compromise was reached whereby it was decided that the Netherlands needed to be able to eliminate an infiltrating force of 1,000. In addition it should make a start with the construction of suitable airfields for the reception of fighter jets.[132]

Further decisions were put off until the accession of the next cabinet, while it also seemed advisable to await Washington's reaction. In February 1959, Minister Staf asked permission for the purchase of four transport planes (C-47s) to replace a number of unreliable American flying boats (Martin Mariners). Although planes of this type formed part of the equipment of the armed forces in the Netherlands, they had been supplied for NATO purposes, so that the State Department's permission was required for their sale. It was a year before the necessary permit was received, however. From American sources it is apparent that the Joint Chiefs of Staff in Washington were devoting themselves wholeheartedly to their project of co-operation with the Indonesian military, and therefore had doubts about the supply of military equipment to the Netherlands outside the framework of NATO. The American military officials were having difficulty with the consideration, put forward by Subandrio, that such a sale would create a curious impression, since Indonesia had insisted it was not contemplating the use of force. As was to be expected, Jones, too, opposed this sale to the Netherlands with conviction, while the State Department was not sure what to do. Hence no straightforward reply was received for the time being, though reports came trickling in at the departments in The Hague from the American embassy in that city that things were not as simple as they looked. After much talk to and fro, the deal was finally clinched a year later, in February 1960.[133]

While this matter was dragging on, in the Netherlands Professor J.E. de Quay's Cabinet took office. Although the election results had not indicated any significant swings, the PvdA had now been relegated to the opposition, being replaced

in government by the liberal VVD. The latter furnished the minister of defence, from September 1959 on S.H. Visser, while the KVP politician P.S.J. de Jong fulfilled the function of deputy minister for the navy. After this Cabinet had been in office for a few months, the *Departement voor Zaken Overzee* was closed down, its tasks being transferred to the department of the interior, headed by Minister E.H. Toxopeus (VVD), where the former East Indies official and KVP member Th. Bot was put in charge of these. The foreign affairs portfolio remained in Luns' hands, assisted by Deputy Minister H.R. van Houten.

During the Cabinet formation, it had been agreed that policy with regard to Indonesia would remain unchanged.[134] This was reflected in, among other things, Luns' staying on. In spite of the far from encouraging reports from Washington, he persisted in his positive outlook, regularly assuring his colleagues that the allies would be sure to come to the Netherlands' aid as soon as help was needed.[135] He had a little more justification in saying so after an interview with Herter on 29 September 1959, in which the latter without further ado confirmed Dulles' undertakings, as formulated in black and white in the written statement of 7 October 1958. To the question whether the support promised here also included logistic assistance, the American gave an evasive reply, however. On the other hand, he did not make any statement denying Luns' impression, expressed after the interview, that this promise, too, remained in place, be it with an American qualification on the point of the necessary planning.[136] At the end of this interview, Luns talked to American Undersecretary Merchant, to whom he expressed his satisfaction at the fact that Herter had confirmed both undertakings, hence also that of logistic support. When Merchant did not react to this, Luns once again drew the conclusion that this was, in fact, the case. Luns still being in the United States at that time, Van Houten on 2 October passed the latter's rather strained argument on to the council of ministers, which, as far as can be inferred from the minutes, took no umbrage at it. On the contrary, the minutes seem to suggest that Minister Visser took renewed courage from it.[137]

Looking back on the affair, the conclusion must be that the most Luns could have said on the basis of his interview with Herter was that the political deterrent was definitely there, but that he could not make out if it had military significance as well. Of course the question is if the conclusions he drew here were a matter of blind faith or of tactics. Luns himself stated after the event that it was the latter.[138] No doubt there is an element of truth in this. By publicly casting doubt on the worth of their undertakings, Luns would have a priori absolved the Americans from any promise at at all. In the degree to which he left his colleagues in the dark about the import of this, however, he was shouldering a heavy responsibility. On the basis of Van Houten's report, on the other hand,

one can conclude that the council of ministers here again was kept accurately informed of the state of affairs. On a few occasions Luns himself questioned the worth of the American promises. To the extent that there was any question of self-deceit, this applied to the Cabinet as a whole. Under De Quay, too, New Guinea remained a subject of Cabinet policy, which, all doubts notwithstanding, in the final analysis was endorsed by all the ministers.

A reflection of these doubts can be observed in the position taken by the new minister of defence, Visser, who took a considerably gloomier view of the affair than his counterpart at foreign affairs. He not only questioned whether help from the allies would really be forthcoming, but also expressed the view that, even if it were, fending off the first thrust would still require substantially more extensive means than were currently present on the island. He was not prepared to make such means available, either, considering Dutch commitments in Europe. This actually brought him to the same standpoint as foreign affairs, namely that the defence of New Guinea could only be realized in an international context. Although the voices of the departments of war and of foreign affairs carried a great deal of weight, there was a third party to be reckoned with as well, finally. This was Deputy Minister Bot, who, having direct responsibility for the administration of New Guinea, also had a stake in the matter and did not fail to make this clear. At the request of the council of ministers, he had a memorandum drawn up in his department, which was submitted to its chairman on 5 January 1960. His intention was that it be discussed in the council of ministers after his return from a visit to New Guinea in the first week of March.[139]

In this document, as well as in the subsequent discussions, Bot took the position that, though the 'deterrent' requested of the Americans was definitely there, it would only become real if the Dutch also did something themselves. His involvement was different from that of his two colleagues, and certainly was more intensive. Under his leadership, Dutch policy now was directed at an energetic scheme for the development of the Papuan people. For the realization of these plans, an adequate Dutch defence was a precondition. Fending off the first thrust in any case was necessary, as far as he was concerned, to gain time till the arrival of reinforcements from the Netherlands. If support from the allies was forthcoming, then well and good, but if it was not, the Dutch should not be left empty-handed.

Bot had less faith in allied help than his colleague Luns, and found the chairman of the Committee of Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral of the Fleet H.H.L. Pröpper, on his side. Both pleaded in favour of more reinforcements. Where this would put some pressure on the Netherlands' NATO commitments, the council now for the first time seriously considered downsizing these to some

extent. For Luns this provided an interesting opportunity of exerting pressure on the Americans, who would not be happy to see their valued ally the Netherlands scale back its NATO contributions, in precisely the period when the cold war was approaching its climax with the Berlin crisis. He invariably brought this possibility up with some relish in his discussions with American diplomats. Although this poker game was right up his street, for the weak Prime Minister Jan de Quay it made selection from the rich assortment of unattractive options extremely difficult.

All the stress and anxiety over this problem notwithstanding, the obvious impasse in which the Netherlands threatened to land forced the Cabinet to take some decisive action at last. In March/April 1960, agreement was finally reached about the size of a force capable of checking an Indonesian advance guard of one to two thousand men until the arrival of reinforcements. In view of the considerably strengthened potential of the Indonesians, a substantial Dutch reinforcement would be necessary for this. According to the latest prognoses, as a first priority twenty four fighter jets were needed for the army, supplemented where necessary with fifteen Neptune reconnaissance planes, a number of landing craft, and a variety of auxiliary weapons and facilities. In accordance with good old Dutch tradition, the penny-pinching Visser eventually agreed to this after the scrapping of eighteen helicopters owing to technical uncertainties and a substantial reduction in the number of transport planes. If all of the twelve Dakotas requested were to be transferred to New Guinea, there would not be a single one left for the army in the Netherlands. These reinforcements came on top of the ships and marines already present in New Guinea. In addition the command structure was adapted to the presence of army and air force units. The command of the navy was vested in the *commandant zeemacht Nederlands-Nieuw-Guinea* (Commander Netherlands New Guinea navy), Rear Admiral G.J. Platerink. As *commandant van de strijdkrachten in Nederlands-Nieuw-Guinea* (Commander of the Armed Forces in Netherlands New Guinea), abbreviated to COSTRING, he was now commander of the air force and the *Koninklijke Landmacht* infantry battalion as well.[140] All these measures taken together made for a sizeable reinforcement of the Dutch defences in the long run. The total troop strength was to be brought up to around 10,000 by mid-1962. Any decision regarding their deployment lay with the governor in the first instance, who, as in the former East Indies, was supreme commander of the armed forces stationed in the area of his jurisdiction.

This process of building up the defences took time. At the beginning of 1960 the disparity between Dutch and Indonesian military resources in the surroundings of New Guinea was considerable, also according to the American

intelligence services. As a temporary measure to bridge the gap, and also to show their teeth in the meanwhile, the Dutch decided on 25 March of that year to send the showpiece of their navy, the aircraft carrier *Karel Doorman*, to New Guinea with an accompanying escort.[141] They would be able to take advantage of this opportunity at the same time to send a number of Hunter fighter jets and other equipment which was ready for dispatch. The dispatch of this ship had been suggested before by Luns, who since his days as a naval conscript had had a weak spot for the navy. It was in itself a sensible idea, providing the fastest and cheapest means of sending a potential worth mentioning to New Guinea and straightaway tipping the balance of power there in favour of the Netherlands. Hence resolute action was indeed undertaken. The ship, accompanied by the submarine chasers *Groningen* and *Limburg* (Squadron V), set out from Rotterdam for the Far East and Netherlands New Guinea, 'to show the flag', on 31 May 1960.

There were also a number of objections to this showing of the flag, however. The departure of the ships took place amid loud protests from the Indonesian government, which had already let it be known on 4 April that it condemned the dispatch of this squadron, as it posed a threat to Indonesia's safety. In this it was supported by the American embassy in Jakarta, which anxiously reported to Washington that the force now departing for Indonesia was by no means a negligible one and would throw the balance of power there totally out of kilter. Hence it was understandable that the Indonesians were worried about it.[142] As though to underscore this, Sukarno announced in his usual 17 August speech that diplomatic relations with the Netherlands would be broken off, whereby the last line of communication between the two countries would be severed.[143]

This was an unmistakeable indication that the journey of the *Karel Doorman* would carry political risks, a circumstance the Dutch took as much as possible into account. The route followed was that around the Cape of Good Hope, in order to avoid problems near the Suez Canal. The expedition was accompanied by an oil tanker, which would supply it with fuel independently of outside help. The plan was to sail to the port of Fremantle, on the west coast of Australia, via various ports of call along the route. After a stay of a few months in New Guinea, the ships would sail on to Japan for a fleet visit in the context of the celebration of the 350th anniversary of Dutch-Japanese relations. After that, they would return to their base in Den Helder via New Guinea, Australia and South America.

The journey proceeded less smoothly than anticipated. A planned visit to Madagascar had to be called off as the government of that country was apprehensive about it. Then the arrival in Fremantle was reminiscent of the early years of the Dutch-Indonesian conflict, as the stevedores' union refused to give

tugboat assistance in berthing the ship. The crew thereupon managed without such aid by placing a number of aircraft with running engines on deck to provide lateral thrust to help manoeuvre it. This caused a sensation not only among the Dutch, but also in the greater part of the Australian press, though the incident did give food for thought. To avoid a repetition of this kind of unpleasant experience, the squadron subsequently sailed around the south of Australia to Hollandia, where it arrived on 1 August. In Biak, the fighter jets ordered for New Guinea were delivered. The next port of call was Manokwari. All these proceedings were of course accompanied by a range of social activities, from boating trips for the local citizenry to fly-pasts. The presence of the squadron helped boost morale among the local Dutch, who had lately come to feel quite isolated on their remote island. The show of strength also boosted the Papuans' confidence in Dutch capability. With such huge ships at one's disposal, surely one did not need to be afraid of the *amberi*, who had never been seen to appear off the coast with anything more than a *proa*, or at most a sailing schooner.

The carefree days of the *Karel Doorman*'s stay in New Guinea were soon followed by harsh political realities. On 1 September 1960 the fleet set sail in a northerly direction, but in Japan the signals were already on red. The immediate cause of this were the actions in Jakarta, which had spread to the trade unions in Yokohama, where the wharf labourers' union announced that it would use force to prevent the ships from mooring. At the same time, the Indonesians protested to the Japanese government, putting it in a difficult predicament. Withdrawal of permission once granted was extremely unusual, but that is nevertheless what happened. The Japanese first came up with a proposal for the fleet to call at Japanese ports on condition that it did not return home via New Guinea, hoping that this might ease Indonesian pain somewhat. The Dutch government reluctantly agreed to this condition, but as it turned out, this was not enough. Indonesia put more pressure to bear on the Japanese government, after which Tokyo requested the Dutch government to call off the visit altogether. When the latter refused this, the Japanese government took the initiative to cancel the visit itself. It was an incident that was all the more painful, and probably not just for the Dutch, in view of the recent history of Japanese-Dutch relations. The squadron thereupon sailed home via New Guinea and Cape Horn, calling at ports in New Caledonia, Australia, New Zealand, Chili and Brazil on the way. It arrived in Rotterdam on 20 December.

For the navy, the whole thing had been a useful exercise, and for the inhabitants of New Guinea it had been something to pep them up. The fast delivery of the fighter jets had been an added bonus. One sympathizes with the naval historians Bastiaans, De Regt and Holst Pellekaan, however, where they wonder if a slightly less spectacular reinforcement might not have been better.[144]

Chapter 8

The Turning Tide in The Hague and Washington

The crumbling home front

As we saw in the previous chapter, the American President Eisenhower found it difficult to believe that the Netherlands was really serious about its New Guinea policy. He was definitely not the only American politician to feel this way. This was not without danger. If the Americans had good reason to doubt Dutch commitment to New Guinea, this might serve to justify any reluctance on their part, considerable as this was to begin with, to share some of the responsibility. In the discussions between Dutch diplomats in Washington and their American colleagues, the strength of purpose of the Dutch therefore was an important factor. Luns, the most outspoken protagonist of a rigid policy, showed himself to be aware of this. A solid home front spelt a stronger international position for him. For a long time he had no reason for complaint about this, as the policy favoured by the successive Drees governments in the 1950s could count on broad political support. After the hesitations of the status-quo year, government policy finally found itself on course. This policy was clearly outlined in the government policy statement of 1952, in which the Netherlands pledged itself to honour the future decision of the Papuans. It was subsequently confirmed on a number of occasions. The strongest manifestation of this was at the Geneva conference, where the Dutch refused point-blank to discuss the status of New Guinea any further with the Indonesians. This standpoint was supported by the council of ministers, in which there was virtually total consensus. The PvdA (labour party) ministers, too, as a rule followed the course decided on by Drees without too much grumbling, as did parliament. After Van der

Goes van Naters' resignation, Jacques de Kadt had become his party's principal spokesman on overseas affairs in the Second Chamber. He had some Dutch East Indies experience, as a man of Jewish extraction having sought and found refuge, together with his parents, in then Batavia in 1940. Although certainly not a colonial in spirit, the alternative of the Sukarno state had no attraction for him either. The cold war was his chief priority, and in this connection Sukarno definitely was not a safe bet, in his opinion. Disappointment with the state of affairs in Indonesia was the predominant sentiment within the party. It was reinforced by the observations in Indonesia of fellow party member Frans Goedhart and the liberal journalist, Dr. M. Van Blankestein. In the view of both these gentlemen the Indonesian politicians were making a mess of things and Sukarno was unnecessarily inciting the people against the Dutch.[1] Similar observations were made by De Kadt after the UN meetings of 1954 and following years. His attitude towards Indonesia provided Luns with the most convincing proof vis-à-vis his foreign colleagues that his policies met with broad support at home.

A touchstone of this was the debate about the place of New Guinea in the Dutch constitution. Though it had started in 1952, the issue did not become a major topic of discussion till 1956. The Indonesians made very heavy weather of the matter and regarded it as an illegal act, but the PvdA sided with the government in arguing that the region after all did form part of the legal community of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, and mention of the territory in article 1 of the constitution was therefore desirable.[2] The press, too, in the main toed the government line. It was kept in line by the regular consultations between the parliamentary party leaders and editors in chief of the major papers, although neither party had a really deep-seated desire to call official policy into question to begin with. As of 1952 it was clear that there was no majority to be found in the Netherlands, come what may, for any policy that might culminate in an agreement with Indonesia. Though one might argue that under these circumstances there was not much point in having any discussion at all, at the same time the facts lead one to infer that evidently there was no great need for an alternative. The policy of putting the issue 'on ice', as it was described at the time, was not only made inevitable by circumstances, but also was desired by a broad section of the population. In spite of the negative effects of this policy on the relationship with Indonesia, New Guinea was not an important issue in domestic politics, which were focused much more on socio-economic problems. Except for the *Communistische Partij Nederland* (CPN; Communist Party of the Netherlands), there was more or less consensus among the political parties as regards New Guinea. In the run-up to the 1956 elections, for instance, there was hardly any discussion on this subject. But then, there was nothing to

choose from, according to the Dutch linguist A. Teeuw in his pamphlet entitled *Het conflict met Indonesië als spiegel voor Nederland* (The conflict with Indonesia as a mirror for the Netherlands), which appeared in that same year. This author further observed that the people were 'resentfully unanimous'.[3]

This observation appears plausible to anyone examining developments in parliament or the press. Even so, this united front began to show the first cracks in that same year as a consequence of the dramatic events in Indonesia and the mounting military threat. Criticism of government policy trickled down via various groups with interests in Indonesia. Dutch policy had invariably been followed with suspicion by both the High Commission staff and Dutch citizens in Indonesia. The strength of purpose with regard to New Guinea in The Hague posed a direct threat to the interests of these groups. As we saw above, the Business Council, consisting of leading Dutch entrepreneurs in Indonesia, had openly declared itself against this policy from the beginning, in 1950. This did not change later. Eventually, however, an informal group, the core of which was formed by representatives of Unilever and KLM, Paul Rijkens and Emile van Konijnenburg respectively, became the main mouthpiece for anti-government criticism. After 1954 they initiated some sort of political action, though in the beginning this was restricted to informal private contacts. They found a forum in the so-called Bilderberg group, an informal organization of prominent persons in international business and government headed by Prince Bernhard. This group was important partly because of the fact that its annual conferences were regularly attended by top officials from the American State Department. No doubt American scepticism about Dutch policy in this department sprang to some extent from the discussions held here. It is typical of the Dutch situation in that period that these entrepreneurs were hardly able to get a foot in the door of Dutch politics as a result of the fairly rigid separation between the top political and social echelons of society.[4]

A similar phenomenon was observable in church circles. The denominational political parties constituted the buttresses of government policy. In the early 1950s they were personified in Romme (of the Roman Catholic KVP), Schouten (of the Protestant ARP), and Tilanus (of the likewise Protestant CHU). The strongest ideological foundations for government policies were provided by the Protestant parties, which were able to appeal to their doctrine of the independent right of the government and the historical right of the Netherlands to a place overseas. Yet all was not well here. Missionary workers in New Guinea, led by Kijne and Kamma, after the events of 1950 had given up all hope of a compromise with Indonesia. Instead, they now fully endorsed Dutch government policy, which they regarded as offering the best chances of development for the Papuan people. As opposed to them, the co-ordinating

body of the mission of the Dutch Reformed Church, the *Raad voor de Zending* (Missionary Council), of which G.P.H. Locher was secretary for Indonesia from 1954 onward, did not do so. It regularly received complaints from mission posts in Indonesia about the increasing pressure Dutch New Guinea policy was placing on the work of the mission there.[5] This gave the council some cause for concern, the more so as this policy was having an inhibitive effect on relations with the Indonesian central church, in which Leimena, among others, played a prominent role. As a result, the standpoints of mission workers in New Guinea and those in Indonesia were diametrically opposed.

Locher's policies were aimed at the development of Protestantism in the central parts of Indonesia on the rim of the Java Sea. From this perspective also there was greater understanding for the Indonesian position. In close connection with this, the senior members of the council were well aware of the isolated position in which the Netherlands was finding itself. They realized that the chances of the Netherlands being able to round off its work in New Guinea at its own discretion were slim. The international law scholar F.M. van Asbeck, the government official C.L. Patijn, and the above-mentioned linguist A. Teeuw broadly speaking belonged to this circle. The debate conducted here went public in 1955 with the appearance of an article by E. Jansen Schoonhoven in the December issue of the monthly journal *Wending*.[6] Partly under the impact of the failure of the Geneva conference and subsequent events, the Missionary Council thereupon prepared a pastoral letter, which it published in a revised version with the synod of the Dutch Reformed Church on 22 July 1956. It did so as an 'Appeal (*Oproep*) for reflection on the responsibility of the Dutch people with regard to the problems concerning New Guinea'. The gist of this rather long-winded, unctuous piece of writing was that the synod considered Dutch policies with respect to New Guinea irresolute and contestable. In harmony with the current spirit of international discourse, it sharply condemned former colonial policy. This led to a recommendation for serious reflection on the wisdom of Dutch New Guinea policy. In a clarification, it attributed Dutch unwillingness to engage in open dialogue to fear of a revival of the emotions stirred up by the conflict of the years 1945–1950, which allegedly had been more or less laid to rest by clinging to New Guinea.

The psychological merits of this explanation aside, this appeal was patently a slap in the face for many people. It did not fail to provoke fierce reactions, in fact, with both the liberal and the denominational press turning against the synod. Furious reactions were received from New Guinea as well, where the small Papuan elite, the local Dutch nationals, and in particular the mission workers, felt as though they had been stabbed in the back. Reactions were negative across virtually the entire spectrum.[7] An interesting detail here was

that two prominent officials of the department of foreign affairs, J. Rookmaker and G.W. Maas Geesteranus, declared their support for the article.[8]

Together with this message from Oegstgeest, the work of the journalist Willem Oltmans made another ripple in the pond of Dutch politics. Oltmans had had a first meeting with President Sukarno during the latter's visit to Rome in June 1956, and had been charmed by the latter's personality. Sukarno had treated him courteously and included him in his group of followers. He had expressed his regrets at the bad state of relations between the Netherlands and Indonesia to Oltmans, but had added that the road to a resumption of friendly relations would not be opened till the West Irian issue was resolved. It was not the first or the last time Sukarno had approached a Dutch journalist in this way, but in Oltmans' case his message fell on exceptionally fertile ground. In the following weeks, the latter accompanied Sukarno on his tour of Europe and got to know him and his close associates better.[9]

In the following years Oltmans became a tireless propagator of Sukarno's message. His first public manifestation was with a series of articles in the weekly journal *Elsevier*, which appeared at the same time as the *Oproep* of the *Hervormde Synode*.[10] These depicted Sukarno as a congenial statesman eager for an agreement with the Netherlands. This set the tone for another series of articles over the next few years, most of which only the weekly magazine *Vrij Nederland* offered to place. In the Netherlands, Oltmans received support from Rijkens and associates. With his wide circle of connections and his tenacity, he proved to be an effective lobbyist. The series of lectures he gave in the United States from 1959 on were exceptionally well received there, while he also managed to establish valuable contacts at the State Department. In the world of Dutch journalism, however, his unorthodox behaviour made him more enemies than friends. Here people felt uncomfortable with both his message and his double role as a lobbyist and a journalist. Such a role might be appropriate for the editor in chief of a newspaper with a basis in a political party, but not for a politician without any party.

The *Oproep* and Oltmans' first publications appeared almost simultaneously in July 1956. This was at a critical moment, a few months after Indonesia's unilateral revocation of the RTC agreements. In addition, both events coincided with the Dutch elections for the Second Chamber and the subsequent formation of a new cabinet. In Oltmans' case, there is no reason to suppose that he had written his *Elsevier* articles especially with an eye to this. This may also have been true of the synod's *Oproep*; in any case, evidence for a contrived coincidence is lacking. In practice, both publications immediately provoked heated debates in the media, though they had little immediate political effect.

This became very obvious in January 1957 when Oltmans tried to organize a petition to the States General, urging for a change of policy, among Dutch nationals in Indonesia. The text was drawn up, at his request, by the linguist P.N. Drost, who was affiliated with the Universitas Indonesia in Jakarta at the time. Oltmans, in his optimism, had 500 copies of it stencilled, but in the end received back no more than eighteen signed copies. These reactions had been sent in by Dutch academics in Jakarta, including some of the most prominent ones, such as the philosopher R.F. Beerling. Members of the business world shied away, possibly from lack of confidence in the person of the activist, though it is equally probable that they were afraid of getting their fingers burnt with a Dutch government that could be exceptionally prickly on this point. A repetition of this phenomenon occurred six months later, when Oltmans tried to persuade a number of businessmen in the Netherlands sympathizing with Rijkens to take more public action. Towards this end he arranged a meeting in hotel De Witte Brug in The Hague. Though the discussions here were lively enough, they did not culminate in any kind of action.[11] The same factors that had led the Dutch in Jakarta to hold back were at work here. There was no such thing as an organized course of action. What did happen was that a few Royal Dutch Shell executives paid a visit to Luns in November of that year to try and persuade him to be a little more accommodating with Sukarno. According to the account of this visit given to the council of ministers, they did so at the insistence of Oltmans, described here as 'a journalist in the service of the Indonesian government'. They might have saved themselves the trouble, as their pleas had not the least effect. Luns placed the blame for the bad relations squarely on Sukarno, while to his colleagues he expressed his regret that Oltmans' recommendations had had so much influence on the oil barons as to stir them into action. His colleague Hofstra of the department of finance agreed wholeheartedly and raised the question, evidently not intended rhetorically, of whether there were no penalties for this.[12] Similar contacts of business representatives with Prime Minister Drees were no more successful. All in all, neither Oltmans nor his sympathizers could count on government sympathy. Though that is not to say that his actions had no effect at all. In his long campaign, in which he persevered over many years, he managed invariably to give the Indonesian opponents a human face vis-à-vis the Dutch public, which eventually facilitated a rapprochement.

Obviously the *Oproep* carried more weight socially, and therefore was of much greater importance politically, than the actions of the lone journalist. The Dutch Reformed Church, with which a considerable proportion of the Dutch population felt a bond one way or another, possessed great moral authority, which could not be simply ignored.[13] The misgivings formulated in

the *Oproep* attracted attention from many sections of society, but obviously the most from the Protestant parties ARP and CHU, where up to then colonial conservatism had been predominant. The first reaction was one of pique at the pretensions of the church, which had thus encroached on political territory. According to H. van Andel, in the very first issue of the ARP party organ, *Anti-Revolutionnaire Staatkunde* (Anti-revolutionary politics), to appear after publication of the *Oproep*, it was 'an extremely subjective piece of writing, objectionable in its omissions and unproven pretensions, consistent only in a single bias', squeezed in between two pious outpourings.[14] It was a view shared by the editor of the daily paper *Trouw*, J.A.H.J.S. Bruins Slot, who also was an important figure in the party. On the other hand, the *Oproep* did meet with sympathy from the chairman of the ARP, W.O. Berghuis, who disapproved of the tendency consistently shown by his predecessor to interpret the concept of sovereignty in absolutist terms. The *Oproep* also found supporters among members of the more strictly Calvinist *Gereformeerde Kerken* (Reformed Churches), and not only among mission personages like Dr. J. Verkuyl, the representative of the Calvinist mission in Jakarta, but also among a number of professors of the Free University in Amsterdam. Within this circle of Calvinist comrades, it provoked a discussion about Dutch New Guinea policies for the first time ever.[15] A similar development took place outside this circle. It culminated in, among other things, the presentation on 1 December 1956 of a petition calling for reflection on the government's New Guinea policy, drawn up by a commission headed by Professor G.C. Heringa of the Municipal University of Amsterdam, to the leaders of the major political parties.[16]

The *Oproep* was not only aimed at a reconsideration of the moral justification of the New Guinea policies pursued by the Netherlands thus far, but also contained a suggestion as to the direction which the discussion should take in future. This was encapsulated in the phrase that the Netherlands should be prepared to give up its claims that it alone had the right to decide New Guinea's future—an unmistakeable hint in the direction of internationalization. Other suggestions to this effect were contained in the report of an ecclesiastical study committee published in May 1956, hence shortly before the appearance of the *Oproep*.[17] Most outspoken on the subject was the Leiden international law expert Van Asbeck. In the summer issue of *Wending* he pleaded unequivocally in favour of a United Nations trusteeship, whereby the Netherlands would be charged with the administration of the territory.[18]

The direct impact of the well-meant advice from the synod and Oltmans on Dutch politics was limited. It was clear that the Cabinet turned up its nose at the recommendations of the journalist, while out of courtesy it refrained from comment on the synod's *Oproep*. This was true of both the second Drees

Cabinet, which resigned in June 1956, and the third, which came into office on 13 October with a programme that was unchanged as far as New Guinea was concerned. Only in both houses of parliament were faint echoes of the non-parliamentary criticism to be heard. Already in the period when the *Oproep* was still in the incubation stage, in May 1956, the *christen-socialist* Schermerhorn had pleaded in favour of a more flexible policy with regard to Indonesia in the First Chamber, backed by the other members of his party here.[19] Then total silence had ensued on the subject for a long time, with New Guinea hardly being mentioned in the debates during the Cabinet formation.[20] Although the leader of the Anti-Revolutionary party, Zijlstra, had stipulated a number of conditions for government participation on this point, these only concerned practical and administrative questions. In February 1957, after this third Drees Cabinet had been in office for four months, the leader of the labour party in the Second Chamber, J.A.W. Burger, in the footsteps of Van Asbeck made a plea for the introduction of a trusteeship, though this did not prompt any subsequent political steps. His proposal was swept under the carpet by his fellow party member Drees, referring to patent Indonesian unwillingness to co-operate in this.[21]

Almost a year later, in January 1958, another labour party member, J. in 't Veld, submitted a question in the First Chamber urging the government to enter into negotiations with Indonesia. A few of his colleagues embroidered further on this theme, but this had no political effect whatsoever.[22] Dead silence now ensued on the New Guinea front in the Second Chamber until July 1958. Yet that month the labour party's advisory body, the Wiardi Beckman Foundation, issued a report questioning the government's 'immobilism'. In practical politics this was attended by a few demonstrations of repugnance by that party's members in the Second Chamber during the debates on a bill providing for the dispatch of conscripts to New Guinea. As observed here, this led to a substantial delay in the introduction of this measure.[23]

A more frontal approach followed in the course of the general political debates on 30 September 1958, when Burger tabled a motion urging the government to gather information 'concerning the views of friendly powers, those in the Far East and the Pacific as well as those possessing interests in these regions, on what form of administration is deemed to be in the best interests of New Guinea and the future development of that part of the world'. In hindsight, this was a fairly innocent question, certainly in view of the consultations with Australia and the United States then in progress, which to a large extent met Burger's wishes. Nevertheless, the formulation of the motion offered more latitude than the government considered desirable, so that it advised against its acceptance. And so defeated it was. This gave Romme an excellent opportunity

to lash out at his socialist allies once again. He considered it unacceptable to treat a part of the kingdom this way. One might as well place a sign saying 'For sale, for rent, for hire, or to be given away. Apply to J. Burger, Wassenaar, Holland' in the south-western tip of the island.[24]

All in all, this creates an impression of a weak opposition, clearly suggesting that the government had free play in both houses of parliament. At most one could say that Burger's actions were a sign that the labour party at last was stirred into action, partly under the impact of the synod's appeal and Oltman's publications. Our conclusion may be that by mid-1956 the seeds of doubt had been sown among a broader section of the population, but that this had virtually no reverberations in parliament in the short term and had no effect at all on the Cabinet's stance. The tone of internal cabinet discussions was more acerbic than before, it is true, but for the time being few signs of this were noticeable to the outside world. Drees was in firm control in this cabinet as well.

De Quay takes office

By 11 December 1958 Drees had played out his role on the political stage. This was a result not of the New Guinea issue, but of an impasse in the debates on budgetary policy. The Drees Cabinet was succeeded by an interim cabinet headed by Van Beel, which as far as New Guinea was concerned restricted itself to a few measures on defence that had meanwhile become essential. After subsequent elections, the KVP member J. de Quay was installed as prime minister, leading an alliance of the VVD and the three major Christian parties. The days of the Socialist-Catholic coalitions that had dominated post-war politics thus came to an end. The immediate consequence of this was that the Labour party, as an opposition party, now had more latitude to distance itself from government policy. According to J. Zijlstra, who had become a minister in the new cabinet again, the New Guinea issue now in effect was 'no longer in cold storage'.[25] This observation is incorrect to the extent that it suggests that the PvdA immediately adopted a new stance. It is true, however, in the sense that a number of drastic developments that made discussion essential took place in the course of the new cabinet period. Naturally it was easier for the PvdA to focus on these as a party in opposition than if it had remained in government. Burger stayed on as leader of the parliamentary party, while the MP J.G. Suurhoff also took an active part in the debates on New Guinea policy.

The De Quay government's programme with respect to Indonesia was no different to that of its predecessor—in itself a sign of the high degree of unanimity in Dutch politics on this question. Under these circumstances, Luns was able to stay on as minister of foreign affairs. In the one single interview he had

had with De Quay during the latter's efforts to form a new government, he had assured him that the Netherlands could continue to count on American support. In light of his fairly recent consultations with Dulles, he seemed completely justified in this, and De Quay had taken his word for it.[26] Even so, there was no longer the rapport between Luns and the prime minister that had existed under Drees; in its place had come a rather uneasy alliance. The policy of sticking to the course that had been plotted was defended in the De Quay Cabinet by the prime minister himself, as well as by Minister Luns and his deputy minister, H.R. van Houten, Minister of the Interior E.H. Toxopeus (VVD), and the chiefs of defence, namely Minister S. H. Visser and Deputy Minister P.J.S. de Jong. These were all closely involved in policy with regard to New Guinea in virtue of their respective portfolios. This was certainly also true of the KPV member Th.H. Bot, who joined the government as junior minister in the department of the interior, where he was assigned the duties of the former minister for the colonies. These members of cabinet were confronted more than ever before with a group of sceptics of different Christian persuasions, including Ministers J.M.L.Th. Cals (education), J. Zijlstra (finance) and A.C.W. Beerman (justice).

At the time De Quay acceded to office, things were looking gloomy for the Dutch position in New Guinea. As we saw above, Indonesia's efforts to increase its armaments led to lengthy internal cabinet discussions about strengthening Dutch defences. Even under the Van Beel interim Cabinet, a few marine and infantry companies had been dispatched to New Guinea, while the De Quay Cabinet's immediate resumption of these discussions led to the dispatch of more reinforcements as well as of the *Karel Doorman* in May 1960. The fortunes of this expedition made clear that the international position of the Netherlands was precarious. The uncertainty was exacerbated by the election of a new President of the United States in November 1960—the Democrat John F. Kennedy, whose intentions as regards Southeast Asian policy were anything but clear. Moreover, an important discussion took place in the United Nations General Assembly in that same year, which led to the passing of resolution no. 1514, rejecting colonialism in the most unequivocal terms, in December. It was very much open to question what the consequences of all this would be for the Dutch position in New Guinea. In the midst of these uncertainties and bad omens, it was clear that the Netherlands would have not only to pursue a more energetic decolonization policy, but also to try and rally more international support for this.

Besides Luns, Deputy Minister Bot was the principal driving force behind Dutch New Guinea policy in this period. In 1950 he had been closely involved in the first phases of the conflict with Indonesia as vice-secretary of the RTC.

Walking a tightrope between concern about the fatal consequences of this for relations with Indonesia and the realization that New Guinea would continue to need external help for its further development for a long time to come, he had publicly pleaded in favour of the establishment of an international trusteeship, whereby Indonesia would be one of the states responsible for the government of the territory. This way, a practical division of tasks among the countries possessing any sort of link with or interest in New Guinea might be worked out.[27] Similar ideas were fostered by a number of senior officials in the diplomatic service at the time. As a result of developments at the New Guinea Conference in December 1950, however, these had come to exceed the possibilities of practical politics. Even so, Bot had never given up the idea altogether, as was now to become apparent.

As the last 'minister for the colonies', Bot's first task was to outline an administrative policy for Guinea that would take the currently much more complicated international situation into account. In the process, he was able to link up with prior initiatives to bring about greater autonomy. Not long after his accession, in the first week of 1960, a proposal for a partial revision of the *Bewindsregeling Nederlands-Nieuw-Guinea* (Rules of government for Netherlands New Guinea), which had already been prepared under Minister Helders' supervision, was completed. This basically aimed at the creation of a Papuan representative body, the so-called *Nieuw-Guinea Raad* (New Guinea Council). Initially conceived as an advisory body with very limited powers, this council now was given the form of a parliament for the Papuans. This was intended, as Bot explained in the council of ministers, 'to give educated Papuans like Jouwe a maximum of satisfaction'.[28] The bill passed parliament before the end of the year, and the elections for the new council took place in February 1961. The government now also resolutely set about the formation of a *Papoea Vrijwilligers Corps* (Papuan Volunteer Corps), which had been in the pipeline since 1950. The first units started training in April 1960. In addition, Bot on 26 March submitted a memorandum on development policies. This lengthy document contained proposals for the opening up of areas that were not yet under government rule and for the further development of those that were. The proposed projects would have to be rounded off in the space of ten years. Taken together, the document presented a broad programme for political, social and economic education and development. In aim and intent it was similar to the three-year plans of retired Governor Van Baal, except that it was carried into effect more resolutely and possessed a stronger political component. Its explicit aim was to prepare the Papuans for the exercise of their right of self-determination with due speed. The government did emphatically take the position, however, that mention of a ten-year term did not automatically

imply that New Guinea would in effect be ready for independence by the end of this period.[29]

It should further be noted that the new deputy minister also encroached on Minister Luns' domain. In the course of his period in office he undertook a series of annual official overseas trips, which were not restricted to New Guinea, but also extended to Australia and the United States. On his first journey, which took place in February 1960, he brought the subject of military co-operation up for discussion in both Canberra and Washington. In these discussions he urged the representatives of these countries to admit New Guinea to ANZUS, whereby the territory would be placed under the aegis of the Seventh Fleet.[30] As was to be expected, there was no reaction to this from the Americans, and ANZUS soon disappeared over the horizon again. In Australia it became clear to him that the Menzies government was wary of giving any explicit undertakings for political co-operation. In his memorandum on development of 26 March, introducing his ten-year plan, which was drawn up after his return home, he nevertheless proceeded from the premise that the Netherlands had the right to ask for co-operation from these countries for its developmental task as carried out under article 73[E] of the UN charter. He hoped to promote this by publicly expressing the expectation that both the Australian and the Dutch part of New Guinea would have outgrown the status of non-self-ruling regions at about the same time. In other words, the similarity in circumstances and interests might compel Australia to lend the desired co-operation.[31]

The Dutch plans were submitted to parliament not long thereafter. The effect of this was, in fact, that the Australians felt they were put under pressure. This gave rise to the question as to their own intentions in this respect. It put pressure on internal relations in Canberra, which led to the immediate dismissal of Governor Cleland, who did not like all this brisk action at all. The minister of territories, P. Hasluck, was also far from happy with it. Administrative co-operation remained on the agenda nevertheless, even though the Menzies government after the consultations with the American and Indonesian governments of the past months had slammed the brakes on political co-operation with the Netherlands. Such co-operation came up for discussion during a visit to The Hague by Hasluck in May of that year. Bot and Luns on that occasion made it clear that there were only two options as far as the Netherlands was concerned. Dutch preference was for a developmental model aimed at eventual self-determination for the whole of New Guinea, which, however, could only be realized in close consultation with Australia. If this should be impossible, then the Netherlands would be obliged to speed up the educational process and to strive for a transfer of responsibilities to a small

Papuan elite 'in the more or less short term'. The ministers conceded that this would not be in the interests of either the Papuans or the West. The Netherlands might feel obliged to take such measures, however, if there was no effective, publicly avowed support for its policies with regard to Dutch New Guinea forthcoming. Hasluck listened to all these arguments 'with understanding for the Dutch position' and once again promised to take the matter up with the British and the Americans.[32]

Meanwhile the question remained about what form the international support desired by the Dutch should take. Luns was still hoping for direct support from the American, British and Australian governments. He did not want to hear of any such thing as seeking the help of the United Nations and working towards some sort of trusteeship. He had squarely rejected a proposal to this effect by the MP Patijn as recently as January, arguing that this would be creating the impression that the conflict was only capable of solution by giving in to Indonesia's demands. And that, he said, was 'not what we promised'.[33] As far as Bot was concerned this was not so self-evident at all, however. In these same months he was toying with the idea of still trying something in this direction, in which connection he was thinking in terms of the creation of a 'High development authority', which would supervise the Dutch administration and thus at the same time assume part of the responsibility.

These excursions of Bot's into the domain of international politics were viewed with approval by De Quay. The prime minister had had doubts about the soundness of Luns' views from the beginning, though he had great difficulty in articulating these. De Quay was an insecure man, who felt no match for his foreign minister in situations of direct confrontation. The protagonists of extra-parliamentary action soon won him over to their side. He was in regular contact with Frits Philips and other members of the Rijkens group, who were urging for an accord with Indonesia. De Quay was not insensitive to these appeals, although he kept the people concerned as much as possible at arm's length. Nevertheless, he was unable to ignore their suggestions. In the summer of 1960, when the *Karel Doorman*'s mission showed up the Netherlands' weak international position, he kept turning Bot's ideas concerning some form of international administration over in his mind. The ship's odyssey, after all, provoked negative reactions from Washington and Japan and led to the breaking off of relations with Indonesia on 17 August. The path followed so far seemed almost inevitably to be heading towards war.[34]

In the council of ministers the first signs of a conflict between the respective lines taken by Bot and Luns became apparent in that summer of 1960. The latter warned against taking precipitate steps and argued that efforts to achieve

independence for New Guinea in the short term would not appease Indonesia, but on the contrary, would only antagonize that country more. He continued to pin his hopes on the United States, signs to the contrary, such as the recent refusal of free supplies for the Dutch defences, notwithstanding. In support of his position, he was able to point to a West European Union meeting in June of that year, at which he had heard some encouraging comments from his British and French colleagues, as of old. They had assured him that a common European-American policy was essential. He was further able to draw comfort from an interview with the new American Secretary of State, Herter, who had convinced him that the United States would 'definitely keep an eye on any military threat from Indonesia and take action where necessary'.[35] In reality, Luns did not consider the military danger very great, being of the opinion that, with the reinforcements just sent it, New Guinea would be able to hold its own for a while. He personally preferred for the time being to steer a course between the Scylla of Indonesian obduracy and the Charybdis of Papuan impotence. No doubt a new situation would arise soon enough, in which things would be different altogether. Rumours of Sukarno's ill health or precarious position gave him cause for optimism.

In the council of ministers these observations gave only partial reassurance. The majority of the ministers remained sceptical, and hence some form or other of trusteeship stayed on the agenda. This was promoted by rumours that the prime minister of Malaysia, Tunku Abdul Rahman, was planning to come forward with proposals in this direction. The big question then would be how to keep Indonesia out. These issues were regularly discussed by Bot and De Quay between themselves, while the subject also invariably came up in the prime minister's weekly consultations with Queen Juliana. Here it became clear to him that both the Queen and Prince Bernhard were keen to take the path of internationalization.[36] De Quay privately suggested to Luns that he should sometime try and discuss the possibilities of internationalization with the secretary general of the United Nations, Dag Hammarskjöld. Luns promised to do so, but the prime minister did not get the impression that his minister intended to make any genuine effort in this respect.[37]

De Quay could not dispel the notion from his mind, however. As a result, the fretting prime minister alluded, accidentally or on purpose, to the possibility of internationalization of the administration of New Guinea at a cocktail party for the foreign press on 5 September 1960. This caused a great hullabaloo in the media, but the prime minister was not to be deterred by this. He went into the matter at greater depth at the next few meetings of the council of ministers, where his colleague ministers, too, appeared to have grave doubts about whether the policy pursued thus far would have the desired result.[38] The dis-

cussions at these meetings were opener than usual, which may be attributed to the circumstance that colleague Luns happened to be away in New York at the time. There was no immediate alternative in the offing, however, so that the ministers decided to keep things under their hats for the time being. The prime minister's remarks at the cocktail party accordingly had a disclaimer attached to them and were ascribed to a misunderstanding on the part of the reporters.

In view of the publicity surrounding this cocktail party, it was necessary, obviously, to keep Luns informed of what was going on. The latter's visit to New York was connected with the upcoming discussions in the United Nations General Assembly, where the crème de la crème of international politics were gathered. Luns took advantage of this opportunity to try and put an end to the commotion in The Hague. He actually followed De Quay's suggestions and was able to report back within a few days that he had sounded out Dag Hammarskjöld about a trusteeship of the kind suggested, but that the latter had given him not the least hope of arranging this matter without involving Indonesia. His advice had been that the Netherlands would do well not to bring it up any more at all. Without any doubt this was the reply Luns had wanted.[39] Better still, the minister was able to report that he had met with much sympathy from Nehru and Menon in New York for the idea of a Melanesian federation, of which Dutch New Guinea was to be a member, and that these two statesmen had given Sukarno, likewise present in New York, a good talking-to. Here, according to the minister, they had clearly pointed out the consequences of a potential Indonesian attack on New Guinea to him. Luns had further found out that Subandrio had given Eisenhower to understand that Indonesia would not use violence against New Guinea. Hence the political deterrent seemed to be remarkably effective, Dutch policy was neatly in line with international realities, and the conclusion must be that a trusteeship should not be on the Dutch agenda. Luns proposed, accordingly, that in his forthcoming speech in the General Assembly he should reiterate the Netherlands' good intentions with regard to the Papuans' right of self-determination and let it be known that a United Nations mission to size up the situation on the ground would always be welcome.[40]

This was no doubt reassuring news from an authoritative source, but it failed to put the Dutch prime minister's mind really at ease. Furthermore, disclaimed though the remark at the cocktail party might be, it had not yet been brushed away altogether. To begin with, De Quay was facing a lower-house debate on the subject, which took place on 4 and 5 October. Here, as was to be expected, Burger, who felt deeply aggrieved at the prime minister's coming forward with his brainchild of internationalization after first pooh-poohing it, came down hard on him. In addition, the contradiction between the dispatch of the *Karel Doorman* and the remarks at the cocktail party, whether alleged or true, was

giving the opposition ample scope for hinting at a difference of opinion between Luns and De Quay. The government and the parties supporting it ignored these hints, and closed ranks.[41] But, as in the case of the *Oproep* and Oltmans' publications, echoes of these remarks remained in the air. De Quay had articulated doubts that were harboured in a wider circle. His disclaimers were to no avail, while the word 'internationalization' had become trendy. At the American embassy in The Hague this development was welcomed with approval. The State Department's—rather premature—comment was that Dutch government policy was beginning to show some consistency at last.[42] De Quay himself was still plagued by his old doubts, though after an interview with the editors of the leading daily and weekly Dutch papers on 30 January 1961 he was able to observe that the latter had shown some sympathy for his suggestions, which he had reiterated on that occasion. The wind had turned, as a very satisfied prime minister noted in his intimate diary.[43]

The first steps on the path to internationalization

Minister Luns and the General Assembly of 1960

While these debates were in progress in the Netherlands, Luns in October 1960 was in New York. Here the earlier mentioned anti-colonial resolution 1514, banning colonialism, declaring independence an article of faith, and explicitly dismissing the quality of governance as an argument against, was under discussion. These were not themes that appealed to the minister. Nevertheless, he contributed to the discussion by seeking to accommodate his New Guinea policies as much as possible to the new situation. The Netherlands voted in favour of the resolution, though taking into account the reservations formulated by the British minister Harold Macmillan. Self-government was what Dutch policy was aimed at, but for this to be granted to the territory in question the latter would first have to meet certain conditions. As agreed with De Quay, Luns in the course of his address suggested that, as far as New Guinea was concerned, a UN mission to test the sincerity of Dutch efforts would always be welcome.[44] Though this may not seem spectacular, it was nevertheless a jump in the deep end for the Netherlands, as it might initiate a General Assembly debate from which it would be impossible to exclude Indonesia. Hence it was definitely an opening shot for a new phase in the New Guinea adventure, which is how the Dutch Cabinet did, in fact, view it.

Luns' trip to the United States also afforded him an opportunity for a farewell visit to President Eisenhower, who had been persuaded by his officials to receive him after Sukarno's planned visit. In terms of protocol, this was an

extraordinary occurrence, given that, because of his hectic schedule in New York, only heads of state were granted access to the American president at that time. Furthermore, an earlier planned visit to Indonesia by Eisenhower had not taken place because of vehement protests by Luns on this. For that reason, the visit by Luns was rather a precarious undertaking, which at Eisenhower's request was not to be given any publicity. The fact that it took place at all may be regarded as a sign of appreciation for Luns' position and of the importance the United States attached to the New Guinea issue. At the same time it offered a good opportunity for letting off steam after the tensions between Washington and The Hague created by the journey of the *Karel Doorman*.[45]

At this meeting, which took place on 7 October 1960, Luns voiced his concern about the consequences of Indonesia's breaking off relations and the accompanying threats of violence. In this connection he was able to refer to recent utterances by the Indonesian president in his speech in the General Assembly, where he had declared that the New Guinea affair could now only be cleared up by means of a 'surgical operation'. Eisenhower, who knew his customers, remained non-committal and promised to give Indonesia another warning.[46] The subject came up at a meeting between Herter and Subandrio in New York a few days later, where the American Secretary of State asked his Indonesian counterpart whether the 'operation' mentioned by Sukarno included the use of violence. Herter reiterated that the United States 'wanted to be meticulous in assuring' that the arms it had supplied were not intended for this purpose. He toned down this 'deterrent' substantially by adding, by way of reaction to Subandrio's statement that the Dutch military were scouting around on Indonesian territory 'in a provocative way', that things would be different if there were question of provocation. Apart from that, the Indonesian minister played his usual role on this kind of occasion, namely that of an angel of peace who wanted to see the right thing done, but was thwarted by the vindictive military leaders and the emotional Sukarno.

The interview took a different turn as soon as the subject of changing public opinion in the Netherlands came up. This was a fact, according to Subandrio, which would make it possible for the Dutch government to be relieved of New Guinea, provided a decent way of doing so could be found. Herter, in reply, recalled Luns' propositions in the General Assembly with respect to a UN mission, to which he promptly added a suggestion of his own for a trusteeship. Although Subandrio was well aware that Sukarno did not want to hear of any solution of this kind, he left his host in the supposition that this might well be the appropriate way to make a transfer acceptable to the Dutch people.[47]

This discussion breathed new life into the suggestion of a trusteeship, which had been floating around for years not only in the Netherlands, but also in the State Department. In its further elaboration due speed was observed, if only because of the fact that, immediately after his return from Washington, Sukarno had travelled on to the Soviet Union, where Khrushchev had warmly welcomed him as leader of the Third World and given him undertakings for new and even more generous arms credits. Herter's suggestion of a trusteeship was worked out further into a memorandum by the State Department's 'planning staff', which was completed on 12 October.[48] This argued that the United States would have to take the initiative itself for the institution of a trusteeship under Article 81 of the UN charter. To enhance its chances of success, it proposed that this plan be discussed first with the Australians. It further expressed the desire that for the time being nothing that was liable to thwart any later American initiative should be undertaken in this respect in the United Nations General Assembly.[49]

Tunku Abdul Rahman's mediation attempt

An attempt in this direction from quite an unexpected quarter was already at that moment in preparation. During the visit of the prime minister of the Malaysian Federation, Tunku Abdul Rahman, to The Hague in May 1960, Luns had asked him for support for the Dutch position. The prime minister had given a positive reaction and let it be known that he was prepared to play a mediating role in the New Guinea question.[50] This was quite an understandable attitude, in view of the location and the position of his newly independent country. He made a public offer to this effect in October of that year, in the course of his visit to Canada, where he was received with much pomp and circumstance in Ottawa as a member of the British Commonwealth. On 20 October New Guinea came up for discussion in an interview with Prime Minister John Diefenbaker. At the end of this the Tunku issued a press statement announcing his intention to act as mediator in the conflict between Indonesia and the Netherlands.

Thereupon the Malaysian mediator set out for the United States, where he called another press conference in New York. On this occasion he announced that he had had encouraging contacts about his New Guinea plans with Nasution and other Indonesian leaders. Saying little about the content of these, he did throw out vague hints that the possibility of a trusteeship had been discussed here. In his interview with Dag Hammarskjöld it soon became clear, however, that his Indonesian counterparts had been none too enthusiastic about the idea and were only prepared to discuss it if it were clear from the outset that control would pass to Indonesia after a period of maximally two years.

Dag Hammarskjöld straightaway gave his guest to understand that this proposal was totally irreconcilable with the right of self-determination that the Netherlands was striving after. He did put the suggestion previously discussed with Luns to him, however, that they try a United Nations commission of inquiry for New Guinea.

As became clear from subsequent events, both the commission of inquiry and a possible trusteeship remained on the Tunku's agenda. As far as the trusteeship was concerned, evidently the suggestion that the Netherlands could in that case be the trustee was one element of the interview with Dag Hammarskjöld that had remained fixed in his mind. Via the Malaysian envoy in Jakarta he established contact about the subject with the Indonesian government, which stated that it was prepared to listen to his advice. Probably as an outcome of these consultations, he thereupon came forward with the idea of a council of trustees formed by a combination of countries that Indonesia trusted, for example Ceylon, India and Malaysia. The list also included Australia, but it was obvious that this country was not the Tunku's first choice. After further discussion with Herter, he travelled on via London to The Hague.

During his stay in London, the Malaysian statesman made a few more statements to the press, this time in particular about his contacts with Jakarta. Here he made some extremely sceptical remarks about the right of self-determination, from which it was easy for the assembled journalists to see how the wind was blowing. He was received with much ceremony in The Hague, where he was even given a gun salute so as not to be outdone by Ottawa. In actual fact, however, the mood in the Dutch Cabinet was fairly critical. The ministers quite early on had come to the conclusion that the Tunku would not be able to sell any arrangement that was unacceptable to Indonesia. Nevertheless, the Malaysian prime minister's movements were anxiously followed not only in The Hague, but also in Jakarta. His goodwill mission provoked fierce criticism in the Indonesian press, much of it from Subandrio. While the Tunku was in the Netherlands, Subandrio had made an official statement in the Indonesian capital in which he expressed his regrets at his trip. Moreover, he roundly consigned both the trusteeship and the UN mission to the scrap heap, thus at the same time providing the answer to Luns' proposal in the United Nations General Assembly for the dispatch of such a mission. For completeness sake, Subandrio further informed the Americans that his government had the gravest of objections to the actions of its neighbour, as he had no understanding whatever for Indonesia's position with respect to New Guinea, and was moreover venturing into the domain of 'public diplomacy'. As the Indonesians saw it, no good would come of any of it.

For the Dutch government, which had had no faith in the visit to begin with, things were made very easy by the reports from Jakarta. Although the Tunku had no grounds for complaint about his reception, his mission had run aground. He was obliged to admit that he had found Dag Hammarskjöld as well as the governments of the United States, Canada and Britain opposed to the idea of a trusteeship for New Guinea. His problems had been compounded by the reports from Jakarta. In the Netherlands, the politicians needed to do no more than walk around looking as if butter would melt in their mouths. Bot carefully explained to the Malaysian prime minister how well the Papuan population was being educated and how prepared his country was to discuss any proposal, provided this honoured the principle of self-determination. The Tunku accordingly departed without reaching any conclusions and filled with irritation at both Indonesian and Dutch pigheadedness. So his mediation attempt fizzled out like a damp squib.[51]

Bright boys in Washington

For the Americans it was all a sound lesson in circumspection with regard to any trusteeship proposals. They therefore took the necessary steps to stop the Tunku publicizing his failure in an official statement, as this would a priori reduce the chances of any subsequent mediation attempts. The planning staff's memorandum of 12 October 1960 was still on the table after all, and would have to remain there for the time being, till after the American presidential elections, in the campaign for which the Republican Richard Nixon and the Democrat John F. Kennedy were contesting each other in a series of sensational television debates. The contest ended in the last weeks of 1960 in a narrow victory for Kennedy, whose new government took office in January 1961. Thus the Democrats were back in the White House after eight years of Eisenhower.

The changing of the guard was not immediately attended by any drastic change of course, in effect. As we saw above, the Americans had already carefully distanced themselves from the Dutch position in Eisenhower's last year in power. This trend continued. With Kennedy's accession, Secretary of State Herter was relieved by Dean Rusk, whose preferences in this respect were still very much a matter for conjecture. In accordance with the American 'spoil system', a number of personnel changes were thereupon also carried out in the State Department. They included, for example, the appointment of Chester Bowles and of the seasoned diplomat Averyll Harriman as undersecretaries. Bowles immediately occupied himself with Indonesia policy. Averyll Harriman made his entrance in the State Department a little after him. Great importance was attached to his actions as undersecretary by Ambassador Howard Jones, who later observed in his memoirs that only under him were Asia policies

directed along the channels he desired.[52] The ambassador thus showed himself to have underestimated Chester Bowles' role in this connection. What is worth noting here is that Jones, who was not an uncontroversial figure in the State Department, either, was able to stay on in his post in Jakarta undisturbed. Hence the new administration showed itself from the outset to be well aware of his value for the policies it intended pursuing.

This ambassador, who had meanwhile built up a good relationship with Sukarno and the circle surrounding him, did in fact enjoy some fair weather after this. He did not tire of arguing that Sukarno was the driving force in the process of political stabilization in Indonesia, which, as a result of the sizeable arms supplies from the Eastern bloc, had the potential to develop into a major power in Asia. Therefore it ought to be a matter of the greatest urgency for the United States to prevent a rapprochement between Indonesia and the Soviet Union. This would only be possible by obliging Sukarno and his military chiefs in the matter of arms supplies and New Guinea. The latter was not only a personal obsession of the president's, but also a political rallying point appropriated by the communists as well. Support for Sukarno on this point would reduce communist influence. The idea that the Netherlands should be pressured into making this small sacrifice on the altar of a world order of the kind desired by the United States, first articulated by Allison and later by Jones, was now expressed aloud at various levels in the State Department. Of course the Far Eastern Section (FE) led the way here, while opposition came, as before, from the European Section (EUR), manned by Foy D. Kohler and W.R. Tyler, who pointed to America's obligations towards the Netherlands as a faithful ally. In addition there was H. Cleveland's UN department, the staff of which was sensitive to the significance of the right of self-determination, which had recently become so prominent, from a professional point of view. To break the stalemate between these sections, the planning department (SP), which was under the Secretary's immediate direction, had been called in to an increasing extent already under Herter. It was the source of the above-cited memorandum of 12 October, which after Rusk's accession had become the starting point for all discussions on the subject within the State Department.

The obvious necessity to avoid a conflict in Asia led to the framing of a policy of the kind advocated by the ambassador in Jakarta. It is worth noting in this connection that the advisor on Indonesian affairs regularly consulted in the department, the Indonesia specialist Guy Pauker, often drew opposite conclusions to Jones from the same facts. He argued, for instance, that Sukarno should not be allowed to get his own way on the issue of New Guinea, as this would only increase the risk of adventurism.[53] Caught between these alternatives, the

Gordian knot would eventually have to be cut by Kennedy. In this, an important part was to be played by the latter's advisors. John F. Kennedy was in the habit of discussing matters with his younger brother Robert, who had been assigned the function of minister of justice. Of the other White House officials involved, we should mention the names Robert Komer, George Bundy, Mike Forrestal and Walt Rostow. In addition the Department of Defence, headed by Robert McNamara, played an important role. It had built up a good relationship with the Indonesian military leaders since 1958, and provided equipment and training courses, which seemed an excellent way of keeping a finger in the pie in the Indonesian centre of power in Jakarta. The desire to keep this relationship alive carried much weight here.

The state of affairs outlined above can be reconstructed from the various official reports of the next few months. Within the department a heated discussion soon took place about the question of whether the United States should come forward with a New Guinea trusteeship proposal of its own, as suggested in the SP memorandum of 12 October 1960. The European Section insisted on an immediate reconfirmation of the guarantee previously given the Dutch by Dulles, whereas for the other sections the speedy removal of the latter from New Guinea had priority. The SP hence devoted its attention to a plan that made it possible for (or would force) the Dutch to bow out gracefully. This would improve the chances of a quieter Indonesia for the US, while the Netherlands would receive the consolation prize of renewed co-operation with its former colony. Taking this as its point of departure, the SP eventually proposed a trusteeship that was to be arranged in such a way as to guarantee transfer to Indonesia in the long run. The remainder of the debate was devoted to the question of how all this was to be made acceptable to the Dutch, in which connection it was immediately observed that self-determination for the Papuans did not have the ghost of a chance anyway. The conclusions were set down in another working paper, submitted to Rusk on 17 February 1961.[54]

The fact that this document was signed by all three sections concerned by no means implied that there was now consensus. The most one could say was that there was a temporary truce, which nevertheless showed up the weak position of the 'Europeans'. Rusk did not take part in this debate. He appeared to be primarily interested in the costs entailed.[55] There was not much time to settle the argument, however, for it became topical again in March 1961 with the announcement of Sukarno's visit, which was to take place in April. For the United States this provided an excellent opportunity to try and get on a better footing with that important but rather dodgy Asian country. Luns's visit of introduction to the new government was to take place at the same time. The minister had immediately agreed to this in the hope of having a chance to offer

some counterweight to Sukarno's stories. For the new American government, it was time at last to devote some thought to this thorny legacy from its predecessor.

The debate opened with a request to 'State' by presidential advisor Bundy for alternatives to the policy of neutrality pursued so far. In response, SP on 20 March presented a more concrete elaboration of its earlier memorandum. Its point of departure was Luns' proposal for a United Nations visitation committee, though adapted here so as to make it more palatable to the Indonesians. This committee would have to be composed in such a way as to make the Indonesian standpoint decisive, while both parties would have to accept its advice a priori. To be on the safe side, the Dutch would be told beforehand that the United States had reviewed its position on the point of the 'deterrent'. The plan for a trusteeship announced in the earlier memorandum had been worked out further, and would have to serve as an advance on the committee's binding advice. In agreement with Tunku Abdul Rahman's initiative, the establishment of a UN trusteeship for New Guinea was proposed, to be exercised by Malaya, which was to be assisted by a consortium of five other countries, which would also be responsible for funding. This scheme was discussed at length, as a result of which rumours about it also penetrated as far as the Dutch permanent UN representative in New York, E.L.C. Schiff.[56]

It was a cleverly contrived scenario, which could not by any means count on unanimous official approval. Rusk seemed to be chiefly concerned with the question of how the United States could keep out of the affair as much as possible. This was not America's last word on the subject, in fact. Anyone examining the internal discussions in the department and among the presidential staff during the preparations for the two visits, however, can only come to the conclusion that the question there was no longer whether there would be a change of course, but only how to go about it. In any case, there was virtually complete consensus about the desirability of not giving the Dutch military guarantees straight away, for fear that they might make too much of these.[57]

The United States' tendency to distance itself from Dutch policy was clearly in evidence at the inauguration of the New Guinea Council in Hollandia on 5 April 1961. This marked the high point of Dutch development policy for the Papuans, which the Dutch wanted to celebrate in some way. So they had invited the United States and the other members of the South Pacific Commission to be present at the official opening. Washington had initially accepted the invitation as a matter of course, but this had provoked a furious reaction from Jones, who pointed out that Indonesia regarded the event as a serious provocation, with Subandrio for one making this more than clear. There is every reason to assume, in effect, that Indonesia did regard the creation of the New Guinea

Council as a definite threat to its New Guinea policy. For it was almost inevitable that the existence of the council would bolster Papuan nationalism, while it would very likely be easy for a well presented campaign in favour of the right of self-determination of such a new state to link up with the global trend towards decolonization. Indonesia made very heavy weather of the matter and, according to Jones, the United States would do well to bear this in mind. Indonesia's growing military strength, moreover, provided an extra argument to take the reports from Jakarta seriously.[58] Protests from the American embassy in The Hague notwithstanding,[59] the departmental heads now opted without much hesitation in favour of Jakarta's standpoint. The visit to Hollandia was called off—a clear sign to the Netherlands that the signals in Washington were standing at danger.

Naturally this rather inelegant behaviour of the Americans provoked indignant reactions from The Hague. In the Dutch press the prevalent mood was one of bitterness, with the opportuneness of Dutch policy with regard to autonomy also being queried. The council of ministers showed itself to be dismayed,[60] and Luns on 27 March summoned the acting ambassador, Richard M. Service, to his office in order to air his displeasure at this new American example of 'appeasement' vis-à-vis Sukarno. In the process, he did not omit to refer to Jones' role. Then he changed the subject to another, possibly even more serious grievance. Rumours about the intentions of Rusk's planning staff had reached Luns via the Dutch United Nations delegate, Schiff. For Luns this was totally unpalatable. He made it clear that it was a slap in the face for the Dutch, wondering on what grounds America felt entitled to arrogate to itself the right to make decisions about parts of the Kingdom of the Netherlands without even consulting this country. Service's report of this acerbic interview led neither Kennedy nor Rusk to change their minds. They gave Luns to understand that actually New Guinea had long ceased to be an internal Dutch matter, and that American commitments (which had not yet been revoked) offered that country a powerful motive to think about a solution itself. Luns backed down and set out for Washington.[61]

The planning staff's proposal and the American refusal of the invitation to Hollandia did not bode well. The problem was compounded by the fact that at that juncture the journalist Oltmans was in the middle of a lecturing tour of the United States. It turned out to be a great success, with this worldly-wise Dutch journalist being met with acclaim wherever he went. His recommendations with regard to New Guinea suited the Americans down to the ground. With a view to the forthcoming consultations, Oltmans had made an analysis of the situation, which the officials of the State Department and the National Security Council read with great interest. The gist of this was that Luns' position was not

at all strong and that the Netherlands only needed a 'knock on the head' to mend its ways. The NSC officials, including Walt Rostow, considered the document important enough to be submitted to Kennedy and to be mentioned emphatically in the president's briefing to prepare him for his interview with Luns. The pithy conclusion here was that Luns generally tended to operate from a harsh Old Testament mentality, whereas Oltmans's views were evidently inspired more by the milder ideas of the New Testament.[62]

These opening manoeuvres were followed by a series of interesting talks on 10 and 11 April 1961, with Luns paying successive visits to Kennedy, Rusk and Bowles. The series was rounded off with an interview with Rusk in the evening of the 11th. At the same time UN representative Dean Acheson visited The Hague, where he exchanged views with Prime Minister De Quay and a number of parliamentarians. In view of his choice of persons to consult with, the American diplomat was evidently in search of the weakest link in the Dutch front.

The interview of Luns and Van Roijen with Kennedy took place in a more relaxed atmosphere than preceding events would have led one to suppose. In the exchange of views between the two parties, controversial issues were as much as possible avoided. Even so, Kennedy could not get out of saying at least something about the American refusal of the invitation for the opening of the New Guinea Council. This he did as casually as possible, remarking that the Americans already had so much on their plate, what with the tensions in Laos, while on second thoughts it did not seem a good idea to offend Sukarno just before his visit to the United States. He continued on in what had meanwhile appeared to have become an established presidential tradition by asserting that he did not quite understand why the Netherlands was going to so much trouble over this remote island, thus giving Luns an excellent handle for a tirade about the moral obligations of the Netherlands with respect to the Papuan people. Naturally the 'deterrent' also came up for discussion. Luns made it clear that, after two defeats in the Pacific, the Netherlands did not exactly relish the idea of landing up in another war in that region on its own. This elicited the Delphic pronouncement from Kennedy that the defence of primitive New Guinea clearly could not be of essential importance to the Netherlands, while the United States attached great value to the existing excellent relations with this country and was eager to keep things that way. For more details the president referred the gentlemen to the upcoming interview with Rusk, adding, however, that a solution to the problem ought to be in the interests of all concerned.[63]

This next interview did in fact provide more clarity, though not in the sense expected by Luns. Rusk was not to be lured into a reconfirmation of the 'deterrent'. He explained to his guest that it was inadvisable to address warnings to

Indonesia too often, lest these become mere empty threats if at a given moment one did not put one's money where one's mouth was. A good listener could have inferred from this that America had no intention whatever of confronting Indonesia squarely. To put his guest's mind at ease, Rusk added in a second interview, in the evening of 11 April, that this did not necessarily mean that the United States' policy with regard to the use of force had changed. America would definitely be careful to avoid giving Sukarno that impression during his forthcoming visit.[64]

In addition the subject of a possible UN trusteeship came up for detailed discussion in the consultations with Kennedy and Rusk. As we saw above, Luns had more or less reluctantly brought up this subject, at De Quay's insistence, in his talks with Herter and Hammarskjöld some six months previously. On that occasion he had noted to his great relief that neither gentleman was in favour of it, doubtless because they expected problems with Indonesia as a result. This time, too, it was impossible to avoid the subject, with Luns pointing out that only a 'bona fide' trusteeship would be acceptable to the Netherlands and the Papuans. By this he meant a trusteeship in the implementation of which the Netherlands would play an important part. In the contrary event, catastrophes of the kind taking place in Congo would be the result, and in that case he would call it quits. The Americans listened to his remarks with interest, but that was as far as it went. In all, these consultations produced a disappointing result for Luns. Although the deterrent had not been dismissed, for the time being it was shelved. At the very least the talks made it clear that, in the event of Indonesian aggression, the United States reserved to itself the right to choose its own response. American silence on the details of a possible trusteeship could likewise be interpreted as a sign that the views of the Netherlands and the United States were opposed. We are able to detect in Kennedy's and Rusk's stance a reflection of the spirit of the memoranda of the SP and NSC.

The same was true for the interview between Luns and Undersecretary Chester Bowles on the morning of 11 April. For these talks the UN mission proposed by Luns was on the agenda. As far as the Netherlands was concerned, the aim of this mission was to review the situation in New Guinea and, if possible, in East Indonesia. It would have to investigate whether the Papuans were really repressed, as claimed by Indonesian propaganda. A visit to Indonesia's east flank would moreover show who was really making preparations for an attack. As has become apparent from the above, in American planning the mission was to be given a different task altogether, though the minister in all probability had not yet got wind of this. When asked about the current state of affairs, there was little more Luns could say than that there was not much progress so far. Dag Hammarskjöld's reaction had been positive, but on being sounded out further

he had backed off, arguing that he did not know how to get a motion to the suggested effect through the council. Without any doubt this was partly because he was anxious to avoid offending Indonesia. In addition, it is not too bold a supposition that the secretary general was aware of the United States' desire to have its hands free for the moment. Be that as it may, Bowles now implicitly asked Luns not to do anything in the short term and to await the forthcoming American proposals first. He ignored Luns' suggestion that the United States send a mission to New Guinea on its own authority. Nor did he react to the latter's suggestion that this kind of plan be discussed at least in tripartite consultation with Australia. Bowles thus let it be understood that America was pursuing a course of its own and had no intention of taking any notice of Dutch wishes at all.[65]

While Luns on 10 and 11 April was paying his difficult visits to the White House and the State Department, the former American Secretary of State Dean Acheson was visiting The Hague. This was too fortuitous to be a coincidence. For the United States, Luns' position at home was an important factor, and his absence offered an excellent opportunity to sound out the mood in the Netherlands. In Washington, Rusk had praised Luns to Kennedy as an experienced, eloquent spokesman for his country. The American politicians moreover were not unaware of individual ministerial responsibility in the Dutch constitutional system. They nevertheless had serious doubts as to whether he enjoyed sufficient support at home. In the Dutch foreign service the New Guinea policies of the past years were anything but uncontroversial. Members of the Planning Staff had observed, for instance, that the Indonesia specialist at the Dutch embassy in Washington viewed their ideas about a more accommodating policy vis-à-vis Indonesia with approval.[66] A glance at the *Staatsalmanak* (State Directory) shows that this specialist can have been none other than counsellor J.L.R. Huydecoper van Nigtevecht. There are also indications aplenty that the Dutch ambassador in Washington, Van Roijen, had the necessary reservations about Luns' actions in this period.[67] Furthermore, the press reports of the American embassy in The Hague showed that the Dutch public harboured the necessary doubts. There were few people pleading in favour of a direct transfer of New Guinea to Indonesia, it is true, but the intelligentsia was clearly grappling with the dilemma of how to reconcile the Papuan people's right of self-determination with some form or other of internationalization of the administration. This was obvious from, among other things, the actions of the *Algemeen Handelsblad* journalist H.J.A. Hofland, who drew up an anti-government-policy manifesto in April 1961, which without any difficulty received the backing of 110 prominent Dutch citizens of a more or less

Plate 1 Soestdijk, 1950; New Guinea delegation in front of the royal palace. From left to right: V. de Bruijn, M. Kaisiepo, J. Ariks, A. Arfan and N. Jouwe. (Nationaal Archief, collection Anefo)

Plate 2 The Hague 1949; from left to right Moh. Roem, H.J. van Maarseveen and J.H. van Roijen. (Collection Spaarnestad)



Plate 3 The Hague 1949; from left to right J.H. van Roijen, W. Drees and the new US ambassador S. Chapin. (Collection Spaarnestad)

Plate 4 Visit to Hollandia, March 1945; from left to right Abdulkadir Widjojoatmodjo, A.L. Moffit (State Department), J.P.K. van Eechoud and P.M. Kerstens. (From J. Derix, Bapa Papua)

Plate 5 Hollandia 1951; Governor S.L.J. van Waardenburg (right) and the army commander F.W.J.M. Peters (left) with their ladies. (Collection F.H. Peters)



Plate 6 Inspector Raphael de Haan in discussion with an Ekari. (Nationaal Archief, collection Elsevier)

Plate 7 New Guinea 1957; visit of a parliamentary mission from the Netherlands. (Nationaal Archief, collection Elsevier)

Plate 8 Hollandia 1958; farewell party for Governor J. van Baal, here in discussion with the reverend Lucas Jouwe. (Nationaal Archief)

Plate 9 Hollandia 1957; the Australian minister P.M.C. Hasluck in discussion with Nicolaas Jouwe. (Nationaal Archief, collection Elsevier)



Plate 10 Manokwari; Governor P.J. Platteel and his colleague from Papua-New Guinea, D.M. Cleland. (Collection F.H. Peters)

Plate 11 Adam Malik. (Collection Spaarnestad)

Plate 12 Subandrio. (Collection Spaarnestad)



Plate 13 John Foster Dulles. (Collection Spaarnestad)

Plate 14 Dean Rusk. (Collection Spaarnestad)

Plate 15 Hollandia 1959; Governor P.J. Platteel and Marcus Kaisiepo. (Nationaal Archief.)

Plate 16 Schiphol, 25 February 1960; Th. Bot gives a press conference after his return from New Guinea. (Nationaal Archief, collection Anefo)

Plate 17 Biak 9 November 1959; installation of the members of the regional council of Biak-Numfor. (Nationaal Archief, collection Elsevier)

Plate 18 April 1961; elections for the regional council of Hollandia, Dafonsoro. In the middle: A. Palit (district officer of Tobati). (Collection F.H. Peters)

Plate 19 Biak, 18 February 1961; elections for the New Guinea Council, with Eliezer Bonay (district officer). (Nationaal Archief, collection Elsevier)



Plate 20 Hollandia, 18 February 1961; elections for the New Guinea Council. Meeting between the candidates for the districts of *Hollandia Binnen*; Olaf de Rijke and *Hollandia Buiten*; Nicolaas Jouwe. (Nationaal Archief, collection Elsevier)



Plate 21 Members of the New Guinea Council, from left to right; first row: O. de Rijke, M.B. Ramandey, H. Womsiwor, M. Kaisiepo, A.K. Gebze; second row: F. Poana, B. Burwos, A.E. Onim, V.P.C. Maturbongs, N. Jouwe, and M. Achmad (far right). (Photo from the monthly paper *De Triton*, Mei/Juni 1961)

Plate 22 Manokwari; on the drilling ground of the Papua Volunteer Corps. (Collection F.H. Peters)



Plate 23 Hollandia 1961; members of the board of the Parna: Amos Frits Indey, Herman Wajoi and Stephan Malibela. (Nationaal Archief, collection Elsevier)

Plate 24 The Hague, 11 December 1961; Prime Minister J. de Quay with members of the New Guinea Council, Mrs. D. Tokoro and N. Tanggahma. (Nationaal Archief, collection Anefo)

Plate 25 Jakarta, 15 April 1965; visit E. Bunker and H. Jones to President Soekarno and Ratna Sari Dewi. (National Archives Record Administration)

Plate 26 November 1962; J. Rolz-Bennett. (Nationaal Archief, collection Anefo)



Plate 27 November 1962; Dr. Djalal Abdoh. (Nationaal Archief, collection Anefo)

Plate 28 New Guinea, July 1962; F. Ortiz Sanz and his team during the Act of Free Choice. (Special Issue *Indonesia*)

Plate 29 New Guinea, July 1962; pictures from the Act of Free Choice. (Special Issue *Indonesia*)

Plate 30 The Hague, February 1962; Sudjarwo Tjondronegoro and Joseph Luns. (Collection Spaarnestad)

Plate 31 New York, October 1969; members of the delegation – Jouwe, with representatives of the Brazzaville states and undersecretary general of the United Nations, Ralph Bunche. From left to right: A.J.F. Marey, Mbiyu Koinange (minister of Foreign Affairs, Kenia), Mr. and Mrs Bunche, the ambassadors of Tsjaad and Niger and Herman Womsiwor. (Collection A.J. F. Marey)

progressive persuasion. The principal objection voiced here was that Dutch policy was training the Papuans in enmity against Indonesia, with which country they would have to co-exist somehow in the future. The manifesto further pointed to the international isolation in which the Netherlands had gradually placed itself over the years, with all the attendant military risks.[68]

For decision-making, obviously political channels were the most appropriate. In this connection the PvdA's position was interesting. Until recently this party had invariably toed the government line, be it sometimes rather grudgingly, but now that it was in opposition it was distancing itself further and further from this line. A similar development was observable among the denominational parties. We have already noted Prime Minister De Quay's doubts, which were fed by among other things his contacts with the business world, but also by the publications and correspondence of the Nijmegen professor Duynstee. A critical attitude was likewise observable within the ARP, where the authoritative Minister Zijlstra was one party member who harboured doubts. In the council of ministers meeting of 30 April 1961 he had endorsed Luns' mission to the United States, as he thought it would be useful to find out how the land lay there. He did, however, feel that, if this did not result in adequate guarantees for Dutch policies, it was high time for an 'agonizing reappraisal' of these policies,[69]

These doubts became manifest in the course of Acheson's visit to The Hague. The latter first had talks here with a group comprising Prime Minister de Quay and a number of members of parliament, including PvdA chairman Suurhoff. In this first talk, in the presence of these members of parliament, De Quay rigorously observed the official line, contrary to Suurhoff and his colleagues, who asserted that without concrete American support it would be impossible to keep any promises of self-determination. In contrast, De Quay in a private meeting with Acheson later that day unreservedly concurred with Suurhoff's remarks. The Dutch were not prepared to spill blood on behalf of self-determination for the Papuans, he said, so that a brief trusteeship would have to provide the solution. Then he went even further by admitting that it would not in that case be possible for the Netherlands to be a member of the trust. The stage of the 'bona fide trusteeship' mentioned by Luns in Washington had evidently been passed, as far as he was concerned. That the Americans found such a statement from a person in authority interesting goes without saying. The impression of 'weakness in the knees' thus gained was reinforced in the next few days in the course of talks with PvdA members of parliament.[70]

The above interview additionally offered an interesting insight into the relationship between the prime minister and his foreign minister. After discussing the possibilities of a trusteeship so frankly with Acheson, De Quay asked his

guest emphatically not to say anything about this to Luns or the Dutch embassy staff in Washington! Acheson dutifully promised this, amusedly observing that the politicians in The Hague obviously had no idea that at that exact same moment their own foreign minister was doing in Washington precisely what they reproached him with not wanting to do. Here Acheson was giving a broader interpretation of the talks with Luns than was warranted by the facts. Nevertheless, De Quay's remark underlined the circumspection with which he was obliged to treat the peevish Luns, which was having an inhibitive effect on efficient policy-making and also restricted the possibilities of giving publicity to any further government plans. In addition the precarious international situation necessitated great restraint. Rusk had emphatically requested Luns on his departure from the United States to make as little of what had been discussed between them public as possible.[71] Secrecy was the watchword in both The Hague and Washington, and little of these private arrangements leaked out to the outside world, which only fuelled the growing anxiety among the Dutch public.

Luns returned to The Hague from his American journey in mid-April. In the council of ministers there, he had first turn to speak. To assert that an 'agonizing reappraisal' of policy, to use Zijlstra's expression, now took place would be going too far. Luns gave a fairly positive account of his experiences in America, from which it might be deduced that there was room for going ahead with the trusteeship plans. This went down well with the sceptics in the council of ministers, as it showed that their colleague from foreign affairs was now also actively beginning to think about a trusteeship proposal.[72] He had up to then consistently held himself aloof from the discussions about this in the council of ministers, it is true. His talks with Bowles and Rusk must have made him realize that if he persisted in doing nothing, the initiative would be seized from him completely. He was not totally without resources in this connection, however, as for the success of any American plans Dutch co-operation was essential. On the other hand, some form of American deterrent was indispensable for the Dutch agenda. Neither party was in a position to make outright promises about this to the other. It was in this grey area that the manoeuvres of the next few months took place. Here we are able to recognize a two-track approach. While Luns was turning the idea of a UN inspection and a bona fide trusteeship over in his mind, the politicians in Washington were proceeding on the basis of the ideas evolved by the planning staff. They did not get much further than concluding that a trusteeship offered definite possibilities, but, depending on the form chosen, would always come up against objections either from the Dutch or from the Indonesians. That is why they now considered first setting up a committee to make recommendations, which the Netherlands (not

Indonesia!) would have to accept a priori. The ideas about this were put in black and white in a memorandum, which was for the greater part ready by mid-June.[73] This would have to serve as a basis for further discussion with the Netherlands, whose views as the power in charge of the administration of the territory would have to be heard first.

Further commotion on the home front

For a proper understanding of the further course of affairs, it is necessary first to take a closer look at developments in internal Dutch politics in the year 1961. These were interesting for all parties concerned, as they defined the scope for possible Dutch concessions to Indonesian wishes. For outsiders there could be little doubt but that not much was to be expected from the official circuit in this respect. When Luns unfolded his plans for a bona fide trusteeship and investigative committee in the First Chamber in May 1961, the only person to attack him was the socialist member De Niet.[74] The government's position appeared to be strong not only here, but also in the Second Chamber. Outside parliament, however, support was eroding drastically. Indonesian threats of war were becoming serious since the recent major arms purchases, and this was causing unrest in the country. In reaction, Oltmans, Duynstee, Rijkens and sympathizers in the spring and summer of 1961 stepped up their activities, mostly in concert with Indonesian initiatives. The message from Indonesia was that this country did not want war. The arms purchases were putting immense pressure on an already over-strained budget, while the resultant dependence on the Soviet Union also had its disadvantages. Reports further suggested that Sukarno and associates had little inclination to turn to the United Nations again for help. Although Indonesian prospects in this organization were improving daily with the entry of new countries in the council, the chances of a two-thirds majority in favour of a solution that was acceptable to Indonesia still were not high. Moreover, as that country still persisted in seeing it, any consideration by it of plans for a trusteeship, which were now surfacing all over the place again, would imply its full recognition that its own claims to sovereignty were disputable. The objective of the torrent of reports that reached the Netherlands via a variety of channels was to demonstrate that a direct arrangement with the Netherlands still appealed to the Indonesians.

There is sufficient reason to suppose that a rapprochement with the Netherlands was desired by many in Indonesia, in fact, and that even Sukarno and his immediate circle were not averse to this in itself, either. At the same time, there was still a strong desire for better relations with the former colony among the Dutch people. Nevertheless, there could be no doubt that the

Netherlands would have to pay a price for this in the form of the transfer of New Guinea to Indonesia. Besides the military build-up, deliberate exploitation of these Dutch sentiments was an integral part of Indonesian policy. Approaching the Dutch authorities via informal channels was liable to provide an excellent opportunity for this. This was a tactic allegedly already discussed by Sukarno, Subandrio and Nasution in the spring of 1960.[75] As a result, a special envoy, Nasution's friend Ujeng Suwargana, was sent abroad to investigate the possibilities for this kind of consultation. Towards this end the latter visited the United States and various European countries, where his principal intermediaries were the Indonesian military attachés in London, Paris and Bonn. He was furthermore always able to fall back on the Indonesian ambassador in Paris, Tamzil, who was a good friend of Sukarno's and Nasution's, for mediation.

Undoubtedly the most effective Dutch mediator for Ujeng and his principals was the Nijmegen constitutional law scholar Duynstee, who enjoyed good relations with various Dutch members of government, including De Quay and Cals. He entered the limelight more after discussing the state of Dutch-Indonesian relations at length with Ujeng in March 1961. Here the latter informed him that Tamzil and consorts were eager for informal contacts with prominent Dutch citizens. He further hinted that, if the Netherlands showed itself to be desirous of such a rapprochement, Indonesia could be expected to be more accommodating in attempts to reach a settlement of the conflict over New Guinea. In the next few months various new contacts were established, with PvdA members of parliament also being targeted. Nasution himself appeared in Europe in June and July and made himself available for consultations here. At his invitation, a number of church and mission heavyweights paid him a visit on 1 July, during which they informed him that it was their impression that a growing proportion of the Dutch population regarded the future of New Guinea as a genuine problem and was prepared to consider a solution that was acceptable to Indonesia.[76] Meanwhile Duynstee was actively lobbying members of government and parliament, whom he bombarded with letters setting out the weaknesses of Dutch New Guinea policy and pointing to the attractions of restored relations. His letters touched a chord with most of their recipients, as we saw in De Quay's case. The Dutch authorities could only in highly exceptional cases be persuaded to consider direct relations, however. Luns viewed it all with marked disapproval, but did not interfere with the professor. He responded in brief, dismissive notes to the detailed reports of the latter's discussions with his Indonesian counterparts.

These informal contacts extended over a wider field than just the line between Duynstee and Ujeng, however. There were more players in the field, among whom there moreover existed all kinds of mutual links. Thus Rijkens

and associates also came into action again, establishing contact with Sukarno during his visits to Washington in April and to Vienna and Rome in June 1961. In this web of relations Prince Bernhard played a distinctive role. As we saw above, the possibility of internationalization of the administration of New Guinea had been a recurrent subject of discussion at De Quay's weekly visits to the Queen in Soestdijk palace. Besides, the prime minister was in regular personal contact with the prince consort.[77] The latter was also otherwise active in this connection. On 25 April, a day after Sukarno's departure, he appeared at the White House, accompanied by ambassador Van Roijen, for a visit of introduction to the new American president. The conversation, as almost all conversations between American and Dutch persons in those days, centred on landing rights for KLM in the United States and on the future of New Guinea. On the latter subject, the prince in the main toed the official line. There was nothing spectacular about this, even though he dropped some very strong hints suggesting that the Netherlands would be well rid of New Guinea. There was definitely a difference in emphasis here with the approach taken by Luns, who was wont to stress the principle of the thing.[78]

More surprising was what transpired during a visit of the American businessman Henry G. Walter Jr to the White House staff member Robert H. Johnson shortly after Prince Bernhard's departure. Walter had visited the prince after his return to Soestdijk and now was able to inform his host that the prince had more on his mind than he had been able to say in Van Roijen's presence. The prince had thought Kennedy a nice fellow, but had come away with the impression from his conversation with him that he was exercising too little pressure on the Dutch in the New Guinea affair. Walter had taken some notes of the prince's views regarding better alternatives, which he left behind with Johnson.

From these notes it is evident that the prince distanced himself entirely from the policy pursued by the Dutch Cabinet. He considered it totally misguided and felt that it should be ceased as soon as possible. The principal—and virtually sole—obstacle to this was the person of Minister Luns, who had become embroiled in a personal feud with the Indonesians. Bernhard now came forward with a few proposals, which he had discussed with Luns before his departure for the United States, but which, he felt sure, the latter had failed to relay to his hosts in Washington in a complete form. These proposals were:

(a) Holland shall announce its readiness to turn over at once West New Guinea to a multi-nation Trusteeship. Whether it is one of the trustees does not matter. The only stipulation is that trustees will be a fair balance between East and West and that the ultimate disposition will be left to local plebiscite.

(b) Holland will agree that it will never accept return of the area and that such a question will not be put to the plebiscite.
(c) Holland will permit its own civil servants to remain so long as the trustees desire or until the trustees replace them with others.

The prince added that points (b) and (c) were new, and had not been brought up by Luns in America. He further showed himself rather annoyed at the fact that, though Luns had in effect touched on the question of a UN trusteeship in his interview with Dag Hammarskjöld, he had only done so very casually. He had allegedly asked him 'whether he would like to take on the added headache of New Guinea. Of course, he said no.' According to Walter's clarification, the prince was prepared to talk things over with the people at the American embassy in The Hague once more, while he had promised to try to persuade Cabinet to adopt a more accommodating stance with respect to Indonesia himself, with the help of Queen Juliana, needless to say 'within the limits of her constitutional powers'. It was 'the split in the Dutch Cabinet which provides him, through the Queen, with the opportunity to have some real influence on this issue'. He was hoping that Minister Luns would be prepared to put a proposal of this tenor forward via the United Nations. If not, then an external initiative was desired, in which connection he was thinking first and foremost of the United States.[79] This was a new variation on the suggestion for a 'knock on the head' earlier made by Oltmans at the White House. It was immediately forwarded to the State Department, which took good note of it.[80]

These princely escapades took place in the deepest secrecy. This was much less the case with the activities of Duynstee and associates. The professor from time to time published an article in the papers, in which he made no secret of his views. P. Rijkens, E. van Konijnenburg and NHM director Scholtens, on the other hand, restricted themselves to covert contacts and talks with Indonesian and other authorities. As members of this group may also be considered the Eindhoven industrialist Frits Philips and the former Dutch high commissioner in Jakarta, Hirschfeld, though this is by no means an exhaustive list. They were unprepared to take responsibility for their actions to the outside world. Scholtens and Konijnenburg, after first talking with Sukarno in Washington, got in touch with Luns in the first week of June to sound him out about the possibility of giving their covert contacts a more official status. In all probability this, as Junior Minister Van Houten alleged, was at the request of Sukarno himself, who was evidently keen for rather more substantial relations than the non-committal assurances of well-meaning private individuals.[81] Luns, again according to Van Houten, rejected the request. What is certain is that the three businessmen published a statement affirming that they endorsed official

government policy in the 10 June 1961 issue of the weekly journal *Vrij Nederland*. It is not improbable that some gentle pressure from Luns had something to do with this. The nervousness they were thus manifesting was a thorn in the side of Oltmans, who now resolved to give them a small push in the back himself. This he did in the form of an open letter, published in the next issue of *Vrij Nederland*, which mentioned each and every one of them by name and denounced their cowardice. The letter ended by calling upon them to publicly distance themselves from Luns and all 'those windbags in The Hague'.[82]

The article caused a lot of commotion, with the more popular major dailies—*Trouw*, *Volkskrant*, *Algemeen Dagblad* and *De Telegraaf*—taking their distance from Rijkens and Duynstee.[83] It was applauded by others, however, and eventually this publicity led to greater openness in the press, with more reputable daily papers like *De NRC* now also leaving room for doubt. The usually pro-government *HP* journalist and radio commentator G.B.J. Hilterman was obliged to admit in his journal that public reactions to Oltmans' outpourings had not on the whole been indignant, which indicated that the wishes of the electorate might well be different from what the politicians believed them to be.[84] De Quay had already informed Acheson in his interview in April that support for government policy had declined the past two months. This trend had grown stronger since, and noticeably so after Oltmans' publication. These developments were underscored by a variety of manifestos, with prominent figures now also joining the sceptics.[85]

To Luns and his supporters in government, these covert contacts were most irritating. Indonesia, after all, had itself cut the last thread binding the two countries together by breaking off relations in August 1960, and there was little inclination now to offer it a helping hand via a back door, which could hardly end in anything other than an ignominious capitulation. They were also causing disquiet in the bosom of government, where De Quay and Ministers Cals, Zijlstra and Beerman in particular appeared to be susceptible to these backdoor temptations. Whereas Rijkens' and Scholtens' statement in *Vrij Nederland* of 10 June, provoked by Luns, had been a first step in a counter-attack, Oltmans' intervention had made for a reversal of its initial success. This declaration of loyalty to the government's policies was moreover putting no obstacles in the way of further visits by Scholtens and Konijnenburg to Sukarno, while Duynstee was going around with an invitation for a meeting with the Indonesian statesman in Belgrade, when he visited this city for the next Afro-Asian conference in September, in his pocket.

From his talks with Nasution in Paris, Duynstee had retained the impression that a catastrophe was imminent if the Netherlands did not repent very soon. Immediately after his return to the Netherlands, he paid a visit to Bot, as Luns

was away on sick leave. Like Rijkens and Scholtens before him, he wanted some form of authorization from the government for his forthcoming meeting with the Indonesian president. Entirely in line with Luns, Bot turned his request down forthwith. As a result, an excited Duynstee threatened to organize a petition to effect a change of policy.[86] A few days later, on 30 June, Nasution made a personal appearance on Dutch TV, transmitted by VARA and VPRO television. Here the general, who came across as very congenial, made a passionate plea in favour of restoration of the old relations of friendship—obviously at the price of New Guinea.[87]

All in all, the outside world appeared to be more and more difficult to tame. To any outsider willing to listen, however, Luns was ready to assert that the man in the street supported the government's policies. *De Telegraaf* confirmed this, and after a rather opaque opinion poll among its readers proclaimed him man of the year. The Dutch government, in a last-ditch attempt to nip the actions against it in the bud, at the beginning of August 1961 issued a statement to the effect that all further contacts of members of the Rijkens group with Indonesians with regard to the New Guinea issue should be discouraged. This made it crystal clear that there was to be no room for diplomatic actions by private individuals on behalf of the government at all. This gave those directly concerned cause to announce that they would cease their actions.[88] They would have difficulty keeping their word, however, and all the conspirators still had regular contacts with their Indonesian connections in the next few months. This might at times have resulted in some good advice being given to the government. Thus on 9 January 1962 a petition to the Queen for a change of policy appeared. It was signed by Professor Van Hamel and most of the persons mentioned above, including the secretary of the Missionary Council, De Graaf van Randwijk.[89] In addition Duynstee individually took up his pen once more to pour out his heart about Luns' intransigent policies to the Queen, stating yet again that direct consultation might even then still offer the solution. Queen Juliana definitely took this proposal to heart, and during her interview with De Quay of 10 January informed the latter that she was prepared to go and talk to Sukarno personally.[90] Thereupon the Queen's Cabinet forwarded a copy of Duynstee's letter to the department of foreign affairs. The secretary general of this department, Van Tuyll van Serooskerken, confined himself to placing a note in the margin that in his view the prime minister should demand that the Queen refrain from entering into any form of correspondence herself.[91] As far as can be ascertained, the matter rested there.

In view of all this frantic activity, it is not surprising that the people at the American embassy in The Hague became more and more convinced in the course of 1961 that domestic support for the policies of the Dutch government

was rapidly dwindling. It was their experience that, after every government representation to the embassy, letters would come pouring in from people all over the country who were worried about their government's policies and were petitioning the Americans to put a stop to these once and for all. It is worth noting that rumblings were finally also heard within the PvdA. On 29 August 1961 the leaders of that party issued a statement that the increasing manifestations of preparedness on the part of pro-government individuals and newspapers to hand over New Guinea after all were as many illustrations 'of the consequences, unforeseen by the government, of its equivocal and ineffectual policies'. The communiqué ended with an appeal, saying that a solution could only be found in an international context.[92] Its negative tone aside, this statement contained little that had not already appeared on the Cabinet agenda. Even so, it was this tone that strengthened the Americans in their feeling that Luns might be left to his own devices for a little while longer, while their own alternatives should be kept on the front burner.

The conception of the Luns plan

Meanwhile Luns was continuing along his well-trodden track. As we know, he had created the impression in his report to the council of ministers of his visit to Washington in April 1961 that he could count on sufficient support there. Doubtless there were a few traces of doubt still lingering in his mind. Hence he took advantage of the opportunity of a meeting with Rusk in Oslo on 8 May 1961 to verify once more exactly what had been said. He gave the American statesman a factual account of what he had told the Dutch Cabinet about their last meetings. Furthermore, he explained that he had not mentioned the possibility of more American support for Dutch policy as a piece of definite information, but as something that he personally felt was a logical implication of the American 'deterrent' and American undertakings on the point of self-determination. As usual, he also let it be understood that the Netherlands was very well prepared militarily and that an attack on New Guinea would be anything but easy. Differently from before, however, he made no bones about the fact that public opinion in the country was unfavourable. The Dutch people as a whole was experiencing the New Guinea affair as a burden, which it would be only too happy to get rid of one way or another. The American State Department archives contain a record of this meeting, in which Luns' words are carefully noted, but there is no trace of Rusk's comments. This would lead one to infer that Rusk chiefly confined himself to listening and had no desire to bring the matter to a head. His principal contribution to the interview was a remark that Sukarno had not made a very favourable impression on him,

seeming to be a man who had lost contact with reality and lived 'at some mystical level'. Rusk made no further attempts to stop Luns from pursuing his plans.[93] Flexible adjustment was the course followed by the Americans the next few months. The line followed by the Dutch, on the other hand, was to keep in as close as possible contact with the Americans in order to hold their attention for the Dutch viewpoint.

In the short term, the agenda was decided by the UN meetings, which were to be held later in the year. On 9 June 1961 the council of ministers approved a plan to consult the Americans about the approach to be taken. By that time a '*Leidraad*' (manual) drawn up at the department of foreign affairs and containing suggestions for a United Nations visiting mission and a trusteeship had become available. It would be the UN mission's task to check the data furnished annually to the UN, as stipulated by article 73[e] of the charter, on the spot. The aim of this was to enable the Netherlands to demonstrate via objective observers that it was serious about the speedy emancipation of the Papuan people, as required by the anti-colonial resolution of 1960. The *Leidraad* expressed the hope that the commission would express an opinion on Bot's plans for administrative reform, where relevant coupled with technical advice. The whole document breathed a markedly administrative atmosphere. With regard to the trusteeship itself, it outlined a few alternatives off the cuff, varying from an exclusively Dutch trusteeship to a UN trusteeship to which the Netherlands would only contribute financially. These suggestions were inspired by the example of Somalia, a former Italian colony, where in 1945 a trusteeship had been introduced with the former colonizer as trustee. Van Roijen was charged with the task of spying out the land for this in the United States.[94] As an alternative, a motion by Bot was tabled in a later phase of the discussions, the gist of which was that the administration of New Guinea should be handed over to an 'international development authority', in which the role of the Netherlands was kept open, but to which it was certain that this country would contribute financially.[95]

In the preliminary discussions in Washington it was immediately apparent that there was little interest there in the preparatory work done in The Hague. It should be remembered here that there was at that time a memorandum by the Planning Staff lying ready in the State Department, which, though it likewise contained both elements, had worked these out differently from the documents Van Roijen was carrying in his briefcase. What had been intended as an open discussion thus degenerated into a game of poker with a stacked deck. In the formal discussions, which took place on 29 and 30 June, Chester Bowles was Van Roijen's chief counterpart. While the Dutch ambassador stressed that it was desirable that the Americans continue to premise their arguments on the

right of self-determination, Bowles let there be no mistaking that he desired to keep a free hand. Then he shook a number of suggestions out of his sleeve in which the contours of the SP plan were recognizable. Instead of the strictly administrative mission proposed by the Dutch, he put forward a suggestion for a political UN committee, which was to try and find a solution for the entire conflict, and to the recommendations of which the Dutch must be prepared to resign themselves a priori. The possibility of a Dutch trusteeship was brushed aside, as there was no country that would be prepared to lend its co-operation in this. Van Roijen's response consisted in some mutterings to the effect that this was a far cry indeed from the trusteeship the Netherlands had in mind, not to mention the concept of a higher development authority, and that it offered not a single guarantee for self-determination. There was much further discussion after that, but no viable formula was produced. The attempt at sounding out the Americans had failed, and both parties stuck to their own programmes. The only positive outcome was that each now knew what the other had in the back of their mind. The consultations ended with the American recommendation that the Dutch go and talk these matters over with Indonesia first. Furthermore, Van Roijen was emphatically advised to keep the Australians out of it, and not to discuss this with anyone else, either.[96] More than ever before, American efforts were now directed at retaining full control of the game.

On the Dutch side there was little inclination to toe this American line without further ado, which would lead directly to consultation with Indonesia. The government's intransigence did not fail to provoke the necessary discussions in the council of ministers, where it faced a round of sparring first with Minister Beerman. He was opposed to the Dutch demand to consider as trustee candidates only UN members who had explicitly recognized the right of self-determination. In Beerman's view this concept in the past had invariably been linked with the concept of nation, which he felt to be inapplicable to western New Guinea. The minister was touching on a dangerous subject here, as the Papuans' right of self-determination had, after all, constituted the basis of the policy pursued thus far. The entire council rose up in arms against him, in fact, whereupon Bot appeased the assembled ministers by suggesting that the term 'self-determination' in this case was used 'in order to develop the Papuans' identity'. Following this, the council approved a proposal by Luns to sound out a series of states more or less involved in the matter to find out which of them was prepared to help raise the subject in the United Nations General Assembly.[97] This proposal was subsequently acted upon with great alacrity, and the results were made known before the end of the month of August. They were rather disappointing. Most positive about the idea were a few South American countries, together with Ireland and Mexico. The remaining reactions on the

whole took the form of polite, evasive statements. As was to be expected, the United States government was most negative of all: the Americans preferred to stick to their own agenda without wanting to say so in so many words. In addition Australia, France and Britain clearly would have nothing to do with it, either, as the whole idea of a controlling UN presence in regions as meant in Article 73[e] of the charter directly opposed their own interests. Once it had been accepted for New Guinea, they might one day have to put up with a similar arrangement for the areas under their rule.[98]

For Luns this was of course a new setback, though he did not let himself be discouraged by it. Where it was clear that he would have to tread on thin ice, he took the extra precaution of emphatically asking the council of ministers for authorization to continue on the path already taken. His intention was to explain the basic principles of Dutch policy once more at the forthcoming General Assembly meeting. He would then present a further worked out proposal in the form of a resolution to the assembly later in the year. The Netherlands had no choice but to do this itself, as no one else was prepared to do it. He hoped that this would make it possible for him to take up the theme of his 1960 speech in the General Assembly again. His preparedness to make concessions had increased markedly, meanwhile. He was no longer talking in terms of a bona fide, that is to say Dutch, trusteeship. In its place there was now 'preparedness to renounce sovereignty to the degree that this is necessary following a UN resolution embracing a plan for bona fide implementation of the right of self-determination'. By this formula he could not mean anything other than that the Netherlands was prepared to take a step back on the point of its own responsibility for the implementation of this right. The authorization to proceed on this basis was given him on 1 September.

Little imagination is needed to attribute this weakening of the Dutch position to the recent unsuccessful attempts at sounding out the Americans in particular. At the council of ministers meeting of 1 September, no such admission passed Luns' lips, and he ascribed the need for concessions rather to 'the collapse of the home front'. The States General would not accept anything less, in his view. Meanwhile his proposal was still miles removed from the American agenda. He still intended to keep Indonesia out, after all. Hence the acceptance of any proposal for the institution of a Committee of Good Offices or of Indonesian participation in the projected international administration was out of the question. He did hope, however, that the United States might give a little more latitude.

All in all, it was a plan that offered little chance of success, a possibility of which the council of ministers showed itself to be well aware. Even so, the proposals of the minister of foreign affairs were accepted. In view of the convic-

tion with which he was arguing, their rejection would have entailed a ministerial crisis. Furthermore, it was open to question if parliament would be prepared to go any further than Luns was now suggesting, in spite of the collapse of the home front. Without saying so in so many words, De Quay at the end of the debate intimated that the enterprise was doomed to certain failure. As he saw it, a two-thirds majority in the United Nations was ruled out. He even so felt that there was no harm in bringing the proposal forward for discussion. This would demonstrate to the world that the Netherlands had the best of intentions and was not bent on retaining its sovereignty at all costs.[99] As was to become apparent subsequently, this was a rather naïve notion, based as it was on the premise that it would be possible to bring the machinery of internationalization to a halt once it had got into motion, in an international setting moreover in which the Netherlands could patently no longer count on any genuine support.

The council of ministers did not put all its money on this one card, however. In these days, doubt plainly showed on the ministers' faces. The reports from private circles, in particular the Nasution-Duynstee axis, that direct talks with Indonesia were necessary and possible, persisted. Cals, Zijlstra and De Quay were especially exposed to pressure from this quarter and now started seriously considering the possibility of bilateral discussions. Various people had pointed out, for instance, that Sukarno's 17 August speech that year had been deliberately milder in tone than might have been expected. De Quay therefore tentatively suggested at the meeting of 1 September that the Netherlands for its part might respond with a friendly gesture in the Queen's speech at the opening of parliament. This suggestion did not go down well with Luns, however. He seized the opportunity this offered him to criticize Duynstee and associates for arousing expectations that Indonesia might have become more accommodating. In this connection he was able to refer to very recent utterances by Sukarno showing that he had far from abandoned his old standpoint of accepting not an ounce less than recognition of Indonesian sovereignty. Luns did not want to hear of any bilateral discussions on this basis, as this would remove all chances of autonomy. The sceptics had nothing to say in reply. Luns was given the authorization he wanted, and promised to inform the permanent parliamentary committee accordingly. In addition permission was granted for the formulation of a passage for the Queen's speech offering some scope for consultation.[100] Seeing that this was to be drafted by Luns and Bot jointly, the ministers could have no illusions about the degree of lenience that would be shown in it. The anti-revolutionaries in particular urged De Quay to use this opportunity to state without reservation that the Netherlands was now prepared to talk to Sukarno,[101] but they were rebuffed point blank. The final text amounted to no more than an expression of regret that the possibilities of

direct negotiations with Indonesia were blocked through that country's own fault. Although the formula left a little latitude, at the same time it implied that the government was averse to the bungling underhand efforts of Duynstee, Rijkens and other well-meaning amateurs. On this point eventually all the ministers agreed. They were all extremely annoyed that the way the media were now reporting on the contacts of Rijkens and his group with Indonesian ministers was undermining the Cabinet's position.[102]

The council further showed itself to be fairly sensitive to the fact that the Papuan front was now also coming into action. This was a direct consequence of the establishment of the New Guinea Council, creating a forum in which a small Papuan elite was able to present itself with some degree of authority. Immediately after its inauguration, on 25 April 1961, this council passed the Arfan motion, expressing the wish that the Netherlands take no decisions about the future of New Guinea without consulting it.[103] The aim of this was to get a foot in the door. In addition, various Papuan missions in the next few months paid a visit to the Netherlands, including the visit by Jouwe and Kaisiepo mentioned earlier. Furthermore, increasingly more people were urging for Papuan participation in the Dutch delegation to the upcoming UN meetings.[104] The institution of the council had provided an important stimulus for greater political awareness in a wider circle of Papuan society. This was particularly the case among students of the various types of advanced education, who were arriving on the scene in slightly larger groups in this period. They were stimulated by the reports of the Indonesian threats and the international discussions about the future of their country that were reaching them via the Indonesian and Dutch media. New political parties were formed, which concerned themselves directly with the associated problems. Already in the course of that year a co-ordinated joint action of the New Guinea Council and the 'extra-parliamentary' *Nationaal Comité* (National Committee), pleading in favour of the introduction of a national flag and a national anthem, was initiated. There were also people in this circle calling for the proclamation of Papuan independence in the short term, in the expectation that confronting the Indonesian Republic with such a *fait accompli* would cause the latter immense embarrassment. Reports of this reached the council by way of Bot's statements, who in effect had stimulated these actions by his conduct. He viewed them with sympathy, without having to bear immediate responsibility for them, invariably finding a dedicated supporter in his immediate superior, Minister of the Interior Toxopeus.

It goes without saying that these developments had not escaped the notice of the government in Jakarta. As a result, an Indonesian counter-offensive was launched in this respect as well, in which the by now familiar hand of Nasution

was discernible. Via Duynstee he invited a number of Papuan students living in the Netherlands, of whom Frits Kirihio was the most well known, for a visit of introduction to Indonesia. As the Netherlands had always felt very strongly about the principle of free choice for the Papuan people, it could not object to this. The visit caused great commotion in New Guinea. This development will be discussed in more detail in a later chapter. For the moment it is important to bear in mind that the first Papuans appeared on the political horizon in the course of 1961. News of this influenced the Dutch as well as the international debate. One thing that is certain is that the members of the Indonesian delegation in New York were pricking up their ears.

The Luns plan in the General Assembly of 1961

Let us here return to Luns, who had been authorized by the council of ministers on 1 September 1961 to continue on the chosen course. As agreed, he first consulted the parliamentary foreign affairs standing committee, which gave him the green light. This was followed on 20 September by a public debate on the policy to be pursued between members of the four coalition parties and a delegation of members of the New Guinea Council in Amsterdam. The upshot of this was consensual approval of the government's internationalization plans.[105] The government also enjoyed broad support in parliament, as became apparent during the budget debate in the Second Chamber of 3 October, at a point in time when the first version of the Luns plan was already available to the politicians in The Hague. Not only did the government parties endorse the proposal, but also PvdA spokesman Burger stated himself to be in total agreement with the government's New Guinea policy. There was only one discordant note to be heard, namely from ARP quarters. Under the influence of spokesmen of the *Gereformeerde Zending*, the upper echelons of this party had come to be increasingly in favour of a rapprochement with Indonesia. The resultant moral dilemma caused it more and more anguish as the Dutch position became more difficult. During the 3 October debate the MP Bruyns Slot committed a serious blunder, as De Quay saw it, by qualifying the significance of the right of self-determination. Although he considered it a fine enough principle, he felt it should always be projected against the actual political situation. No government could or should allow itself to be unreservedly committed to it, and under the given circumstances consultation with Indonesia was a must.[106] Not long after that, party chairman Berghuis said something to a similar effect. Although this was not the unanimous view of the ARP as a whole, it was definitely that of prominent spokesmen of the younger generation. Berghuis further stressed that he and his associates had arrived at this conclusion independently and that the party maintained no relations with Rijkens and his supporters.[107]

While the parliamentary debates were in progress, Luns was already high and dry in New York. On arrival there he had given a rough outline of his ideas in a speech before the General Assembly on 26 September. This amounted to not much more than a list of loosely formulated suggestions for a UN mission and for a trusteeship that was open to broad interpretation. It provoked few reactions, save from the Indonesian delegation. Subandrio was quick to lash out at Luns, pointing out that the arguments of his Dutch colleague negated the Indonesian position. He invited him for direct talks with Indonesia first, tactfully alluding to the collapsing home front in the Netherlands.[108] As though to round off the entire debate, Sukarno let it be known from Jakarta that such consultations could only take place if Indonesian sovereignty were recognized a priori.

After each side had defined its position, as far as Luns was concerned a further elaboration of his ideas was called for, in order that these might be submitted to the council in the form of a resolution. There were various options open for this. The Dutch could come forward directly with a motion of their own, or they could link up with discussions already started by other parties. Luns chose the latter, enabling him to respond to a proposal put forward by the Soviet Union to discuss implementation of Resolution 1514 'regarding the granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples'. The 'Luns Plan' especially adapted to this was ready for public discussion on 9 October. In it the Netherlands, expressing the wish to have this resolution implemented as soon as possible with regard to New Guinea, declared itself prepared to hand over sovereignty over this territory to the indigenous population, to place it under international administration, and to continue making a financial contribution. It was emphatically stipulated here that the region's future status should be decided in accordance with the wishes of its people. An operative section pleaded in favour of the setting up of a UN committee to enquire into these wishes of the people, as well as into the possibilities for a plebiscite and for a transfer of the administration to an international development authority. Ideas about the form the latter should take were formulated in a separate memorandum. Whereas the initial intention had been to restrict this plan to the general principles, informal consultations in the corridors led to such emendation of the document that it now explicitly stated that Papuan self-determination might have three different outcomes, namely integration into Indonesia, independence, or fusion with eastern New Guinea. It further indicated that the Netherlands only wished to take an active part in the administration if the United Nations expressly desired it to, and was prepared to withdraw its own troops and administrators from the area at the UN's request.

These finer details were set out in a new memorandum of 4 November.[109]

Thus the Netherlands had gone very far, in Luns' opinion. Nevertheless, it turned out not to be enough, for during its preliminary discussion in various committees, the proposal met with fierce Indonesian opposition. Covert consultations furthermore made it clear that the thus adjusted 'Luns Plan' had little chance of survival, as America did not want to become Indonesia's adversary and was urging for even more far-reaching Dutch concessions. This was crystal clear from the discussions of Adlai Stevenson and a few other members of the American delegation with Subandrio and his companions. Here an interesting alternative was put forward—one with which we are already familiar from the internal debates in the State Department. What it boiled down to was that the act of self-determination would take place after a number of years of Indonesian administration. Subandrio agreed to this to the extent that he stated himself to be prepared to let the Papuans reconfirm after a few years of Indonesian administration that their region formed part of Indonesia. The Indonesian claim to sovereignty over New Guinea as of 17 August 1945 was inviolable. Although this actually implied an immediate transfer of the administration to Indonesia, the Americans nevertheless considered it seriously and tried to get a discussion with the Dutch underway. It was a futile attempt, however, if only because Luns was against bilateral consultations and was opposed altogether to immediate talks about a transfer of the administration to Indonesia.[110] The Americans indefatigably persisted in their efforts to force a rapprochement between Indonesia and the Netherlands, however, taking advantage of the circumstance that protagonists of both parties were present in New York. This culminated in, among other things, an uneasy discussion between Luns, Malik and Yamin. Luns felt under duress and reacted accordingly, evincing his resentment against Indonesia, which had steadily mounted over the years, by declaring that that country was of less importance to the Netherlands than Outer Mongolia at that moment.

In between these discussions, the Dutch motion was dealt with in the General Assembly as of 7 November. Subandrio, as always, rejected autonomy for the Papuans as, in Indonesia's view, the latter had already made their real choice at the Indonesian proclamation of independence of 17 August 1945. He was prepared to admit, however, that neither party had right a hundred per cent on its side. Therefore he reiterated his previous off-the-record undertaking that Indonesia was prepared to give the Papuans the opportunity to *confirm* that they wanted to continue on as part of Indonesia. Apart from that, he launched into a tirade accusing the Dutch of exploiting resolution 1514 to keep Indonesia divided. Referring to the ongoing actions for a Papuan flag and a national anthem in New Guinea, he threatened that his country would retaliate with every available means, even with war, if the Netherlands insisted on

making separation of the region a *fait accompli.* These were recurrent themes in his subsequent presentations. At a later stage of the debate, on 20 November, he finally put forward seven 'constructive points', most of which contained few new facts or ideas. In point five he declared his support for a motion submitted by India urging bilateral negotiations under the auspices of the chairman of the General Assembly. In point six he pledged Indonesia's full co-operation in finding 'an honourable solution' in the form of a transitional period in which the UN would play a role.

The reactions of the great majority of speakers to the Luns plan ranged from total rejection of it as a neo-colonial ploy, to evasive comments that, though it might contain some positive elements, it failed to provide for any role for Indonesia. It met with unreserved support only from Australia, Nationalist China, Israel and New Zealand. The American delegate Bingham in his address of 22 November adroitly steered a middle course by wholeheartedly endorsing the importance of autonomy, but on the other hand reproaching the Dutch for underestimating the extent of Indonesia's interest in New Guinea. The United Nations ought not to concern itself with the question of sovereignty, but should look for a solution 'offering the people of that territory the opportunity at the appropriate time to make its own choice with regard to its political future under the aegis of the United Nations'. Referring to Subandrio's sixth 'constructive point', he expressed the opinion that a solution of the conflict would only be possible via a UN interim administration, whereby Indonesia, he assumed, would have access to the area. This would enable the country to pursue its goals by peaceful means.[111] Here we recognize the transitional period as a sop to the Dutch, as discussed in the informal consultations with Stevenson and associates.

All this having been said, it was clear that the Dutch resolution would not stand a chance, while it was just as unlikely that the Indian resolution would get accepted, as it made no mention at all of autonomy. The next initiative came from an unexpected quarter. Earlier that year a number of newly independent French-speaking African countries at a meeting in the capital of French Congo, Brazzaville, had united in a *Union Africaine et Malgache* (African and Malagasy Union). This union comprised Upper Volta (Burkina Faso), the Central African Republic, Dahomey, Gabon, Ivory Coast, Cameroon, Congo, Madagascar, Mauritania, Niger, Senegal and Chad, popularly referred to as the Brazzaville Group, after the town in which the relevant treaty had been signed. The members of this group had come to take an interest in the fate of the Papuans, who with their Negroid features seemed like one of them. On these grounds they had declared themselves in favour of Papuan autonomy at a meeting in Tananarive in September 1961. To what extent their interest was

stimulated by the actions of Dutch and French diplomats at the conference is not clear from the documents kept in the Netherlands. Be that as it may, the spokesman of this group on 24 November came forward with a motion that carefully reflected an intermediate position between the Dutch and the Indian resolutions. It urged both parties to resume negotiations so as to reach agreement on the future of the region 'without prejudice to respect for the will and self-determination of peoples'. To this end, the good offices of the secretary general were requested, to be performed through a five-member committee. The latter was to report to him on the progress of the negotiations on 1 March 1962. If no progress had been made by then, the committee would be instructed to institute an investigation into the conditions in the area and the possibilities for international administration.

For the Netherlands the Brazzaville resolution was attractive, because in any case it honoured this country's principles and might eventually lead to formation of the desired committee of enquiry. In theory, it still held the door open to one form of internationalization or other whereby Indonesia would be sidestepped. Subandrio opposed the proposal for the same reasons for which it was attractive to the Netherlands. In the ensuing impasse the Dutch delegation decided, in consultation with the council of ministers in The Hague, not to put its own motion to the vote. It further reconciled itself to an amendment to the Brazzaville resolution, made at the insistence of the Americans, whereby rather too explicit a reference to autonomy was eliminated, but the reference to the general principle in point (1) was left intact. Subsequently the resolutions by India and the Brazzaville nations were put to the vote, one soon after the other, on 27 November, with the result that neither secured the necessary two-thirds majority. The Indian motion was defeated by forty one votes for, forty one against, and twenty one abstentions. For the Brazzaville resolution these figures were fifty three, forty one and nine respectively. For the Netherlands the fact that this motion had at any rate managed to attract more than half the number of votes, including those of the United States, Australia and the United Kingdom, was cold comfort. The French government, too, had shown warm support for the action of its former colonies. The British government, which, as so often in the decolonization debate, found itself in a difficult dilemma because it felt constrained to oppose the standpoint of Commonwealth member India, made a separate statement about this. It had felt obliged to reject the Indian resolution because this totally ignored the Dutch proposals, as well as the right of self-determination.

In the end, the Dutch representative Schürmann declared that more than half the members of the General Assembly had honoured the right of self-determination by voting in favour of the resolution. This would encourage

his government to continue on the chosen path towards internationalization. His Indonesian opponent Subandrio had different ideas about this. He had explicitly opposed application of the right of self-determination in the case of the Papuans in the debates, and was now gratified to see the Brazzaville resolution, which so emphatically mentioned this right, rejected. Hence Indonesia would confidently press ahead with its plan for deliverance of West Irian from the colonial power. He also stressed that his country was prepared to negotiate, however. Thus he was implicitly accepting the olive branch held out by Schürmann when stating in his first reaction to the African motion that his country accepted this resolution and was prepared to comply with the request contained in the first operative article. As we have seen, this involved preparedness to resume negotiations with Indonesia without delay in order to reach agreement with this country about the future of western New Guinea.[112]

Thus the New Guinea debate in the sixteenth United Nations General Assembly was undecided. By failing to back jointly either of the resolutions submitted, neither party was committed on any of the points contained in these with regard to the other. On balance it must be observed, however, that the Netherlands had made the most concessions. Whereas it had declared its preparedness to give up its sovereignty over the contested area, Indonesia had hardly given in as regards its rejection of the Papuans' right of self-determination at all. The only glimmer of hope was to be drawn from Subandrio's statement that Indonesia might be prepared to give the Papuans the opportunity to 'confirm' that their territory was a part of Indonesia. The Dutch negotiators might take some consolation besides from the results of the vote on the Brazzaville resolution, as well as from the fact that the American representative Bingham, when stating the reasons for his vote, had also shown his strong support for the applicability of the principle of self-determination in this case. The procedure he proposed, whereby self-determination would only be exercised after a period of UN administration, in which Indonesia would also be involved, showed that the Netherlands had little cause for rejoicing, however.

This became obvious in a very confidential talk which took place in Washington at the end of the session, on 4 December. Here the members of the American State Department Sisco and Cleveland lifted the hem of the veil in Van Roijen's presence. In their personal view, the Netherlands and Indonesia should now strive to find a definitive solution. To try to do so via the United Nations General Assembly would be futile, as neither party would be able to secure the required two-thirds majority for its standpoint here. Hence direct talks between the Netherlands and Indonesia had become inevitable, and Bingham's suggestion might provide a guideline for these. Hereby acceptance of Indonesia's claim to sovereignty as of 17 August 1945 should be combined

with acknowledgement of the Papuans' right of self-determination. In this connection the two-phase system suggested by Bingham would offer the way forward. In the first phase, Dutch New Guinea was to be brought under United Nations administration, after which, in the second phase, the people would be given the opportunity to exercise their right of self-determination. The Americans revealed that they had already discussed this with the Indonesian delegation and expected that on these conditions Indonesia might possibly be prepared to revoke its demand to be put in charge of the administration itself as United Nations trustee. It was now up to the governments concerned to tie up these loose ends.

Van Roijen cabled this eloquent example of creative thinking without comment to Luns, who had meanwhile left New York again. The minister stated that he 'had been quite alarmed' at this idea, 'which tends so much in the direction of what the Americans of the Asia Section, in particular Bingham, had already suggested to the Indonesians, namely to leave the question of sovereignty open and to concentrate on total withdrawal by the Netherlands, whereupon a situation would be created, with the help of the UN, in which Indonesia would actually have the final word'.[113] As will become apparent in what follows, this was an apt recapitulation of the ideas developed by the Americans and Indonesians in informal consultations in the corridors.

Chapter 9

The Metamorphoses of the Luns Plan

The Dutch Cabinet's definition of its position

In the Netherlands, Luns' trip to New York in 1961 met with broad approval. This became apparent at, among other things, the meeting of parliament of 3 October, where criticism was voiced chiefly by the Anti-Revolutionary Party, which was of the opinion that the Netherlands should have gone much further in meeting Indonesian wishes straightaway. It was not opposed to the new course, but felt that this was not taking a sufficiently sharp turn. This state of affairs indicated that a drastic change had occurred in the mood of the Dutch public and in the position of the political parties. After all, the plans unfolded by Luns in the UN General Assembly signified a major step back in the Dutch political stance, and this was even more true of the outcome. Nevertheless, they met with little opposition at home. Partly as a result of the intensified press debate in the summer of 1961, larger sections of Dutch society had become convinced that consultation with Indonesia was becoming essential in any event. This was obvious once again in a First Chamber debate of 29 November, where the ARP senators showed themselves quite pleased with the results of the consultations in New York. In this they were supported by the leaders of the three major denominational parties.[1] In addition the board of the Dutch Reformed synod and the joint Roman Catholic bishops each came forward with a public appeal to the government to seek a peaceful solution.[2] Even the PvdA was one of the parties that agreed unanimously, not budging from its pro-government standpoint.

This became manifest from, for example, a public debate between Burger

and Duynstee in Amsterdam on 23 November. Here the PvdA leader accused the Nijmegen academic and his associates of troubling the government with political ephemera, at the very time when the latter was on the right track. He followed this up with a tirade about the right of self-determination. Although he sincerely hoped that the Papuans would eventually opt for union with Indonesia, he nevertheless felt that to the outside world the government should appear to be supported in the course it had adopted. If New Guinea ended up being handed over to Indonesia without international guarantees, giving rise to bloodbaths and chaos, as in the case of Congo after the departure of the Belgians, the professor and his cunning chums would be to thank. When Duynstee parried these remarks with the observation that he attached more value to Indonesia's word than to any international safeguards, Burger just about exploded, giving a spontaneous demonstration of Luns' pet argument that what counted for the Netherlands as far as New Guinea was concerned were principles, not interests.[3] Only in the weeks following this did both the ARP and the PvdA distance themselves from Luns a little more, also on the point of the right of self-determination.[4]

Internal consultations in the council of ministers started on 1 December 1961, straight after Luns' return from New York. Duynstee had predicted a few months previously that if Luns did not succeed in pushing his plan through there, he would be 'nowhere'. Although he had, in fact, been unsuccessful in this, the minister had no intention of admitting that this irritating commentator had been right. He showed himself satisfied with the result, in particular stressing the American vote in favour of the Brazzaville resolution. This resolution had, after all, been defended by the American Bingham by underlining the importance of the right of self-determination for the people of New Guinea. This had safeguarded the cornerstone of Dutch policy. He did not bother to mention that at the suggestion of that same Bingham the sharpest edges of the principle of self-determination had been blunted in the text of the Brazzaville resolution. He was further taking the fact that the Dutch had now been condemned to another round of consultations with Indonesia into the bargain. This time again he blamed the extra-parliamentary opposition, which had undermined faith in Dutch determination, for the fact that no better results had been achieved.[5]

This argument is in need of some comment. It is, in effect, true that interested foreign countries, in particular Indonesia and America, kept a close eye on the mood in the Netherlands. For Indonesia the above-mentioned swing in Dutch public opinion was important, as was apparent from its active support for the extra-parliamentary actions and from the arguments used by its diplomats in the United Nations meetings and elsewhere. It is very much open to

question, however, if this swing had really been a motive inducing the Americans, too, to refrain from giving the Netherlands stronger support at the United Nations. For the American diplomats, the mood in the Netherlands rather was a useful argument that they could use against the Dutch negotiators where they saw fit. For internal American consumption the arguments borrowed from Cold War rhetoric were much more important. This was different in Dutch domestic politics. There the publicity to which Oltmans' and Duynstee's actions had given rise was definitely undermining support for the government policy pursued thus far. Even so, on closer examination the advantages of that campaign in the longer term were greater for that same government than the disadvantages, as it contributed significantly to acceptance of the policy eventually pursued.

This first round of deliberations in the Dutch Cabinet led to the adoption of a tentative stance, which was formulated in a letter from De Quay to the Second Chamber of 8 December.[6] Cabinet was desirous of proceeding on the route of internationalization, if possible via the United Nations and on the basis of a bona fide exercise of the right of self-determination as specified in the Brazzaville resolution. In addition, De Quay emphasized that, though the Netherlands had not put its own resolution to the vote, it had not withdrawn this, either. The Luns plan thus still constituted the cornerstone of Dutch policy. Here we are able to observe that, although this position still left a great deal open, it even so signified a major adjustment in the direction of Indonesian and American wishes. The Dutch offer of transferring sovereignty to the Papuan people remained, as did Dutch preparedness to co-operate actively during the transitional period in the work of a development authority to be set up by the United Nations. This Dutch participation had become uncertain as a result of the attachment of the memorandum of 4 November to the Dutch resolution. For the latter not only made Dutch participation in the United Nations interim administration conditional on a United Nations request, but it also opened up the possibility of Indonesian participation in that administration. The chances of this happening were increased by the fact that the Dutch government now continued to adhere to the Brazzaville resolution, which after all stipulated that it should negotiate about the future of New Guinea with Indonesia. In light of the tenor of the debates in New York, it was highly likely that the UN recommendations would now aim precisely at Indonesian participation in the work of the development authority. The one final resort would be the principle of self-determination, accepted by the Netherlands as well as the United Nations in numerous places. However, if the Netherlands did not take part in the interim administration to be formed by that time, this country would have precious few opportunities of influencing the realization of this principle. Although in the

policy intentions formulated in De Quay's letter of 8 December, the odds against the policy pursued so far were numerous, this was ignored for the moment. A subject to which attention was drawn, on the other hand, was the acceleration of the political development taking place in the area.[7]

For what happened next, the American position was of major importance. During the UN meetings, Washington had adopted a neutral stance vis-à-vis the outside world. Although it had not supported the Luns plan, it had also rejected the Indian resolution. Through Bingham as its spokesman, the American delegation had expressed itself in favour of the Brazzaville resolution, while at the same time professing its sympathy for the right of self-determination, also for the Papuans. In the corridors it had nevertheless shown itself fairly accommodating with respect to Subandrio's wishes. This was in accord with the policy prepared internally in Washington with which we are already familiar, the main points of which had been formulated recently in the 'Guidelines on US policy in Indonesia' of 3 November.[8] This document had once more underscored the importance of Indonesia for American politics and pointed out the need to have the Dutch out of New Guinea as soon as possible. The sixth point of Subandrio's speech at the meeting of 20 November (total Indonesian co-operation and support in the implementation of a possible transitional period under UN supervision) fitted in virtually seamlessly with the suggestion for a brief interim administration discussed secretly with the Americans. Luns at that juncture was not familiar with the finer details of the rapprochement between the Indonesians and the Americans. He was able to inform the council of ministers on 1 December, however, that shortly before the vote on the Brazzaville resolution, the Indonesian delegation had expressed its preparedness to acknowledge the right of self-determination provided Indonesia was given ultimate control, but that the State Department had rejected this out of hand as being 'absurd and grotesque'. This leads us to infer that at that point a head-on collision with the Netherlands was unwelcome to Rusk and his associates, who deemed further massaging of the egos in The Hague necessary. The first step in this direction had been the interview between Van Roijen and Cleveland of 4 December in Washington. As we saw above, Luns had taken exceptional umbrage at this and had insisted on strict secrecy to Van Roijen. The latter's telegram about this, marked as confidential-personal, played no visible role in the subsequent discussions in the council of ministers, in fact, presumably having disappeared into a drawer in the minister's desk at the department.

After the sixteenth General Assembly, Washington's next move was to request both parties to indicate how America might be of help in finding a

solution. This request to Sukarno, as the politicians in the Netherlands were informed via Van Roijen, was accompanied by a personal letter from Kennedy, dated 10 December, urgently requesting the Indonesian president to forgo the use of violence and adding, according to Van Roijen, that if force were used, it would be extremely difficult for the Americans to be of any help at all.[9] This admonition was considered necessary because Sukarno for some time had been using threatening language and in Jones' presence had referred to the need to take a decision on military action soon. In view of the reinforcement of the Indonesian military apparatus, which was now taking place at increasing speed, it was impossible to dismiss this as an empty threat intended solely to step up political pressure, though doubtless this factor also played a role. The results of the United Nations discussions had, after all, been quite unsatisfactory for Sukarno as well, while the developments in New Guinea were also worrying him. For here the Dutch administration had proceeded on 1 December to introduce a flag and an anthem for the region, while the Papuans were debating the proclamation of a state of their own.

Kennedy's actions were predictable, fitting in with the role of an impartial mediator. Unfortunately, the Indonesian reaction to his request was entirely negative. On 17 December 1961 Indian troops unexpectedly invaded the Portuguese enclave of Goa, on the west coast of India. This violent decolonization measure of his colleague Nehru did not escape Sukarno's attention. We will pass over in silence the question of whether, and if so to what extent, the actions of the two statesmen were co-ordinated in this connection.[10] What is certain is that Sukarno two days later took a step in the same direction. On 19 December he delivered his so-called Trikora speech in Yogyakarta, Trikora being an acronym for 'Tri Komando Rakyat', or 'People's Threefold Command', the main theme of this speech. In it he instructed the armed forces to put an end to the Dutch 'marionette state' in West Irian, to raise the Indonesian flag there, and to prepare for a general mobilization before the end of the next year. This was followed promptly by an appeal from the acting secretary general of the United Nations to both parties to settle the difference between them amicably, accompanied by an expression of the expectation that they would take the necessary steps towards this.[11]

On the Dutch side, Kennedy's offer of mediation of 10 December led to elaborate attempts by Van Royen to feel the pulse of the authorities in Washington, in particular Undersecretary Averyll Harriman. His point of departure here was the instructions from the Dutch Cabinet to ask for American co-operation in getting the negotiations with Indonesia, as specified in the first point of the Brazzaville resolution, underway. The results of his probes were anything but encouraging. On 20 December Van Roijen reported to The Hague that

Kennedy's warning to Sukarno about the consequences of Indonesian aggression did *not* imply that the Netherlands in that event would be able to count on American military, or even logistic, support. This would only be possible in the unlikely case that Australia were to become involved in the hostilities and to appeal to the United States for support on the basis of the ANZUS treaty. Things would change also when the time for 'a major confrontation with the Soviet Union' came, though even in that case it was uncertain if America would involve New Guinea as well, according to Van Roijen. 'In any case the possibility that they would commit themselves prior to such an event, in such a way that the Netherlands might take this into account in its military planning, must be excluded.'

Apart from that, the discussions were about the possible role of America in getting the consultations between the Netherlands and Indonesia off the ground. The message was that the United States wanted to avoid stepping too much into the limelight, but desired to keep its hands free so as to be able to be of service to both parties in equal measure as a 'helpful friend'. Then the ideas on a United Nations interim administration, formulated in the preceding UN meetings, were developed further. The State Department did have some understanding for the Indonesian wish for a referendum in New Guinea to be preceded by a few years of Indonesian administration, though Van Roijen's hosts immediately conceded that this demand was going too far. Indonesia might possibly be persuaded to accept an arrangement whereby it could be involved in developments in New Guinea in an early phase of the UN interim administration in order to redress the problem of the biased education of the Papuans. Thus the talks had returned full circle to Bingham's formula of 22 November. In any case they had given an idea of the American view on the room for discussion on this crucial point.[12]

Following this, lengthy internal cabinet deliberations took place in The Hague on 22 and 23 December. Here Luns gave something of an over-optimistic recapitulation of the results of the consultations in the United States. The drift of this was that the Netherlands had created a good impression with its presentation in the United Nations and should now be quick to pick the fruits of the goodwill gained there. To the question of whether military support was to be expected from America, he replied that in his view Van Roijen, after consulting with Harriman, had not excluded this possibility. These were the most reassuring terms possible in which he was able to pass the message on, but it failed to put the minds of the council at ease. The ensuing debate in fact was dominated by the theme of the mounting Indonesian military threat, added to the consideration that the Netherlands was not bound to do the impossible. The latter idea was put forward by, among others, Bot, who up to then had

made a consistently firm stand against the wishes of the Indonesians. It was quite clear from the speakers' reactions that Sukarno's Trikora speech had definitely made an impression on them. The matter could no longer be allowed to take its course uninterrupted, but good advice was hard to get. One possibility was to lodge a complaint with the Security Council, but after some discussion the ministers decided against this. Earlier experiences with the UNCI instituted by the Security Council had hardly been encouraging, while under the current circumstances the council's passiveness in the Goa issue was no recommendation, either. After all, there a proposal for an appeal for a 'ceasefire' to the parties involved had come up against a Russian veto. Chances were high that something similar would happen to the Netherlands if Indonesia were actually to launch an attack.

The other option was to start direct discussions with Indonesia at this moment, as this country itself desired and Rijkens and his group were urging. It was impossible to brush this alternative aside without further ado, among other reasons because several ministers, Zijlstra in particular, were in favour of it. Luns opposed the proposal with the argument that in that case the Netherlands would inevitably come off worst, as Indonesia was bound to come up after the event with a distorted version of what had actually been said. He referred to the Dutch experiences in the Geneva talks in 1956, when Anak Agung had presented a half-time score in the negotiations that he had formulated himself as the end result of the consultations. Hence he subscribed only grudgingly to the majority view that it would be best for the government to abide by the recommendation of the Brazzaville resolution and talk to Sukarno under the supervision of the United States or the United Nations. This in turn provoked a heated debate on whether the demand for the right of self-determination should in fact be a precondition for entering into such talks. The acting United Nations secretary general, U Thant, who had recently succeeded Dag Hammarskjöld after the latter lost his life in a plane crash, had warned against this from New York. Ministers Luns and Toxopeus in particular found it hard to make any concessions on this point, however. Eventually Luns made one slight concession, coming up with a compromise already discussed by Van Roijen with Harriman. Acceptance of the right of self-determination need not necessarily be a precondition, but would be the point of departure for the Dutch in an open discussion with Indonesia.[13]

The upshot of this debate was that a number of telegrams were dispatched even while the meeting was still in progress. The first of these was addressed to U Thant. In it De Quay assured the secretary general that the Dutch, too, were worried about the developments in relations with Indonesia and were actively looking for ways of reaching a solution that would be acceptable to both

parties.[14] Then the conclusions of the meeting of the council of ministers were cabled to Van Roijen. The latter was instructed to convey the message to Harriman that the Netherlands was prepared to enter into open talks with Indonesia, taking the right of self-determination as its point of departure, in which connection it had a preference for the presence of a third party. In addition he was to find out what assistance was to be expected from the Americans.[15] After Christmas, all this was set down in a statement to the First Chamber of 2 January 1962. The Netherlands was aiming at consultations with Indonesia in a wider context. Although the right of self-determination would not be a precondition, the interests of the Papuan people remained a stake in the negotiations, as far as this country was concerned. It was expected that Indonesia for its part would now also be prepared to join in the discussions without prior conditions.[16]

This step marked the end of the course first adopted in 1951. Not only the status of New Guinea, but also the right of self-determination as such had once more become the subject of negotiation with Indonesia. In the Second Chamber debate of 3 January 1962 the reactions were on the whole positive, the most negative coming from the PvdA, which now declared the government unfit to conduct the forthcoming negotiations with Indonesia. Practically speaking, the objections went no further than that this party feared that the government would show insufficient flexibility in these negotiations—an objection also voiced by the anti-revolutionary camp (Biesheuvel). De Quay in his rejoinder was able to point out that the cabinet he led had been the first to be prepared to negotiate about the status of New Guinea at all, provided this could take place in a broader context.

In its further clarifications the government was bound by the American request to say as little as possible about the deliberations in Washington. The impartial mediator had to keep his hands free, after all. This immediately gave rise to problems, as the government was basing the possibility of talks on an assurance from Washington that Indonesia would not impose any conditions either. While the Chamber was still assembled, reports were received from Jakarta, however, that Subandrio was only prepared to negotiate on the basis of a transfer of sovereignty. Hence the Chamber had more than enough cause for scepticism, which was shared by the government. On the whole the debate did not produce any new insights. At the end, the government was free to explore the possibilities of a different course.

For Luns personally this was a black day, and matters did not get any better when the members of parliament Lankhorst and Burger raised the question whether his person might not pose an obstacle to the solution of the problem preoccupying the Chamber. Naturally, De Quay thereupon stressed that the

Cabinet had total confidence in the way in which the minister was implementing his policies. This was cold comfort, however. Luns for his part retorted with an angry swipe at the extra-parliamentary activities and at the members of the Chamber who had engaged in these. He ended with a bitter condemnation of Indonesia, which had gone on threatening war in spite of the hand the Netherlands was holding out to it. If it carried out its threats, this would be a blow 'directed not first and foremost at the Netherlands, or even the Papuan people, but at the international legal order'. For the consequences to be expected from this, Indonesia would be solely and exclusively to blame.[17] Though the minister's remarks were well-intentioned, they were not calculated to dispel the doubts of the two persons raising the question. For many, and certainly for Luns, it was anything but a foregone conclusion that the difference with Indonesia might be settled by means of peaceful negotiation.

Talking under pressure

The military situation

The Cabinet's decision to negotiate with Indonesia was the prelude to an enervating period, which would last until 15 August 1962, the date on which the Netherlands ceded New Guinea to that country by signing the New York Agreement. The negotiations took place under the umbrella of the United Nations, but were in actual fact carefully stage-managed by the United States. In addition, this period was characterized by the rapid build-up of the Indonesian armed forces, in which the Russian, American and other military investments were beginning to bear fruit. Sukarno's Trikora speech of 19 December 1961 was the starting signal for this build-up of the offensive forces. An operational command was formed, in which the Indonesian army, navy and air force were to co-operate in the conquest of Dutch New Guinea. The chief of this command was Major General Suharto, later president of Indonesia. It is difficult to get an exact picture of the subsequent build-up, for which we are dependent on the reports of the Dutch and American intelligence services. Around the turn of the year 1961, Indonesia had a huge army of 283,000 at its disposal. The air force comprised ninety fighter planes, sixty six bombers and sixty transport planes. The navy, in addition, consisted of a fleet of six destroyers, a few submarines and over a hundred smaller vessels. The Dutch had a few *Koninklijke Landmacht* battalions, a battalion of marines and a small air force, the core of which was formed by the twelve Hunter fighter jets that had accompanied the *Karel Doorman*, available to them in New Guinea. Their navy had three medium-sized warships nearby, plus a few dozen smaller vessels.

Additionally, the first of the ten new Neptunes on order—versatile aircraft suitable for reconnaissance as well as combat duties—arrived in New Guinea at the end of 1961. The air force was concentrated on Biak, while the army and marine units were spread over a series of posts along the coast, the strongest concentrations being in Sorong, Jefman, Merauke, Kaimana and Fakfak.

Hence numerically as well as materially, there was an overwhelming Indonesian majority. Over against this, however, the Dutch had experienced personnel on local standby, while there was the possibility of the dispatch of substantial reinforcements from the Netherlands where and when necessary. They could also count on the support of virtually the entire population of New Guinea. The Indonesian resources, on the other hand, were spread over the vast territory of Indonesia and would not be able to get to the area of operation immediately. The organization of the assault command, which necessitated the formation of an efficient offensive force from among the large body of troops, had not even started. Even then, the lines of attack would be long and vulnerable, the more so if Dutch units proceeded to conduct pre-emptive strikes at intermediate air bases. The American report consulted for the above account assumes that, if Sukarno were to launch an attack, he might possibly manage to occupy one or two of the places on the west coast, whereas an attack on Biak for the time being remained beyond his reach. This would change in the foreseeable future, however, once the last consignments of materials on order in the Soviet Union and the accompanying trained personnel became available. This was expected to be the case towards the end of 1962. Under those circumstances the Indonesians could be presumed to have the capability to defeat the Dutch forces stationed in New Guinea.[18]

The above estimates tallied with Dutch assessments. In the course of March 1962 the Dutch general staff arrived at the conclusion that the enemy's build-up had progressed so far that Indonesia would achieve military superiority before the end of the year. All this was accompanied by constant Indonesian threats. In that same period the Indonesian information service installed a strong radio transmitter in Ambon, whereby it was placing this threat on the doorstep of the inhabitants of New Guinea daily. It was obvious that both parties were on the eve of a race between diplomats and the military, whereby it was anything but certain that the former would win. Here we should bear in mind that the Dutch for their part definitely had no intention of letting the situation escalate into a major military confrontation. After all, the Dutch government had announced its willingness to negotiate as early as 2 January. Military efforts were intended to avoid a situation in which they would have to negotiate from a position of acute weakness.

On the Indonesian side, this was not so clear. Now that the course of the

build-up of an offensive force, adopted in 1958, was beginning to pay off, it became increasingly attractive for more militant groups to actually start using this force. On the other hand, the military top brass entertained grave doubts as to whether such a course was right and desirable. Not only would it drive the country further and further into the arms of the Soviet Union, and thus strengthen the position of the PKI within the state, but it also remained to be seen if a military force assembled so hastily would be able to overcome the enormous logistical problems entailed by such an operation. As far as can be ascertained, these doubts were strongest in the circle of officers surrounding Nasution. To judge from the reports from Jones and the Dutch intelligence service, around the turn of the year a mood of nervousness prevailed in political circles in Jakarta, with people realizing with some dismay that the moment at which the verbal threat of war would have to be converted into deeds was approaching. It seems that the more the build-up progressed, the more Sukarno in particular was tempted to really press ahead now, and thus crown Indonesia's struggle for independence in a spectacular way.

Hence for each party it was a matter of negotiating and meanwhile trying to strengthen its own military position, albeit each with a different emphasis. On the Dutch side the accent was definitely on the former, though this needed to be viewed in interrelation with the latter. For both, United States co-operation was an essential factor, and more acutely so now than before. As far as Luns was concerned, it was time for Dulles' undertakings to prove their practical worth, if not in fending off an attack, then at least in strengthening the Dutch negotiating position. He refused to take at face value the very definite information about American reluctance with which Van Roijen had furnished him.

This was not without good reason. Dulles' undertakings of 1958 still possessed a certain relevance for the American policymakers of 1962. Only, the Dutch should not be given the chance to use these against them. Thus Harriman observed in an internal discussion in February that, though these undertakings were not equivalent to an 'open commitment', they did entail something of an obligation. Therefore he personally felt that overt Indonesian aggression would put the Americans under great pressure to go to the aid of their Dutch allies to enable them to defend themselves. Whether or not such support would actually be given would be dependent on the circumstances.[19]

Thus for each party it was a matter of exploring the other's boundaries. As regards the Netherlands, we see this position reflected in the council of ministers debates of the first months of 1962. The ministers were prepared to talk, but did not wish to create the impression that the Netherlands had 'come round'. On the question of when that might, in fact, be the case there was no unanimity, though on the other hand there were no very clearly pronounced views on

the matter either. The Indonesian precondition of transfer of sovereignty was carefully avoided. A number of ministers, namely Zijlstra, Beerman, Cals, and to some extent the prime minister, were prepared to give in on this point to some extent. They, too, attached importance to the right of self-determination, however, and realized that little would come of this if the Indonesian point of departure were accepted a priori. As far as Luns was concerned this was the crux of the matter. His efforts in the coming months continued to be directed at salvaging as much as possible of this right, and thus saving his own face. Towards this end it was essential for the Dutch to occupy as strong as possible a negotiating position vis-à-vis Indonesia as well as America.

The debate on this was conducted chiefly within the council. Here a heated discussion immediately broke out on 6 January 1962 about when there would be question of *force majeure* and the Netherlands would be compelled to throw in the towel. Although this discussion was conducted with passion, no clear conclusions were drawn.[20] Parliament was almost entirely sidelined. The parliamentary committees, on the other hand, were kept fairly regularly informed, though always with the greatest reserve in view of the desired secrecy, as leaks were apt to occur. This gave rise to an atmosphere of suspicion, although on the whole there was sufficient support for the Cabinet's policies all the time. The press, too, kept a fairly low profile throughout this exciting period, even though it grew increasingly impatient as time went on. Nevertheless, the absence of clear information gave third parties room for manoeuvre. There was, in fact, question in this period of a revival of the extra-parliamentary actions, which had temporarily subsided after the government's threatening language of August 1961 and during the subsequent talks in New York and Washington.

American diplomatic assistance

A serious handicap in the hesitant attempts to get the talks between the Netherlands and Indonesia underway was the non-existence of any form of diplomatic relations between The Hague and Jakarta. These relations had been broken off in August 1960, while after the Independence Day speech of the following year, Indonesia had even refused to let Great Britain take care of Dutch affairs in Jakarta—a fairly unusual and moreover clumsy manoeuvre in international relations. The Americans, upon being sounded out about this by the Dutch, had not been prepared to take over this role, though they continued to fulfil it even so, be it in an extremely inadequate way. The Netherlands had to pick up any signals from Jakarta via the press, or at best through the intermediary of the American ambassador in Jakarta, Howard Jones. In addition, it occasionally gleaned some information via connections in Indonesian government circles. By their very nature, however, the latter only lent themselves to one-way

communication and hence made a very limited contribution to the quality of the debates. The principal outcome of all these reports was that Luns was strengthened in his conviction that Sukarno was the evil genius of Indonesian politics, egged on and manipulated by Subandrio.[21]

Ambassador Jones' behaviour was in itself, from the Dutch point of view, a source of confusion. This motivated diplomat arrogated a wide margin to himself in his dealings with his own minister, omitting to pass on any information between Washington and the Indonesians that he did not consider to be in the interests of the cause he was fighting for. Furthermore, the reports from Washington to The Hague were of necessity selective, as American and Dutch interests did not coincide, after all. The Indonesian preconditions were not always forwarded to the Dutch, with the object of thus luring the latter to the negotiating table. As we saw above, the decision to negotiate was cabled to New York and Washington immediately after the meeting of the Dutch council of ministers of 23 December 1961. On 27 December Rusk was able to inform Van Roijen that Sukarno had told Jones that he, too, was prepared to talk without preconditions and agreed to the presence of a third party, dropping the name U Thant in this connection.[22] This all seemed fine. The next day, however, Rusk's assistants did their utmost to stop the Dutch government passing this message on to the Dutch parliament.[23] A few days later again, Van Roijen was given to understand that Jones had misheard and that all Sukarno wanted was an open discussion about the mode of transfer.[24]

Something similar happened around 5 January, when U Thant asked both parties if they were prepared to negotiate on the basis of the fifth operative article of the (defeated) Indian resolution, whereby he himself was to act as moderator. The Dutch reacted by saying that, though they were definitely willing to talk, they could not accept any reference to the Indian resolution, as this contained no mention of the right of self-determination. Subandrio for his part reacted positively to this suggestion, however, and requested Jones to transmit this message to New York, only to be told by the ambassador two weeks later that he had omitted to do so. Jones' reason had been, as he informed the department in Washington, that he had not wanted the United Nations to seize the initiative from him. America was no errand boy! As a consequence, there was no Indonesian reaction to U Thant's offer, so that the Indonesian representative at the United Nations, Lapian, thought his country had rejected U Thant's moderatorship.[25]

A third well-documented example occurred on 3 April 1962, when the State Department sent a message to The Hague that the Indonesian government had accepted the recently proposed Bunker plan, omitting, however, to mention that it had done so subject to a number of conditions that were unacceptable to

the Netherlands. It was a successful attempt at luring the Dutch to the negotiating table more quickly, but the result was a long, deep crisis, which almost led to the collapse of the talks.[26] As a consequence of all this, the American actions were viewed with suspicion in The Hague. This suspicion was directed first and foremost at Jones, who had made himself quite unpopular here. Matters did not exactly improve when it became known that the ambassador had felt impelled to loudly shout '*Merdeka*'(Freedom) into the microphone held in front of him after a speech by Sukarno in Macassar, where he had followed the latter. Seeing that the subject of this speech had been almost inevitably New Guinea, he had thus seemed to the Dutch to be publicly endorsing Sukarno's policies in this respect. No formal protest was lodged with the American government, but the ambassador's reputation as 'Merdeka Jones' was established once and for all.[27]

The dispute about the preconditions

Let us trace here the developments from the moment the Dutch government defined its standpoint around Christmas 1961. In the final days of that year, Van Roijen was in close consultation with Harriman, to whom he passed on three messages on behalf of the Dutch government. The first was that the Netherlands was prepared to negotiate without preconditions, though also without giving up its commitment to the right of self-determination. This news was greeted with approval. The second concerned a request for the Americans to play a role as 'third party' in the negotiations. This was met with great reserve, as Rusk stuck to his preference for quiet diplomacy, since a neutral stand would give him more room for manoeuvre and would prevent the Dutch leaning too heavily on the United States. So he told Van Roijen that he did not want to move too much into the foreground as mediator. He therefore recommended that a UN functionary be invited as observing party at the negotiations. Luns had no objection to this, while the Dutch government also agreed. The final choice would depend on, among other things, Indonesian preferences.

The third message involved a request for American military support. As we saw above, Van Roijen came back with little encouraging news about this. Preceding the interview, Rusk had been instructed by Kennedy to make it clear that direct bilateral support to the Netherlands was ruled out. For Luns this reaction was a source of disappointment and deep vexation. Uncle Sam's finger was pointing inexorably to the negotiating table, and no substantial support for the Dutch position was to be expected.

The Dutch minister was not prepared to accept this sitting down. In order to nip American doubts about Dutch determination in the bud, Van Roijen was instructed to point out clearly to Rusk once more that the Dutch armed forces

would offer 'all-out' resistance in the event of an Indonesian attack. This Van Roijen did during a visit to the State Department on 3 January 1962.[28] Luns gave him permission to try and test the value of the earlier American undertakings further. In the next few days the ambassador approached the American authorities about the use of American airfields for flying over Dutch marines in the event of an Indonesian attack on New Guinea. Together with Luns, he felt that it would not be a bad idea to remind the Americans of the agreements about this made in 1958 and 1959, so that they would be ready to hand in case of need.[29]

On the Indonesian side, there were no new initiatives on the diplomatic front after Sukarno's and Subandrio's weak overtures had come up against Jones' unwillingness to act as errand boy. Among the Indonesian diplomats in Washington and at the United Nations there was uncertainty about their own government's standpoint. There were speculations about possible solutions, however, with a formula for giving the Papuans a choice at some point after a period of Indonesian rule still being given the most thought.[30] In Jakarta, meanwhile, the authorities had other things on their mind. On 2 January a meeting between Sukarno and his military staff took place there. Nine days later the *Komando Mandala* (regional command) for the liberation of West Irian was created under Suharto's command. This was attended with threats against the Dutch in New Guinea.[31] That these needed to be taken seriously became apparent on 15 January, when three Indonesian torpedo boats were seen heading at full speed for Vlakke Hoek, on the south coast of New Guinea, opposite the Aru Islands, in the afternoon. The group formed part of a larger unit, which also included a troop transport ship. The expedition had been spotted well in advance by the *Nederlandse Marine Inlichtingen Dienst* (Marid; Dutch Naval Intelligence Service) and was awaited by a number of ships and aircraft. Just before eight in the evening, hence well after dark, a Dutch Neptune did some reconnaissance of the Indonesian ships. Thereupon the small fleet was approached by two Dutch frigates. Just before ten, when the ships were within about twenty miles of the coast, the Dutch Neptune fired a flare, whereupon the Indonesian ships fired shots at it. Following this, a combat situation developed, with the Indonesian ships first heading further north and west and the Dutch ships opening fire on them. As a result, one of the torpedo boats caught fire and sank after a while. The other two managed to escape after a wild chase. The ship that had sunk turned out to be the *Matjan Tutul*, which in addition to its usual naval crew of forty-five was carrying thirty-five land troops equipped with arms and landing craft. From later interrogations it transpired that the object of the venture had been to put about 100 landing troops on land near Kaimana, where they had been instructed to liquidate the Dutch local government. It was an aptly chosen place, as it contained a sizeable Indonesian community, which

might be expected to support the Indonesian cause. In the attack, around fifty Indonesian naval and military personnel lost their lives, including the commander of the expedition, Commodore Jos Sudarso.[32] The failure of the expedition was attributable chiefly to the fact that the Dutch navy had kept it under surveillance long in advance.

This Indonesian assault marked the beginning of a new phase in Indonesian military strategy.[33] There was now no longer question of poorly armed infiltrators of dubious military status. The operation was executed by the navy and army who were equipped with state-of-the-art equipment. The motor torpedo boats were German-made, while from the interrogations it became clear that the land troops had been flown across to the Indonesian base on Dobo by American-supplied Hercules planes. The operation moreover took place shortly after Sukarno's Trikora speech and within less than two weeks after the staff meeting in Jakarta, where its further implementation had been discussed. Hence it was impossible to view the whole thing as anything less than a slap in the face for diplomacy. Because of its unfortunate ending, it was also a slap in the face for the Indonesian military. Dutch intelligence reports reveal that the event caused great commotion in Jakarta, with Nasution putting the blame on Sukarno, who as supreme commander had allegedly pushed through the whole enterprise. The buck was finally passed to the latter's confidant Suriadarma, the commander of the Indonesian air force, who was reproached with failure to retaliate with an air strike on the Dutch ships immediately after the incident. His resignation was announced a few days later.[34]

Besides these reports, we also have Jones' observations. Visiting Subandrio the day after the incident, he described the latter's state of mind as 'bewildered, discouraged, totally devoid of his usual resilience'. He had spent the morning in the palace, where he had discussed the events of the previous night with the president, Prime Minister Djuanda, and the army, navy and air force commanders. Subandrio spoke of a provocative Dutch attack at sea, in which the Dutch had fired the first shot. The meeting had concerned itself virtually exclusively with the question of how to retaliate, and according to Subandrio, those present had felt that haste was of the essence. The counter-action would have to take place before the large Dutch fleet units that were still in the Mediterranean Sea and the Caribbean area had time to concentrate in New Guinea. War now seemed inevitable!

Jones tried to calm the excited minister down somewhat. In his message to Washington, however, he reported entirely in the latter's spirit, warning in all seriousness about the possibility of Dutch attacks on the ports of Surabaya and Jakarta, which would then jeopardize American interests in Indonesia. Hence he was advising in advance against stopping American arms aid as a

counter-measure against the Dutch action. He further pleaded in favour of using the incident at Vlakke Hoek as an excuse for intensified American political activity, suggesting that before the start of the negotiations Sukarno should make a statement about the right of self-determination in exchange for Dutch preparedness to discuss the transfer of the administration to Indonesia.

Jones' cable does not make clear if this is what he had agreed with Subandrio.[35] The UN specialist Cleveland nevertheless put the idea to Van Roijen in Washington that same day as an Indonesian proposal, further embellishing it with the announcement that Sukarno's statement would include a promise about the right of self-determination for the Papuans after a five-year period of Indonesian rule. Van Roijen reacted to this by now more than familiar idea by saying that no self-respecting government could be expected to openly show itself prepared to put everything on the table before negotiations even started. In his view it was high time for the Indonesians to react first to U Thant's attempts at mediation, which had commenced in the meantime, with the latter once more appealing to both parties, after receiving news of the incident at Vlakke Hoek, to start talking immediately.

On 17 January Cleveland's staff were able to give more details about Indonesia's preparedness to negotiate, referring to 'what the Indonesians had said in Jakarta'. To be on the safe side, they added the reservation that these statements dated to before the action near Vlakke Hoek, adding that it was not always possible to guarantee 'that the Indonesian arguments, elliptical as they usually are, are interpreted entirely correctly'. On this shaky basis, the Americans had nevertheless arrived at the conclusion that the Indonesians desired exploratory talks at the ambassadorial level first, without the presence of a third party. These talks would have to remain top secret. Official negotiations, 'introduced by statements by both governments, as indicated by Cleveland', would then be able to start only at a later stage. Van Roijen restricted his comments to his statements of the day before, and reiterated the Dutch view once again that bilateral talks without the presence of a third party were unacceptable.[36]

The next step was an interview between U Thant and Kennedy, in which a virtually identical plan was put on the table, the crux of which was also a period of Indonesian rule followed by self-determination. This was forwarded to Van Roijen via U Thant and the Dutch United Nations representative, Schürmann, on 20 January, whereupon the former immediately approached his counterparts at the State Department. The ambassador, who had meanwhile been briefed by Luns, expressed his 'keen disappointment' at the fact that this proposal, which, he felt, wholly reflected the Indonesian standpoint, had been put forward by the Americans. He further pointed out to Cleveland that the latter

had not so long ago himself rejected a similar plan, which he had then described as grotesque. Cleveland immediately got in touch with Kennedy about this reaction, whereupon the latter distanced himself from the proposal to some extent, saying that it had only been considered as a casual suggestion by U Thant, in case the talks really got off the ground.[37] Cleveland again faithfully passed this message on to Van Roijen, not omitting to add, however, that under the current circumstances a United Nations trusteeship of the kind suggested in the Luns plan would also involve one or other form of Indonesian interim administration. Evidently he did not consider the idea quite as 'grotesque' as his Dutch guest had thought after all. Luns, at any rate, took the matter seriously enough to inform the Australian, Belgian and British governments of the suggestion as well, adding that it was totally unacceptable. What stung him in particular was that Kennedy and U Thant were now making proposals for a material solution without consulting the Dutch.[38]

The question of what the Netherlands should do about this was becoming crucial, as at the same time an Indonesian reaction to U Thant's appeals of 15 and 17 January was received. The document contained a bitter condemnation of the Dutch actions at Vlakke Hoek, which it termed unjust. It nevertheless ended with the message that the Indonesians were willing to talk.[39] In this connection Sudjarwo Tjondronegoro was mentioned as negotiator.[40] This diplomat arrived at his post in New York around 24 January. On his visit of introduction to U Thant, he informed the latter that, although Sukarno wanted a transfer of sovereignty, he was prepared to make some sort of undertaking with regard to the exercise of the right of self-determination by the people after a certain period of Indonesian rule. This represented a top-level Indonesian endorsement of the idea that had been discussed by the American and Indonesian delegations ever since November 1961. On that same day Sukarno indicated that there were other alternatives as well when he gave the go-ahead for the general mobilization announced earlier in his Trikora speech.

In the meantime similar suggestions about the methods and the contents of the negotiations were reaching the Netherlands via other channels. In addition to the signals from Jakarta, whether or not these had been correctly transmitted, there were always the Indonesian statements to third parties. As before, the Indonesian embassies in Europe played a major part in passing these on, with that in Bonn being particularly active in this respect. This provoked renewed actions by, among others, Professors Van Hamel and Duynstee, as well as Mayor De Gou of Venlo. In this rather shadowy discourse it never became clear what really was the exact meaning of any given statement, which as a result was always liable to be revoked at will. Luns was firmly convinced that the entire operation was intended by the Indonesians to show that the Netherlands was

prepared to concede more than the official statements led people to believe, and thus to undermine his negotiating position. He was supported in this view by the Cabinet, although the difference between him and the prime minister in the assessment of the value of these messages remained.[41]

More serious were the various attempts at establishing direct relations at the ambassadorial level. These led to an interview between the Dutch ambassador to Britain, Bentinck, and his Indonesian colleague, the ambassador in Moscow, Adam Malik, in London on 30 January 1962. Rumour had it that Sukarno had appointed the latter as his agent. Bentinck had been given permission by De Quay only to listen. He got to hear the same message that Sudjarwo was relaying to U Thant at about the same time, including the five-year term of Indonesian rule preceding the Papuans' exercise of the right of self-determination. Bentinck's sole contribution to the interview consisted in his insistence on discussions under the supervision of a third party. This was blocked by Malik, however, according to whom talks under U Thant's supervision might only take place in the final phase. Bentinck was able to report that the mood at these meetings had been positive.[42] Obviously these meetings by their very nature could not end in definite conclusions, but they must have left Malik with the impression that it was possible to talk to the Netherlands on this basis. At the end of the talks Bentinck was in fact convinced that his Indonesian counterpart would set out for Jakarta forthwith to ask for authorization to continue talking on this basis, but here he was mistaken. Malik returned to his post in Moscow and for the time being kept a low profile. In any case, however, the people in Jakarta now had some idea of the options.

A reaction was now expected from the Netherlands. It was impossible to ignore Sudjarwo's formal reply of the 24th to U Thant's invitation. Ambassador Schürmann's first reaction was negative. Like Van Roijen before him, he reminded the secretary general that the Americans had only a few weeks before that described a similar proposal as grotesque. It was, in fact, a far cry indeed from the Dutch statement of 2 January, in which the government in The Hague had declared itself to be prepared to negotiate only if there were no preconditions. U Thant looked at it differently and thought that the Indonesian reply definitely did offer an opening for more detailed consultation. He therefore proposed that the Dutch make a public appeal via him to Sukarno to discuss an agenda for the coming negotiations in his presence.[43] This proposal came up for discussion in the Dutch council of ministers on 26 January. Luns appeared irritated. De Quay had authorized Bentinck to go and talk without consulting him first. His bad mood was caused not so much by the prime minister's wilful behaviour, however, as by the fact that a transfer of sovereignty to Indonesia now suddenly seemed to be becoming a serious option. There were other things

besides about which he was displeased. Obviously the news of the general mobilization in Indonesia gave him little cause for optimism. Nor was the projected visit of the Papuan student Frits Kirihio to Indonesia, arranged by the journalist Hofland with the co-operation of the Indonesian embassy in Bonn, to his liking. Lastly, an appearance of Nasution's trusted associate, Ujeng Suwargana, in the Netherlands was now threatening. Up till then the latter had played a role as contact between Nasution and Duynstee from Belgium and Germany, but Minister of Justice Beerman was now contemplating granting him a visa to the Netherlands, where doubtless he would establish new contacts. Luns had every reason to fear that this kind of action would put another spanner in the works. All comments in Indonesia and the alternative circuit contained sharp criticism of Minister Luns' policies and person.

The remainder of the discussions in the council took place in an atmosphere of despair. One or two points were decided in Luns' favour. Bentinck was put in his place and De Quay resigned himself to the situation. Ujeng was granted his visa and Kirihio's trip to Indonesia also took place, as there were no good grounds for refusing either. There was deadlock on the principal point. There was serious doubt about, and on Luns' part outright aversion to, accepting U Thant's proposal. The old divisions became perceptible here once again, with Minister of Defence Visser showing himself to be most resolute. In his opinion, the Netherlands should simply stick to the standpoint that a transfer of sovereignty against the wishes of the Papuan people was out of the question. Then they would all just have to wait and see how things turned out! The minister of internal affairs, Toxopeus, also took the view that the Dutch should not come forward with any more new proposals, but should have more faith in their own policies. Even Minister Cals, who off and on had shown some leniency towards the Indonesians, now felt compelled to observe that it would not be in the interests of the indigenous people if Dutch rule disappeared and the small Papuan elite lite was massacred. The ministers were aware, on the other hand, that a refusal to talk would be impossible to sell to the outside world, from the perspective of both national and international politics. Minister Zijlstra concluded that union with Indonesia might well be the sole option, but that it was impossible to discuss this seriously on account of the differences about this in the council. The result was that, though Van Roijen and Schürmann were designated as negotiators, De Quay concluded that negotiations on the basis of an agenda with transfer of sovereignty to Indonesia as point of departure would be unacceptable to the Netherlands. The council concurred.[44]

Following this, Van Roijen was summoned to the Netherlands—something which he had urged several times. He was present at the meeting of the

council of ministers of 2 February. In view of the role he played in subsequent developments, it is important to say a few things about his person here. This diplomat, who was 57 years of age at the time, had been minister of foreign affairs in the first Dutch post-war Cabinet, had played a key role at the Round Table Conference, and now again had been designated as chief negotiator. All this is clear evidence of the confidence he enjoyed in broad, particularly progressive, circles. More conservative circles viewed him with suspicion, on the other hand, precisely because of his role at the Round Table Conference. In this connection people were always apt to point to the fact that he had an American mother to underline that he was really half American, with insufficient regard for specifically Dutch interests. It may be noted here that the way he acquitted himself as a diplomat gave no cause for such criticism whatsoever. He always followed his instructions punctiliously and operated constructively within the parameters indicated. That is not to say that his relationship with Luns was entirely unproblematic. The latter had voiced criticism as far back as 1945 about what he regarded as excessively lenient policies of the then Cabinet towards the major powers[45]. This was a cabinet in which Van Roijen held a seat in foreign affairs together with Van Kleffens. The differences between them were once more perceptible now that they were confronting each other again, albeit in different roles. As an official, Van Roijen kept as close as possible to Luns. Now, too, he let it be known that he felt just as annoyed as the minister at the machinations of private individuals discussing all sorts of things with Sukarno's agents behind their backs. In addition he followed the minister in the latter's customarily optimistic approach with regard to the Americans. In his opinion they were not really all that ill-disposed towards the Dutch. As long as the Dutch remained reasonable, they would always be able to solve whatever problems there were between them somehow. He felt that it would be possible with American support to drive the Indonesians to the negotiating table to talk without preconditions. Thus he was actually pleading in favour of a continuation of the policy of playing along with the Americans that had been followed thus far.

This had, in fact, always been Luns' policy up till then. Van Roijen disagreed with the minister, however, about how much room for manoeuvre was to be left the Dutch in this connection. This became plainly apparent at the council of ministers meeting of 2 February, part of which Van Roijen attended. To Minister Van Aartsen's emphatic question whether, in the event of a military encounter, the Netherlands might count on any form of American support, he replied that the American government had not been prepared to hold out any prospects of such support so far. Whether it would at any time in the future would be dependent on circumstances. This was the first time the council

was given to understand this in so many words. Furthermore, Van Roijen's expectations of what might still be achieved were modest. The Brazzaville option stood no chance, but by the same token, a transfer of sovereignty without a plebiscite was beneath Dutch dignity. He made it clear to the council that he was confident that under American pressure the Indonesians would drop their preconditions. Once the parties were sitting around the negotiating table, it would always remain possible to discuss each other's wishes rationally.[46]

Looking at the discussions at these meetings, we may conclude that Van Roijen's view then and later was that negotiations were inevitable, and that, come what may, the outcome of these had to be accepted. One last hope was that sufficient American support might be secured along the way to score some marginal advantage on the point of self-determination. The end result would have to be restoration of relations with Indonesia. On this subject his priorities were the same as those of the extra-parliamentary critics of official policy. They were also the priorities of the State Department, where prominent circles were eager for such a restoration for the sake of keeping the difficult situation in Southeast Asia under control. In this, Luns showed hardly any interest in these years, judging from his repeated assertions about the relative unimportance of Indonesia to the Netherlands. In principle, he, too, was in favour of negotiations, though at the same time he hoped that Indonesian opposition or impotence might constitute an insuperable stumbling block on the way to these. This would then give the Netherlands the chance after all to pursue its own course in New Guinea.

Back in Washington, Van Roijen immediately paid Undersecretary Harriman a visit on 9 February, during which he explained once more to the latter that, in spite of all the press gossip, the Dutch parliament was still firmly backing the government. The Netherlands did not feel that its hands were tied in any way militarily or politically and took the position that only total commitment to the right of self-determination provided a sound basis for negotiation. Its point of departure was a neutral intermediate phase culminating in an act of self-determination. A preceding Indonesian trusteeship was definitely out of the question.[47] He conveyed the same message to his Australian colleague and to the Indonesian ambassador, Zairin Zain. The latter would hear none of it, saying that Sudjarwo had visited various European capitals to take the pulse of opinion there. In response, Van Roijen observed that in that case he had obviously not found any solace there, as he was already back in the Indonesian capital.[48] For the time being the negotiators assigned by The Hague and Jakarta were each going their own separate ways.

Washington's 'knock on the head'

Kennedy nails his colours to the mast

While Van Roijen and Luns were weighing up the chances of aid from Washington, some ominous pieces of news arrived in The Hague from the American capital.[49] As observed above, in the internal discussions between the State Department and the White House in the course of 1961, efforts had increasingly been directed at a solution in conformity with Indonesian wishes. This had already become apparent in informal consultations in the corridors of the United Nations in November 1961, although the significance of these had not quite fully been brought home to the Dutch diplomats, as they were not informed of the internal talks between the American and Indonesian delegations. Luns had grumblingly put aside the warnings passed on to Van Roijen by Sisco, Cleveland and Harriman at the end of these, without giving them a place in his policies. Besides, the encounter at Vlakke Hoek had not gone unnoticed in Washington. According to Van Roijen, the way the Dutch navy had acquitted itself there had created a favourable impression on American public opinion. Over against this, the State Department and White House staffs had been given proof that Sukarno was serious and would not shrink from using violence again. This confirmed the need for haste in taking the path indicated in the various memoranda. For the United States, international complications carried more weight than the question of whether or not the Netherlands was in the right.[50]

This became obvious straightaway from American reactions to the Vlakke Hoek incident, in which up-to-date, recently supplied equipment was used for the first time. At Dutch promptings, most Western suppliers of weapons had always done so on condition that the equipment would not be deployed against the Dutch in New Guinea, and Indonesia had invariably promised this as a matter of course. The Indonesian operation at Vlakke Hoek was carried out using German equipment, though American planes, too, had been deployed in the preparations for the operation. Then, as well as later, Hercules planes were regularly used in Indonesian operations, their Indonesian crews being assisted by instructors from the American Lockheed factory until the moment of take-off. The European allies suspended arms aid to Indonesia immediately after the incident. Not so the United States, which resumed its supplies after an inconspicuously implemented two-week freeze. This country drew no conclusions from Indonesia's breach of the terms of supply. This was, as the State Department officials never tired of saying, in order to be able to keep a handle on the diplomatic process. Both parties had asked the Americans 'to take an

active interest in the matter'. America was the only major Western power that was still able to influence developments in Indonesia. The Americans therefore felt they had their own responsibility and in this connection wanted to continue making their own choices. The State Department and the Pentagon were primarily interested in maintaining relations with Nasution, which they considered essential if they were to retain any influence.[51] The same American reserve was in evidence in the granting of landing facilities for Dutch troop transports to New Guinea. At the beginning of 1962 a few hundred army personnel who had spent Christmas in the Netherlands had to be flown back. Normally they would have been flown in civilian clothes on the regular KLM flight from Amsterdam to Sydney via Tokyo and Biak. This time, in order to fly as many personnel back to the area as speedily as possible, which was desirable in view of the tense situation, a few extra planes were chartered. Though normally on this flight there was a routine stopover in Tokyo, the Japanese authorities, at the urgent request of the Indonesians, now refused the necessary permission for this, thus creating a situation comparable to that at the time of the *Karel Doorman*'s visit to Japan in 1960. As an alternative, the Dutch then decided to resort to special charter flights via Alaska (Anchorage) and Hawaii, deliberately making the requisite announcement of this to the American authorities at very short notice. The first plane was, in fact, given landing permission on 2 February, as it had already been on its way when the application arrived in Washington, for which favourable outcome Harriman's intervention was chiefly to thank. The second flight was stopped, however, with the argument that these were not private but government flights, for which separate permission was necessary. Doubtless this decision was partly prompted by the actions of the Japanese, as well as by the smashing of the windows of the American embassy in Jakarta by protesting students after the first flight had been permitted to proceed.[52]

For the Netherlands, this was one in a series of setbacks. The Dutch had not expected that the matter would be taken as seriously as it was, with Luns and Van Roijen viewing this as a good opportunity for testing the value of the American undertakings about logistic support. In this respect the action was a logical follow-up to Van Roijen's efforts to find out how the land lay in January, when the Americans had restricted themselves to listening attentively. This most recent experience served to confirm Van Roijen's gloomy message of 27 December. Now that an appeal was actually made to them, the Americans turned out, in spite of all protestations of friendship, to be unprepared to stick out their necks, even in an inoffensive case like this. This became even more obvious when KLM tried to solve the problem by deploying a few larger planes on the regular route. This again came up against American-Japanese opposition, so that this plan, too, had to be given up. The soldiers eventually reached

their destination after all, as the Japanese agreed to a resumption of regular flights via Tokyo with soldiers wearing civilian dress on board.[53]

As indicated above, for the Dutch, transport via America had not only been desirable, but at the same time had functioned as some sort of a test case. What Luns and Van Roijen did not realize was that the authorities in Washington had recognized it as such and for their part had used it as an effective means of confirming Harriman's message of 27 December regarding logistic support. For Harriman it was an opportunity to demonstrate that the Dutch should not count on this. They certainly ought not to believe that they possessed an automatic right of transit and passage through American airspace on the basis of the agreements of 1958 and 1959. Every decision about this would be taken separately in each individual case.[54] This did not mean, though, that American support would always remain out of the question, but as far as the Americans were concerned, it was not the business of the Dutch to know this. In any case, the incident was an unmistakeable sign of the weak international position of the Netherlands. This was all the more obvious since, to the great annoyance of the Americans, the affair was surrounded with a great deal of publicity both in the Netherlands and in Indonesia, partly because the plane grounded in Anchorage contained a soldier objecting to being sent to New Guinea, who now took grateful advantage of the interest shown by the international press to draw attention to his case. For the Dutch the incident was all the more painful as the Indonesians rightly regarded the course of action adopted by the United States and Japan as a political victory.[55]

A further warning about the limitations of American support was provided by Robert Kennedy's actions during a visit to Indonesia. This younger brother of the American president filled the post of minister of justice in the new government, while at the same time acting as the president's trusted advisor. His trip was a clear sign that the president was personally concerning himself with the New Guinea affair. Subandrio notes in his memoirs, which are on the whole fairly unreliable, that he approached President Kennedy personally after the incident at Vlakke Hoek and that Robert's visit was the direct result of this. In reality, however, the visit had been planned quite some time before this, and Luns had made several attempts to prevent it long before the incident at Vlakke Hoek. Of course it is not impossible that the time eventually chosen for it was prompted by Subandrio's request.[56]

The visit by Kennedy and his wife took place in the second half of February. The American was popular with the Indonesian public because of his boyish behaviour. The visit was moreover important from a practical point of view, even though Kennedy's contacts with his hosts did not go altogether smoothly. The visit confirmed the existing impression in Washington that Indonesia was

determined to get what it wanted and would not shrink from the use of force on another occasion. Kennedy later announced that he had not been altogether taken with Sukarno's personality. Furthermore, he had been annoyed at the Indonesians' expectation that, if it came to the crunch, the United States would come to Indonesia's aid. He attributed this to Jones' compliant approach, the continuation of American arms supplies, and the recent American refusal to grant facilities for continuation of the flight carrying Dutch soldiers in Anchorage. In reaction, he had felt compelled to impress upon his hosts that they should not suppose that America would oppose the Netherlands in case of an armed conflict. He also expressed his displeasure at Sukarno's refusal to negotiate without preconditions, as the Dutch had agreed to. The upshot of this was an agreement with Sukarno that provided some sort of a possible opening. This involved the formula that the Indonesian government would be prepared to drop its preconditions if agreement could be reached about the agenda. Hence secret negotiations would have to take place about the agenda first. At Kennedy's insistence, Sukarno now agreed to the presence of a third party, with the Indonesian preference being for an American not under the United Nations secretary general's supervision. After that, the actual negotiations could take place in U Thant's presence.[57]

At the end of their trip to Indonesia, Kennedy and his wife also paid a visit to The Hague, at the request of the Dutch government, on 25 February. Very little time had been set aside for this, and the officials of both the Dutch embassy in Washington and the American embassy in The Hague had racked their brains about how to turn it into a success. Van Roijen had urged Luns to try and create a positive impression and not to say too much about Dutch irritations with Indonesia and the United States. He felt this was superfluous, as the Indonesians themselves had seen to it that Kennedy left with an unfavourable impression of their country. Complaints about Washington, moreover, were best shelved till Luns' forthcoming visit to the American capital, the principal objective of which would have to be to convince Kennedy of the Papuans' aversion to Indonesia, as well as of the fact that the population of the Netherlands backed their government to a man. According to the ambassador, Kennedy had without a doubt been misinformed on both points in Indonesia, and Luns' visit would provide an excellent opportunity to offer some sort of counterbalance.[58] The American ambassador in The Hague, Rice, adopted a different strategy, aimed at sidelining Luns as much as possible. As far as he was concerned, the timetable for the visit was to be organized so that the loquacious Luns could first waste his ammunition chatting about constitutional matters, and a little more time would be left for a real business talk with De Quay afterwards.[59]

As was to be expected, Luns heeded none of Van Roijen's advice. He was already holding forth in the car with which he had picked up his guests from the airport about the outrageous injustices done to the Netherlands in the past by Indonesia and about the United States' incomprehensible behaviour of the last few months. So there was no time left for him to discuss current affairs, which did not come up during the interview with the affable De Quay, either, for that matter. As a result, Luns followed Kennedy to his next destination, Paris, at the end of the visit in an attempt to make up for lost time. Unfortunately for the minister, this did not yield any tangible results, either, on account of the lateness of the hour. The gist of Kennedy's message was that the Netherlands would do well to go and talk to Sukarno immediately, without the United Nations and, if necessary, in the presence of an American mediator. The reply was that the Dutch government would look forward to seeing Sukarno's proposals. Apart from that, the two sides showed little appreciation of each other. Kennedy was bewildered by the emotionality surrounding the subject in both Indonesia and the Netherlands, while many people in the Netherlands were disgruntled at his insolent behaviour. He had let slip the remark, for instance, that the difference in size between the Netherlands and Indonesia was an important factor. He had further posited that, if the Netherlands was not prepared to fight, then America should certainly not be expected to. This made Minister Toxopeus so angry at the formal dinner in honour of the American guests as to make him leave the room. At the end of the visit, Luns and his fellow-ministers were in complete agreement that the president's brother had obviously been brought round to Jones' point of view. Luns drew some grim satisfaction from the fact that the moment Kennedy left, Sukarno again retracted his statement, sending word from Jakarta that Indonesia was only prepared to talk on the basis of Dutch preparedness to transfer the administration. 'It seems doubtful that Mr Kennedy anticipated these machinations', Luns commented rather scathingly in his report on the matter.[60]

Luns was not impressed with the Americans' behaviour. In accordance with his motto that one should never let oneself be walked over, he made no secret of this, either. The upcoming NATO meeting in Paris offered an excellent opportunity for him to air his feelings on this subject. On 20 February the Dutch representative here, Boon, registered a protest against the American arms supplies, sharply condemning the United States' past and present behaviour. The Americans' weak attitude was having a negative effect on efforts to get negotiations with Indonesia underway. A firm embargo was what was needed to get Sukarno to the negotiating table. Boon was applauded for his presentation by all the West European Union members present. The British representative Ted Heath stated that the Western countries' Indonesia policy had been a failure.

The Americans disagreed, with the representative of the United States affably but resolutely refusing to budge from his standpoint in the subsequent discussion on the subject.[61]

The upshot of all this was that in the Netherlands doubts had increased about whether the United States could be counted on. This was particularly painful for Luns, as he had constantly tried to keep up his fellow-countrymen's spirits by pointing out that Dulles' undertakings of 1958 still held good. The issue became particularly relevant when, in the wake of Vlakke Hoek, the question about sending reinforcements to New Guinea came up in the council of ministers. Minister Visser's first proposal for this dated from 10 February.[62] On 26 February, Van Roijen approached the State Department for permission to use American airspace for flying over two companies of marines. He did not meet with much approval. After some internal discussion, the acting undersecretary for European affairs, Tyler, assured him that, in the opinion of the American government, execution of this plan would be the deathblow for the negotiations. Then followed a friendly request not to submit such a request. This provoked a bitter reaction from Roijen, who concluded that the United States was not permitting the Netherlands to defend itself and thus was bolstering Sukarno's aggressive attitude. He wound up the interview with the observation that this did not exactly give cause for optimism about the forthcoming discussions with Minister Luns in Washington.[63]

The visit by Luns, for which there had been plans for some time, took place at the emphatic request of the Dutch council of ministers, whose members wanted more certainty about the American position. On 2 March 1962 Luns had meetings in Washington with Rusk, Kohler, Harriman, and others. Once again he was received by President Kennedy, but the tone of the conversation was considerably less amicable than during his previous visit of almost a year before. The president reiterated what his brother had said in The Hague, and now went into the details a little further. He informed Luns that for the United States the war in Vietnam took priority, and that that was why it was important to keep on friendly terms with Sukarno. The strategic value of New Guinea was not sufficient to run risks, and the United States did not intend getting directly involved. The message could not have been clearer. The absolute low point for Luns was Kennedy's reaction to his news that the Dutch government had decided to send four ships via the Panama Canal to reinforce the defences of New Guinea. The president's reply to this was that he first needed to discuss this with his defence minister, McNamara. Luns nearly exploded and informed Kennedy that any such discussion was superfluous, as 'no force on earth could prevent the Dutch fleet from using the Panama Canal', except in the fairly unlikely event that the Netherlands declared war on the United States or that

Kennedy decided to follow in Nasser's footsteps and flout all existing treaties.[64]

This is as far as these high-level consultations went. The question of American aid was discussed on a practical level in the talks with Rusk and his officials. Although the latter left slightly more room for manoeuvre, what they had to say hardly sounded more encouraging. Rusk refused to reiterate Dulles' statement of 1958 and strongly advised against sending Dutch reinforcements. He did, however, admit that America would definitely take responsibility for the Dutch if the latter restriction should make it impossible for them to defend themselves. Thereupon he made a statement to Luns in the course of a tête-à-tête, which the minister immediately cabled to De Quay and Van Houten as follows:

1. 'We cannot back your political position with our military might ... [but if hostilities were to break out in the course of the negotiations] ... I assure you that we will use all possible means to prevent the use of force ... we will reconsider our position'.

   Rusk added that I was not to conclude from this statement that he was promising me that the US would definitely take action in this eventuality. Only if hostilities actually broke out would America, at its convenience, take a decision.
2. [In the event of an attack on Dutch New Guinea,] 'the fate of the Dutch citizens and children will be uppermost in our mind and we shall see what we can do to protect them'. These were still, according to Rusk, neither 'irresponsible promises', nor a 'firm commitment'.

The American minister asked Luns to pass the statement on only to his government and not to make it public. Both Luns and Van Roijen in their cables to The Hague showed themselves very pleased with this emphatic statement. They considered it most important and regarded it as 'an undertaking on which we may rely'. As it later turned out, Kennedy and Harriman were also aware of it, while Rusk was moreover prepared to put the undertaking in writing and give Van Roijen a copy.[65]

With regard to negotiations, Luns was informed, in conformity with Robert Kennedy's report, that Sukarno had agreed to secret preliminary discussions without preconditions. As 'third man' the name of the American diplomat Ellsworth Bunker, who would be acting on behalf of the United Nations, was now dropped. From the American point of view, this was an ideal combination. Through the choice of person, the Americans would have a total grip on the negotiations without, as a result of the United Nations link, being accountable. In The Hague the ministers, after receiving Luns' first cabled reports,

concluded at their meetings of 2 and 3 March that not much was to be expected of the United States and that the Papuan people's right of self-determination evidently had no high priority there. Luns was instructed to agree to the discussions about the agenda under the supervision of a third party. In this connection preference was still given to a United Nations representative, though an American was also considered acceptable. These concessions provoked the remark from the pugnacious female minister Marga Klompé that the gentlemen were 'on a slippery slope'.

Meanwhile, it was interesting to observe that the Cabinet was more divided in Luns' absence than usual. The minister for war, Visser, now was on the offensive, fiercely denouncing those who were in favour of waiting a little longer before sending reinforcements. In this connection he was able to refer to a recent belligerent speech by Sukarno and to assertions by Robert Kennedy in Washington that the Indonesians had a strong case in claiming that New Guinea was rightfully part of their country. Then there were panicky telegrams from Hollandia, in which Governor Platteel asked permission to start evacuating Dutch women and children from places on the west coast of New Guinea, where acts of Indonesian aggression were to be expected. The obvious disadvantage of this was that it would cause great unrest in these places, which in turn would be detrimental to the Dutch bargaining position. For Visser the military arguments were decisive, and he wanted to dispatch part of the fleet to New Guinea forthwith. As was to be expected, this came up against opposition from ministers Zijlstra (ARP) and Beerman (CHU). Continuing to send reinforcements was senseless, as they saw it, and it would be better to go and discuss the merits of the case, in particular the brief to the negotiators. Otherwise it was foreseeable that the discussions would reach deadlock as soon as they were resumed. There seemed to be no solution at hand, and so it was decided to instruct Luns to return to The Hague immediately. The latter had other priorities, however. Following his visit to Washington, he was scheduled to hold talks in Japan, which he was reluctant to cancel.[66]

As a consequence, the Cabinet in The Hague was not able to resume ites deliberations until 12 March. Of course Luns now had the book thrown at him for not complying with Cabinet's urgent request, in which connection the term 'cabinet crisis' was even used. When the excitement had died down a little, Luns reverted to his usual strategy of playing the American card, no matter how weak, in Cabinet to the bitter end. Although he had to admit that the Americans were against the dispatch of reinforcements, he was able to add that they had promised to exert the greatest possible pressure on Sukarno to refrain from launching an attack while the talks were in progress. He was further able to point to Rusk's undertaking with regard to the protection of women and

children. That was as far as it went for the time being, but in any case it was better than nothing.

In the subsequent discussions the various strategies began to crystallize. On the one hand, there was that of Luns, who even now still wanted to try and get the Americans to make their limited undertakings more concrete, of which there might be a possibility if the internal situation in Indonesia deteriorated. Hence it was important not to antagonize the Americans by sending reinforcements to New Guinea against their express wishes. On the latter point he was supported by Zijlstra and his allies, be it for a different reason. Their faith in more American support was minimal, and they were of the opinion that it was important to try and reach agreement with Indonesia quickly. Both these standpoints clashed with that of the defence department, which felt responsible for the defence of the region and wanted to take the necessary measures for this. At Visser's request, admirals Pröpper and Brouwer appeared at the meeting to explain once more that Indonesia's military potential would be at full strength within a few months. Luns for his part played down the extent of the Indonesian threat. He asserted that the Indonesian military forces were in abominable shape and that the crews did not know how to get the recently supplied ships running. This time, too, the majority of Cabinet sided with Luns, with the minority not daring to risk a split. The final conclusion was that a number of squadron V ships, which at that moment were in the Caribbean region, should be given permission to sail part of the way in the direction of New Guinea to start off with, without this being announced to the outside world in terms of a reinforcement for New Guinea. These ships, namely two frigates and two submarines, were directed through the Panama Canal, then to be detained on the west coast of America, ready for action in New Guinea whenever necessary. Furthermore, instructions were sent to Platteel not to proceed to evacuate. The decision about the objective of the negotiations was deferred.

For Luns, negotiation was a necessary evil, intended to avoid antagonizing the Americans any further and to get them onside in the long run. He hoped to be able to get by without tying himself down to any undertakings he might later regret. An open discussion about the transfer of sovereignty was the last thing he wanted, therefore. Nevertheless, it was impossible to avoid such a discussion altogether, as there was a strong faction within Cabinet that wished to prepare seriously for this alternative. Now that discussions about the agenda had been decided on, it was important to be proactive and, to begin with, to decide if the subject of 'transfer' could be an item on it. Zijlstra's standpoint that in case of a refusal any discussion about the agenda was bound to end before the first day was out, has already been mentioned above. At his insistence, various agenda items were suggested at the meeting of 16 March, but agreement only seemed

possible about trivialities. While the right of self-determination still scored high within the council, Minister Cals argued that the ministers could not be serious about it, as it was totally unacceptable to Indonesia.[67] No solution was reached at the next meeting, either. At Luns' suggestion, the council finally arrived at the non-decision to await the Indonesian proposals first and then discuss these in the council. In the meantime, he had cabled his own ideas on the unacceptability of any possible item 'transfer of the administration to Indonesia' that the latter country might want to put on the agenda to Van Roijen, who on 17 March protested, pointing out that the Dutch government again and again had declared itself to be prepared to discuss anything.[68] Though this was the incontrovertible truth, there was no reply from Luns.

In spite of the unmistakeable reluctance of the Dutch, the talks finally got underway. Here Van Roijen was the principal contact on the Dutch side, and he engaged in intensive deliberations with Rusk and his closest associates on an almost daily basis. Even before his departure from Washington on 3 March, Luns had been able to announce on behalf of the Dutch government that his country agreed to unconditional talks. On 4 March Jones reported that Sukarno, too, agreed to 'secret preliminary talks in the presence of a third party without preconditions'. He added the proviso, however, that the United States must realize that transfer of sovereignty would be the first subject the Indonesians would bring up for discussion. As 'third party' Sukarno gave preference to an American citizen, in which connection, according to Jones, the name of Professor Graham had been mentioned, who in the view of the Indonesians had proved to be of great service in 1948/49. As venue, his preference was for London, evidently as a result of Malik's favourable experiences here in his discussions with Bentinck. Malik was, in fact, mentioned straightaway as Indonesian negotiator. Following this, Jones had an interview with Subandrio, who imposed a few additional limiting conditions as regards publicity and the choice of individuals. Van Roijen advised The Hague to take these wishes to heart and urged the Dutch to hurry. His own preference was for a place in the vicinity of Washington, which, in view of the position of the United States in the forthcoming negotiations, seemed the most practical. On all these matters agreement was reached after some cables to and fro between Jakarta, Washington and The Hague. The negotiations would be held in a stately home in Middleburg, a small town close to Washington. As 'moderator' on behalf of the United Nations, the American diplomat Ellsworth Bunker was eventually chosen, in consultation with Van Roijen and Subandrio.[69]

At Indonesia's special request, maximum secrecy would be observed. For example, Bunker was not to be allowed to report to the United Nations secretary general till the end of the negotiations. The reason the Indonesians gave for

this was that the UN secretariat allegedly leaked like a sieve. In this connection Sukarno and Subandrio pointed out that the fact of the negotiations was difficult for them to sell at home. That was why they had initially expressed the hope that it would be possible to announce the results during Lebaran, on 8 March, which was a time of year when everyone was in a peaceful mood. Luns had his own personal explanation for these Indonesian wishes, namely that secrecy and summary reporting would leave the Indonesians more room where necessary to present their own interpretation of the state of affairs to the outside world, regardless of whether or not this was shared by the other parties to the negotiations. Whichever explanation was the correct one, the deadline of Lebaran could not be met in any case. The secret agenda discussions in Middleburg finally started on 20 March 1962.[70]

Up to this point, everything seemed to be going very smoothly, leaving aside for the moment the inadequate briefing of the Dutch delegation, the Indonesians' ongoing preparations for war, and the Dutch counter-measures. The delegations in Middleburg comprised Adam Malik, Sudjarwo and Nugroho on the Indonesian side, versus Van Roijen, Schiff and Huydecoper on the Dutch side. In addition there was Bunker as host and 'moderator'. According to those taking part the atmosphere was good, but the results were meagre. Van Roijen's intention had been not only to discuss the agenda, but where possible also to start talking about the contents, in order to inspire confidence and break the ice. It was an ambitious aspiration in light of the limited powers of the two negotiators. Stalemate was reached at the very beginning on the point announced by Zijlstra. Malik was obliged to state that he was authorized to discuss only transfer of sovereignty, undertakings to the Papuans, and restoration of relations. The inadequately briefed Van Roijen held back from a discussion of the first demand, which everyone had been expecting, by explaining that an undertaking on this point would tie the Netherlands down to a transfer of sovereignty. Malik expressed his surprise at this, since he believed he was justified in expecting, since his talk with Bentinck, that it would be possible to negotiate on this basis. The Dutch negotiator for his part thereupon suggested that they start off by discussing the interim administration, in response to which Malik was obliged to assert that he had no authorization to talk about this. This is difficult to explain in any other way than that the transfer of sovereignty was a precondition for Indonesia after all. At Bunker's suggestion, the talks were adjourned, therefore, with the Indonesian negotiators returning home for fresh instructions.[71]

Malik arrived back in Jakarta in a fairly optimistic mood. According to Jones, he was of the opinion that in the secret negotiations the two standpoints had approximated each other quite closely. He expected that the matter would be

sorted out in no time in Jakarta, but here he was in for a disappointment. At the time of his return, there was uncertainty in Jakarta about what course to adopt. To begin with, Subandrio expressed doubts to Jones as to whether the Dutch were acting in good faith, as their negotiators had not been at any liberty whatever on the point of transfer of the administration. Furthermore, Subandrio on 22 March had an in-depth interview with the Soviet ambassador, in which the latter expressed the view that Indonesia was dancing too much to the tune of the Americans. Moscow had not lent this country massive aid for nothing! Subandrio turned a deaf ear to this, but the pressure remained. According to Malik, Sukarno in particular was sensitive to this argument, supported by the PKI and radical nationalist elements.[72] As though to underscore his stubbornness, Sukarno delivered another bellicose speech for mass consumption at that same time.

The preparations for the major attack were gathering speed. Mobilized troops were embarked, and a stream of arms started flowing in the direction of East Indonesia, while a series of minor military operations was staged in preparation. On 20 March, the day of the start of the negotiations in Middleburg, a troop of fifty landed in Waigeo, while a few days later similar units disembarked on the nearby Isle of Gag and further along the south coast of the Bird's Head. On this occasion the schooner carrying the Indonesian troops was attacked by Dutch Neptunes, while at approximately the same time an Indonesian Mitchell fired on a Dutch landing craft. A quite significant escalation ensued when on 27 March a group of paratroopers was dropped near Fakfak.[73] The Dutch government for its part exploited the deadlock reached on 21 March to send fresh reinforcements to New Guinea. The four Dutch navy ships from the Caribbean, which had meanwhile passed through the Panama Canal, were now sent on to New Guinea. In addition an extra company of marines was dispatched, and in preparation of further reinforcements, the first 2,400 *Koninklijke Landmacht* troops were subjected to medical examinations for service in the tropics. As a consequence, the strength of the Dutch defences in the island within the space of a few months rose to 10,000 troops, in addition to a sizeable number of ships and aircraft. Thus peace in the Dutch Cabinet was restored for the time being.[74]

The Americans were not exactly happy about this initiative, but resigned themselves to the situation when the Netherlands subsequently stuck to its guns. The Dutch warships and troopships passed through the Panama Canal without hindrance and were able to use American way stations in the Pacific Ocean, be it with a few restrictions. Thus direct Dutch dependence on the United States decreased without the promise of a guarantee coming into play again. It seemed to be a success for Luns. There was now a little more room militarily speaking, while a breach with the Americans had been avoided.

Ambassador Bunker's plan

As a consequence of all these developments, the signals were all for war again immediately after the first secret whiff of peace. However, the Americans had no intention of leaving the initiative to the two adversaries. Immediately after Malik's departure from Middleburg, Kennedy sent a message to Sukarno urging him to send the negotiator back again as soon as possible. In the same letter he announced a proposal by Ambassador Bunker, exhorting Sukarno to have a good look at this.[75] Bunker was, in fact, busy at that moment drafting a mediation proposal, linking up with the proposal discussed with the Indonesians in the course of the United Nations session of November, which had since come under review in various versions.

Van Roijen was not ignorant of what was brewing in American circles, either. Still at Middleburg, immediately after the breakdown of the negotiations, he had been taken aside by Bunker, who had shown him a document to which he referred as a possible agenda for the next round of negotiations. Where the problem in Middleburg had been that Malik had only been authorized to negotiate about a transfer of the administration, while Van Roijen had instructions to give precedence to the Papuans' right of self-determination, both these points now were combined in a single document. Hence, precisely speaking, it was not an agenda, but a draft agreement, which, if swallowed whole, might break the deadlock. Moreover, it was worded in such a way that the end point would be permanent Indonesian administration. Though the Papuans would be given 'freedom of choice', this was immediately qualified by the phrase that 'final responsibility would reside with Indonesia, unless this is contrary to the wishes of the people of the territory'. Van Roijen's reaction had been fairly non-committal, but he had not said anything about it to Luns. Evidently he had wanted to wait and see for a little while first.[76]

A few days later, on 27 March, the two gentlemen went into the matter in greater depth. Like Kennedy, Bunker, now roundly stated that he considered a solution of the conflict between the Netherlands and Indonesia in the interests of the entire West, and that this was more important than the fate of the Papuans. He proposed that an interim authority with responsibility for moving the Dutch troops and officials out and Indonesian troops and officials in should be created, after which transfer of the administration would follow. As long as this took place under the aegis of the United Nations, the Dutch would have more than fulfilled their obligations towards the Papuans. Not a word was said here about self-determination. Van Roijen bridled and described the proposal with the words 'abject surrender'.

From all the arguments put forward by him, it was clear that Bunker was viewing things primarily from an American, and not necessarily a UN, standpoint. Van Roijen's conclusion was, in effect, that this plan must have been cooked up in close consultation with the State Department. He immediately got on the phone to Rusk, therefore, who that same day informed him via Tyler that the department knew of the plan, but that this was not intended to reflect United States policy. Although it is possible that this reaction really did reflect the view of Rusk and Tyler at that moment, it is certain that things looked different a few days later. On 2 April Van Roijen received another visit from Bunker, who handed him a detailed proposal that was to serve as point of departure for the negotiations with the Indonesians.

This Bunker plan comprised four points. It provided for a phased transfer of the administration of New Guinea to Indonesia. During an interim period of UN administration of maximally two years, all Dutch personnel would be recalled and replaced first by international staff, and then in the second year by Indonesian officials. This period would be rounded off with the transfer of 'full administrative control' to Indonesia. However, some UN personnel would remain in order to act as technical advisors and to help with the preparations for the arrangements provided for by article four. According to this article, Indonesia would agree 'to make arrangements, with the assistance and participation of the acting secretary general of the UN and UN personnel, to give the people of the territory the opportunity to exercise freedom of choice not later than ... years after Indonesia has assumed full administrative responsibility for West New Guinea'. Points 5 and 6 stipulated, finally, that the costs of the operation were to be borne by Indonesia and the Netherlands jointly, while after signing the Agreement these two countries were to resume normal diplomatic relations.[77]

As was to be expected, Van Roijen raised objections to this American message straightaway. For, in view of Indonesia's standpoint that it was already the sovereign of New Guinea, it was all too clear that under these circumstances freedom of choice for the Papuan people was out of the question. He immediately remarked to Bunker, in fact, that this was not the honourable solution suggested earlier, but represented a total capitulation to Indonesian wishes, as far as these were known, and a retreat before their aggressive position. These arguments he repeated to Rusk and the officials of the State Department, showing indignation especially at the circumstance that he had been taken completely by surprise by this plan, in spite of the fact that he had been constantly available for consultation in the preceding weeks, while Rusk had informed him only a few days before that America was not the source of this kind of plan. He was equally displeased at the fact that the plan had immediately been

submitted to Indonesia, making the whole thing a *fait accompli*. Evidently there had been no room for consultation with an old ally.

The politicians in The Hague entirely agreed. Criticism here was directed at the circumstances under which and the formula whereby the Papuans might exercise their right of self-determination. The Luns plan had provided for a plebiscite to round off a period of UN administration. On the American grapevine there had been constant rumours since November 1961 of the date for this having been postponed. The plan lying before them now accorded with this, providing for a much vaguer 'freedom of choice' after an indefinite period of Indonesian administration. Furthermore, the role of the United Nations, to which Indonesia had been opposed from the beginning, was very vaguely defined. American involvement, conversely, was more than obvious from the way the plan had been presented. In the first place, there was the earlier mentioned letter from Kennedy to Sukarno announcing the plan. Moreover, its presentation in the Netherlands had been accompanied by letters of warm recommendation from Kennedy and Rusk to De Quay and Luns respectively. Kennedy underlined once more to De Quay that the whole of the West had an interest in a peaceful solution, while Rusk took a similar step with Luns. No stronger American recommendation was conceivable.[78] Involvement of the UN in the matter was only apparent from the fact that Bunker was after all operating under the auspices of the secretary general of this organization and that at the presentation of the document he had informed Van Roijen that he had discussed his ideas 'in general terms' with U Thant. The latter had thereupon expressed the view that this was a reasonable proposal, which he was able to endorse.[79]

In The Hague a highly indignant Minister Luns observed that the Americans had now turned against the Netherlands. He immediately summoned the American ambassador, Rice, to his department to point out to him that his government's policy was one of appeasement towards dictators.[80] On 4 April Van Roijen communicated this message to Rusk. The interview with him was an uncomfortable one. Rusk bridled at the term 'appeasement' used by Luns to Rice. Van Roijen for his part once more let it be clearly understood that he felt he had been made to look a fool in The Hague because he had been confronted with the plan totally unexpectedly. The gentlemen thereupon proceeded to debate the question to what extent Van Roijen had or had not been informed beforehand. The ambassador insisted that he could only have had knowledge of any possible secret plans of Bunker's, which moreover were to be discussed first, in the past few days at the earliest. He was able to point out in this connection that he had still been talking to Rusk, who had not said a word about it, the previous Saturday.[81]

In view of the evidence, it looks as if Van Roijen had right on his side. This Rusk fully conceded, and a few days later confirmed to Luns in writing, admitting that he had not realized the import of the matter on the Saturday in question.[82] This gave the Dutch the impression that the State Department had been overruled in this matter by the White House.[83] Of course it is conceivable that the busy Rusk, in his fleeting encounter with Van Roijen, did not have the relevant information directly at his fingertips. It is also possible that he found it difficult to confront the ambassador whom he so highly valued with the unwelcome message just in passing. It is even not to be excluded that the whole course of affairs was the result of a cunning deal between Bunker and the Dutch ambassador, who, after all, since the impasse at Middelburg, was eager for a breakthrough. In the latter case, it would have been important to inform Minister Luns first. What is certain, however, is that it was felt in American circles that a 'kick in the pants' was necessary to induce the Dutch to adopt a more realistic standpoint. This was precisely the objective of the plan drawn up by Bunker, in which connection it is important to bear in mind that the negotiator in these days had easy access to the White House. Possibly one factor responsible for the way the plan was presented was the consideration that it would be better for the president than the minister to play the bogeyman, which had already been considered inevitable in earlier memoranda.

After Luns had thus poured out his heart in front of Rice, it was important to reflect on the next steps. It is interesting to note in this connection how neither De Quay nor Luns was quick to involve the council of ministers. They evidently needed to have a tricky debate about the dispatch of some army units behind them first. This debate took place on 6 April, when the effective dispatch of the earlier planned reinforcements was decided on. Doubtless both ministers were apprehensive that a debate on the Bunker plan might put these measures indefinitely on the backburner again. The Bunker plan was not placed on the council of ministers agenda until 9 April, that is to say, a week after its submission. Van Roijen, too, had flown over from the United States to take part in the discussion.

The debate that ensued on this occasion was in many respects a repetition of that at the council meeting of the beginning of February. Van Roijen once again pleaded, with some show of bravado, in favour of acceptance of the plan, coupling this with the advice to try and get the US to make some amendments. Luns obviously had difficulty with this and refused to give in, pointing out that the Netherlands was in such a much stronger position militarily since the most recent decision to dispatch reinforcements. To his mind it was open to question if there really was need for so much hurry in reacting to the plan. For reports were trickling in from Indonesia that Sukarno was dissatisfied with the Bunker

plan and was persisting in his demand for possession of West Irian before the year was out. Together with Minister Toxopeus, Luns was of the opinion that it would be much more sensible to put the Americans under pressure by doing nothing. He seized the opportunity to air his repressed irritations with Van Roijen, as well as to express his still undimmed hope that the problems with the Americans would eventually be solved, by drawing a historical parallel, comparing the current situation to that of 1949. At that time, too, the Netherlands had been put under strong pressure by the United States, resulting in the transfer of sovereignty over Indonesia. In his view, the affair might then have ended much more favourably if the Netherlands had been a little less accommodating, as the international climate had changed appreciably in the following few months. For after the Chinese victory on the mainland, America had gone running to the aid of the French in Vietnam, in which up to then it had shown little interest. A comparable development would have been possible in Indonesia!

Now, too, the minister felt that the international situation held possibilities for future change, pointing in this connection to the increasing sympathy shown for the Dutch standpoint by African countries. As always, the expectation that 'the Indonesian house of cards' would collapse also played a role here. Although his jibe at the principal negotiator of 1949 without doubt gave Luns great satisfaction, even he could have known that this might be too optimistic a view. He therefore proceeded to put part of the blame on the internal situation in the Netherlands. Although he would have liked to veto the whole plan, and the international situation seemed promising, he did not feel strong enough to do so. After all, the election campaign had started in the Netherlands, and the PvdA was using the New Guinea question as a plank in its platform. There was moreover great confusion in the ARP, while not only the leftist but also the liberal press was distancing itself from the government. Proof of the tottering domestic front was further to be found in the council of ministers. At the same meeting, a number of council members, including the authoritative minister for education, Cals, argued that, by rejecting the plan, the Netherlands would get itself into an even more difficult situation, while it would be compelled to give in, under increasingly less favourable conditions, in the end after all. His colleague from the finance department, the anti-revolutionary Minister Zijlstra, expressed himself in even stronger terms. He pronounced it irresponsible to continue the game of poker on the off-chance of a change of circumstances, or possibly in the American position. This way the Dutch would run the risk of coming off with even worse terms for the Papuan people than if the Netherlands accepted the Bunker plan.

Luns and Van Roijen even now were against giving up the American card. The minister believed he could discern the first signs that the Americans were

changing their mind in the talks with Rusk and Bunker, who had both assured Van Roijen that the proposals in no way represented a rounded plan, and were open to considerable doctoring. He suggested persuading the Americans to come forward with some amendments themselves, without the Netherlands being obliged to tie itself down to these immediately. This way it would be possible to stall for time without antagonizing the Americans at the outset. Possibly then a compromise with greater scope for the Papuans' right of self-determination might be arrived at eventually.

After a lengthy debate, the Cabinet finally accepted this proposal,[84] which it then put to Kennedy and Bunker by letter of 14 April. This letter deplored the way ambassador Bunker had acted, as well as the circumstance that the American government had felt compelled to express the hope that his proposals might serve as a basis for negotiation 'in their present form'. This would only be possible 'after the necessary modifications have been introduced'. What these modifications might be was indicated in the letter to Bunker, which pointed out the need for stronger guarantees for the Papuans' exercise of the right of self-determination, whereby a more important role would have to be assigned in particular to the United Nations. These provisos would have to be formulated in a United Nations resolution. On the practical level, responsibility for the preparation and implementation of the 'Act of Free Choice' would have to be given to a United Nations plebiscite authority, which would moreover have to have security troops at its disposal for this. In addition, the plebiscite would have to be held in the short term.[85]

As we saw above, these letters from the Netherlands were meant only as suggestions for American amendments to the Bunker proposal, not as a starting-point for actual discussions. Luns explained this once more in a separate letter to his American counterpart, in which he stressed that it was inconceivable for the Netherlands to hand over the administration of New Guinea, to whomever, without much stronger safeguards for the rights of the people.[86]

It was up to Van Roijen, who had meanwhile returned to Washington, to explain this to Rusk and Bunker. The first discussions between them took place on 17 April. Rusk showed himself to be 'encouraged' by the Dutch stance, but Bunker was unhappy about the fact that the Netherlands was already imposing further conditions. After all, everything would be open to discussion once the negotiations got underway. Even so, he went into the Dutch suggestions at greater depth immediately. As a consequence, he came forward with a new version of his plan, now bearing the title 'Proposals for negotiations between the Governments of Indonesia and the Netherlands', on 23 April. The passage on the right of self-determination, included under point 4, here was reinforced

with the addition that the Netherlands agreed to a transfer of the administration on condition that it received 'adequate guarantees for safeguarding the interests, including the right of self-determination, of the Papuans' during formal negotiations. How these would turn out in practice was of course dependent on the results of the negotiations, but this passage gave the Netherlands an absolute veto on the whole plan, according to Bunker, if in that country's opinion it contained no adequate guarantees for the right of self-determination. Asked what these 'adequate safeguards' actually were, Bunker mentioned 'certain forms of fairness and reasonableness', for which the Netherlands could count on his support during the negotiations.[87] Rusk's reaction was similar. In a confidential letter of 25 April he assured Luns that the proposals in his opinion provided a 'suitable framework' as a working paper for the resumption of talks that might lead to a solution acceptable to both parties. He added that his government 'will support an arrangement for the expression of self-determination by the Papuan people which would be a reality and not a mockery'.[88] Rusk gave further evidence of his goodwill by inviting Luns to go through the whole thing with him once more at his leisure. The upcoming NATO meeting in Athens would provide a good opportunity for this. Luns was pleased to accept the invitation, and it was agreed that the two gentlemen would talk together on 5 May 1962.[89]

Such was the Dutch approach. Meanwhile the question was, of course, what Sukarno would do. Although there was a plethora of negative reports in the Indonesian press, it was not a good idea to go by these, as in that case all hope of further negotiations might just as well be given up altogether. There was no secret intelligence to go by in The Hague, either. For its information from Jakarta, the Netherlands was chiefly dependent on the American news. So Van Roijen with some regularity sounded out both Bunker and Rusk about the Indonesian reactions to the plan so far. Both invariably assured him that there were no problems. Bunker asserted that he had been informed that the Indonesians in principle accepted the addition to point four. Rusk went even a step further, expressing the opinion that this was an important concession, as the Indonesians hereby had clearly indicated for the first time that they recognized the right of self-determination in principle. Asked if they were then also prepared to discuss all the subjects touched on in the plan, he replied he had the impression they were. He even suggested that the negotiators might be able already in the phase of discussion of the agenda to move on gradually to that of consultation on the essentials.

This optimistic reply fitted in with the airy tone in which the Americans desired to conduct the talks, but it lacked a firm foundation. Notwithstanding Bunker's and Rusk's assurances that Indonesia had agreed to the revised text

and was prepared to talk about it, no concrete Indonesian reactions to Kennedy's and Rusk's letters had been received to date. Now the Indonesians in their turn wanted to wait and see what the Dutch reactions were first, in which they were wholeheartedly supported by Jones. On 27 April the American ambassador cabled Rusk that he had informed Subandrio and Sukarno in the course of a joint plane trip to the North Sumatran capital Medan that the Dutch were on the point of accepting the Bunker proposals, and that it would therefore be better if they kept a low profile for the moment.[90] Obviously this message was meant to be kept from the Dutch. Of course the result was that there was no Indonesian reaction at all forthcoming for the time being. Sukarno at that moment had other priorities than a resumption of the talks, for that matter. The preparations for operation Mandala were well underway, and he had no reason whatever to stop these at that point. On arrival in Medan, he gave a speech that left little room for doubt on this score. Talks could not re-open until the Dutch stopped sending reinforcements to New Guinea.[91]

For Luns, as for Sukarno, procrastination was the crux of his policy. As had repeatedly become clear at the meetings of the Dutch Cabinet, he still cherished the hope that something that might change Dutch prospects would happen in the meantime. In addition he wanted absolute certainty that provisional acceptance of Bunker's proposals would not mean that he would be nailed down a priori to any particular element of these. Moreover, he must have felt that he himself was better able to arrange matters with Rusk, owing to his predominantly positive relations with the latter, than Van Roijen. That was why he was pleased to accept Rusk's invitation to the NATO working lunch in Athens on 5 May.

In the Greek capital, consideration of New Guinea did not remain restricted to the planned private chat between the two ministers. As usual, there was a Dutch statement expressing deep dissatisfaction with American policy on the table at the meeting of delegates here. Now too the Netherlands received all the verbal support it could have wished for from the Europeans in this NATO company. The French and British ministers had not yet forgotten the way they had been treated in the Suez crisis. In addition there was the Portuguese minister, Noguira, whose memories of Goa were still fresh in his mind. It was he, in fact, who made the most forthright comments, arguing that the Netherlands, in spite of the fact that it was acting wholly in accordance with United Nations principles, was having problems with a few of its allies who were out as much as possible to attract the Afro-Asians to their side, if necessary at the expense of their friends. He predicted that, if these allies continued on their chosen path, they would eventually come to the conclusion that they had lost both their old and their new friends.

None of those present had any difficulty in guessing who these 'few allies' were, and, so as not to aggravate the difference between the parties, Rusk preferred to ignore these comments. He did take advantage of the working lunch and of a second, hastily convened meeting with the Dutch to explain the American standpoint clearly once more, however. He confirmed that the American government had just as great a dislike of Sukarno, whom he called 'a son of a bitch', as they did. Nevertheless, in the interests of the West they had to talk to him. To put some pressure on his Dutch counterparts, he casually hinted that the United States would be only too glad to withdraw from the affair if the Netherlands wished. Luns rejected this suggestion with some show of hesitancy, not wishing to appear too eager for American support. He made grateful use of the opportunity thus offered him to indicate that what was really lacking was the necessary co-operation and mutual trust between the two administrations to face up together to the intrigues of a figure like Sukarno. It was solely due to the United States' position of power that the Dutch government had not rejected the Bunker plan out of hand as being totally unacceptable. Rusk thereupon distanced himself from the plan somewhat, describing it as 'a number of suggestions which the Netherlands was wholly free to reject if all of the conditions set by that country were not met'. Evidently to make clear that this would not do Sukarno's position much good, he made the rather obscure remark that, in the event of a possible transfer, the latter [would] have to pay an extremely high price in terms of the guarantees.

The end result was an agreement that the Netherlands was fully prepared to discuss all aspects of the so-called Bunker plan with Indonesia, provided, however, '*that each party would be free to table any subject it considered relevant*' (author's italics). This passage was soon to become known as the Athens formula. Rusk undertook to submit this to the Indonesians and try to get them to accept it. On the other hand, he made it plain again that the United States was not prepared to exercise its military might to force Indonesia to meet its obligations. He did promise, however, to put in a good word for the Netherlands at the forthcoming tripartite discussions between Australia, New Zealand and the United States in Canberra, the next stop on his world trip.[92] Rusk did, in fact, state at a press conference here a few days later that the Papuans' right of self-determination was a matter of great importance to the United States. Subsequently, the closing statement of this ANZUS conference on 9 May urged for a peaceful solution of the conflict over West new Guinea. That same day the Dutch embassy in Washington received news that the Athens formula had been forwarded to Ambassador Jones with instructions to submit it to the Indonesian government. Jones was to add that the State Department trusted that this formula would be acceptable to Indonesia as well and was looking

forward to a quick reaction, so that the secret preliminary discussions might be resumed that same week.[93]

'Athens' appeared to be an excellent result of the strategy of picking holes in the Bunker plan adopted by Luns. In the first place, it enabled him to put off a more fundamental reaction for another few weeks, to Van Roijen's immense annoyance. Furthermore, though the endorsement received from the European NATO allies might not amount to much, it constituted in any case a form of moral support that was most useful to him in this difficult situation. Moreover, where he could not have made it plainer that he was not in favour of the plan at all, acceptance of the Athens formula had given him the necessary room to let the talks founder at any appropriate point if he wished. A repetition of the strategy adopted in Geneva in 1956 seemed to be coming within the bounds of possibility.

On his return to the Netherlands, the Athenian message was received with approval in the council of ministers, even though Zijlstra, critical as always, was interested to know actually what other items Minister Luns wished to place on the agenda. The latter got no further than a mention of the promises the Netherlands had made to the Papuans and of the way a plebiscite should be carried out under United Nations supervision. This was something of an anticlimax, as these subjects could quite well be discussed under the terms of the Bunker plan anyway. More relevant was the information he was able to give the council that the sharpest edges of the plan had been progressively blunted in the course of the discussions with the Americans. Minister Klompé pointed out to him, however, that though Rusk might be more accommodating than Kennedy, there still remained the president's warm recommendation to De Quay to accept the Bunker plan. Luns had to concede the truth of this, observing that there seemed to be a contradiction between the policies of the State Department and the White House.[94] He was foolish enough to repeat this statement at a meeting of the parliamentary foreign affairs standing committee a few days later. This was ill advised indeed. News of it was immediately communicated to the American embassy in The Hague, with as a result a message from Rice, on behalf of an angry Rusk, that the latter did not like being played off against the president. This provided Luns with a good opportunity, in turn, to voice his astonishment that the Americans seemed to be informed of what went on at secret committee meetings in the Netherlands. Justified though his astonishment might be, his reproach was deserved more by his own organization than by the Americans.[95] The sole outcome of this interlude was that it nibbled away another piece of American goodwill. From Rusk no more was heard on he subject of the Athenian formula. U Thant, on the other hand, on 21 May, after an interview with Stevenson and Harriman, made an urgent appeal to the

Dutch government to drop this formula and to state itself prepared to resume the talks on the basis of the amended Bunker plan.[96]

This intervention by Undersecretaries Harriman and Stevenson shows that the policymakers in Washington were indeed displeased with Rusk's Athenian escapades. Further, one wonders if Jones confronted the Indonesians with the Athens formula with the necessary forcefulness. Although it had been forwarded to him on 9 May for submission to Subandrio, no more was heard of it after that, at any rate in The Hague. However, an Antara-AFP report was received from Jakarta that Sukarno on the 12 May had expressed confidence that the West Irian issue could be settled within the shortest possible time thanks to new arms purchases in Russia. In the next few days threatening language was used by Nasution and Subandrio as well, which was followed by a renewed drop of paratroops near Fakfak on the 16th.[97] At the meeting of the council of ministers of that same day, the deputy minister for defence, De Jong, observed that Indonesia was continuing to carry out infiltrations, now using well-trained commando troops and modern equipment instead of ragtag bands of volunteers. Where up to then the commander of the armed forces in New Guinea had been authorized to execute pre-emptive strikes if necessary against the Indonesian bases from which attacks took place, under the current circumstances decisions about this should lie with the Dutch government. Hence De Jong had revoked his authorization.[98] This development underlined the fact that tension over New Guinea was rapidly mounting and that matters there could not be left to take their own course. It likewise underscored the topicality of the Bunker plan and reduced Luns' chances of playing the matter down.

The graver the threat of war became, the harder it was for the Dutch government to get out of letting the United Nations secretary general know what it thought of the Bunker plan, an amended version of which its author had meanwhile presented to both parties on 23 April. Certainly since Minister Luns' return from Athens, it was impossible to find a good argument for deferring the answer any longer. A draft reply had been drawn up at the department of foreign affairs, which was sent to New York immediately after the above-mentioned council of ministers meeting of 16 May. It almost inevitably bore the imprint of the events of the past few days, opening with a reference to the most recent Indonesian utterances and deeds of aggression and a request to the secretary general to register a protest against this with the Indonesian government. It also asked the latter (once again) for the appointment of a UN committee of investigation into matters. The crux of the missive nevertheless was an assurance by the Dutch government that it was willing to discuss every aspect of the Bunker plan, *together with any subject connected with this issue* considered

relevant by either party. Thus the moribund Athenian formula was given a place in the official discourse after all, as far as the Netherlands was concerned.

U Thant was quick to react, his answer arriving as early as 22 May. He remained completely non-committal on the practical level, however. He rejected both Dutch requests, appealing to his position as an impartial observer. Instead, he urged *both* parties to cease hostilities, saying he was prepared to grant the request for observers only if *both* parties asked for this. For the Dutch this was of course a very unsatisfactory reply, though they had probably not expected any better. Even more disappointing, certainly for Luns, was U Thant's reaction to the third point. Formulated in two telegrams to De Quay and Sukarno, it advised both protagonists to resume the talks 'on the basis of the proposals already communicated to Your Excellency by Ambassador Bunker'. Not a word was said about the formula added by Luns and Dulles.[99]

For the further progress of the affair it was important that U Thant was now also giving permission to make the Bunker plan public. The initial strict secrecy was no longer sustainable, as it hindered public debate, which had got underway nevertheless. In the Netherlands, the members of parliament were well aware that there were discussions going on, but did not know how or about what. Meanwhile, inevitably more and more of the content of the Bunker plan was leaking out. This was a result of, among other things, the visit of a delegation of the New Guinea Council to the Netherlands in May. This council was kept as well informed as possible about developments by the government, which made the Second Chamber feel passed over, which then in turn gave rise to more questions. Now that matters had advanced to the point where the Bunker plan was to be released in New York, it was obvious that a normal parliamentary debate should take place about it. The leader of the ARP parliamentary party, Bruins Slot, in particular pushed for this.

Before it was ready for this, however, the government wanted to formulate its reply to U Thant's proposal of 22 May to resume negotiations on the basis of the Bunker plan. This gave rise to a cabinet debate that plainly revealed the differences between the parties. For after all, the domestic front had meanwhile weakened considerably. In the ARP and the KVP the sceptics were in the majority, while the PvdA was now roundly arguing in favour of transfer. Similar voices were heard in the Cabinet. It was not to be ruled out that the latter would be compelled to go and talk exclusively on the basis of the Bunker formula, in conformity with U Thant's proposal, after all. Ministers Zijlstra, Cals and Beerman did not object to this, but Luns opposed it tooth and nail. Though he was prepared to discuss the plan, he did not want to be tied down to it a priori. Zijlstra was inclined to wonder how this would be possible and expressed the fear that such an approach would lead to a war of words. He put his finger on

the sore spot by supposing that Luns was still hoping to hold the plebiscite *before* transfer to Indonesia. But if he was really serious about this, the ARP minister asserted, then he was trying to sell the Luns plan under the banner of the Bunker plan. He considered this a disastrous attempt, to which he pronounced himself opposed there and then. Luns had no other defence than a barely convincing appeal to the Athenian formula, which the Americans had not officially withdrawn, after all. In the face of so much optimism, his opponents were obliged to observe, through Minister Beerman as mouthpiece, that it had become obvious that Rusk had had to back down on this point. De Quay concurred. At his suggestion, the council finally decided on the formula that the Dutch would accept the Bunker plan as a basis for the discussions to be held with the Indonesians, but with the proviso that the transfer of New Guinea not be accepted as a precondition for the talks. What exactly this phrase meant was left aside.[100]

The parliamentary debate took place the next day, 24 May. In the course of this, copies of the Bunker plan were circulated, followed by clarifications by De Quay and Luns. Thereupon the spokesmen of virtually all the parties urged for a continuation of the negotiations, giving the government the green light for conducting these as it saw fit. Luns once more explained that the government was prepared to discuss the plan, but not to accept these proposals without demur, as explicitly requested in a PvdA motion introduced by De Kadt and associates. For in that case the Netherlands would be nailing itself down a priori to a transfer of the administration, which in the government's view should on the contrary be a subject of negotiation. The De Kadt motion was defeated that same day by a vote of 93 to 48. This time, too, all those voting in favour were members of the opposition parties, in particular the PvdA.[101]

The matter came up again in the council of ministers meeting of the next day, where a definitive reply now had to be formulated. There was grave dissatisfaction here about the course of the parliamentary debate, especially among Luns' opponents. According to Cals it had been a very confused affair, which he attributed to the vagueness of the government's standpoint. His colleague Zijlstra even expressed the view that actually the defeated De Kadt motion had articulated the government standpoint. Though closer scrutiny of the wording shows this to be an untenable argument, the dissatisfaction with the state of affairs was such that support was withheld from Luns to sneak in the Athenian formula in the reply again this time. At De Quay's suggestion, the council agreed to a statement to U Thant 'that the Netherlands accepted the Bunker formula as a basis for the discussions with Indonesia, with the reservation that this did not imply as a matter of course that the Netherlands accepted transfer as a precondition.'[102] A visibly shaken Luns the next day delivered this reply to Ambassador Rice, who read a 'statesmanlike' approach into it. Luns thought

differently about this, and explained to the ambassador that the bitter fruits of this course, which the Netherlands had adopted under duress, would have to be picked by other countries. In New York the Dutch reply was passed on to U Thant, without the minister's qualification, by ambassador Schürmann on 26 May.[103]

While these scenes were unfolding in The Hague and New York, new incidents were taking place in New Guinea. The most spectacular of these was another landing of eighty paratroopers near Kaimana. In accordance with the rules of the multi-track policy, an Indonesian diplomatic reaction was additionally received on 25 May. It actually was in reaction to a letter from De Quay concerning a ceasefire, requested by U Thant. The Indonesian note was totally unacceptable from the Dutch point of view, as it took Indonesian sovereignty over New Guinea since 1950 as its point of departure. In it, Subandrio for instance described the Dutch presence on the island as an act of aggression fully justifying the actions of the Indonesian armed forces on this 'home territory'. The Dutch request to U Thant for the dispatch of UN observers was rejected as being superfluous for the same reason. The same reasoning was applied to U Thant's appeal to both parties to refrain from acts of aggression. The Dutch were the offensive party, as was evident from the recent reinforcements of the Dutch land, naval, and air forces in West Irian, which served 'to affirm colonialism in its worst form in part of the territory of the Republic of Indonesia' there. Hence it was the task of the United Nations to help find a solution for the problem by eradicating Dutch colonialism in West Irian and restoring the region to the bosom of the Republic of Indonesia. Thus Subandrio's answer represented an eloquent contribution to the rhetoric of anti-colonialism of the period. Even so, the door to further negotiations was not slammed shut entirely. The letter also contained a passage concerning the fact, as yet unknown in the Netherlands, that Indonesia had completely accepted the Bunker plan *in principle*. This, according to Subandrio, was in stark contrast to the attitude of he Netherlands, which had not made it clear yet whether or not it accepted the Bunker plan at all.[104]

Back to Middleburg

The Dutch and Indonesian reactions of 25 May had left the door ajar for a resumption of the talks that had broken down in Middleburg on 22 March, but it would be a case of running the gauntlet. On the Dutch side the reservations about a potential transfer to Indonesia had decreased markedly. Although this was more evident from the internal debates than from the formal reply, it nevertheless could not imply anything other than that the Netherlands would

be prepared to agree to this on certain conditions. The same could be said, mutatis mutandis, of the Indonesian reply, even though here, too, the phrase 'in principle' left the future negotiators the necessary latitude. Here was a challenge for the UN negotiators to try and reconcile the mutually suspicious parties a little more. After receiving both reactions, U Thant urgently admonished the two parties again to put an end to all hostilities, so as to make it possible for the negotiations on the future of the region on the basis of ambassador Bunker's proposals to proceed under the most favourable possible circumstances.

In light of developments prior to this, this renewed appeal to both parties to cease hostilities was hard for the Netherlands to stomach. Luns promptly instructed Schürmann to point this out to U Thant, which the ambassador did on 2 June. He argued that, no matter what one might think of Subandrio's 'absurd' propositions from a legal point of view, it was a definite fact in any case that the Indonesian infiltrators were carrying weapons and using these against Dutch soldiers. Therefore it was impossible for the Netherlands not to interfere with them. Moreover, such a procedure would not mean an end to hostilities, as the initiative after all did not lie with the Netherlands. U Thant refused to get involved in this evidently fruitless discussion and straightaway diverted the attention to the question of how best to get the negotiations started. The first hurdle was already coming into view, as he had understood that some misunderstanding had arisen about whether the Netherlands had really accepted the Bunker plan as a basis for negotiation without attaching new conditions. This question had been prompted by the Indonesians, as soon became evident. Without hesitation Schürmann explained that his message meant that his country was, in effect, prepared to resume the negotiations on the basis of the Bunker plan, but with the reservation that it did not consider itself obliged to hand over the administration if it was given no 'adequate' guarantees on the point of safeguarding the rights of the Papuan people, as specified in point 4 of the Bunker plan.[105]

U Thant's question was the starting signal for a game of musical chairs in which Sukarno personally played a very active part. In a series of representations during the next few weeks, he had the same question repeated, each time in different wordings, again and again. As long as the answer failed to satisfy him, the dispatch of negotiators remained out of the question. Subandrio busied himself carrying the various messages to and fro, explaining that Indonesia did not believe in the good faith of the Dutch. About this he was right to the extent that Luns was still looking for a way out of the transfer of sovereignty. The Dutch minister moreover felt that it was unnecessary for the formulas used by

Indonesia and the Netherlands to be completely identical, so that there would remain something to talk about. Sukarno's efforts were obviously still aimed at nailing the Netherlands down to a transfer a priori, even before the start of the negotiations, which Luns wanted at all costs to avoid. All this signalled a resumption of the discussion that had been held in the Dutch Second Chamber before and was continued on the diplomatic level now. U Thant's solution was to announce with a perfectly straight face that the various versions submitted to him were identical, and gradually to reformulate them in such a way that this indeed surreptitiously became the case. This manoeuvre he executed, it seems, with the full connivance of the Dutch and American diplomats in Washington and New York, who wanted nothing more than that the negotiations would now really get underway. In the Netherlands it was supported by a cabinet majority. Thus Schürmann was authorized on 12 June to relay the message to U Thant that the Dutch government agreed entirely with the latter's view that there was no difference between the various formulations. The Dutch preparedness 'to resume the negotiations on the basis of the Bunker plan' meant exactly the same thing as the Indonesian 'acceptance of the Bunker plan in principle' or 'acceptance of the principles of the Bunker plan'. To add to this linguistic casuistry, Schürmann explained once more in his own words to his counterpart at the United Nations headquarters, Narasimhan, that the Netherlands was prepared to talk along the lines of the plan, in which connection securing the guarantees mentioned in point 4 was of prime importance for his country. If this was possible, then the Netherlands was in effect prepared to agree to the transfer of sovereignty to Indonesia stipulated by the plan.[106]

This official equating of the various options considerably restricted Luns' room for manoeuvre. 'Acceptance of the plan', whether or not in principle, in his eyes went a lot further than the 'preparedness to discuss the plan' he himself preferred. In view of the situation at home and on the international stage, however, there was nothing for it but to resign himself to the fact. Sukarno for his part on receipt of the news indulged in a little more play-acting. To Jones, who passed the message on to him, he stated that he was so happy with it that he could hardly believe it. To be on the safe side, he therefore asked Jones to repeat it to him once more.[107] After that, confusion arose along the various axes between Jakarta, Washington and New York, with as many posts in each place as there were parties involved, about the question of whether this message should be delivered, and whether or not publicly, by U Thant or by the Netherlands itself. The upshot was that everyone put forward different ideas. By an unlucky coincidence the information services of the departments of the interior and of foreign affairs in The Hague then in one or two cases used

slightly different wordings, which Sukarno in turn seized on to ask for more clarification.

In the end, Luns agreed to say no more about the matter, provided U Thant drew the conclusion from the representation of the Dutch position that the Netherlands accepted the Bunker plan in principle, but did not want to be known to have said so himself. This exercise with which Schürmann was charged unfortunately failed miserably, as U Thant not only drew the said conclusion, but also immediately attributed it publicly to the Dutch spokesman. To get him to rectify this response after the event seemed counter-productive.[108] For Luns there was little else for it, again, but to resign himself to the situation, amid much grumbling at the unfortunate ambassador. His sole consolation was that, if necessary, he could always come back to the matter. Nevertheless, as all this was going on the weeks slipped by, and it was 21 June before the dust began to settle on the unsavoury affair, which as far as the Netherlands was concerned ended in Schürmann issuing a statement that the Netherlands had unconditionally accepted the Bunker plan, which did not, however, mean that it was giving in on the condition of 'adequate guarantees' specified in point 4. The Dutch negotiators felt that this still left them a little leeway, although without any doubt this formulation was weaker than that at the starting point, which had been restricted to Dutch preparedness to discuss the plan, with a more strongly worded reservation with regard to the transfer of sovereignty.

Another striking detail was that the Dutch now had 'unconditionally' accepted the plan. This was in accordance with Sukarno's wishes, although the Dutch themselves had meanwhile also come to have fewer qualms about it, with reports from Indonesia leading them to expect that they might well have to settle for something less than what the plan stipulated. Within the space of a few months, the American mediator's plan had become transformed from a miscellany of random suggestions, which Luns had consented to discuss some time in among a whole lot of other things, in conformity with the Athenian formula, into a last straw at which the Dutch needed to clutch if they wished to salvage anything of their good intentions with respect to the Papuan people. This development had everything to do with the changing military position in and around New Guinea. Indeed, a new phase had begun when the Indonesian team of negotiators led by Adam Malik returned to Washington on 12 July 1962. The latter was charged with conducting the preliminary discussions, and once these were rounded off, Subandrio would fly over as chief negotiator. He was the only man whom Sukarno trusted, as Schürmann was able to report.[109]

The New York Agreement

The Indonesian approach

Ever since the early 1950s, Indonesia had consistently pursued a multi-track policy in its dealings with the Netherlands. The various tracks originally comprised negotiation, the dealing of military pinpricks, and the imposition of sanctions against remaining Dutch interests in Indonesia. After negotiations ceased and the programme of sanctions was rounded off, military pressure was steadily stepped up, until from 1960 on it assumed increasingly threatening forms. The balance of power at home gave Sukarno ample scope for this, even though there were a few limitations. The introduction of his 'guided democracy' in 1959 had virtually eliminated the political parties. The president did still have to reckon with the PKI, however, which had remained intact as a strong extra-parliamentary organization. The military, too, now occupied a stronger position as a result of their success against the rebels in the outlying regions, though they certainly did not have free play altogether, if only because the 1961 agreement with the rebels had weakened the unity within their ranks. This gave the necessary latitude to the president, who in addition held the balance between them, the PKI and various radical nationalist groups. The effect of all this was a stronger emphasis on the militant voice, but with Sukarno as chief interpreter and as the person pulling the strings. In the implementation of his policies he was assisted by Subandrio, ever ready to explain to anyone willing to listen that his boss had no other option than to use such belligerent language in order to keep the rough elements in the army in line. In his interviews with Jones, he would regularly refer to the person of the commander of the armed forces, Nasution, in this connection.[110] This would seem curious to anyone familiar with the general's career and may, in fact, be taken with a pinch of salt. The principal reason for Subandrio's insinuations should be sought in the suspicions entertained by Sukarno with regard to Nasution's political ambitions.

Both in the Netherlands and in the United States, Nasution enjoyed a different image from that Subandrio wished to propagate of him. In authoritative American circles he was regarded as the sole counterpoise to a threatening red take-over. The Dutch found his person more problematic. Though those who knew him classed this ex-KNIL officer with the more moderate elements, the feeling was that one never knew how he might act under different circumstances. As army chief, he was bound to present the military side of the story, and where necessary he did so with verve. Furthermore, it was realized that he played an important role in the power game in Indonesia, where he stood out

as one of the crown princes behind the ageing Sukarno. Luns' secret informant, 'Virgil', was able to report that Nasution had an exceptionally low opinion of Subandrio because of the latter's role as a supplier of women to the president, while he further held it against him that he had unnecessarily insulted the Malaysian prime minister, Tunku Abdul Rahman. According to the same informant, Nasution viewed Sukarno's policy of rapprochement with China with suspicion. Though it might have certain advantages as a strategy, it was unacceptable in principle. He was furthermore apt to make derogatory remarks about the president's lax morals, whereby the latter had antagonized Nasser as well as Nehru. Though the Russians might be useful as suppliers of military equipment, Indonesia's natural allies were Japan, the Philippines and Malaysia. This put Nasution in line with the Americans on the point of foreign policy.[111]

For the rest, Nasution was apt in private to show concern about Sukarno's aggressive policies with respect to New Guinea and the Netherlands. He did not like the idea of the costs entailed and was afraid that a military encounter would end in disappointment for Indonesia. That was why he tried to influence Dutch domestic politics. As we saw above, his confidant, Sugeng, in 1961 was wandering around in Europe, where he maintained contacts with the opposition in the Netherlands. Nasution himself in this period went on a number of world trips, in the course of which he was introduced to the great and the good of the international community. With his military reputation and growing international status, he was a dangerous potential opponent for Sukarno. This stimulated the president to keep him at a distance wherever possible. We see this need reflected in Subandrio's disparaging remarks and the president's actions. So Sukarno succeeded in the course of 1962 in passing Nasution over for an appointment as army commander, giving the post to Ahmad Jani instead, in whom he had a more docile underling.[112]

Obviously these are mere elements of a more complicated picture, but they do give an idea of the principal fields of influence within which Indonesia's New Guinea policies had to be framed. If this country wanted to persist in its efforts to take control of the region in the short term, pressure on the Netherlands had to be stepped up. This could take the form of political pressure, military force, or a combination of the two. For Sukarno, a military victory over the Netherlands would signify a major moral success, inter alia vis-à-vis the increasingly influential general. Even so, the chances that in the end the latter would benefit more by this than the president were high. For the PKI such a victory would be a mixed blessing. It would reduce Indonesian dependence on the Soviet Union and so deprive the party of an attractive point of agitation. For the same reason a peaceful solution was none too attractive to it or the radical nationalist elements, or to Sukarno himself. For the PKI, what was more, the

resultant prospect of a more stable economy held little attraction. For Nasution and many with him, on the other hand, of course it was a favourable prospect, partly as it would open the door wide to co-operation with the United States. The consequence of this divergence of interests in internal Indonesian politics was that the choice between diplomacy and war remained up in the air. This created room for a continuation of the mixed approach with which Subandrio had meanwhile so deservedly won his spurs. As a result of the reinforcement of the Indonesian military forces over the past few years, the opportunities for threatening with violence had increased enormously. In the second quarter of 1962, Indonesia's military might was mobilized and occupied positions from which a major attack on Dutch territory might be launched.

All this had immediate consequences for the approach to the New Guinea question after Malik's return to Jakarta in the last week of March 1962. On his departure from Middleburg, the Indonesian diplomat had intimated that he would be back with the desired authorization soon. In practice, things turned out differently. The politicians in the Indonesian capital were in no hurry. Here the view prevailed that talks could only commence again once the cannon were in position. The final decision about a solution by either military or diplomatic means could then be put off till the last moment. Though the first option might be coercion of the Netherlands under the threat of a major assault into a diplomatic capitulation, the prospect of a resounding military victory was at least as attractive to nationalist sentiment. Both options were kept open, with the choice being dependent on a series of not entirely predictable variables. These were, for instance, the attitude of the Americans, the position of the Dutch and, last but not least, the capability of the Indonesian military to realize the long planned military build-up in reality. In any case, such was Virgil's appraisal, whose reports were kept at the department of foreign affairs in The Hague, where they were open for inspection to a very limited circle.[113]

Though Virgil's reports were partly based on conjecture, the facts bore out the correctness of his interpretation. The year 1962 marked the high point of the new-style two-track policy. In between the diplomatic shenanigans, the military preparations were proceeding in a routine fashion. Indonesian armament was slowly but surely getting organized. American and Russian planes, ships and other equipment had come pouring into the country since 1958. Eastern European and American instructors were assisting with the training of specialist personnel. The pre-final phase was ushered in by Sukarno's Trikora speech, which was followed by the establishment of the Mandala command for the liberation of West Irian. The West Irian Bureau, led by Sudibio, organized the necessary campaigns and the recruitment of volunteers. In April the transport

of personnel and equipment to the military bases surrounding Macassar and Ambon got underway. In addition, regular pinprick operations, using modern equipment for the first time, were launched from the outset, the starting signal for these having been the failed attempt at landing near Vlakke Hoek. This was followed by paratroop landings at Fakfak, Kaimana and Merauke. From the timing and from the accompanying speeches by Sukarno and others it was evident that these operations were meant to show that Indonesia had an alternative to diplomacy. They invariably took place at critical moments in the negotiation process.

This strategy was detailed explicitly in a set of instructions from Subandrio to all Indonesian ambassadors of 18 May 1962. Here he explained that it was necessary historically, for the prestige of the Indonesian revolution, and for the future of New Guinea itself for Indonesia not to have the territory handed to it on a silver platter. Its acquisition would have to be the result of the struggle of the Indonesian people itself. The question of whether the final solution would be arrived at through negotiation or by some other means aside, it was necessary, therefore, to organize some military feats first. The capability of the Indonesian armed forces at that moment was adequate for this, in his view. If only enough casualties were made among the Dutch troops, the enemy would soon be made to see the error of his ways.[114]

This brings us to the question of the state of affairs on 12 July, when Malik after months of dithering finally returned to Middleburg. On the Dutch side, the plan for dispatching supplementary naval personnel, including two companies of marines, which had long been in preparation, had been put into effect on 27 March. The transport of these took place via Peruvian and French airports, the general staff having little inclination to put another bet on Anchorage and Tokyo after the problems previously experienced with the Americans and Japanese in the attempt at clearing the passenger backlog created by the soldiers' Christmas leave. In all, there were now 1,400 marines in New Guinea. In April it had been decided to reinforce the army with two infantry battalions of approximately 800 men each, plus several anti-aircraft artillery units to protect airfields and port installations. These troops had arrived on the two large passenger ships *Waterman* and *Zuiderkruis* in mid-June, after a voyage via the Panama Canal and Pearl Harbour. The core of the air force was made up of two Hunter fighter jet squadrons, the first of which (twelve aircraft) had been conveyed to New Guinea by the *Karel Doorman* in 1960. For reconnaissance and transport duties a squadron of fourteen Neptunes was available. In addition, the navy had been considerably expanded. The destroyers and submarines of squadron V, which after passing through the Panama Canal, at first had been

detained on the west coast of America for a few days, had been given instructions on 27 March to set course for New Guinea, where they arrived in around mid-April. This brought the strength of the navy up to two to three frigates, four destroyers and three submarines with smaller ancillary and accessory equipment. The strength of the three military forces combined at the time of Malik's arrival in Middleburg came to ten thousand, meaning this had doubled within the space of a few months. They consisted for the greater part of conscripts, though there was a significant core of professional personnel besides, particularly in the navy.[115]

On the Indonesian side, a considerably larger force was assembled at that moment. Macassar was the principal point of concentration, but Dutch air reconnaissance in July revealed the establishment of a significant bridgehead near the Moluccas as well. The Indonesian navy comprised a wide variety of vessels, including a few older Dutch ships, supplemented with Italian, German, American and Eastern bloc equipment. Its core consisted of five Skyori torpedo boat destroyers, four smaller destroyers or frigates, and a number of Russian submarines. According to Dutch intelligence, six of these were available in July for deployment within the Mandala command. Because of the great diversity of equipment and the low level of training of the crews, the Dutch did not have a very high opinion of the worth of this navy. Another factor responsible for this was the poor performance of the motor torpedo boats near Vlakke Hoek. As the equipment deployed here had been far too high-quality for the actual purpose, there was cause for doubt about the tactical insight of the leaders as well. Nevertheless, it was a force to reckon with, the more so as, in the view of the defence department, under the current political circumstances offensive operations by Dutch forces were virtually ruled out.

The greatest threat was posed by the Indonesian air force. It now comprised approximately a hundred modern Russian fighter jets, while its nucleus was formed by twenty Tupolev-16 long-range bombers that could operate from Java. The same was true of the Hercules transport planes, which were used for dropping paratroops. For this, a corps of six thousand trained paratroopers was on standby. Finally, the Dutch intelligence service reported that six of the Tupolevs were fitted out with missiles. Though the range and strength of these was still uncertain, this nevertheless gave extra cause for concern.[116]

There was uncertainty on the Dutch side right up until the last moment about the aims of the Indonesian assault. In spite of the reinforcements that had arrived from the Netherlands in the mean time, an attack on the Dutch administrative centre was still possible. This would probably open with an assault on Biak, the result of which would depend on the state of alertness of

the anti-aircraft battery located there, as well as, clearly, of the Hunters. Large-scale drops were hard to prevent, however, as practical reality was demonstrating with some regularity. These might result in the establishment of a bridgehead on the west coast of New Guinea, which could serve as a bargaining chip in the political negotiations. The Indonesians were working hard on this, with the naval attack near Vlakke Hoek having been followed by air drops in Onin, in various parts of the Bird's Head and the Raja Ampat, and near Kaimana and Merauke, while the infiltrations from across the sea were also continuing.

The latter were better organized and larger-scale than the infiltrations of previous years. They were executed by well armed and well trained troops. In one of the largest-scale landings in the Bird's Head, namely that near Teminabuan on 18 May, eighty paratroopers were initially deployed. A month later they had been eliminated in a series of minor actions, in which the local people, the Papuan police and units of the *Papoea Vrijwilligers Bataljon* (Papuan Volunteer Battalion) were extremely helpful. The Indonesian attacks near Kaimana were more persistent, probably because of Indonesian hopes of occupying the local airfield. The first attacks here started with the landing of small groups of lightly trained infiltrators around 24 March. The first paratroopers arrived a month later, followed by renewed drops in May. Up until the end of July a total of 160 of these paratroopers were landed here, half of whom the Dutch succeeded in eliminating. The remainder managed to survive in the terrain, without posing a military threat, for the rest. This did result in the Dutch garrison in Kaimana having to be substantially reinforced, however.

The largest-scale of this series of assaults took place in the vicinity of Merauke, where on 23 June three Hercules planes dropped about two hundred paratroopers. As usual, they landed in widely scattered spots, and in fact continued to operate from dispersed places. Unlike what happened in the aforementioned assaults, most of these paratroopers managed to evade their Dutch and Papuan pursuers, aided by circumstance. The terrain here was less impassable than in most other parts of New Guinea and provided ample opportunity for collecting food. With this operation, they managed to tie down the Dutch troops quartered there, though they posed no direct threat to Merauke or the nearby airfield.[117]

One might conclude that in mid-July the Indonesian infiltrators in New Guinea did not yet pose a genuine threat to the Dutch position there. The main weakness of these operations was that the drops were executed in a slipshod way, that the infiltrators received no help from the local population, and that the main Indonesian force was unsuccessful in keeping them adequately supplied. They did manage to cause a great deal of unrest among the population of

New Guinea, however, in particular in the towns on the west coast, where neither the civilians nor the military could know what was awaiting them from one day to the next. It was moreover clear that the Indonesian actions need not necessarily remain restricted to this kind of small-scale operation. The Dutch air shield was insufficiently dense, and if the Indonesians wished, they could step up the number of paratroopers fast enough. The Dutch military furthermore had to be prepared for unexpected and destructive air attacks. A combination of such an air strike followed by mass drops was certainly a possibility, so that they lived in constant uncertainty about what would happen next. Whereas in Geelvink Bay they still had the advantage that the entire area came within the range of the radar installations in Biak, this was not the case on the south coast, where a projected radar installation near Kaimana had not become operative in time.[118]

The Indonesian air landings only got properly underway after the start of the negotiations in Middleburg. According to a report drawn up after the event, in the period between 15 January and 14 August 1962, a total of 1,819 Indonesian troops were landed or dropped in New Guinea. The majority of these were paratroopers, of whom the defending troops killed 159 and took prisoner 479. At the end of the military phase, a little under a thousand were able to report alive, while the remainder could be considered missing. Of the one thousand Indonesian troops registered at the end of the hostilities, about seven hundred had arrived by plane or ship only a few days before. This brings the total number of Indonesian military personnel who managed to survive in inhospitable New Guinea for more than a few weeks to around 300.[119]

The value of these infiltrations was politico-psychological. Militarily, the Indonesian troops posed no danger to the Dutch occupation. Their mobility was limited and they had no radio contact. A few exceptions aside, they met with no positive response from the local population, either. The limited threat they posed is also reflected by the figures of Dutch losses. According to the detailed overview of Van Holst Pellekaan and associates cited here, in the period between March and the end of August 1962 ten Dutch soldiers were killed in direct action. In addition, one Dutch police officer and at least six Papuans lost their lives.[120] Though these figures speak of as many individual human dramas, they are low in terms of military mathematics. The threat implied by the infiltrations in that month of negotiations in Middleburg was real, however, the more so as the possibility that the Indonesians would actually deploy their large navy and air force, would carry out mass paratroop landings, and would really land the huge army concentrated near Celebes on the coasts of New Guinea had to be reckoned with. The Indonesians spared no pains to keep this awareness alive. They exploited the fact of the infiltrations in their

propaganda, for which the radio transmitters in Macassar and Ambon came in very handy. Sukarno claimed that a bridgehead had already been established for the liberation of the oppressed Papuans and that a few administrative centres had even been occupied. Subandrio asserted to the Americans that violence was the only language the Netherlands understood.[121]

Van Roijen and Malik get down to business

Let us now return to the consultations. In the last weeks of June 1962, when the talks about the preliminaries were dragging on slowly, eager Van Roijen optimistically anticipated their successful ending after learning that Subandrio was to act as negotiator and had no objection to negotiating as a minister with an ambassador. It was an indication that in Indonesian circles Van Roijen's prestige was high. In consultation with Bunker, he paid several visits to Zairin Zain, the Indonesian ambassador in Washington, who was in hospital 'recovering from a fairly serious illness', between 22 June and 2 July. Inevitably, the first conversation between these two concerned the question of what acceptance of the Bunker plan by the Netherlands actually meant. Van Roijen confirmed the Dutch preparedness to agree a priori to the order of (1) a transfer of the administration, (2) a UN administration, (3) a period of Indonesian administration, and finally, (4) a plebiscite. After that, the substance of the negotiations gradually came up for discussion, with Zain wanting to know if the Netherlands would be prepared to deviate from the terms specified in the plan, and what guarantees for safeguarding the rights of the Papuans (point 4) this country actually desired. From The Hague, these exploratory manoeuvres were anxiously followed by Luns, who feared they might give rise to new misunderstandings, whether or not deliberately created. On 3 July he tried to impress upon the negotiator that it would be better not to start talking at the conference table except under the supervision of a third party.[122] This was a sign that the minister and the negotiator were not operating on entirely the same wavelength and that each knew this of the other.

The official preliminary talks started on 13 July, when Malik and Van Roijen met in Middleburg again. Van Roijen had a number of 'guidelines' agreed with The Hague with him, which stipulated that he should try and reach agreement on the broad outlines of an agreement on the basis of the Bunker plan and on the practical measures flowing from this.[123] According to reports from Jones in Jakarta, Malik now had authorization for 'broad discussions', while, if all went well, Subandrio would also fly over soon.[124] The talks opened with an exchange of mutual basic principles. Van Roijen made the statement agreed on with Zain, whereupon Malik signified acceptance. This made it possible to consider the point of Dutch preparedness to hand over the administration to

Indonesia as cleared up, and the hurdle of 20 March as overcome. Next, the discussion concentrated on the problem of the interim administration, about which Malik had previously been forbidden to talk. According to the Bunker plan, the period of UN administration was to last minimally one and maximally three years. In the first year (Phase 1), Dutch officials were to be replaced by UN personnel, which in turn would be replaced in the next period (Phase 2) by Indonesians. After a period of interim administration by Indonesia (Phase 3), indefinite for the time being, would follow the moment of the Papuan people's exercise of their right of choice (Phase 4). This timetable left many questions still undecided, and it was now up to those present at Middleburg to find an answer to these. Malik's attention was directed in particular to the first phase of UN administration, in which the departure of the Dutch was to take place. This would have to happen as fast as possible, the term of one year specified in the Bunker plan being too long for his liking. The duration of the second phase was negotiable with him, though in general in his view the UN administration should be given as few powers as possible. The period of Indonesian interim administration (Phase 3), on the other hand, should be kept as long as possible, doubtless in order to make it possible for the Papuans to become as familiar with their own standpoint as possible, thus guaranteeing a favourable outcome of Phase 4 for Indonesia. By way of reassurance, Malik announced that Indonesia was prepared in a general sense to take over the commitments to the people of the region taken on by the Netherlands.[125]

The first stage was followed by a few days in which the parties sounded each other out, with Van Roijen showing himself prepared to climb down a little with regard to the duration of the first phase, in order to make sure that the period of Indonesian interim administration would not last over-long and to secure better guarantees for the Papuans' freedom of choice in the final phase. Indonesian suggestions regarding the duration of their interim administration varied from five to twelve years. The latter was the same as the length of the period of Dutch administration over New Guinea since the transfer of sovereignty in Indonesia, though the Indonesians did not want to be too insistent on this point. With regard to freedom of choice for the Papuans, Malik let it be known that Sukarno had already stated publicly a few times that the people would be given a free choice, with even the possibility of separation from Indonesia not being ruled out. Van Roijen considered this an encouraging piece of information, even though Malik showed little inclination to go into the details of the plebiscite to be held in that phase.

At the same time, attention was directed to the more practical points, which would have to be settled one way or another. The list swelled till it finally included twenty four items, for which the UN staff framed draft texts. Via this

detour, the talks got back to the key questions again, with the Indonesians taking special interest in the question of how the withdrawal of the Dutch troops was to be organized. The less time this took, the shorter could be the duration of the first phase of UN administration. In the discussions about this, the Dutch mentioned a term of six months, counting from the date of ratification of the Agreement. In this connection, Van Roijen came forward with the suggestion to try and move the date of ratification forward a little by recalling the Dutch parliament from its summer recess. It was a sign that for him as well most points were negotiable. The Hague was inclined to leave these matters up to the negotiator to decide, though Luns added the grumpy comment that the Indonesians were out to get the Dutch out of New Guinea as soon as possible, after which they would be free to ignore all the other points agreed.[126]

The making of the New York Agreement

As these explorations of the terrain were going on, Subandrio arrived on the scene with a number of his staff, including the minister for national security, General Hidajat. Their arrival was attended by a new spate of infiltrations and reports about preparations for the forthcoming attack. These actions were in sharp contrast to American assurances about the peaceable intentions of the authorities in Jakarta, though they were wholly in accord with the policy pursued by the Indonesians thus far. This approach was immediately discernible in the tone of the negotiations. From the moment of Subandrio's arrival in America, the alternative of violence was constantly ready at hand. On arrival in Washington, he immediately invited Van Roijen to pay him a visit in his hotel suite, during which the minister complained about the fact that the military were causing him so much bother at home and were urging for a speedy transfer. So would it not be better to skip the entire UN administration? The Papuans would surely not object, as they were only looking forward eagerly to a transfer of their territory to Indonesia. These rather startling remarks of Subandrio's were followed by a reference to the Indonesian paratroopers already present in New Guinea, whose number, according to him, was by then two thousand. Couldn't the Dutch designate an area now which they could keep occupied? Subandrio did not even deem Van Roijen's comment that the authorities in the Netherlands were anything but pleased with the latest infiltrations worthy of a reply. He did, on the other hand, continue to stress that he would like to see a restoration of friendly relations with the Netherlands. According to the imperturbable Van Roijen, this curious interview was marked by a pleasant enough tone, though it did not exactly improve the prospects of an agreement.

With this opening shot, Subandrio had given a new twist to the talks in Middleburg, which he only supervised from a distance. On the Indonesian side

the further negotiations were conducted by Malik. The non-committal phase was over, however. Continuing from Subandrio's introductory remarks, Malik argued at the meeting of 20 July that the Indonesian troops should be admitted to the UN apparatus already in the first phase of UN administration, while the whole of the UN period, including the second phase, should end by 31 December 1962. Any remaining Dutch subjects could then be repatriated by Indonesia. This idea was in line with Sukarno's repeated boast that the Indonesian flag would be flying over West Irian by 1962. As a reason for this change of mind, Malik argued that the situation had changed in the past three months, by which he could hardly mean anything other than that the Indonesian assault force was now ready to strike. Upon Van Roijen's expressing doubts as to the feasibility of the proposal, he was immediately told that in that case there was no point in talking any longer.[127] Hereby the phase of proceeding by ultimatum had been reached in Middleburg.

This tough approach stirred the State Department officials assigned to Bunker into action, who as always urged the Dutch to be more flexible and told them it was time their country at last cut its losses and took what profit it could, as otherwise the whole affair would end in war, by which it had nothing to gain.[128] The gains presumably consisted in a transfer of sovereignty with at least a semblance of organization, for which some useful arrangements had meanwhile been made in the discussions between the delegations. On 23 July Bunker gave Van Roijen an account of an interview between U Thant and Subandrio in New York. U Thant, too, had now advanced the opinion that the Netherlands could easily give in a little more on the point of the length of the first phase of UN administration, while it need not trouble its head over the subsequent stages, as this was a United Nations affair. Bunker supported this view and in this interview with Van Roijen expanded on it. In his opinion, transfer of the United Nations administration to Indonesia might take place even before the first year was out if the secretary general deemed this advisable. It was an ingenious proposal, whereby in one and the same sentence he had changed the term of one year for the first phase, as specified by the Bunker plan, to apply to the duration of the entire UN administration, which at the same time he had reduced further again at the secretary general's discretion. It furthermore turned the boundary between the first and the second phase, that is, between the moment of the departure of the last Dutch and the entry of the Indonesians, which was clearly drawn in the original plan, into some vague point in time, which did not even need to be mentioned in the treaty to be signed. Bunker moreover now suggested that the beginning of the first phase, that is, the transfer of the administration from the Netherlands to the United Nations, should coincide with the moment the Agreement was signed, rather than that at which

it was ratified.[129] This would be going completely over the head of the Dutch parliament. All in all, it constituted a crass deviation from what had been discussed before, which justifiably gave rise to the question in The Hague whether the United States and the UN were really still backing the Bunker plan.[130]

Thus with no one holding him back, Malik went on to make the even stronger demand to set 13 August 1962 as the latest date by which a draft agreement should be signed. The only explanation he was able to give for this was that this would give Subandrio the opportunity to fly to Jakarta for consultation and back to Middleburg again by 17 August to wind up the negotiations. This way Sukarno would be able to announce the return of West Irian to the bosom of Ibu Indonesia in his speech celebrating the twenty seventh anniversary of the Indonesian proclamation of independence—a matter of uppermost importance for the Indonesian psyche, and not least for that of Sukarno.

While these storm clouds were gathering over Middleburg, the consultations concentrated on practical matters for which a solution needed to be found in the short term, one of them the implementation of the Papuan people's free choice. On this important point a lengthy recommendation from the UN official Stavropoulos was lying ready, which guaranteed the Papuans a reasonably strong say on a variety of clearly defined options, including UN supervision and separation from Indonesia. This document met with considerable opposition from the Indonesian negotiators, in particular as regards the role of the United Nations in the implementation of the plebiscite. They in turn found Bunker as well as Stavropoulos and the Dutch delegation opposed to them en bloc on this score, which gave Van Roijen some hope that the Netherlands might be able to hold its ground here, especially if a few concessions were made with regard to the length of the different terms.[131]

On 24 August and over the following few days the consultations took place in the smaller circle of protagonists consisting of Van Roijen, Subandrio and Bunker, with constantly changing combinations taking part in the discussions. In the background, Rusk and Kennedy continually kept a finger on the pulse, while Van Roijen consulted with De Quay by telephone at critical junctures. In this phase, Subandrio raised substantial objections to Stavropoulos' document. During two meetings with Van Roijen, he argued that this proposal contained a number of elements implying a humiliation and an insult to Indonesia. He further dug in his heels on the point of the timing. He was now also threatening to walk out himself, hinting that this might signify the outbreak of war. In response to Van Roijen's reproach that this way he was repudiating every point of the Bunker plan, he defended himself by saying that he had made reservations on all these points to Jones in the run-up to the negotiations. When Van Roijen immediately after his interview with Subandrio checked this out with

Rusk, it turned out that this was true, in fact, but that the Americans had omitted to inform the Dutch of this.[132]

After these rather unsatisfactory consultations, there followed a discussion between Van Roijen, Bunker and Subandrio, in which the latter clarified his objections to the Stavropoulos plan. Indonesia did not want a UN watchdog present at the Papuans' exercise of the right of self-determination. Nor was his country in favour of the continuous presence of UN staff during the period of Indonesian interim administration in phase 3, as stipulated in the Bunker plan. Their presence would only give rise to constant complaints by the Papuans and thus be a source of unrest. Then he backed down a little by stating that Indonesia had no objection to UN supervision of the way it implemented the right of self-determination, and would be prepared to accept any assistance from this organization in this. He did make the reservation, however, that this supervision be exercised not by the General Assembly but by the secretary general. He further came forward with the personal suggestion to extend the period of UN interim administration by two months over and above the term Indonesia was offering, with 1 March 1963 then being set as the date by which both phases should terminate. After these rather 'mild' opening remarks, the Indonesian negotiator changed tone again and lapsed into a long tirade about everything the Netherlands in his eyes had done wrong since the days of Linggadjati. This country had systematically sabotaged every agreement, and the Indonesians did not want to run the risk of this happening once again. After he calmed down a little, the discussion touched for a brief while on the position of the Indonesian paratroops, which he wished to keep on, weapons and all, under UN supervision in the first phase. This remark he followed up with some observations on Dutch-Indonesian co-operation in New Guinea, also in this first phase of UN administration. This rather erratic discussion ended totally inconclusively and with the threat of an immediate Indonesian departure, and hence of war, remaining hanging in the air.[133]

The negotiations subsequently relocated to Washington, where Rusk and Kennedy were following events in Middleburg with an eagle eye. The American president urged the Indonesian minister on 26 August not to leave immediately, or, if he felt he had to, at least to leave Malik behind, so that the negotiations might be formally continued. He further pointed out that it would be madness to proceed to the use of violence at a time when both parties seemed to be in agreement on the main points. No one would understand. Exactly what else was said on this occasion is not clear. What is clear is that at the end of the interview the State Department officials presented the president's message to the Dutch as the great 'deterrent', which had prevented the negotiations breaking down in the nick of time.[134]

It is certain meanwhile that American pressure on the Dutch was also strong. This was evident during the discussions between Van Roijen and Rusk that same day. The Dutch negotiator had been authorized to announce that The Hague was prepared, within certain limits, to counter violence with violence, though the American did not appear particularly impressed by this. He merely reiterated that the Netherlands need not count on American support in that event, and insisted on a few more concessions.[135] Van Roijen passed this message on to De Quay by telephone, impressing upon him that giving in on the point of the duration of the UN administration was the only alternative to a futile war. According to his offsider, Huydecoper, the ambassador later that evening, in an interview with Rusk, mentioned 1 May 1963 as the earliest possible date of conclusion of the first phase of UN administration, of which, however, he made no mention in his telegraphic report to Luns.[136] He thereupon received authorization from Luns, on behalf of the council of ministers, the next morning to agree to a United Nations interim administration of one year, or as much shorter as the secretary general deemed feasible, on the obvious condition of an adequate provision for the right of self-determination for the Papuans.[137]

The tangible result of these discussions was that Subandrio remained in the United States for a few more days and set out for New York for talks with U Thant on 27 August. Bunker, too, sped to this city, where the secretary general was the first person to be briefed by him on the most recent developments. U Thant, in his subsequent talk with Subandrio, qualified somewhat the latter's demand for an earlier transfer of the administration to Indonesia. A transfer to Indonesia before 1 January 1963, as requested by Subandrio, was unfeasible on technical grounds alone. When Subandrio thereupon pulled the suggestion for a few extra months out of his sleeve, the business spirit took hold of both statesmen, who then arrived at a compromise date of 1 May as deadline for the termination of UN administration. It was the same date as that mentioned by Van Roijen to Rusk, though for the end of the first phase, the night before. In his telegraphic report, Van Roijen did not go into this distinction, advising his government to accept the offer.[138] The matter was clinched on this basis at a meeting of 29 July in Middleburg, at which Subandrio was also present. The Netherlands hereby agreed to a transfer to Indonesia as per 1 May 1963.[139] Advantage was also taken of Subandrio's presence to work out a provision for the right of self-determination that was acceptable to the Netherlands, as well as to settle a number of other outstanding questions. By 31 July matters had advanced to the point where Van Roijen was able to dispatch a draft agreement on twenty five points to The Hague. Of course, pending the final negotiations, these remained 'subject to amplification', but the principal points had definitely been decided.[140]

The New York Agreement, as eventually ratified by both parties, is included in the present book as an appendix. Various elements of it will be discussed further on, in the discussion of its implementation. Here we set out the main points, as cabled to The Hague by Van Roijen on 31 July as the preliminary result of the discussions. To avoid confusion, these points are provisionally given their definitive numbers. For the sake of a proper insight, a phrase that was not included in the definitive text until a later phase of the discussions is also provisionally added here between square brackets, namely in article 18d. This later change aside, the Dutch proposal for internationalization, which had started as the 'Luns plan' and had taken different forms in the hands of sober politicians and subtle diplomats, now looked as follows:

1. After the formal Agreement between the governments of the Netherlands and Indonesia has been signed and ratified by both parties, the Netherlands and Indonesia will jointly sponsor a draft resolution in the United Nations under the terms of which the General Assembly takes note of the formal Agreement.
2. After the adoption of the resolution referred to in paragraph (1), the Government of the Netherlands will transfer administration of the territory to a United Nations temporary executive authority (UNTEA) upon the arrival of the United Nations administrator appointed in accordance with paragraph (4). The UNTEA will in turn transfer the administration to Indonesia in accordance with paragraph (11).
7. The secretary general will provide the UNTEA with such security forces as the United Nations administrator deems necessary; such forces will primarily supplement existing Papuan police in the task of maintaining law and order. The Papuan Volunteer Corps and the Indonesian Armed Forces in the territory will be under the authority of, and at the disposal of, the secretary general. The United Nations administrator will, to the extent feasible, use the Papuan police as a United Nations security force to maintain law and order and, at his discretion, use Indonesian armed forces. The Netherlands armed force will be repatriated as rapidly as possible and while still in the territory will be under the authority of the United Nations administrator.
9. The United Nations administrator will replace as rapidly as possible top Dutch officials as defined in annex (a) with non-Dutch, non-Indonesian officials during the first phase of United Nations administration which will be completed on May first, 1963. The United Nations administrator will be authorized to employ on a temporary basis all Dutch officials, other than top Dutch officials defined in annex (a), who

wish to serve the UNTEA. As many Papuans as possible will be brought into administrative and technical positions. To fill the remaining required posts, the UNTEA will have authority to employ personnel provided by Indonesia.

12. The United Nations administrator will have discretion to transfer all or part of the administration to Indonesia at any time after the first phase of United Nations administration (i.e., after May first, 1963). The United Nations administrator's authority will cease at the moment of transfer of full administrative control to Indonesia.
13. United Nations security forces will be replaced by Indonesian security forces after the first phase of United Nations administration. All United Nations security forces will be withdrawn prior to the transfer of administration to Indonesia.
14. After the transfer of full administrative responsibility to Indonesia, the Indonesian national laws and regulations will in principle be applicable in the territory, it being understood that they be consistent with the rights and freedoms guaranteed to the inhabitants under the terms of this Agreement. New laws and regulations or amendments to the existing ones can be enacted within the spirit of the Agreement. The representative councils will be consulted as appropriate.
16. At the time of the transfer of full administrative responsibility to Indonesia, a number of United Nations technical assistance personnel, as deemed adequate by the secretary general after consultation with the Government of Indonesia, will be designated to remain wherever their duties require their presence. Their duties will, prior to the arrival of the United Nations representative, who will participate at the appropriate time in the arrangements for self-determination, be limited to advising and assisting in preparations for carrying out the provisions for self-determination. They will be responsible to the secretary general for the carrying out of their duties.
17. Indonesia will invite the secretary general to appoint a representative who, together with a staff made up, *inter alia*, of personnel in paragraph 15, will carry out the secretary general's responsibilities to advise, assist and participate in arrangements which are the responsibility of Indonesia for the act of free choice. The secretary general will, at the proper time, appoint the United Nations representative in order that he and his staff may assume their duties in the territory one year prior to the date of self-determination. Such additional staff as the United Nations representative might feel necessary will be determined by the secretary general after consultations with the Government of Indonesia.

18. Indonesia will make arrangements, with the assistance and participation of the United Nations representative and his staff, to give the people of the territory the opportunity to exercise freedom of choice. Such arrangements will include:

    a. consultations (*musjawarah*) with the representative councils on procedures and appropriate methods to be followed for ascertaining the freely expressed will of the population;
    b. the determination of the actual date of the exercise of free choice within the period established by this Agreement;
    c. formulation of the questions in such a way as to permit the inhabitants to decide (a) whether they wish to remain with Indonesia; or (b) whether they wish to sever their ties with Indonesia;
    d. the eligibility of all adults, male and female, not foreign nationals to participate in the act of self-determination [to be carried out in accordance with international practice,] who are resident at the time of the signing of the Agreement and at the time of the act of self-determination, including those residents who departed after 1945 and who return to the territory to resume residence after the termination of the Netherlands administration.

19. The United Nations representative will report to the secretary general on the arrangements arrived at for freedom of choice.
20. The act of self-determination should be completed not later than 1969.
21. After the exercise of the right of self-determination, Indonesia and the United Nations representative will submit final reports to the secretary general, who will report to the general assembly on the conduct of the act of self-determination and the results thereof.
22. The UNTEA and Indonesia will guarantee fully the rights, including the rights of free speech, freedom of movement and of assembly, of the inhabitants of the area. These rights will include the existing rights of the inhabitants of the territory at the time of the transfer of administration to the UNTEA.

    The UNTEA will take over existing Netherlands commitments in respect of concessions and property rights.

    After Indonesia has taken over the administration it will honour those commitments which are not inconsistent with the interests and economic development of the people of the territory. A joint Indonesian Netherlands commission will be set up after the transfer of administration to Indonesia to study the nature of the above-mentioned concessions and property rights. [141]

A perusal of this document shows that, with regard to the practical implications of the provisions proposed here, much was still open to conjecture. This was no coincidence. Particularly in the final phase of the negotiations, both chief negotiators had aimed at a formulation that would allow avoidance of the most sensitive topics. The entire Agreement was worded in such a way, for instance, that the word 'sovereignty' was not used once. This was especially true of the second article, regulating transfer by the Netherlands to the United Nations. Greater precision was superfluous, as Van Roijen told Luns, since it was clear enough without. Thus this point of principle in the interpretation of the RTC agreements, which had kept the parties divided ever since 1950, was almost casually brushed off the table. There was lack of clarity also regarding what had happened to the second phase of UN administration, which had shown a tendency from the start of the discussions, and certainly since Bunker's suggestion of the 23 August, to disappear almost surreptitiously. The text of the draft agreement now mentioned a transfer to Indonesia 'at any time after the first phase' (Article 12), at the secretary general's discretion. This was at odds with transfer of the administration on 31 May 1963, as settled between Subandrio and U Thant, while Article 13 now specified that Indonesian security forces would only be allowed to take over from the UN forces after this first phase. The solution to this was provided by the circumstance that the entry of Indonesian troops was no longer tied to the second phase, as specified in the original text of the plan. In the new text, the presence of Indonesian troops even before the first of May was assumed as a matter of course, so that they might be in readiness for their new task immediately on that same day. The Agreement even left open the possibility of the UN administrator deploying them for police duties already before that, that is, in the first phase (Article 7). Clearly the Dutch had made major concessions here, without the implications of this being properly worked out. This the delegation left up to a separate military committee, for which purpose the admirals H.H.L. Pröpper and L. Brouwer set out for Washington at the beginning of August for consultation with General Hidayat and colleagues. It was a foregone conclusion that the negotiators one way or another would have to take into account the fact that the first two phases of UN administration had in effect fused into one.

The arrangements for the subsequent period of Indonesian transitional administration were virtually the same as those stipulated by the Bunker plan. 'After the transfer of full administrative responsibility to Indonesia' (article 14), there would be only limited room for United Nations busybodies. The duties of the remaining UN personnel after that were limited to assisting and advising Indonesia in preparations for carrying out the provisions for self-determination (Article 16). In a later phase, they were to assist the

representative appointed by the UN secretary general, who was to assume duties at most one year prior to the date set for this. The duties of this representative, which had been emphatically described as being of an advisory nature already in Stavropoulos' proposal,[142] were now stated to be 'to advise, assist and participate in arrangements' for the act of free choice. To avoid misunderstanding, it was added that the responsibility for these arrangements was Indonesia's (Article 17).

With regard to the provisions for the actual implementation of the act of self-determination, there had been some considerable narrowing down. Where in Stavropoulos' proposal a 'plebiscite' was mentioned as the internationally accepted method, implying a system of free elections, this had now given way to some sort of undefined 'freedom of choice', referred to elsewhere in the text as an Act of Free Choice. All in all, the task of the assistant to the secretary general would consist in advising, assisting and participating in the making of the arrangements for this Act of Free Choice, while Indonesia had the power of decision.

Nevertheless, the Agreement included some further provisions in this connection that might help ensure the democratic quality of the system to be used. These were formulated in four points in Article 18. Point (a) stated emphatically that it was not solely up to Indonesia to decide, with the assistance and so on of the UN, but that consultations also had to take place 'with the representative councils on procedures and appropriate methods to be followed for ascertaining the freely expressed will of the population'. Even so, this did not curtail Indonesia's final power of decision, while moreover the composition of these councils would in any case be determined by the Indonesian administration. To be absolutely on the safe side, Subandrio had wanted to add that these consultations would take place 'in accordance with Indonesian practice'. When Van Roijen objected to this, this phrase was replaced at Subandrio's suggestion with the term *musjawarah.* Van Roijen had then agreed to this without further ado after having had it explained to him that this was the usual way of discussing important matters in Indonesia.[143]

The introduction of this term later was to give rise to all sorts of complications, as we shall see below. In actual fact it made for a high degree of dirigisme, or central control. Of course this had been precisely the Indonesian negotiators' intention, though it should be added that the use of this term in this connection had been suggested by the Dutch delegation member Schürmann, as Van Roijen reported, not without some pride, to The Hague. This brilliant idea had provided the decisive argument in bringing the Indonesians onside on the point of the plebiscite as well. After the introduction of this term, they were able to look forward to the adventure ahead with an easier mind, in which

connection we tend to wonder if Van Roijen had any idea of the implications of Schürmann's brainwave. In this context, it is important to note that the addition placed between square brackets in article 18d above did not occur in the text cabled by Van Roijen on 31 July, while it was not mentioned in a report of the discussions drawn up by him for the government in The Hague on 1 August, either.[144] The statement that the act of self-determination itself would be 'carried out in accordance with international practice' apparently was at odds with the preference for *musjawarah* expressed by the Indonesian negotiators, and was only inserted in the text in the later stages of the negotiations. It must be added here that there is no trace of any discussions leading up to it to be found in the Dutch reports. Presumably it is one of the corrections Stavropoulos made later, which somehow or other found a way into the final text as accepted by both parties.

From Van Roijen's reports it is obvious, however, that serious discussions about the conditions under which the act of free choice was to be implemented took place in Middleburg. Stavropoulos' original proposal stated that one of the responsibilities of the representative and his staff was to be to help create the general conditions under which the people would be able freely to exercise their right to self-determination. The text as it stood would have opened the door to UN intervention on a whole series of points of practical administration, which had been totally unacceptable to the Indonesian negotiators.[145] The final version of Article 22 only mentioned a joint UN-Indonesian guarantee of the rights of free speech and of assembly for the inhabitants of the territory. Where full administrative responsibility was vested in Indonesia, and the UN representative's task could only be a mainly advisory one, active intervention by the latter in this respect, too, was effectively prevented a priori.

All in all, this draft agreement still followed the principal lines of the Bunker Agreement, except that concessions were made mainly by the Dutch. Up to a point, the result reflected the tactics adopted by Van Roijen. He had striven to ensure that any concessions made by him would be primarily on the point of the timing of the first and second phases, in the hope that he might then in return be allowed to retain as much as possible of the provisions regarding implementation of the right of self-determination. He had been only very partially successful in this. In this respect, too, the wording had been watered down considerably and the guarantees for a proper implementation, as desired by The Hague, dropped altogether. Much would depend on the goodwill of the party in charge of the administration at the time of the exercise of this right, that is to say, Indonesia. Van Roijen, whose prime concern was to get the plan accepted by The Hague, nevertheless looked at matters positively. He drew comfort from Articles 21 and 22, which clearly defined the responsibilities of

the United Nations, irrespective of the question of whether the provisions preceding them really made it possible for this organization to discharge these responsibilities adequately.

With the drawing up of the draft agreement, the delegations had accomplished their principal task. This did not mean that the conference was over, however. A number of technical questions still remained to be settled, while for the Dutch it was of the utmost importance to make clear also to the outside world—and to the Indonesian government—that the negotiations had not broken down after Subandrio's departure. Such a development might, after all, have provided the war party in Jakarta with an argument to proceed to further action. Subandrio left New York, after paying U Thant a farewell visit, on 31 July, hence well before the date of 13 August initially mentioned by Malik. His task was to present the draft agreement to Sukarno in Jakarta. He travelled via London, where he announced that it was time he returned home, as reports from the Indonesian capital indicated that the president felt that he had made too many concessions. Now, it is always difficult to assess how much truth there was in unpredictable Subandrio's statements, but it seems that in this case he was right. British sources, too, inform us that Sukarno was thirsting for further feats of war, but that military circles were trying to restrain him. Subandrio appears to have complied seamlessly with his boss's whim. On the very day of his arrival in Jakarta, he publicly called the Dutch all the names under the sun again and threatened war once more.[146]

The last hurdles

The Indonesian military had not sat twiddling their thumbs since the start of the negotiations. Dutch intelligence reports testify that on 31 July all was in readiness in Indonesia for a major attack. At that time a fresh group of paratroopers was dropped near Kaimana.[147] On the Dutch side it was assumed that these air landings were carried out in order in any case to have as many troops as possible on the ground at the moment of the signing of the Agreement. Information from captured paratroopers revealed that they had been dispatched in order to celebrate the 17 August holiday together with the Papuans.[148] Then news arrived that two large Tupolev-16 planes with guided missiles on board had arrived in Morotai. About the range and explosive force of these the Dutch were uncertain, but the threat they posed was none the less real for all that. In addition, troopships, submarines and motor torpedo boats capable of landing commandos were sighted in the waters surrounding New Guinea. Besides, three thousand paratroopers, though possibly double that number, had been conveyed to Ambon and surrounding islands. There was a

large concentration of merchant ships, carrying twelve thousand troops, in Bangkalan Bay near Celebes, escorted by virtually the entire Indonesian war fleet. It was more than sufficient for a major assault, after the paratroopers and the landing forces had carried out the necessary groundwork.

Although the Dutch *Marine Inlichtingen Dienst* (Marid; Naval Intelligence Service) had reliable information about the general aims of the operation, uncertainty remained about when and where the major actions were to be expected. This was particularly true of the assault on Biak planned by the Indonesians and expected by the Dutch, which would clear the way for a leap to Hollandia. As it later turned out, this operation was initially planned for 12 August, but had to be deferred for a few weeks owing to logistical problems. Although scattered fragments of information were received about this on the Dutch side, the exact details were unknown. Most of the locations of the Indonesian units were known, but there was uncertainty about the decision-making process at the highest political and military levels.[149] What little the Dutch did know seemed ominous enough in any case. Only after 3 August did news arrive via Jones that Sukarno was prepared to start formal negotiations on the basis of the provisional agreement.

All these reports gave rise to enormous tensions in the Dutch camp. For the troops in New Guinea extreme vigilance was called for so as to be able to deal with a surprise attack in time, while in Hollandia as well as in Washington and The Hague the military and civil authorities had to occupy themselves seriously with the preparations for an evacuation of the civilian population with the promised American help. The Americans were in fact making preparations for this, but were primarily concerned about the few American and British subjects in the area, whose rescue in a contingency evidently deserved priority—a most unfriendly gesture, according to a thoroughly disgruntled Luns.[150]

The mood in the Dutch council of ministers did not exactly improve when the results of the talks in Middleburg became known. The minister ultimately responsible and some of his colleagues showed deep irritation, not only with the Americans, who had now even dropped the Bunker plan, but also with Van Roijen, who had swallowed this and was thus leaving the council with no choice. Although Van Roijen during the negotiations had kept The Hague generally informed, the opportunities to suggest adjustments had been limited as a result of the complexity of the situation in Washington and the internal divisions in Cabinet. The initiative had in actual fact been seized from the latter after the start of the talks. Van Roijen had been continually instructed valiantly to hold his ground, but how he was to do this had of necessity been left to his discretion. In addition a futile debate had taken place in the council of ministers about the possibility of getting the United Nations, or even the Security

Council, to help, which, in view of the international constellation, did not hold out any chance of success. Cabinet had been in a position where it was able to furnish precious little information to the two houses of parliament, so that its prestige was declining. The American embassy staff in The Hague observed with some satisfaction that an increasing number of members of parliament were showing obvious signs of scepticism about the trustworthiness of the foreign minister and prime minister.[151] It was a most unpleasant situation for Luns and his colleagues, who gave vent to their irritation by grumbling about the results of the negotiations.

The first opportunity for them to voice their dissatisfaction with well-founded arguments was the Cabinet meeting of 3 August, for which Van Roijen had also come to The Hague. For this he had brought a rather more detailed record of the negotiations with him, which also included the whole of the draft agreement. In principle this was open to further negotiation, so that both sides might still make additional demands, which could then be put forward during the formal talks to be held after Subandrio's return to the negotiating table. Hence the Dutch council of ministers was not asked for a definite standpoint at this stage. The meeting, and more especially the preliminary discussions, where Van Roijen was absent, rather provided an opportunity for letting off steam. The starting signal was given by the minister for defence, Visser, who let it be known that he was not at all happy with the results of the talks and stood by his original proposal. This was for the Dutch to withdraw to Biak and to organize their retreat from there under their own steam within the space of a few months. The Americans were not needed for this. After all, the Netherlands was a maritime power and was well up to the job by itself. Luns thought this was going too far, raising the objection that in that case New Guinea would soon be awash with Indonesian troops, which might make things quite difficult for the Dutch posts concentrated on Biak. He wanted to confess that in the past few weeks he had repeatedly hoped that the negotiations would founder on Indonesian sabotage. One implication of these remarks was that he felt in his heart of hearts that Van Roijen had been too lenient. He was feeling rattled by the conduct of the Indonesians as well as of his own delegation. His behaviour suggested that he would have gone about it quite differently. The tone was set by De Quay, however, who expressed the opinion that things could have been worse. This was also the line taken by Van Roijen after his admission to the council meeting. The delegation had been with its back up against the wall, and by the looks of things the results were not really all that bad. Though there were grounds for disappointment about the concessions with regard to the timing, the right of self-determination had been salvaged at all events. The Netherlands would just have to be satisfied with that. More than moral satisfaction had not

been possible since the introduction of the Bunker plan anyway. It was therefore important for the Netherlands and the Papuans to accept the outcome.

Then followed questions from the other members, with the deepest disgust being evinced by Ministers Visser, Klompé, Korthals, Bot, Calmeyer and Toxopeus. After the negotiator's departure, Deputy Prime Minister Korthals articulated the right-wing view that, though perhaps a fiercer fight might have been put up, the Dutch government had done what it could. It had gone to the brink of war, even in a situation in which the home front showed no solidarity. No more was possible. With this everyone agreed. Luns got his own back by saying by way of a parting shot that he did not want an American as UN administrator of New Guinea, and certainly not Bunker, who had revealed himself as an agent of Kennedy's![152]

The following Monday the proposals were discussed in detail by the council, with no fundamental changes being suggested. Minister Toxopeus wanted it known that he felt the negotiators had exceeded their brief, and that he was deeply shocked that the Netherlands now had no more opportunity of further educating the Papuans. The council then dealt with the question of further development aid for New Guinea, to which Van Roijen had given little attention. Under the terms of the Luns plan, the Dutch contribution during a United Nations interim administration had been set at a hundred million guilders a year, which was more or less the same as the sum currently spent on the area by the Netherlands, not counting the costs for defence, which had meanwhile risen sharply. This plan had tacitly assumed that the Netherlands would then still be wholly in charge of the administration, be it under a UN trusteeship, which now was totally out of the question. Hence Minister Zijlstra suggested halving this amount, on condition that Indonesia paid the other half. The principal motive in offering this aid was that it would ensure the physical presence of UN personnel during the transitional period, up until the 'Act of Free Choice'. This, according to Luns, was just about the only material guarantee that could still be given to the Papuans.[153]

Junior Minister Bot thereupon asked that attention be given to the guarantees in respect of concessions and property rights provided for in Article 22. In principle these rights were to be preserved, provided they were not inconsistent with the interests of the people. He felt that an addition to the effect that Indonesia should pay damages in case of default was called for. This was particularly important in connection with the recent agreements between a few American mining companies, the *Oost-Borneo Maatschappij* (East Borneo Company), and the Dutch government about exploitation of the big copper and gold deposits in the Carstensz Mountains.[154] Minister Klompé further wanted it said that to sign an agreement one did not believe in was an abominable

thing. De Quay tried to qualify this by reiterating once more that most matters were optimally provided for by the Agreement, and that implementation of the latter in co-operation with a reasonable partner would not create any problems. He did not exactly radiate confidence that this was, in fact, the case.

The outcome of the consultations was at least that Van Roijen was authorized to go and negotiate on the basis of this draft, in the expectation that a number of amendments suggested in the course of the meeting would still be possible. These concerned in particular more unequivocal guarantees for the powers of the existing representative bodies in New Guinea, the secret nature of the plebiscite, and the carrying into effect of its results.[155] Thereupon Luns received the American ambassador in The Hague, Rice, at his department, where the latter was told to give Rusk to understand that he need not think the Netherlands had approved the Agreement. He might add that the Dutch government was deeply disappointed at the immense pressure the United States had brought to bear on the Netherlands, only to throw overboard 'every principle of genuine self-determination, of maintenance of the international legal order, of resisting blackmail, as formulated in the United Nations Charter'.[156]

At the time of Rice's visit to the minister, the latter was in an even worse mood, if possible, than at the council of ministers meeting a few days previously. The reason for this was the receipt of the so-called 'flag memorandum' from U Thant. As was mentioned above, Subandrio, in his interview with Van Roijen of 29 July, had agreed to 1 May 1963 as the date of transfer of the administration to Indonesia by the United Nations. This had not been formulated absolutely clearly in the wording of Articles 12 and 13 of the draft agreement chosen by the UN secretariat, but, as Van Roijen had cabled to The Hague on 31 July, this had been the emphatic intention, also of the Dutch delegation.[157] The first of May of the year 1963 hence would be the end date of the first as well as the second phase, whereby the latter had in actual fact lapsed.

About the flag nothing explicit was said in the Agreement. However, the Dutch had expected, on the basis of the text, that after transfer to the UN administration, the United Nations flag would fly over the territory, possibly side by side with the Dutch one, until the end of the UN period. According to this line of reasoning, the Indonesian flag could not be hoisted till the end of the (meanwhile extremely hypothetical) first phase, that is to say, till 1 May 1963. As now became apparent, Subandrio had discussed this matter with U Thant during his farewell visit of 31 July, and here had got the latter to state in writing in a memorandum that the Indonesian flag might be flown alongside the United Nations standard as early as 1 January. It was further to be inferred from this document that the Dutch flag would be furled immediately after transfer to the United Nations. The Netherlands had not been informed of this regulation,

the existence of which only became known because Sukarno's letter of 8 August, in which the president agreed to the opening of formal negotiations with the Netherlands on the basis of the draft accord just concluded, contained a reference to it. The act of signing had to be completed by the national holiday on 17 August.

For Indonesia this issue was of great propaganda value, as it meant that Sukarno's prediction that the Indonesian flag would be flying over West Irian on the first day of the new year would now come true. As it further transpired, the Indonesians had discussed the subject with Van Roijen in the final phase of the negotiations, when the latter had reacted quite laconically by saying that this was a matter for the secretary general.[158] When U Thant subsequently acted accordingly, the reaction of the Dutch Cabinet, already in a highly irritable mood as it was, was furious. It felt it had been tricked once again, and on a sensitive point of prestige like this, too. Aside from this, it meant that between 1 January and 1 May 1963 all Dutch officials and military personnel still present in the area would have to operate under the Indonesian flag. It was to be supposed that under these circumstances the actual administration would also pass into Indonesian hands, whereby the fiercely opposed transfer to Indonesia on 31 December 1962 would be realized, via a back door, after all. Several ministers threatened to resign, and Minister of Defence Visser, resolute as always, put forward the suggestion not to conclude any treaty at all now. The Netherlands would do better to walk out there and then and simply leave the matter to the United Nations to decide. Then at least it would not have to be responsible for whatever happened after that. However, the majority let itself be led by the realization that this would do no one any good. Van Roijen was instructed to try and persuade the United Nations via Bunker to retract the memorandum. But upon discussing this with Rusk, Harriman and Bunker, the negotiator came away empty-handed.[159] They all expressed their regret at the situation, while Kennedy, on being consulted by telephone, was even prepared to state that he was deeply shocked. After that Van Roijen was referred to the 'bright boys' of the State Department, as usual, and to U Thant himself for a solution. The end result was a proposal to keep the Dutch flag flying, next to that of the United Nations, till 31 December.[160] It was cold comfort, and had the obvious disadvantage of even more unequivocally marking the turn of the year as point of transfer.

Before it came to this, a number of matters still needed to be dealt with, however. These were the position during the period of UN administration of the Indonesian infiltrators already present in the area, the final wording of the Agreement, and, finally, the fixing of the date for the transfer of New Guinea to

the United Nations. With regard to the paratroopers and other infiltrators, the Indonesian negotiators adhered to Subandrio's standpoint, whereupon the problem was passed on to a military committee. For this, Fleet Admirals Pröpper and Brouwer were summoned to New York. For Luns, who had followed developments from The Hague biting his nails, this was all but impossible to stomach. Subandrio, in his discussions with Van Roijen, had mentioned a figure of two thousand Indonesian military personnel in Dutch territory, thereby hinting that a number of larger administrative centres were already under their control. This was mere bombast, however, and Luns pointed out to his negotiator in Washington that most of the paratroopers had been rounded up soon after their landing, while the remainder were roaming around lost in the forests of New Guinea.[161] Nevertheless, it would now not be difficult for the Indonesians to do something about that. In the final phase of the negotiations they stepped up the number of paratroopers in Dutch territory through fresh drops, in fact, demanding in the course of the discussions with Pröpper and his staff that Indonesian ships and planes be allowed immediately after the signing of the Agreement to provision these troops, thus emphasizing their status as 'occupation forces'. This problem was resolved by means of a compromise suggested by UN General Rikhye, who was also present at the discussions. Subject to a number of extremely restrictive conditions, provisioning might take place using white-painted UN planes. Apart from that, the end result of this particular discussion was that those already present in New Guinea would be allowed to remain where they were until the arrival of the UN administrator, so that they might then be handed over to him as a 'manageable' apparatus.[162] For the rest, Indonesian paratroopers were still dropped in a number of places even after this was agreed, so that on 15 August their number rose again. Although obviously this did nothing to alter the arrangement, it did compound the problems. About the entry of Indonesian troops during what formally speaking was still the first phase of UN administration no agreements were made. This was definitely considered to be one of the UN administrator's responsibilities.

While these discussions were still in progress, Subandrio returned to Washington again on 11 August. Within the Dutch delegation there was still some consternation at the time at the fact that the Indonesian delegation had rejected out of hand a final version prepared through the kind offices of Stavropoulos. As a result, the negotiators were obliged to revert to the draft of 31 July, which had remained rather vague on a number of points. Nor was discussion possible about several amendments with respect to the Papuans' legal position proposed by the Dutch government.[163] In this phase also the so-called flag compromise was pushed through in the face of fierce opposition from The

Hague and Jakarta. The end result was viewed by Van Roijen as a significant feat. He reported to The Hague that this was thanks to American pressure on Sukarno.[164] At the same time, 1 October 1962 was fixed on as the date of transfer to the United Nations, an earlier date having been rejected by the Dutch, as this would have made it impossible to submit the draft agreement to parliament for ratification. After the final hurdles had thus been cleared, the act of signing itself was a mere formality. It took place in the United Nations building in New York on 15 August 1962, giving Sukarno time to work the message into his speech marking the anniversary of the Indonesian revolution.

In the Netherlands, the Council of Ministers gave its approval unanimously though grudgingly. The ministers also had to concern themselves intensively with military operations that day. There had been fresh landings near Kaimana, while a Dutch warship had brought down an Indonesian plane. By far the great majority of the council felt they had been made a fool of by their own delegation, and spoke of an exceptionally unfavourable agreement. It nevertheless had to be accepted.[165] Immediately after it was signed, De Quay announced the result to the people of the Netherlands in an emotional televised speech. Here he expressed his regrets that the Dutch had not been able to do more for the Papuans, though he immediately followed this up with the expectation that the Act of Free Choice might produce some favourable results yet. He exhorted the Papuans to look to the future with full confidence in the justice of their cause, concluding with the assurance that 'The Dutch people will continue to be with you in their thoughts and kind wishes'.[166]

Jakarta had different ideas about this. Sukarno in his 17 August speech rejected the external right of self-determination for the Papuans, as provided for in the Agreement just signed, point-blank. Instead, the Papuan people would be given ample opportunity to state their views on their internal position within Indonesia. This statement prompted a telephone conversation between Bunker and Van Roijen, in which the former used the word 'outrageous', while the Dutch negotiator felt compelled to admit that he could not have imagined even in his wildest dreams that anyone could give the term 'self-determination' the interpretation they had just heard from Sukarno.[167] It was a conversation that may have satisfied the logics of diplomacy, but bore no relation whatever to reality.

The New York Agreement came about under great pressure, while between the moment of its signing and the transfer of the administration there was an interval of only six weeks. Under these circumstances, neither parliament had an opportunity of exercising any influence. As far as Sukarno was concerned, this was not necessary, either. In his country, guided democracy had meanwhile

come to full fruition and, as he himself commented, he had every right to give the Agreement the rubber-stamp approval himself. In the Netherlands, a recap of the events leading up to this event was the only action taken by parliament, with the government receiving the credit it desired. The Agreement was accepted after a few days' debate, on 7 and 13 September, by a very large majority in both houses. Before it came to this, however, Minister Luns almost as a matter of course came under fire. The opposition quite rightly reproached him for giving an over-optimistic representation of the American position.[168] This was to remain a regular subject of debate, whereby Luns was able to cling to his standpoint that Dulles, Herter and Rusk had, after all, given definite undertakings to come to the aid of the Netherlands if the worst came to the worst. He was further able to point out in his defence that he had never made a secret of the fact that these commitments had been vague and had definitely not taken the form of concrete treaty obligations. He was also right in saying that the United States had still taken the position, even at the time of presentation of the Luns plan to the United Nations in 1961, that New Guinea should remain under international control up to the moment at which its people would be obliged to make their own choice. As far as he was concerned, the scales had not fallen from people's eyes until submission of the Bunker plan on 4 April 1962.

Van Roijen was later to reproach Luns for not interpreting the signs correctly in time, arguing that it would have been better if he had thrown in the towel sooner.[169] In actual fact the difference between the points at which the moment of truth had come for each of them was no more than a few months. Van Roijen had only let Luns know on 20 December 1961 that American military assistance was most definitely not to be expected in the event of an Indonesian attack. The problem here is that from 1958 on the American standpoint was continually shifting. In the discussions between Luns, Dulles and Rusk this was only alluded to in vague terms, though the signs became clearer sooner to the embassy in Washington, on the practical executive level. Added to this was the fact that on the Dutch side, Minister Luns had a tendency to hear what he wanted to hear, which was a matter of tactics as well as an assessment of the situation in Indonesia. Luns had difficulty in believing that Indonesia was really capable in 1962 of building up a dangerous offensive force and at the same time maintaining its political stability, but was quite clearly wrong about this. In addition it was important for the minister to pressure the United States to nail its colours to the mast as clearly as possible, so that the responsibility for the ultimate retreat would be Washington's. In this he was doubtless successful.

Taking an overall view of the negotiations, it can be concluded that the Netherlands did its utmost—within the bounds of possibility—to draw out the

final phase of Dutch control of New Guinea as long as possible. In retrospect we may ask whether this was a wise thing to do. There is no conclusive answer to this, as we do not know what might have happened if an alternative course had been chosen and it is not possible to compare incomparables. What is certain is that an earlier capitulation, for example at the time of the Round Table Conference or the talks in Geneva, would have worked out cheaper for the Netherlands. It would have saved this country a lot of expense and effort and might possibly have enabled a smoother winding up of its remaining interests in Indonesia. Over against this, the question then remains what benefit twelve extra years of Dutch rule may have meant for the Papuans, and whether any advantages would not have been outweighed by an intensification of anti-Indonesian antagonism. To get a better idea of this, we must now return to New Guinea itself, where the administration and part of the population had watched the developments in the diplomatic and military arena of the past few years with rapidly sinking feelings.

Chapter 10

Democratization Under Bot and Platteel

For a long time we have been leaning against an old tree whose leafy canopy has provided us with needed shade. However, the tree is now beginning to decay and thus, to our regret, forces us to stay out of its way so that we won't end up beneath it, should it fall over one day.[1]

New Guinea; reactions of the government and the population

In the three preceding chapters we followed the international developments pertaining to New Guinea from 1950 to the signing of the Agreement of New York, which heralded the end of the Dutch rule. We shall now return to Netherlands New Guinea itself, which we described in chapter six as a development project under a colonial flag. The section of Papuan society that had an interest in it, had experienced this with great enthusiasm. The new opportunities for acquiring an education were increasingly appreciated and efforts were made to prepare Papuans for an active role in the new society. As early as 1944 Van Eechoud had made a modest start by establishing a school where dozens of Papuan teachers were trained for positions in the Civil Service. Among these were the cousins Marcus and Frans Kaisiepo, Isaac Hindom, Marthen Indey, Lucas Rumkorem, Corinus Krey, Augus Matani, Frans Djopari, and Filemon Jufuway. With the separation from Indonesia in 1950, New Guinea became their exclusive territory. The withdrawal of the relatively large contingent of Indonesian civil servants, which until then had filled the lower and some of the higher positions, created more space. Throughout the fifties the number of qualified Papuans multiplied thanks to the availability of new training

facilities. In this context we should mention the OSIBA (*Opleidingsschool voor Inheemse Bestuursambtenaren* or *Training College for Indigenous Civil Servants*), which was founded in 1951. It offered a five-year programme that produced a younger and better trained generation of civil servants. By the time Van Baal left office in April 1958, every district bureau had graduates of this college on its staff. Many Papuans experienced it as a period of optimism and progress. Under the direction of Dutch and to an increasing extent Papuan civil servants, people were enthralled with things such as education, progress and the opening up of the country's interior.[2]

Van Baal's resignation, casually mentioned above, was a personal drama for this highly capable governor. Its reason was the so-called censorship case, which at the time caused such a stir that a parliamentary fact-finding committee was formed in 1959, which delivered a report in December of the same year.[3] To understand the story it is relevant to mention that its roots already existed in the Waardenburg period. In the years immediately following the separation there had still been many contacts between Indonesians on the other side of the newly drawn border and people on the west coast of New Guinea. These contacts sometimes had political overtones. The same was true for contacts between Moluccans on New Guinea and supporters of the RMS.[4] In order to keep an eye on this, the governor had granted authorization to the solicitor general in Hollandia at that time to censor all incoming and outgoing mail for which this seemed appropriate. With the Obano rebellion of 1956 in the region of the Wissel Lakes this censorship had acquired a new impulse. Fearing that the Indonesian government might exploit the news related to this politically, all incoming and outgoing mail in that region was strictly censored for a period of time. Obviously, absolute secrecy was essential, although in more private circles it had become common knowledge because the official in question relished telling the story of his experiences at the club. The ball really got rolling, however, when the vicar apostolic in Hollandia, Monseigneur Staverman, noticed that his mail was being read by civil servants in the office of the public prosecutor general in Hollandia.[5] It was this incident that led to the above-mentioned uproar. Although there was a legal basis in the ordinance of the Netherlands East Indies Services Direction (*Indische Diensten Toezicht Ordonnantie*) of 1936, it was not self-evident that this should have been applied to the issue at hand. In any event, it was undeniable that the official in the public prosecutor's office had not demonstrated any of the appropriate restraint required in his duties. Nevertheless, it was the governor's responsibility and one could blame him for not having exercised adequate supervision. Van Baal submitted his resignation, which was accepted as of 30 April 1958. Minister Helders granted him this with a word of thanks for his proven diligence.[6] No praise could have been more chary.

His duties were assumed by Dr. P.J. Platteel, who took office on 1 May 1958. Because of the political impasse caused by the fall of the Drees Cabinet, it wasn't until September 1959 that he acquired a satisfactory partner in The Hague in the person of Th. H. Bot. They were both old hands of the Netherlands East Indies civil service. The last post that Platteel had held was an appointment in the government of the federal state of East Indonesia, where he was in charge of the organization of a department of the Ministry of the Interior.[7] In 1949 Bot had served at the secretariat of the Round Table Conference and had subsequently been transferred to the secretariat of the Dutch-Indonesian Union. This had provided him with an intimate knowledge of the early stages of the New Guinea issue. The question had preoccupied him intensely in 1950, which had led to his previously mentioned article in the *Internationale Spectator*, in which he had argued for some form of international rule.

As a deputy minister at the Department of the Interior in The Hague under Minister Toxopeus he was in charge of the New Guinea policy. Chapter five already indicated that their combined actions in this respect could be characterized as a change of gear. Both Platteel and Bot had been marked by their previous experiences with the decolonization in Indonesia where the Netherlands had encountered the opposition of a large part of the Indonesian population. The forced departure from Indonesia of the majority of the remaining Dutch citizens during the first half of 1958 harshly reminded them of this once more. In his first year, Platteel in particular feared a repetition of this scene in his new administrative district. To him it was not a foregone conclusion that in the hour of danger the Papuans would stand on the Dutch side as a matter of course. To get to that point, they would have to be included far more in the management of matters and begin to take responsibility for these as well. We saw in chapter six how this led to stepping up the establishment of educational programmes and the opening up of the interior. A first step was taken in The Hague in January 1959, even before Bot took office, when he discussed the development programme with Helders, then the Minister of Overseas Affairs.[8]

Both were convinced that the approach required greater speed. The sense of urgency only increased during the following months. After an in-depth discussion in the Second Chamber in March 1960, Bot made a statement concerning the necessity for a significantly shorter period of development than had been considered thus far. He then designed a ten-year plan that provided for as complete as possible a development and mobilization of Papuans in the country's government. It implied explicitly that the end of the term would not offer automatic independence but it would open the door to it. The plan also contained proposals for democratization and mobilization of the Papuans in the country's defence. Furthermore, it implied a different arrangement concerning the

legal status of the Dutch civil servants that accentuated the temporary nature of their presence. They would all be part of an Aid Corps whose members would become redundant and return to the Netherlands when the work was accomplished. In addition, the plan contained proposals for cooperation with Australia and defence reinforcement. The dispatching of the *Karel Doorman*, which took place at the same time, indicated that time was growing short.[9]

The policy relating to the Papuans that was henceforth pursued did not show a fundamental break with the preceding period but was essentially its intensification. Under Van Baal they had thought in terms of three-year plans with primary objectives in the area of infrastructure and education. Their acceleration and intensification had now become possible because their foundation had been laid in that period. Besides, the pressure of the internationally advancing decolonization had been tangible then, too. As early as 1956, Van Baal had come to the conclusion that acceleration was necessary and that the Papuans had to be provided with a concrete prospect for the future. In real terms, too, the first initiatives had been made to speed up the course taken. We saw this in relation to education, opening up of the interior, democratizing the government and making preparations for farther-reaching economic development. With the arrival of Platteel and the rapidly changing prospects of the subsequent years things were gaining momentum.

Still, this acceleration signified more than merely a gradual change. In following the earlier Netherlands East Indies policy, the Dutch government in Van Baal's time had striven mainly for a lateral development. First a broad development of the common people was to be achieved before one could foster the training of an elite that would be able to take over essential parts of the administration. This was the only guarantee that such an elite could truly come under the control of the broader population. The drawback of this approach was that it also limited the social possibilities of those people who had acquired a more extensive schooling in the meantime. They would have to wait a long time before the group as a whole would be sizeable enough to take the helm. In the Netherlands East Indies a similar approach had led to a frustrated younger generation that couldn't summon the patience for this. It had been the lesson of the 1945 revolution. In 1959 they were made to face these facts again because of developments elsewhere in the world. The course of events in the Belgian Congo, specifically, caused a shock because there, almost from one day to the next, the term for achieving independence had to be reduced from decades to weeks. The result was that the Belgians had to fall back on an elite whose top echelon had not made it any further than schoolteacher or sergeant. Since that time the education of the ordinary people of New Guinea had been a priority, even though this was not strictly necessary for an island of this size.

Nonetheless, now more emphasis was placed on the accelerated training of an upper echelon too. If independence were to arrive, a leap in the dark would have to be made—in which case it was preferable to have a new generation of somewhat better educated leaders at the ready.

We saw the results in chapter six, where the figures show that around 1960 almost all the children in the coastal regions were enjoying some form of elementary education. For the large majority this consisted of a three-year course of elementary training but several thousand pupils had been offered the opportunity of taking a six-year course, of which the finishing point corresponded to elementary school in the Netherlands. These forms of elementary education provided access to a number of vocational training programmes that had openings for approximately one thousand students a year. In addition, a system of continuing education courses had been created, whose core was formed by a number of Primary Secondary Schools. These PMS-schools were attended by three to four hundred students at a time. They formed the gateway to the OSIBA and other vocational colleges. Around 1960, approximately sixteen thousand Papuans were employed by the government or private employers. More than two thousand of these were in permanent service, of whom several dozen held intermediate positions.

In large sections of the interior none of this had yet occurred and the people were living in the Stone Age. Yet, much work was being done to incorporate them in the new entity, although with rather limited resources. From 1955 on, ten new administrative posts were established in the interior, whereby the number of individuals brought into the administration had risen from 342,600 to 461,900. In 1960, approximately 150,000 square kilometres were still outside of any administrative rule, with a population estimated at a minimum of 200,000 souls.[10] Even so, according to the government in Hollandia, the expansion had actually moved too fast. There wasn't enough manpower to continue at the same speed. The expectation was that a broad exploration of the as yet untrodden areas could be completed within a few years, whereupon many more years of administrative and educational intensification would be needed before the level of the coastal regions would be attained.[11]

Inside the circle of those few thousand with a better education, a growing political consciousness was noticeable. Moreover, several different roads were open to them. In the early fifties there had still been a rather widespread sympathy for Indonesia, notably in the western parts of New Guinea. Obviously, this was strongest among the thousand or so Indonesians who were employed by the oil industry in Sorong and the hinterland, among the Butonese near Fakfak, and the Javanese in the rice region near Merauke. However, considerable groups of Papuans were sympathetic to Indonesia as well. This was notably

the case among the people from Serui. The spirit of Ratulangi had stayed with them. The torch had been picked up by Achmad Djalali and Silas Papare. The latter had left Serui for Jakarta in 1949, where he was able to become the figurehead of the Indonesian West Irian campaign. He gained a seat in the Indonesian parliament and his presence in various action committees that were devoted to the liberation of West Irian was prominent. Initially, he maintained contact from Indonesia with his adherents on New Guinea through epistles in which he sang the praises of the situation in his new place of residence. These letters were passed from hand to hand and eagerly devoured.[12] When he left Serui he had vowed to his followers that they could henceforth leave the matter to him. And so they had. This promise, coupled with an active interest from the administration and police, had led to a collapse of the PKII. The focus on Indonesia continued, however, which the Dutch also attributed to the rivalry of these island inhabitants with their Biak neighbours who were more strongly oriented towards the Netherlands. Additional groups of Serui lived in Hollandia and in the cities on the west coast where the potential of contact with Indonesia was the greatest.

Furthermore, beyond the above-mentioned groups there were people here and there who remained focused on Indonesia as well. There were some notables among these who, under favourable circumstances, might gain considerable support from the population. In Biak these were Corinus Krey and Lucas Rumkorem. On the Waropen Coast there was the crocodile hunter Stephan Refasi, while his colleague Felubun had made a similar reputation for himself on the South Coast. In this context the names Petrus Wettebossy, Marthen and Amos Indey and Petrus Sembor should be mentioned as well. These men were administrators and teachers of the old school.[13] The list is certainly not complete and the influence of those mentioned here is hard to evaluate.

In the early fifties, Dutch resistance to political action with red-white (pro-Indonesian) leanings had been quite strong. Pro-Indonesian individuals were carefully watched and noted violations were immediately dealt with. Later on less attention was paid to these. When Hermanus Wajoi and Augus Nenepat, both in the service of the administration, publicly expressed their pro-Indonesian tendencies, no corrective measures were taken. According to van Baal they weren't necessary; one would merely turn them into martyrs.[14] When we look at the 1953 statistics of those punished we find mention of six criminal cases concerning violations of public rule, involving a total of eighty five individuals. It cannot be said that political motives were involved in each of these cases but, insofar as they are present, they need to be sought in this category. In 1960 the total number of people sentenced in this category had decreased to twenty nine. The largest-scale operation in this area was the 1959 round-up of

a paramilitary organization, the *Bataljon Tjendrawasih*, which was active primarily among the Indonesians in Sorong.[15] In early 1962, a record of individuals to be kept in preventive custody in case of an Indonesian invasion came to a total of thirty in Hollandia and Fakfak, half of whom were Papuans. As far as could be checked, application of this measure was never required.[16]

The overall image that emerges from the Dutch reports is one of support from the Papuan population for the policy pursued. This was stimulated by the administration and, more specifically, by the Information Service under Merkelijn and his colleagues, of whom the primary one was the highly competent Marcus Kaisiepo. The activities of this service included informational tours during which the government's measures were explained to the population. Thus, one of the tasks of the department was to provide information about the establishment of regional council as well as other councils. It also published the *Pengantara*, a Malay-language newsletter that, in addition to a news summary, also offered more in-depth opinions on the developments in international politics. The paper drew attention to the altruism of the Dutch policy that was aimed exclusively at the well-being of the population. Later on, the alluring prospect of growing independence, international cooperation and, perhaps, a possible merger into a Melanesian Federation of Dutch- and Australian New Guinea with the islands to the east were added. Progress in this area could be demonstrated from the cooperation with Australia that was actually occurring and of the reports of the annual conferences of the South Pacific Council, in which Dutch Papuans also regularly participated. Both Marcus Kaisiepo and Nicolaas Jouwe were regular visitors and, from 1958 onward, students from the entire region went back and forth to take continuing vocational training courses. Thus eight youths from Papua New Guinea attended the nautical college in Hollandia, while roughly ten young Papuans from the Dutch region were taking courses in Port Moresby. A bi-weekly airline connection was established between Hollandia, Lae and Port Moresby, while athletic competitions took place annually between secondary school students from Hollandia and Wewak. These events were very popular with the Papuan youth, contributing to building trust in the Dutch development policies.

Because of this the disconnection from Indonesia increased, although the latter contributed to the estrangement as well. The infiltrations did not arouse any sympathy and the local population was almost always ready to lend a hand in rounding up the intruders. Moreover, the 1956 nomination of the Sultan of Tidore as Governor of a fictitious Indonesian province of West Irian was generally seen as presumptuous. The name Tidore reinforced the effect because it brought back the most negative memories of earlier contacts with the Indonesian neighbours to the west. All of this became intensified by the sharp

tone of the Indonesian radio that could be heard daily from Ambon and Macassar.

At the same time, these noises from Indonesia produced not merely irritation, they were also signs that something was wrong and that the future of the Papuans was not indisputably safe in the hands of the Dutch. The resulting sense of insecurity came to be critical for the first time with the call of the Synod of the Dutch Reformed Church of 1956, which led to violent protests in the cities on the north shore.[17] The subsequent developments, specifically the increasingly critical mood in the Dutch press, did not escape the notice of the small group of politically interested Papuans either. It made them realize that they should become more actively involved in shaping their own future. During that same time, Van Baal observed that the Papuans were maturing and that a clear perspective should be offered to them. To this end, gaining self-sufficiency in short order was necessary and it would be best to set a deadline immediately. As we have seen, he was thinking of 1980 as the target year for greater independence.[18] In a number of memoranda he then provided more stable forms for the plans to democratize the administration on both the regional and central level.

The democratization of the administration

Town and Regional Councils

Intensification and democratization of the administration became the most important points on the agenda under Platteel and Bot. During the first half of the twentieth century, the establishment of advisory and administrative councils had been the central theme in the discussion on colonial policy. In the Netherlands East Indies it had led to the establishment of the *Volksraad* (People's Council) in 1918, which was charged with the supervision of the budget and legislation. Diverse forms of participation developed on a lower level. Running the villages was left to the local powers, albeit under supervision of the native Regencies. The latter had been remodelled as much as possible to mirror modern Western agencies, run by elected councils under the chairmanship of the highest indigenous administrator, the *Regent* or, in Javanese, *Bupati*. At an intermediary level between regencies and central government, the Netherlands East Indies territory was subdivided into provinces or governments. Thus, until 1942, New Guinea had formally been part of the Government of the Great East. At the time there was not yet a representative council for the region. This had been established after the war when the federal state of East Indonesia was formed, which could be seen as the successor of that government. Then, however, New Guinea was no longer part of it.

The introduction of some participation of the population in the affairs of the administration presented itself as the obvious approach for New Guinea as well, but the country was miles behind. Pre-war New Guinea had been governed by a small number of Dutch administrators with the assistance of a rather substantial body of civil servants of Moluccan origin. Village development had not, or barely, started happening. Traditionally, the administration was run by Malay-speaking people, while the clans were led essentially by family elders or the strongest personalities. When the administration accepted these as heads or *kepala* they would acquire greater power, which they had to share with the local representatives of the administration and the missions. Initially these were predominantly Ambonese and Keieans, but in the course of the fifties Papuans who had obtained further education gradually assumed their positions. In 1954, Van Baal had demonstrated a certain enthusiasm for the establishment of village councils in the Mimika region, with which an administration could be built from the ground up. Such councils appeared in other places as well, but only randomly and with moderate success. Villages remained small and artificial and, whenever they saw their chance, the population would wander off again to their scattered gardens and hunting grounds.

The system of *kepala* under administrative supervision that thus developed was not particularly democratic. Attempts at improvement were made but without any positive results because of the fragmentation of the society. Insofar as there were any unifying tribal institutions, the Dutch civil servants and anthropologists then in charge didn't always recognize them and this would sometimes cause friction. We have already noticed how the Mandatjan brothers in the eastern region of the Bird's Head were able to create a most resourceful unifyng link that had hardly any roots in the existing social structure. Elsewhere, however, war alliances could be found, notably in the region of the Wissel Lakes that, when necessary, facilitated a superseding authority. Something similar may also be assumed in the Biak and further regions of Geelvink Bay. Here, its origins lay in the organization of the fleets, which the Biakkers used to put out to sea in the old days for trade, pirating or war expeditions. Each *keret* would provide a proa and a chieftain or council of elders would command the fleet. The question remains, however, to what extent this had any meaning in the daily life of the fifties.[19] In any event, in the judgement of the Dutch administrators it was too little to support a regional administration.

In the early years of the new administration in Hollandia, the introduction of representative institutions had been the subject of rather abstract discussions, but from 1954 onward the subject acquired a more prominent place on the agenda. It was then part of a broader framework. It all began with a

memorandum by Van Baal about the establishment of representative councils on different levels. The diverging needs of the various population groups were thereby taken into account.[20] The introduction of some say by the primarily European population in the running of the affairs of the few larger towns seemed easy enough. In 1955, Hollandia was able to install an advisory municipal council. It consisted of a number of appointed members under the chairmanship of the resident. The council comprised both Papuan and Dutch members. The latter tended to interpret the council in terms of a modern municipal council that should have control over its own budget. Van Baal did not want to hear a word about this, fearing that if they had this control, the small group of Europeans in the towns would appropriate too large a portion of the available budget. He deemed it best that they restrict themselves to the business of playgrounds, street lighting and the like, for which a limited budget from taxation monies was available. Shortly thereafter, Manokwari acquired a similar council, while for Biak such an institution was under consideration. At that point the possibilities were exhausted, and in practice the councils didn't amount to much. Difficulties with personnel were never-ending: there was a shortage of suitable Papuans while Dutch citizens were not happy to hold a seat on these relatively meaningless bodies.[21]

More important for the political development of the Papua world were the plans for the establishment of councils for larger units, on the level of the *regentschap* or, in Javanese, *kebupaten*. The problem here was that there were no indigenous structures that could provide a starting point. The solution was sought by taking the already existing administrative subdivisions (territory of an *assistant resident*) as points of departure. After all, these had been delineated, whenever possible, according to the condition of the terrain and the ethnic distribution. Yet, in order not to be bound too narrowly by this administrative concept, the newly created councils were referred to as *Regional Councils*. On this broader scale more exciting business was the order of the day, touching the interests of the slowly rising Papuan middle echelons. Yet, the question still was whether suitable candidates could be found. A committee formed by Van Baal in 1956 couldn't resolve the problem. The members considered that only two Papuans were suitable for such advisory work, namely Nicolaas Jouwe for the residency Hollandia and the Reverend (*pendeta*) F.J.S. Rumainum for Geelvink Bay. They might possibly be assisted by H. Womsiwor and the Reverend Mori Muzendi. On the west coast one could appeal to the Reverend Osok and Rajah Ibrahim Bauw of Rumbati. There was not a single suitable Papuan to be found in the south and it seemed improper to take a Keiese instead. As we have seen, this didn't eliminate Van Baal's sense of urgency.[22] An additional complication was that the work of administrative reform was directed from The Hague by a

commission under the chairmanship of the jurist W.L.G. Lemaire. The agenda comprised a general revision of the Administrative Regulations of 1950. It was a big task and the commission needed time for deliberation. Consequently very little came out of it that was concrete, although when the Cabinet of 1957 was formed there was some pressure from the political side, specifically from the KVP, to move things along. The death of Minister Kernkamp in 1957 caused further delay. This state of affairs didn't prevent the administration on New Guinea from starting to think about the most urgent reforms. The subject came up at the Resident Conferences of 1957 and 1958, whereby a new Van Baal memorandum served as a point of departure. In advance of the results of the work done by the The Hague commission, democratization was formulated here as an administrative project for the establishment of Town, Regional and Village councils, which could already be instituted on the basis of the existing Administrative Regulations. Subsequently one could see how they might fit into an administrative organization as revised by the Lemaire commission.

First thought was given to the forming of representative bodies in the Schouten Islands (Biak and Numfor) and on Japen, the two most developed areas where the mission had begun its work a hundred years earlier. Furthermore, it was decided to undertake something similar in the hinterland of Hollandia.[23] When he took office in May 1958, Platteel could link up with it, which he did with great energy. He started with Biak and Numfor, where the chance for success was greatest because an advisory council of *adat* leaders, the Kankain Kankara, had already been functioning there since 1948. The administration had already gone over the notion of further democratization with various individuals in the population. The new governor felt it was high time for the Netherlands to demonstrate its firm will to educate the Papuans for greater independence. For that reason the councils to be established ought to be as representative as possible. He preferred indirect elections with both male and female suffrage. The ordinance for the establishment of the Regional Community Biak-Numfor could be placed in the statute book on 24 June 1959.[24] The region was divided into six electoral districts, whereupon the electors would be chosen in August. Things were accompanied by a jubilant official report: the Information Service had accomplished its job. Men and women alike fully understood the election process. Interest was huge and anyone who was physically able went to vote. Those who couldn't read or write whispered their preference into the ear of the civil servant present. There was an 89% turnout. The fact that the population was urging energetic young men in particular and a few women between the ages of 20 and 35 to run for election inspired great pleasure. Thus only a few dynamic village chiefs and no gurus at all made it to the finish line. Apparently, people didn't want the traditional

village elite to tell them what to do. Consequently, the new authority was no longer based on the old *kepala* system. It all lived up to the expectations in Hollandia. A modern elite was emerging, as a happy Platteel stated on 10 September 1959 in his account of the result of the preliminary elections.[25] There is no reason to argue about this. Even if the result can be attributed to a large extent to the work of the Information Service, the fact remains that this result came about through secret ballots. It should also be remembered that these elections were a completely new phenomenon and, in view of the great distances in the region, called for a large organization with ample opportunities for sabotage on the part of the population should they have wished it so. Clearly nothing of the sort occurred.

The selection of candidates and the final elections followed this first round. It was done by bringing the electors together by district and having them make their statements there. This took place in October so that the council could be instated according to plan on 9 November 1959. To give added lustre to the occasion, Cleland, the governor of Australian New Guinea was invited to attend. The township of Biak was excluded from the regional council because its territory was reserved for a city council. Those who were seated on the regional council were not solely the government's favourites. Among the elected was Corinus Krey, who had spent the years from 1953 to 1957 in prison because of anti-government activity.[26]

During the following years regional councils were established in similar fashion in Japen-Waropen, the hinterland of Hollandia, Fakfak, the Rajah Ampat and Merauke. There, too, the attitude of the population was generally positive, with the exception of a few villages on Japen where people resisted the creation of the regional council because they felt it a betrayal of Silas Papare to whom they had left the initiative, after all. When Kaisiepo, the information officer, visited these villages in mid-1960 he was greeted by groups chanting the text 'kita tolak dewan'—we do not want any council! However, their resistance remained within the bounds of the law and the preparations for the council continued according to plan. The only result was that in the above-mentioned villages the turnout was limited.[27] In that same year a regional council, the Dafonsoro, was established in the hinterland of Hollandia, taking its name from the mountain that dominated the area. Merauke and Fakfak followed shortly thereafter. In addition to the city area, the council of Merauke included the region of both the Marind-Anim and the Mujus and was given the Marind name Anim Ha (The True Human). Students of the OSIBA were brought in to help with the preparation. As far as participation in the elections is concerned, it is remarkable that no more than 25% of the enfranchised in the town of Merauke appeared, while the figure in the surrounding villages was over 80%.

The explanation may well be found in the fact that the urban area had a highly mixed population of which Papuans were a minority. In the urban area of Fakfak, the same problem occurred. For the rest, the turnout percentages in all the regional communities surpassed the 80% mark.[28]

Thus, during the final years of Dutch administration, New Guinea had a system of representative councils in its most developed regions of which it could justifiably be said that they represented the voice of the Papuans. In principle, these councils had a considerable say and formed the core of the local government. They were in charge of their own personnel and their own budget. The councils were chaired by the assistant resident, who only had an advisory voice in the meetings. Yet, only limited experience was gained with regard to their functioning, because they did not come into effect until the final stages of Dutch rule. There is no doubt, however, that the regional council of Biak-Numfor functioned best. Here they had gained some experience with administration in consultation via the Kankain Kankara, while the council included some forceful personalities, Eliëzer Bonay, the district leader of Bosnik, and Lisias Rumbiak among them.

The New Guinea Council

So much for the provision of popular representation on the regional level. In addition, and primarily for political reasons, there was a need for a certain amount of democratization of the central administration, too. The administrative regulations of 1950 had left some room for experimentation in this area because in it mention had been made of a representative and law-making council for all of New Guinea. At the time, this announcement had been made exclusively for show. The discussion became more concrete with the previously mentioned Van Baal memorandum of 1956. To be sure, there was the problem of finding suitable candidates but the Governor found comfort in the thought that it would all work out because the Papua world was in the process of extensive development. From the point of view of Hollandia, the concept of a New Guinea Council was especially appealing because thereby one could give its proposals to The Hague greater authority. The game mentioned in chapter two, in which the Council of Departmental Directors transformed into a law-making body whenever the governor withdrew for a bit, was not very plausible. At the same time the interests of the Papuans couldn't be left in the hands of the Indigenous Development Council much longer, dominated as it was by the missions. The call of the Synod speeded up the matter. Van Baal began to push it more although, for the time being, he continued to be a proponent of an appointed council. Anyhow, he now appeared with further proposals.[29]

It was all a little too brash for the commission of Lemaire, which kept playing for time. In July 1958, after visiting New Guinea, it presented a proposal that was a combination of boldness and restraint. On the one hand, the council should be created via general and free elections but, on the other, in the early stages its powers should not go beyond giving advice on the budget. The ordinance legislation could be left to a smaller committee, yet to be formed. Even in its developmental stage this plan, which the commission referred to as a 'training school in democracy,' had met with Van Baal's resistance because he was of the opinion that it would lead to a rebellious council lacking in prestige. His successor Platteel agreed with him and went a step further. He presented his own proposal on 20 November 1958. He made his plea for a mixed system of indirect elections and nominations, whereby local circumstances should be taken into account. In better developed regions elections were the obvious approach, while the appointment of regional representatives would be sufficient elsewhere. In any case, a strong representation of the indigenous elite was needed immediately. Furthermore, the council should be given actual power. After all, the experiences in the Netherlands East Indies and elsewhere had taught that 'as soon as the people's influence on colonial rule was introduced, an immense momentum was initiated that would not be channelled by artificial means into a favourable disposition towards the Dutch'.[30]

The department agreed with him and Platteel was asked to come up with further proposals. These followed soon enough but the discussion didn't pick up any steam until the Deputy Minister for Overseas Affairs, Bot, took office. He gave his support to the already initiated policy in November 1959. Nevertheless, during his first visit to New Guinea in January 1960 he couldn't refrain from adding a few marginal notes to the Council of Departmental Directors. There he expressed his concern about politicizing characters who would come forward with nothing but criticism about the Dutch, although they themselves were unaccustomed to doing any constructive work. It was therefore of utmost importance that people should be seated in the New Guinea Council and in the regional councils who had already shown elsewhere in society that they were able to hold their ground.[31] One may assume that he was thinking not merely of the earlier experiences of the Netherlands East Indies with the Indonesian nationalists, but also of the very recent struggles with Nicolaas Jouwe, one of the most prominent Papuans of the time. The latter had already had a run-in with Van Baal at an earlier stage because the Governor thought his ambitions were not in keeping with his formal education and ethical qualities. This had led to his dismissal from the service. At the end of 1958, during a visit to the Netherlands, he had been sharply critical of the administration in Hollandia in press interviews.[32] It was more than likely that

he and other *homines novi*—new men—would take a wilful stand within the body to be formed. On the other hand, in the run-up to the elections the administrative machine fulfilled an important role and much could be attained by giving good advice. It should therefore be possible to nip potential solo performances of overly ambitious candidates in the bud. In their reaction, the governor and the council members were able to refer to the recent elections for the Regional Council of Biak-Numfor, where the desired individuals had, indeed, come forward. There was no reason to presume a priori that for the elections of members of the New Guinea Council the results would be different.

To start with, the regulation draft for the New Guinea Council was being further developed in The Hague. It now acquired the form of a partial revision of the Administrative Regulations of 1950. On further consideration, where the budget was concerned the Council was now given advisory powers only. As long as the Netherlands was largely saddled with the expenses it should be determined by law, that is to say via the States-General. That could only be changed when New Guinea had sufficient available income of its own. The Council could express itself on all administrative affairs, of course, and, if so desired, present the people's interests to the King, the States-General, or the Governor. Moreover, a permanent assembly of delegates from the Council would be more closely involved in the establishment of ordinances. All in all, it was a configuration that was consistent with the previously aired ideas of the Lemaire commission.

In conformity with the advice from Hollandia, the land was subdivided into twenty-four roughly equal electoral districts, each comprising 12,000 to 15,000 voters. Attention was paid to ethnic and economic relationships. In the larger urban centres of Hollandia and Manokwari a simple system of direct elections could be used. For fourteen other districts the path of indirect elections appeared to be preferable, whereby an elector would be appointed for every fifty voters. In the remaining ten districts, situated in the barely opened parts of the interior, appointments would have to be made whereby, at best, the people's recommendations could be taken into account. To keep the business orderly, each voter could only have one vote while each district would only have one representative. Because of this system, the elected Papuans generally came from the most important tribe in their region. The right to vote was reserved for Dutch subjects only (that is to say, for every Papuan) and for those Dutch citizens who had already spent some time in the colony. Individuals of Indonesian nationality were not included, which also held true for most of the Moluccans. The proposal did provide for the possibility of designating a number of representatives of minority groups that would otherwise have very little chance of being appointed due to their numerical inferiority.[33]

In New Guinea itself, they had embarked on the practical preparations for the formation of the council well before Bot's visit. As a first step, the governor had requested the residents to draw up a list of prominent people who would be capable of playing a role in the new establishment. This had not been an easy process, in which the residents had been confronted a number of times with the scepticism of their district officers (*controleurs*) who implied that they weren't quite sure what to do with this request. After some prodding the lists were submitted, however, some of them accompanied by more explicit personal descriptions. All in all they contained the names of about two hundred individuals who, in the opinion of the civil servants concerned, met the qualifications. Not surprisingly, most of them were from Hollandia and West New Guinea. Sollewijn Gelpke, head of the subdivision of the Schouten Islands, came up with no more than eleven names for the entire region of Geelvink Bay, of which three for Japen and seven for the Schouten Islands. He had found no one worthy of the required classification on the Waropen Coast or in the Wissel Lakes region. In comparison with the others this was an extremely poor result, which can be attributed primarily to the fact that Sollewijn Gelpke had set the standard a bit too high. Nevertheless, as chairman of the regional council of Biak-Numfor, he certainly knew what he was talking about. His list was accompanied by the remark that the experience with the council mentioned had proven that the importance of the individuals generally turned out to be different from earlier evaluations. He therefore didn't think it impossible that the following year would produce prominent people in Japen and on the Waropen Coast who at this point were not yet recognized as such. A hopeful message with a cynical undertone. Finally, we can state that here, too, the various lists contained names of individuals who were known to be openly pro-Indonesia. Apparently, political preference was not a decisive factor in determining the level of prominence, just as it hadn't been in the candidature for the Regional Councils.[34]

The list soon served its purpose when in March 1960 Bot was able to announce from The Hague that, when the draft bill was under discussion, the Council of State had asked that 'leading figures in the population' be approached. Bot rather liked the idea, not only because such a gathering would offer a fine opportunity to get a sense of the mood among the Papuans and to provide further information, but also to be able to indicate to the United Nations and the Dutch public that the aspirations of the population involved were being taken into account. This could be useful in the General Assembly debates of the United Nations and the Dutch parliament where opinions concerning the New Guinea policy had become strongly divided.[35] The result was that in May 1960 the enactment was discussed in a meeting with twenty

well-known Papuans, among whom—in addition to the almost inevitable Marcus Kaisiepo and Nicolaas Jouwe—were the Reverend Osok, Herman Womsiwor, Seth Rumkorem, Eliëzer Bonay, and Petrus Wettebossy. The last three were part of the group that had shown a critical attitude toward the government in the past.[36] To a large extent, the meeting took place in the absence of the Dutch authorities. After the debates had come to a close, a report was made to the governor who could then signal to The Hague that the meeting had gone well and had produced a number of practical recommendations. The most significant of these was the expressed wish that both the right to vote and the eligibility for election be restricted to the indigenous population and to those foreigners who were prepared to settle in New Guinea permanently. Kaisiepo had emphasized this by stating that people could only have one home country. In addition, a minority had objected to the district system; they had deemed it acceptable only because there were no political parties yet. The third point of consideration was a lack of satisfaction with the advisory task concerning the budget, for it would take a long time before the condition posited could be met. Therefore they had expressed the wish to have further powers available to spend that part of the income that came from their own means.

Platteel was happy with the outcome and let it be known that the comments made didn't mean the enactment had to be revised. The requested restriction of the right to vote had to be denied. The demand for permanent settlement supposed a kind of citizenship that didn't yet exist as such. Therefore, suffrage would be open to all Dutch citizens residing on New Guinea. On the other hand, Platteel did see the request as a sign of nationalist feelings that should be appreciated. The topic was also discussed in a separate advisory deliberation with a group of Dutch, Chinese and Indonesian citizens although they didn't delve into the subject very deeply. However, Gosewisch, the Dutch participant from Manokwari, intercepted Kaisiepo after the meeting and asked him directly what he imagined the position of the East Indies Dutch to be when the country was finally independent. The answer was not particularly encouraging; Gosewisch was left with the impression that there would be no personal, privileged place for them and they would be better off finding their future elsewhere.[37] As far as Kaisiepo was concerned, Papuan nationalism was determined on an ethnic basis.

The enactment was presented to the Second Chamber in June 1960 and was warmly welcomed there.[38] The government now pressed on with it. Right at that time Minister Luns was taking the first steps toward the internationalization of the New Guinea question and thus a progressive action was all the more desirable. Bot recommended a schedule that could be upheld almost to the day.[39] In the meantime, the total number of members, chairman included, had

been set at twenty-nine, of whom sixteen would have to be seated by means of elections. These began in the last days of December and were completed in the early months of 1961. In certain places it led to fierce competition. This was notably the case in Hollandia City where the lawyer Olaf de Rijke ran against the popular Reverend Mori Muzendi. The latter lost by five votes. In Manokwari and Sorong, too, Dutch residents won the elections. In Manokwari it was the above-mentioned settler H.W.F. Gosewisch and in Sorong the civil servant A.R. van Zeeland. There were many Dutch inhabitants in these towns and yet, for a variety of different reasons, Papuans also voted for these Dutch candidates. As the only jurist in the country outside the administration, De Rijke was the *enfant terrible* of official Hollandia. He was one of the few who had an independent position vis-à-vis the authorities and dared to confront them. Undoubtedly, there were many who considered this a good characteristic in a representative of the people. The fact that he had been sentenced to four months in prison for forgery a short time before did not preclude his election. Among the Arfak population of the Manokwari the quiet farmer Gosewisch was popular, as an employer among other things. Van Zeeland profited in Sorong from the make-up of the population that guaranteed no majority for any of the Papuan ethnicities. Apart from that, his colleagues regarded his candidature with mixed feelings. For the rest, only Papuans were elected. These were N. Jouwe (Hollandia), M. Suway (Nimboran), M. Kaisiepo and B. Mofu (Schouten Islands), M. B. Ramandey and E.J. Bonay (Japen-Waropen), P. Torey (Ransiki), A. Arfan (Rajah Ampat), A.E. Onim (Teminabuan), D. Deda (Ajamaru), N. Tanggahma (Fakfak), A.K. Gebze (Merauke) and M. Achmad (Kaimana), respectively.

Of the sixteen elected indigenous members twelve were civil servants and two were teachers. Abdullah Arfan, the representative of the Rajah Ampat, was a member of a prominent rajah family. We encountered him earlier, together with the elected Jouwe and Kaisiepo, as one of the participants of the Papua delegation to the Round Table Conference in 1949. He was a Muslim, as was the delegate Achmad from Kaimana.

Of the twelve appointed members seven had a teaching background, one of whom was Dorcas Tokoro-Hanasbey, the only woman in the group. In addition, there were the civil servant V.P.C. Maturbongs and the businessman H. Womsiwor. Karel Gobay represented the Wissel Lakes. Two clergymen, the Reverend Kamma and Father C. van den Berg, were given a position in the council as representatives of the population of the interior, which as yet had barely been placed under government rule. It was a small advance on their continued conversion to Christianity. The government appointed the civil servant F. Sollewijn Gelpke to the chairmanship. Apart from his indisputable skills, an

important reason for his appointment lay in the fact that he had played an active role in the creation of the regional council of Biak-Numfor, which he had chaired since then.

Little can be said about the political affiliation of the council members because they had no specific party background. When questioned the Director of the Interior, Boendermaker, stated that 'they really should all be seen as progressive insofar as not a single one of them would be willing to settle for the present circumstances in which the Papuans find themselves.'[40] One may add that not one of them had a criminal record for political activities. The Papuan nationalist who was least opposed to Indonesia was Eliëzer Bonay, the representative of Serui. As the only Papuan in the administrative corps he had the rank of head administrative assistant and his merits in this position were highly touted by his colleagues and superiors.[41]

In the creation of the New Guinea Council, an important task had been reserved for the civil service and the Information Service. The enthusiasm for the elections differed from one place to another. On the whole, the turnout had been great. In Hollandia City the race between Mori Muzendi and Olaf de Rijke had been a genuine event with a turnout of 83%. For Manokwari, where there had also been direct elections, the figure at 70% was considerably lower. In the indirect election areas the percentages varied from 55 to 85%.[42] As had also been the case in the election for the regional councils, in some villages on Japen almost half of the voters had not shown up.[43] In the cities on the west coast the population's mixed composition functioned as a brake on the turnout because it offered these important groups no prospect of a successful candidate from their own ranks. The surrounding homogenous villages consistently had a much better turnout. Nonetheless, the administration could be pleased with the outcome. It had resulted in a reasonably representative council that embodied the region's younger generation in particular.

Given the extremely varied composition of New Guinea's population the council had only limited representative value. Insofar as it had been elected, whether by direct or indirect elections, it almost exclusively represented the more developed coastal areas. The interior had to settle for appointed representatives, whereby the Central Highlands and parts of the southern coast were even represented by a few Dutch pastors and missionaries. However, the representation was disputed only by a few groups on the west coast that were kindly disposed to Indonesia, while the turnout in some parts of Japan spoke volumes as well. There was also some disappointment among a few groups that would have no chance in any election but had hoped to gain a seat on the council by appointment. This was notably the case for the rajah of Rumbati, Haji Ibrahim Bauw, who was the head of the KING, the Islamic Party he himself had recently

founded. It was equally true for the Ambonese, many of whom had spent their life in the administrative services. To be sure, the civil servant Maturbongs was appointed to the council but he hailed from Kei. The government's desire to limit the number of Moluccans must have been the primary reason for leaving it at that.

After the elections had been held, the council was installed on 5 April 1961, almost exactly according to plan. Minister Toxopeus and Deputy Minister Bot came over to Hollandia for the occasion,. The most important political speech was that of Bot in which he relayed the government's request that within a year the council 'advise it on the manner in which the right to self-determination for the inhabitants of Dutch New Guinea could best be implemented.' The Cabinet had exchanged its views on this long before.[44] During the opening ceremony Jouwe pointed out that the creation of the Council was the result of the work of Van Eechoud who therefore could rightfully be called the Father of the Papuans. Thereby he provided a local-historic perspective to the solemn occasion, which for the rest was dominated by actual political affairs. These were reflected even in the composition of the guests present. In attendance were representatives of the governments of England, France and Australia, while the governor of Australian New Guinea was present as well. However, the United States of America did not show up as we have already seen. So international politics overshadowed the work of the council from the very first day of its existence.[45]

Forming Parties

While the government organized the Papuan voice, the Papuan world also began to stir. The council's creation stimulated the forming of parties. In the late forties, Nicolaas Jouwe, Marcus Kaisiepo and Johan Ariks had been the leaders of a political party known as the *Gerakan Persatuan New Guinea*, but it had collapsed right after 1950. Jouwe and Kaisiepo continued to be rather prominent in civil servant positions where Kaisiepo developed into a praiseworthy employee of the Information Service. He was equally active in the trade union where he was the vice-chairman of the *Perkoempoelan Sekerdja Kristen di New Guinea* (Persekding), the indigenous section of the CWNG (the *Christian Workers' Association of New Guinea*). However, he had greater ambitions, driven by a fierce sense of responsibility for the future of the Papuans. He always made sure to dovetail as much as possible with the guidelines the authorities provided.

Nicolaas Jouwe had a more complicated relationship with the government after his trip to Holland in 1949/50 . He had been on study leave in the

Netherlands from 1951 to 1955 where the Department of Overseas Territories had arranged a special course of study for him. However, this had not led to any degrees that would give him access to the higher ranks of the civil service. Thus, to his profound disappointment, on New Guinea he never managed to go any further than administrative assistant, whereupon he resigned from the service. Subsequently, working with a government advance he began a cooperative fish industry. Due to careless management it fell apart in 1959. He then sought his salvation with Herman Womsiwor in Biak. The latter had departed for Japan in 1944 as kitchen help with the American army and was further educated there. After Jouwe's business went bankrupt, the two of them began a logging company for which they had contacted a Japanese firm that would take care of the needed advances. This enterprise, too, failed because of financial complications.

Both Kaisiepo and Jouwe were creative and self-assured people and rather well-informed about the internal relations in the Netherlands and in New Guinea, on which they had views of their own that they were able to discuss compellingly. In addition, Jouwe had the advantage of speaking fluent Dutch, which was a rarity among the Papuans of his generation.[46] It gave him easy access to the upper layers of the Dutch administration where knowledge of Malay was thinly spread. Although both Papuan leaders almost always pursued the same goals during their lengthy careers and to this end had to rely upon each other, there was strong rivalry between them, both at the time and later on, due to background and personality differences.

In 1960 Jouwe was in disfavour in Hollandia. He had rubbed Van Baal the wrong way before and Platteel looked upon his business transactions with suspicion. Besides, after his resignation Jouwe had taken a trip to the Netherlands and had expressed himself harshly about abuses that were supposedly prevalent in official Hollandia. He found a willing audience in the Netherlands where a growing opposition to the policy pursued made the minds receptive to criticism. Back in Hollandia this led to renewed contact with De Rijke and the CWNG. Right at that time, De Rijke was involved in his forgery trial for which he was sentenced in the end. Although the law did not require it, Platteel thereupon fired him as member of the advisory council for Hollandia, which was thrown into a deep crisis because of it. Both Jouwe and De Rijke were looking for a strategy to turn their career around. With the discussion on new representative councils well under way, this appeared to lie in the realm of politics. De Rijke's most important goal was to provide the group of East Indies Dutch, to which he belonged, with a solid position in a more independent New Guinea. In the past Jouwe had shown himself to be a regular supporter of cooperation between Papuans and East Indies Dutch, and so the two drew together. It was a

coalition that made sense. Yet, Platteel watched the increasing closeness between Jouwe and De Rijke with displeasure. 'Two amoral elements seem to have found each other,' thus the Calvinist statesman on 13 January 1960 in a letter to Minister Toxopeus.[47]

In fact, Jouwe and De Rijke moved into action shortly thereafter. On 4 February, together with the CWNG, they organized a demonstration about the bad working conditions of the Indo-European personnel that had been recruited in New Guinea. Jouwe managed to drum up the Sentani Papuans for this event. The demonstration took place in front the governor's mansion in the presence of Deputy Minister Bot, who thus ended his visit to New Guinea on a sour note. The action had a valid reason. It was in these very months that great unrest over the uncertain political future was spreading among the locally hired East Indies Dutch. Apart from the international threat, the expected growth of the supply of educated Papuans and the government's sought-after Papuanization of civil posts were equally alarming. The action focused on acquiring better guarantees in the case of possible eventualities.

Although Platteel could understand the seriousness of these issues, he did not in the least approve of the fact that the demonstrators had involved the Papuans for this purpose. He saw this as a dangerous game and blamed Jouwe for playing the leading part in it. Yet, there were good reasons for sparing him. After all, he was one of the few Papuans who were known outside New Guinea as well. And, more importantly, at that time rumour went that he might possibly take the side of Indonesia. Both Platteel and Bot were shocked when they heard so. It would be a blow to the Dutch prestige, which should be prevented no matter what. Thus, Jouwe was included from the very beginning in the internal deliberations on the New Guinea Council.[48] For the rest, the demonstration was quite successful because Platteel took immediate measures to reassure the East Indies Dutch. He promised a regulation that would secure their position, while the arrival of the *Karel Doorman* a few months later calmed the nerves somewhat. Jouwe kept his privileged position and managed to find his way to the New Guinea Council on his own steam, as did Kaisiepo.

In the meantime, the forming of parties got underway, for which the initiative came from the younger urban Papuans. From many parts, new combinations took shape. The sociologist G.W. Grootenhuis, who studied these groups on commission of the government,[49] distinguishes between two categories that he defined as based on generation and on the level of education. The first category was formed by a rather broad section of people with no more than elementary education and limited vocational training that fitted into the life of the big city in a simple and incomplete manner. Where Hollandia was concerned, they

lived in the poorer sections of the town, the *bidonvilles* Kloofkamp, Overtoom and inner-Hollandia. They did temporary jobs for the government services and in the business world and kept in close touch with their native villages. They held an intermediate position. They had landed in the lowest regions of urban society but derived great prestige from it within their own community. Generally they were still keeping one foot in the traditional, mythical way of thinking. They felt threatened by Indonesia and looked first of all for protection from the government.

The second category was considerably smaller and consisted of the youth that had acquired further education in the late fifties, ranging from VVS and teacher's training to advanced elementary and higher professional education. Frequently they lived in the newly created Papuan model village Hamadi. They had found a closer connection with the modern world but in the eyes of the authorities they, too, were still part of the lowest levels of the bureaucracy. Thanks to the rapid progress in the level of education, the youngest among them had the best prospects. This can be seen in the development of the Primary Middle School (PMS). In 1951 it consisted of a three-year course, following the six years of elementary education, including the VVS. The first PMS-course was offered only in Hollandia. A few years later there were three of them with a total of 73 students. By the end of the decade there were Primary Middle Schools in twelve places with a total of approximately 330 indigenous students. Dutch was the language of instruction in both the VVS and the PMS. Among the students there were strong ties with the government but the more mature ones were well aware of the vulnerability of their own position. They were sensitive to rumblings from the outside, such as oppositional groups in the Netherlands in the circles around Oegstgeest and Nijmegen. These were the more well-read youngsters, who also followed the Indonesian and Dutch radio broadcasts. They read the informational paper *Pengantara* and the illustrated monthly magazine *Triton*. That was the extent of it. The daily and weekly papers published in the Netherlands barely made their way to these groups. Quite a large number of them came from Serui where, as we have seen, there was a greater appreciation for Indonesia than in most other parts of the country. The Biak people were amply represented in this group as well. The people of Biak and Serui of old had been the target group of the Protestant mission. Their children now formed the vanguard of the Papuan elite.

The first, 'mythically oriented' group sought its representation chiefly in the *Democratische Volks Partij* (DVP). This Democratic People's Party had been founded in 1957 and since then had occupied itself with sending telegrams to the United Nations and other influential organizations. The theme was always that of rejecting the Indonesian claims and loyalty to the Dutch authorities. In

principle, this party had a broad national distribution with branches in every place of a reasonable size. However, mutual contact went from very loose to completely non-existent. The headquarters were at the Hollandia branch, which formed the core. The organization was plagued by internal rivalries and ethnically determined suspicion. The leader was the thirty-three-year old Lodewijk Jacodewa, to whom Grootenhuis referred as a central but rather odd figure. For instance, he had once paid a visit to the territory that shared borders with the Australian section, dressed in a white suit with gold medals. He had presented himself as an Australian administrator coming to inform himself about the situation in the Dutch section. He had been received with great respect by the highly impressed chiefs and this had enabled him to live comfortably in the village for some time, where he took grateful advantage of the privileges his adopted status offered him. He was a persuasive conversationalist to whom credence was readily given concerning the grandiose prospects he had developed for the future. Hence, Grootenhuis rated him as one of the 'modern-mythical' types.

The same can be said for Moses Rumainum, the secretary of the executive committee of the DVP, although for him the stress should be more fully placed on the word 'modern.' He was the leader of an evening school in Hollandia that he had founded himself. Here, he introduced his students to the secrets of the modern world in the areas of political science, democracy, history, and the like. In jest, it was sometimes said that he provided information from the ward committee of Hamadi to the Council of State and the Security Council. He was a self-made man, not taken seriously by the educated people but with an enthusiastic audience among the marginalized.

Inside the DVP, both were leaders of two factions that, up to a point, were regionally determined. Lodewijk Jacodewa had his most important adherents among the veterans of the Papua battalion in Hollandia's hinterland. He saw himself as the one who should continue the GPNG, formerly led by Jouwe and Kaisiepo, considering himself to be the true leader of the people. Hailing from Biak, Moses Rumainum was the person in command of the intellectuals in his party. The members of the DVP were strongly aware of the new dignity of the Papuans that in their own judgement was due to post-war Dutch rule. It had treated the Papuans as human beings and this, they felt, stood in sharp contrast with the pre-war period. At that time the contacts of the Papuan population with the government had run via the Moluccan gurus and administrators who, so they said, had treated them like dogs. However, after 1945 the government had revealed itself as a father who cared about their fate. They looked with loathing at Indonesia that had detached itself from the Netherlands and now had to bear the punishment for this patricide by paying the price of poverty and

civil war. It was a very negative image that the government-provided information services did not discourage.

The antipathy of Jacodewa and his followers extended to the Indonesians and the pro-Indonesians in their community. It was aimed specifically at the Serui people who were suspected of wanting to relinquish the country to the Indonesians. In this circle there were also great reservations where the Biak people were concerned who, in their self-overestimation, sometimes seemed to think they could manage without the Netherlands. In the end this would have the same result. Finally, the distrust also included the Moluccan gurus and administrators, whose further departure they would be very glad to witness. Proposals for their exchange with the Papuans living in Indonesia were frequently heard in this circle. The attitude toward the East Indies Dutch was more ambivalent. Some of them argued in favour of a close relationship, which fitted in with the opinions Jouwe had expressed.[50] Still, there were the usual reservations in this regard because they didn't want to give the impression they were tied to anyone's apron strings. The more common tendency was to lump Indonesians and East Indies Dutch together, which Grootenhuis explained as being caused by the often disdainful attitude of both groups toward the Papuans. There was a wide social distance between Papuans and East Indies Dutch and most Papuans did not appreciate De Rijke and Jouwe's plans for a closer connection, nor did the members of the DVP.

In terms of the programme, they were first and foremost for the government to which they really wanted to contribute their might. This led to wild plans that were not very realistic.[51] One example was the veteran of the former Papua Battalion who wanted to use his tiny pension for the benefit of a large number of foundations for social and economic aid. This can be viewed as a reaction to the propaganda for cooperative enterprises that the Information Service had made. The concepts Kaisiepo offered for a Melanesian Union also aroused great interest. This was especially the case in the area of Hollandia where people had contacts with the population of the Australian section of the island. The desire to work hand in hand with the Netherlands was overwhelming, for it would bring development to the people. Fear of Indonesian actions was translated into a great concern for one's own security. The result was that people followed the forming of the new Papua Volunteer Corps very closely. For the rest, the primary focus was on the improvement of one's own position. This was certainly understandable, since the party primarily offered shelter to youth with limited education for whom the possibilities of steady employment were as yet extremely poor.

The younger people with a better education began to be active in the *Partai National (Parna)*. The initiators were Herman Wajoi and Amos Indey, two

members of the somewhat older generation. They had been classmates at the VVS in Joka. In 1950, the young Wajoi had been strongly oriented toward Indonesia, which he considered to be the natural relation of New Guinea at the time. As a student at the OSIBA he ran into trouble with the government when he leaked an administrative report to the *Partei Kemerdekaan Indonesia.* It had brought him six months in prison and a faltering career where he couldn't get beyond the middle ranks. Moreover, he was active in the *Persekding,*[52] within which he was the secretary of the ward committee of Hamadi, among other things. It was where the core of the party lived as well. According to reports, he had been cured of his pro-Indonesia feelings after the Sultan of Tidore was appointed 'Governor of West Irian' by Sukarno. In the meantime, his most profound belief was that the Papuans would have to stand up for themselves in the end. In this opinion he had the support of Indey, and in the spring of 1960 they were planning to launch a party of their own.

When in mid-1960 the young Frits Kirihio (aged twenty-six) was on home leave from his studies in the Netherlands, they succeeded in winning him over. This young man enjoyed a prominent status because he was studying non-Western sociology in Leiden. One of his professors there was Godfried W. Locher, a brother of the previously mentioned secretary of the Missionary Council, Gerrit Locher. They both had strong doubts about the feasibility of the existence of an independent New Guinea, of which they made no secret. In the Netherlands Kirihio had been able to follow the discussions about the future of New Guinea very closely and, understandably, was not very confident about it. He returned to his own country in the summer vacation of 1960. Through his conversations with Herman Wajoi and Amos Indey in Hollandia, the thought of a party of their own began to take shape. On 10 August, the Parna was founded in Hollandia. Its central point was collaboration with the government in its programmes for accelerated development towards independence, whereby tangible proof was demanded for the fulfilment of the promises the Netherlands had made. Commonly the term of ten years was mentioned in the Parna circles for attaining independence.

The core of the new party consisted of the more educated people from Biak and from Serui, the chief township on the island of Japen. They enjoyed the complete backing of the Papua Student Association in Hollandia, of which Amapon Jos Marey was the chairman. This association represented a large part of the student youth. On Biak itself there was a great deal of distrust for the Parna because it participated in the *gila kedaulatan,* the 'sovereignty madness,' which could have dangerous consequences for New Guinea's immature population. Nonetheless, Kirihio managed to create a branch of the party when he visited the island at the end of his vacation on his way back to the Netherlands.

The inaugural meeting was attended by some sixty people, almost all of them members of the Persekding. On Serui, however, the party didn't get very far, although Grootenhuis remarked that the inhabitants were pleased with the fact the founders stemmed from their island. Pride of place, however, was disrupted by family rivalries. The new developments had a harmful effect on the glory of the Papares, whose great man was Silas. Kirihio's rise as a political figure was felt as a threat by them. The case was similar with the Bonays who had already joined the mission three generations before and were thus on the side of the government. Fortunately for them, the election of the competent Eliëzer as member of the regional council and the New Guinea Council caused the star of the Bonay family to rise again.[53]

Members of the Parna were primarily recruited from the youngest graduates who had taken the more superior training courses of the second half of the fifties. For this youth the distance to the traditional society was greater than for the majority of adherents of the DVP, which also signified a disassociation from tribal chauvinism. They wanted to bridge the dissensions within the Papuan world. A critical undertone could be heard here concerning the anti-Indonesian policy of the government and thus of the Dutch.[54] Although they were part of the upper class of Papuan society, the social distance between them and the Dutch was wide as well. Even if Hamadi was the best neighbourhood, its houses made a poor showing when compared to those of the Dutch. The fact that they had no screens in their windows resulted in the bitter joke that mosquitoes were the government's secret weapon to keep the Papuans under control.[55] Still, they were not simply pro-Indonesian: they were pro-Papua. The party wanted better educational institutions and credit facilities to establish their own enterprises. In addition, they were attentive to the conservation and development of their own culture. This went hand in hand with some hesitation concerning the concept of a Melanesian Union because they were afraid that within such an organization the Papuans would again become the backward party.[56]

Their attitude is highly reminiscent of that of the first generation of Indonesian nationalists on Java in the twenties. Much like them, they too distanced themselves from the father image that was part of the government and diagnosed the inconsequential position they held in their own country. They were sensitive to the discrimination suffered beside the Dutch, notably the East Indies Dutch, who filled the jobs that were now within their reach as well. The problem of separate salary scales for different groups, which had endlessly upset the relationships in the Netherlands East Indies, was arising here as well. The fact that many members had a labour union background made them all the more alert to this.

The most important political fact, however, was that the Parna wanted to break through the existing impasse in the conflict with Indonesia.[57] The members were disturbed by the Indonesian attitude in the United Nations where without any further ado Subandrio swept the Papuan aspirations under the rug as being a Dutch creation. In addition, they feared the concept of internationalization, which Luns took on the road in the fall of 1960. They were fiercely conscious of the urgent need to redefine their own country. Therefore, they appreciated the Dutch ten-year plan, the Dutch attitude to the right of self-determination and the creation of the New Guinea Council. Notwithstanding all of this, their first thought was that without Indonesia the problems could not be solved. This was at the heart of a resolution accepted in November 1960 that expressed the need for a triangular consultation between the Netherlands, Indonesia and the Papuans.[58]

A branch of the Parna was created not only in Hollandia and Biak but also in Manokwari in August 1960, where it did not develop, however. There was little contact with far-off Hollandia and life in the small town was characterized mainly by a mythical sentiment, much as we saw it in the DVP. Furthermore, forming the party here was heavily influenced by the contrast between the coast and the interior. During the post-war era, the town had grown a great deal and a certain discrepancy had been created between the Arfak mountain people and the coastal population, which, coming from every corner of the Geelvink Bay, had sought out the urban life of Manokwari. These newcomers had taken greater advantage of the better educational facilities than the Arfak people had, of whom the brothers Barend and Lodewijk Mandatjan continued to be the uncrowned kings.[59] For their part, the Arfak maintained close ties with the Indo farmers from Manokwari for whom they worked. It was by this route that the monetary economy slowly but surely penetrated the Arfak regions as well.

The project to form a party in Manokwari had originated with the truck farmer Gosewisch, which his participation in the above mentioned pre-deliberation on the New Guinea Council in March 1960 had undoubtedly inspired. After returning from Hollandia he discussed the affair with the former teacher Johan Ariks. We met him previously as the travelling companion of Jouwe, Kaisiepo and Arfan on their visit to the Netherlands for the Round Table Conference of 1949. Obstinate as he was, Ariks was not a man to be directed. He took control and this led to the creation of a party that found considerable support especially among the coastal population. This took place on 13 September 1960. It received the name *Partei Orang New Guinea* (Pong). The core of the committee consisted of veterans of the former Papua Batallion. A week later, the Mandatjans and Gosewisch found each other in forming their own party, the *Eenheidspartij Nieuw-Guinea* (*United Party of New Guinea*), the Epang. The

programmes of the two parties were essentially not very different. Both strove for independence in close association with the Netherlands over a period of time that should not be too lengthy. The difference lay in the social background. The Pong of Ariks represented the coastal population, primarily the more mobile Biakkers and Wandammers who had ample contacts with the outside world. The Arfakkers with their Epang perceived them as being pro-Indonesia. For the latter, distrust was the main reason for forming a party. As the DVP-members in Hollandia, they too feared that the sophisticated Biakkers of the Pong would feel sufficiently developed to take over from the Dutch. As far as Ariks was concerned, they had no reason to be worried for he wanted nothing to do with Indonesia, which for him was also the primary reason to forcefully reject collaboration with the Parna. He did, however, keep the Dutch out in order to let the outside world believe the party was run one hundred per cent for and by Papuans. Still, among the members of the Pong there were undoubtedly those who were more focused on the importance of a good relationship with Indonesia.[60]

The fear of the Epang that the more educated coastal inhabitants might want to strike a bargain with Indonesia existed in the quite recently opened region of the Wissel Lakes as well. In Enarotali this led to the forming of the *Kena U Embay* or *Kracht Uit Eenheid* (Power through Union) on 20 November. The name was a clever invention, for this way they could keep the acronym KUE in two languages. Here, too, the initiator was an East Indies colonist, supported by the village elite. The recurring theme was trust in the government as father figure. For the sake of completeness regarding the Manokwari, we should also mention the *Partei Serikat Pemuda Pemudi Papua* (Parsepp), a small party whose core consisted of younger people who had met at the local dance school. Their biggest problem was paying for dowries, which especially in the urban community became an ever greater burden. Their central goal was to abolish dowries, whereby they would be counted among the powers of the modern world.[61] In Sorong, finally, the last few months of the year 1960 saw the establishment of two parties founded on a religious basis. These were the *Persatuan Christen Islam Rajah Ampat* (Perchrisra) and the Brotherhood of *Sama Sama Manusia*. In both parties Muslims and Christians worked together. For the sake of completeness, we should mention the wholly Islamic *KING* in Fakfak again, where the rajah Ibrahim Bauw ran the show.

The foregoing demonstrates that in many places the relationship with the East Indies Dutch played a role in forming the parties, but only in the colonial world of Manokwari had it resulted in a coming together. On the whole, the desire was for purely Papuan parties. In fact, the Epang was the only exception. Whenever the discussion focused on sending away the Indonesians, the

departure of the East Indies Dutch was often added as a self-evident part. Grootenhuis introduces a prominent member of the Pong, who had to laugh uproariously when he was asked whether Dutchmen could also hold administrative positions in a future Papua. This reaction indicated more clearly than any words that they were not acceptable as part of the society.[62] Nevertheless, this didn't sit well, for the new parties were almost always on the side of the Netherlands government, while they were aware that the help of the Dutchmen either from Holland or from Indonesia would be vital in realizing their plans. In an attempt to redress their position, one of the first actions of the new political parties in November 1960 was the publication of a joint manifesto that bluntly declared Papuanization (a policy of preference for Papuans in the distribution of jobs) to be unfair.[63] Apparently, it implied that it was unfair to the East Indies Dutch. It was undoubtedly a case of overreacting and one cannot assume it was actually intended that way.

For most Papuans the Dutch government and the East Indies Dutch living among them were phenomena of a different order. Their sympathies lay with the government. Still, there were also clear objections to its policies. The establishment of the New Guinea Council was welcomed but, according to Grootenhuis, not without mumblings that the Netherlands would do better to focus their attention on the reinforcement of the economic and social position of the Papuans. Many of them lived in fear that with this novelty the Netherlands would want to be rid of them earlier than would be sensible. This was notably the case for Jouwe who publicly expressed his doubt about the Papuans' moral maturity for independence. Mutual distrust was still quite great and anyone who had accomplished anything was suspect by definition. Besides, a Papuan who had gained status would be all too readily inclined to profit by it for himself and lose sight of the common good.[64] That is why this Papuan leader, who himself was suspected of misuse of power, argued for sending as many young people as possible to the Netherlands for their education, which would have a positive effect on the moral level of the new elite. These were no empty words, for he established the scholarship fund *Chena Tadje* that was supposed to provide young people with the opportunity to continue their studies in the Netherlands. He sent his own son there as well to further his education.

The number of members of these parties is unknown but it cannot have been very large. There was no question of registration. They were loosely organized bodies that functioned mainly on a local level, suspiciously regarded by the outside world. Usually no more than a few dozen people would attend the inaugural meetings of branches in the larger towns. Nevertheless, they represented

ideas that were alive among those who were more or less educated.[65] They represented a feeling of identity and the beginning of a nationalism that makes one's own dissension and the dependency on others more sharply felt. It was but a small group among them that watched the international developments with concern.

All the parties mentioned took the position of wanting to cooperate with the government, albeit to different degrees. As mentioned, there were also groups that removed themselves further from the Dutch rulers or openly resisted them. These were found on the west coast in particular, namely in Sorong and Fakfak. There was noticeable movement in these groups as well. In the late fifties the extraction of oil was going badly, which to a large extent made the still employed Indonesian personnel redundant. The Indonesian government was not particularly inclined to cooperate in their repatriation. It didn't really want people who had done well by the Dutch during a period when business at home was suffering. Still, the NNGPM persisted in sending them away because it wanted to be rid of the superfluous personnel. In 1960, the company rented a KPM ship on which 800 people could depart at one time. In addition, privately arranged small scale expeditions took place as well. The flow back was accompanied by a great show of pro-Indonesian sentiment. People who were ready to leave would quickly do some propaganda work and present their departure for Indonesia as an act of resistance. The Dutch shrugged their shoulders and saw no more in it than an attempt to get in Jakarta's good graces as a resistance hero.

This scepticism was justified insofar as the people in question undoubtedly had motives other than patriotic feelings alone. On the other hand, it is a fact that among the infiltrators who worked their way into New Guinea in the fifties former oil company employees were regularly encountered. This was the case in the 1954 infiltration in the Etna Bay and in the clash at the Vlakke Hoek of January 1962. For the later years, the reports recorded another flow to Indonesia of young Seruians who wanted to serve at the TNI. Normally, the journey would go via the harbour of Sorong because it had the best connections. To receive these support troops from New Guinea, the Indonesian government had created special refugee centres on Ambon and elsewhere. In organizing their entry to New Guinea, the *Korps Irian 17*, which Silas Papare had established in 1950, played an undeniable role but one that was anything but clear to the Dutch Intelligence Service.[66] What is clear, however, is that there was a certain collaboration back and forth between the red-white sympathizers in New Guinea and their support groups in Indonesia.

On the New Guinea side, too, a certain organizational form existed quite early. Here the chain store of the firm Tjendrawasih with branches in Manokwari, Serui, Sorong, Biak and Hollandia, played a role—not a very clear

one either. Then there were discussion groups of pro-Indonesian individuals here and there, while Indonesian KPM personnel were able to arrange contacts with Indonesia. In 1954 a group was rounded up in Sorong that was suspected of being part of a subversive organization known as *Tjendrawasih Muda.*[67] It resulted in a few convictions after which nothing further was heard. This continued until 1958 when the prisoners were set free again. Thereafter a *TNI-batallion Tjendrawasih* was formed in Sorong, which resulted in new arrests in October 1960. The police had obviously not caught the actual leaders there. The business continued under the flag of the OPI, which stood for *Organisasi Pemuda Irian*, also formed in 1958. The driving force behind this was Achmad Djalali, who had been active in recent years along the entire west coast with varying success. Then the OPI established branches of several dozen members in Hollandia and most of the towns on the west coast. Furthermore, the organization had about fifty members among the Indonesian sailors on the ships of the KPM. The purpose was that of lending support to the Indonesian cause. There was a branch in Hollandia as well, where everything always came together. The result was that, from 1961 on, rumours made the rounds about plans to attack Dutch barracks in Sorong and Hollandia in order to obtain weapons. In Hollandia the leadership was in the hands of the Tugunese Tepy, who came from Java.[68]

So much for a look at the activist branch of the red-white sympathizers. More important in regard to our survey of the political orientation of the Papuan youth around 1960 is the fact that within these circles there was also a group that began to follow a more political course, which was the *Gerakan Revolusioner Irian Barat* or the GRIB. Its most important figure was the administrator of forests, Galim Reasa from Fakfak, in addition to Ismaël Bauw, a nephew of the rajah of Rumbati, who was equally involved. The first news about the existence of this organization dates from July 1961. The principal activities at the time consisted of seeking contacts with kindred spirits in Indonesia and pledging support for infiltrations. Since right at that moment the population was eagerly participating in the hunt for infiltrators, this part of the programme had to remain dormant whilst other paths had to be found to realize its aims.[69] The transformation into a legal political party was also the work of Ismaël Bauw and Galim Reasa. In January 1962, they drew up statutes to this effect in which they expressed their confidence that the Dutch government would want to talk with Indonesia. Attached to this was the expectation that Indonesia wouldn't send volunteers to New Guinea to disturb the peace. The documents made no mention of the extent to which this was but a pious wish. What the result does clarify is that the GRIB developed into the only party on New Guinea that aimed directly at an affiliation with Indonesia. Shortly

after its inauguration, the executive committee sent a letter to Prime Minister De Quay, stating that the party was for self-determination but that therein the association with Indonesia was its desired purpose.[70] From that moment on, the GRIB occupied a modest but obvious place in the political discourse on New Guinea during the tense days in which consultation with Indonesia got started.

Chapter 11

Papua Blues

The New Guinea Council and the political parties

The New Guinea Council was established in 1961 under outside pressure and carried on with greater energy than either the administration or the people wanted. The top civil service officials believed that they lacked the manpower to carry out the job, and wondered whether things could not be handled more simply. Straightforward discussions with the people would suffice for picking suitable candidates for the councils. The Papuan side, too, looked upon the developments with some scepticism. The government's plans were fine, but many felt that responsibilities were being imposed for which there was as yet no need. Might this not simply be an easy way to ensure a positive disposition towards the Indonesians? These hesitations were reinforced among the law-abiding because some individuals, suspected of being in league with Indonesia, were seated on the new councils as well. Named in this connection were Pieter Wettebossy, an official of the Information Service who had recently been promoted to a higher rank, and E.J. Bonay, a member of the New Guinea Council who was in the market for the directorship of the training school for civil servants. Similarly, they had little confidence in two members of the recently established regional council of Hollandia, Marthen Indey, who had been raised in Ambon, and the teacher B.T.J. Jufuway. Thus, in his speech on the occasion of the opening of the council, Indey had not said a single word about cooperation with the Dutch, although he had immediately put out feelers regarding the sending of students to Japan. Did any of this actually make sense and did it not indicate the beginning of the end?[1] These were the questions that were being asked by the Papuan public.

The Hague had no patience for such hesitations. The international situation

called for dynamism and the prescribed procedures had to be followed as closely as possible, including electoral lists and all the rest. It would only be acceptable to the outside world if it could be pointed out that the opposition, too, had seats on the councils. The Second Chamber took a similar stand and requested that the Papuans be given a sizeable majority on the council. It was also suggested that Papuans be appointed there as deputies of the government, defending government policies in the New Guinea Council. The latter proposal, however, was carrying things a bit too far, and was kept pending by Platteel.[2]

Minister Toxopeus opened the council on 5 April. He was accompanied by secretetary of state Bot, who took advantage of the opportunity to emphasize that the task of the Netherlands was essentially a diminishing one. In his carefully prepared speech he invited the council to advise the government within one year in what way and within what period of time the right to self-determination would have to be realized.[3] He thereby hoped to gain Papuan support for his own policies.

After the solemn inauguration the council could get started. Similar to the former People's Council of the Netherlands Indies, it was to have two annual sessions on general matters, to be followed by detailed budgetary meetings. A College of Delegates would handle ongoing issues between the sessions. Consensus with the governor was required in developing ordinances that would regulate the local administration. An impasse could only be broken by the intervention of the minister. In this respect, too, the situation was comparable to that of the former People's Council. In the council, most of the talking was done by the Papuans, but the five Dutch members were definitely not silent. This was particularly true for De Rijke who as an experienced lawyer combined a legal approach with a sharp debating style. The most active Papuan members were Kaisiepo and Jouwe, but N. Tanggahma, P.Torey, H. Womsiwor, and E. J. Bonay contributed regularly as well. The authority exercised by the two older leaders became immediately obvious at the election of the vice-chairman. In the very first round Kaisiepo and Jouwe jumped way ahead of the remaining candidates, with 16 and 13 votes respectively. Together with Father van den Berg, De Rijke, Reverend Kamma, Tanggahma and Torey, they were the elected members of the College of Delegates.

The personal contributions of the members were most clearly visible in the motions submitted. At the very first meeting of the council, at which routine matters were handled, it was they who dotted several of the 'i's. De Rijke made sure that whenever the government deputy had the floor he would be assigned a personal seat that would indicate his position versus that of the council. Jouwe pointed out to Sollewijn Gelpke that as chairman he was to refrain from

offering any commentary relating to content. That same day a motion was placed on the table bearing the name of the deputy Abdullah Arfan, which previously had been discussed at length in a wider circle. It attempted to mark the council's position vis-à-vis the Netherlands as specifically as possible. In the motion the council expressed its judgement that the Netherlands was no longer free to introduce changes in the status without the approval of the council as the representative of the people of Netherlands New Guinea.[4] As Kaisiepo, among others, made clear, it was the express intention to thereby bind the Netherlands to its previous commitments to lead the Papuan people to freedom. In addition, they referred to the altered mood in the Netherlands and to the international developments that might well tempt the Netherlands to strike a bargain with Indonesia. This signified some doubt in the resolve of the Dutch government, even though the discussion itself was accompanied by expressions of greatest confidence therein.[5]

It was a well-founded doubt. In the next session of the Cabinet the ministers concluded that the mood in the Netherlands was changing. This was caused, among other things, by the stance of Oltmans, Rijkens, and Duynstee, and by the fact that America's attitude left a lot to be desired. On this occasion Minister Zijlstra thought that the core of the problems lay in the fact that the Dutch people had no emotional ties to New Guinea in the way that had been the case in the past with the Dutch East Indies. At the same time, Minister Toxopeus referred to the content of the Arfan motion as a self-evident truth, but after some reflection the final reaction of the government was a great deal more reserved.[6] On 19 July they let it be known that the duration of their task couldn't be entirely dependent on the desires of the New Guinea Council. However, within that restriction they were determined to continue their work in consultation with the council. In other words: the government would do its best but could not perform the impossible.[7]

The preparation of this response also led Bot to writing the memorandum of 24 May 1961 on future policy. This was intended as a way of indicating a middle course between the wishes of the Papuans and the restrictions of international politics. The document contained suggestions on the further elaboration of his ten-year plan. He replaced the idea of a trusteeship, which was seen as old-fashioned, with the proposal of a 'development authority' whereby the Dutch administration would be continued under the flag of the United Nations. The year 1970 was mentioned as a possible moment for self-determination, which he deemed a fairly sound time period to allow the Papuans to prepare the choice. As shown earlier, this was the first impetus toward the Luns Plan that inadvertently would lead to the Bunker Plan and the Agreement of New York within the year.

In the spring of 1961 that point had not yet been reached, however, although America's absence at the opening of the New Guinea Council was certainly an omen.[8] The main issue was that, due to the establishment of the council and the Dutch reaction to the Arfan motion, the Papuans thereby had a voice in Dutch policy while, conversely, the opportunity had now been created for the Netherlands to underline the legitimacy of its policy to foreign nations. Arfan and those who had joined him in submitting the motion were pleased with the government's response.[9] Yet, this show of pleasure was appearance rather than reality and doubt in the Netherlands' resolve continued to exist.

The same thing was true for the political parties, specifically for the Parna, which felt that the course of events had excluded them. While the members of the New Guinea Council now had a place within the Dutch political orbit, the political parties had to find their own way. This was no simple matter because they did, in fact, not have any people of their own on the New Guinea Council, merely and at best, some sympathizers. Preparation for the elections had been established at a point in time when the parties were still being formed. They had been able to play a role only in the urban centres of Manokwari and Hollandia where direct elections had been held. Outside the cities the system of indirect elections limited the possibilities, while in most places the parties had not penetrated at all. Furthermore, the Dutch civil servants and the more mature Papuan notables were not terribly impressed with the quality of the party membership. Although a few council members were connected with a party, they weren't functioning as its representatives. On the rare occasion that someone did, it aroused irritation among the rest of the members, according to Platteel.

The parties would have to develop further before they would be able to participate in the game. For the time being the leaders limited themselves to reacting to daily events. They followed the radio and felt hurt by the Indonesian propaganda that derided the Dutch plans for New Guinea and their own ambitions. In that context, Radio Macassar drew attention with its peppered discussion between Daeng Lada and Daeng Meritja, who spoke about the situation in Indonesia on a daily basis. This duo of 'Black and White Pepper' specifically urged the Moluccans in service to the Dutch not to be led up the garden path for the second time. The Papuans, too, were advised to make the best of a bad deal in a timely manner. The DVP and the Manokwarian parties dug their heels in and formulated resolutions that expressed these opinions. In January 1961 they arrived with a joint resolution in which they registered their protest against the Indonesian position in the United Nations. Shortly thereafter a statement followed that was directed at the Indonesian propaganda, which shouted from the rooftops that great unrest reigned in New Guinea and riots were taking place.[10]

Other resolutions followed. Such expressions brought relief and they could then move on to the order of the day.

For the Parna the world was more complicated. After Frits Kirihio departed for the Netherlands, the leadership in Hollandia had landed in the hands of Herman Wajoi and Amos Indey. The opening volley consisted of the resolution of November 1960 concerning the opening of a three-way discussion between the Dutch, the Papuans, and the Indonesians.[11] Getting this started was no simple proposition. For the time being, the Indonesian side only made sounds of rejection. During the UN session of 1960, Subandrio made disdainful comments about the sham of the Papua state. These were not well received by the Parna people. Nevertheless, over the course of time the beginnings of some contact were established. In June 1961, Rumaseeuw, a Papuan living in Indonesia who was active in the various Irian campaigns run by the Indonesian government, sent a letter to Wajoi that was energetically discussed in Parna circles. There the Indonesian point of view was pointedly expressed. The Netherlands were talking the Papuans into a false sense of identity while the incontestable truth was that they, just like the Ambonese, the Sumatrans, and the Javanese, were part of the glorious Indonesian people.[12] At a 1 July meeting, specifically set to deal with this issue, it seemed that some of those present were quite eager to fall in with Rumaseeuw's words. During the same period there were also indications that Womsiwor and Marthen Indey were seeking contact with Silas Papare in Indonesia.

With all of this, a dangerous split was threatening to occur in the Parna, which didn't sit well with Wajoi and a few other leaders. An attitude on the part of some members that was too pro-Indonesia would not only threaten the unity of the party but also that of the Papuans in general. There was a good chance that the outside world would then play them off against each other. Jouwe had the same thoughts and, as vice-chairman of the New Guinea Council and the member with the greatest foreign experience, he saw himself as the obvious person to handle the matter. Thanks to his sound mastery of the Dutch language he had less difficulty than anyone else making contact with the members of the government in Hollandia and The Hague. It wasn't in his character not to take advantage of these possibilities and he was looking for ways in which to channel the existing dissension.

The tactics he followed consisted on the one hand of showing the Papuan world that the Netherlands was serious about its policy of self-determination and, on the other, of pressuring the Dutch to put their cards on the table as openly as possible. In this context we have to remember that the Dutch deliberations concerning the policy to be followed were primarily held behind closed doors, which left much to be guessed at for the outside world. That was

certainly the case in the middle of 1961 when the Dutch government contemplated changing its course. In the discussions that followed the completion of the Bot memorandum, Luns also took the path of internationalization more purposefully, but there were many reservations and opinions differed strongly within the circle of policymakers. The Dutch public was informed of all of this but only in the most general terms. Parliament knew rather little of it at first, the members of the New Guinea Council even less. In the existing uncertainty Jouwe could try to play the role of middleman between the council, the political parties, and the government.

One of his action items was that the Papuans should say more about their own future. When Toxopeus and Bot were in New Guinea for the opening of the council in April 1961, Jouwe had alerted them to the importance of sending Papuan delegations abroad to clarify their position.[13] The ministers had been open to this and seemed willing to receive a delegation from the New Guinea Council in the Netherlands. Dates were set for a first visit. Before this happened, Jouwe stayed in as close touch as possible with the leaders of the political parties. His contact with Wajoi was especially fruitful. On 2 July, right after the meeting of the Parna about Rumaseeuw's letter, he appealed to him concerning the possibility of removing the dissension that existed in the party. The immediate result was that he composed a memorandum intended for the governor. It asked point by point what the government's plans were for the immediate future. It put the Central Security Service to work, which drew the conclusion that Jouwe was finely attuned to the displeasure of both the Parna members and the more conservative groups, while at the same time seeing the opportunity to move his pet topic, that of a Melanesian Union, higher up on the agenda.[14]

The archives are silent about Platteel's reactions but, in view of the situation, these couldn't have consisted of much more than generalities. Dissatisfied with this, Jouwe composed a new memorandum in which he already began to go through the fine points of future policy. He started with a fifteen-year plan towards independence, which contained a UN trusteeship for the transitional phase wherein the Netherlands would act as the administrative power. This showed that his line of thinking ran parallel to that of Bot who had finished a revised version of his memo on 2 July.[15] Although it is unlikely that Jouwe ever had this document in hand, it is quite possible that he had caught some wind of it. In any case, it is a fact that fundamentally the views of the Papuan leader and the deputy minister didn't differ much, which indicates that the approach suggested by each of them flowed logically from the circumstances. Bot's document circulated within the upper echelons of the administration both in the Netherlands and New Guinea. Jouwe's piece was discussed in a closed meeting of the New Guinea Council. No report of this exists but Boendermaker's

communications show that Bonay and Tanggahma were reluctant to express an opinion about it.[16] However, the document was further discussed on 31 July with the leaders of the Parna and the DVP, and proved suitable for discussing the questions posed earlier in the deliberations between Wajoi and Jouwe. So it had the effect of creating more clarity between the parties and contributed to the establishment of a common Papuan policy. Jouwe told Boendermaker that it all had occurred with the complete approval of the Parna and that the leaders of both parties would appreciate discussing it with the government at some point. He was thereby able to touch upon the parties' complaint that they were being excluded from the deliberations on the right of self-determination and the Arfan motion. They still wished to have a say there.

Subsequently, on behalf of the leadership of the Parna and the DVP, H. Wajoi, A.F. Indey, A. Runtubuy, and Reverend Rumainum asked Boendermaker in writing on 3 August to be given the opportunity to offer their opinion on the question raised by Bot on 5 April concerning the how and when of the pursuance of the right to self-determination. Boendermaker interpreted this as a guarded request for participation in the deliberations with the New Guinea Council delegation that was to arrive in The Hague. He forwarded the letter to Bot with the requisite display of understanding but also with the advice to let the matter drop. Bot agreed. Both were of the opinion that the Papuan leaders would be better off staying the course that had been prepared in the interim. The exchange of views between the government and the Papuan world should take place via the New Guinea Council and, if the parties that were formed in the meantime wanted to take part in it, they ought to try and win over the council members to their plans.[17]

Thus the deliberations took place as intended. This first delegation of the New Guinea Council visited the Netherlands during the summer recess of August 1961. It was a rather sizeable group, with Jouwe in charge. Bonay was among the participants as well. Bot discussed the current matters with them on the 24th, on which occasion he gave them some insight into the background to the Dutch policy. That was no easy task and the following day Bot was forced to report to the Cabinet that his communications had disconcerted them. 'With respect to the idea of internationalization of control, their unanimous reaction was that they expected the Netherlands to implement its chosen policy of self-determination. They did not want to have their country overrun by the Indonesians the way Tibet has been by the Chinese.'[18] A somewhat more extensive report of this meeting confirms the above. The visitors from New Guinea were unanimous in their urging that the Netherlands should remain involved. Bonay was of the same opinion.

Furthermore, the contacts were not limited to the government. Both Jouwe and Bonay were in touch with Frits Kirihio, something that was almost self-evident in the small world of Papuans in the Netherlands. After returning to Leiden, Kirihio had picked up his studies again but was now in the grip of politics. Shortly before the arrival of the delegation he had had an interview with Professor Duynstee, who had presented him with a bleak picture of Dutch politics and the dangers for the Papuans that resulted from an estrangement from Indonesia. Since then, the Amsterdam *Antara* journalist Hasan had arranged a meeting between Kirihio and Saul Hindom with the Indonesian ambassador in Bonn, Umarjaid, and his military attaché Pandjaitan. Bonay showed interest in this and joined the group. The meeting took place in Antwerp on 9 September. It turned into a bizarre conversation in which the Indonesians sang the praises of their military supremacy but let it be known on the other hand that New Guinea might acquire a far-reaching autonomy within the context of the Indonesian state. According to what he told later to one of Bot's assistants at the ministry in The Hague, Kirihio limited himself to an overview of what the Dutch had accomplished in New Guinea during the past decade. In addition, he expressed the wish to speak with Papare about these matters, whereby the possibility was suggested that the latter should be sent to Europe. Bonay's attitude in these discussions is not mentioned. What is known is that for Bot this visit was an unpleasant surprise. After their return, the students in his department were duly lectured. There was a limit to impertinence, especially for scholarship students![19] Undoubtedly, Bot's anger must also have been directed at the person of Bonay, although he controlled himself as much as possible. With the declaration that, obviously, he was free to come and go where he wanted, he was still asked to say with whom he had spoken in Antwerp and what he actually had in mind. When he returned to Hollandia, Bonay, to his indignation, was taken to task once more by Sollewijn Gelpke, the chairman of the New Guinea Council. Bonay wrote an angry letter following this. If everyone in the Netherlands could gabble with the Indonesians why, as responsible spokesman for the Papua people in a treacherous situation, shouldn't he?[20] It was a truth that would register more profoundly with the Dutch leaders in the months to come.

The forming of the National Committee: Flag and Anthem

During the visit to the Netherlands not only Bonay, but Jouwe, too, had spoken with Kirihio about a matter that was very dear to his heart. It concerned the symbols that were to mark the budding identity of West New Guinea's population. Already Jouwe had made a design for a flag. It consisted of a rectangle with a red triangle in the forefront in which an image of Sampari, the Morning Star,

was displayed. In the Biak tradition this was the symbol of hope, and in different variations other parts of New Guinea were also familiar with it. Seven blue horizontal bands adjoined the red triangle, which stood for the six residencies and the exploration province of the Central Highlands. The star and the spaces between the bands were white. It was important to Jouwe that the familiar red-white-blue would be part of his flag as well. Kirihio had some reservations of an esthetic nature, which led to the red triangle being changed into a rectangle. The design's form was thereby set.[21]

Jouwe and Bonay's contacts during this first visit of the delegation of the New Guinea Council to the Netherlands showed that they were actively researching the alternatives and not merely letting the Dutch lead them by the nose. Both wished to play the Dutch card to best effect. It was evident as well, that they agreed upon the need to emphasize a distinct Papuan identity. Yet, in their approach to Indonesia they parted company.

After their return to Hollandia, they continued on their course, whose direction the discussions in the Netherlands had made clearer. Whether one liked it or not, it was heading towards a loosening of the ties with the Netherlands and putting West New Guinea on its own two feet. The speech of 26 September 1961 by Luns at the United Nations, in which he announced the Dutch internationalization plans, stressed the urgency of the matter. The proposals were discussed and amended in the General Assembly from 7 November onwards, which demonstrated that even these had been rather optimistic. Then Jouwe and Bonay, together with Tanggahma and Torey called a meeting of all the key figures they were able to contact from all over the territory. The group consisted of 72 persons, among whom were members of the New Guinea Council, representatives of the political parties and individuals who had authority among the most important tribes. They had seen to it that there was good regional diversity. The group met on the evening of 19 October. From among those present a *National Committee* of 17 people was formed. The superintendent of schools, Willem Inuri, was appointed to be the chairman. It was important that the rivals Jouwe and Kaisiepo each had a seat at the meeting. Further participants were Bonay, Tanggahma, Torey, and the pastors Mori Muzendi and Rumainum. The schoolteacher Willem Songgonau was available for the region of the Wissel Lakes. All in all, it was an authoritative assembly that represented the social pinnacle of the Papua world.

The National Committee met on 21 October. This meeting was devoted entirely to the choice of symbols that were to reflect the identity of the country and people of Netherlands New Guinea. These were: flag, coat of arms, anthem, name, and motto. For the flag there was a choice of three designs, of which

Jouwe's was preferred. For the coat of arms they chose a stylized crested pigeon (burung mambruk) and for the anthem the choice went to the popular '*Hai Tanahku Papua.*' This song 'Oh my Papuan homeland' was composed in 1923 by the missionary Kijne during his first journey across the Geelvink Bay and it had been sung in schools ever since. With very few adjustments it could serve well in its new capacity. They then entered into an agreement about the name of the country and people. There wasn't much to say about this: West Papua was inhabited by the Papuans. The choice for the motto fell to *Diversity in Unity* that, not coincidentally, was the reverse of the Indonesian motto, which hailed *Unity in Diversity.*[22] Then followed the signing of a manifesto in which the yearning for these distinct Papuan symbols was expressed. The meeting concluded with the collective singing of the new anthem. According to the written report the meeting took place in a dignified, serious mood and in remarkable harmony.[23] One might add that, in a sense, it was also a replication of the by now almost mythical gathering of 1928 in Batavia, at which time the brand new Indonesian national movement had taken a similar first step. However, the meeting in Hollandia was also a clear and demonstrative rejection of the Indonesian ideals as these were then articulated.

After these initial moves, the decisions of the National Committee were presented to the New Guinea Council, which gathered on 30 October 1961 in a special meeting initiated by ten of its members. The matter attracted a great deal of interest with most of it relating to the new flag. The representatives expressed the expectation that accepting these symbols would visibly fulfil the Dutch promise of self-determination. The Papuans were to stand up for their own cause, disconnected from the conflict between the Netherlands and Indonesia. Kaisiepo rejected the Indonesian claims with elaborate documentation. Torey pointed out that by accepting the symbols the council placed itself not in opposition to, but rather behind the Netherlands. The acceptance of the flag demonstrated the Papuans' aspiration to become a free people, but the day that it would be raised would not be the day they would separate from the Netherlands. According to him, the unique aspect of the proposal was that the Papuans wished to fly their flag beside that of the Netherlands. Gosewich was authorized to declare that the proposals had the support of the Manokwarian parties, the Pong, the Epang, and the Parsepp. On behalf of Herman Wajoi he had also been delegated to convey the agreement of the Parna.

Bonay, the representative whose point of view chimed most closely with that of the Parna, dotted the 'i's' by stating that the National Committee did not presume to have the right to interpret the voice of the people. That was the role of the New Guinea Council, which held the greatest authority in this matter. He

advised the members to return to their places of residence immediately after the meetings so that they would be present at the raising of the country's flag. Finally, a motion was unanimously accepted in which the council declared itself to be the manifestation and bearer of national unity. The proposals of the National Committee were accepted by the New Guinea Council on six points. Specific items were presented to the governor in the form of two initiative ordinances. The explanation stated that this form was chosen because it did not concern national symbols, upon which only the government of the realm could decide. It merely concerned the adoption of a country flag, a country coat of arms, and a country anthem, which was within the competence of the country's organs. It is probably not going too far to recognize the careful hand of the chairman Sollewijn Gelpke in this explanation.[24]

The Luns Plan in the New Guinea Council

In the same special meeting of the New Guinea Council the Luns Plan came up for discussion as well. On 2 November the representative Burwos put forward a motion requesting agreement with the plan. The discussion showed that the majority of the speakers were in accord, whereby they emphasized the Dutch government's resolve to defend the right to self-determination. The majority also supported the Dutch proposal to dispatch a United Nations commission that would take stock of the situation in New Guinea. Baldus Mofu let it be known that his heart had burst with pride when he heard Luns' speech at the United Nations on Radio Biak. The entire world now knew of the existence of the Papuan people and its aspirations for an independent life. Hardly a word was said, however, about the fact that the introduction of the plan entailed, first and foremost, a Dutch withdrawal. The delegate Torey did wonder what might happen if the United Nations were to reject the Dutch proposal, but this inkling of a doubt was swept aside with a few optimistic words of dismissal by the government's representative Veldkamp. The council could rest assured that the Dutch people and the Dutch government would hold their ground and keep the promise they had made.

The members Van Zeeland and Bonay were the only ones to take a more critical tone. Van Zeeland declared himself unhappy with the rush in which everything had to happen and with the lack of sufficient information, which didn't leave enough time and opportunity for a thorough discussion of the plan. Furthermore, he put his finger on the weak spot in the Luns Plan. It might be a fine design but the question was whether it would work. He pointed to the proven unreliability of the United Nations and their commissions. After all, between the years 1947 and 1950 they had left a free hand to the Jogja Republic Indonesia, so that the Indonesian Federation that was formed at the transfer of

power, had been wiped off the map just a few months later without a murmur of protest from New York. Bonay, too, had his doubts, although he was either not willing or not able to clarify them. Both sceptics were blasted by De Rijke. He targeted Van Zeeland in particular, whom he tried to ridicule by commenting on his choice of words. Bonay got a thrashing as well. De Rijke appreciated the courage of this representative to offer his opinion even when it went against that of the majority, but in that case he declared that the latter ought to state what he meant rather than shroud himself in mystery. Bonay reacted most irritably to what he termed a hostile approach. He left the hall and offered his resignation. In his absence, the Burwos motion was unanimously accepted the following day.[25]

Bonay's resignation formed an ugly incident whose repercussions were to be expected. Without stating it in so many words, he obviously shared Van Zeeland's concerns about the feasibility of the Luns Plan. Bonay's feelings had already been badly hurt by Dutch reactions to his visit to Antwerp, and this assault put the icing on the cake. In a stiff letter to the governor, he expressed his ill feeling about the conduct of 'some Dutch council members' who supposedly dominated the council. It is clear that he specifically had De Rijke in mind. In this he had the support of his colleague Achmad who wrote a separate letter with a similar thrust. These protests were effective. De Rijke apologized and the tempers were calmed. At the next session Bonay was present as usual.[26]

Nevertheless, the incident indicated that the representative of Serui was in a difficult position. We have seen above that he gave his full cooperation to all dealings intended to put the Papuan identity more clearly on the map. At the same time, it is equally clear that he didn't want to start off by closing the door to Indonesia. He thereby had a rather isolated viewpoint within the council where the support was always greatest for those elements in Dutch politics that were geared towards keeping Indonesia at a distance. This was also the approach of the government in Hollandia. The voices in the Netherlands that pointed in the other direction were ignored or rebuked. The same was true in the deliberations about the Luns Plan. Thus, on that occasion Kaisiepo spoke of the 'Judas professors,' by which he meant the opposition groups in the Netherlands around Duynstee. Around the government table no offence was taken at that. In such an atmosphere it wasn't easy for Bonay to say what he wanted to say and 'shrouding himself in mystery' may have been the only way open to him. We should also keep in mind that, although he was not a Parna representative, those circles were watching him carefully. After all, he was 'their' heaviest man. His behaviour makes it clear that it was difficult for the Parna to formulate a viewpoint acceptable to itself and to others. Consultation with Indonesia remained taboo for most of the Papuan politicians of Netherlands New Guinea.

Apart from these irritations between the Rijke and his opponents, the special meeting of the New Guinea Council came about in an atmosphere of unanimity, and the Hollandia Government, too, felt satisfied with it. On 18 November, after the special session was over, Platteel recorded the regulations concerning flag and anthem for New Guinea in ordinances according to the council's advice. Moreover, civil servants were instructed to use the terms Papua and West Papua as much as possible, if they weren't already doing so. Dealing with the coat of arms would have to wait a little longer because the High Council of the Aristocracy in The Hague would have to participate in that.[27] The flag was raised on 1 December 1961 in Hollandia City and in every capital of the subdivisions. This took place in great solemnity and calm everywhere, in the presence of the local authorities and members of the New Guinea Council.[28]

There is every reason to assume, as Jouwe states[29], that this initiative to create national symbols originated in the Papuan world. Equally clear is that it always had the full approval of the Dutch administration. After all, it chimed with the policy being followed. In view of the attitude of Indonesia, which didn't miss any opportunity in either word or action to let its aversion to the right to self-determination be known, it also indicated a collective distancing from that country. Platteel was extremely pleased with this course of events and even pleaded for raising the Morning Star daily immediately, while saving the Dutch flag for special occasions. Bot reprimanded him. It would create the impression that the Netherlands had already transferred the region. The flags should always be flown side by side, whereby he made the clear distinction between the flag of the kingdom and that of the separate countries. Accepting a country flag did not signify any recognition of sovereignty. This still rested with the Netherlands, which would have its flag raised first.[30]

Officially the comment was correct. Sovereignty was, indeed, still considered as resting with the Netherlands but that responsibility was beginning to weigh heavily. Both in the Cabinet and in the intra- and extra-parliamentary opposition there were serious doubts about the feasibility of the Luns Plan and the underlying expectations. It gave Bot an additional reason to strike a note of caution. Rightfully so, as we shall see. All too soon a shadow would be cast over the celebrations.

Bitter travel experiences

Jouwe, Tanggahma, and Womsiwor had not been present at the special session of the New Guinea Council of November 1961. At that time the trio had just departed for America to work as experts with the Dutch delegation at the United Nations. Without any great success, as we already know. Luns was forced to withdraw his plan and settle for the Brazzaville Resolution, which not

only expressed its support for the principle of self-determination, but also advised the Netherlands to start talking to Indonesia again. In other ways, too, the visit was a great disappointment for Jouwe and his colleagues. The Papuans hardly entered into it at all. They were shocked by the ambiance in the General Assembly that, according to them, was determined by emotions and anti-colonial feelings. More specifically, they wondered with astonishment and dismay why all those people thought they had the right to sit in judgement over New Guinea and its population without any knowledge of the facts or any expertise. Their only consolation was the attitude of the representatives of the Brazzaville group. Jouwe was especially impressed with Wachuku, the Nigerian minister of Foreign Affairs, who dared turn against the Russians by urging gradual decolonization and continuing friendship between colonizer and colonized.[31] It had warmed Jouwe's heart. However, one also had to wonder whether the Netherlands would be prepared to resist this international pressure. More generally, among the Papuans the news of events in New York led them to think that they would have to take responsibility for themselves, if necessary.[32] The idea of proclaiming independence began to play a part in the discussions among the politically conscious youth of Hollandia and elsewhere in the country at this time. Its echoes penetrated the United Nations as well. On the Indonesian side the new developments in New Guinea were watched with great concern, which led Subandrio to declare in the General Assembly that his country had no intention whatsoever of intervening militarily as long as it remained a matter between the Netherlands and Indonesia. That would change if Indonesia were to be confronted with a *fait accompli*, such as the declaration of independence of West Papua.[33]

At the end of the visit to America, Jouwe and his companions travelled on to The Hague where Sollewijn Gelpke and a few other members of the New Guinea Council had arrived in the meantime. The occasion was to be used for a detailed exchange of ideas with the Cabinet and the ministers about the Dutch government's ten-year plan and the definition of the Council's viewpoint on the right to self-determination that Bot had asked for in April. These discussions took place between 10 and 20 December 1961. As the reader will remember, this was a critical period during which the Dutch home front was tottering. That didn't escape the visitors. Upon their arrival, Jouwe, Womsiwor, and Tanggahma were already rather shaken by their experiences in the States and what they observed in the Netherlands didn't improve their mood. Among the Cabinet members with whom they spoke they noticed an unfavourable attitude regarding the statements of the New Guinea Council about their flag and anthem. It was a rude awakening. Subsequently, the General Synod of the Dutch Reformed Church came on 18 December with a new Call to Reflection,

followed by the Indian attack in Goa and Sukarno's 'Final Command' of 19 December. That same day, the parliamentary group of the Labour Party (PvdA) defined its viewpoint. The bottom line was that the Netherlands ought to come to an agreement with Indonesia as quickly as possible.[34] The Papua delegation in The Hague had plenty of reason to fear that its room for manoeuver would be seriously limited by the outcome of the Cabinet debates yet to take place. Still wanting to hold on as much as possible to the previously agreed line, it was important for the Dutch government to keep the New Guinea Council on its side to reinforce its position both internally and externally. Obviously, it couldn't hide from the delegation the fact that its possibilities in that direction were limited.

At these deliberations in The Hague, Jouwe and company reported on their visit to the United Nations. They also discussed the functioning of the New Guinea Council and the place of the College of Delegates therein. Obviously, the right to self-determination was discussed at great length as well. There was a large measure of consensus about these matters. On the other hand, a clear reversal was visible in the government's point of view concerning contacts with Indonesia. Since Kirihio and Bonay's visit to Antwerp the wind was blowing from a different direction in The Hague as well. A certain orientation toward Indonesia wouldn't do any harm. In discussions, the Dutch side was now pointing out emphatically that self-determination could also be lived as a specific status within the Indonesian state.

The same theme returned in the discussion about the final communiqué, already on the agenda on 19 December at a point in time when The Hague already knew of the Trikora Speech. Bot urged his Papuan friends to remain calm in order not to irritate Sukarno too much. In addition, he did his best to convince them of the need not to make too much fuss about the cooperation with Australia, so they wouldn't frighten that country off. Finally, at his suggestion, the communiqué contained the declaration that the right to self-determination was the Papuans by right and not automatically attached to the degree to which their society had already been developed. It was a tactical use of the UN Resolution number 1514 of the previous year that for the Netherlands made it possible to define their position more quickly—and thereby the relinquishing of their responsibilities. In the end, the delegation did swallow this but with obvious reluctance. For the Papuans, it pointed to the intimidating conduct of Indonesia, in response to which they had needed extra support from the Netherlands.[35]

Up to a certain point the delegation was willing to accept the cautious position of the government. As we have seen, at that time voices were being raised among Papuan youth calling for accelerating the move forward. They wanted

the raising of the flag to be followed by the declaration of independence and of their own authority and responsibility. Of course, that went too far for The Hague, while Bot could refer to Subandrio's recent warning at the United Nations. Such an approach was not favoured by the older generation of Papuans who sat on the New Guinea Council either. 'Easy does it with the matter of independence,' was their motto. It was on this point that government and delegation came together. In late 1960 the Parna had spoken of independence over a term of ten years. Jouwe had stuck to fifteen years in his piece of July 1961 while, during the deliberations in The Hague, Bot had a term of ten years in mind. They were looking in the same direction but the details differed. What is remarkable is that the pressure to shorten the run-up to independence was now coming primarily from the Dutch side. The Papuan delegation took the position that the Netherlands should be kept to their word and ought not to shirk their responsibilities at this point. In the course of the deliberations it became clear that this would be the tenor of the New Guinea Council's response to the question Bot posed in April of the previous year concerning its wishes regarding the time and manner in which the right to self-determination was to be exercised.[36]

The new course taken by the government was somewhat hesitantly announced in its policy statement of 2 January 1962. In it a window of opportunity with Indonesia was left open again. The government was seeking a solution that could be compatible with its responsibilities but, if possible, acceptable to Indonesia as well. This didn't mean that the Netherlands was now unanimously taking the same course. During the subsequent Cabinet discussions the spokesman of the Labour Party, Burger, pointed out that his party wanted to negotiate with Indonesia on the basis of the position that a Papuan choice for Indonesia would be in the interest of the Netherlands. Furthermore, he believed that the Indonesian position on sovereignty wouldn't have to be an obstacle to the realization of reasonable forms of self-determination. These positions were not underlined by the other parties but neither was their usefulness denied.[37] They were in the back of the minds of many others.

The government's declaration coincided with the news from Indonesia that Kirihio was visiting that country. After his visit to Antwerp, the dynamic student had not been deterred by the angry reaction of Bot's officials. During the Christmas vacation he visited Indonesia where he had the opportunity of meeting Sukarno, among others. The Indonesian statesman welcomed him warmly and emphasized the need for the Papuans to come to an agreement with his country. Just as Umarjaid had done, he also called attention to the possibility of a special form of autonomy for New Guinea within the great Indonesian entity. The news of this was broadcast on 2 January 1962 over Indonesian radio and hit

New Guinea like a bomb. It was going a little too far for most of the members of the Parna as well. The student organization in Hollandia sent a telegram of protest to Prime Minister De Quay. Demonstrations were held in Hollandia and Merauke, with banners that called Kirihio a 'windbag'.[38] Disconcerted Papuan students in the Netherlands joined the choir. Kobe Osor, their association, let it be known that Kirihio had acted alone and certainly had no right to speak on their behalf. Members of the New Guinea Council raised indignant voices as well. For example, that of the member Torey, who was on his way to Western Samoa to attend the independence celebrations as the representative of the council. Kirihio had no right to represent the Papuans; he'd do better to leave that to the New Guinea Council. The government in The Hague was angry, too. Bot may well have said that talking with Indonesia was necessary for the Papuans also, but only on his own conditions. To start with, he put an end to Kirihio's study grant. This was easily done because the student in question had already fallen quite far behind in his courses.[39] However, to the outside world he made no comment.

Jitters in New Guinea

Meanwhile, the public in the Netherlands was following the course of events concerning New Guinea with increasing anxiety. In the Dutch press a reversal had been noticed as early as 1958. However, the Dutch inhabitants of New Guinea, too, were becoming aware that the lights had changed to red. This initiated an exodus that was very barely compensated for by the arrival of new manpower from the Netherlands. A variety of things led to a mounting shortage in personnel while the uneasiness remained.[40] Personnel who had been sent out later felt less vulnerable because they had been hired in the Netherlands, which meant that they would be able to return to that country. Nevertheless, even they were anxious. This became especially evident after the Luns Plan had failed in December 1961. Even without any familiarity with the mechanisms of international politics, it was clear to citizens that Indonesia would be involved in each ongoing solution. Sukarno added oil to the fire with his aggressive Trikora Speech of 19 December 1961. From then on there were open discussions about the evacuation of Dutch women and children from the towns on the west coast. The anxiety was partly eliminated by additional government guarantees for locally hired personnel, but confidence that New Guinea had a future to offer was fading. The administration now had to struggle with being short-staffed at a rate that was escalating towards eighteen per cent.

Anxiety and demoralization were greatest in the urban centres where people had the most contact with international politics. This was also the experience of

the Australian journalist Peter Hastings, who visited Netherlands New Guinea in the fall of 1961. There he was able to make an assessment that staff in the urban centres were discussing the situation with disquiet and cynicism. He spoke of Netherlands New Guinea as 'a country of quiet despair'.[41] Still, people dug their heels in and kept working. In this connection, the memories of the civil servants in the Great Valley of the Baliem are remarkable; they did their utmost to prepare those Papuans who had only recently been incorporated in the administration, for an uncertain future. Their motivation remained unshaken until the very end.[42]

The contrast that had emerged in The Hague in December, although not explicitly stated, between the Dutch government and the Papuan delegation—that is to say, the contrast between cautious overtures towards Indonesia versus clinging to the previously set policy—continued to be a heavy burden on the relationship between The Hague and Hollandia in the early months of 1962. Part of the Cabinet still hoped for a favourable outcome, whereby with the support of powerful allies an internationalization could be established that would leave sufficient room for the Netherlands to reach its central objective. Luns kept his cards close to his chest and Bot supported him. The result was ambiguity toward the outside and uncertainty for all those involved.

This position of the Dutch government made many in New Guinea uncomfortable, which surfaced in sharp discussions and recriminations back and forth. Platteel had landed in deep trouble. Right after Sukarno's speech he had made a forceful statement in which he assured his subjects that the Netherlands would not yield.[43] In reaction, Bot had made it clear that the governor was to refrain in every way from giving any information that Indonesia might interpret as provocation. Therefore it was the same position as during the deliberation with the delegation in The Hague concerning the formulation of the communiqué, something the local administration in New Guinea had found equally difficult to digest. In the western coastal towns specifically, the Trikora Speech, the Indian occupation of Portuguese Goa, and Indonesia's fierce war propaganda had led to panic. Van Bodegom, the resident of Manokwari, had thus found it necessary to make a tour through his administrative region together with his wife in an attempt to ease the anxiety somewhat.[44] In view of the government's stance, however, he had very little to fall back on. The distrust extended to the leading Papuans as well. Sollewijn Gelpke, who had accompanied the delegation to the Netherlands and returned to Hollandia a few weeks after his travelling companions, had to conclude on that occasion that in the interim his companions had visibly declined. They were going around looking dejected and pale. It was significant that after his return Nicolaas Tanggahma, a member of the delegation, resigned his membership in the National

Committee. Shocked by this, Sollewijn let himself be enticed into expressing doubt on the radio concerning the question whether the Netherlands would be prepared to fight for New Guinea without the help of any third parties. Bot considered this a crass remark, for which he seriously reproached him.[45]

The incident led to a bitter exchange between the Deputy Minister and the Governor who took the side of the chairman of the Council. He launched a frontal attack. The Luns Plan would undermine the readiness of the civil servants to devote themselves to a task that was no longer a Dutch one. The only alternatives now were that the Netherlands would either prepare for the withdrawal of their position in New Guinea or else stand firm. To the latter end it would be necessary for the Americans to hold naval manoeuvres in the waters around New Guinea, in order to clarify where the border between East and West actually was. Platteel's preference clearly went to the second option of standing firm. The decision about this would have to be made in short order and the outside world would have to be informed. After all, with the existing instruction concerning information, the local authority had ended up in a completely illusory position. As the governor opined '[It established] values that the Dutch themselves are to maintain and that [are] contrary to what was developing in Indonesia.' It was deceitful to talk the Papuans into a move toward Indonesia even if they would ostensibly agree. That was well put; it was even true. However, the American fleet did not appear on the horizon, although The Hague had not given up hope entirely. For the time being they would have to make the best of a bad job and it was up to Bot to sell Platteel on the resulting policy.

The Deputy Minister met Platteel halfway in some aspects. In order to calm the unrest among the East Indies Dutch somewhat, he authorized the governor to make certain pledges to them that would guarantee their social security.[46] To that effect a number of arrangements were, indeed, made during the subsequent months. A Special Assistance Corps was established, which offered officials in service of the colonial administration the possibility of continuing their career within the Dutch home administration, should they have to be evacuated. Regulations were also set up to provide compensation for damages in case personal possessions were lost. For those Moluccans who might wind up in an uncomfortable position after the departure of the Dutch, the nationalization rules were slackened. In time, these measures did actually lessen the tension somewhat. However, that was not immediately the case, and politically Bot had little else to offer beyond assurances that were not worth the paper they were written on. Thus, in a number of highly personal telegrams, he presented Platteel a reassuring picture of the Dutch international position. It was much more favourable presumably than that of Portugal in the Goa crisis. For the

time being, Indonesia wouldn't be capable of much and in the meantime Dutch diplomacy would be able to mobilize the Security Council in peace and quiet.[47] These were rather desperate pleas and from the reactions that were forthcoming Bot must have sensed that the message was not getting across. As a result he decided to go to New Guinea himself to assess the mood on the ground and better inform the population.

The visit took place from 19 January to 6 February 1962. Bot didn't spare himself. He visited all the more substantial towns and spoke with delegations of every group in society. He encountered a disgruntled population. The Dutch were cynical and the Papuans were confused and incredulous. Bot did his best to convince them not to lose heart but failed in the attempt. The great majority of the Dutch wished to continue their work; the overwhelming majority of the Papuans desired that they should, indeed, be doing so. However, much as he regretted it, Bot was unable to guarantee this would happen.[48]

Psychologically, the signs of the Dutch change in direction came at a moment that was highly unfortunate for the Papuans. The events of December 1961 had caused turmoil throughout New Guinea. The 1 December flag-raising had gone well almost everywhere. Only in Japen had a dissonant note been heard when scornful remarks about the place of the Dutch flag were made in the meeting of the regional council. Generally speaking, however, it had been a positive experience. For many it had been a shot in the arm that had provided them with a new sense of self-worth. It was instantly followed, however, by the shadow cast by the news that Sukarno was to decree his 'final command,' which was generally interpreted as the announcement of an immediate attack. When the Indonesian president gave his Trikora Speech on 19 December, it didn't have any direct results, but it did herald a period of increasing military threat. As the months went by this would become more serious. All of it was emphasized by the biting Indonesian propaganda on the radio, underlined by news about expanding military power and active infiltrations. Troop reinforcements and Dutch successes in clearing out Indonesian parachutists offset these to a certain extent.[49] Warding off the attack on Etna Bay in February 1962 led to an enthusiastic session of the New Guinea Council where the speakers loudly cheered the Royal Netherlands Navy and expressed their faith in the determination of the Netherlands.[50] On further consideration, it was above all a demonstration intended to allay the existing uneasiness. After all, the attack had shown that Indonesia was serious and that the country wouldn't flinch from actively using the newly acquired military equipment against New Guinea. Robert Kennedy's conduct also had a negative effect and led to fierce debates in Hollandia. The local administration concluded from the reactions that the indigenous population would violently resist Indonesian oppression.[51]

Above all of this floated rumours of the Indonesian arms escalation, the concentration of the Indonesian power of attack, and the imprecise news about negotiations with Indonesia. From April onwards, it took the form of the Bunker Plan, which colloquially was given the nickname 'Plan-Bongkar,' freely translatable as the 'Demolition Plan.'[52] In the subsequent months the rumours about this gained a greater level of reality. Amidst all these uncertainties, the government was rather reticent in providing information and the behaviour of the Dutch in New Guinea only reinforced the misgivings of the Papuans. The evacuation of women and children, the gradual liquidation of businesses, and the scaling back of supplies among the importers were not signs of self-confidence. The mission was ahead in this, which was demonstrated with a letter from Locher of 24 January, sent from its headquarters in Oegstgeest to all mission workers in New Guinea. It stated clearly that the Dutch policy had been fatal for the Papuans, that the Netherlands couldn't manage without the cooperation of Indonesia, and that they should say this openly to the Papuans. The only thing remaining was an orderly evacuation. That, for a start, was why the families of the two hundred mission workers employed in New Guinea should be pulled out.[53] The letter was not necessarily intended to reach Papuan ears right away but through various channels the mood it conveyed undoubtedly reached the population.

The mood varied depending on both time and region. For the large region of the Geelvink Bay, the resident reported an overwhelming support for the Netherlands in the first few months of 1962. This was also true for Manokwari, where the Pong, the Epang, and the Parsepp, joined by the local branch of the Parna, sent a resolution to the government on 3 April in which they urged a preemptive attack from the Dutch that would instantly crush the gathered Indonesian forces.[54] Examples of a similar mood could be construed from the statements of the DVP. These political parties thereby communicated a public opinion that, according to the residents, was generally anti-Indonesian.

However, this was not the case everywhere. To this end we need to direct our attention to those regions and groups where a positive feeling concerning the red-and-white Indonesian flag had been noticeable all along. As was to be expected, a greater degree of self-assurance could be detected there. This was particularly true for the island of Japen and its capital city Serui. We have described above how during the course of 1961 large numbers of Seruians in the diaspora had returned to their island. This influx had increased the number of more activist elements and after Sukarno's speech rumours made the rounds about plans for an attack on several vital sites in Serui and Ansoos. Specific mention was made of the police station, the post office compound, and the

office of the local administration. The total number of participants would probably consist of 600 individuals. Proof of the impending uneasiness could be noted in the flourishing of the trade in amulets providing invulnerability. At the same time, the flag-raising led to critical comments in the regional council and beyond, including the remark that the new country flag had been forced upon the Papua population by the Dutch government and its accomplices Kaisiepo, Jouwe, and Inury. The chief interpreters of this criticism were Izaäk Numberi, Willem Wajangkau, Kader Seri, and Estefanus Rumbewas. The administration observed these events anxiously. Some extra police were stationed in the area and the resident requested that twenty soldiers be placed on the island, which had no military garrison at all.[55] This led to a long drawn-out discussion with the army commander that finally resulted in the resident being rebuffed. Transfer to Serui was not part of the military plan but, if need be, some people would eventually be sent. In the end, this did not happen. Peace continued to reign on the beautiful island and the rumours faded. The opposition groups made their contributions to the work of the regional council, which was limited to household matters. In the course of 1962, however, increasing numbers of Seruians did return from Hollandia to their own island. They were primarily women and children looking for protection in the uncertain times at hand.[56]

In this connection it should be mentioned that in Hollandia, too, plans were discovered in April for an attack on the arsenals of the army and the police. The key figure here was R.J. Tepy, the leader of the local *Organisatie Pemuda Irian.* According to the police, the core consisted of Seruians who had contact with West Irian organizers in Indonesia by mail. The group was rounded up and brought to court. The verdict came down on 30 August, whereby seventy-two individuals were sentenced to severe prison terms. Due to the turn-around in the political situation that had taken place in the meantime, they were able to face their sentences with relative calm.[57]

There was unrest in the residency of West New Guinea as well. In the course of 1961 a rather sizeable number of people had left Sorong and Fakfak for Indonesia and in the New Year rumours were going around that they were returning to New Guinea as part of the Indonesian armed forces. This was, indeed, the case. Thus, at the raid on the Etna Bay three people from Fakfak were fished out of the water. Actually, that town still had a sizeable population of Butonese with red-and-white sympathies, who had their supporters among the Papuans as well. Their presence created an aggressive mood among the rest of the inhabitants, who projected the threat from Indonesia onto them. This was felt all the more because Fakfak and its surrounding areas formed the most important point of departure for the Indonesian infiltrations by sea and by air.

Nevertheless, no serious incidents were reported. It actually proved possible for the citizens and the administration to direct much of the resulting unrest through political channels, in which the recently established regional council served them well.

In its wake, the Gerakan Irian Barat (GRIB) was transformed from a militant action group into a political party.[58] It quickly gained an impressive following. When Bot visited Fakfak on 28 January, the inauguration meeting was just in progress—which was no coincidence. It was accompanied by a parade to the resident's house to present him with the minutes that had just been approved. The procession started off with some eighty to a hundred people but rapidly increased to 250, amongst whom were quite a few local civil servants. The demonstration proceeded in an orderly fashion and in his report the interim Resident, Dubois, expressed the expectation that both leaders, Galim Reasa and Ismael Bauw, would stay within the confines of the law. While Ismaël threw himself actively into the fray this way, his uncle Ibrahim Bauw withdrew from it. With his *Komité Islam Nieuw-Guinea*, Ibrahim devoted himself for the time being to religious matters and stayed away from politics.[59]

The more northern Sorong was a sleepy area early in 1962. Oil production had shrunk to a quarter of its previous size and a complete end to the business seemed imminent. The majority of the Indonesian personnel had been removed, while most of the Seruians had also returned home. Politically, the resident of the West Coast had little else to report other than that the mood rose and fell with the prospects for the Island. Thus the news that troops were to be sent in March had created great relief among both the Dutch and most of the Papuans and, obviously, proportional disappointment for the remaining sympathizers with the red-and-white. Just as in other regions, here, too, an increasing animosity from the population's majority was noticeable vis-à-vis those that were kindly disposed to Indonesia. Threats were heard that the latter would be killed should any Papuans die in the fight against the infiltrators. However, there was absolutely no question of any panic.[60]

In that regard, the situation in Merauke and and its environs showed greater variation, which can partly be attributed to the fact that in this residential capital a regional council was also formed in 1961, the Animha. Just as on the West Coast, a sharp eye was kept on the red-and-whites, while the great majority of the population wouldn't let an opportunity go by to express their support for the Dutch authorities. Still, a pro-Indonesian movement continued to exist here, reinforced by the regularly occurring infiltrations. In May it was reported that a *Pemoeda Soekarela Indonesia* had been formed, which started up with about seventy members. The purpose of this PSI was to lend support to infiltrators. Among the members were quite a lot of Keiese and some ten civil

servants. One of them was the commander of the local police. Among the Moluccans living in Merauke with a RMS background a certain split in preferences was discernable. Most continued to feel connected with the Dutch government. They showed great interest in the Dutch nationality that would allow them to depart for Europe should that become necessary. Yet, voices were also heard in favour of a cautious overture toward Indonesia as a solution to the problems. It was a dilemma for almost all of the four thousand Moluccans on the island.

During that same period a modern countermovement was seen among the Mujus and Marinds of Merauke in the shape of a political party. This was the *Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Recht* (People's Party for Freedom and Justice) that came into being on 14 May 1962. The Muju leader Johannis Tamberan was the formal founder of this VVR, who had taken the advice of the Dutch head of the local radio station. Right off the starting blocks, the party had the support of three hundred members and sympathizers. The first act was the delivery of a resolution to the governor in which the Bunker Plan was rejected, support was expressed for the Dutch authorities and for Nicolaas Jouwe as the representative of West Papua. In addition, the document mentioned a few practical points. The most significant of these were confiscating all firearms belonging to the local Indonesians, assigning guards to the villages, and replacing all Keiese teachers with Papuans. Probably upon their instigation, the Animha briefly entered the arena of international politics and sent a telegram to the secretary general of the United Nations. In it, the close connection with the Dutch government was stressed and the Indonesian claims to West Papua rejected. Finally, on 25 May the Papuan members of the Animha linked with the board of the VVR. Together they formed an action team, the *Achirnja Menentukan Nasib Sendiri* or 'Self-determination is our Aim'. Its first aspiration was to gather all Indonesian infiltrators and bring them to justice.[61] In the New Guinea Council the region was represented by Kaleb Gebze.

Meanwhile in Merauke preparations were made for the coming events. Outside the town on Frederik Hendrik Island, a traditional cargo cult was noted that was affected, however, by the political topics of the day. The religious psychosis was used here for the glorification of a future Indonesian rule and for slandering the Dutch. Its underlying element was the local population's resistance to the pushy West in the form of mission, missionaries, and government. The same sentiment was also discernable in the regions that only recently had been opened up, although the current political context was totally lacking here. As we have seen, in 1956 the phenomenon had led to an insurrection in the region of the Wissel Lakes, which in the end had to be suppressed by military means. Calm had returned to those areas since then and the parties involved

enjoyed a positive collaboration. Willem Songanau, one of the first men from the area to visit the teacher's college in Hollandia, had joined the National Committee there.

In the Great Baliem Valley in the Central Highlands, there was no question yet of any sort of modern political organization. The West was just in its very first stage of entering the region. The authorities took a careful approach, whereby one or two civil servants, with the assistance of a handful of police officers, settled in a strategic spot to try and get a foothold there. This approach was prescribed not on tactical grounds alone but also because of a shortage of civil servants and policemen. In 1960 this had led to a few incidents, during which a suspicious tribal elder was shot down by Gonsalvez, an overworked civil servant. It had resulted in the government being more careful for a while, while a number of policemen were trained in order to be better equipped for the next phase. The immediate effect was that one could feel Dutch control slacken in these regions. All the projects that had been initiated needed to continue, but the Danis involved showed little interest in cultivating unfamiliar vegetables or in road construction. Sometimes they simply refused to take part in the tasks at hand. This situation led to a few attacks on government patrols, mission posts, missionaries, and merchants in transit.

Moreover, the presence of the missions formed a complication that was not to be ignored. The American missionaries of the CAMA, in particular, were anything but restrained in their work. They were guilty of publicly burning sacred objects, which not only aroused indignation all around but was also interpreted as an assault on the position of several major tribal chiefs. A scuffle between the local Danis and a few Ekaris from the Wissel Lakes ended in a powder keg being set on fire and one of the Ekaris being killed. These individuals were in the service of the Dutch and wore clothing, which distinguished them from the Danis. The death of one of them convinced the Danis that people who wore clothes were vulnerable. It caused an escalation in violence that a mere handful of civil servants and policemen was powerless to contain. A patrol of ten policemen under the leadership of Raphaël den Haan, the commander of the Central Highlands, that set out to catch one of the killers was received with great hostility. The patrol was shot at with arrows from the side and in the end had to turn back without having achieved its aim. It should be remembered that a police presence of ten men was a large-scale undertaking in the administration of New Guinea. In the months that followed, Den Haan was faced with the unenviable task of subduing some sixty thousand rebellious and barely pacified Danis again with the help of thirty policemen.[62] In fact, nothing further could be done, which shows how great the pacification task was that awaited the Dutch and any subsequent rule. After all, deeper in the interior lived another

hundred thousand people with whom no contact had been established at all yet. For the Dutch government this situation was especially inconvenient, for the Indonesians could seize the unrest effortlessly to point to the resistance in the interior of West Irian against the colonial oppressors. That, indeed, is exactly what happened.

The political stance of the Papuans in 1962

We shall now further follow the developments among the politically conscious Papuans after the New Guinea Council's delegation returned from the Netherlands in the second week of January 1962. That visit had been a shocking experience for the participants. It had made it clear to them that the mood there was unstable and that it would be quite conceivable that the Dutch government might give in to Indonesian demands. On the side of the Papuans attempts were now made to pin the Netherlands down concerning the previously followed policy. Right after the parliamentary debates in the Netherlands had ended on 6 January 1962, the National Committee met for the third time in Hollandia. They tried to connect with the developments in the Netherlands but on their own conditions. The Committee formulated a number of desires that linked up with the Dutch position. They expressed their agreement with the Dutch intention to go back to consulting Indonesia, but with the reservation that the Papuan people ought to participate in this with a delegation of its own. The discussions were to be held with the United Nations as arbiter and witness. The importance of the right to self-determination was once again emphatically underscored. Furthermore, a number of concrete points of action were mentioned, namely the reinforcement of the Papuan Volunteer Corps and a visit to New Guinea by a delegation from the Brazzaville Group countries. The latter was an unmistakable result of the visit of Jouwe and his companions to the General Assembly of the United Nations in the previous year. Finally, the Committee expressed its disapproval of the conduct of Frits Kirihio and his visit to Indonesia. It emphasized that he didn't have the right to crusade on behalf of West Papua..[63]

These points were recorded as a motion, accompanied by a recommendation that the issues touched upon be put on the agenda of the next meeting of the New Guinea Council. There was pressure brought to bear upon the Council from The Hague as well. In that city, Deputy Minister Bot expressed the wish that it should quickly name a specific date on which the Papuans would want to exercise the right to self-determination. Not only did the minister need this as an argument in the upcoming deliberations with Indonesia, but also to quell the rumours that the Netherlands was planning to move on to granting

independence shortly. Just to be sure, Bot urged Platteel to review the reactions of the council thoroughly with the chairman first, so that a serviceable proposal would be the result.[64] The Dutch government did not intend to have the New Guinea Council lead it by the hand without any further ado.

In the subsequent weeks in Hollandia the requested deliberations about the right to self-determination took place and the various wishes were discussed in the subcommittees of the New Guinea Council. On 7 February the draft response was ready. It was sent to Bot who then had the opportunity to offer comments. The document began with a discussion of the Indonesian claims as articulated by Subandrio during the last session of the General Assembly at the United Nations. The Indonesian position that New Guinea was included in the proclamation of 17 August 1945 was rejected again with the argument that, as different from Java, New Guinea had already been liberated by the Allies at that time. The right to self-determination was that of the population and the duty to educate was entrusted to the Netherlands as a member of the United Nations. Furthermore, a series of conditions were mentioned with which popular development would have to minimally comply before there could be any question of self-determination. Thus, the entire region would have to be brought under the administration's rule and further progress was to be made in the areas of education, Papuanization, and democratization of the administration. Economically, the country should be developed to such an extent that it would be able to provide at least half of the required government budget. Therefore the conclusion was that much remained to be accomplished in New Guinea and it was not yet possible to state how much time would be involved before the people could make a choice of their own. Thus the time for a further ruling was moved back to the next council elections. Just to be sure, it was stipulated again that a Netherlands trusteeship was to be preferred over that of another nation or over direct rule by the United Nations. Indonesian rule in the build-up to the act of self-determination was emphatically rejected.

The document was defensible in view of the internal relationships in New Guinea, but its contents were at odds with the UN resolution on decolonization, which had simply paid little heed to the practical side of the independence question. Still, it did meet with Bot's agreement. However, he did press for a date to be mentioned; after all, the United Nations would surely not accept anything beyond the year 1970.[65] This wish was granted. The public consideration of the revised advice began on 16 February. The topic attracted great attention within the council. A total of seventeen speakers presented themselves for the first round and at least thirty for the second one, while the public interest was rewarding, according to Platteel. In the debates the two familiar currents became evident again. Jouwe and his friend Womsiwor emphasized

maintaining the bonds with the Netherlands. Bonay didn't reject this but was of the opinion that an accord with Indonesia was needed. In this he had the same viewpoint as the Parna, which had been redefined on 22 January. On that occasion the party had made a resolution in which it established that the governments of the Netherlands and Indonesia ought to cooperate in accelerating the liberation of the Papuan people. Thus, deliberation was encouraged but with self-determination as its point of departure and final goal.[66] With this in mind, the New Guinea Council was almost entirely in accord with the idea that, if discussion with Indonesia had to take place, the population of West Papua should have a voice in it. A motion of this tenor was accepted with twenty-three votes for and two against. Arfan and Tanggahma thought that negotiations were the responsibility of the Dutch government and left the room during the vote.[67]

All in all, this session showed a remarkable consensus within the Papua elite. They agreed to a policy whose core was the right to self-determination while, under international pressure, they were willing to give shape to it in consultation with Indonesia. This elaboration of their position was in harmony with the declaration of the Dutch government of 2 January, but not with the votes in the Second Chamber that stated that such an accord with Indonesia could result, at best, in Netherlands New Guinea merging with Indonesia. In addition to this basic outline, two special wishes kept coming to the fore in the council and the debates outside of it that were generally shared and had been posited by the National Committee as well. It concerned a contribution by the Papuans themselves about the defence of the country and a weightier voice in the international discussion about their own future.[68] The first members of the Papuan Volunteer Corps, who had joined up the previous year, had now completed their training and new recruits were to be called for. However, that first batch had included only 200 men, while the intention was that the corps should count 800 men within three years.[69] In the opinion of Jouwe and his sympathizers this was too little and too slow. After the Indonesian action in the Etna Bay, voices were also heard asking that the population be provided with arms so that they could defend themselves should this become necessary.[70]

Contacts with the Eastern neighbours

The Papuan desire to maintain their own contacts with the outside world was nothing new. It had previously led to the dispatch of two delegations to the Netherlands and to Jouwe's mission to the United Nations in 1961. The proponents wanted to expand these contacts to other foreign nations. Initially, Jouwe thought of Australian New Guinea but later the attention shifted to those African countries that had taken such a positive stance in the General Assembly regarding Papuan aspirations.

The relationship with the eastern neighbours had already been a focus for years. It had been stimulated by the Dutch-Australian cooperation of recent years and particularly by the meetings of the South Pacific Commission. This had impressed the participating Papuans. On the Dutch side these were Nicolaas Jouwe and Marcus Kaisiepo. On the Australian side one can mention the names of John Guise and Ruben Taureka. The meetings had made them aware of the fact that they belonged to a greater entity. In his information tours of the later fifties Kaisiepo, especially, had called attention to the similarities between the inhabitants of Netherlands New Guinea and those of the eastern regions. This notion had political implications and the Papuan leaders had not been impervious to this. Melanesian integration had been explicitly mentioned in the programme of the DVP. This was primarily the party of people from Hollandia whose border with Australian New Guinea was nearby. The Manokwarian parties were more ambiguous on this issue. In their programmes they limited themselves to alluding to the importance of English as the second language. Only the Parna proved to be absolutely averse to any plans in this direction, probably in order not to annoy Sukarno unnecessarily.

Apart from the formal party positions, it is safe to say that the more developed Papuans were conscious that a neighbourly existence would offer interesting potential opportunities. During the December 1961 deliberations of the second Papuan delegation in The Hague, the visitors had urged that greater pains be taken regarding this matter, but Bot and the officials of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs had taken a rather reticent position. Undoubtedly, what played a role therein was that the Dutch side was not eager for Papuan delegations to become involved in the already fragile cooperation between the Netherlands and Australia. Now Bot only indicated how desirable it was not to irritate Sukarno unnecessarily, adding that one need not always say out loud what one was thinking! His visitors (De Rijke, Jouwe, and Torey among them) were not happy with this argument. They put forward that as a United Nations trust territory the Australian part already had an internationally recognized right to self-determination, on which they could lean with good reason. One might keep one's mouth shut but that wouldn't prevent Sukarno from going his own way. Neither would it prevent future contacts from being established between the western and eastern part of New Guinea.[71]

After the delegation had returned to New Guinea, the approach continued in that spirit. It was disappointing that, immediately after the Netherlands had stated its willingness on 2 January 1962 to begin talking with Indonesia again, Sir Garfield Barwick, the Australian Minister of Foreign Affairs, categorically dissociated himself from the New Guinea policy of his predecessors. It was clear that he was in no mood to bet on the losing Dutch horse any longer. However,

the Labour opposition was not pleased. Therefore, its spokesman A. Calwell announced that after the opening of the Australian parliamentary year on 20 February he would haul the government over the coals.[72] In anticipation of this, a telegram was sent from Hollandia signed by almost all the Papuan members of the New Guinea Council. They thanked Calwell for his initiative, highlighting the determination of the Netherlands government to continue in the direction taken, and indicating the importance of the developments in Netherlands New Guinea for the population of the Australian half of the island. Bonay's was the only name missing on the list of signatories. He thereby demonstrated his support for the Parna resolution of 22 January in which Melanesia had been rejected as a colonial construct. The incident showed his isolationist position within the council.

In Australia the document received a great deal of attention in the press and it was expected on all sides that it would play an important role in the next parliamentary debate. Furthermore, it was sent to the chairman of the recently established legislative council of the Australian part of New Guinea, officially known as the *Legislative Council of the Territory of Papua and New Guinea.* At the Netherlands Embassy in Canberra they observed with some glee that this might be the beginning of a combined offensive of the two halves of the island against the tepid Australian stance concerning the intergovernmental cooperation with Australia that the Netherlands so desired.[73] As if to emphasize this, the National Committee in Hollandia then jumped into action with a declaration about the right to self-determination for the Papuans of all of New Guinea. During a visit to Port Moresby in March/April 1962, Womsiwor and Jouwe presented the document to council member John Guise, requesting him to collect signatures for it from the Papuan leaders of Australian New Guinea. Thereafter the document could be transmitted to the secretary general of the United Nations, U Thant. Jouwe took the opportunity to consult other members of the Legislative Council as well about cooperating, but with a disappointing result. They let him know that the Australian government wanted nothing to do with initiatives of this kind from their side and said in guarded terms that continuing on this path might well land them in prison some day. Indeed, the two visitors themselves had been able to conclude that the administration in Port Moresby was following the all too rapid developments in the Dutch part with real concern.[74]

Nevertheless, it didn't mean that all contacts had been cut off. Thus, in August 1962 a delegation from the regional council Dafonsoro, which represented the area around Hollandia, paid a working visit to its eastern neighbours. The leader of this delegation was Eliëzer Hamadi. The visit took place after the Agreement of New York had been signed and the mood was sombre. It

was dominated by what the future of the island would be. Hamadi declared in Rabaul that the Agreement had broken the heart of the Papuan people. Nonetheless, he showed a combative spirit. He predicted that in the near future Papuans from the western part would emigrate eastwards and would try to create a pact between the two halves. He could already announce that in his country active resistance to Indonesia was increasing and he warned against the coming Indonesian pressure on eastern New Guinea itself.[75]

These were precisely the things that the Australian government of TPNG feared. The already planned counter-visit had thus been canceled immediately after the Agreement of New York was made. In years to come Australia would pursue a careful policy where Indonesia was concerned, as we shall see in the next chapters. For now, it is sufficient to confirm that mutual cooperation between the Papuans during the era of Dutch rule had not got very far. The inhabitants on either side of the border were no independent people, with all the limitations that entailed. The two motherlands wanted to keep the reins in their own hands. What did continue to exist was the awareness of solidarity. One of those who noticed it was the Canadian diplomat Stansfield, who was visiting Australian New Guinea during those same weeks. He was very impressed by the interest that the eastern Papuans showed in events in the western part of the island. The half-hearted stance of the United Nations worried them particularly, something that in the long run could prove to be to their disadvantage as well.[76] It was certainly to be a point of concern for the Australian government in the future.

Contacts with African countries

A new element in the Papuan view of the world was the interest in the African countries that had operated in the United Nations under the banner of the Brazzaville group. During the 1961 General Assembly they had demonstrated their interest in the mutually shared African Values to the Papuan delegation led by Jouwe. The awareness that Papuans did not resemble Asians had contributed to the draft of the Brazzaville resolution. Jouwe and the other delegation members had wasted no time in spreading the news about this around New Guinea. They weren't alone in the world, after all. This idea was recorded in a resolution of the New Guinea Council. Immediately thereafter, in March, the National Committee called on the heads of the young African states to vote for the right of Papuan self-determination in the United Nations.[77]

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs in The Hague was interested in this group's existence as well. After all, it had shown support for the underlying intentions of the Luns Plan and, thanks to its cooperation, the Indian resolution hadn't stood a chance. Since that time, the Dutch diplomats in New York kept their

finger on the pulse and wouldn't skip a single reception given by members of the Brazzaville group. Bot, too, was interested and even urged making more formal contact. The diplomats didn't want to take it that far because they expected it would offer more disadvantages than advantages. Useful contacts could be maintained even without formal connections.[78] Indeed, it was through informal consultation that the idea emerged of having a few diplomats of the Brazzaville group visit New Guinea and observe matters on a personal level. Of course, this was not the UN mission that Joseph Luns had encouraged from the summer of 1960 onward, but it was probably better than nothing. The result was that from 1 to 13 April two African diplomats posted in New York visited New Guinea at the invitation of the Dutch government. They were Frederic Guirma and Maxime Zollner, the representatives of Upper Volta (Burkina Faso) and Dahomey (Benin) respectively. On their journey they were accompanied by the Dutch diplomat L.J. Goedhart, who was also posted to New York.

New Guinea put its best foot forward and the guests were received with every honour the territory could offer. Thus, on the trip from Biak to Hollandia their Dakota was escorted by a few Cessnas decorated with large Papuan flags. Upon landing, an indigenous dance group, equipped with a model proa named the *Karel Doorman*, performed a war dance. Civilians and administrators in the other towns visited did no less than Hollandia. The finest moment came when Zollner insisted on paying a visit to the little town of Kaimana, which according to Indonesian radio, was occupied by Indonesian troops. He was able to see for himself that this was not the case.

Goedhart had the impression that the visit had succeeded in its intended effect. At first, both visitors had been somewhat sceptical. The war dance had not particularly impressed them, but afterwards they had gradually become convinced that Papuan nationalism was a fact and that Papuan desire for an independent existence was certainly alive across a vast spectrum of the population. The high-spirited discussions with members of the regional councils and with the students of the training school for civil servants were an important contribution to this. These conversations offered them a sharper image of Papuan identity.

The most important result of their stay was that they encouraged their interlocutors to greater activity. Zollner and Guirma concluded that their Papuan friends were too much inclined to think they would be given their independence on a silver platter. They pointed to the fierce struggle they themselves had been forced to wage to this end. This was carefully noted. Furthermore, they encouraged them to make their own contacts with the outside world, namely

with the African countries. It was an instructive visit for both diplomats and a real boost to the Papuans. All parties, the Dutch included, saw it as a forerunner of further contacts.[79]

Members of the New Guinea Council visit The Hague

Following Guirma and Zollner's visit to New Guinea, the third round of deliberations between the New Guinea Council and the Dutch government took place in The Hague in April 1962. The delegation included Jouwe, Kaisiepo, Tanggahma, Womsiwor and Torey. All the ongoing concerns were discussed. The enlarging of the Papuan Volunteer Corps was brought up by Kaisiepo, who indicated that the situation was growing uncomfortable and that a general desire for a rapid expansion of the corps was present among the young. If there were to be any battles it would have to be Papuan blood that would flow first. The suggestion was also made that arms should be distributed among the civilians and that vigilantes should be established. Pressure for this came especially from Merauke and the western coastal towns. Bot admitted that he had heard this wish expressed from all sides during his recent visit to New Guinea but that Platteel and he himself were none too keen on this. Such a disorderly circulation of arms would only cause accidents. He did promise that the Papuan Volunteer Corps would be robustly expanded in the coming months, which was possible now that the first officers had been trained. The first units of the Corps were, indeed, deployed a few weeks later in the fight against parachutists near Fakfak where they performed admirably, according to their commander. In July it was decided to augment the corps to 1,200 men no later than 1963.[80]

Of course, the conversation with the delegation in The Hague also addressed the mobilization of Papuans in the execution of foreign policy. Agreement was soon reached on sending missions to interested African countries. Jouwe was able to mention that the National Committee had already sent letters to the heads of state of Ethiopia, Liberia, Ghana, Guinea, (former Belgian) Congo, Nigeria, and Sierra Leone, in which they had asked their support for the aspiration of the Papuans toward an independent existence as a nation. It should surely be possible to have this followed by a visit there. On the Dutch side there was no objection whatsoever. On the other hand, there were objections to Jouwe's wish for an independent Papuan delegation to the discussions in New York. Bot admitted that this would be a fine recognition of New Guinea as a separate unity, to be sure, but he also believed that Indonesia wouldn't stand for it, for the same reason. Therefore, the Deputy Minister would not go any further than making the promise that a few Papuans could be included in the Dutch delegation once the actual negotiations had begun. Perhaps at an earlier stage, the presence of Mr. Jouwe might be useful, too. It sounded rather thin,

but the continued conversation proved that Jouwe's expectations of this were higher than those of his Dutch partners.

A livelier discussion emerged about the position regarding Indonesia. Kirihio's visit to Indonesia around the turn of the year was still a thorn in the side of the delegation and the members couldn't refrain from pointing out that he had been wrong. However, in the interim Bot had changed his opinion. He now defended Kirihio and showed himself to be a proponent of further trips like this. It was a topic he had recently discussed with a number of people of the Parna, Wajoi among them. In view of the present state of the discussions with Indonesia, it was also a logical step. The shift in Dutch politics under the pressure of the negotiations was noticeable here. In the meantime, the Parna had become the party whose programme offered the greatest link with that of the Dutch government. The approach of both was now aimed at negotiations with Indonesia. However, its purpose was still uncertain, in Dutch circles as well as in the Parna. During his visit to Sukarno, Kirihio had pleaded for self-determination. He had been told that Indonesia was willing to offer West Papua a new style of autonomy once it had been transferred to Indonesia. Aceh had been set as the example. It was the same song that the Indonesian diplomats in Europe had repeated via Duynstee and his colleagues in the Netherlands. Duynstee advised the government to accept this without any further ado and interpreted the aspiration to self-determination as being unreasonable and unattainable. Kirihio agreed. This had brought him into conflict with the majority of the members of the Parna in New Guinea. As was apparent from the resolution of the Parna of 22 January, among other things, they did urge deliberating with Indonesia but on the condition that both the Netherlands and Indonesia would recognize the right to independence of the Papuan people.[81] The claim to the right of self-determination remained the primary issue for the Parna as well and, according to most members, the autonomy Sukarno had suggested continued to be totally inadequate. They wondered justifiably what the shining example of Aceh was supposed to mean.

Contrary to the Parna's resolution Kirihio had let it be known in February from the Netherlands that the objectives of the Dutch politics could not be realized and that, therefore, the Papuans should be satisfied with a position as an autonomous region (daerah istimewa) within Indonesia. He had asked the department to be given the opportunity to go to his native land with a number of friends in order to sell these notions there. At the same moment, Bonay was asking Platteel for financial help to make an information tour to Serui. In conformity with the shift of emphasis in Dutch politics The Hague was open to Kirihio's message. Shortly after the arrival of the delegation of the New Guinea Council in the Netherlands, on 19 April, Kirihio had left for Indonesia with

eight other students for a second orientation visit. From there the group was to travel on to West Papua. The trip had been made possible by the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

The members of the New Guinea Council delegation did not exactly thank Bot for this generous gesture. Kaisiepo, in particular, struck out bitterly. He was of the opinion that such trips served primarily as a pretext for the pursuit of a different goal, namely the transfer of Netherlands New Guinea to Indonesia. Bot did not react but raised the question of what the Papuans would think of a counter-visit from an Indonesian delegation to their country. Jouwe was curt. He said he feared for their life. The others were a little more open but in the course of the conversation it became clear that Bot had not been successful in subduing the aversion that the delegation members felt to any contacts with Indonesia. 'What business would the Papuans have,' said Womsiwor, 'in a country where chaos and famine reigned and where they would only use an outstretched hand to capitalize on it for reasons of propaganda?'

In view of this stance it is no wonder that the delegation was equally displeased with the information that Bot provided about the state of affairs of the negotiations in New York. It was the first time that they gained some insight into the contents of the Bunker Plan and it was a bitter disappointment. Despite all the sombre rumours that made the rounds in this regard, until now they had not been willing to believe that the Netherlands was actually involved in letting them go and that they would have to manage on their own with Indonesia and the United Nations.[82] They had no intention of hiding their disappointment about this and expressed it publicly when they left the Netherlands.[83]

When this highly unsatisfactory meeting came to an end, the delegation continued its way. Jouwe went off to New York for an exploratory visit to the United Nations. It did not improve matters. Bunker himself barely freed up any time to receive him and Jouwe spoke primarily with Guirma, Zollner, and other Africans. The conversation was restricted chiefly to the question of what they should do if the negotiations based on the Bunker Plan were to backfire. At the end of the visit, on 18 May, Jouwe and his Brazzaville friends presented their findings to the Dutch ambassador Schürmann. They told him that they had come to the conclusion that if the negotiations failed the Papuans would have to take the initiative themselves. They would have to come to New York with a representative group to be heard as petitioners. On that occasion, they would have again to make it clear that they were not Indonesian and that they claimed the right to self-determination. On that basis the African countries could then submit a resolution of support to the General Assembly. It was a rather desperate plan, which in Schürmann's opinion, did not stand a chance in the General Assembly. He figured that in that case they could expect that, following an

American initiative, the General Assembly would impose the Bunker Plan on the Netherlands and Indonesia. Moreover, breaking up the preliminary negotiations at that moment was inappropriate.[84]

After their visit to the Netherlands, the larger part of the delegation led by Kaisiepo traveled on to Africa, where they visited a number of Brazzaville states. The participants were accompanied on their journey by the Dutch ambassador Jonkers, who reported to Minister Toxopeus on 19 June. He communicated that the group had been deeply impressed by African speeches to the effect that the Dutch presence in their country had highlighted the colonial character of the conflict with Indonesia. They would be better off if they themselves declared independence, whereupon the dispute could be defined as a conflict between Papuans who demanded their right to self-determination and a colonialist Indonesia. These reports were confirmed by simultaneous reports from Hollandia.[85]

A proclamation of independence?

The African message had made an impression in the Papuan mind. The concept of just declaring independence on their own authority had played around in the minds of the more radical youth ever since the first meeting of the National Committee and the raising of the Papuan flag on 1 December 1961. Later on, Guirma and Zollner's visits to New Guinea and Jouwe and Kaisiepo's contacts in New York and Africa had reinforced the idea that it was the Papuans' turn now and they should venture out. Sollewijn Gelpke's contacts with Papuan leaders in Hollandia in June and July 1962 gave him the impression that many of them thought it to be wiser not to await self-determination under Indonesian rule as mentioned in the Bunker Plan, but rather to proclaim independence at the outset themselves. The proposal to that effect could be presented in a next session of the New Guinea Council, or be delivered unexpectedly by an influential commission. In this connection, Kaisiepo, whose name was mentioned regularly, was said to be planning to come to an agreement with the Dutch military forces. He seemed to be convinced that the international position of the Papuans would thereby be strengthened. For Gelpke the case was serious enough to be brought to the attention of the governor on 19 June, so that he could consider possible countermeasures. Such a step would complicate the Netherlands position to a significant degree, which the Dutch side could certainly do without.[86]

The intelligence service was called in and delivered two reports, on 24 and 30 July. It confirmed the rumour that an important group of core people around Jouwe and Kaisiepo were planning to proclaim an independent Papuan state at the moment that the administration was to be transferred. Among the

conspirators were members of the DVP, the Parna, as well as important figures in the New Guinea Council. According to the reports, there had even been telephone contact on the matter with Kirihio who was in New York at the time as member of the Indonesian delegation. Only Bonay was emphatically uninvolved. He was said not to be inherently against Indonesian rule. The date of 8 August was mentioned as the date for the action. They were even reported to already be preparing military groups to strengthen the demands of the Papuans. To this end, Kaisiepo had sought contact with members of the local police and with East Indies Dutch who could function as instructors to train Papuan soldiers in using firearms. The operation was to begin with the arrest of all Indonesians and Chinese. The Europeans, too, would be held in protective custody in Hollandia under guard of the military. Kaisiepo apparently already saw himself as the President of West Papua.[87]

The question remains how 'firm' these intentions actually were. Groping in the dark is difficult, even for intelligence services. What is certain is that some traces of such a plot can be found in the reports of the session of the New Guinea Council that began on 4 July, after the return of the Papuan delegations from the Netherlands, Africa, and the United Nations. It was also the council's first meeting after the Netherlands had accepted the Bunker Plan as the foundation for negotiations with Indonesia. This session was dominated by the tensions and uncertainties of the period. The council members were familiar with the Bunker Plan but they didn't know how far the negotiations had come and what the final outcome might look like. Moreover, it had definitely not escaped them that parachutists were being dropped above the soil of Netherlands New Guinea with clockwork regularity. However, they did not know the scale of the invasion forces that were being mobilized. Although they still trusted the good intentions of the Netherlands, their confidence in her power to realize them was diminishing. Thanks in part to their visits abroad, the members had acquired a better sense of the weak international position of the Netherlands. It was a small country surrounded by powerful players that, in addition, was seriously split internally. Its inclination to come to an agreement with Indonesia was creating anxiety. Almost all speakers expressed themselves in terms of urgently wanting to take action on their own. On the whole, the mood was tense. Nevertheless, in the New Guinea Council they believed until the very last moment that there was more time and more room for manoeuvring than there really were.

In the general debate, which began on 4 July,[88] the members of the council one after another expressed their aversion to the Bunker Plan. The only person who was fairly positive was Bonay. He agreed with a statement of the Parna that, on 19 April, had greeted the proposal as the only way of bringing the parties

together at the conference table again. He added that rejection of the plan would amount to rejection of the right to self-determination. Kaisiepo, too, accepted the plan as a potential basis for negotiations, but in his opinion that was all that could be said in its defence. The only thing that might make it work would be if the plebiscite mentioned therein were to take place under the leadership of the United Nations. Once the Indonesian army had entered the country, the chance for making a free choice would be lost.[89] This view was widely shared. The leaders had a common loathing for the Indonesian parachutists who were coming to 'liberate' them without ever having asked for the opinion of the Papuans and killing them whenever they had the chance. There was an almost unanimous mistrust in the honesty of the Indonesians and their willingness to live up to possible guarantees for the implementation of the self-determination.

The matter of a potential proclamation of independence was touched upon immediately on the first day of the session by Baldus Mofu whom we met as early as 1949 as the much appreciated advisor of Kijne. At that time he held a rather positive position toward Indonesia. He now lined himself up vehemently against the Bunker Plan precisely because it completely met the wishes of Indonesia. The Dutch government may well have accepted it as a basis for negotiations but the Papuans had not yet reached that point. They ought not to be led by the nose either. He believed that they should have spoken up much sooner, but that it was now high time for the world to hear from them via a proclamation. If they did not follow that advice it would be their death under Javanese domination. Why would the Papuans exist if they were worthless? They had to defend themselves, for no one else would do so. They had a choice between two options. One was for a free and sovereign West Papua, the other was that of becoming a colony of Indonesia. He plainly and simply chose the former. To these sharp words he immediately added that he had faith in the promises of the Dutch government which had the fate of the Papuans in its hands. The Papuan Bird of Paradise with its clipped wings was threatened by the predatory Indonesian Eagle that wanted to tear it apart. Its master had kept it caged for its own safety, but that could not continue. Now he would have to make sure it would grow feathers so that it could soar and fly off to the mountains, which offered security.[90] From this one may conclude that he wanted West Papua's independence but not without the support of the Netherlands.

This conclusion was at odds with the main premise of his speech, in which the word 'proclamation' was used. The other speakers did not elaborate on this. In a different context, Jouwe did let it be known that some people were saying that Papua should proclaim independence but that he himself heartily disagreed. After all, one would thereby provoke an Indonesian attack, as had been

proven earlier in Ambon and on Sumatra. Besides, the Netherlands would be squarely against such a step. This statement must have concealed a tactical element. If, indeed, there was a plot it would be wiser not to announce this in the council beforehand. We must also remember that the council's session was taking place in a tense phase of the negotiations in which the government was constantly indicating the need for restraint. Any sound from Hollandia could now be used in Middleburgh against the Netherlands. Still, Mofu and Jouwe's statements, Sollwijn Gelpke's news, and the analysis by the intelligence service confirm that the possibility of a proclamation of independence was being considered.

More can be said about this. When the general debate was over, a number of motions were handled. They had to do: (1) with the reinforcement of the Papuan contribution to defence; (2) with the sending of diplomatic missions to the United States and Indonesia and ; (3) with the forming of a special commission that was to deliberate on the practical side of the execution of the right to self-determination.

There was no difference of opinion on the first issue. All agreed that the Papuans should be able to defend their own cause. Thus, a motion for speedy reinforcements of the Papuan Volunteer Corps was passed unanimously. The second motion, presented by Jouwe, caused greater complications. Initially Jouwe had spoken of establishing a separate Papuan Mission in New York. This met with the resistance of the Netherlands government that was afraid of a diplomatic post that would operate a bit too independently. Such objections did not exist concerning the placement of a few Papuans at the Dutch delegation in New York or elsewhere. Thereupon the Council passed the motion as revised in this respect. Jouwe used the occasion to remark somewhat mockingly that the government need not fear that these representatives would suddenly proclaim independence.[91]

The third issue, regarding the Special Commision, was introduced by a motion from Kaisiepo that had the support of Deda, Arfan, Meset, and Jouwe. This took some doing because the original formulation had been badly phrased.[92] After some negotiation, it appeared that the presenters wished to have a commission to research what conditions should be met before a popular election could be held concerning the right to self-determination. It was recorded in this same motion that such a commission should work on the basis of the position that no solution to the conflict was acceptable that did not include sufficient guarantees for the free execution of the Papuan right to self-determination.[93] In his explanatory speech, Kaisiepo emphasized that the commission could not begin before the tentative results of the deliberation with Bunker were known. At that point it would participate in the deliberations as a

third party.[94] One might say that this was completely in the spirit of Bonay who had always supported the Parna's position for a triangular deliberation. It seemed that this project could finally be realized through this special commission. Nevertheless, the Parna sympathizer declared himself against this proposal in a brief final statement that no one understood. Apparently, he now saw an impediment in coming to an agreement with Indonesia here.

Besides acting as a watchdog for Papuan interests, the question remains whether this special commission was intended to be the body dealing with the proclamation of which the Intelligence Service reports had spoken. This is conceivable, especially if we see it in the perspective of a subsequent motion by Kaisiepo that came to a vote later that month. It asked the Council to state explicitly that the plebiscite should only be held under the authority of the United Nations. In theory, this point of departure would offer interesting possibilities to the Papuans to join the struggle after the discussions on the Bunker Plan had ended inconclusively or with a result unacceptable to them.

The New Guinea Council could accept every one of these four motions with a large majority or by unanimous consent. So, on the main points a solid claim was laid for Papuan participation in things to come. Yet, on one point they remained divided. This had to do with the question raised by Tanggahma about whether the time had come for a delegation of the council to visit Indonesia. The main reason for asking this was the annoyance within the council at the visit that the six Papuan students had paid to Indonesia with the support from the Netherlands Government. They saw it as an infringement of their own prerogatives. The council was the authorized representative of the Papuan people and not just a band of youngsters who did not understand the real problems and would let itself be persuaded by professors in the Netherlands and Indonesian diplomats in Bonn and Antwerp. Everyone agreed. Tanggahma, Torey, Bonay, Jouwe, and Van Zeeland proposed a motion to this effect.[95] There were, of course, substantially different motivations. Tanggahma and his allies thought that it was necessary for the Papuans finally to go to Jakarta themselves and tell the Indonesians their thoughts on the matter, which would not necessarily have to be friendly. However, such a visit to Indonesia could also be seen as a first opening to direct negotiations that could lead to greater insight into the mutual viewpoints of Papuans and Indonesians. This second motivation was definitely Bonay's who saw in it a realization of the triangular negotiations he desired. He emphatically stated that this was urgent because in his opinion there was no hostility between Indonesia and the Papuans, but only between the Netherlands and Indonesia.[96]

The latter statement met with strong resistance from both the Dutch and the Papuan council members. Father van den Berg denied that any hostility towards Indonesia existed from the Dutch side or, conversely, that there was any general hostility in Indonesia towards the Netherlands. The conflict was merely the result of the drive by a few groups in Indonesia who had an interest therein.[97] Kaisiepo explained elaborately that there was perhaps no hostility between the Papuans and the Indonesians, but that traditionally the two groups had never got along and that, as far as he could recall, the Indonesians working in New Guinea had never seen the Papuans as compatriots. Therefore antagonism definitely existed, but neither the Dutch nor the Papuans were to blame. Several other speakers endorsed this, adding that the Indonesian position of the past few years had been experienced as hostile. Talking with Indonesia would only be appropriate when that country stopped firing.[98]

Thus Tanggahma's proposal provoked a lively discussion in which the problems with which the Papuan world was confronted came to the fore. They could not come to an agreement. A first resolution, presented by Bonay and Tanggahma, reflected the spirit of the triangular negotiations with Indonesia. It was rejected by twelve votes to fifteen.[99] It did not pass until an amendment in the direction of Kaisiepo's requirements was made and after the government had given the proposal its support. Then it was accepted with a small majority of fourteen votes to eleven.[100]

A few days later, on 21 July, three members of the student delegation that had visited Indonesia arrived in Hollandia. They were the Parna members Amos Indey, Esau Somisu, and Marthen Jelmau; self-assured people who presented themselves as the heralds of the Indonesian government. They praised the simplicity and hospitality of their hosts. In Jakarta everything had been prepared for the transfer of West Irian and they could mention the names of those individuals who would hold an important position under the new regime. They would first tour the island to visit a number of their friends. Then the plan was to return to Indonesia to report on their trip. Their first action consisted of a visit to Bonay, now the Parna's vice-chairman, who was waiting for them in his home with a large number of fellow party members.[101] The message of Amos Indey and his companions now offered a clear and ready alternative to the news from the African front. However, it was anything but welcome. They were awaited at the airport by a hostile crowd carrying banners with inscriptions such as 'Papua sleazers, keep your nose out of politics' or 'Collaborators, go back to Indonesia.'

At the same time, the Netherlands retreat now began in great haste. On 25 July and against the government's wishes, Platteel ordered the wives and children of the Dutch civil servants under him to start leaving the country. It was

very obviously intended as the first step toward a general evacuation. On 31 July an accord was reached in the negotiations in Middleburgh in which the vaguely phrased 'Act of Free Choice' would take place in 1969, that is to say after six years of Indonesian rule. With the announcement of this tentative accord the last hope for a reasonably acceptable agreement went up in smoke. Platteel concluded that from that moment on the Papuan community had a sinking feeling in the pit of its stomach.[102]

The final months under the red-white-and-blue

The events of the second half of July 1962 ushered in a period of confusion. Those who were on Indonesia's side gained new hope. This was the case among the members of a small group on Serui, which was already checking the military installations and the movements of the police employees so they could report on them to the Indonesian authorities later on.[103] Others were fearful because they expected to be molested during the transition period. In Fakfak the GRIB warned against any anti-Indonesian actions because they could have negative results for the Papuans. Thereby they might forfeit their claim to self-determination. The members of the GRIB already no longer dared to show themselves outside of the town for fear of being beaten up. Reports from Merauke stated that in the final weeks of July tensions were mounting day by day. The Indonesians living there showed greater self-assurance, thus antagonizing the Papuans, who felt thrown back on their own resources. The aggression sometimes turned against the Dutch as well. In order to prevent any accidents, a curfew was imposed in the town. At this command the Papuan public blamed the Dutch civil servants for restricting them to please the Indonesians and leaving the Papuans to hold the baby. However, that same day a Dutch Marine was killed on the edge of the town in a fierce gunfight with parachutists.[104]

Among the anti-Indonesian groups a wide range of reactions could be noted. Plans for the proclamation vanished into thin air: insofar as the conspirators had been really serious about it, they now no longer dared persevere. In observing the situation, Platteel perceived despair among some of them, but the majority seemed to feel a kind of resignation to the inevitable.[105] A meeting of local leaders, convened by Gosewisch in Manokwari on 4 August, was the final convulsion of the conspiracy plan. He made a watertight argument there for the proclamation of a free Papuan state as soon as the Dutch civil servants were replaced by United Nations functionaries. He said he knew that the government was sympathetic to this idea. Reactions were noisy but consisted primarily of self-pity and criticism of the Dutch. They were the *Guru yang sudah mulai gulung tikar*, the schoolmaster who rolls up his sleeping mat in preparation for

departure, as the famous slogan of this meeting went. The ever-obstinate Pieter Wettebossy shouted that all of this was nonsense. Together with a group of Arfak, quite drunk on beer, Barend Mandjatan sat in the back of the room. From time to time they loudly called for weaponry. The whole atmosphere was one of rage and powerlessness. Outside the room the aggression was directed against those groups suspected of sympathy with the red-and-white Indonesian flag. In Manokwari these were the Seruian and Biak immigrants. Rumours were heard that they would have their throats cut. Once the transfer was a *fait accompli*, rumour had it that the Arfak people would withdraw into the interior and pick up their former way of life. Urban living had not debilitated them and they were still capable of the natural life.

Comparable rumours emerged from the interior as well. On the Wissel Lakes the commissioner of the Central Highlands was having a very hard time calming the population down. There they feared that there would be a new period of transition much like the one between the Dutch and Japanese authorities at the beginning of the war. The more vigorous Ekaris were in favour of simply killing all foreign missionaries, civil servants, and their Indonesian assistants, and demolishing the airports. That way they would be on their own again and be free to resume their former life, much as the Arfak people dreamed of doing.[106]

However, the heart of Papuan politics was located not in the interior but in Hollandia. It was there that on 31 July the director of the governor's Cabinet, C.H. Stefels, received a visit from the chairman of the DVP, A. Runtumboy. He requested that the government send 'his people's' women and children back to their original places of residence and provide arms for the men who would stay behind and then be free to act. Stefels responded that protective measures for the families would be taken when needed. Obviously, he did not pursue the request for arms although he was intrigued by it. He linked it to the rumours about the proclamation of independence. In all likelihood Runtumboy's failed mission, together with the meeting in Manokwari, was one of its final manifestations.[107]

Once it was clear that no support could be expected from the authorities, Runtumboy and his allies put their minds to limiting the damage. To this end, representatives of various groups gathered at the house of Kaisiepo on 2 August. Besides members of the DVP, there were also the Parna leaders Marthen Indey, Frans Waromy, and Rudy Barbareaux. The assembly decided to set up an information committee, or *Badan Penerangan*, that would contribute to keeping the peace and preventing incidents between the various population groups. In this we recognize the hand of information officer Kaisiepo. It is easy to understand why the Parna was interested in a Committee

such as this because it was precisely the groups suspected of red-and-white sympathies that would run the greatest risks in the upcoming weeks. Another plan was to create a popular movement to make it clear that the vast majority of the Papuan population demanded an unrestricted implementation of the right to self-determination.[108] This was manifested in Hollandia through a demonstration by the DVP on 4 August.

The demonstration was followed by similar marches by the recently formed *Front Nasional Papua* in Manokwari and Hollandia and a few other places. This front intended to form a collaborative link between all the various population groups. It was led by Dirk Ajamiseba, Dirk Sarwom, Marcus Kaisiepo, and Eliëzer Bonay. The local Netherlands resident described the demonstration in Manokwari as 'a sad demonstration by a loyal people feeling abandoned.' The largest demonstration occurred in Hollandia on 10 August, where some 1400 people gathered. Kaisiepo made the opening speech, demanding that before they departed the Dutch authorities give the Papuans 'rightful and complete control in West Papua'. The New Guinea Council members Eliezer Bonay, Arfan, and Mofu were heard from as well. The demand that Kaisiepo had made was recorded as a resolution with 150 signatures, and presented to Platteel on 13 August, requesting that it be transmitted to the secretary general of the United Nations.[109]

The total picture shows the huge distance between the wishes of these Papuan groups who had fixed their hopes on the Netherlands and the reality of the moment. A clearer pattern began to emerge when the New Guinea Council started dealing with the Agreement of New York. This was desirable because in its response to the Arfan motion of 22 August 1961 the government had stated that no changes would be made in the status of New Guinea without the council having been consulted. After 15 August, however, that change was practically speaking a *fait accompli*, so that the question arose whether such a session even needed to be held. Still, both Bot and Platteel believed that it was only fair that there should be an opportunity for a verbal exchange of ideas. This arose during the farewell visit that Bot paid to New Guinea at the end of August. He arrived on the 24 August at the airport in Hollandia where he was welcomed by speeches delivered by the complete Front Nasional Papua. A choral group of nurses performed the *Hai Tanahku Papua* but not the *Wilhelmus*, the Dutch national anthem. Bot rightfully interpreted this as a gesture showing disappointment in the inability of the Netherlands to finish the job they had started. Once again, this time 'with tears in his eyes,' Kaisiepo demanded that the right to self-determination be executed during the UNTEA period while it was still possible.[110]

The New Guinea Council meeting held in the governor's palace on 27 August was informal. Nevertheless, with the exception of three individuals, all the members were present. Bot explained the good intentions of the Netherlands once more and pointed to the circumstances beyond their control that necessitated the Dutch retreat. Kaisiepo replied that the Papuans understood this but that they had a dismal view of the situation nevertheless. In his opinion, the great mass of the population didn't accept the Agreement and wanted that to be known. Papuan nationalism was still in its early stages and thus people were obsessed with it. The next discussion yielded a few surprising perspectives. Tanggahma thought that the only thing left to do was to wait for the popular consultation of 1969 and indicated that until that time the Netherlands ought not to offer any financial support. The people should feel that under Indonesia they would be badly off. Both Bonay and Kaisiepo supported this idea. The budget that the Netherlands had reserved for New Guinea's development would be better set aside to be used after the departure of the Indonesians. For that same reason they thought that the Dutch civil servants had better leave as soon as possible as of 1 October. Otherwise they would merely become the scapegoat should things go wrong here. The hope of the meeting was that there would be renewed cooperation after the Indonesian interim rule had come to an end.[111]

The tone of this informal meeting of the New Guinea Council was dignified and intimate without any fingers pointing towards the Netherlands. Several days later, on 31 August, the official meeting of the complete council took place that was to decide whether they would or would not accept the Agreement of New York. On that occasion the tone of the discussions was sharper and the question arose as to whether they ought not to have taken a tougher stand. Might an independent proclamation of independence not have been wiser, after all? It was Kaisiepo, in particular, who wondered about this. Bonay believed that they could expect the warranted Papuan desires to be fulfilled under Indonesian rule. Although his fellow members certainly did not share that confidence, twelve representatives supported a resolution that accepted the Agreement in the end. Only two people voted against it, one of whom was Kaisiepo. The other half, Jouwe and the five Dutch members among them, had left the room during the vote. A quorum had therefore not been present so that the outcome—insofar as it had any value under the circumstances—was invalid. Nevertheless, with this outcome the council had not turned against the resolution with any great majority. Since it had a total of twenty-three Papuan members, one could actually say that the resolution had been accepted with the smallest possible majority by the 'Papuan block.' Be that as it may, it was not a very warm welcome for the new rulers.[112]

An equally significant meeting took place a few weeks later. This was the *National Papua Congress* held in Hollandia between 14 and 20 September. It was initiated by the Front Nasional Papua, which had won the cooperation of the government for this effort. The intention was to make it possible for the Papuans across all of New Guinea to deliberate on the situation that had emerged from the making of the Agreement. Primarily consisting of members of the regional councils, the New Guinea Council, and of the political parties, 130 people had been invited. In the end, 98 of them appeared. The only one of the invited speakers who did not accept was the pro-Indonesian Marthen Indey. Jouwe and Kaisiepo spoke on the first day. They were present only briefly, for on the second day of the conference they left for New York to participate in the final discussions at the United Nations on behalf of the New Guinea Council as members of the Dutch delegation. Thereupon the conference was led by Nicolaas Tanggahma who proved to be a firm facilitator. The meetings were somewhat unruly, in part because of the presence of a large audience that had gathered outside the building. Thus, critical issues were discussed behind closed doors as much as was practicable. Recriminations in the direction of Indonesia or the Netherlands were avoided as much as possible. The one exception to this was the attitude of Herman Wajoi, who in a vehement speech blamed the Netherlands for shirking their responsibilities for the Papuans by entrusting the execution of the right to self-determination to the Indonesians. Thereby the capitalist Netherlands were getting 'right to self-determination at a bargain price.'

Yet, this was not the general mood. The tenor of most speeches was that, although they accepted the course of events, they wanted to be prepared as solidly as possible for the act of self-determination. However, the circumstances under which this was to take place continued to be a point of contention until the last minute. The Agreement mentioned 1969 but, as we have seen, Jouwe and Kaisiepo had repeatedly expressed their desire for the year 1963, in which the plebiscite could still take place under the supervision of the United Nations. A motion to that effect, presented by the delegate Wanma, was accepted by a solid majority but stopped by Tanggahma. He explained that for such a drastic demand a two-thirds majority would be needed, which had just been missed. It was undoubtedly a relief for the chairman who knew that such a pronouncement would put him on an immediate collision course with the upcoming Indonesian regime. Another hot potato, too, was skirted around with some effort. It had to do with the place of the national symbols, the flag and the anthem, in the interim period. It was an important issue for the Papuans. Many feared that the UN governance would immediately forbid the flag. Nevertheless, they did not make a decision: the matter would be better solved

in consultation between the governments involved and the representative bodies. Finally, it was recorded in a resolution that they accepted the Agreement because they would thereby avoid a major war in the Pacific. Moreover, they added a few practical points. One concerned the establishment of a Political Papuan Bureau that was to occupy itself with the preparation of a plebiscite in 1969 whereby, in principle, the right to vote should be restricted to the Papuans.

With these decisions, the National Congress demonstrated that it had no intention of coming into conflict with the incoming regime. On the other hand, it showed there was no mistaking the full attention that ought to be paid to showing the symbols again in 1969 and then to becoming masters in their own home. This was also true for most of the Parna supporters. The only exception in this regard was the GRIB, but it was not the one to set the mood.[113] In the regions under Dutch rule, the recent years had shaped a self-assured people with a sophisticated leadership. The latter would be sorely needed. The meeting was still going on when the first planes with civil servants of the United Nations Temporary Administration (UNTEA) on board arrived on Biak and Sentani. The meeting was closed by composing the delegation that was to depart for Jakarta to present the recommendations of the National Papuan Congress to the Indonesian government.

Chapter 12

Under Jakarta's Thumb

The entry of the UNTEA

In the preceding chapter we painted a picture of the mood among the inhabitants of New Guinea during the last year of the Netherlands administration. This was not the same overall. In their desire to obtain as much as possible for the Papuans, where the Dutch negotiating position was concerned the Cabinet members in The Hague had maintained the most positive image possible to the outside world. This had certain consequences for the internal situation in New Guinea. For the Dutch population of the island uncertainty was greater among those who were more aware of the international developments; on the Papuan side, however, confidence in the Netherlands remained predominant for a long time. Thus impressions varied, depending upon the position and expectations of the observer. During his November 1961 visit, the well-informed Australian journalist Peter Hastings drew a rather sombre picture. Coming to New Guinea a few months later, the diplomat Percival had a very different reaction. Although he noted the steadily growing number of women and children departing for the Netherlands, he reported that the morale of the Dutch men was high and that work continued as usual. The Navy was sure of its ground and the arrival of thousands of Dutch soldiers only seemed to reinforce its position. Under the pressure of the recent events, and specifically of Indonesian news coverage, the Papuans had grown gradually more anti-Indonesian. Internally there was freedom of opinion but it went accompanied by increasing criticism of anything red-and-white. Furthermore, like many Australians visiting New Guinea, Percival was struck by the amiable rapport between the Papuans and the Dutch.[1]

Inwardly, uncertainty dominated, which was clearly noticeable in the relationship between Bot and Platteel. We have already seen that in early 1962 there

were problems with regard to public relations. Obviously, The Hague kept Platteel fairly well-informed on the state of affairs, but the latter was not allowed to explain it to the public. He therefore had plenty of reason to wonder what he should actually be doing. His greatest concern was the timely evacuation of Dutch women and children from the small towns on the western coast. In those areas Indonesian infiltrations were constant. To be sure, they didn't reach the population centres but that possibility needed to be taken into account, which would put the Dutch citizenry in an uncomfortable position.

Bot and the Cabinet ministers kept the evacuation at bay as long as possible, because to the outside world such a move would make it obvious that the Netherlands were giving in. It would do away with the last elements of negotiating freedom, with the result that the Netherlands would no longer be able to cling to its conditions concerning the right to self-determination. This game of bluff reached its peak in July 1962. Military news pointed to an imminent Indonesian attack. An efficient defence would only be possible with a preventive attack on the Indonesian air force bases on Ambon and Macassar but that would amount to political suicide. Furthermore, it was quite clear that in the case of an Indonesian attack the Netherlands would not be able to count on any American military support. This would be limited to support for the evacuation. Although deals were made to that effect, the Netherlands was very little inclined to pursue them: if need be, they were still able to handle that problem themselves. On 25 July, much against the will of the Cabinet, Platteel gave permission to send all women and children away from the most exposed places. In the end, Bot had resigned himself to this but, much to his annoyance, that 'permission' in Platteel's instructions had taken the shape of a recommendation. Weeks later, even after the signing of the New York Agreement, the deputy minister was still fighting tooth and nail against the plan of the governor and the military commander, Rear-Admiral Reeser, to send their own wives back to the Netherlands before they themselves departed. When, in spite of everything, both ladies left on 24 August anyway The Hague was less than appreciative. The motivation of the two top dogs in New Guinea was to let those remaining behind know that things were now very serious and that procrastination was no longer desirable. New Guinea experienced the reality differently than The Hague.[2]

When the curtain came down on 15 August, another month and a half remained to clear the Dutch positions. In the interim, the New Guinea administration had prepared this operation well and it could be started quickly. With the new school year in mind, most women and children had already left by the end of August; the men followed in the subsequent weeks and months. We have seen that Bot visited New Guinea for the third time in September, this time to

clarify that the cause was lost. His most important task consisted of urging the Papuan population to cooperate fully with the UNTEA and to have faith in the future plebiscite that, thanks to intensive Dutch negotiations, would still provide the opportunity of ensuring the desired self-determination. He did so, among other places, in his 18 September speech to the members of the New Guinea Council. The sources do not mention whether he used that occasion to point out that their future could possibly lie with Indonesia as well.[3]

In the meantime, the UN machinery had been put into action. To supervise the implementation of the cease-fire, U Thant called in the Indian General Indar J. Rikhye who had also been involved as a UN counsellor in the Middleburgh negotiations. Eighteen military observers originating from six different countries were assigned to him for this purpose. Called in to provide security, Pakistan made 1500 troops available. They were known as the United Nations Security Force. General Rikhye went to work energetically. He arrived in Hollandia on 20 August to consult with the Dutch authorities, during which time Rear-Admiral Reeser was his most important interlocutor. Then, in Jakarta, he consulted with Sukarno, the army commander Achmad Jani, and the commander of operations against Netherlands New Guinea, Major General Suharto, on 25 August. The truce had actually gone into effect on 18 August but, during his visit to Hollandia, Reeser pointed out to the UN representative that Indonesian military operations had not yet ceased. He was able to show him radar images of four Indonesian submarines in Dutch territorial waters near Biak. In consultation with Rikhye, they waited until the night of 21 to 22 August when one of the ships emerged to put a rubber boat with infiltrators overboard. Thereupon the ship was spotlighted and photographed from a Dutch Neptune. Part of the rubber boat's crew was captured immediately, while the rest managed to get away and the operation came to an end.

In addition, Rikhye was told that, according to the Dutch estimates, in recent weeks more than 770 parachutists had been dropped in various places on the west- and south coast. Of these, 450 had been captured. Furthermore, an unknown number of fighters, left behind from previous infiltrations, was supposedly still roaming around in the interior. The Dutch reckoned there were about two thousand of them. It was feared that their number was diminishing rapidly due to injuries incurred upon landing, the roughness of the terrain, insufficient equipment and food, and attacks by the population.

Upon arrival in Jakarta, Rikhye handed over the photograph of the emerging submarine to a highly interested Sukarno, while Jani gave him a lower estimate of the number of dropped parachutists. They decided to find them as quickly as possible, to provide them with supplies from the air, and to inform them of the truce. To this end two Indonesian planes were made available. Complete with

UN signs and a UN observer on board, they were to make a trip over the potential whereabouts of the infiltrators, drop pamphlets and food, and finally land on Biak where they would be able to collect the captives.[4] The operation took place on 28 and 29 August and went pretty much according to plan. Furthermore, it was decided that Indonesia would post three liaison officers with the UN staff in Hollandia. Thereby the stipulations of the truce had been followed for the most part. Still, problems did occur in the subsequent weeks with Indonesian infiltrators who appeared here and there and who were assembled in just a few places in as large numbers as possible. Their numbers were considerably smaller than the earlier Dutch estimates had suggested. As mentioned in chapter nine, it turned out that after the hostilities ended there was a total of some thousand Indonesian troops left in the terrain, the majority of which consisted of the parachutists dropped in Merauke. Supplying them was a United Nations responsibility, which could then make use of planes delivered by the Americans, while the Dutch supplied medical care where needed.[5]

At the consultations in Jakarta, the Indonesians showed rather little interest in the arrival of the UN troops that were to take over the Netherlands positions as of 1 October. Ignoring what had been agreed upon in Middleburgh, Leimena and Sukarno now expressed their preference for direct cooperation with the Netherlands military forces with which, so they said, the Indonesian army had had such good experiences during the transfer of sovereignty period in 1949. Rikhye clarified that this was not the intention and that the plans would be carried out according to the format prepared in Middleburgh. The commander of the UNSF, the Pakistani Brigadier-General Said Ud Khan, arrived in Hollandia at the end of August to explore the terrain; the troops didn't come until early October. The men were billeted in Fakfak (8 Oct.), Sorong (10 Oct.), Biak (12 Oct.), Hollandia (14 Oct.) and Subic Bay (21 Oct.). There they relieved the Dutch troops who had all left by the end of November, according to a previously arranged evacuation schedule. America and Canada delivered a number of planes and helicopters to the UNTEA for the transportation of troops and civilian personnel. These were charged to the United Nations, which divided the costs between the Netherlands and Indonesia as per the Agreement.[6]

All these decisions were made quickly and with relatively few problems. The choice of the UN administrator caused greater problems. The American side insisted that Bunker be appointed but the Netherlands declared him unacceptable. Sukarno was first in favour of Ambassador Jones and then of an Asian appointee. In the end, it was the Persian diplomat Dr. Djalal Abdoh, but his appointment was not a done deal until late October.[7]

The formal transfer took place on 1 October, for which occasion José Rolz-Bennett, the acting chief of the Cabinet of the UN Secretary General, came over

from New York. The idea was for him to act as temporary administrator. It was an extremely restrained ceremony, during which Bennett acted in close telegraphic consultation with New York. Platteel had already left a few days earlier after handing over control to H. Veldkamp, his second in command. The trickiest question had to do with the handling of the Papua flag. In the opinion of the Dutch, this need not become a problem because, according to the Agreement of New York, all legal arrangements would be continued under the UNTEA administration. The creation of a country flag was one of these. However, Bennett made it clear from the start that in the Agreement no mention had been made of such a flag and that the UN was against it. That was easy to say, but from the side of the population they could only expect resistance. Therefore the flag-related ceremonies had to be reined in and made as simple as possible. Initially, the intention was to raise the UN flag beside the Dutch one in all the residents' capitals on the morning of 1 October. However, this was rescinded the evening before because the Papuan police in Hollandia refused to lower the Papuan flag because it was not to be raised again the following day. Thereupon the ceremony was scaled down to an absolute minimum everywhere. On the morning of the transfer in Hollandia, the Dutch and the UN flags were raised at the governor's mansion under the watchful eye of a small select group. Other than those, no flags were intended to be raised in the residents' capitals at all that day.

This arrangement was implemented only in part, however, because the directives had not managed to reach the various residents' capitals in time. Besides, in countless places the Papuan flag was simply still flying. In the capital city, too, it continued to be flown on taxis and cars. Nevertheless, by and large the transfer took place quietly. No incidents occurred. The Papuan population followed the directions, while the Indonesian entourage around Sudjarwo conducted itself in exemplary fashion and dealt amicably with the Papuans. Veldkamp described the Papuans' attitude as acquiescent. This was also a credit to the thorough preparation by the departing administration. Ever since 1958, the machine had been run largely by Papuan civil servants, up to and including at the district level. In the months preceding the transfer all the HPB's and police commissioners had been replaced by Papuans, too. These were well-trained administrators and police personnel who had been instructed to act cooperatively. As long as they were given the opportunity to stick to this, very little would go wrong.[8] On the day that he took office, Rolz Bennett explained the set-up of the UNTEA administration to the population in a press release. The idea was to take over the central posts with a limited number of key civil servants. Some forty of these, hastily brought together, arrived immediately after the transfer. The core was formed by a number of

individuals who were to replace the Dutch residents. They did so under the title of 'Divisional Commander'. Of these, only the British member Gordon S. Carter spoke the Indonesian language. According to the previously made agreements, the UN presence would be increased to 170 people. Furthermore, Dutch and Indonesian liaison officers were added to the UNTEA staff. The Netherlands was represented by the diplomat Goedhart, while Sudjarwo was there on behalf of Indonesia. Each of them had played a role in the deliberations in New York at some stage and was therefore well informed on the agreements made. The Australians, too, had an observer there because they had not pulled their political representative out of Hollandia.

It had been agreed in Middleburgh that as many Netherlands personnel as possible would continue through the end of the first projected phase of the UNTEA period, that is to say until 1 May 1963. This was encouraged by the Dutch government because it hoped thereby to help ease the transfer. When it turned out that enthusiasm for this was not particularly great, Deputy-Minister Bot promised bonuses, but without the desired result. At the moment of transfer they expected about a quarter of the Dutch personnel to remain until further notice. The department heads remained available for a month. Experience taught rather quickly that they were functioning in a vacuum because the UNTEA staff lent its ear primarily to the influx of Indonesians. Thereupon the Dutch exodus progressed rapidly and within a few weeks the great majority had left.

The planned entry of the Indonesian civil servants and military didn't fare any better. It had been agreed in Middleburgh that this wouldn't occur on any large scale until after the first phase of the UNTEA period had ended. Before that time there would only be an Indonesian liaison staff, of which Sudjarwo had meanwhile become the chief. The agreement between Subandrio and U Thant about raising the Indonesian flag as of 1 January 1963 quickly undermined this regulation. Although not formally, this stirred the suggestion that the first phase would thereby come to an end, so that the originally planned second phase, after 1 May, during which the influx of Indonesian troops and civil servants under the aegis of the UN would be able to take place, had lapsed. In real terms, Subandrio's office in Jakarta had immediately begun recruiting among the civil servants of the various departments in the Indonesian capital. In addition, volunteers were recruited among students and other interested parties.

The Indonesians went to work energetically to make this theoretical option a reality. Upon his arrival in Hollandia, Sudjarwo was accompanied by twenty correspondents and sixty civil servants. Without delay Bennett sent half of the latter back with the same plane claiming a lack of accommodation.[9] However, they

returned again very soon. Sudjarwo repeated a request to the population, previously made by Subandrio, to support the UNTEA administration. He added that his government would soon provide the vacancies that would be created during the transition period and would assist the UNTEA in resisting the agitators where called for. This explanation by the Indonesian liaison officer caused resentment in his colleague Goedhart, who concluded that the Indonesians were thereby already getting involved in administrative affairs. Subandrio's own arrival was prevented by the United Nations taking a firm line, aided and abetted by U Thant himself. Still, a considerably larger number of Indonesian military and civil servants arrived than was needed to run a liaison group. After just a few days as many as sixty Indonesian civil servants were already on the ground, the core of whom were employed by the Department of Finances. Lieutenant-Colonel Sutarto and ten officers were placed at the UNSF as a liaison group.[10]

The first team of Indonesian civil servants had been put together with great care. For them, being dispatched to New Guinea was attractive because the United Nations provided them with a good salary. Larger groups of volunteers followed right behind them. They had been recruited by Subandrio's West Irian Secretariat and often came from the universities of Jakarta. Initially there was a great deal of idealism among them for their development work with their new compatriots. However, in practice it worked out differently. In Hollandia they were confronted almost immediately with a prosperous looking, well-run city that had abundantly stocked shops at a time when the towns on Java were struggling with neglect and shortages of all kinds. For the older generation delicacies such as Van Houten chocolate bars were a delight, and they shipped large quantities of them to relatives on Java. Moreover, many of them felt uncomfortable when enthusiasm about their arrival turned out to be wanting among the freed compatriots. In addition, a deep chasm soon developed between the civil servants placed there by the United Nations and the volunteers who had to make do with a monthly (Indonesian) payment of 25 rupias. In view of the high prices in Hollandia, this was not exactly a fortune. This separation appeared both among the civil servants and the military. It was sharply felt by the infiltrators who were slowly assembled and placed in a few camps. Their living conditions contrasted sharply with those of the new military groups that were pouring in under fine conditions and as if they were victors. They also ran into huge problems with the Papuans of the Papuan Volunteer Corps and the police who until very recently had pursued them and were now kept on as official functionaries of the UNTEA. The Indonesian side looked upon their continued presence with mistrust. This was encouraged from higher up. Sukarno and Nasution warned repeatedly against the time bombs that the departing Dutch colonial administration had left behind.[11]

The criticism suited the Indonesian aspirations to gain a better grasp on the UNTEA machine. Progress toward this goal could be made by the Indonesian troops becoming part of the UNSF right away. When Rikhye visited Jakarta on 25 August, Jani had already offered him the parachutists who were present in West Irian at the time. Rikhye's answer had been ambiguous. Although he agreed to have them placed under the command of the UN, this obviously did not imply that therefore they would be deployed for police duties as well and thus receive payment from the resources of the United Nations. It was agreed that this would only be possible if the secretary general in New York were to give his explicit permission. When researching the United Nations archives no indications were found that this actually occurred. Nevertheless, it didn't take long for Indonesian forces to be seen in the urban streets of New Guinea wearing the UNTEA insignia on their sleeve and beginning to act more and more independently as their numbers increased.[12] In consultation with Abdoh, after a few months these former infiltrators were replaced by regular Indonesian troops, with the agreement that their number could not exceed that of the Pakistani troops. However, in his final report the administrator Abdoh makes no mention of the numbers.

The Indonesian influx became greater in November 1962. During the first month of the UN administration and in close cooperation with the local administrative bodies, the Papuan staffed police had enjoyed sufficient elbow-room to maintain order as they saw fit. With the arrival of police commissioner Dr. Lugowo, a Sukarno confidant, this changed. The remaining Dutch police commissioner was heavily pressurized to depart and J. Robertson, the UNTEA police chief, agreed with a rapid take-over of the corps by Indonesian officers. The Papuan officers were to be sent to Java for re-training or to take courses in Hollandia to gain greater insight into the Indonesian government policies. To Robertson's irritation, Lugowo had already made the necessary arrangements even before informing him of his plans. In practice, it turned out that from early November the Indonesians had been able to prevent any meetings of anti-Indonesian individuals. Abdoh made another attempt to make himself less dependent on the Indonesians by appointing Filipino police personnel, but this failed due to language problems. The UN administration made no use at all of the Papuan Volunteer Corps, to which the Agreement had assigned an important role in the enforcement of law and order. When the Netherlands forces departed in January 1963, it was placed under Indonesian officers.[13]

The conduct of Subandrio's wife was symbolic as well; she had landed in Hollandia just before 15 November with a troupe of Javanese dancers to organize a series of cultural events in West Irian. In her performance she showed

absolutely no sign of any understanding for Dutch sensitivities nor did she take any interest in those of the UN administrators. Thus, upon her arrival she addressed a crowd of Papuans about the evil days that lay behind them and the glorious times that awaited them. To the annoyance of both Abdoh and Goedhart, who was also present, she further developed this theme during a goodbye party for Rolz Bennett held at the governor's mansion. Incidents such as these accelerated the Netherlands exodus.[14]

Indonesian policy thus looked increasingly in danger of undermining the New York Agreement. Right after the transfer of the administration, campaigns had already begun to bring the UNTEA to an end as of 31 December and to dispense with previous agreements on a plebiscite. Papuans were brought into these anti-plebiscite campaigns from the very start. A 19-man delegation of members of the National Congress and the New Guinea Council left for Jakarta at the end of September as guests of the Indonesian government to meet the new bosses and inform them of their wishes. The delegation was led by Herman Wajoi. In the Indonesian capital they were received by Subandrio and a number of cabinet members. On that occasion Subandrio declared that he did not wish to discuss the topic of self-determination because it would denigrate Indonesian prestige. He elucidated this further by positing that for Indonesia the battle over New Guinea had been a matter of principle, rather than because they needed the region. He then had a go at the Dutch whom he accused of maligning the Indonesians toward the outside world and leaving weapons behind in various spots on West Irian in order to continue to undermine them in the future. His dumbfounded audience did not have much to say in response.

Sukarno met the delegation on the Army Day of 5 October when the president declared that West Irian was simply a part of Indonesia now on which development money would be spent. Thus, West Irian would acquire its own university. He did make it plain that Indonesia would not let itself be kicked around and that those who caused any chaos would be dealt with severely. Wajoi continued to act as the major spokesman and his statements were entirely in the spirit of the Indonesian pronouncements up to that point. At the end of the trip, during a visit to Bali, the delegation issued a statement that 'the youth of Bali and West Irian' recognized but one flag, one language, and one nation, namely those of Indonesia. Dutch stories claiming that chaos reigned supreme were said to be deliberate lies. Upon their return the delegation would devote itself to provide better information to the Papuans about the true situation in the motherland. The first step was a travel report in the informative magazine *Tjendrawasih*, in which they praised their hosts to high heaven. The magazine was the continuation of the former *Nieuw-Guinea Koerier* (New Guinea Courier), and was now edited by E. Bonay.[15]

Politically these statements were not insignificant, but apparently there had been no space for a conversation about more concrete matters. As a topic of discussion, the resolutions of the National Congress about a plebiscite during the UNTEA administration had been taboo in Jakarta. According to American and Dutch reports, the delegation had carried a proposal with it about the formation of a separate federative link with Indonesia that would be established right after the departure of the UNTEA. According to the same reports, Subandrio apparently vetoed this immediately. Indeed, it would have been in total conflict with the policies that Indonesia was then following and would continue to follow. In greater agreement was Antara's remark on 24 October that Wajoi and Ajamiseba had argued for an accelerated transfer to Indonesia and for the abolition of the plebiscite. After a conversation with Subandrio in Jakarta, representatives of the DVP, only recently still so favourable to the Netherlands, came with a similar declaration. Antara also announced that Sukarno was receiving numerous petitions from Papuans requesting a speedy transfer and expressing their opposition to a plebiscite.

In Jakarta the PKI and the National Front now under Subidio gave full consideration to this matter as well, having played an important role in the preceding years in every West Irian campaign of the Indonesian government. They brought up the fact that participating in the UNTEA administration was an expensive proposition for Indonesia, while the facts proved that it was unnecessary. After all, the Papuans wished only to be integrated into Indonesia and that country was perfectly capable of taking the reins immediately. The commission for foreign affairs of the Indonesian parliament took the same position. American intelligence reports stated that the action was being supported by promises of financial and political favours to the Papuans who were willing to cooperate. Besides, it wasn't only the Papuans who were heard from. According to the same report, the trusted protagonist of the Indonesian position of an earlier era, the vice-president of the KLM, Van Konijnenburg, presumably let Subandrio know that he would urge his government to end the UNTEA as of 1 January.[16] The American and Australian embassies read all these reports with great concern and sent them on to their capital city. According to the American reporter, they were merely waiting for the Netherlands' reactions, whereupon the United Nations would find themselves saddled with an interesting discussion once again.

The official opening shot for the anti-plebiscite campaign was fired during Djalal Abdoh's introductory visit to the Indonesian government between 8 and 13 November. At an informal dinner in Jakarta, Subandrio introduced the possibility of an accelerated transfer by the UNTEA to Indonesia. Abdoh reacted guardedly. He said that he wanted to stick to the agreements and that during his administration he saw it as his duty to prepare the population for the agreed

plebiscite that was to be held before the end of 1969. A few days later, on 17 November, Subandrio introduced the question in the same informal manner to Ambassador Jones, whereby the minister expressed the hope that the American government, so accommodating towards Indonesia until then, would not be obstructive if the Netherlands and Indonesian governments wanted to take this path together. He referred to the agreements made with the KLM about reopening the connection with Jakarta and the negotiations which had already started with the Netherlands about resuming diplomatic relations. For the attentive listener it was not hard to guess that these matters would now also be used as bargaining chips in any upcoming discussion.[17]

Jones relayed the message to the American government without comment. However, Subandrio clearly viewed the outcome of the conversation as a possibility. As the next step, Nico Palar, the Indonesian representative in New York, paid a visit to U Thant on 28 November to present him with a memorandum asking that the UNTEA administration be ended as of 1 January and that the plebiscite be abandoned. U Thant advised him to keep the agreement as it was but Palar explained that he was not free to do so.

These proceedings did not go down well in Washington or New York. Like so many Dutch people before him, an exasperated Rusk now also wondered what Indonesian promises were worth. Jones was instructed to tell Subandrio, should he return to the subject, that Indonesia would be better off upholding international agreements in good faith. That also would be a fitting occasion to point out to him that they had entered the region far more rapidly and in far greater numbers than had been previously agreed. The phrasing shows that Jones was not expected to take the initiative here. This should be left up to the United Nations as much as possible. In fact, the Australian diplomat Plimsoll, who was stationed there, did address U Thant on the issue, whereupon the latter publicly declared that he was sure the parties involved in this unique operation would stick closely to the agreements made. When asked, his envoy Abdoh in Hollandia asserted that changes were possible only with the consensus of all parties involved.

The Dutch reaction was patently clear. Luns declared that the Netherlands were utterly opposed. Van Roijen, who had been informed about the conversation between Jones and Subandrio by the Americans, made certain that everyone knew there was, and could be, no relationship between KLM's landing rights and this affair. Subandrio did not give up; on 7 January, Palar formally presented the same two-fold proposal to the Dutch government. It was promptly declined. Plimsoll thought that Indonesia had thereby forfeited its credit in the world.[18] However, the action continued for many months thereafter at a lower level. We shall return to this below.

For the Papuans, the arrival of the UNTEA meant a leap into the unknown. The time has come to take a look at their reactions to the new situation. The 'old' leaders, who had been the most outspoken exponents of the Netherlands policies, kept silent or withdrew. When the most recent meeting of the New Guinea Council ended, Jouwe and Kaisiepo had gone to New York to attend the United Nations session of 21 September. It was on that occasion that the New York Agreement, consistent with article 1 of the text, was presented to the General Assembly by the Netherlands and Indonesia together. It passed in the Assembly without further discussion. However, the friends from Upper Volta and Dahomey noted that this was horse trading in human beings, which went counter to the agreements made in Bandung. This visit had been useful to Jouwe and Kaisiepo because of the closer acquaintance with the United Nations and the new encounter with Guirma and Zollner, but otherwise it had made no difference at all.[19] They declined an invitation Subandrio extended to them there to return to New Guinea again. After the meetings they went to the Netherlands where they received the asylum they requested without much ado. It was given to them under the usual condition that they could no longer be involved in politics.[20]

In New Guinea itself the arriving Indonesians were thus forced to look for new leaders. As was to be expected, Frits Kirihio was assigned as personal advisor to Subandrio who, as head of the West Irian Secretariat, would continue to be the man in charge of the administration in New Guinea for the years to come. Furthermore, right at the start a Papuan was pushed onto the stage, set up to honour the great men in Indonesian history. Sukarno chose the Biak schoolteacher Lucas Rumkorem as one of the heroes of the revolution, clarifying that this man had suffered years of torture and imprisonment in his fight against Dutch oppression.[21] In this context it is remarkable that the favourite was not Silas Papare, who had fought on his side from the very beginning. For reasons that are unclear, he was in prison at the time. Rumour had it that his opinions on the national future of New Guinea differed from those of the Indonesian government.

The leading groups of the more recent period were the civil servants and the members of the various councils. On the whole, they represented the better educated population of the north coast and the urban centres elsewhere in the country. Consistent with the strategy outlined in September by the New Guinea Council and the National Congress, the majority were adopting a wait-and-see attitude while attention was focused on the more long-term self-determination. This was not always easy. Problems arose almost immediately around the symbols of Papuan nationalism. Dealing with these formed a sticking point in the relationship with the incoming Indonesians. The disapproving attitude of

the UNTEA administration regarding the flag had caused a great deal of unrest, although serious incidents had not occurred. The tension increased with the ever more tangible presence of military and civilian Indonesians in the streets and the confrontation with their opinions. Understandably, the newcomers felt like conquerors and they showed it, too. The tension was palpable on the annual Indonesian Heroes Day of 10 November. It was celebrated by laying the foundation stone for a stadium in the capital of West Irian where Maramis, second in command after Sudjarwo, gave a speech about the role sports played in international understanding. At the same time, and as a result of Sukarno's promise to provide West Irian with its own university, Frits Kirihio gave a fanatical speech in which he sang the praises of Indonesian unity from Sabang to Merauke. So far so good. More serious was the fact that both ceremonies were attended and guarded by Indonesian military without any UNTEA insignia, who let their presence be emphatically known. For example, they harrassed the OSIBA students present by frisking them publicly as they entered their own school building.[22] In December fights broke out in Merauke and Sorong between Indonesian parachutists and the Papuans, in which people were wounded and killed. They were caused primarily by the fact that the Indonesian forces did not wish to abide by the directions of the Papuan police and Papuan officials. That same month, a group of some forty students from the OSIBA and the Teachers' College fled to the area near the Australian border. They were completely frantic due to the conduct of the military by whom they were mistreated and intimidated, and who had burned all their Dutch-language textbooks.[23]

The most important target group, in Indonesian eyes as well, were the members of the National Congress, the New Guinea Council, and the leaders of the political parties. To begin with, they were given ample opportunity to establish contacts, but were put under heavy presssure to conform to Indonesian principles as well. We have already mentioned the trip of the delegation to Indonesia, led by Wajoi, from 19 September to mid-October at the invitation of the Indonesian government. Although they praised their hosts, the delegation kept silent after their return about matters such as the duration of the UNTEA administration and the time of the plebiscite. A second delegation led by Wajoi paid a visit to Jakarta in early November. This resulted in the drafting of two documents. The first, dated 14 November, argued merely for an accelerated transfer of rule to Indonesia. The second and more elaborate document followed on 21 November expressing doubt about the need for a plebiscite. It would come to be known as the Common Declaration of Kota Baru, as Hollandia was named by the Indonesians at the time. Abdoh did not receive this until 6 December when it was handed to him by a ten-man Papuan

delegation, together with a number of documents in the same vein originating from various organizations on Java. The delegation included individuals with divergent convictions. Present on behalf of the New Guinea Council were Tanggahma, Bonay, Poana, and Gebze, while the Congress was represented by Herman Wajoi, Corinus Krey, G. Mirino, Ibrahim Bauw, and the Seruian Worabay. Abdoh's attitude was distant. He noted that the names of the members of the delegation did not appear on every document and, just to be sure, asked them directly whether they agreed with the contents. The only one who denied that he had even read it was Gebze who, just to be on the safe side, also added that he didn't agree with it. Later on, in a conversation with Goedhart, Tanggahma let it be known that their hosts had put heavy pressure on the delegation members to sign the document. Wajoi admitted the same thing afterwards in a conversation with the American-Dutch researcher Paul van der Veur.

The drafting of the documents did not go unnoticed, and opposition voices were also heard. The UNTEA administration noticed great tension everywhere during the days when the duration of the UNTEA and the plebiscite were the all-consuming questions. At the end of November a number of Papuans, among them the secretary of the New Guinea Council Henk Joku, had approached the UN administration in Hollandia wishing to hold a demonstration in commemoration of the one-year anniversary of Papua having received its flag and anthem. According to Goedhart, the organizers wanted to dig in their heels against the statements by the National Congress, by which they must have meant the 'Declaration of Kota Baru.' In a pamphlet they rejected the National Congress' claim to speak for the people and stated that they wanted to go ahead with the plebiscite. In addition, their agenda contained the request that Silas Papare be freed from prison and that the Indonesians depart after international consultation. The document was seized during the night of 30 November to 1 December. Thereupon Abdoh banned the gathering and the operation in Hollandia collapsed. A first wave of intimidation swept through the cities, with Indonesian soldiers and Papuan assistants killing and torturing protesting Papuan youths at will.[24]

While the operation in Hollandia thus collapsed, a new initiative for some form of organized protest was taken in Biak. It came from the regional council of Biak-Numfor and was drafted in the form of a request to the secretary general of the United Nations. It was signed by Arnold Mampioper, the council's chairman, and a few others. Together they represented, so they claimed, the forty thousand inhabitants of the islands. The document stated that the delegation of the New Guinea Council had been heavily pressured by Subandrio to sign the declaration in question and that he had not minced words about

Indonesian military dominance. He had added that, if need be, he would drive the UNTEA out of the region. In conclusion, Subandrio had told his guests that after the transfer of the administration they need not count on any United Nations personnel staying behind to keep an eye on things. The request ended with the conclusion that the future in which the Republic would govern them single-handedly looked dismal for the Papuans and that their only hope was that the United Nations would work on the basis of the agreement between the Netherlands and the Indonesian republic.[25]

In the mean time, political pressure continued. After their visit to Abdoh on 6 December, the New Guinea Council delegation was sent back to Jakarta. There they received instructions to travel on to New York to present the 'Declaration of Kota Baru' to U Thant. The council members Tanggahma, Gebze, and Poana refused to do so and returned straight home after they had left Jakarta. Four others, namely E.J Bonay, H. Wajoi, L. Jouwe, and Hajji Ibrahim Bauw complied with the request. They travelled through Bonn and seized the opportunity to pay a short visit to the Netherlands where they were welcomed by the Prime Minister. De Quay explained to them that the Netherlands wished to abide strictly by the agreements made and that the interests of the Papuans would be best served thereby as well. He refused to react to the suggestion Bonay made that if the Netherlands would agree to the contents of the request, the UN secretary general would probably do the same. Since this was not the case, their mission appeared to be pointless. The group travelled on to New York but it was clear very soon that they would come away empty-handed. Sukarno then told the mission to return to Jakarta.[26]

The rejection of Indonesian wishes in this unique case was surely the most powerful step the United Nations took during this period. It can be attributed primarily to the fact that the United States wanted nothing to do with Indonesia's wishes either. On most other points the Indonesians had an easy time. Thus the demonstration ban of 1 December had been issued at the urging of Subandrio. In this, Abdoh had appealed on the basis of the need to maintain law and order. Nevertheless, it went counter to the Agreement of New York in which the UN had guaranteed freedom of expression for the population under Indonesian supervision. In practice, its strict observance was not a great priority. According to American sources in Jakarta, soon after his arrival in Hollandia Abdoh had come to the conclusion that it was probably better to give in to Indonesian demands. After all, the Papuans were entirely dependent on them for everything. Moreover, the Indonesians were the only ones who could speak with the Papuans because almost no one in the UNTEA spoke a word of Indonesian or Dutch. As the last Dutch people departed, the UN administration would find

itself in total isolation. In fact, they had no hold over the doings of the Indonesian military and civil officials, nor did they have sufficient political means to enforce their will. Thus it really was absolutely necessary to accommodate Indonesia.

It was a conflict between duty and practice and everything points to the fact that the administrator struggled with it. It is fairly certain that he was critical of any pro-Indonesian noises from the Papuan leaders. That had been revealed in his questions when the requests of 6 December were presented. On 13 December he wrote a special report on the matter, based on his own observations and on advice from his co-workers. It provided a general picture of the relationships within Papuan society, which follows on from what we outlined in chapter ten of this book. In his opinion, the leadership lay with the members of the New Guinea Council, the regional councils, and the civil servants. As he saw it, the parties had no popular support. Under the current circumstances, personal interests played as great a role as Indonesian pressure. In his opinion, these two factors explained the series of pro-Indonesian manifestos, while outside the centres political interest was largely lacking.

In addition to this general picture, Abdoh also provided a more specific overview of the situation in the various residencies. This was based on the administrative reports from the UNTEA commissioners in Biak, Manokwari, Sorong and Merauke, and Fakfak. Almost all of these residencies were known by their administrators to be fiercely anti-Indonesian. In Biak, Commissioner Robert H. Johnson had yet to meet the first soberly thinking Papuan with a sense of responsibility that saw anything positive in the approaching link with Indonesia. The overwhelming majority looked at the coming Indonesian invasion with misgivings. True, in some places, on Japen and in Hollandia specifically, there were groups of young people who were devoting themselves enthusiastically to the Indonesian cause but they, too, wanted nothing to do with any accelerated transfer or cancellation of the plebiscite. In Manokwari, Commissioner A. Cameron noticed a deep-seated frustration among the inhabitants of his region about the fact that the Netherlands had made decisions over their heads. The yearning for a plebiscite was widespread there, but they also feared that when the time came the United Nations would not muster the strength to push it through. The same fear was present in Sorong and Merauke, although any political consciousness was generally underdeveloped, particularly in the southern regions. In Merauke, Commissioner D. Wilson noticed strong pressure from the Indonesian side for them to join rapidly with Indonesia and for cancellation of the plebiscite, but he also believed that, were the UNTEA to give in to this, the population would feel betrayed. An extraordinary note was sounded by C.P. Gebze, the leader of the Marind. In a petition,

he urged his followers to join Australia. The only direct plea for Indonesia came from Fakfak, where the GRIB of Galim Reasa was enjoying its glory days. He requested that New Guinea be connected to its rightful owners, namely the Indonesian government, as of 1 January.

On the basis of this data, Abdoh argued for great restraint with respect to the Indonesian campaign. From a technical viewpoint, a 1 January transfer was impossible but might be feasible some time in February because the entry of Indonesian personnel had happened much faster than planned. With a little good will, all six hundred available openings could by then be filled by Indonesians or Papuans. Nevertheless, he strongly advised against this. It had become clear to him and many other observers that actions for accelerated transfer and cancelled plebiscite were being promoted by dubious means from Jakarta and that among the Protestant upper class on the north coast the enthusiasm for the Indonesians was not particularly great. Giving in would take away the Papuans' confidence in the United Nations. On the other hand, for Abdoh it was questionable whether he would be able to hold this line. If it so desired, Indonesia could trigger great administrative problems. The rapid influx of Indonesian personnel would intensify the risk of incidents whereby they would be forced to keep the situation under control with the help of the UNSF. Then it would remain to be seen whether the small, not very motivated, Pakistani occupation, equipped with old-fashioned English rifles, would even be up to it. One could only guess at the number of Indonesian troops but it was substantial. Furthermore they were strongly motivated and in possession of the most modern American and Russian weapons. They would need to be convinced that it was necessary to exercise a little more patience in order to avoid any accidents. It was the secretary general's task to convince them.[27]

So much for his report to the headquarters in New York. The outside world at large, however, was offered a much more positive picture, in which UNTEA was claimed a great success. Here, Abdoh disposed of the petitions for a rapid transfer with the comment that the Papuans had the right to bring forward such documents. He usually discounted news about the rough treatment the Indonesian military used with the statement that this was common Indonesian practice and therefore nothing to get excited about.[28]

Under one roof with the UNTEA and Indonesia

The Indonesian army commander, Major General Achmad Jani, arrived with a small entourage in Hollandia on 30 December 1962. He came as a guest of Abdoh in order to be present on 31 December for the raising of the Indonesian flag.[29] This was accompanied by a parade of Indonesian troops through the

streets of Hollandia and the dispersal of pamphlets with good wishes for the New Year from President Sukarno. In reality, this was the beginning of the second phase of the UNTEA administration. No one said a word about the fact that, according to the Agreement of New York, this was not to happen until 1 May 1963. The length of the formal second phase was in the hands of the secretary general of the UN and it had been clear from the start that its beginning would also be the end of the UNTEA period. In the Netherlands they took the position that it wouldn't make much difference if the moment in question were to fall a day or two later.[30] This made the official 'phasing in' of Indonesian civil servants and military personnel vitally important. Therefore, as he departed, Jani voiced the expectation that the administrative transfer from the UNTEA to Indonesia would run smoothly. The almost simultaneous landing of hundreds of Indonesian troops in Merauke underscored this as well. Subsequently, the same thing happened in other places, too.

Henceforth Indonesia put its mark ever more clearly on the region. The pressure on the Papuans was increased, whereby the Indonesians went to work just as they saw fit without asking the UNTEA administration for its opinion. The appearance of the red-and-white flag on the government buildings in Hollandia early in the New Year led to new conflicts between Papuans and the Indonesian military who thought that the former didn't display sufficient respect for the flag. Their action was also directed at the last of the Dutch and Papuan flags. As a safety measure, alcohol was prohibited for ten days, the weapons of Papuan police officers were seized, and a decree was broadcast via the radio and the press that anyone who did not show loyalty to Indonesia would be severely punished. A previously announced demonstration on 2 January in favour of the plebiscite was outlawed.[31] At least eighty arrests were made in Hollandia, and those arrested were locked up in the barracks in Ifar.

Around 10 January, the situation returned somewhat to normal but the Papuan flag had vanished from the streets. In his 9 January report to Canberra, Birch, the Australian liaison officer with the UNTEA stated that in the previous days six incidents had taken place in Hollandia and that detainees often were held for days on end and treated very roughly. Two of them were in the hospital as the result of a beating. Similar things had also happened in Merauke and Manokwari. He referred to deliberate intimidation of the Papuans by the Indonesian troops just to show the people who was now in charge. He also spoke of large groups of Papuans from Hollandia who were headed for the Australian section in search of a safe haven.[32] But it wouldn't do them much good. On 23 January the refugees returned to Hollandia. This was the group of the more than forty OSIBA students who had taken to their heels after the brutal conduct of the Indonesian military in December. After they arrived in

the Australian district they were extradited immediately. The government in Canberra had no desire to trouble the budding relationship with the new neighbour right away by functioning as a sanctuary for discontented Papuans. After their return to Hollandia they were first incarcerated for a while and tortured.[33]

Goedhart, the Dutch liaison officer with the UNTEA, who was normally a sober reporter, had also noticed that something was awry. A few days after Birch, he reported to The Hague that the Indonesians were constantly tightening their grip on the population and had set up an elaborate intelligence network. They were therefore thoroughly up-to-date with regard to what the Papuans were feeling, while they also kept close track of the gibes regarding Indonesia on the part of the Dutch still working with the UNTEA. The second in command of the Indonesian liaison mission, Max Maramis, was quite open about this; he kept the Dutch diplomat carefully informed about all that was being said.[34] For the Dutch involved this hardly had any consequences, but the case was different for the Papuans. Opinions vary concerning the degree to which these and similar incidents were handled with violence and torture. Examples of serious mistreatment can be found in the various sources of the time. They are confirmed by those involved who later fled to the Netherlands, as different interviews demonstrate. Another source is an appeal by Jouwe et al. of 4 February 1963 sent to the Red Cross, a copy of which was also sent to the Netherlands government. It listed nine incidents, each of which included serious abuse. For the first two days in January the number mentioned included one dead and a large number of wounded. This was reinforced by an attached affidavit of a local Dutch physician.[36] Another informant was the Dutch judge De Zoete who returned to the Netherlands on 16 March. Immediately after his return he informed Bot that during his stopover at the Biak airport he had been approached by the New Guinea Council member Torey and the head of the subdivision, Arnold Mampioper, the first signatory of the Resolution of the Biak Council of 3 December. As mentioned, he added that in the interim this resolution had been rescinded and replaced by a copy that was agreeable to Indonesia. In it, much was made of the unity of New Guinea with the rest of Indonesia since the days the Indonesia Republic had been proclaimed.

During their encounter with De Zoete, Torey and Mampioper claimed to be speaking on behalf of the sympathizing members of the New Guinea Council and the civil servants of the interior administration. They told him that censorship and repression prevented them from publicly expressing their opinions and that they wanted to take advantage of his visit to impress on the Netherlands once again that the Papuans trusted the Dutch government not to let go of the implementation of the right to self-determination as guaranteed in the Agreement. They also told him about the intimidating conduct of the

Indonesian troops in the early days of January. As far as Hollandia was concerned, De Zoete could expound on this from personal experience. With Bot he actually used the term 'fierce SS terror,' which was especially applicable to the sections of town that were farther away from Hollandia harbour—and thus not readily observable by the UNTEA. De Zoete assumed this was not in step with the wishes of the UN administration but that the top officials were clearly not remotely aware of what was happening both inside and outside of its own machine. The escalating group of Indonesian officials, operating inside or outside of it, handled matters as they saw fit and often in conflict with the agreements made. This could occur unhindered because at that moment the police and the public ministry were already to all intents and purposes in Indonesian hands.[37]

Although, up to a point, a genuine transfer did take place, the first of January 1963 actually passed without Indonesia's demand for the end of the UNTEA administration having been fulfilled. As a result, in the first few months of the New Year, the Indonesians still urged an accelerated transfer and cancellation of the referendum. The latter was a particularly delicate matter because, according to most of the eye witnesses, the hope of the developed section of the Papuans was focused on it. In Jakarta, after a conversation with a delegation of kindred spirits from New Guinea, the chairman of the Indonesian Protestant-Christian party Parkindo, Tambunan, had come to the conclusion that they were unenthusiastic about the prospect of an Indonesian administration and were hoping that some time in the future there might be a separate status for them within Indonesia.[38] De Zoete was more decisive about this. In his report to Bot, he let it be known that there was no doubt about the outcome of a referendum, were this to be held. He had the impression that on the Indonesian side there wasn't anyone who believed for a second that such a referendum would end to the advantage of Indonesia. He added that he had yet to meet a single Indonesian official who was willing to discuss this topic with him. Tangahma was under the same impression. In a report of 16 January, destined for the Netherlands, he stated that ninety per cent of the population hoped to become detached from Indonesia through a plebiscite. Those who expressed themselves differently were only doing so in the hope of acquiring a job or profiting in other ways, or out of fear of being threatened. As such, he mentioned the names of Eliëzer Bonay, Ibrahim Bauw, Lucas Rumkorem, Lucas Jouwe, Herman Wajoi, and Silas Tokoro.[39]

In fact, the actions in favour of accelerated transfer and against the plebiscite had not stopped because of the Dutch rejection of Palar's request. As if to highlight Tanggahma's words, a demonstration took place on that same 16 January

in front of Abdoh's house where the members of the New Guinea Council, now back in Hollandia and under the leadership of Bonay, came to present the 'Petition of Kota Baru' to the secretary general's representative in Hollandia, not having been able to deliver it to him in New York. Similar demonstrations also took place in Merauke.[40] According to Goedhart who observed the demonstration in Hollandia, it was a listless spectacle by a group of hastily assembled Papuans who barely understood what was happening.

This course of events demonstrated Indonesia's efforts to crush whatever stood in its way. In the Indonesian press, led by the news agency Antara, they reacted against the British and Australian functionnaries within the UNTEA administration, whom they accused of lack of respect for the Indonesian flag.[41] Furthermore there were constant tensions between the Pakistani soldiers and the Indonesian army whereby the Indonesians tried to limit the freedom of movement of the UN troops as much as possible.[42] They also mistrusted the Papuans within the police, and not without reason. These had been the most active adversaries of the parachutists during the confrontation period and mutual aversion lingered on. That was why in many places the police had been disarmed during the operations of the early days of January. Because they were a regular part of the UNTEA machine and were needed to maintain order, they couldn't be eliminated permanently. As we have seen, the primary remedy consisted of constantly sending large groups of police personnel to Java for retraining, while in New Guinea itself courses were also taught by Indonesian police functionaries who came over for that specific purpose. At that same time, the Indonesian grip on the police force was reinforced by the arrival of units of the semi-military Police Mobile Brigade, the Brimob.[43]

Another point of concern was the Papuan Volunteer Corps. At the time of the UNTEA's arrival, some thousand members of this Corps had been more or less trained. In New Guinea terms its was not a small unit by any means. These soldiers were equipped with vast local knowledge and could count on the sympathy of the population. On 31 January 1963, a farewell parade took place in their brand new barracks near Manokwari for the Dutch commander Colonel W.A. van Heuven and his staff. According to his own report, he had prepared them as well as possible for the arrival of the Indonesians but the result was clearly deficient. The soldiers were highly emotional in their farewell and wept bitterly. The Dutch were replaced by the Indonesian Major Ramly and fourteen officers.[44] In the weeks following the transfer, conflicts broke out between the soldiers of the PVK and the Indonesian commando troops billeted elsewhere in town. On 18 February, some 70 to 100 armed PVK-ers headed there with the obvious intention of driving the Indonesians out of the country. The whole thing had not been very seriously prepared and the Papuan civil servants

present managed to calm the men down again. The event was sufficient reason for the UNTEA to disarm the Corps and dismiss the ringleaders from the service. One of these was Sergeant Permenas (Ferry) Awom, whom we shall meet again a little later on in this story.[45]

While actions against the plebiscite in New Guinea continued, negotiations were taking place on a higher level concerning the implementation of the transfer. Because 1 May 1963 would also mark the end of the second phase, the influx of Indonesian troops and civil servants would need to have made sufficient progress to take on full responsibility for the region. The UNTEA leadership aspired to have the Indonesians take over both military and civil tasks completely at that point in time. However, this practical side did not yet have Indonesia's official attention. In mid-January, Sudjarwo was still travelling to the United States with the explicit aim of delivering the Declaration of Kota Baru to U Thant personally. Not much value could be attached to the document any longer because the date of 31 December stated therein had long since passed. In reality, he was interested in consulting the people of the United Nations and the State Department regarding the organization of the Indonesians' arrival. Still, he did his best to give that as much 'flexibility' as possible. During his visit to the State Department on the 19 December, he put extra emphasis on the need for an early transfer, whereby he referred specifically to the wish of the Papuans themselves. However, no date was now mentioned and the attention almost naturally shifted to the organization of practical matters. Subsequently, in consultation with U Thant and the Netherlands permanent mission, it was decided that one could safely assume that as of 1 January the period of accelerated 'phasing in' of Indonesian personnel had already begun. It was agreed that the head of the Cabinet of the United Nations Secretary General, Narasimhan, would travel to Jakarta and New Guinea for further deliberations. This decision was made public in a United Nations press release that stated that the Declaration of Kota Baru would thereby be taken into account as much as was feasible. Thus, in the end, the controversial document acquired a certain official status. It was a gesture of good will towards the Indonesians on the part of U Thant, but was not appreciated by the State Department and the Australian mission of the United Nations. Before his departure, the Americans therefore impressed upon Narasimhan not to be taken for a ride by the Indonesians and to stick to the letter and the spirit of the agreements made to the fullest possible extent. They showed particular apprehension that too much flexibility on this point might be disadvantageous later on to a reasonably meaningful execution of the Act of Free Choice.

This anxiety was not unfounded for, when questioned, U Thant recounted that the reference to the Declaration of Kota Baru in the press release had been

included with the approval of the Dutch diplomats in New York and that, based on his consultation with them, he was left with the impression that they had already resigned themselves to the idea that this 'Act of Free Choice' would probably not be terribly effective. That in any case was U Thant's personal opinion, for in a conversation with the Australian representative Plimsoll he let it be known that any number of details concerning the proper timing of the plebiscite were, in fact, not very important since in the end the Indonesians would have it their way anyway. None of this was reassuring to Plimsoll. One should add that the telegram exchange between the Netherlands Embassy in New York and the Ministry in The Hague shows none of this laconic approach on the side of the Dutch diplomats, which did not mean, however, that U Thant's impression would have been totally unfounded. As we have seen, it wasn't the first time that the Dutch diplomats at the United Nations had shown a broader understanding of Indonesian desires than was the case in The Hague.[46]

Narasimhan arrived in Jakarta on 5 February 1963 and moved on to New Guinea three days later to consult with Abdoh. Both in Jakarta and Hollandia he landed almost immediately in a discussion about the arrival of Indonesian troops in Merauke. Indonesian parachutists had clashed with local police there on 17 December. In consultation with the UNTEA they were then transported back to Indonesia and replaced by 360 regular Indonesian troops. On the Indonesian side this had been done through an agreement with Abdoh that the arrival would be organized in such a way that, as of 1 May, there would be an equal number of Indonesian and Pakistani troops present. However, the number of newcomers was far greater than the United Nations people had expected, while similar developments occurred elsewhere as well. If it were to continue in that vein, the ratio would be disturbed in no time at all, whereby the poorly armed and rather unmotivated Pakistani troops would be no match for the fresh Indonesian troops. The latter would be able to drive the Pakistanis out instantly, something that the Indonesian commander Sudarto regularly threatened to do. It wouldn't even take him twenty-four hours. In the Netherlands, Minister Luns had become particularly incensed about this and demanded an explanation from Abdoh. The latter apologized, saying that the Indonesians wouldn't listen to him either and that he couldn't do anything about it. Goedhart, who had to relay the message, was of the opinion that the UNTEA did not want to risk a conflict with Indonesia. General Khan, the commander of the Pakistani troops, offered a different explanation. He thought that the Indonesians would have to hurry if they wanted to have at least fifteen hundred men present by 1 May, as a counterpart to the fifteen hundred men of the Papuan police. In this conversation no mention was made of the fact that it was

quite odd that heavily armed troops should be afraid of lightly armed police officers.[47]

Thus this Dutch intervention had no results. In Jakarta, Narasimhan made an agreement with Sukarno that the end of the UNTEA would coincide with the transfer to Indonesia. This was to take place on 1 May at 12:30 PM. The influx of Indonesian personnel continued and on paper the UNTEA had twelve hundred Indonesian civil servants at their disposal in early March. Another two hundred and fifty men were added from Sudjarwo's liaison offices. The vast majority of the administrative machine was formed by more than seven thousand Papuans.

The UN reports mentioned nothing about the numbers of troops. Thus, we have to assume that it was around fifteen hundred, although there may well have been more. In his report Abdoh states that in the long run it received less and less attention. In early March, the Indonesian Brigadier General Rukman made an inspection tour through the most important towns of New Guinea to 'receive the praise of the people,' as the Australian reporter Birch somewhat sarcastically remarked. Not all the Papuans were comfortable with this, but the journey went smoothly and they were able to come to the conclusion that in most places the Indonesians and Papuans got along well enough. Rukman relayed the message that he would not stand any nonsense from the Papuans, but the UN officials categorically denied there was any question anywhere of cruel acts committed by the Indonesian troops.[48]

The final months of the UNTEA period were focused on the consolidation of the Indonesian position. It was during this time that the last of the Dutch departed as well. Missionary schools were told to switch over to the Indonesian language and about a hundred students registered for the forthcoming *Tjendrawasih University*. The New Guinea Council did not meet any more at this time. The Indonesian Bank took over all banking matters at the end of March. For the time being they kept the Netherlands guilder as means of payment, while they announced that after the transfer this would be replaced with a new West Irian rupia of the same value. In Sorong, Shell changed the name of the NNGPM to the *Sorong Petroleum Company*, although nothing was altered in the matter of ownership. Airline connections were reorganized in consultation with KLM, whereby *Merpati*, a new company, would take over the work of the KLM subsidiary De Kroonduif. Coastal connections, attended to by KPM until then, were taken over by the Indonesian *Pelni*. New names also appeared in the domain of trade. The distribution of goods, until then arranged by the Nigimij of the Dutch commercial house Hagemeyer, was to be assumed by a new Indonesian company, the *Irian Bakhti*.

Among all these changes in the economic area there were a certain number of tasks set aside for the United Nations as well. One of these involved the

framing of a development plan. This could be done on the basis of an agreement, added in a supplement to the New York Agreement, that both the Netherlands and Indonesia would make available a considerable sum of money, estimated at 10 million guilders for each of the two participants, to carry out special development projects in the region. This fund would eventually gain some renown as the *Fundwi*. Further accords would have to be made in this regard between the Netherlands and Indonesia. However, the UN personnel posted in Hollandia went to work immediately and drew up lists of potential projects. Yet, from the very start the implementation could not get off the ground. Not only would it require a considerable financial sacrifice from Indonesia, but such a UN development plan implied that there would also be representatives of that organization working in the region. For the Netherlands this had been one of the appealing aspects of the agreement but, in contrast, utterances by Subandrio made it clear that from his point of view their presence would be a disadvantage.

Nevertheless, during Narasimhan's visit to Jakarta in February this issue was on the agenda and it even seemed that an agreement was reached. An international fund under the United Nations flag was discussed, to which countries other than the Netherlands would also contribute. However, it was not at all clear yet who those other contributors were to be. Long before this, the Dutch had already urged the United States to chip in as well, but they had not yet confirmed any of this. Still, this prospect of 'internationalization' had diminished the Indonesian resistance and the UNTEA was able to proceed with the preparations.

This didn't mean it was a done deal. From the UN side, they imagined a broad system including four civil servants permanently stationed in Indonesia, of whom one would be in West Irian on a rotating basis. They would have to focus primarily on preparing the development plan, wherein the possibility would remain open for them to be involved in its execution as well. The ambitions of the United Nations Secretariat went even further. These same officials could also help with the preparations for the future Act of Free Choice. The New York functionaries worked at this with much more energy than Indonesia wanted to see. Ambassador Jones stated in Jakarta that in the conversation with Narasimhan only a few accountants had been mentioned. He must have received this information from an Indonesian source. Under these circumstances the Netherlands took an anticipatory position. When the UNTEA was suspended, much had been said but little was done.[49]

The economic situation at the end of the UNTEA period was described in a report by H.A. Visser, who was attached to the Netherlands mission as financial and economic advisor. As might be expected, it didn't provide a very positive

picture. Numerous projects had come to a halt due to the departure of Dutch civil servants, experts, and companies, which led to serious unemployment among the population. As a remedy, the UNTEA had completed a number of already started projects, among them the new conference building for the New Guinea Council. The total sum expended for these under the UNTEA came to more than three million Netherlands guilders.[50] Without any doubt, that money did benefit the employment situation but it was insufficient. In addition, because of the lack of new supplies of food stuffs and consumer goods and because of the eagerness to spend among the suddenly well-paid Indonesian officials and military in the UN administration, the store supplies had diminished considerably. Irregular requisitioning meant that the situation had deteriorated further. Some compensation was found in the trade in goods left behind by the Dutch that were sold for peanuts, but the urban Papuans did not benefit from this very much. Even if they were still employed, they were faced with shortages and resulting increases in price. It was during this period that urban Papuans began to return to their region of origin.

Some hope was probably to be drawn from the agreements about the development fund and the Indonesian pledge of good treatment. Nevertheless, the more distant future looked grim. New Guinea had been a project of the prosperous Netherlands, which had plenty of good and expert personnel left from the East Indies estate. One could not expect that Indonesia, in such serious arrears on every level, would be able to make the same means available for a newly acquired region, which in many respects was in a better position than its other provinces. Moreover, there was the problem of personnel. In Visser's judgement, the new Indonesian civil servants generally did not have the expertise of their Dutch colleagues and would need much more time to learn about the problems of the country and its people. It sounded harsh but was undoubtedly true. And there was another thing. Initially, the UN administrators as well as the Dutch had praised the effort and skill of the first Indonesian personnel deployed in the area. As the numbers increased with the continuing influx this began to change. 'The lack of skilled manpower and of organizational abilities and the already obvious lack of commitment of the Indonesian personnel deployed give ample reason to fear the worst for the future.' Thus the sharply attentive Visser.[51] Time would prove that he was right.

All of this leads us to the question concerning the Indonesian reactions to, and experiences with, the new sphere of activity. Influenced as they were by the campaign of many years to bring West Irian back into the lap of Mother Indonesia, the newly arrived civil servants and military were convinced that they were there to liberate their oppressed brethren. In practice, it was a bitter

disappointment. The newcomers were amazed to see ostensibly prosperous towns with well-maintained streets and buildings and well-stocked stores. They also felt uncomfortable when confronted with the educated Papuans there, who clearly were not waiting for them. Thus they began to show a tendency to want to leave again, and quickly. A delegation of the Dutch Bible Society, which visited the area early in 1963, concluded that most of the Indonesian civil servants felt like fish out of water and were counting the days until they could go home again.[52] The Javanese physician Dr. Wasito, who during a six-month stay had seen more of the region than just the big towns, had a different impression. Looking back, he stated that he had been disconcerted by the primitiveness of some of the Papuan peoples. He was inclined to think that they represented an inferior kind of human being and wondered if they would even be amenable to any further civilizing. Whatever one may think of this, his statement showed that at least he was wondering what Indonesia might be able to do for the population. For a growing percentage of the newcomers this was not even a relevant question. Their new environment did not arouse any consideration or compassion in them, only greed.[53]

The question remains what the final assessment of the UNTEA administration and its personnel should be. In Dutch reporting the coverage was on the whole very negative. The general impression was devastating. Eyewitnesses and participants spoke unanimously of a hastily gathered bunch of incompetent adventurers. One may ask whether this is completely justified. There is no doubt that the achievements of the substitutes were poor when compared to the Dutch 'professionals' they replaced, but this picture is undoubtedly coloured by the frustrations that were felt on the side of the Dutch. In any event, they weren't replaced by the best of the UNTEA. Its own reports showed nothing but satisfaction. Cooperation with the Dutch and Indonesians was excellent, the population had warmly welcomed the Pakistani troops, and all in all everything possible had been accomplished. This image, too, was coloured. As we have seen, shortly after his arrival in his new jurisdiction, Abdoh was quite willing to confess in his private correspondence with Rolz Bennett that he was faced with an impossible task, so that from time to time it would be necessary to look the other way and, furthermore, to let the outside world believe the operation was a success. In short, it was the same attitude that the diplomatic telephone conversation between Bunker and Van Roijen betrayed, with which we closed a previous chapter.

The same impression remains after reading the final report that Abdoh presented to the secretary general at the end of his visit.[54] Here we read that the UNTEA mission had succeeded. They had maintained peace in the region and the transfer from the Netherlands to the Indonesian administration had gone

off without too many problems. This goal had been reached primarily because the desire to keep the peace with Indonesia was a priority. However, we need to add that it had led to a neglect of Papuan interests. The question, of course, is whether the United Nations should have taken this lying down. We ought to remember that the organization was not merely the guardian of timeless norms, as recorded in the Charter and in a series of solemn resolutions. It had, and still has, to work within the political situation of the moment. The New York Agreement was not the final product of a conference on the welfare of the Papuans, but the closing phase of a lengthy and embittered conflict between the Netherlands and Indonesia. In it the interests of the Papuans were not the only and, in the final analysis, not the decisive factor. Yet, even with that limitation, its implementation came nowhere near to what had had been recorded in the Agreement. In the first place this is true for the security of person and property. It was not offered. Equally noticeable is the observance of the guarantees of freedom of speech and assembly for the regional inhabitants as mentioned in Article 22. Compliance therewith was also far below par. However, these freedoms were guaranteed by the UNTEA and Indonesia together, which did not make matters any simpler. The Netherlands and Indonesia, both of whom were signatories to the Agreement, had thereby already relieved the United Nations of part of their responsibilities beforehand.

The result of the interim administration of the UNTEA was that both parties had room to catch their breath and make the transfer without too many direct confrontations. This was advantageous not only to the Netherlands but also to Indonesia. The country thus had some time to switch from armed action to administrative matters, on which previously they had hardly focused their attention. However, this switch was only very partially made. Willingness was limited and beneath the surface the spirit of rivalry, the spirit of Trikora, continued to be present. As the Dutch withdrew the Papuans were the sole remaining object for Indonesian mistrust.

Insofar as the UNTEA managed to smooth the way for the transfer, this was to the advantage of the Papuans as well. There was no desire in the Netherlands to become involved in a long-lasting armed conflict and, even had that been the case, it would not have profited them. The alternative, too, of too hasty an evacuation under chaotic circumstances would not have been to their advantage. Thus there was an expression of contentment in Abdoh's final report, while Goedhart, the Dutch liaison officer, submitted a bland but rather positive final report to his chief in The Hague. The sombre news originated with Dutch and Australian officials who had witnessed the course of events in the field. Finally, extraordinarily gloomy noises came from those Papuans who had worked closely with the Netherlands earlier.

With the departure of the Dutch administration their social position had become uncertain and the early experiences with the Indonesian successors gave them good reason not to expect any improvement there in the near future. Besides, the political prospect, so promising until very recently, had become extremely uncertain almost overnight. In fact, the New Guinea Council had been disbanded. Although the body had not been suspended under the UNTEA, it had also not been meeting. This had been a point of attention for Abdoh because according to Article 13 of the New York Agreement it was his responsibility to maintain and consult the existing councils. However, it was to be expected that this would create problems with Indonesia. Fortunately for him, a solution appeared almost by itself. Due to the departure of Jouwe, Kaisiepo, and the Dutch members, there was no longer a quorum, while under the given circumstances nominating or electing new members would lead to insoluble problems. Therefore he considered himself justified to leave it at that. Matters were different for the completely native regional council of Biak-Numfor, the oldest representative body of New Guinea. Officially this council was being maintained by the locally posted Division Commissioner Robert Johnson. This New Zealander was one of the rare UN civil servants who played by the rules of the game. That was why the council had been able to stay together, although we have no details about this. We did see, however, that it had passed a resolution on 3 December in which it had turned against the Indonesian approach. Its outspokenness had been of short duration and due to forceful outside interference the resolution was reversed a month later. As came out later, the members had been pressured for days to come to this decision. When that didn't produce the desired result, it was the Indonesian supervisors themselves who simply wrote a text they liked.

This didn't mean that the regional council gave up on its own ambitions. On 7 June 1963, more than a month after the transfer to Indonesia, a resolution was put in Bot's way that had been signed on behalf of the Biak-Numfor regional council by the chairman Arnold Mampioper and Lisias Rumbiak, member of the Council of Deputies. It requested the Netherlands to continue to commit itself for the coming six years to the realization of the Papuans' right to self-determination. In addition, the council recognized the 'brothers' Marcus, Kaisiepo, Nicolaas Jouwe, Filemon Jufuway, Jos Amapon Marey, and a few others who had left for the Netherlands earlier, as their spokesmen abroad.[55] At the time Jouwe, in particular, was indeed active there with the forming of a national committee of Papuans that wanted to keep the attention focused on the right to self-determination. The initiators were even thinking about declaring independence right away. From their safe position in the Netherlands that was a fine thought but it was unlikely that Mampioper and Rumbiak would take instant

action on Biak. There were others who shared this thought. In a conversation with the diplomat Schürmann, this co-architect of the New York Agreement pointed out to Jouwe that it would be a perilous endeavour, especially since according to his intelligence Indonesia at that very moment already had fifteen thousand men in the region. Jouwe and his associates would be better off limiting their ambitions to autonomy. It was cautious advice that would still turn out to be quite ambitious enough.[56]

Indonesia as temporary administrator

As had been agreed during Rolz-Bennett's visit to Jakarta, the transfer of the administration of New Guinea from the UNTEA to Indonesia took place on 1 May 1963. On Saturday, 4 May 1963, the former government vessel *Oranje* appeared in Hollandia harbour, escorted by the cruiser *Irian*. On board was Sukarno with a group of invited guests, among them the ambassadors of America and Japan. The president addressed an audience of two to three thousand Papuans, many of them school children, and summarized the most recent history that had led to the reunification of West Irian and Indonesia. He then rehearsed his audience in singing the Indonesian national anthem and exclaiming '*Merdeka*.' According to W.A. Vawdrey, the head of the local Australian liaison office, these lessons met with only mediocre success. The public's heart wasn't in it while, with adamant gestures, the 'Brimob' directed those who tried to get away surreptitiously back to their place. The following day the president laid a wreath at the monument for fallen parachutists, which had recently been erected near Sentani.[57]

And so the period of Indonesian interim rule began that, according to the New York Agreement, was intended to familiarize the local population with their new bosses. Their arrival also signified the importation of 'directed democracy.' One of the first acts of the new administration was the establishment of a 'political quarantine.' The transition period was to serve as a period for the adaptation to the Indonesian state and its ideology. To attain this, foreign influences were to be eliminated as much as possible. The political parties and labour unions that existed in the Dutch period were banned and a wide path was cleared for Indonesian education. Allowing foreigners in was restricted as much as possible. Even during the final months of the UNTEA this had already been in preparation. When the American researcher Paul van der Veur spent time in the region, in February-April 1963, Maramis, then the second in command at the Indonesian liaison mission, told him repeatedly that he absolutely had to be gone by 1 May and, if at all possible, a week earlier.[58] Thereafter the region was accessible only to a rare diplomat on a special mission, a UN administrator, or a businessman whose presence was needed to deal

with any outstanding interests. Only very exceptionally did an occasional journalist manage to acquire a visa for the area. In the beginning, Shell kept a few Dutch technicians on but rather quickly it began to work with Filipino staff members as much as it could.

Thereafter the most important group of foreigners was formed by the hundreds of missionaries in the Central Highlands and in the south. The former were mainly Americans and Australians, the latter were Dutch. For the most part their Protestant compatriots who were still employed by the Evangelical Christian Church and the mission connected with it in the north had departed during the UNTEA period, leaving the business in the hands of the leaders of the Evangelical Christian Church of New Guinea that, ever since 1956, had been operating independently. The insertion within the context of the Indonesian Council of Churches was arranged at a synod held in Hollandia in September 1962. It had existed thereafter as the *Geredja Kristen Irian Barat* or GKI-IB, with the Reverend Rumainum as the synod's president.

The altered situation necessitated a new administrative system. A new province of West Irian or *Irian Barat* was formed, whose insertion into the Indonesian state and internal organization were laid down in the presidential decisions nos. 1, 2, and 57 of the year 1963. Its essence was that for the time being the province would be ruled differently from the rest of Indonesia. Because it was to be expected that international attention would continue to be focused on the region for years to come, the Indonesian Department of Foreign Affairs remained closely involved with developments. In Jakarta the former West Irian Bureau, now under the name of West Irian Secretariat (*Sekretariat Urusan Irian Barat* or Sekkib) was still charged with the co-ordination of all matters that concerned the region. The secretariat began to develop into a large organization of several hundred civil servants who were responsible, among other things, for attracting personnel and purchasing acquisitions for the new province. The everyday leadership was initially entrusted to Sudjarwo Tjondronegoro. A representative of the Sekkib, who also functioned as vice-governor, had been posted in Hollandia, of which the name was changed to *Sukarnopura* after the president's visit.

Initially this was Maramis, who until then had been the second in command of the Indonesian delegation with the UNTEA. He was succeeded in October 1963 by a lieutenant-colonel of the military police named Muljono. These vice-governors had a powerful position. Formally, they were subordinate to a governor for which post from the very beginning a Papuan had always been named. We can see this as a fulfilment of Sukarno's pledge that Indonesia was serious about the autonomy promised. The first governor was the New Guinea Council member Eliëzer Bonay, whom we already know. However, his position was

primarily a ceremonial one and the Indonesian civil servants, who now occupied all the important posts, stayed in direct contact with the WIB representative as vice-governor. In addition, the troop commander had a finger thrust deep in the pie, consistent with the theory of the co-administrative task of the military developed by Nasution.[59] Within the military division of Indonesia, West Irian was known as Komando Daerah Militeir (KODAM) XVII. We have already met its first leader in the figure of the brigadier-general Rukman, who was succeeded later that year by Colonel R. Kartidjo. The military influence showed clearly in the composition of the central administrative council, known as the *Pantja Tunggal*, freely translated as the Five Brothers. Besides the governor and the Sekkib representative, the commanders of the three armed forces' divisions were seated there. The governor held the chairmanship but in practice he didn't have much to say in this body either.

Below this top echelon, the administrative system of the Netherlands period was more or less maintained. The heads of the departments were now almost always Indonesian. As for the regional division, the already existing six residencies were maintained, although in 1965 they were converted into administrative regencies, known by the Javanese term *kabupaten*. Thereafter another three new regencies were formed, namely Paniai, Sorong, and in 1969, Japen-Waropen. Thus the number of regencies was increased to nine. After the 1963 departure of the UNTEA 'Divisional Commissioners', Indonesian administrators took their place. The entire region of West Irian was divided into 35 subdivisions and 144 districts. These subdivisions and districts had all been run by Papuan civil servants when the UNTEA arrived, most of whom had been trained at the OSIBA. Soon after the entry of the Indonesians, the Papuan subdivision heads (*Hoofd Plaatselijk Bestuur* or HPB, now known as *Kepala Pemerintah Setempat* or KPS) were sent to take courses on Java or elsewhere. Upon their return they discovered that Indonesian officials had taken their place.

The objectives of the Parna, the DVP, and the rest of the parties that were formed during the Dutch era, were not thought to be in line with the ideology of the unitary state of Indonesia. Thus, in the framework of the quarantine, they were suspended. Initially, no new parties were to be formed either and the restrictions concerning the right to assemble and meet that existed in Indonesia now were applied to West Irian as well. So, a situation was created in West Irian that was, in fact, not very different from that in the rest of Indonesia. Under 'directed democracy', most of the political parties that had formed there in the course of time had by now very little or no voice at all. The Masjumi and the PSI were forbidden and the rest of the parties were severely limited in what they could express. The primary exceptions to this were the PKI and the PNI that

could assert themselves through channels other than the parliamentary ones. In spite of these restrictions to political life, the guided democracy in Indonesia did have representative councils, although their members were exclusively appointed and dealt only with advisory issues. As of circa 1955, the parliament in Jakarta had always had a few Papuan members, among them the previously mentioned Silas Papare.

Once the Indonesian administration arrived in West Irian, the New Guinea Council was discontinued and was replaced by a Dewan Perwakilan Rakjat Daerah-Gotong Rojong (DPRD-GR), newly formed in 1964, which had appointed members only. In principle, the council was composed in such a way that the various 'functional groups' in society were represented. Thus, besides civil servants and representatives of the people, the military were also seated in these councils. Originally, four members of the New Guinea Council, too, held seats here.[60] On a lower level, during the next few years nothing was heard from the regional councils anymore. That remained so until the acting President Suharto signed a decree in 1967 that would lead to the forming of new regency councils, also done by appointment. Overall, one can say that the Indonesians took over from the Dutch on every level, and that only a limited number of Papuans continued serving in the bodies that had existed before, but were now reorganized. New Guinea was added to an already existing state. Therefore the transition did not bring with it any fundamental change in the position of the native administrators, as had been the case with the 1950 transfer in Indonesia. The local elite were placed in a subordinate position with regard to the new masters. That wasn't necessarily the end of the matter and much would depend on the room the Papuans would have to be heard and to improve their own position. In the first year of the new administration, the DPRD met four times and, according to the reports, discussed serious questions as well, particularly economic ones.

Furthermore, there were the informal cooperative links, such as the National Congress and the National Front that had been formed during the year 1962 on the initiative of the Papuans themselves, with the primary objective of providing the newly created political parties with some say in the course of events. As we have seen, they had acquired a certain political importance, especially during the final months of the Netherlands' rule. In the UNTEA period, the Indonesians had availed themselves gratefully of this by swaying their leaders to utter kind words on their behalf, whether pressured to do so or not. Front and Congress had been used interchangeably in this, as had also been the case with the New Guinea Council. The final meeting of that body took place in December 1962, the only item on the agenda being that year's adjournment of the session.[61] In fact, for the UNTEA and the Indonesian administrators, these

concepts were synonyms for the elite that had come forward during the Netherlands period, which always consisted of the same core of people no matter what the grouping.[62]

The Declaration of Kota Baru created the beginning of a new bond. In Indonesian historiography it is dated 1 December 1963 and depicted as the moment at which all political organizations and parties had been converted to republican ideals. This line of thought became the basis for continued work. On 6 May 1964, the 'movement' was reorganized with the establishment of a department for West Irian of the National Front that was active all across Indonesia under the leadership of Sudibijo, which we can best describe as the propaganda body of the 'guided democracy'. The executive committee in Sukarnopura included Eliëzer Bonay, Herman Wajoi, Ibrahim Bauw, Marthen Indey, and Nathaniel Ohey. The sole Indonesian in the group was the vice-governor Colonel Kartidjo. In the words of Foreign Minister Subandrio and the Minister of Information, Roeslan Abdulgani, this was the moment when the mental integration of the West Irians with the leadership and the ideas of the Indonesian government had been attained. In crowning recognition thereof, Governor Bonay read the loyalty oath to the great leader of the Indonesian Revolution at a 'Great Conference of the West Irian People.'[63]

A year later a new step toward the adaptation process was taken. On 22 April 1965, Sukarno announced the repeal of the political quarantine. As he stated on that occasion, this was done at the request of the nine political parties that were formally active in Indonesia, the Sekkib, and the National Front. An obvious restriction was immediately attached to this in the form of a prohibition, decreed on 25 May by the administration of West Irian, to disseminate the idea of independence.[64] In July the delegations of the large parties visited West Irian to organize the departments of their organizations. After the necessary contacts had been made, the final phase took shape through a meeting of the National Front in Sukarnopura, from 3 to 7 August 1965, chaired by Herman Wajoi. When it ended, the forming of eight political parties was made public, as well as the names of the already confirmed leaders. Respectively, these were the Partai Katolik Republik Indonesia (Willem Songgonau), the Partai Komunis Indonesia (Jean Torei), the Partai Kristen Indonesia (Agus J. Korwa and Ds. M. Koibur), the Partai Indonesia (Nathaniel Ohee, Agus Nenepat, and Moses Rumainum), the Partai Serikat Islam Indonesia (Abdullah Achmad Ehei), the Nahdatul Ulama (B. Rahmad), and the Partai Nasionalis Indonesia (F.M. Kirihio, H. Wajoi). Of the thirty-three party leaders that were mentioned by name at least fourteen were Papuans. The chairmen were generally Papuan as well. The only exceptions to this were the leaders of the two Islamic parties.[65] In the years to come, little would

be noticed of the actions of these parties. These organizations drew their programme from their genesis in the Indonesian context and missed being connected to the political aspirations of most of the Papuans. Thus actual political life, insofar as it was present, remained underground.

An added measure of the quarantine had included the restriction of civilian freedom of movement. The Papuans soon needed the permission of local police to pay visits outside of their own district. The repeal of the political quarantine, as announced by Sukarno, did not relax this at all. After the departure of the Dutch administration, the police had already been reorganized under the UNTEA. Now it became the Indonesian National Police. Its core consisted of former Papua policemen, now placed under Indonesian officers.[66] In the performance of their tasks they were assisted by the paramilitary Police Mobile Brigade (Mobrig). It was an aggressive section that tended to perform its duties with an iron hand. It thereby compensated for the regular police within which anti-Indonesian noises continued to be heard. In addition, within the framework of the '*dwifungsi*' the regular units of the army also kept a close watch on enforcing public order.[67]

The Indonesian programme contained not only restrictive but stimulating elements as well. We have already seen how, from the UNTEA period on, members of the New Guinea Council and other politically important figures had been given a task in the anti-plebiscite action via visits to Java. Groups of police personnel and civil servants had been sent to Java at that same time. Initially this was intended to reinforce Indonesian control over West Irian. They would be out of the picture for a bit while the new rulers could place them wherever they saw fit afterwards. For the heads of the subdivisions (KPS) this was invariably a demotion. Furthermore, the element of training played a role, too: civil servants and officers had to become acquainted with the practices and administrative views of the Indonesian state. In the subsequent years, there were invariably several hundred Papuans studying on Java. Refresher courses for civil servants played a central role therein. As of 1964, these were offered chiefly at the Training School for Interior Administration, the Akademi Pemerintahan Dalam Negri (APDN) in Malang. In part, the classes there were run by American instructors who were sent to Indonesia through the Youth Volunteer Programme. Generally speaking, these were not Indonesia experts but young people who were knowledgeable about the basic principles of the American state.[68]

As could be expected, the Indonesian administration was very much interested in education. As early as the UNTEA period, Subandrio had already announced grand plans for its development. This had always been accompanied by scornful comments about what the Dutch had accomplished in 350 years. The entire population should now become literate as quickly as possible

while the level at the top should also be raised. The latter was done thanks to the establishment of the Tjendrawasih University. It was formed in 1963 by combining the existing administrative training school with the teachers' college. The university thus acquired a legal, a pedagogical, and an agricultural department. Volunteers were sent out to replace the Dutch personnel and most of these were recruited from among the younger co-workers of the Universitas Indonesia. The programme had three full-time professors and a staff of several dozen instructors. The first vice-chancellor was Prof. Ismaël Suni.

For general education the Indonesian system was imported. Until then the three-year elementary course had always been the all-inclusive course of instruction for the great majority of children within New Guinea's governed region. It was now to be changed into a six-year educational programme, to which a system of lower- and higher secondary education would be added. To put this into place, several hundred Indonesian teachers were sent out to the new region as early as 1962. Obviously, they served in the first place as substitutes for the almost equal number of Dutch teachers at the adult education, primary secondary schools, and the MULO's, who had departed for colder climes when the UNTEA arrived.

These were the declared intentions. Bringing it to fruition was a great deal more difficult. In practice, education for eighty per cent of the population remained in the hands of the GKI-IB, and of the missions, as always. The funds, too, continued to be handled in the old way. In the early years the Indonesian government contributed considerable amounts, whereby the basic services could be maintained. However, the planned expansion toward the ideal system certainly did not become a reality in subsequent years. The figures of the Department of Education do show a continuous rise, whereby the number of students in the elementary school division increased from 59,000 to 81,000 between 1963 and 1967, and in further education the number rose from 3,200 to 7,000.[69] The question remains, however, to what extent reality kept pace with these statistics. As early as August 1964, an American delegation that was given the opportunity to spend a few weeks in the country came to the conclusion that, although the administration constantly broadcast news about newly opened schools, in the field these could not be found.[70]

The government also attached great value to the national training of the Papuans. In accordance with what was customary in the rest of Indonesia, the subject of physical exercise was put on a pedestal in every form of education. In the upper years this was supplemented by basic military training. Boys were drilled and given the first elements of military discipline. Sometimes it was coupled with the anti-Malaysian campaign that immediately became the core of Sukarno's rule as soon as the conflict over New Guinea had been resolved. In

addition, the curriculum always contained knowledge of the Indonesian government teachings. These courses taught the five points of the Panca Sila and Sukarno's philosophies on neo-colonialism and imperialism (Nekolim), which ruled the spiritual life of the Indonesian state in Sukarno's latter years and long thereafter. Furthermore, the curriculum contained the systematic deletion of any memory of the Netherlands' era in place- and street names and in textbooks. Obviously, the radio was used in teaching, too, to which the stations on Biak continued to contribute, as did those on Macassar and Ambon, which during the period of confrontation had broadcast Indonesian propaganda to New Guinea.

To all of the above we should add that, in the first year of Indonesian rule and on Sukarno's initiative, special literacy courses were organized instantly. It is said that within a year illiteracy was thereby abolished. Sukarno himself provided the directions. A blackboard was to be placed in every village on which each day three words from the presidential jargon were to be written. The next day the villagers had to gather in front of that board and would be tested to see whether they had memorized the words in question. That way they would kill two birds with one stone.[71]

The transition from the UNTEA to the Indonesian administration went hand in hand with considerable personnel shifts. At the time of the transition there probably were no more than a few thousand Indonesian troops in New Guinea. In subsequent years new reserves were sent. According to Australian intelligence reports, 5,000 troops were added in 1964 and the total number in 1965 was 10,000 men. Among these were 1,500 Papuans.[72] That was roughly the same number as the number of troops the Netherlands had kept in New Guinea for a few months in 1962 to defend the area against a threatening Indonesian attack. Now they were apparently deemed necessary to keep order, although we should take into account that the operation against the Malaysian Federation was an additional motive to station a good number of troops in West Irian. After all, the neighbouring Territory of Papua and New Guinea was in the hands of Australia, a notable member of the British Commonwealth.

Besides, the number of Indonesian civil servants was growing considerably as well. Officially there were 1,500 people on the payroll during the last few months of the UNTEA. A year and a half later, the figure mentioned was 16,000. We have already seen that by the end of the UNTEA period and with the increase in Indonesian personnel, foreign observers were noticing a downward trend in quality. This tendency persisted after the UNTEA departed. Once their appointed term expired, the first crop of civil servants returned to their former posts and with them the best segment of personnel disappeared. Similar shifts also took place within the lower echelons. The early groups of volunteers were

imbued with a great deal of idealism, with great willingness to commit themselves to the liberation of their compatriots whom they had been taught to see as still suffering beneath the Dutch yoke. Because reality turned out to be quite different, many of them soon felt rather uncomfortable in the position they now occupied. They, too, disappeared after a relatively short while. They were succeeded by much larger groups of foreign personnel than the country had ever known and, once those arrived, the difficult living conditions and the lack of acceptance made their mark.[73]

In the pre-war years, New Guinea had been a hard and unpleasant region for Dutch civil servants and being posted there was often viewed as a punishment. Anyone there tried to get away again as quickly as possible. The same phenomenon was surfacing now among the Indonesian administration and two-year terms of office were the rule rather than the exception. Obviously, it is not possible to generalize in this respect. The Indonesian administration always had people who accomplished their work with a great deal of dedication. However, under the circumstances this could not be said for the majority of them.

Besides the entry of civil servants and military personnel, a modest flow of private individuals arrived as well, of whom the merchants from Celebes and the Molucca Islands should be mentioned in particular. At first their numbers remained small, however. With the prospect of the transfer, the Papuans had been somewhat apprehensive that their country would be instantly flooded with Javanese who would then displace them. True, immigration was one of the items on the agenda of the Indonesian government right from the start. As early as 1963, Subandrio viewed the transfer of Javanese to the region as a fine way to produce the integration of West Irian with the rest of Indonesia. However, the first larger-scale migration programmes did not begin until 1965.[74] In that respect, during the early years of Indonesian rule Papuan society was not yet under pressure.

Nevertheless, the sizeable influx of civil servants and military personnel caused there to be less room for Papuans within the government apparatus, while the children of the newcomers occupied the few places in higher education. An instructor working at Tjendrawasih University in the early years noticed that originally her classes were filled with Papuan students but that a few years later their number shrank significantly compared to that of the children of foreign civil servants posted there.[75] This observation has been confirmed elsewhere. The number of registrants came to about 100 in the first year and the vast majority of these were Papuans. Less than a year later, in August 1964, the above-mentioned American diplomatic mission concluded that only twenty-seven of the 160 students were Papuans. Foreign visitors who came to West Irian in 1965 and later years often complained about the abominable

quality of the education there. It was a bad omen when the then army commander, brigadier-general Sarwo Edhie, also had himself appointed as the university's vice-chancellor in the year of the plebiscite.

And then there was the question of money and goods. Under the new administration a separate monetary unit was introduced in West Irian at first. It was a West Irian rupia, initially of the same value as the Netherlands guilder. This continued to be more or less the case until September 1965. Thereafter the rate of exchange began to rise very rapidly.[76] This equalization was intended as a stabilizing measure for the transition period. In the Dutch era, the New Guinea economy had been characterized by large imports of essentials and luxury goods and a related elevated price- and salary level. In compensation, the salaries of the newly posted UNTEA civil servants had been adjusted to this. Now the Indonesian administration kept a comparable system going. As had been the case for European personnel in the Netherlands East Indies, the salaries were composed of the Indonesian base salary supplemented by a substantial local allowance. For those concerned, this was attractive but the system could only work if the central administration injected solid financial subsidies. During the early years this was indeed the case and at the end of 1964 the price level of the most important foodstuffs was still more or less equal to that of the preceding period.

For the Papuans the regulation turned out to be less favourable. They viewed the unequal pay as serious discrimination that emphasized the colonial aspect of the situation. There was more to it. The rapidly growing group of relatively well-paid Indonesians seized most of the luxury goods available. They bought up the existing supplies and, when possible, exported them again for resale. This flow of goods did not just follow a regular path, although a continuing development can be noticed here. As early as the first few months of the new administration, shiploads of goods found in New Guinea were exported, consisting of the furnishings of administrative buildings and those abandoned by Dutch private citizens. This included the equipment of modern hospitals and clinics that had been established in the larger towns of New Guinea. At a subsequent stage, people made grateful use of the goods purchased by the Sekkib in Jakarta, paid for with the money that the central government had set aside for the development of New Guinea. Especially during the first few years of the Indonesian administration these were quite generous. In 1964, the sums reserved came to about 33 million USD, that is to say, just 10 million dollars less than the annual contribution during the Netherlands era. What is not known, however, is to what extent these sums were actually made available. The purchase and transportation of goods destined for West Irian were arranged by the West Irian Sekretariat in Jakarta, whereby government-run import businesses

were also involved. Subsequently, distribution was to some extent arranged in West Irian as well, where the PT Irian Bhakti played a central role.

As opposed to the Dutch era, when foreign ships were able to call at every large and small harbour and deliver their goods there, all import was now focused on Sukarnopura and Biak. Not only did this create huge problems with regard to supplying the outposts, but it also opened up enormous possibilities for manipulation by those in power in the country's two major cities. Whoever had the power could exploit the flow of goods to his own benefit. Thus the concerted efforts of civil servants, the military and the merchants grew into an interesting 'trade.' In the long run, some of the entering ships were not even unloaded anymore but immediately sent on to Jakarta or elsewhere, where the cargo could be sold off with greater profit. Those goods that were unloaded were stored in government warehouses and used primarily for distribution among the civil servants. Therefore, only a small part of the import ended up in the stores where there would be an instant run on them. Then the prices mounted rapidly so that those who had little money were no longer able to buy what they needed. An official of the Department of Public Health in Australian New Guinea, Dr. Scragg, who together with his chief visited Biak and Sukarnopura in July 1966, noted that this was the state of affairs with the transaction of the five ships that had called in at the harbours of Biak and Jayapura during the past month. Moreover, the large and constantly changing exchange differences between the Indonesian and the West Irian rupia continued to offer interesting possibilities for augmenting profits. It meant that large quantities of goods were withheld from the inhabitants of West Irian while their profits disappeared into the pockets of corrupt intermediaries.[77]

All of this led to considerable impoverishment of the urban population. The problems of the groups directly connected with the government were few because they could rest assured they would receive their share of the imported goods. For the less fortunate among them, the consequences could be controlled to some extent by sizeable imports of rice that reached relatively distant areas via the existing cooperatives. Other commodities, clothing in particular, were scarce and expensive. During Dr. Scragg's visit the situation was such that the better-paid, higher-placed Indonesian civil servants and professional workforces, such as doctors, led a reasonable existence and were actually able to put some money away each month. The Papuan middle and lower civil servants, too, were not hungry thanks to the rice imports, but for the rest it was a meagre and tedious existence. For large groups of day labourers the situation was downright awful. Under the new administration, access to work and pay for Papuans was ever-decreasing and poverty increased. Many of them went back to their places of origin, but because of the absence of consumer goods there

was no incentive for the inhabitants of the areas around the larger towns to fish or to grow vegetables to be sold in town. It should be added that this had never been their custom either. After all, during the Netherlands era this function had been mostly practised by Indo-European settlers who had all departed in the interim.

After a few years, the consequences began to be visible in the neglect of buildings and roads, while a serious housing shortage was created by the great influx of personnel. Houses, once intended for a single Dutch family, were emptied of their former inventory and now inhabited by large groups of Indonesian civil servants. Still, occasionally the story was different. Thus Dr. Scragg and company found the Public Hospital of Biak, completed during the UNTEA period, to be in excellent condition, while the government buildings there were also still well equipped with furniture and typewriters. It is conceivable that the official civil servants posted there may have managed to prevent the removal of the medical equipment to other places. However, the Papuan civil servant Arnold Mampioper has a different explanation. According to him, the medical furnishings of the hospital had already been stored in warehouses before Dr. Scragg's arrival in preparation for export to Java. For the occasion of his visit, however, the stuff was temporarily put back in its old place.[78]

Very little of all this penetrated into the outside world. With the arrival of the Indonesian authorities, the door had been shut to foreign visitors and information was entrusted to the press agency Antara that generally spoke in positive tones. Official guests, always carefully accompanied, did the same. Such was certainly the case for Herbert Feith, the young Australian historian, who visited West Irian a year after the transfer. According to the Antara report, he seemed to be extremely impressed by the devotion of the Indonesian civil servants and teachers. They had the finest intentions but had insufficient means to do what they deemed necessary. It should be added, however, that at the Australian Embassy in Jakarta there were doubts about the veracity of this report.[79] His colleague Jaspan published a rather extensive report in *The Australian Quarterly* a year later, which was written entirely in a spirit that his Indonesian hosts would appreciate. He went into great detail about the administration's various intentions to develop the country.[80]

The American publisher Robert Crawford painted a considerably more nuanced picture after he visited West Irian in February 1965 for a conference of the Geredja Kristen Indjili, the GKI. He was there as a member of a delegation of the Indonesian Council of Churches, the DGI, so that his presence escaped from the control of the bureaucrats. He, too, outlined a rather favourable image

of the Indonesian government in his report. He, too, emphasized the Indonesian efforts in the realm of education and criticized the Papuans for not appreciating them enough. In addition, he noted the irritation they felt at the entry of Islamic religious teachers and the construction of mosques in areas that were well-nigh a hundred percent Protestant. He mentioned the discontent concerning the ban on their own women's and youth organizations. Finally, he did not fail to announce that every Papuan was looking forward to the plebiscite of 1969, of which ninety-nine per cent expected independence to be the outcome. He very appropriately placed this expectation in the framework of a new messianic vision. After the conference ended, he presented his report to the leader of his delegation. That was former Minister Leimena, who advised him emphatically not to circulate the piece because it was too explosive. He added that, although it did present a good and honest picture of the situation, it would not be acceptable to his compatriots. They would consider it subversive and anyone having anything to do with it would risk being incarcerated.[81]

In addition to these early, relatively positive, reports, one can find a series of foreign reports in the archives that offer a far darker picture. They follow the line of the March 1963 report by De Zoete, mentioned earlier in this chapter. Among them we can include the report by the previously mentioned American diplomatic delegation that visited the region in mid-1964. It strongly emphasized the themes of economic disarray and Indonesian arrogance. The final impression was that initially public opinion among the developed segment of the Papuans had been expectant, but after fifteen months had made a complete turnabout and crossed the line to a fierce anti-Indonesian mood, whereby full attention was focused on the possibility of self-determination when the time was ripe.[82] We hear the same from other sources. One of these was the American researcher Reiter who spent time in West Irian during the first six months after the transfer.[83] Another name to be mentioned is the Dutch businessman Gerritzen, who had a good deal to say on 30 September 1964 after visiting the region. He based his report on direct contacts with Governor Bonay.[84] Added to this there was information from Papuans of all kinds, usually in the form of a letter secretly handed to a missionary, an occasional diplomat, or an oil employee.

The problems listed therein were legion and all of them could be traced back to the circumstances outlined above. They referred to lack of supplies, unemployment, food shortages, and the shoving aside of Papuans by the incoming flow of Indonesian civil servants and military. Then there were complaints about an education system in which military training came first, about the Dutch curriculum being destroyed without being replaced by anything else, about incompetent teachers, and the cultural domination where everything

that came from Java had priority and local artistic expressions were pushed out of the way. Furthermore, there was unrest about the future of religion. With all of this came the constant noises about the arrogant conduct of the Indonesians, the vanishing of the freedom of expression, and the fading of legal certainty.

Even more serious were the stories about the conduct of the army and the police, wherein the Brimob often played a major role. This referred to the disappearance and killing of those Papuans who did not indulge Indonesian wishes. News items about this were prominent in the reports by Kaisiepo and Jouwe to various foreign presidents and heads of state,[85] and are often confirmed in the reports of the Local Intelligence Committee of the administration of Australian New Guinea that provided monthly critical analyses of the situation in the neighbouring area. The commission could do this on the basis of declarations made by defectors from the Indonesian part of the island to the Australian sector.

Obviously, these were not the most charitable observers, but their reports were not alone in their criticism. The sharp anti-Indonesian tone exists in all the reports from Papuan leaders that we know.[86] A good example of this can be found in the attitude of the now familiar Biak teacher Baldus Mofu. In 1949 his then director Kijne described him as a thoughtful Papuan capable of good judgement, whose opinion was representative of a large part of the 'most level-headed gurus and civil servants.' His position concerning a potential transfer of the region to Indonesia had been quite positive at the time, whereby he had started from the idea that from an historic perspective a link between New Guinea and Indonesia was simply inevitable.[87] Afterwards, his opinion af Indonesia had changed for the worse. We met him in 1962 as a prominent member of the New Guinea Council, in which capacity he had shown himself to be a fierce opponent of transfer to Indonesia. After two years of experience with the new administration, he was still of the same opinion. When Rolz-Bennett, the UN administrator, came to Biak on 26 May 1964 the town had been well prepared for his visit. The police barracks were occupied by military troops and the army had temporarily taken over the enforcement of order. The store windows that the notable guest would pass were well-stocked and Papuans were lining the road with banners bearing inscriptions such as 'We prefer Indonesian food to ties and beer.' Not all Papuans felt this way and they wanted to use the occasion to share their own truth with the UN representative. After all, Rolz-Bennett's visit was a first run-up to the long-awaited plebiscite. However, they were not given the chance to speak with him or even shake his hand, nor to do so during a reception where Papuans were present as well. The Reverend Alex Prawar did read a speech that had been given to him in which he

sang Indonesia's praises. When he finished, the Indonesians present applauded loudly, but the Papuans' conduct clearly reflected that they did not agree.

For Rolz-Bennett the signs were sufficiently apparent, for he refused to give a speech and confined himself to a few brief words of thanks. On the other hand, he did nothing to raise the spirits of the Papuans who were present. Since any other attempts to approach the guest were thwarted by the military, Mofu and a number of sympathizers decided to make their opinion clear to the United Nations secretary general in another way. This took the shape of a report on what had occurred during the visit, accompanied by a summary of Indonesian wrongdoings during the recent years. Among many other things, mention was made of the persecution that had been initiated against former members of the regional council, during which Permenas Joku had been killed. Furthermore, they pointed to the mismanagement, corruption and thievery of the civil servants, and to all kinds of repression, including systematic torture. The report also indicated that the Biak people had long acted to save the Papuan flag and this had resulted, just before Rolz-Bennett arrived, in a fateful burning of all Papuan flags that could be found, which came from the administration. Striking were the complaints about the hospital and its doctors, for which Scragg had so much praise after his visit. Here the tone was set by a lament about medical experiments done by incompetent physicians, whereby pregnant women had lost their babies and often their own lives. In addition, they pointed to the total absence of medications and bandages. That same evening, Mofu made another attempt to present the document to Rolz-Bennett in his hotel room, but security guards obstructed him in this. Finally, the report reached the outside world via a refugee to the Australian sector and undoubtedly reached New York from there as well.[88]

A different Papuan protest originated with the Student Association of Tjendrawasih University. Here the law students complained about the fact that they had no freedom of speech or action; they were constantly forced to make statements that were contrary to their own views. That is why on 12 December 1964 they made a declaration they called an 'expression of firm will' in which they expressed themselves to be for the state, the flag, and the nation of West Papua, adding that they wished to be delivered from 'the murderous, repressive, and corrupt rule' of Indonesia. A few months later, on 17 February 1965, a plea in favour of the plebiscite followed, which came from a group that called itself the representatives of the underground political parties in *Hollandia* (author's italics). In the same document they also described themselves as the underground organization in Hollandia of the West Papua 'Freedom Committee' of Nicolaas Jouwe. Among the signatories were individuals who had played a role in the earlier political life of Netherlands New Guinea,

such as Esau Itaar, Adolf Hanasbey, and Nicolaas P. Nere.[89] Moreover, there were also regular messages from Nicolaas Tanggahma, the former member of the New Guinea Council, usually referred to as the actual leader of that committee.

Generally, these reports were directed to the secretary general of the United Nations and in most cases reached the outside world via Vanimo, a place situated in the Australian sector just across the border of West Irian. All these documents expressed profound dissatisfaction. In addition, there is every reason to assume that the evaluations of well-nigh general discontent made by the various foreign visitors were justified. After all, the Papuans who from the beginning had clearly put their money on the new administration had had enough a few years later. Thus, Governor Eliëzer Bonay had felt obliged to step down as early as November 1964. It is not wholly clear whether he did so of his own accord or was forced to do so by the Indonesians. The news reports about the actual cause are unanimous, albeit they vary in tone. From the Indonesian side they complained that he wanted to be too much involved in the affairs and demanded true co-management. Conversely, it was said that Bonay was growing frustrated about the direction the Indonesian administration was taking and the impossible position he occupied within it. He was succeeded by Frans Kaisiepo, a nephew of Marcus and the man who previously had represented New Guinea at the Malino Conference.[90] In him Indonesia had a more docile governor who did, indeed, manage to stay on after the Act of Free Choice. To the outside he came across as a willing puppet. From intelligence obtained from back channels it came to be known that he, too, was fed up after some time and was looking forward to the end of Indonesian rule. The same thing holds true for Herman Wajoi. Another clear sign was that, year after year, the ten Papuan students who were studying in Port Moresby in 1962 kept postponing their return to West Irian because they couldn't see any future awaiting them in their former homeland.

Usually such discontent was borne in silence. Small incidents would occur here and there but for the time being there was no larger-scale insurgent action. The level of organization was not sufficiently high for this and the options for control by the Indonesian machine were too numerous. A certain evolution in this area can be observed. The Americans who visited West Irian in 1964 concluded, somewhat to their surprise, that the Papuans on the coast spoke to them freely about their discontent. Subsequent visitors were struck mostly by how timid the people were and how constantly they were watched by Indonesian functionaries. Apparently, control was tightened after that year, which may have been caused in part by the increase in the number of officials and military that followed.

We should add also that the willingness to move on to further action was apparently not very great. In their declaration from Vanimo, Nere and his friends stated that they wanted to prevent violence and were hoping for a peaceful way by which to obtain their wishes. After all, that is what the New York Agreement guaranteed. All the same, in a few places the beginning of some organized resistance became noticeable. This was especially the case in the region of Manokwari. It is where the Papuan Volunteer Corps (PVK) had been trained during the final year of the Netherlands administration and where the sphere of influence of the Mandatjans was to be found as well, who had made it clear from the start that they wanted nothing to do with the Indonesians. We saw earlier how in February 1963, that is to say still under the UNTEA administration, the soldiers of the corps had rioted. They had then been disarmed by the Pakistani UNFS troops. Thereafter the Indonesian army resolved the affair by sending the PVK to Java for continued training at the Siliwangi Division. After their return, in the course of 1964, they were dispersed among the various units stationed in West Irian. Since then Papuans always formed a significant part of the troops stationed there. In 1964 this was estimated to be about 1,500 men.

It had not brought the unrest in the Bird's Head to an end, which existed not just among the military but among the Arfakkers as well, not to mention the Biakkers and other coastal inhabitants who had moved to Manokwari over the course of time. A typical case occurred in September 1963 when a group of Papuans entered a Chinese shop in Manokwari. One of them was the former PVK sergeant Ferry Awom who in the interim had been dismissed from the service and freed from prison. The Papuans were promptly kicked out of the store by the Indonesian military customers already there. Awom wouldn't swallow this and went for his gun. The incident blew over but to the indignation of his pals Awon was sent to prison again for several months. Shortly thereafter, just before 1 December, a great many arrests took place after Indonesian authorities had heard that there were plans to celebrate that day specifically as the national holiday of the Papuans. After he was set free on 29 January 1964, Awom picked up the thread again. He began by providing Arfakkers and other interested parties with military training. Among them were a rather large number of police officers who were still on active duty. He managed to keep this going for a number of years. Comparable activities were taking place in Sorong and Fakfak as well, whereby the beginning of an organized resistance had been initiated.[91]

Turmoil broke out in the course of 1965. It was a chaotic year throughout Indonesia, full of tensions that were to lead to the Untung coup of 30 September 1965 and the anticommunist sweeps that followed. This news

penetrated New Guinea as well. As they did on Java, the rumours about Sukarno's failing health contributed to sharpening relations. The consequences of the deterioration of the Indonesian economy were quite tangible here as well. Still, the actions mentioned have to be attributed primarily to local factors. The first of these was that, after a few years, the Indonesian authority had settled in better and made itself more felt. The numbers of troops had been considerably increased that year, which caused almost automatic reactions. Unrest increased because the year in which the plebiscite was to be held was approaching. In the course of the year 1965, news appeared in both the Indonesian and foreign press about brawls between Papuans and Indonesian troops in Sukarnopura, Wamena, Biak, and Manokwari. No direct connection between these actions could be proven, which were apparently the result of local tensions. For instance, the riots in Wamena were directed at immigrants from Java who for the past few months had been pouring into the central mountain land and occupying the properties of the local population there, in the context of the first great transmigration projects. The same thing happened in Arso, close to the Australian border. In Biak it concerned store supplies. These had fallen apart completely because the Papuans who lived outside the town were unwilling to deliver their products. After all, there was nothing they could buy with the money they received. Its major cause was economic disarray. In the area of Sukarnopura the violence was caused by resistance against police intervention in a tribal conflict. In addition, the terrible shortage of supplies played a role there as well. True as this all may have been, the underlying cause of the unrest was the same everywhere and was of a political nature.

The resistance of that period often took the form of a systematic Papuan boycott of the political meetings convened by Indonesian authorities. They tried to avoid having to listen to political speeches given by those in charge.[92] In Merauke, Papuan police officers disturbed a torchlight parade of Indonesian residents by shooting at the stick on which the Indonesian flag was carried, which then broke into two pieces. This provocative act was followed by a series of fights that continued for several days, in which members of the Muju tribe were particularly active.

The situation was most tense in Manokwari. Missionaries in that area recounted afterwards that as early as March 1965 rumours had made the rounds about a rebellion in the making against the Indonesian administration. The affair grew more concrete when news arrived in May that Sukarno was supposedly on his death bed. Preparations for an uprising were made for the moment he died. In that context the names of Lodewijk Mandatjan and Ferry Awon were mentioned. A corps of 250 men was formed that included just about the entire local police force. The leadership was in the hands of 'Captain'

Mandatjan, who went back to the title the Dutch had given him for his activities during World War Two. Ferry Awom was appointed as field commander. As Governor Frans Kaisiepo, who visited the region shortly after the events, reported to his friends (among whom Moses Weror), they had made contact with Tanggahma in Sukarnopura, here referred to as the leader of the 'Free Papua Movement' as well. Although he had strongly advised against the action and Awom, too, apparently didn't feel much like pitting his strength against the Indonesian army so soon, there was heavy pressure from the side of the Arfakkers to finally do something. According to this report, the first disturbances broke out on 2 June 1965 with an attack on an Indonesian jeep carrying five men.

An even more serious incident followed on 25 June. Early that morning, Awom's men attacked the former PVK barracks near Mankowari. On that occasion three Indonesian soldiers were killed during the daily flag raising. The perpetrators then went looking for weapons concealed in the camp. It led to violent shoot-outs by Indonesian troops at any Papuan they encountered. The next day the camp was re-conquered but bitter fights followed near the town, during which the rebels not only used light hand weapons but also turned out to have heavier artillery, mortars included. The shootings lasted for at least a month and the riots couldn't be suppressed until significant reinforcements were sent from Biak and Hollandia. In addition, a parachutists' unit was sent from Java, supplemented by a few small warships and planes. The figures of the numbers of victims vary widely but must have been considerable. Australian intelligence reports mention roughly a hundred Papuan victims during the fights of August alone. Governor Kaisiepo mentioned a total of 1,105 victims in his report. That seems high, but one should remember that the Indonesian troops were under great pressure and that both Subandrio and Sukarno were engaged in the matter. They had ordered that the rebellion be repressed by 17 August, no matter what, something they partially succeeded in doing. During the operations terrible cruelties were committed by each side. While the battle was going on outside, Awom's wife and children who lived in town were killed by Indonesian soldiers.[93]

After the fierce fighting of August 1965, the situation was consolidated but the turmoil was not over. The Indonesian army controlled the town but not the hinterland.[94] In the town a curfew was imposed. The Indonesian army had made arrests but the numbers here are also contradictory. According to an August 1966 statement by Suhadi, the police chief, there had been eighty prisoners, half of whom had been set free in the meantime. Papuan sources speak of six hundred individuals, of whom hundreds were still incarcerated a year later.[95] The one thing that was clear, and this is corroborated by all the reports,

was that after a few years' rule Indonesia had not won the hearts and minds of the Papuans. The missionaries who worked in the region reported that the goal of the action was independence.

Build-up to the plebiscite

For the record, we should go back in time now to 1962, the year in which the New York Agreement was signed and western New Guinea was entrusted into the care of the United Nations. Most Western countries had followed the course of events in Indonesia since the transfer of New Guinea with concern. The fact that directly thereafter Sukarno had started a campaign directed against the forming of the Malaysian Federation seemed to confirm the position that the preceding campaign for West Irian had been set up primarily out of domestic-political considerations. Added to that, it turned out that the transfer of New Guinea had not put a stop to Indonesia's advances to the communist world. True, the Russians were now somewhat in disfavour and Sukarno and Subandrio's attention was directed more towards the China of Mao Tse Tung. Nevertheless, the 1962 transfer of New Guinea was a source of satisfaction for the United States government. It looked upon it as the removal of an important impediment to building better relations with Indonesia. President Kennedy's first concern had to do with the reactions in the Netherlands. Afterwards he sent not only a letter of gratitude to the Dutch government for the understanding it had shown, but also one of similar tenor to the Netherlands head of state. In it a special word of thanks was directed to Prince Bernhard 'whose thoughtful comments on this difficult issue were helpful to me at an important moment'.[96] Furthermore, it cannot be entirely accidental that at the same time his government was making a few positive gestures on behalf of its European ally. During the talks at the State Department of the recent past, one of the regular topics, in addition to New Guinea, had been KLM's landing rights in the United States. On that score the Dutch negotiators had not been able to make an inch of progress. A breakthrough was made in the subsequent years on that agenda item, so important to the Netherlands.[97]

In Australia matters were different. We have seen that Sir Garfield Barwick, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, had positioned himself as being as conciliatory as possible towards Indonesia after the Netherlands had shown itself to be willing to reopen the deliberations on New Guinea in January 1962. He had been severely criticized for that both by the opposition and by his own party.[98] After the transfer, Australia was saddled with a new neighbour, whose further ambitions were not known but were dreaded. Wouldn't they now try to expand eastwards? This fear was reinforced by the action against Malaysia, a member of the

British Commonwealth just like Australia. Fear of continued entanglements continued to be discussed in the Australian press. On the other hand, the Australian government was profoundly aware of the need to build good relations with Indonesia. Generally speaking, these were not warm during the first years, which can be attributed to a large extent to the Australian government's displeasure with Sukarno and Subandrio's international policies.

In 1962, Australia had hoped to keep its observer in Hollandia there after the Dutch had departed, preferably by converting the post into a consular representation. Reciprocally, however, the country was unwilling to allow an Indonesian representative in Port Moresby for fear that this would develop into a source of unrest in the capital of Papua New Guinea. Thus nothing came of it and the Australian representation in Hollandia came to an end when the UN administration departed. The primary concern had to do with the common border, which required cautious handling. Among other things, there was the problem of the West Papuans present in Papua New Guinea. At the moment of the transfer a dozen or so Papuan students from the Dutch side were studying at the medical school in Port Moresby. In subsequent years they did not feel much like going back to the part that had now become Indonesian.[99] Their ranks were reinforced by a growing stream of refugees from that region. We have seen that, in December 1962, a first group of Papuan students from Hollandia tried to withdraw from Indonesian rule immediately by leaving for the Australian sector of the island. Many more would follow. The first year there were 273 but later the number decreased to roughly a hundred a year. With the approaching plebiscite and the more brutal police conduct of the Indonesian army that came along with it, the flow increased. In 1967, the figure suddenly grew to about 600. On the Australian side, they handled it with care. If there were clear grounds for asylum the refugees were allowed to stay under the title of 'permissive residence.' In the first year this status was conferred eighty-one times, thereafter the number of admitted individuals rapidly diminished, under pressure from Indonesia. The vast majority were promptly sent back again.[100]

For a long time the question remained for the outside world whether the New York Agreement would be fully executed. Thus, an irritant to all those involved, there was the Indonesian manoeuvring around the duration of the UNTEA administration and the anti-plebiscite action directed from Jakarta. There were plenty of other indications that Indonesia had no intention of being serious about its implementation. Along these lines and only a few weeks after the transfer, Subandrio commented calmly at a luncheon speech to foreign diplomats in Jakarta that the plebiscite in West Irian would obviously not be held.[101] In subsequent years remarks of this nature were heard regularly from

the lips of the Indonesians rulers. Consequently, the outside world had little faith that Indonesia would really move into action when the agreed moment arrived. The relationship between Indonesia and the United Nations continued to be fragile due to the criticism expressed there about the campaign against Malaysia. Nothing much came of the development fund, Fundwi, either that the United Nations had established specifically for West Irian. In New York, the Netherlands had appropriated 30 million guilders for this but the necessary Indonesian willingness to cooperate was not forthcoming. Initially Indonesia made an attempt to collect its part of the contribution through fundraising but after just a few months, in June 1963, this had to be stopped due to lack of success. After the UNTEA departure, Indonesia did not allow any UN staff members to remain behind, as might have been expected on the basis of the Agreement's stipulations.

In fact, the quarantine was therefore applicable to the United Nations as well and they put up with it. The co-signatory, the Netherlands, did not protest either. The only divergent action was Rolz-Bennett's extremely quiet visit of 1964 to Indonesia, during which he also visited West Irian. Everywhere he went he was greeted with banners that announced that the plebiscite was not needed. As we have seen, Baldus Mofu did not succeed in meeting with him although others did manage to get four letters to him in which they urged the return of the Dutch. He did not conceal this from his hosts. He did, however, put their mind at rest with the announcement that he would not do anything about it.[102]

Obviously, during this visit the pending matters of the plebiscite and Fundwi needed to be discussed but nothing could be decided because Sukarno and Subandrio would not set time aside for him. They were on the verge of leaving for Tokyo when he arrived. The plebiscite was mentioned only in passing but that was better than nothing at all. At the end of his visit, Rolz-Bennett implied that he was pleased that, at least, he had not been confronted with a flat refusal. They did agree to have further meetings concerning the continuation of Fundwi. In the meantime, a few civil servants of the United Nations development fund had drawn up a list of twenty-seven potential projects, the large majority of which could now actually be discussed with officials of the Indonesian government.[103] The execution of these had only barely begun when Indonesia withdrew from the United Nations in January 1965. This meant the automatic end of Fundwi's work. Sukarno then took the next step by stating on 24 May 1965 that the plebiscite was not needed either.[104]

In the Netherlands, the distance from New Guinea provoked a remarkable reversal in the attitude towards Indonesia. There was general relief about the fact that after the transfer they could deal with that country on a better footing.

Also, in the Netherlands people didn't seem to be too shocked about the Malaysian adventure either. After all, it proved they had been right. Satisfaction with the prospect of better relations prevailed and there was a strong tendency to be dissociated from New Guinea. Nothing could be done about it any longer, anyway. The Netherlands had done its best and had transferred its responsibilities to the United Nations. This became the standard reaction of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs when the Netherlands was requested to be more closely involved. The same applied to Fundwi. The Netherlands remained willing to make the appropriated funds available but wanted to have as little as possible to do with the operation thereof.

The relationship with the United States during the coming decades would continue to be good as well. From the American side the visible relief concerning the Dutch attitude triggered a similar reaction from the Netherlands from which a ring of gratitude was not wholly missing. For Luns it continued to be a balancing act. He made sure that the blame stayed on the American side but otherwise was actively included in the turnaround. He put his best foot forward when he visited Sukarno in 1964. It was a successful visit and created the first step on the road to a debt arrangement with conditions advantageous to Indonesia.[105] This was important for the Netherlands too, because it thereby held to the principle of compensation for the dispossession of Dutch properties in Indonesia. As far as West Irian was concerned, it was an important lesson for Indonesia. They would not need to pull their weight with the Netherlands: a symbolic gesture would suffice. Indeed, at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in The Hague they used to react quite laconically when the matter came up for discussion. This was true for parliament as well. Both small Christian parties, the SGP and the GPV, would invariably raise compliance with the New York Agreement in the annual General Debate there, to which Luns would react by stating that they expected Indonesia to fulfil its obligations.[106]

In Indonesia a drastic change occurred on the political scene with the ascent of Suharto, the man who had led the military operations against the Netherlands in New Guinea in 1962. The turning point came with the military coup of 30 September 1965, generally referred to by an acronym, as Indonesia is wont to do. That was 'Gestapu', standing for *Gerakan September Tigapuluh* (Movement of 30 September). In the early morning of that day a group of officers, led by lieutenant-colonel Untung, swung into action and with their troops occupied a number of strategic points in and around the capital city. Similar actions took place on central Java as well. As indicated, they did so to prevent a surprise attack of the army leadership on the PKI. Indeed, rumours about this had been making

the rounds for months and the matter seemed acute at that moment because of Sukarno's failing health. One of the first acts was the murder of eight highly placed generals, amongst them the army commander Achmad Jani. General Nasution, who was then the Minister of Defence, barely escaped with his life. Later that day, the Unting group issued a decree in which it announced the establishment of a 'Revolutionary Council,' that for the time being would take charge. All of this seemed to point to very conscious planning. Still, the assault was badly prepared, the ringleaders failed to make clear what they wanted and in the first few hours of the conflict most of the key figures were still hurriedly choosing a position. Even Sukarno's role continued to be a question mark. It was not inconceivable that, confronted with a *fait accompli*, he would live to see the sudden reversal and make an agreement with a new communist regime. However, hard evidence that this was the thing he really wanted is lacking completely.

Everything was cut short because the commander of the Strategic Reserve, Major General Suharto, took the initiative upon himself. While a power struggle was taking place at the top between a faction under the aegis of Suharto and Nasution and the Sukarno loyalists, the army and various anti-communist organizations unleashed a major 'purification operation' against the communists and anyone related to them. It led to an enormous slaughter among small farmers on Java and Bali, who for the sake of convenience were done away with under the communist label. The PKI-led actions of recent years for redistribution of landownership had gone the wrong way for the better-off farmers.[107] At the same time, a shadowy game of musical chairs was being played in Jakarta to create some order. Sukarno, formally still president for life, was gradually pushed aside, in which activity the military was assisted by the student committees, orchestrated or not, who put pressure on Suharto's adversaries when needed. The end of the story was that, on 2 March 1967, the legislative assembly (MPRS), widely expanded by Suharto himself, appointed Suharto as acting president. They promised elections for 1968, where the foundation would be laid for the regime's legitimacy.[108] It was now up to Suharto to put the ruined country back on its feet and he realized that he would need foreign support. The prospects for this were good. The developments after the Gestapu had been closely followed by the Western countries, especially the United States. The risk of a new communist takeover in southeast Asia was gone at last and the State Department was bubbling with eagerness to support the winsome general in executing his task. In spite of worried observations in the Dutch press, politicians in The Hague were in a very similar position.

One of the items the new regime discovered in the estate of its predecessor was the question of the Act of Free Choice. It was now high time to move into

action, for according to the Agreement the operation was not to take place any later than 1969. Indonesia would have to start preparing the way long before that, for which it had to invite a representative of the secretary general of the United Nations. This invitation was the first important decision in the international area that faced the new regime in Jakarta and the way in which it would react was viewed from every side as a touchstone of its willingness to comply with international accords. Thus the attitude of Suharto's regime was carefully watched and not only by the governments of America, the Netherlands, and Australia, but also in West Irian itself and by the Papuan circles in exile. The same thing was true for the Secretariat of the United Nations in New York.

At first the political changes penetrated West Irian only very slowly. At the time of the Gestapu, the rebellion in the Manokwari region that began in May 1965 was only just over and missions were under fire. They were suspected of supporting the rebels. The American missionary Lovestrand, who worked in the area, was arrested on the grounds of some vague accusations. The most important reason for this probably was that, for his visits to Manokwari, he always had to go through the areas where the operations were happening, but the rebels had left him alone every single time. In the case of the Dutch priest Van den Berg, a former member of the New Guinea Council, things were a bit clearer. They ran into him at the airport of Biak carrying a letter for Nicolaas Jouwe. That was sufficient reason for the Indonesian authorities to arrest him without any further ado. A few weeks later, shortly before the Gestapu, a meeting had been organized of the representatives of the Partai Katolik and the Parkindo, with others from the Protestant and Catholic churches in West Irian. Its goal was to form local branches of these parties for West Irian. Former Minister Leimena, who defended Sukarno's regime, addressed the audience. Although he did not deny that mistakes had been made, he was still of the opinion that it was the duty of the church groups to defend the unity of the state. West Irian was, so the minister said, a bouquet of beautiful flowers that Indonesia could not really do without. To sustain this, he argued for greater control over the foreign missionaries.[109] In fact, the Partai Katolik and the Parkindo would expand in West Irian in the coming years. After all, the churches, and the GKI-IB in particular, were the sole organizations in which the Papuans themselves played a leading role. The rest of the parties came to nothing. Only the PKI had come to life, in part thanks to the efforts of the now familiar Galim Reasa.[110] However, for the latter the pleasure was short-lived. The immediate result of the coup d'état was that throughout Indonesia all parties were outlawed. This was certainly true for the very new PKI branch in West Irian. A hundred of its most important members were shipped off to other parts of the country.[111]

In Jakarta the West Irian Secretariat was Subandrio's stronghold where, as the head of the organization, he was in charge of appointing personnel. As a result, the organization was known as a Subandrio hotbed, which also held true for the administrative machinery in West Irian. In March 1966, activists of the KAPPI student organization occupied the bureau, in which Papuan students participated as well.[112] That operation had Suharto's blessing and Subandrio was fired. Accused of supporting the communists, he was condemned to death. Although the execution did not take place, it did mean the end of his career and he would spend the next thirty years in prison.

The immediate result was that the newly appointed Minister of Foreign Affairs, Adam Malik, replaced him at the bureau in his additional function as vice-premier of socio-political affairs. Most of the administrative tasks were transferred to the Ministry of the Interior. In consultation with Suharto, Adam Malik also implemented a number of personnel changes. Dismissals in the Pantja Tunggal, the administrative council, followed where, in addition to the governor and a few civil servants, the region's top army officers were seated. Control of the regional military commando (KODAM XVII) now went from Kartidjo to General Bintoro.[113]

Reorganization was not the only thing that was done. Criticism was expressed in the parliament, which had been made to toe the presidential line under Sukarno, but that for a period continued to play a role of some importance during this unstable period. In the June 1966 session, three Papuans had the floor. The first one was the Netherlands-trained elementary school teacher Elsina Ajamiseba who spoke on behalf of the combined Protestant-Catholic group from West Irian. She pointed out that Indonesia needed to carry out the internationally agreed upon referendum. A.B. Karubuy argued for subdividing West Irian into a number of administrative districts, all of them to be led by Papuans. Finally, Manuel Waromi wanted to see the governor's position reinforced so that all his tasks wouldn't continue to be taken over by officials from central government. Besides more autonomy, he also wanted the old West Irian Secretariat to account for the manner in which its budget had been spent during the past few years. With regard to the burning issues of the moment it was a clear position-finding for each of the three speakers.[114]

Adam Malik took the criticism very seriously. In August 1966, he paid a five-day visit to West Irian, accompanied by a number of Western and Indonesian journalists. In contrast to previous government officials, he was open to the complaints of the population. Upon his return, he publicly declared that these were more than justified. The Javanese civil servants had robbed the country blind and embitterment reigned everywhere. His picture was confirmed by Frank de Jong, the correspondent of *Het Vaderland*, who had travelled with

him. He was the first Dutch journalist to visit the region after the transfer. The first thing he noticed was that local Indonesian civil servants had approached Malik directly after his arrival in Biak and urged him to immediately remove a number of journalists, who had travelled ahead, from the West Irian region. They feared that they would write unfavourable things about the administration. To everyone's amazement, Malik answered that they should simply go their way and that the truth should be known. The Papuans were surprised as well, unable to believe at first that they might actually be permitted to say with impunity what they were thinking. When they realized this was indeed the case, they exploded with endless stories about unemployment, hunger, poverty, and arrogant conduct on the part of the Javanese officials. Even people like Herman Wajoi and Frits Kirihio, who had welcomed the Indonesians with open arms, turned out to be bitter and could now finally say so. Only the governor, Frans Kaisiepo, refused to say a word. Apparently he did not trust this apparent liberty at all.

The high point of the visit to Sukarnopura was an open-air speech on 17 August, in which Malik listed every point again. While the officials and the upper military echelon with their gold-embellished caps watched grimly, he declared that the Papuans' complaints about large-scale robbery of goods were more than justified. The Javanese civil servants had hauled away pretty much everything they could lay their hands on only to sell these for good money in Jakarta. The new regime needed them like a hole in the head. Thereupon Wajoi and Kirihio took heart as well and declared that all those guilty of corruption should be shot. This produced loud cheering among the Papuan audience. However when Kirihio, who was obviously still having his doubts, declared that the West Irian people would not insist on a plebiscite, a tangible silence fell over the square.

It set the tone for the rest of the trip. Upon Malik's arrival in Merauke, a doll of a Javanese official had just been burned in effigy. Encouraged by this, Malik added a little extra. In his speech he asked the audience what the new government should do with Sukarno. At first the reaction was a hesitant 'keep him under your thumb' but, once the crowd dared, it soon became 'ganyang,' which means as much as 'do him in.' What is remarkable as well is that Malik enthusiastically praised the work of the missions. The development of education in the interior alone was almost exclusively due to the fact that, contrary to the government's civil servants, the missionaries had not shied away from living among the people for years on end. It was a hint in the direction of the cautious Leimena, who in the previous year had made the continued presence of these people a point of discussion in an impulse of anticipatory political correctness. After returning to Jakarta, Malik told his people at the Ministry of Foreign

Affairs that it was obvious that West Irian's return to Indonesia had not been in the Papuans' interest, which had stirred serious anti-Indonesian sentiments. He promised to make a clean sweep and not merely in the administrative area. Economically, too, a few matters had to be dealt with now. He showed his civil servants that of the 25 to 30 million dollars the previous regime had appropriated for West Irian annually, in reality not even one and a half million had been deposited over the entire term. Improvements needed to be made and, to begin with, he appropriated the sum of 5 million dollars for the coming year to make up for lost time.

In fact, something was finally being done in this area.[115] In November 1966, Kirihio was sent to Hong Kong and Japan for the business enterprise Irian Bhakti. According to reports, he had 4 million dollars to spend there to purchase food and textiles. The urgency of the visit was emphasized by a parliamentary mission led by Arudji Kartawinata, which visited West Irian at the same time. After his return he stated that the situation was alarming and that almost no goods were coming in. Furthermore, he expressed his criticism about the grandiose development projects of the previous regime that had turned out to be nothing but hot air. Finally, he expressed his concern that this would influence the outcome of the upcoming plebiscite.[116]

At the same time there was much international discussion about resuming development aid to Indonesia, for which an international consortium would be established with the participation of America, Japan, and the Netherlands. It was the run-up to the IGGI, the international consortium for aid to Indonesia presided over by the Netherlands as of February 1967. In coming years this group would make large sums available for development projects in Indonesia, whose destination would be decided in close consultation with the Indonesian government.[117] In the longer run, West Irian might be able to profit by that as well. Of greater immediate importance for the region was the fact that Indonesia re-entered the United Nations, so that the Fundwi, which came under this body, could pick up its work again on 1 February 1967. The organization went to work energetically but it was clear that the tangible result would not be seen until some time later, while its success would contribute to establishing Indonesia's credit abroad.[118]

Between Delft, Manokwari and New York

In passing, we have mentioned the small group of Papuans who had played an important role during the final years of Dutch rule and, when the Indonesians arrived, had deemed it wiser to await the course of events abroad. We have seen how Nicolaas Jouwe, Marcus Kaisiepo, Filemon Jufuway, and several others

sought refuge in the Netherlands where the government had granted them asylum. Kaisiepo, a principled man, would settle for that status permanently but the more practically inclined Jouwe requested Dutch nationality and obtained it a few years later. That did not alter the fact that they each continued to struggle for a better future for their country. With their departure, the heart of the action had essentially moved to the city of Delft where they had each found a modest home. Their prestige was apparent from the fact that, as early as December 1962, Nicolaas Tanggahma, who had stayed behind in Hollandia, was wondering anxiously how without their physical presence he would manage to keep the ship of Papuan nationalism on a steady course. As we have seen, at that moment the leading figures of the New Guinea Council and the National Congress were focused more on the question of how to sort out matters with the incoming Indonesian government. Not so the Papuans in self-appointed exile. As early as 27 January 1963, Jouwe and Kaisiepo sent a report to the Red Cross in which they summarized the heinous deeds the Indonesian troops had committed in New Guinea so far.[119] The decision of the regional council of Biak-Numfor in the spring of 1963 to recognize them as the leaders of the Papuans abroad had supported them in this.[120] The number of expatriates rose to a few dozen individuals during the final weeks of the UNTEA administration. In addition to the small group that had presented itself politically, these consisted of five police officers who would be at risk when the Indonesians entered because of their active role in the struggle against the infiltrators. Generally speaking they were single young men who were taken care of with the help of the government or friends in the Netherlands or Australian New Guinea. In the subsequent years the group increased considerably. At the time of the Act of Free Choice there were several hundred Papuans living abroad, by and large in the Netherlands and Australia.

Shortly after their arrival, Jouwe and Kaisiepo were making plans to create a National Front of Papuans Abroad, whose potential goal was said to be independence. In the next few years Kaisiepo, Jouwe, Womsiwor, and several others visited America, Australia, and Japan. The point was to ask them to pay attention to the events in their homeland and to make sure that Indonesia would comply with its obligations in keeping with the New York Agreement. They were able to acquire the necessary means for this purpose from a number of wealthy individuals in the Netherlands. Most of the support came from the foundation *Door de Eeuwen Trouw* (Loyal through the Ages), which had been founded in 1951 to help the Ambonese in their conflict with Indonesia. Thanks to his contacts in Japan, Womsiwor managed to obtain some funds there as well. Kaisiepo sought and found support from the adherents of the Republic of

the South Moluccas in the Netherlands who thereby proved they wanted to hold on to the ideal of Maluku Raya.[121]

The visits to the Departments of Foreign Affairs in Washington and Canberra were easier for those on the fringe of the movement than for Kaisiepo and Jouwe themselves. Usually, visas for the United States were granted to them without much ado, but Australia generally kept the door shut. In conversation, officials who were not too highly placed usually listened to them with interest and appreciated them as individuals. In addition, the work consisted primarily of gathering reports about the developments in New Guinea for which they received the information in many different ways. The majority arrived via the refugee route through Wutung in the Australian sector. Tanggahma was really an important contact person in New Guinea, but news reached Delft in other ways as well. Thus, in May 1964, Kaisiepo wrote a detailed letter to the President of the United States, complete with recent information about the situation in West Irian.[122] A similar document followed in August of that year, addressed to the secretary general of the United Nations. This 'Note of Protest' resulted in a request to send an international research committee to New Guinea, remove the Indonesian troops, and establish an interim administration of the United Nations.[123]

The organization suffered from the start from the rivalry between Jouwe and Kaisiepo. It was caused by differences in personality, background, and political insight. On the whole, the fierce Kaisiepo would settle for nothing less than independence, preferably in the shape of a united Melanesia, while Jouwe was more inclined to accept an intermediate solution. At the end of 1964 they split up. Thereafter Jouwe's group went on as the 'Freedom Committee for West Papua', while Kaisiepo assumed the convoluted title of 'President of the Upper Court of the Chamber of Deputies of West Papua/West Melanesia'. For simplicity's sake he sometimes also called himself the President of the West Papua Government in Exile. It was an expression of the same ambition that had rubbed Jouwe up the wrong way as early as 1962. During their visits abroad they minced no words about the fact that they were at odds with each other, but other than that they did stand together. Thus the damage was limited although, obviously, their hanging around together but separately was a serious disadvantage that devalued their already limited possibilities to accomplish anything. To their exasperation, the Netherlands government was at all times very discouraging. It made it clear from the start that it would not support them. Should they so desire, they were welcome to visit the Ministry of Foreign Affairs as individuals, but the standpoint of the Netherlands that it was not formally involved in the settlement of the stipulations of the New York Agreement was carefully guarded.

The approach of the moment that the Act of Free Choice was to take place increased the sense of urgency, both among the Papuans in West Irian and among the leaders in exile. It was a chance they should not throw away. This led to a series of activities on various levels. In the autumn of 1966, a student conference was held in Biak. About a hundred participants from different parts of New Guinea had gathered there. It ended dramatically. Although there were no political items on the agenda, they could not prevent the fact that most of the speakers did bring up complaints with a political overtone. Intelligence people who were present there took offence at this. It led to a shoot-out that killed a number of students. Others were arrested or fled. They had to go underground and no longer dared to go back home.[124]

Then, too, calm had certainly not returned to the Bird's Head after the insurgency was repressed in the summer of 1965. During Malik's visit in August 1966, the curfew in Manokwari was still in effect. In the subsequent months the rebellion flared up again. According to reports by American missionaries in the region, Ferry Awom succeeded at the time in persuading the Arfak leaders Lodewijk and Barend Mandatjan and Meidudga to participate. This, in turn, led to harsher counter operations from the side of the Indonesian military. In February 1967, Bintoro's troops took part in an operation with the ominous codename *Tumpas*, which means 'Destroy!' Indeed, it was not intended to be a half-measure and airplanes and marine artillery were used. Nevertheless, the result was incomplete, for news kept coming afterwards of hundreds of Arfakkers wandering through the forests and harassing the Indonesians, which led to the import of more troops. In April 1967, the American missionary Ronald Hill noted that 600 heavily armed soldiers were disembarked in Manokwari.[125] One of his colleagues remarked that 400 Indonesian troops were stationed in the small area of Ransiki, with a population of no more than 250.

This information penetrated to the outside world only in tiny droplets, but in February 1967 the news about great numbers of victims of Operation Tumpas reached the Australian and Jakartan press. Figures of two- to three thousand individuals were mentioned. On 10 March, the Papuan representative in the Indonesian parliament gave an emotional speech in which he accused the Indonesian army of bombing his people and treating them as enemies. Two days later Silas Papare, too, broached the subject. He attributed the unrest in the region of Manokwari and the Bird's Head to the deteriorating economic conditions. The people were rebelling because of a lack of food and clothing. He said he knew that some thousand Papuans had been killed in the actions.[126]

Much was made of this number. General Bintoro shoved it aside without any further ado, speaking at a press conference of a 'minor incident.' Supposedly

only forty rebels had been killed, who did not have the support of the population. The air force had been called in only when the rebels threatened to invade Manokwari. The bombers that were called in had not used bombs but machineguns. Adam Malik sided with him. He said that the number Silas Papare had cited was exaggerated but was unable to mention a different figure.[127] This was not particularly impressive. The Indonesian actions had not been limited to one only and calling in airplanes and marine artillery against a defenceless people normally produces many victims. In a report of 20 July 1967 that reached the outside world, Ferry Awom himself mentioned the number of three thousand dead in Manokwari, to which he added that most of the deaths had occurred after injured people had fled into the forests.

This report was signed by Awom as 'Commander of the Jungle Troops of West Papua.' In it he provided a short summary of his own acts of resistance and those of his men since the first attack on the Indonesian troops in Manokwari in February 1965. Among these he included attacks on the Indonesian army in the Baliem, Sorong, Teminabuan, and the areas more to the south all the way to Kokanoa. He also dealt with the Indonesian counteractions that had been coupled with all the fateful characteristics of counterterrorism in the form of arrests, torture sessions and executions. According to his rather detailed listing, at least 150 victims had died, but he expressed his suspicion that the real figure was considerably higher. The best-known victim was Johan Ariks who, according to Awom's report, at the age of seventy-eight had died in prison after being tortured. In addition, he mentioned the arrest of a large number of Papuan police officers and other people during the months of March and April 1967, that is to say after the 'Tumpas' operation had officially come to an end. Among the names of those arrested were Eliëzer Bonay, Thon Meset, Reverend F.S.J. Rumainum, and Silas Papare, who apparently had gone to West Irian after speaking to the parliament. They were all accused of anti-Indonesian propaganda. These were people who had always been prepared to cooperate with the Indonesian government. After their arrest they were transferred to Jakarta.[128] The accuracy of this report is confirmed by various sources.[129]

This report and other information show that Ferry Awom assigned himself an important role and that the rebellious actions spread across large sections of New Guinea. The question remains to what extent all of these can be lumped together as one. In his book *Ik bén een Papoea* (I AM a Papuan) the agriculturalist Zacharias Sawor, who fled West Irian in June 1967, mentions not only the figure of a thousand dead that Silas Papare cited as the result of the insurgence in Manokwari, but he also speaks of large numbers of individual arrests and legal executions elsewhere in the country. Among these is a list of twenty-nine

prominent Papuans who had all been arrested just before he fled. Five of these were members of the regional councils and the New Guinea Council from the Dutch era. Furthermore, it contains names of dozens of more or less notable persons who were killed by the army, usually without any apparent reason. He also states that these are but a few snatches from among other far more massive events.[130]

News from the Indonesian side frequently spoke of the fact that the disturbances were caused by the OPM and foreign 'imperialists.' In the Jakarta newspaper *Kompas* this was mocked. After all, the 'imperialists' supported the New Order of General Suharto wholeheartedly and wouldn't dream of supporting the insurgents. If the 'Free Papua Organization' was successful, it was because the population of West Irian did not appreciate the Indonesian way of ruling.[131]

In addition to these harsh actions, a number of Papuan activities took place in the area of 'foreign policy' insofar as, under the circumstances, this could be spoken about. Thus, on 21 June 1967, at the American Embassy in Jakarta an extensive conversation was held with a number of students from West Irian, the son of Thon Meset among them. They drew a sharp and detailed picture of the situation, emphasizing the power of the army on the island. The students stressed that Indonesia wouldn't succeed in suppressing the drive for freedom of their compatriots, but they were conscious of the fact that it wouldn't be easy to loosen the tie with Indonesia. After all, the symbolic value of possessing New Guinea was enormous for Indonesia. This was especially the case for the new president who was known to be the 'liberator' of that country. A bitter aspect here was that the conversation took place at the very moment that they heard that the father of young Meset had been arrested.[132]

A special appearance in the field of Papuan foreign diplomacy was the figure of Moses Weror. He was a graduate of the nautical college in Hollandia who had left for Indonesia around 1960. At the time he was deeply disappointed in the Dutch because, after finishing his training, he had not been admitted to the Royal Institute of the Navy in Den Helder. According to the standards in force he did not meet the entrance requirements. He was welcomed in Indonesia and had found a job at the West Irian Bureau of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. At the time now under discussion he was connected, among other things, as third secretary to the Indonesian Embassy in Canberra. In his multiple contacts with the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and the various embassies in Jakarta, he gave ample evidence that his sympathies for Indonesia were long gone. For Canberra and Washington he was an important source of information about the way in which Indonesia was handling the West Irian question. This was particularly important because he had access not only to the

Indonesian Ministry of Foreign Affairs but also to West Irian, which he visited around June 1967. After he returned to Jakarta, he expressed great pessimism to the Australian ambassador there. He recounted that Governor Kaisiepo now also shared the general aversion to the Indonesians and that, should the people get the chance, in 1969 they would reject all forms of association with Indonesia. The question, of course, was what should happen then. Weror thought he knew that in Sukarnopura the politically aware Papuans, governor included, were hoping for a UN trusteeship for the duration of about five years, in preparation for a next step towards independence. For himself and his informants in West Irian, Indonesia was not on the list of potential candidates for membership in such a trusteeship council.[133]

The most important action of the Papuans in the realm of foreign policy came from Delft, where Jouwe and Kaisiepo each had an office. With the Act of Free Choice in sight, they became very active. Early in 1967, Jouwe made a statement in which he articulated a number of conditions needed for the Act to proceed smoothly. These contained the demand for the return of all Papuans to their homeland. Furthermore, he wanted freedom of expression and organization. Kaisiepo, too, put pen to paper. On 28 February, he drafted a resolution destined for the secretary general of the United Nations. In it he argued for the return of all Papuans to their homeland during the election and asked for the Indonesian troops to be replaced by armed forces from the United Nations for the duration of the plebiscite.[134]

The next step for both of them was to place a representative in New York, especially in view of the upcoming plebiscite. In March 1967, Jouwe appointed his fellow committee member Womsiwor as the permanent representative of his Freedom Committee to the United Nations. This step was facilitated by the fact that Womsiwor had already moved to New York for business reasons. At the same time, Kaisiepo was also visiting that city. Their lobbying was directed specifically at the delegates of the Francophone African states who had provided active support for the case of the Papuans' right to self-determination in 1961 and 1962. In this connection one should recall that, during the deliberations on the New York Agreement at the General Assembly in September 1962, the representatives of the Central African Republic and the Upper Volta were the only ones to have made some sharp comments on the Agreement. The former had called it 'a complete violation of the principle of self-determination,' while the latter made it known that Indonesia was acting in a colonialist manner with respect to New Guinea, thereby repudiating the sacred principles of Bandung.[135] For Jouwe and Kaisiepo it was now a matter of remobilizing this support.

Upon arrival in New York, Jouwe expressed himself positively about the results achieved to anyone who was willing to listen. Covertly, he also hinted

that the Papuans would only have a chance if one of the Western countries at the United Nations were willing to dedicate itself to their cause. That wasn't so easy, however. On the other hand, they did have the opportunity to report on their lobbying work to the American UN Mission in New York and to the Department of Foreign Affairs in Washington. Although people listened to them with interest, the reports do not give the impression that their lobbying accomplished very much. According to the evaluation of the American UN representative, Plimsoll, there wasn't a ghost of a chance that they would convince even one member to argue that their case should be placed on the United Nations agenda.[136]

Still, it was not a foregone conclusion that this lobbying work would remain entirely ineffective. After the plebiscite, U Thant would have to report to the General Assembly, and should things be revealed that were a bit too peculiar, the consequences might be dire. An Australian analysis of that period postulated that, although it would be extremely difficult for the Papuan nationalists to get the world to focus on their case, to the extent to which they would succeed therein it would greatly influence the way in which the Indonesian government would comply with its obligations as stated in the Agreement.[137] The same awareness was at work at the United Nations headquarters, where they were most definitely being listened to. To what extent this was the case will be dealt with in the next chapter, where we shall discuss the conduct of the Bolivian diplomat Fernando Ortiz Sanz, who was to be appointed in June 1968 as the representative of the secretary general for the Act of Free Choice.

Against this background it is understandable that the Indonesian delegate in New York, Kamil, was watching the lobbying of the Papuan representatives with some concern. He had more than one reason to be apprehensive. Jouwe and Kaisiepo certainly made an impression on the diplomats whom they encountered, while the news about the bombers that had been called in near Manokwari was badly received internationally. Both the United Nations members and the Americans and Dutch took advantage of the nervousness this had caused by gently pressuring the Indonesians. The Americans suggested to them that agreeing to the plebiscite would be the best response. They did not react to the Indonesians' insistence that Jouwe and company should not be granted a visa. The Netherlands, too, began to show greater interest. In the corridors of the United Nations, the Dutch diplomat Boddens Hosang let it be known that the Netherlands was feeling some responsibility to see to it that in 1969 self-determination should come to West Irian in accordance with the stipulations of the New York Agreement.[138]

The ball was now in Malik's court. Until then he had taken a hesitant position. After his visit to West Irian in August 1966, he had declared that the

plebiscite would take place, although he added that he himself thought it to be unnecessary. This cautious position in favour of a plebiscite met with serious resistance in Jakarta, whereby dissenting opinions came from the as yet not wholly crushed Roeslan Abdulgani and the student association KAMI. Suharto's taking of office as acting president on 12 March 1967 also reinforced Malik's position. The new Cabinet's first session was devoted to the consequences of the news from Manokwari for Indonesia's international position. On that occasion, they both came to the conclusion that a step was needed to gain immediate international goodwill. After the meeting was over, Malik made a statement to the press in which he discussed the events in Manokwari as casually as possible and promised that, as agreed, Indonesia would organize a plebiscite in 1969.[140]

However, not all the causes for delay had yet been removed . This was revealed in, among other ways, a conversation held in Jakarta between Malik and the American diplomat George Bundy. On that occasion, Malik attributed the events in Manokwari to clumsy manoeuvring by the Indonesian military. He added that it was caused also by the Javanese prudence of the president who didn't dare take a strong enough position vis-à-vis the officers in the outlying districts.[141] Nevertheless, the Indonesian representative in New York, Kamil, paid a visit to the United Nations headquarters on 5 April, during which he promised U Thant and Rolz-Bennett that Indonesia would comply with its pledges made in the New York Agreement and that the first consultations could start in three months. With that goal in mind, Rolz-Bennett took a trip to Indonesia between 20 July and 2 August 1967, whereupon the first speculations about the shape of the plebiscite appeared in the press.[142] The disclosure of the decision came on 16 August, when Suharto announced in parliament that the Republic of Indonesia would implement the plebiscite in West Irian. In the same breath he added that he expected the Papuans to express themselves in favour of the Republic. Thereby the path to an Act of Free Choice was open, but with it a heavy burden had been placed ahead of time on the presumed freedom of expression.[143]

Chapter 13

The First Phase of the Act of Free Choice

Preliminary manoeuvres

The task of the United Nations

From the perspective of the United Nations in New York, the implementation of the Act of Free Choice was imperative. Not only had the organization provided a forum for the negotiations about the New Guinea question, but subsequently it had also extended its services in resolving the conflict. This was true from the start for its involvement in the appointment of the negotiator Bunker, who operated under the auspices of U Thant. With the passing of Resolution 1752, the General Assembly had been informed on 21 September 1962 of the agreement reached by the Netherlands and Indonesia whereupon it had authorized the secretary general to carry out the tasks thereby assigned to him.[1] It was on that basis that the Secretariat had taken responsibility for the interim UNTEA administration, had sent military observers to supervise the implementation of the truce, and had even provided a security force for the region's UN administrator. As laborious and incomplete as the implementation had been, the task was nevertheless brought to an end. The larger question was to what extent the UN interim administration had succeeded in satisfying point 22 of the New York Agreement, namely together with Indonesia to guarantee the population's freedom of expression, of movement, and its right to assembly and meeting. In the previous chapter we have shown that this was not the case. We also established there that the administrator Abdoh had serious doubts about these as well, but no room was made for them in his final report to the secretary general.

With the transfer of western New Guinea's administration to Indonesia as of 1 May 1963, the entire responsibility now lay in Indonesia's hands. The only role remaining for the United Nations was that of organizing the Act of Free Choice. In addition, according to the agreements negotiated between the Netherlands and Indonesia in Middleburgh, they had the task of implementing the special development fund for West Irian (Fundwi). At the time that the accord was presented to the General Assembly on 21 September 1961, these agreements had not been firmly established, other than that the Dutch government had appropriated an annual sum of 10 million dollars for that purpose, to be made available to the UN secretary general, starting with a period of three years.[2]

The stipulations for the implementation of the Act of Free Choice were recorded in points 16 to 20 of the Agreement of New York. The outlines of the Act of Free Choice itself were stated in article 18. To carry this out, the secretary general was to appoint a representative whose task it was 'to advise, assist and participate.' To this end, the latter was to arrive in the region a year before the actual plebiscite would take place. Furthermore, the UN was authorized to place a number of experts in the field earlier to prepare for that task. In theory, this was actually possible from the moment the UNTEA period ended, but according to the text of the Agreement it would have to be done in consultation with Indonesia. They were to have complete freedom of movement to fulfil their task.

With regard to the set-up and allocation of tasks to put Fundwi into operation, further agreements would have to be made between the Netherlands, Indonesia, and the United Nations. In that case, the experts mentioned in Articles 16 and 17 of the Agreement could be put to work for that cause immediately. The underlying idea on the American and the Netherlands' side had been that, via these functionaries, they would still be able to keep an eye on developments in New Guinea, even after the departure of the Dutch. It was for that same reason that the Indonesian side had been far less interested in it. It was one of the reasons why Fundwi hadn't been able to get off the ground during Sukarno's regime.

In carrying out these tasks, U Thant was assisted at his headquarters in New York by his cabinet chief Narasimhan. The daily leadership was entrusted to José Rolz-Bennett, undersecretary for special political affairs of the UN. We have seen that he went to Indonesia to discuss the case further after Suharto's government had declared somewhat reluctantly in July 1967 that it was prepared to cooperate in the plebiscite. This consultation came off more smoothly than during his 1964 visit, when Subandrio and Sukarno had not been willing to deal with the matter. With Malik and Suharto, Rolz-Bennett could even

discuss the provisos of the implementation. Thus the idea was suggested of forming a provincial council by indirect elections that would be authorized to pronounce the desired decision. To the Dutch ambassador, Schiff, officials of the Indonesian Ministry of Foreign Affairs stressed the role that new, still to be formed, regional councils might play there. It was all still very provisional. In any event, it was decided that the representative of the secretary general would arrive in West Irian in the middle of the following year to implement point 18 of the New York Agreement.[3]

In Jakarta, Rolz-Bennett also made agreements about starting Fundwi up again. They now really pushed through its implementation. Therein the UN could fall back on the officials in their own development programme who, at a previous stage, had already been involved in planning Fundwi. Thomas F. Power was appointed as executive secretary, while David Owen directed the fund from New York. In order to pick up the work left incomplete by his predecessors, a six-man mission departed for West Irian right after Rolz-Bennett's visit and pitched its tents there for the month of August 1967.[4] Later that year, after the Geneva UN office concerned approved the spending policy that this commission had put together, a permanent staff settled in Sukarnopura to begin its implementation. Leading them was the Swede Stein S. Roeed. Improvement in the regional airline connections topped the agenda.

During the deliberations with Rolz-Bennett it was agreed that there would be an observable line drawn between the duties of the Fundwi personnel and the staff of the secretary general's representative yet to arrive, who would have to assist the Indonesian government in executing the Act of Free Choice. Politics and economics were to be kept clearly separated. However, it turned out not to be always feasible. One of the first acts of the August reconnaissance mission to Jayapura was the drafting of a report on the political situation in West Irian. It reached the New York headquarters in September and gave an immediate first taste of what was in store for the political representative. The Fundwi people reported an anti-plebiscite petition drawn up by Papuan civil servants whom the army commander Bintoro had drummed up. However, the very same people had let it be known surreptitiously that in reality every Papuan, in fact, yearned for such a plebiscite. Additionally, the report contained further data on the continuing rebellions in the Manokwari area, due to which the agrarian and geological experts in the group had been unable to visit the regions they had indicated. They also reported turmoil in Fakfak and Biak. In the latter place, the Indonesian pilots they had hired had refused to fly by night. They wanted to be at home to guard over the safety of their family. Longer trips were therefore impossible, so that out of desperation they were forced to charter an Australian plane.

It was their general impression that the army acted harshly and that the Indonesian military and civil servants openly showed their contempt for the primitive Papuans. The feelings of aversion were mutual and there was no question of any reciprocal respect. Besides, in the places they visited, about half the soldiers were Papuans who demonstrated very little discipline and were much too trigger-happy. When things got out of hand, Indonesian paratroopers were the ones to reinstate order and did so with equal ruthlessness. As for the work of Fundwi, the team rather quickly ran into Indonesian objections to sending Papuan students abroad. The reason was that practically all the students who had been sent abroad since 1960 had refused to return to their country. Those sent to Jakarta had been badly treated there, even in the judgement of the Indonesian officials in West Irian. They were occupied primarily with politics and anti-government demonstrations. The general impression was one of a country in need of leadership but unwilling to receive it from the Indonesians. When this first UN team arrived, young people lined up almost immediately to serve in the United Nations army. It had taken a bit of doing to convince them that this was not the intent. For these Papuans the era of a renewed United Nations presence on their soil thus began with a disappointment.[5]

The appointment of Ortiz Sanz

On 1 April 1968, the Bolivian diplomat Fernando Ortiz Sanz was appointed in New York as representative of the secretary general for the implementation of the tasks mentioned in point 18 of the Agreement of New York. In UN jargon he would be known as the United Nations Representative for West Irian (UNRWI). Apart from being a large landowner, he had a varied career behind him in which he had been a professor of history and a journalist, as well as a UN officer.[6] He used the first few months of his appointment to read up on the documents available at the United Nations Secretariat, among which were the Fundwi report and the documentation that Jouwe and Kaisiepo had sent to New York over the course of the recent years. Moreover, he had every opportunity to take up contact with Jouwe, Kaisiepo, and Womsiwor, who were present in the corridors of the United Nations in New York at the time. One of the documents was a report of 3 May 1968 in which Jouwe gave Ortiz Sanz a whole array of useful recommendations for implementing the Act of Free Choice. It was accompanied by a list of names of well-educated Papuans abroad whom he could call on to help with the work of the UN mission.

Then there was a detailed overview of the administrative structure in West Irian, complete with the names of the most important Indonesian and Papuan functionaries. It tells us that the provincial parliament, under the chairmanship

of Governor Frans Kaisiepo, consisted of forty-five members. Many of the Papuan names are known to us from the period of the Dutch administration. The majority of the important administrative posts were held by Indonesians. The secretariat of the governor and the staffs of the Department of Education were primarily Indonesian personnel; the rest of the departments were entirely in Indonesian hands. Jouwe stressed the fact that the only acceptable thing would be a referendum with an obvious choice for or against Indonesia. To this he added the useful suggestion that it would be sufficient, for the less developed regions, to show them the Indonesian or the Papuan flag. For voters this would be enough to make their choice and it also linked up with the Indonesian custom of using symbols. To this advice he added the warning to Ortiz Sanz to be very careful about his own safety and that of his staff members. Assassinating Ortiz Sanz would give the army a welcome reason to take serious reprisals and incorporate the entire region into the military regime. In his later conduct, Ortiz Sanz would prove that he had kept this advice very much in mind.[7]

Obviously, during his early period, the diplomat also spoke with Indonesian functionaries. The most important discussions took place on 3 and 5 June 1968 with Sudjarwo Tjondronegoro, whom Malik had appointed as his special assistant in handling matters concerning West Irian. He was well qualified for the task because at an earlier stage in his career he had been a member of the negotiation team that had procured the New York Agreement, while he had only recently returned from The Hague where he had been the first Indonesian ambassador after diplomatic relations were resumed. Both Ortiz Sanz and Rolz-Bennett were present at these discussions. It was agreed that Ortiz Sanz would arrive in Jakarta in the first half of August, accompanied by a small staff of six people. Both in Jakarta and in Sukarnopura office space would be made available to him. Furthermore, Sudjarwo firmly reiterated to both UN officials that, according to the New York Agreement, the organization and design of the Act of Free Choice was exclusively an Indonesian responsibility, while the task of the UN representative was limited 'to advise, assist and participate in such arrangements.' For the moment, the gentlemen did not dig more deeply into the question of what exactly these words entailed but agreed that further details would be discussed with Ortiz in Jakarta. Sudjarwo did promise that the Indonesian government would consult the provincial council and the regency councils on the design of the plebiscite. These regency councils had been instituted only recently by Presidential Decision No. 177 of 13 October 1967. They were intended to be successors of the former *streekraden* (regional councils),[8] and for the time being would consist only of appointed members. According to Sudjarwo, these had been formed in the interim, which was done on the basis of the Indonesian democratic system. In practice this meant that, in

appointing the members, a distribution of the various groups of society had been taken into account. Thus, one third of the membership came from the military.

In addition, Sudjarwo urged frugality. The costs of the UN participation were to be defrayed by the Netherlands and Indonesia together and consequently could not become too high. It was an issue to which he would return frequently. It was an indisputable exhortation to Ortiz Sanz not to get on his high horse. To compensate for this practical advice, the two UN officials emphasized at the end of the meeting that it was necessary for the Act of Free Choice to be implemented in such a way that it 'would bring out the true and freely expressed wishes of the population concerning its future'.[9] A few weeks later, during a visit to the State Department, Ortiz Sanz said the same thing but phrased it differently. In this more familiar environment, he let it be known that he wanted to be sure that completely free elections would be held. He would rather resign than be directing a farce.[10]

Defining positions in The Hague, Jakarta and Washington

The appointment of Ortiz Sanz confronted the Netherlands with the question of how to define its position toward him and the Act of Free Choice as it was to be completed in his presence. As of April 1967, there was a new cabinet in The Hague in which a number of the protagonists from 1962 were members once again. Such was the case for the then deputy minister of Defence, P.S.J. de Jong, who was now Prime Minister. Minister Luns had held on to his post at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Thus, in these crucial times, the Cabinet was well versed in this old matter. That is not to say that the ministers in question were yearning to become immersed in the affairs of New Guinea again. The memory of its outcome was painful enough and, in the meantime, new issues had drawn their attention. Officially, the Netherlands had very little to do any longer with the implementation of the once so dearly won plebiscite. The text of the New York Agreement gave the country no role other than to pay for half of its expenses. Nevertheless, one would expect that as a partner in the Agreement the Netherlands would show interest in its implementation and, during the signing thereof, both the negotiator Van Roijen and then Prime Minister De Quay had made it abundantly clear that the Netherlands would closely follow the continuing developments of the Papuans. The outside world expected no less and, should The Hague so desire, it could cause a great deal of trouble for Indonesia. Thus, from that side of things, there was much at stake for the latter to avert the threat of any active Dutch involvement. The best way to do so was to include the Netherlands up to a point, so that a form of joint responsibility would be created without leading to any active participation.

As early as the summer of 1968, Malik had discussed the question repeatedly with the Dutch diplomats in Jakarta and had heard reassuring noises. Still, the situation was not without risk. As the moment of the Act of Free Choice approached, critical attention in the Netherlands government increased. During the General Debate of 1966–67, the Act of Free Choice had been on the agenda in parliament for the first time in somewhat greater detail again, with an undertone of uneasiness. Toxopeus, still Minister of the Interior, had declared that it was the moral duty of the Netherlands to stand up for the right to self-determination. Similar noises could be heard from the side of the ARP. In addition, the facts continued to require attention. On 10 May 1968, the influential *Volkskrant* published an explicitly critical article about the situation in New Guinea, whose prisons were jam-packed as the result of the suppression of freedom of speech.[11] The government ought to take into account a potential mood change and should act with care.

In this spirit, Luns then took a few steps. In July 1968, he visited Indonesia where he discussed the plebiscite question with Suharto on the 4th of that month. The president indicated the objections to it that were present in Indonesia. He promised that it would go on, nevertheless, but asked for understanding for the special circumstances. Luns reacted a bit stiffly. He expressed his concern to Malik about the situation in New Guinea and explained that for the Netherlands the issue of the plebiscite was not a matter of power politics but of principle.[12] After his return to the Netherlands he paid a visit to the American embassy. According to Ambassador Tyler's report, he had been in a bitter mood on that occasion. He hauled the Americans over the coals concerning their earlier conduct with regard to the New Guinea question and pointed to the resulting responsibilities they had. At the same time, Maclaine Pont, a colleague at the Netherlands Embassy, was paying a visit to the State Department to ask the Americans to support a reliable implementation of the Act of Free Choice. Both Tyler and Schiff, the Netherlands ambassador in Jakarta, attributed these steps of Luns to a need to cover himself against potential parliamentary criticism.

This was undoubtedly justified. Less justified was the fact that Schiff relayed his personal opinion to his American colleagues in Jakarta, adding that it would be unwise to put pressure on the Indonesian government now. In his judgement, Luns' approach was nothing but a tactical step to strengthen Malik's position. This was transmitted to Washington immediately. Maclaine Pont had also made it clearly known to the State Department that things were not as dark as they seemed. With an introduction like this, Luns' attitude was not taken all that seriously by the State Department and the desired result was not forthcoming. It can be said that his officials did not serve their minister well.

Nevertheless, New Guinea regained its prominent place on the Netherlands agenda. In her opening speech to parliament in September, Queen Juliana declared she set great store by the upcoming plebiscite in this former part of the Kingdom.[13]

The contradictory reactions of Luns and his diplomats were expressing a dilemma that now faced the Dutch policy. The events in Indonesia after the coup, and especially Sukarno's departure, had drawn wide attention and reinforced the hope for better relations with Indonesia. During his discussion with Suharto on 4 July, Luns had been reserved concerning New Guinea but little of that was noticeable to the outside world. Generally speaking, the atmosphere was good and the tone in the Indonesian press had been extremely positive. In a subsequent discussion with the Cabinet, Luns indicated that the mood in Indonesia had improved and that interest in renewed cooperation with the Netherlands was coming alive again.[14] This was also the experience of a group of nineteen members of the Dutch parliament who had visited Indonesia shortly thereafter and attended the 17 August celebrations. The people at the American embassy in the Indonesian capital had observed the event with some amazement. They noted how old contacts were picked up again with mutual pleasure and how cabinet members who had never been on Java before were moving about as if they were at home. The parliamentarians showed no inclination to burn their fingers in New Guinea and both the parliament's chairman, Van Thiel and the PvdA (Labour Party) senator, J. Burger let it be known publicly that there was no future for West Irian without Indonesia. The interactive tone demonstrated that the Netherlands' priorities had shifted. Still, it was clear that something had to happen in New Guinea and, on Dutch initiative, the issue was now brought up in conversations with the president, with Minister Malik, and in numerous personal conversations. At its departure, the parliamentary delegation expressed its concern about the West Irian situation, but emphasized the official Netherlands stance that is was no longer the business of the Netherlands.[15] In a post-mortem in the Cabinet, Luns drew the conclusion that the Netherlands would only be able to accomplish something for New Guinea if it were to use a coercive measure by threatening the end of economic and financial aid, but at the same time he was incontestably sure that the Cabinet would find no one either in the business world or in parliament willing to hear of this.[16]

In Jakarta it was more difficult to shrug off the matter. The Act of Free Choice was on the agenda after Suharto had promised that Indonesia would also implement this part of the New York Agreement. Within the circle of men with which Suharto had surrounded himself, opinions were widely divided on the

question of how the matter should be handled. Among others places, this had already been demonstrated in a cabinet discussion in February 1968. The Minister of Foreign Affairs, Adam Malik, had taken the position then that the pacts made in the New York Agreement should be followed. This would require that the army sing a different tune and part of the troops be withdrawn from West Irian. In the run-on phase toward the plebiscite, it would be important to try to win over the leading Papuans. The mood could be enhanced by improving the supply of goods. In fact, this did get started.[17] In addition, the administrative element was placed more in the forefront. The Minister of the Interior, General Basuki Rachmat, was appointed as 'project-holder.' In principle, he thereby took over the co-ordinating duties of the West Irian Secretariat. An interdepartmental commission headed by Maramis was formed as well, which was to focus particularly on the right to self-determination in West Irian.[18] On the other hand, the number of troops was not reduced. The army had its hands full with reining in the already existing unrest so that, in fact, its leadership was urging for reinforcements to be sent. These did arrive and in the year 1968 military operations regularly took place in the Bird's Head, for which several thousand troops were brought in.[19]

Discord grew because Malik had come up with the plan to visit the region again with a number of journalists. By doing this, he was taking a big risk, for such a venture could easily go wrong. We have already seen that the Fundwi report—unfamiliar to him—offered plenty of reasons for this. Its tenor might well have been known to him, not only from personal observations but also from news provided by the Australian journalist Hastings who, with his cooperation, had only just visited the region. In the latter's own words, he had found a chaotic situation there and it had cost him the greatest difficulty afterwards to write a piece that wouldn't cause his own patron too much grief. He made it amply clear that a team of journalists who were not very up on the matter would not understand what was actually going on, so that Malik would be wiser to stay home.

The minister responsible, Rachmat, shared this concern. And justifiably so. However, the question remains whether as far as Hastings was concerned this opinion may not have been in defiance of the journalistic ethic of the free gathering of news. It seems that he had difficulties with competition in his own area.[20] In any case, Malik didn't let such thoughts get in his way. He was still hoping to save the day by a conciliatory attitude towards the Papuans and the world press and also to build an optimal relationship with Ortiz Sanz thereby. As he saw it, it was a necessary condition to attain an acceptable result in the upcoming Act of Free Choice. To this end, a clear majority vote in the plebiscite would be enough for Indonesia in his opinion. In this respect, his viewpoint

differed from that of the military and the more ardent nationalists who had no intention of being satisfied with anything less than a hundred per cent.

All in all, this contradiction contained the possibility of a conflict between Malik, the military, and the nationalistic elements in Jakarta. To offer some counterbalance, Brigadier General Sarwo Edhie was now appointed as military commander of the forces in West Irian. Sarwo Edhie had been one of the loyal comrades of Suharto during his struggle for power and had made a robust stand in the operations against the communists in central Java and the rebels in Aceh. According to the sharp observations of journalist Brian May, he was 'a face saver with that curious blend of bullying and sentimental appeal at which the Javanese excel.' May's colleague Hastings thought him to be a cocky guy with blood on his hands who had failed as peacemaker in Aceh.[21] Later on, Ortiz Sanz would have more positive things to say about him and praise him for his communication skills. Indeed, Sarwo Edhie immediately presented himself publicly as the smooth executor of Suharto's line. His oft-repeated message was that the Act of Free Choice would come but that the Papuans shouldn't get any funny ideas.[22]

So much for the positions of the Dutch and the Indonesians. Finally, there was the third group, namely the Americans. They, too, had been present at the birth of the New York Agreement, although, at the time, they hadn't been particularly keen on the Papuans' right to self-determination. It had been the pet topic of the Netherlands, not theirs. Still, they also believed that it was important for reasons of international prestige that the final round be properly handled. However, it wasn't necessary to exaggerate and the statement Ortiz Sanz had made in Washington that he did not want to direct a farce had produced nervous reactions in American circles in Jakarta. Ambassador Green instantly noted that anyone who would trumpet such things around in the Indonesian capital would land in deep trouble. What was the man thinking? The advice came that he should be given a talking to by Sudjatmoko, the Indonesian ambassador at the United Nations, so that he would gain better insight into reality. This sat well with Washington, for the State Department did not want to end up in a position where it would have to impose the Indonesian standpoint on the United Nations or on the Netherlands itself. When the Dutch diplomats in Washington and New York were probed on this, the concerns were partially erased. Luns' bark would be worse than his bite if things were to come to a head, was the message from that side. Moreover, Plimsoll, the American representative at the United Nations, read Ortiz Sanz the riot act before he departed for Jakarta, urgently calling on their personal friendship. He also attempted to mediate in his contacts with Sudjatmoko. This seemed to be successful, for Ortiz let it be known through his American interlocutors that he was inclined

to have faith in the goodwill of the Indonesians and that he planned not to interpret his task too strictly. Furthermore, he promised to remain in discreet touch with Ambassador Green in Jakarta.[23]

While these efforts at diplomatic massage were taking place, the small circle of American, Netherlands, and Australian diplomats in Jakarta was busily exchanging ideas with Adam Malik about the form of the Act of Free Choice. His basic principle appeared to be promising: the choice was to be made by a representative body, organized along the lines of the New Guinea Council. They were thinking of a system of appointments, supplemented by elections where possible. This reference to the New Guinea Council was accurate only to a very minor degree, however. After all, when that council was formed, the elective element had been crucial and appointments merely an addendum. In the bodies now to be formed, matters were the reverse from the very start. Even where elections were technically possible, they would not be allowed to take place unconditionally. Malik announced that Indonesia could not work with free electoral registers. It would have to have its finger in the pie more solidly in their creation, so that it would be able to make its own decisions concerning those who could participate in the elections. In this his target was the 'election' of natural leaders, whom he indicated were 'tribal chiefs.' A first delegation of such chiefs had already been invited to attend the upcoming 17 August celebration in Jakarta, where they were thoroughly pampered.[24]

Ortiz Sanz's first steps

Ortiz Sanz left for Indonesia a few days before the country was to celebrate the 23rd anniversary of the proclamation of independence on 17 August 1968. Even during the trip, he made it clear to the outside world that he had taken the American lessons to heart. When he passed through Hong Kong, he told the awaiting press that Indonesia was a great and important country. It would be his task 'to advise and assist the Suharto Government and to participate in carrying out the Act of Free Choice.'[25] This was in harmony with the text of the New York Agreement, while he would need further to discuss the interpretation of these words with his Indonesian colleagues. In this statement he made it clear that he would not be leading the plebiscite, however it might be organized. This was important because Indonesia had been extremely parsimonious in providing information on the question of what the upcoming UN operation was actually about. In West Irian, too, things remained exceedingly unclear and expectations among the politically aware Papuans were high.

A busy period followed for Sanz after he arrived in Jakarta on 15 August. The first few days were occupied with mutual introductions, during which Ortiz especially liked Minister Rachmat. Furthermore, the immediate future would

also bring him in close contact with Sudjarwo, whom he already knew. He paid a visit to President Suharto as well, who promised him full cooperation. He attended the latter's speech at the opening of parliament in which Suharto confirmed once again that Indonesia would observe the stipulations of the New York Agreement. On 22 August 1968, Sarwo Edhie called the press together in Jakarta for an important announcement. It was attended by fifty journalists, some of them from the West, who had been invited to accompany Adam Malik on his journey to West Irian, which had been announced long before. The general declared that in the Bird's Head nine thousand rebels had just surrendered and that the capitulation of the remaining two thousand was now only a matter of time. He also declared that 43 of the 152 captives in the various towns of West Irian would be set free. The message was clear. The rebellion was under control, and thus the first condition of smoothly managing the Act of Free Choice had been met.[26]

That same day the delegation, led by Malik, left for West Irian. Once there, it visited Biak, Sukarnopura, and Manokwari. In Sukarnopura the group attended a meeting of the members of the provincial council, supplemented by a number of Papuans, invited specifically for the occasion. The minister gave an explanation of the Indonesian plans, but the crux of his speech stated that it was God's will for West Irian to belong to Indonesia.[27] In spite of this, the journalists reported his attitude as mostly positive. This was particularly true for the American colleagues who had been given a good talking-to at their embassy in Jakarta. From the Dutch journalists who were present the noises were more critical. They were shocked by the fear the Papuans showed to be seen speaking with them. Those who did dare asked for independence and handed out anti-Indonesian texts. The rancour was greater than expected. The reporter of the Indonesian daily paper *Sinar Harapan* saw matters in a different light. He made scornful remarks about the 'Heineken-Papuans' who, by drinking beer from the Netherlands era, were spoiled to the core. The same paper did imply, however, that there was much that was wrong but attributed this to the fact that the administration had not yet changed hands and that the clique around Sukarno was setting the tone. Moreover, the paper remained loyal to the motto that Suharto had provided, saying that choosing anything other than the red-and-white Indonesian flag should be marked as treason. In what he observed, Bob Hawkins of the *Far Eastern Economic Review* saw a confirmation of the toughening of the hard military line.[28] From every side, the group was handed news about OPM attacks on Indonesian posts in Sukarnopura. During the visit, Malik personally intervened by promising a general pardon to the rebels who had not yet surrendered. His utterances always attested to goodwill, of which all the journalists made careful note in their articles. It gave them the opportunity

to show that the situation may well be wretched but that under the New Order that Suharto had established there was hope for a turn for the better.

That same 22 August, Ortiz Sanz also began his first visit to West Irian. He made the trip in the same plane as Malik and his group. Ortiz Sanz would be staying in West Irian until 12 September. He had three co-workers with him, while Sudjarwo and his staff accompanied him for the entire journey. The trip gave him the chance to gain a first impression of the country and its population and to make it clear to the outside world that now the Act of Free Choice had truly been initiated. It also enabled him to set up an office in Sukarnopura. From the Indonesian side the visit was well prepared. At his arrival, the police's duties had been largely taken over by the army and throughout the rest of his stay the mission's contact with the Papuan population was closely watched at all times.[29] Due to Sudjarwo's presence, this first visit was highly official whereby the hosts pointed out to Ortiz Sanz how much progress had been made over the recent years in the fields of education and integration into the Indonesian world. Ortiz Sanz himself kept his eyes and ears wide open so that it didn't take him long to figure out that something was wrong with this positive image. As soon as he arrived at Sentani airport, he found Papuan youth demonstrating for freedom awaiting the group. Throughout his journey hundreds of letters and petitions were slipped to him from Papuans lamenting the oppression and the lack of freedom of speech. He read them carefully. At the end of this first visit, he reported in writing to U Thant that the Indonesians were unsure about the outcome of a plebiscite and, to be on the safe side, wanted to leave it to as small a delegation as possible, which the government itself would appoint. He himself now also took the stance that it would not be possible to have the people vote individually and directly in every region. He did, however, set a clear condition for this. If they would have to work with representative councils, those would have to be as large as possible and established as much as possible according to democratic lines.[30] He did not hide this opinion from his immediate entourage so that rather quickly an uncomfortable relationship arose between the two protagonists in the drama.

Back in Jakarta, he let the diplomats with whom he was in contact know that he had a good relationship with Sudjarwo, but that the latter was constantly trying to put the brakes on him. His attitude toward the press was somewhat reserved, although he proved willing to let them know that the great majority of the region's population still had no inkling whatsoever of what to expect. Therefore, there was a fine informative task set aside for the UN team. He assured the journalists that he would do his utmost to make sure the voice of the population would be heard. He also told them that he had received a number of

petitions and letters in which Papuans expressed their opinions. Although this trip had taken place under Indonesian supervision, he would do independent research on the next occasion so that he could determine the real feelings of the population. Even if responsibility for the implementation of the Act of Free Choice was completely in Indonesia's hands that did not prevent him from doing his very best to keep its democratic level as high as possible. Indeed, that was the essence of the term 'participate' in his instructions.

He was even more open toward his Indonesian hosts. At a reception given in his honour in Jakarta at the home of the Minister of the Interior, Basuki Rachmat, he made it no secret that in his opinion, should the Papuans not choose for Indonesia, it would be best to let them have their way. The Indonesians present listened to these remarks without any comment but we may assume that they were not amused.[31]

He left for his second visit to Sukarnopura on 10 October 1968, this time with his wife and a somewhat larger staff of initially six persons. In the months to come that number would increase to twelve. At the urging of Indonesia, the staff was kept as small as possible. At first there was no one in the group who spoke Dutch or Indonesian, which made them entirely dependent on their Indonesian companions. Not until April 1969 did the mission acquire the American student Peter Jennings, who had a limited knowledge of Indonesian.[32] The local key figure was his political secretary, the Iranian Ali Nekunam, who would occupy his UN post in Sukarnopura almost permanently.

Together with his staff members he deepened his knowledge of the region, insofar as this was possible in view of the language barrier, of course, and the fact that he was surrounded continually by Indonesian military and officials. Divided into three teams, he and his co-workers visited Sorong, Manokwari, Biak (team I), Merauke and Agats (team II), Kokonao, Waghete, Nabire, Bokondini, and the Wissel Lakes (team III) in November and December. The latter team consisted of seven persons and was led by Ortiz Sanz himself. During these visits, the teams provided information about upcoming events and admonished the population to keep calm. In Sanz's own words, they were warmly welcomed everywhere. He did have to conclude that anti-Indonesian feelings were unmistakably alive among the population, whose strength was difficult to assess.[33] Self-evidently, discontented Papuans were the group's target and, to the dismay of his Indonesian hosts, he took their complaints seriously. In contrast to Rolz-Bennett at an earlier time, he gave the people the opportunity to approach him. Thus he made it his custom immediately to collect the petitions and complaints presented. He made detailed summaries of their content from which he carefully omitted any personal information. He

submitted a first collection of these petitions to Sudjarwo when the latter arrived in Jayapura on 12 November. He did so with the respectful request that he familiarize himself with them and, whenever needed, take action as well.

The documents contained examples of harsh Indonesian behaviour that extended from the period of 12 August to shortly before the date of the transfer. Mention was made of hundreds of captured, countless dead, bombings, and burnt-down villages. The material showed great ferocity and the data were specific enough, particularly when the personal information held back from Indonesia was available, to be examined more closely if the UN should wish to do an inspection on the ground. Indeed, that was what the majority of those who lodged the complaints expected. This first collection also contained a number of documents in which the writers expressed themselves in favour of Indonesia. They mentioned objections to the plebiscite as such. This sort of document increased the longer the UN mission stayed in West Irian. They originated almost always from civil servants or regional councils and presented the familiar texts of the previous anti-plebiscite campaigns.[34] Private observations from Ortiz Sanz to Rolz-Bennett clarify that he interpreted the increase in these anti-plebiscite documents as the result of an organized counter-operation from the Indonesian side. He did not appear to be particularly impressed and let it be known that he was not at all certain that, if these same council members and civil servants were given the chance, they would actually prove to be on Indonesia's side. From his end of things, Sudjarwo was definitely not pleased with the way in which Ortiz Sanz handled this material. With each new submission, he asked him suspiciously what he intended to do with it, sometimes adding somewhat scornfully that he had no authority whatsoever to deal with administrative issues. Such irritations were not swept away by Ortiz Sanz's repeated declarations that he fully recognized Indonesia's sovereign rights.[35]

Sudjarwo did little to suppress his irritation and told anyone who would listen that Ortiz Sanz didn't know his place. However, his attempts at keeping him out of New Guinea as much as possible didn't amount to much. Ortiz Sanz would not return from this second visit to West Irian until 7 January 1969, and thereafter would regularly spend time in the region, too. Of the one year that he was in Indonesia, he spent roughly half in West Irian, while most of his staff was there throughout the year. Despite the Indonesian security measures, this made it amply possible for the opposition groups to make their wishes known.

During his second stay in West Irian, Ortiz Sanz focused his attention on creating the most favourable circumstances possible for the implementation of the Act of Free Choice. To this end, good information was needed about the significance of the upcoming event, and then also about freedom of expression, of movement, a safe return for those who had fled abroad, and release of the many

political prisoners mentioned in the letters and petitions he received. He wrote memos about all of these issues to Sudjarwo who, according to Ortiz himself, always reacted 'promptly and positively' to them. On 28 October, the Indonesian government sent the members of the representative councils an informatory letter.[36] In a letter of 21 November, Sudjarwo explained to the UN representative that he needn't be concerned about the rights and freedoms of the inhabitants of West Irian because not only were they guaranteed in the New York Agreement, but also in the Indonesian constitution itself. He also seized the opportunity to explain in detail once again that the requests and petitions received could, therefore, only be coming from organizations that were hostile to Indonesia, which had established their headquarters in the Netherlands.[37] Sometime later, on 11 December, news arrived from Jakarta that fifty political prisoners who had been interned in labour camps on Java had been set free.[38] According to Indonesian data, up to the moment of the Act of Free Choice a total of 346 political prisoners would be released, among whom the former governor, Bonay. However, there was no reaction to Ortiz Sanz's request for a complete list, including all the prisoners' names. Yet, he did receive the promise that all those who had fled abroad but now wanted to devote themselves to the development of the country could return. In fact, the various Indonesian embassies in Australia and the Netherlands announced that Papuans who so desired could return to their country to participate in the Act of Free Choice.[39]

All of this was important for creating the preconditions under which the plebiscite was to take place but, obviously, the most important question was how the Act of Free Choice, as mentioned in the Agreement, was to be organized and implemented. This included who would be permitted to vote, what procedures should be followed, and what would be the options. Voting rights posed no problem. As the Agreement had stated, it would be the right of all women and men who were living in New Guinea at the time of the transfer. As far as the method to be followed was concerned, the text of the Agreement left some elbow room. At first, Ortiz Sanz's expectations in this respect were quite high. He had left for Indonesia in the expectation that the plebiscite would take place 'in accordance with international practice.' In this he was thinking of a plebiscite, a concept that contained a direct voting right of all enfranchised citizens. Based on the text of the Agreement this opinion was well justified. To be sure, during the negotiations the word '*musyawarah*' had been included in Article 18a to indicate the way in which the regional councils were to be heard concerning the method to be followed but, as we have seen also, the phrase that the plebiscite itself should be in harmony with international practice was later included in Article 18d.

In the report on his first trip Ortiz Sanz had already told U Thant and Rolz-Bennett that the Indonesian inclination did not tend towards a direct vote for every citizen. He had added that, up to a certain point, he was willing to go along with that. As a position to fall back upon he now suggested a mixed system of 'one man one vote' in the developed areas, supplemented by some form of delegation for the rest of the country. After all, this had also been the method by which the New Guinea Council had been established during the Dutch era. He did suspect, however, that his Indonesian interlocutors would tend to shrug this off somewhat too lightly. He thought he could find the confirmation of this suspicion in an informal discussion paper that Sudjarwo sent him on 1 October 1968. The title of this document, unfortunately not found in the UN archives, was: 'Some preliminary thoughts regarding the methods of the "Act of Free Choice"'.[40] In it there was a recommendation to leave the final choice to a 'renewed' provincial council of sixty members, supplemented by eighty appointed members from the various social-political groupings and sixty tribal chiefs chosen by the remaining 2,000 or 3,000 tribal chiefs. In this set-up, only a part of the latter group would owe its participation to some form of indirect election.

Nothing much was said about the way in which that body would express itself, but Ortiz Sanz gathered that it was to occur by way of *musyawarah*. This preference was emphasized once again in the previously mentioned Indonesian informatory bulletin of 28 October 1968. This document, also written by Sudjarwo, was intended for the local administrators in West Irian. It certainly was not an encouragement for truly discovering what the population actually thought. On the contrary. Not only did Sudjarwo declare the entire undertaking to be unnecessary, but he also posited in plain language that the method of a direct individual vote was absolutely unsuitable for West Irian's special circumstances. The choice would be made democratically but adjusted to the special circumstances of the region. As for the content of that choice, he recognized that it would deal with the question of whether the Papuans would remain as part of the Indonesian republic or separate from it. However, he made no attempts to hide the fact that he couldn't see how the latter would work. 'Heaven knows what they will become!' he complained in the English translation of this text.[41]

With these opening shots Ortiz Sanz was warned. He reacted with a memo of 4 November. In it he confronted Sudjarwo with the fact that his proposal completely bypassed the text of the New York Agreement. Although it did state that *musyawarah* would be used in the preliminary round, in which the local councils would give their opinion about the procedure, this was not to be the case in the actual decision itself. However, he did not reject the idea of making the

decision via an expanded provincial council right from the start. He made it clear that he saw this section of the Indonesian document as a useful point of departure for further discussion.[42]

Sudjarwo's arrival in West Irian on 8 November could have provided ample opportunity for this but not much came of it. Initially, the gentlemen were preoccupied primarily with the circumstances under which the Act of Free choice would take place. This concerned the release of prisoners and the freedom of expression and gathering. In and of itself this did not create any major problems but the atmosphere was ruined almost immediately when, on 12 November, Ortiz Sanz presented Sudjarwo with his first overview of the above-mentioned requests and petitions that the population had slipped to him and his colleagues. The matter of the plebiscite was dealt with more extensively in a discussion on 14 November. On that occasion, attention was focused particularly on the preliminary round, requested in article 18a, whereby the regency councils were to be asked for their opinion on the set-up. Ortiz Sanz suggested offering the members three clear-cut options. They should be asked whether they (1) wanted one man one vote, (2) wanted to leave the decision to a chosen college, (3) preferred a mixed form whereby 'one man one vote' would be valid in the urban centres while in the less developed areas of the interior the outcome would be reached by way of collective consultations. Following this, he made it clear that as the representative of the United Nations he had to speak out in favour of 'the democratic, orthodox and universally accepted method known as "one man one vote" ', but that he could well understand that in certain parts of the interior this might be difficult to attain. Therefore he declared himself willing to settle for the mixed method mentioned in point 3. If Indonesia were to accept this, then he would be willing to share the responsibility of bringing it to fruition.

This viewpoint was later recorded in a letter of 21 November to Sudjarwo.[43] In it, Ortiz Sanz added the clarification that although this third method was less than what the United Nations, based on the promises made by various Indonesian statesmen, should demand, under the circumstances it was 'nearest to perfection.' It would be to Indonesia's credit if the secretary general, in his final report to the United Nations General Assembly, could declare with a clear conscience that on this issue he had gone as far as the circumstances had allowed him to go. We should add that in his preliminary consultation with Rolz-Bennett he had already mentioned this intermediary solution as his first fall back position.

It seems that at the meeting of the 14th it was primarily Ortiz Sanz who had the floor. From his end, Sudjarwo limited himself to asking a few questions and then showed up a few days later with a somewhat disdainful

reaction to the 4 November letter of Ortiz Sanz. In it he claimed that the UN representative had not understood his earlier document of 1 October. His proposal to let an expanded provincial council make the choice was not intended to eliminate the preliminary round with the regency councils as mentioned in Article 18a of the Agreement, but merely as a suggestion to be presented to these councils. Certainly, this would be expressed via the system of a *musyawarah* method, but that was emphatically stated in the Agreement as well. It was an uncharitable piece of writing, particularly in view of the fact that this 'misunderstanding' could have easily been solved at the discussion of 14 November, had the will existed. Besides, in his letter he ignored the question about which voting process would be used in the definitive plebiscite. Obviously, that would not come up until the proposal for it had taken a more fixed shape but, from the correspondence around it, it had become quite clear that the system of 'one man one vote' was not the one Sudjarwo preferred. In a letter of 15 November he returned once more to the fact that the Act of Free Choice was not only unnecessary but was a hard sell inside the realm of domestic politics. He admitted that for reasons of international politics it was unavoidable and expressed the hope that they would both succeed in finding 'a simple, practical, and pragmatic solution' for the problem that was facing them.[44]

This correspondence closed the consultations in Sukarnopura. The result was that by arguing for a mixed voting method, Ortiz Sanz had taken a step back and ended up in a backward line of defence, as discussed beforehand with Rolz-Bennett. Sudjarwo stuck by his preference for an expanded provincial council to implement the Act of Free Choice and therefore had not given up his preference for *musyawarah*. The advantages and disadvantages of both positions were not discussed any further, while the tone of the correspondence indicates that during their joint stay in West Irian the relationship between the two had deteriorated significantly.

Shortly after receiving the 21 November letter Sudjarwo returned to Jakarta. There he must have complained to Adam Malik, for on 3 December the most important administrators of the UN secretariat in New York involved in the case were invited to lunch by the Indonesian permanent representative, Ruslan Abdulgani. Also present there were the Indonesian diplomats Anwar Sani and Maramis. During this conversation, which Rolz-Bennett reported as being amicable, they complained about the lack of understanding of Ortiz Sanz who, in their opinion, spent too much time in West Irian rather than in Jakarta. The Indonesian irritation at his interest in the Papuans' petitions remained barely beneath the surface. Furthermore, they expressed their concern over the fact that Ortiz Sanz was letting himself be led by the Fundwi staff in Sukarnopura,

who had been in the field there for several months already. That was not completely unjustified, for other sources reveal that the Swede S. Stein Roeed and the Dutchman Hans Reiff, stationed there, had a less than favourable impression of the Indonesian administration, which was no secret to Ortiz Sanz and his co-workers there. In addition, Abdulgani tried to move the discussion to a higher level by suggesting that Ortiz Sanz was living under the erroneous assumption that he was confronting a colonial issue, when the only issue was obtaining confirmation of something quite self-evident, namely that West Irian was a part of Indonesia![45]

Then there was the matter of the petitions. During the meetings in New York it was not touched upon, but in Jakarta Sudjarwo began to write a strongly worded counter-argument to the letter Ortiz Sanz had offered with the added petitions and requests.[46] Here he attempted to refute a number of the complaints the Papuans had presented. It made little difference, for, in the coming months and with the regularity of clockwork, Ortiz Sanz would deposit new and similar collections on his desk. These did increasingly contain pro-Indonesian pronouncements. In the first collection of 12 November, nine of the forty submitted documents can be characterized as pro-Indonesian. When the final collection was submitted on 30 April 1969, the number of petitions had grown to 179, of which no more than forty per cent expressed itself against the plebiscite and for the union of Sabang to Merauke.[47] As said before, it was Ortiz Sanz's opinion that to a great extent this was a counteraction organized from the Indonesian end. On the other hand, he did not automatically take for granted that anti-Indonesian actions were entirely spontaneous either. He assumed, and rightly so, that the encouragement from the leaders abroad, specifically from Jouwe's freedom committee, played an important role in this. By reviewing the documents, we are able to conclude that the uniformity of the pro-Indonesian documents was extremely great, in contrast to the petititions against, that went more deeply into actual events and contained data that would have been verifiable for a UN research team, had it been permitted to go into the field. However, that was absolutely out of the question within the room that the Agreement allowed.

Interim consultations in The Hague and New York

After the consultation with Ortiz Sanz in Sukarnopura had come to a standstill in a mutual settling of viewpoints, Sudjarwo left for Jakarta towards the end of November for further deliberations in his own circle. It is important to note here that he left a group of co-workers from the central administration behind in West Irian, who were to occupy themselves with the practical preparation for the upcoming Act of Free Choice. He himself further refined his own

proposals in Jakarta. The ministers Malik and Basuki Rachman fully participated in these deliberations. Early in January 1969, the plans were deemed ready for discussion with the representative of the United Nations. They still stuck to the principle that there would be no question of a direct individual vote for the population as a whole, not even in the more developed areas. In addition, they still started from the idea of forming a special electoral college to implement the Act of Free Choice. However, they had moved away from the concept of a renewed provincial council as a forum to make the decision. The emphasis now was on the eight regency councils that had been created a year earlier. These had been intended as advisory bodies for local issues, appointed and dismissed by the minister of the Interior. They consisted of twenty-five individuals each, a third of whom were military. The plan now was to take the Papuans within these councils as the point of departure and expand their number with roughly twenty 'tribal chiefs' per council. Thus reshaped and supplemented, there would be eight 'consultative councils' that could take charge of the Act of Free Choice. It was the task of these councils to record the opinion of the people (*Penentuan Pendapat Rakjat*). In Indonesian these Consultative Councils would therefore be referred to as Pepera councils. The information available does not clarify to what extent the regency councils had already been formed at that moment. In all likelihood it was the task of the officials Sudjarwo had left behind to lend a hand in this effort and give advice in selecting suitable individuals.

At Malik's request, Ortiz Sanz returned to Jakarta on 7 January for further discussions with him and Minister Rachmat, who was to die unexpectedly a few days thereafter. The first conversation took place as early as 8 January and concentrated on the usefulness of the system, argued by the UN representative, of a direct individual vote in the urban areas. They made it clear to him that neither of the two ministers wanted anything to do with that. Malik now used the argument that it would set a bad example for the rest of Indonesia where popular participation occurred exclusively in the form of *musyawarah*. Surely the primitive Papuans shouldn't acquire more rights than the so much farther advanced people of Java and Sumatra! Ortiz Sanz defended his proposal with the suggestion that Malik would be wise to take a risk in this case. His own proposal was fully in the spirit of the New York Agreement and, if this were not implemented, the suppressed political riots would increase, only to explode violently afterwards. He added that, according to his observations, there were undoubtedly serious nationalist feelings within some of the sectors of the region's population.[48]

Needless to say, this was not the way to solve anything but neither did the two parties want matters to come to a head. Ortiz Sanz limited himself to the

conclusion that there was little else he could do, whereupon he informed U Thant that the Act could not be implemented in accordance with international practice. It was his advice in that case to let the Dutch and the Indonesians together work out as realistic an interpretation as possible. His expectations of such an effort were not very high. In a personal letter to Rolz-Bennett he stated that he could foresee having to accept one more step backwards in his line of defence. This amounted to letting Indonesia have its way and letting the United Nations emphatically reject any joint responsibility for any of it. He did not draw the conclusion that he himself would do better to go home, for that would have proven the failure of his mission. He impressed upon his superiors that he could still adjust matters from the sidelines, among other things by trying to make the voting body as large and representative as possible. To keep up appearances where the outside world was concerned, he provided an overblown press release about the results he had achieved so far while in consultation with the headquarters in New York. The need to attain a success for the UN was a priority for both the secretary general and himself.[49]

With the discussions between Sudjarwo and Ortiz Sanz about the democratic standard of the Act of Free Choice having come to a standstill, the attention of the negotiators both in New York and in Jakarta shifted to The Hague. Sudjarwo set out and presented himself on 17 January to Minister Luns at the Netherlands parliament. He complained to him about Ortiz Sanz who initially had shown understanding of the Indonesian position that, for practical reasons, there could be no question of 'one man one vote' but who now, after a lengthy stay in West Irian, had changed his mind. If he was going to stick to his proposal for a system of direct voting, at least in the urban areas, then the Indonesian government would end up in a most difficult position. He then declared that he wanted to verify with U Thant and Rolz-Bennett in New York to what extent Ortiz Sanz was or was not acting as directed. Finally, he let it be known that a bilateral understanding with the Netherlands would not be unwelcome to his government. Luns reacted coolly. He recognized that the Agreement made in 1962 concealed seeds of difficulty but that nothing could be done about that now. The primary goal of his policy was to prevent any new friction from arising between the Netherlands and Indonesia from the final settlement of the Act of Free Choice. Therefore it was in the interest of both to emphatically underscore the responsibility of the United Nations.[50]

Further contacts in The Hague generally went through the recently returned Ambassador Schiff, who had just been named secretary general of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. There, Sudjarwo came back in more detail to his suggestion, already made to Luns, to leave the United Nations alone and to finalize the Act of Free Choice in consultation with the Netherlands. In view of the Dutch

position, this was out of the question and Schiff stood resolutely by the position Minister Luns had articulated that the Netherlands had no responsibility in these matters. Sudjarwo, who apparently had not expected anything else, resigned himself to this without any further protest. For the rest, he had no complaints about the way he was received. The satisfaction that the Netherlands parliamentary mission to Indonesia had felt about the new cooperation continued. People liked him and even the rigid CHU politician, Tilanus managed to appreciate him. Only the small Christian parties kept grumbling, but that had no effect. Luns himself was of the opinion that it should be clear by now to Sudjarwo that Indonesia had nothing to fear from the Netherlands as long as that country, together with the United Nations, was to achieve an optimally free expression of opinion.[51]

After this warm welcome in The Hague, Sudjarwo continued on to New York. There he was received a little more coolly but the result was the same. U Thant pointed to the necessity of implementing the stipulations of the New York Agreement to the letter and advised him to come to an understanding with Ortiz Sanz in Jakarta. After all, he was well-informed of the situation on site and had proven to have an understanding for the local circumstances and the political difficulties of Indonesia. With this answer, the ball was back in Jakarta's court, where Ortiz Sanz had been kept informed by Rolz-Bennett of the result of the discussions in New York. He let him know on 30 January that the secretary general had not bound himself in any way, 'but that from the understanding he had shown for the local circumstances one could assume that it was his opinion that this should be taken into serious consideration.' It was a barely disguised directive to Ortiz Sanz to give in to Indonesian wishes.[52]

At that time, Sudjarwo had been back for a week or so in Jakarta for consultations with his staff and with the generals Ali Murtopo and Sunarso, who acted as advisors to Suharto. Up to a certain point, Ortiz Sanz was caught up in these as well. Sudjarwo went through the most important details with him, from which Ortiz Sanz gained the impression that it might still be possible for part of the local consultative councils to be elected by universal suffrage. He was also present at two meetings held at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on 10 and 11 February. These led to his making a public statement afterwards, at the request of the Indonesian government, in which he once again said emphatically that his task consisted of advising, supporting, and participating in the implementation of the Act of Free Choice, which was to take place in accordance with international practice. He now added that thereby the special circumstances of region and population needed to be taken into consideration. Thus he had taken the lesson from New York to heart, while the limitations of his task had

been brought forcefully to the attention of the public once again. It could be seen as preparatory to a step back on his part.

This was equally true for the second part of the declaration, which referred to the continual flow of petitions and requests being submitted by Papuan malcontents and others to the representatives of the United Nations in Jakarta and Sukarnopura. Ortiz Sanz had mentioned these in his communiqués meant for the outside world, about which Sudjarwo had made serious complaints during his visits to The Hague and New York, albeit without getting any response. This matter was not only disturbing to Indonesia but dangerous as well because too much emphasis on the unrest in West Irian could instigate an international debate, which was the last thing that was needed. The internal discussion threatened to become unpleasant enough already. In his note of 30 December on the subject Sudjarwo had tried to denigrate or ridicule the various complaints, or else blame them on foreign troublemaking.[53] In a rather sharply worded reaction, Ortiz Sanz had admitted on 21 January that it was hard to infer the true state of the people's opinions from these documents, but that he still expected to be able to form a balanced final judgement at a later stage.[54] So, the matter was as yet unresolved. This was an unpleasant message for Sudjarwo, who had presented the pro-Indonesian petitions as proof for his thesis that the population wished to remain part of Indonesia, and that the suggested *musyawarah* method was more than sufficient to confirm it. The interpretation of these documents was most definitely an important element in this discussion and, upon further research, it might turn out that Ortiz Sanz was holding the better cards.

However, after receiving the directive for indulgence from New York, Ortiz Sanz no longer played these cards as keenly. In his public statement of 11 February, he was surprisingly accommodating on this point, which had been so essential to him.[55] In his statement he now sketched an image of the documents received that heavily supported the Indonesian picture. His readers were led to understand that the pro-Indonesian documents set the tone and that the rest were a marginal phenomenon that should be respected out of basic courtesy. That took the sting out of the discussion. Subsequently, Ortiz Sanz continued to collect Papuan complaints and requests, but he never came back to it again publicly. It was his way of indicating that henceforth he was willing to go along with the Indonesian wishes and proposals. It certainly showed that he had clearly understood the hint from New York and that he planned to bring his mission to an end that his bosses would find acceptable.

The further development of the Indonesian plans

Reassured by the flexibility Ortiz Sanz had demonstrated, the Indonesian planners then continued on their intended course. The end result was made public

in Jakarta on 17 February and in writing to Ortiz Sanz a day later. The proposals formed an elaboration of the ideas previously discussed and contained at most a cosmetic concession to the objections the UN representative had offered. The role of the provincial council as the executor of the Act of Free Choice had been dropped. With it, the concept of a final ceremony was abandoned as well. Officially, this was done to avoid logistical complications and that undoubtedly was a convincing argument. Additionally, the more difficult manageability of such a mass meeting in the capital of the province must also have played its part.

The electoral college for the Act of Free Choice would now be formed by the Papuan members of the eight regency councils, supplemented by representatives of functional groups and traditional leaders. As a starting point there were six such regencies or 'kabupaten', formed from the six former residencies. These were now supplemented by two recently formed kabupaten, Paniai and Sorong. Paniai comprised the region of the Wissel Lakes to the coast, with Enarotali and Nabire as the most important towns. An already planned ninth kabupaten, namely Japen-Waropen, had not yet been created. The Act of Free Choice itself would thus be implemented by eight separate consultative meetings or Pepera councils, to be held consecutively.

As far as the composition of these consultative meetings was concerned, the principle of proportional representation would be followed, whereby the number of representatives per regency was to be proportional to the population. The point of departure was a ratio of 750 voters per council member. As the size of the regencies' populations varied from 35,000 to 165,000 individuals, the size of the councils to be created would have to increase more or less in direct proportion. Thus it was deemed appropriate that the memberships would run from 75 to a maximum of 175 members per consultative council. Together, the total number of members of the eight councils would come to 125,000 people. The choice would be made by way of *musyawarah*, explained as 'a decision based on discussion, understanding and knowledge of a problem'.[56]

Upon receiving the decision, Ortiz Sanz reacted as he had already told Rolz-Bennett in September of the previous year.[57] Indonesia had not adopted his suggestions for direct elections. That was its right and he accepted it as such. It had now presented its own proposal for a representative council that was to make the decision in question. In and of itself that was not such a bad idea. The system of a popular decision via a representative council was highly justifiable and followed the internationally common and very respectable form of a constitutional convention. Still, the democratic calibre of this approach was not as high as the UN had foreseen so that the latter no longer needed to bear any joint responsibility for it. Therefore, in Ortiz Sanz's own opinion, the representative

of the United Nations was henceforth immune to criticism. From here on in, his participation would consist merely of a continued effort to improve the process via publicity, consultation, and participation, and thus make it as democratic as possible.[58]

In that respect his expectations were still positive. After all, the Indonesian government had taken his advice on a number of important points. This was true specifically for the number of council members, which was considerably larger than had originally been planned. He had also concluded from his conversations with Sudjarwo that it would still be possible to have a sizeable number of the supplementary members of the consultative councils elected. In spite of the limitations, it seemed to be a workable plan. To Rolz-Bennett he conveyed extreme pleasure with the Indonesian promises of a continued informational campaign, the permission to allow Papuans in exile to return to West Irian, and the release of prisoners so that they, too, could participate in the Act of Free Choice.[59]

The question remains what the basis might have been for Ortiz Sanz's optimism. In fact, after Sudjarwo's visit to The Hague and New York, the Indonesian government had an open field. True, this diplomat had not acquired any endorsements for the Indonesian plans, but neither had he run into any meaningful resistance. Indonesia could therefore draw the conclusion that it need not expect any serious opposition from its partners in the Agreement, confirmed by the subsequent deliberations with Ortiz Sanz in Jakarta and the latter's declaration of 11 February. Such was precisely the conclusion that Indonesia did draw. From that moment on, it acted in accordance with its own insights and at its own discretion, for which the Agreement gave it plenty of room.

At that moment, Ortiz Sanz still believed that there would be an opportunity to have at least some elected members of the consultative councils, while he still hadn't given up hope either that, for the Act of Free Choice itself, the council members might express themselves individually. One needed to be an optimist to believe this, especially after the earlier conversation with Malik about the impracticability of 'one man one vote' in the Indonesian context. From conversations between the Indonesian negotiators and the American diplomat Lydman it is amply clear that the Indonesian government had not moved an inch from this standpoint. On 17 February, Malik told Lydman in so many words that they would use the *musyawarah* method both for the election of the council members and for the popular decision. He added in confidence that it was only Ortiz Sanz who was still being obstructive with his 'one man one vote.' However, the Indonesian minister implied that one need not worry about that too much because the Dutch had actually approved the Indonesian proposals.

For this Malik based himself on Sudjarwo, who had stated on that occasion that his interlocutors in The Hague had told him in January that *musyawarah* was the only practical method by which to implement the New York Agreement.[60] However, this is definitely not in accord with the internal reports of Luns, Schiff, Udink, and Biesheuvel about their meetings with Sudjarwo. They only report that they had let him calmly speak his mind without any commitment whatsoever from their end. On the other hand, their reports also show that Sudjarwo was not easily daunted and was inclined to twist information. Thus, during his second visit to The Hague after his return from New York, he had told Udink and Schiff that U Thant would be able to reconcile himself with the Indonesian plan to hold the plebiscite by means of *musyawarah* via the expanded regency councils to be established, and that therein they could count on the full support of New York.[61] As we have seen, that is at loggerheads with the report that Rolz-Bennett sent to Ortiz Sanz.

Obviously, it is not impossible that from his conversations both in The Hague and in New York Sudjarwo may have had the impression that he would have free play. The distance between listening willingly and agreeing need not be all that great. In any event, the fact is that he was able to shout it from the rooftops with impunity. It also meant that henceforth the UN representative could be considered a negligible quantity. While Ortiz Sanz was still cheerfully reporting that he would continue 'participating in the act of Free Choice,'[62] in reality, if he was quick enough to get there, he would be allowed to be present at the various events but he was to have no say in any shape or form in its execution.

It was in that spirit that matters were dealt with from then on. After the plans were made public, Suharto's advisor Ali Murtopo paid a visit to West Irian for a first consultation with the local authorities. He used the occasion to rename Sukarnopura, the former Hollandia, and call it *Jayapura*, the City of Victory. In the Carstensz Mountains something changed as well. The former Wilhelmina Peak, renamed Sukarno Peak in 1963, now became *Puncak Jaya*.[63] Thereby this far corner of the archipelago had received the stamp of the New Order. After returning on 26 February, Ali Murtopo stated to the press that the Netherlands government and the secretary general of the United Nations, as well as the latter's representative in West Irian had approved the Indonesian plans. That may have been incorrect, but his words did not meet with any protest from either the Netherlands or the United Nations. Furthermore, he clarified once again that 'one man one vote' was not an Indonesian concept and that he expected the outcome to be nothing other than a choice for Indonesia. He elucidated this with the thesis that all those countries that recognized the Republic had

automatically accepted that West Irian was a part of it simply because it said so in the constitution. It was an argument that the American ambassador described as 'a curious twist of logic'.[64]

For the rest, matters were dealt with efficiently. Between 22 March and 12 April, the consultations with the regency councils mentioned in article 18a of the Agreement were held. For this purpose, Sudjarwo traveled with a number of colleagues to West Irian where he visited the capitals of the eight kabupaten. During that time, Ortiz Sanz was in Jayapura but didn't accompany the group. The UN task of 'assistance and participation' was left to members of his staff. The outcome was predictable. After elaborate deliberation, the council members present unanimously accepted the resolution proffered, in which the Act was declared unnecessary because West Irian already was part of Indonesia. If it still had to happen anyway, they were in full agreement with the proposal of the Indonesian government that it was to be implemented by each regency's consultative council, yet to be organized.

Thus the *Antara* news coverage and the text of the subsequent final report by Ortiz Sanz. This is not to say that there was no protest. The historian John Saltford mentions a report by the British journalist Garth Alexander, who attended the meeting in Merauke and noticed a sharp resistance to the government's plans there. It surely was not because it was a gratuitous exercise. In Paniai dissenting opinions were also heard. In addition, the UN report stated that at the session in Jayapura four speakers expressed themselves in favour of individual voting. It had produced no effect on the outcome, which in view of the prescribed *musyawarah* would not have been possible anyway. However, members of the local Fundwi team reported that the meeting of the regency council in Jayapura on 11 April had been accompanied by critical speeches whereupon at least a hundred men had been arrested.

At the end of the tour, the outcome was presented to the provincial council of West Irian that approved it on 24 April, also expressing the hope that the operation would not delay the five-year economic development plan that the government had promised. At that moment they had already started to appoint the supplementary members by which the regency councils would be transformed into consultative councils. According to the Indonesian plan, they would be nominated by ad hoc commissions from the regency councils.[65] Well before this time, a government team had been composed, led by the new Minister of the Interior, General Amir Machmud, whose task it was to direct the further progress of the Act of Free Choice.

The group arrived in Jayapura on 14 April where things still had not quieted down after the 11 April speeches. The minister was greeted at the airport by a crowd of Papuans demonstrating for the principle of 'one man, one vote'.[66]

During this phase of selecting the electorate for the Act of Free Choice, Ortiz Sanz's attitude was extremely passive. His reporting to New York does not show that he was aware of the March and April preparations made by the Indonesian authorities. His first news about Sudjarwo's mission to the regency councils dates to 17 April, when it was long done. His lack of knowledge and detachment caught the attention of staff members of the American embassy as well, who visited him in Jakarta when he returned from Jayapura on 25 April. On that occasion he abstained from any commentary on the course of events and remarked that the execution was entirely in the hands of the Indonesians. His role was limited to offering advice, which they were free to take or not. The American visitors were forced to conclude that the UN representative was now interested primarily in the question of what his final report should look like when the time came.[67]

Papuans in action

Resistance

The Indonesian preparations for the Act of Free Choice may have seemed irrelevant to the representative of the United Nations in the eyes of the world but the Papuans watched them with great concern. In the earlier chapters of this book we were able to observe the signs of a growing awareness of their common identity among the inhabitants of western New Guinea. Generally, its manifestations were diffident. Most Papuans had resigned themselves grudgingly to the new situation after 1962. Freedom of expression was not possible and the new rulers suppressed any expression of Papuan identity awareness with an iron hand. Even so, under these conditions a hard core had formed within the society that concentrated on active resistance. In the summer of 1969, Frits Kirihio estimated its size to be no greater than 150 individuals. That may have been so, but the number of supporters was undoubtedly much higher.[68] The approach of the Act of Free Choice sharpened the sense in many people that action was needed because the moment had come when the country and the people's future were to be decided.

With the arrival of Ortiz Sanz in August 1968, the Indonesian side had made preparations to reinforce its grip on the region.[69] This task had been entrusted to Brigadier Sarwo Edhie, Suharto's confidant. By his own admission, he had no more than six thousand troops available at that time. In the early months of 1969, that number was increased to ten thousand men,[70] according to Minister Amir Machmud, while at the time of the Act of Free Choice the number had grown to sixteen thousand men, according to a statement by Malik. That was

amply sufficient to keep any potential unrest under control. The spirit of the Indonesian administration is reflected loudly and clearly in the speech that Sudjarwo gave on 18 July 1968 to the students of the Tjendrawasih University. There he had explained to them that, indeed, an Act of Free Choice would take place but there could be no question of their voting for anything other than Indonesia. They shouldn't think that all the carrying on by Jouwe and consorts abroad would have any effect. Discussion was forbidden.

It was in the same spirit that the administration was reorganized. In that same year of 1968 the composition of the provincial council had been drastically revised. Individuals whose loyalty was doubted were incarcerated or replaced. Thus, all the soldiers of the Second Tjendrawasih Battalion were disarmed. The former governor, Bonay, had been imprisoned for a period of time in the summer 1968, while Tanggahma, now mistrusted, was fired from the service.[71] He was an exceedingly cautious man who had managed to combine his position as Jouwe's contact person with a number of important posts in the administration. The same thing happened to Herman Wajoi who, as vice-chairman of the provincial council, was still relaying messages about Indonesian military measures to the leaders of the Front Pembebasan Papua Barat as late as 25 June 1968.[72]

On the side of the resistance movement reorganization was also taking place at the time. Both the Indonesians and the Papuans usually referred to it under the collective name of Organisasi Papua Merdeka (OPM). Originally, Tanggahma was the central figure who acted as contact person with the leaders in exile in the Netherlands. Later Amos Indey and Clemens Runawery came forward as chairman and vice-chairman of the Front Pembebasan Papua Barat (FPPB). This 'Liberation Front for West Papua' was the consultative body of a number of resistance organizations whose primary goal it was to thwart the Indonesian army. Additionally, an important task consisted of relaying information to the outside world. Other than that, we should not think of either the OPM or the FPPB as close-knit organizations involving many people. We have already seen that Frits Kirihio mentioned 150 individuals as the hard core, operating within a far wider circle of kindred spirits. Collecting and conveying data was a question of improvising, much of which depended on taking opportunities which arose unexpectedly. To send gathered information abroad, they had to use every opportunity that cropped up. Sometimes this could be done via regular mail, using the detour via the Australian sector that was located close to Jayapura. It might be via a departing missionary, a businessman passing through, a journalist or a diplomat on a special mission. A useful midway station was the independence committee in Port Moresby, formed by Papuans who had fled to the Australian sector. The most important contact people

abroad were Jouwe and Kaisiepo who, as of 1964, had called themselves respectively President of West Papua and Chairman of the Freedom Committee. The links to Jouwe usually ran through the region of his birth near Jayapura, those to Kaisiepo via the Biak people. With the arrival of Ortiz Sanz and the establishment of his office in Jayapura, possibilities for these kinds of contacts expanded.

In addition to maintaining contact with the outside world, committing acts of violence was another item on the agenda of the resistance organizations. We have seen that attacks were made on Indonesian posts in Manokwari from early 1966 on, while minor acts of resistance were undertaken also in Biak, Jayapura, and other locations. These, too, showed no organized connection whatsoever although a given name might have suggested that. It is noteworthy that Ferry Awom showed no sign of any existing contacts with the OPM or the FPPB in his previously mentioned report of 20 July 1967. The actions were first and foremost local initiatives, born from a mix of general discontent and opportunities on the ground. The conditions for a higher level of organization were lacking. Land connections within New Guinea were difficult and awkward. For instance, on foot, the journey from Jayapura to the Bird's Head via the 'mouse path' through the Baliem and the Wissel Lakes would take about two months. Regular connections were controlled ever more rigorously, which was made possible among other things by the prohibition against Papuans travelling outside their own district without written police permission. Besides, in those years the society still consisted of countless introverted separate communities to which, to a certain extent, only the more developed coastal regions formed the exception.

The OPM and the FPPB were nothing more than collective names for these mostly unco-ordinated actions and groups. Nevertheless, the same names kept appearing as the leaders of these movements. What is striking is that these were often people who also had a place in the body of the Indonesian administrative machinery. Tanggahma had always been an important administrator and, in the end, made it to director of the Interior Administration. Clemens Runawery, Herman Wajoi, and Saul Hindom were members of the provincial council, appointed by the ruling authorities. This implied that they were expected to cooperate with the Indonesians and that, up to a point, they succeeded in doing so. One can only guess at the extent to which the Indonesians were aware of their dual position, but one may assume that to some extent it was accepted. When the Indonesian authorities wished for a somewhat credible representation of Papuans in their machinery they were dependent on this group. Apparently, with the arrival of Ortiz Sanz and the Act of Free Choice, they deemed it necessary to look at their connections among the Papuans with a

more critical eye. We have already seen that both Tanggahma and Bonay were sidelined in the summer of 1968. The same thing happened to Herman Wajoi and Saul Hindom. Another example is the figure of Lodewijk Ajamiseba who reported with seven family members to the Australian refugee centre in Wutung in November 1968. As co-signee of the 1962 Charter of Kota Baru and an official with the Financial Department, he was definitely not the least of the servants of the Indonesian government.

As the date of the Act of Free Choice came closer, rumours began to make the rounds about a general uprising that was to break out on 1 January 1969. We also see attempts on the Papuan side to create an umbrella organization. In October 1968, the Australian intelligence service received a message, described as reliable, concerning a reshaping of the FBBP whereby the various subdivisions known so far were placed in a more systematic connection. The names of thirteen organizations were mentioned whose actions were co-ordinated by the FBBP. In it the FBBP was described as the actual government of West Papua in exile. Its mailing address was in Port Moresby, where Adolf Hanasby acted as the representative of the Australian government.[73]

Within the totality of the organizations mentioned, the OPM held a strong position. According to an Australian intelligence report of 9 May 1969, it had an executive office of twelve individuals at its disposal in Jayapura in April of that same year. Governor Frans Kaisiepo was mentioned as its chairman, while the secretary Clemens Runawery was presumably the actual leader. Those people who had a position in the administrative service, namely Frans Kaisiepo, Amos Indey, Lisias Rumbiak, Saul Hindom, Thon Meset, Tobias Gebse, and Runawery himself, were said to function as advisors only while the rest of the members performed active tasks. To what extent this actual leadership of Runawery was compatible with his role as advisor is not mentioned. What we do know is that this college never met in its entirety. Amos Indey was mentioned both as the link to the PPPB and someone who had a good relationship with Sarwo Edhie.[74] It did not last long, however. The majority of the members were arrested shortly thereafter during an operation by the Indonesian army on 15-16 May 1969, just after the uprising in the region of the Wissel Lakes erupted, about which more later. That was not the end of the organization. The vacated seats were occupied by people from the Tjendrawasih University.

The American Galbraith, who was examining the comings and goings of the OPM and the PBBI at the time, was not impressed. He described the organizations as a series of loose contacts, whose members had no fighting spirit. Although the anti-Indonesian sentiment was profound and many of them went around making wild plans, the real readiness to move forward into action was missing. When the chips were down, the Papuans were always prepared to

cooperate with the Indonesian government. Thus the Indonesian army never lacked for Papuan recruits and the local army had two Tjendrawasih divisions that in the lower ranks were fully manned by Papuans. We could express it more positively than Galbraith did by saying that the Papuans operated with a great deal of caution. As much as possible they kept their contacts open in every direction, recognizing the fact that if they were to behave carelessly they themselves would be the losers. It reflected the prudent attitude of their parents who, in their internal wars, had often demonstrated a certain sense of moderation. To what extent this had been reinforced by the pietism of Christianity that the missionaries had brought them is difficult to evaluate. It must have had a certain amount of influence. After all, the pastors always had a finger in the political pie of the Papuan people and they always argued for moderation and tolerance. In spite of this, the Indonesians rulers had plenty of reasons to be worried. This is demonstrated not only by the previously mentioned dismissals and arrests but also by the fact that acts of violent resistance continued to be committed here and there.

The spirit of resistance was strongest in Manokwari and the Arfak hinterland. The initiative came from Ferry Awom and the Mandatjans who had been struggling against the Indonesian presence from the UNTEA period onward. According to unconfirmed reports of Australian origin, the bombing flights, which began in 1966, had continued on a regular basis for the next two years. Their targets were in northern Biak, the Bird's Head, and in the Sorong area. The flights started out from Biak, where two bomber planes, a B-25 and a B-26, were stationed permanently for that purpose. They were each equipped, thus the observer, with bombs, machineguns, and rockets.[75] In an attempt to put an end to the resistance in a less costly manner, during his August 1968 visit Adam Malik had promised amnesty to those who were willing to surrender. At the same time, the new army commander Sarwo Edhie had brought in fresh troops and established a pacification programme with the inviting name of operation *Sadar*, which can be translated by 'Come to your senses' or 'Use your head'!

In November, Nasution repeated the offer of amnesty once more, followed by Sarwo Edhie with an ultimatum to the rebels to surrender before 30 November or else all hell would break loose.[76] In fact, Lodewijk Mandatjan and a number of his comrades in arms responded to this call. Opinions differ about the number of rebels who laid down their weapons on that occasion. Sudjarwo mentioned the number 1,650, but higher figures also made the rounds. Lodewijk Mandatjan was taken to Jakarta where he surrendered to President Suharto in a ceremonial gathering on 1 January 1969. It provided the head of state with a good opportunity to point to the futility of the resistance. However, thereby the uprising was not yet completely suppressed. Awom and

his closest companions kept it going. It would continue to be turbulent throughout the next few months of the Act of Free Choice. In September 1969, the Indonesian commander-in-chief General Panggabean did see some signs of improvement but did not yet consider it safe to decrease the number of troops in West Irian.[77]

There has been ample evidence that clear information was not the strongest suit of Indonesia's rule in Papua and that continued to be true during the period in which the Act of Free Choice was being prepared and implemented. Neither the Indonesian government nor the representative of the United Nations felt the need to go into any details and there were few, if any, other sources of information. That is already clear from the news we have available about the riots in Jayapura during Sudjarwo's meeting on 11 April with the members of the regency council concerning the settlement of the procedures to be followed. The turmoil this caused was revealed not only in the hall itself but in the streets as well, but around the facts and the course of events themselves there is a great deal of uncertainty. We have seen that the Fundwi people reported 100 people arrested there. According to Australian intelligence reports, these were no spontaneous actions. Their supposition was that Governor Kaisiepo and Frits Kirihio had played an otherwise undefined role in organizing them.[78]

These demonstrations in Jayapura were intended as an argument for the freedom of expression for which Ortiz Sanz struggled so hard. He himself reported that they had taken place, in part, in front of his own office, from where he had managed to calm emotions. He had promised the demonstrators that the United Nations would continue their efforts to assure the rights and freedoms to which the Papuans could lay claim. When shortly thereafter armed soldiers surrounded the group anyway, he had contacted Sudjarwo and the military commander Sarwo Edhie, whereby the incident was brought to a peaceful end, as he himself stated. He presented this event to his chiefs in New York as a demonstration of the peaceful and democratic mood of the population and as a proof of the goodwill on the side of high-ranking Indonesian military commanders.

This restrained conduct on the part of the UN chief didn't prevent the actions in the capital from continuing. Such was the experience of the most significant organizer of the Act of Free Choice, Minister of the Interior General Amir Mahmud, when he was greeted at the Sentani airport on the morning of 14 April by a crowd of Papuans demonstrating for the concept of 'one man one vote'. Here, too, reports vary widely with regard to size and circumstances. Antara reported that it concerned 150 school children and students but that the very next day a far larger anti-plebiscite demonstration was held. On the other

hand, an American pilot of the missionary organizations reported that the demonstration of the 14th had originally been at least a thousand people but that, in the end, no more than a hundred had managed to make it into the airport.[79] This is an indication of the active conduct of army and police. We also find confirmation on this from Dirk Vlasblom who, in his study published in 2004, has managed to find a great many details by means of interviews with those involved. According to his report, the demonstration in favour of the Indonesian view consisted of a hundred or so Macassarese and Seruians who were transported through town in four army vehicles, while the demonstrations for an honest plebiscite had attracted large groups of Papuans for which the army had been made ready. A few days later, several dozen leaders, among whom the earlier mentioned Herman Wajoi and Mozes Weror, were arrested by the army and locked up in the Ifar Gunung prison for the next several months.[80]

There was unrest in other places as well. In the hinterland of Jayapura, specifically in the areas near the Australian border, violent actions were happening constantly. The Indonesian troops would hunt down small groups there that were trying to get away across the Australian border. Occasionally, this would even lead to the shooting of Australian troops on their own territory. The number of border crossings showed a considerable increase after January 1969. The Australians interpreted this as a result of a harsher Indonesian approach.[81]

In the early months of 1969, news came in from the north of Biak about fights in which, according to the ABC press bureau, six Papuans and one Indonesian soldier had been killed and 187 Papuans were arrested on suspicion of support for the OPM. Here the leadership was in the hands of one of Ferry Awom's brothers. News about roaming bands continued throughout the summer, but apparently these were unable to do very much damage. According to Indonesian intelligence, the insurgents were scanning the coast in expectation of a submarine that would bring weapons, food, and equipment. Rumour has it that this was instigated by a letter from Marcus Kaisiepo from the Netherlands, which had supposedly announced the arrival of the ship.[82] In this connection the name of Saul Hindom, a former student in Leiden who had sought safe haven in the Australian sector in the spring of 1969 was also mentioned.[83]

In spite of these incidents and the growing number of refugees on the eastern border, actual resistance was relatively limited during the first months of 1969. A more serious conflict erupted in the region of the Wissel Lakes, which was now part of the kabupaten Paniai. As of 11 April, demonstrations were taking

place here as well, which we can link to Sudjarwo's trip. The complaints came from the Ekaris in and around Enarotali, who already had shown before that they were at odds with the consecutive masters coming in from the outside. Earlier they had resisted the Japanese and the Dutch, now they turned against the Indonesian administration whom they accused of having done too little for them during recent years. They demanded their freedom back. During a street gathering, 400 impressively-painted Ekaris turned against the Javanese regent and asked him to withdraw from their region and take his civil servants with him. The same thing held true for the teachers. Pressure soon mounted and the threat of war floated in the air. The civil servants, teachers, and their families did, indeed, withdraw from Enarotali and surrounding towns. The mission's radio transmitters were seized and with them the demands of the rebels were broadcast to the world. The Indonesian troops were to be withdrawn and they should be replaced by United Nations observers who were to supervise the Act of Free Choice. The latter was a sign that it was not merely a question here of striving to reinstate the old times but that an element of Papua nationalism was playing its part as well. On 1 May the Papuan flag was raised. Airports were inactivated to prevent further Indonesian troops from landing. When Brigadier Edhie Sarwo surveyed the situation from the air on 30 April, his plane was greeted with bullets. Indonesia reacted by sending parachutists while the air force was mobilized as well. The Ekari population pulled back into the forests and resisted from there. This caused a wider fanning-out of resistance, which held the valleys in its grasp for several weeks at least, during which an unknown number of victims died. According to Governor Frans Kaisiepo this action had the support of all the chiefs of the circa 30,000 souls living there. Australian reports mentioned a member of the Songganao clan as the man responsible. The roughly 100 armed policemen who had joined the rebellion offered firepower.[84]

On 8 May, a report went out from Sarwo Edhie that everything had returned to normality, but the persistent news in the Indonesian and foreign press contradicted this. To size up the situation Sudjarwo paid a one-day visit to Enarotali and surrounding area, accompanied by Ortiz Sanz and a few Indonesian officers, on 17 May. Upon his return to Jakarta, the UN man made a statement to the press in which he announced that he had seen no signs of unrest and that the press reports about any riots were mostly exaggerated. It was a non-committal statement because he had to admit also that during his visit there was no one to be found in the city and the people were still in the mountains. For further details they should direct themselves to the Indonesian government as it was not his task to pose any questions. He added a call for the extreme self-control of all parties.[85]

This story shows once again that Ortiz Sanz was now going along willingly with Indonesian wishes and was eager for formulations that would cause as little apprehension as possible in the outside world. It is equally remarkable that initially he had wanted to stand aloof entirely in this case. He didn't swing into action until Rolz-Bennett directed him to make contact with Sarwo Edhie. It was suggested to him that he ask what was going on and he was urged to be restrained in his approach. For Ortiz Sanz, there was ample reason to handle the matter with care. He was especially afraid that the rebellion in Enarotali would be a reason for the Indonesian military to take a harsh line across the board and to oppress what little freedom of expression remained. Thereby a still somewhat credible Act of Free Choice would vanish completely behind the horizon. The American embassy in Jakarta shared this concern and was profoundly shocked when the *London Observer* published an alarming article by its correspondent Michael Donald on 1 June. Beneath the headline 'Tribes wiped out in three year revolt' the gravity of the situation in Enarotali was outlined in all its gory details. It spoke of a hidden war that had dragged on for years and had cost thousands of human lives.[86] This news reached The Hague as well, via the report of the new ambassador recently posted in Jakarta, H. Scheltema. There it also caused predictable alarm. The American embassy attributed it to the inexperience of Scheltema who presumably sent all worrisome press releases on to his chief in The Hague without delay. Ambassador Green planned to give him better information for which the reports of the member of his staff, Laporta, contained some useful material. For someone scrutinizing Scheltema's careful reporting, this seems a redundant effort. Obviously, he sent the necessary press releases on to The Hague but his own analyses always gave evidence of the greatest reserve.[87] Green's reaction is particularly interesting because it demonstrates once again how keen he was to keep control of the information in his own hands.

So much for the turbulence in Jayapura and the hinterland, Biak, and the region of the Wissel Lakes in 1969. The overall picture was one of local actions performed across wide distances and with varying degrees of ferocity. Central leadership was missing, as were resources and fighting power. On the opposing side stood an energetic Indonesian counteroperation, taking leading Papuans into preventive custody and not shrinking from any violence in order to keep their followers in check. Due to the greater expertise and armaments of the Indonesian armed forces, this usually succeeded reasonably well. Nevertheless, the Indonesian army was at a loss and long feared an unexpected revival of the rebellion. In order to keep this concealed from the outside world as much as possible, entry permits for journalists specifically were prohibited on 8 May 1969. To the world outside, Sarwo Edhie did his best to keep the mood high by

disseminating cheerful comments. Their gist was that the army had everything well under control and that everything was just fine. Under the circumstances, the help given by Ortiz Sanz had been welcome. On the other hand, the news in the *London Observer* about a secret war in Enarotali definitely was not.[88]

Diplomacy

In addition to this armed resistance there was also diplomatic activity on the Papuan side during the approach to the Act of Free Choice. We have seen that Jouwe, Kaisiepo, and Womsiwor visited New York in 1967 to argue their case in the corridors of the United Nations. Jouwe also used that occasion to open a small office where Womsiwor was settled as a permanent lobbyist for the Freedom Committee at the United Nations.

The first goal was to get West Irian on the agenda of the fourth (political) commission of the United Nations, which could be an impetus to having the case dealt with in the General Assembly of the organization. To this end, support was needed from as many member nations as possible. In New York, Jouwe and his colleagues had made contact again, obviously, with their old friends from 1962, namely the African diplomats Zollner and Guirma. It was on their advice that Jouwe had visited the conference of the *Organisation Commune Africaine et Malgache* (OCAM) in the Nigerian city of Niamey in January 1968. For that visit he had composed a terse document in which he painted a sombre picture of the first five years of the Indonesian administration. According to this document, ten thousand dead had fallen during that period by the agency of Indonesia, an assessment that rises far above what had been reported previously. The piece further emphasized the Negroid appearance of the Papuans. Earlier contact with Africans had taught him that this was a theme that played well. He was well-received and they even afforded him the opportunity to address the committee of presidents and ministers of foreign affairs of the fourteen member nations. After the conference ended, he visited Tubman, the President of Liberia. It looked as if the case of Papuan nationalism could henceforth count on the support of this group of countries represented at the United Nations.[89]

Jouwe continued to operate successfully. Thus, he was back in New York in June 1968 where he had been invited to a hearing in the United Nations building, attended by the representatives of thirty-six nations. Besides the Africans, all the Latin American ambassadors to the United Nations made an appearance while Jouwe and Womsiwor had the opportunity to explain their perspective on New Guinea. Jouwe provided a meticulous report to Luns on this.[90] At the same time, Jouwe's group paid a visit to Ortiz Sanz, who was preparing his upcoming assignment in Indonesia and West Irian elsewhere at the

headquarters. As we saw in the previous chapter, this did not fail to make the necessary impression.

Furthermore, both Kaisiepo and Jouwe did their utmost, albeit in vain, to get Australia and America on their side. The Australians had no desire to burn their fingers and refused them a visa twice.[91] The Americans proved a little more accommodating. With regard to the visa they caused no problems, something they would have had more difficulty doing, anyway, since the United Nations headquarters were after all on their soil. Therefore Jouwe managed to argue his case several times both at the American embassy in The Hague and at the State Department. On those occasions he generally showed his most realistic side. Toward Kaisiepo, who was playing with the idea of an armed rebellion and the declaration of independence, he positioned himself as the man of peace.

In May 1968, he expressed his opinion at the American embassy that West Irian was not yet ready for self-determination and that it would be better for his country to come to a political arrangement that would produce independence in friendship with Indonesia. For this, in his judgement, the withdrawal of Indonesian troops would be required, followed by a UN trusteeship with the United States, England, France, Australia, and New Zealand as the administrative powers. Just to be sure, he added that Indonesia would most definitely not be eligible for a place in this group. After this trusteeship came to an end, one of the possibilities should be that West Papua would join Papua New Guinea in a Melanesian Federation. At that point in time, this option had gained a certain level of reality because Australia had named the year 1971 as the year in which that region would gain its independence. In fact, Jouwe's proposal was a reversion to the Luns Plan of 1961. The American side did not react and Jouwe's interlocutors limited themselves to the laconic remark that they preferred sticking to the stipulations recorded in the New York Agreement. When Jouwe visited Washington in November 1968, the State Department reiterated this point of view.[92]

When it became clear in February 1969 that Indonesia would take little notice of Ortiz Sanz and was determined to go its own way, Jouwe came up with a number of new suggestions. First his representative Womsiwor approached the State Department with the question whether it might still be possible to have a UN force supervise the implementation of the elections. When there was no reaction whatsoever, he appeared personally at the American ministry on 27 May, accompanied this time by the previously mentioned Zacharias Sawor, who only shortly before had fled from West Irian and could provide first-hand information about the situation in the region. He now arrived with the interesting proposal of having the fourth political commission of the United Nations organize a hearing where the presence of Eliëzer Bonay, Herman

Wajoi, and Moses Weror would be requested. All of them were people who originally had been willing to cooperate with Indonesia but had revised their views. In the meantime, Bonay had been released, but Wajoi and Weror had just been locked up (again) in the prison in Ifar after the 11 April demonstrations in Jayapura. In anticipation of his arrival, Jouwe argued for postponement of the elections, preferably until 1971, the year in which Papua New Guinea would also have to decide its future. The American response was as non-committal as before. The Papuans would do better to simply await the outcome of the Act of Free Choice. Then they would see.[93]

Chapter 14

The Second Phase of the Act of Free Choice

Luns, Udink and Malik to Rome

In May 1969, public knowledge of the Indonesian plans for the implementation of the Act of Free Choice and the subsequent news about riots in Biak and Enarotali led to anxiety in New York and The Hague. At the United Nations Headquarters in New York they were worried about the unfavourable impression this would create internationally and about the thorny questions that might be posed during the discussion of the final report to be presented to the General Assembly at the conclusion of the Act of Free Choice. The news could provide gratifying material for the opposition to be expected from the African States that were the primary targets of the Papuan lobbyists. Other news was coming in from New York that Jouwe and his entourage seemed to be having some success with the Scandinavian governments as well. The Australian delegation in New York was of the opinion that in many of the other member states, too, there were serious doubts about the manner in which the Act of Free Choice was being handled.[1]

This news caused Malik great concern. In this context it should be mentioned that, in the course of the year 1969, the Indonesian negotiators had made some attempts to make direct contact with Kaisiepo. One of those occurred during Sudjarwo's visit to The Hague in January. At that time the delegation was carrying a letter of invitation from Governor Frans Kaisiepo for his nephew Marcus, requesting that he come and have a talk. Marcus Kaisiepo responded that he would only do so if it could take place at the United Nations headquarters, which, obviously, had not been the intention. Shortly thereafter,

Womsiwor stated that the Indonesian representative in New York had asked him whether it might not be possible to get in touch with Kaisiepo somewhere in Europe. Womsiwor relayed this message to the Americans and the Dutch, adding his assumption that the Indonesians wanted to try to placate the Papuans and thereby reduce the criticism of the manner in which the Act of Free Choice was implemented. This may be true, but it should be remembered that the negotiator Sudjarwo had promised Ortiz Sanz that his government would make every effort to persuade those Papuans who were living abroad to participate in the plebiscite. Of the two top figures only Kaisiepo could qualify because, in contrast to Jouwe, he had not taken Netherlands nationality. Finally, we can also see it as an attempt to play Kaisiepo out against Jouwe. It did not succeed, but it was worth trying, anyway.[2]

In the Netherlands a growing interest in Indonesia had been generated in the course of 1968, in which New Guinea played only a marginal role. On the one hand, there was great appeal in the possibility of a renewed Dutch role in Indonesia in the economic and cultural sphere; on the other hand, there were moral qualms. In the wake of debates that had already flared up previously about the legitimacy of the bloody American interventions in Vietnam, there had been a vehement discussion in the Netherlands from December 1968 onward about acts of violence that the Dutch army had committed in Indonesia during the decolonization conflict in the years from 1945 to 1950. Yet, there was also much for which to criticize independent Indonesia, namely the way in which Suharto was engaged in establishing his power. The attack on the communists, the huge numbers of victims that it had cost, and the tens of thousands of prisoners who were incarcerated in prisons and places of exile had made a deep impression. The Komité Indonesia, formed in 1969, in which the Amsterdam university professor W.F. Wertheim was active, asked specifically that attention be paid to these matters.[3] It sowed the first seeds of doubt about the desirability of cooperation with that country. These feelings crisscrossed every layer of the population, although the attention of the left was focused primarily on the excesses of earlier and contemporary times. The matter of New Guinea attracted the special attention of groups that could be seen traditionally as being in the conservative colonial corner. The subject was of less interest to the left. It was, after all, a consequence of the colonialism that had been negatively evaluated since then, as had the policy of the Netherlands therein. These discussions were played out against a background in which, as elsewhere in Europe, large groups of youths were rebelling against the high-handed style in which the older generation had directed the affairs heretofore. It created uncertainty among society's leading strata, which was expressed in a more abrasive and more direct way of reacting to the demands of the young. It was a cultural

shift that provided the actions of the authorities with a certain unpredictability, although one should immediately add that the Dutch Cabinet under the aegis of Prime Minister P.S.J. de Jong dealt with this rather matter-of-factly.

As mentioned above, Sudjarwo had been warmly received by Minister Luns and his colleagues during his visit to The Hague in January 1969. Good relations with Indonesia had been a high priority for the Netherlands government for several years and Luns had no intention of allowing this final stage in the New Guinea drama to spoil that. On the other hand, he did not want to renounce his previous position toward New Guinea either. The conversation with Sudjarwo went well, but the minister had not pursued Sudjarwo's suggestion for a joint Netherlands-Indonesian action that, in fact, would put the United Nations on the sidelines. Luns had stuck to the position that the plebiscite was a matter between Indonesia and the United Nations, in which the Netherlands only had a role as an interested third party. Nevertheless, an article in the *Algemeen Dagblad* announced immediately thereafter that the government had endorsed the Indonesian plans. The matter caught the attention of the Cabinet where it was discussed in detail at the meeting of 21 February. It was there that Luns showed his most realistic side. He made the case to his colleagues that neither the government, nor the States General, nor public opinion in the Netherlands should have any illusion that the country could do anything whatsoever to procure a reasonable implementation of the plebiscite, if only because all those in West Irian opposed to integration with Indonesia had been eliminated or had fled the country. The only thing the Netherlands could do was to encourage Indonesia to keep up at least the appearance of a proper plebiscite. They would only be able to accomplish this by persuasion. The Netherlands had no realistic means of coercion, unless they wanted to threaten the withdrawal of economic cooperation or initiate a diplomatic action via the United States or the European countries. However, he was quite certain that neither the parliament, nor the public, nor the Cabinet would be at all inclined thereto. Furthermore, he resisted the suggestion that he had given in too much to Sudjarwo's wishes. He had stood firm with him and had urged him to execute the Agreement to the letter and in spirit.

Further discussion in the Cabinet proved that this approach could not count on undivided approval. Within the religious parties, starting with the ARP, there was a strong movement that wanted to try acquiring more for the Papuans. They felt that the Netherlands should follow an active policy. This led the Cabinet to the topic of Suharto's plan to visit Europe in the near future, at which time he was also to visit the Netherlands. According to the plans, this would happen before the Act of Free Choice was to take place. For the 'activists' in the council it seemed a fine opportunity to point out once more the

importance of running the plebiscite in West Irian honestly. For the more sceptically inclined, Luns and Udink among them, this was a bridge too far because a state visit served to confirm good relations. If the visit and the Act of Free Choice were to coincide, there would be a great risk of disturbances and riots. The story ended in a compromise whereby Suharto was informed that a later visit would be preferable, but that he would be welcome should he wish to come sooner.[4]

In the week following this cabinet conversation, the Second Chamber discussed the budget for Foreign Affairs. It produced an intense debate about the policy concerning New Guinea. It turned out that practically every party was apprehensive about the way in which Indonesia was planning to implement the Act of Free Choice. Obviously, the question of which methods of sanction the Netherlands might have available arose as well. Luns made it clear that the New York Agreement had not dealt with that, while no one wanted to go so far as to require him to threaten a halt in development aid and economic support to Indonesia. A motion of that nature by the *Gereformeerd Politiek Verbond* (GPV) member P. Jongeling was rejected by a great majority. It led to the antirevolutionary N.G. Geelkerken proposing a somewhat odd motion, wanting the government to make a 'political agreement' with Indonesia about the further development of West Irian even before the plebiscite was to be implemented and regardless of its outcome. The minister of Development Cooperation, B.J. Udink responded by announcing that there was enough money available for West Irian, which he would spend depending on the wishes of the Indonesian government and the outcome of the plebiscite.[5]

The matter was put back on the agenda at the Cabinet meeting of 28 February. At that time, the anti-revolutionary minister B. Roolvink explained that his party did, in fact, demand that a political agreement be made to have Indonesia further develop West Irian with the cooperation of the Netherlands. In addition, the anti-revolutionaries wanted guarantees that no violence would be used against the Papuans should they vote against remaining with Indonesia.[6]

Things simmered down a little in the weeks thereafter. The threat of Suharto's untimely visit vanished because the Indonesian president announced he would postpone his visit to the Netherlands for a while. The Geelkerken motion was withdrawn after he was taken aside by the Prime Minister, the ministers Luns and Schut, and party chairman Biesheuvel. The radical anti-revolutionary had to knuckle under with this much pressure but, after sounding out other parliamentarians, Minister Luns thought that the time was almost right when, for political reasons, it would be wise if the Netherlands were to declare that it did not consider the way of holding the plebiscite as Indonesia suggested

was the ideal way.[7] A good occasion for this arrived when in the next cabinet debate Jongeling asked whether it was possible to have the plebiscite in West Irian verified by an international military force from neutral countries. The minister decided to research this right away. On 14 March he instructed D.G.E. Middelburg, his United Nations ambassador, to inform U Thant about the dissension in the Netherlands and present him with Jongeling's question. As was to be expected, U Thant reacted disapprovingly, arguing that there was no stipulation whatsoever in the Agreement that would oblige the United Nations to make such a move. Furthermore, he deemed it wholly out of the question that there would be enough countries willing to support such a proposal.

U Thant's staff immediately relayed the message to Ortiz Sanz in Jakarta, who reacted with amazement as well. He couldn't believe that Luns was serious and rightly assumed that it was probably a ploy to place the burden with the UN. He advised his superiors in New York to convey the message to the Indonesians right away so that they would be familiar with the details of the matter should Luns come back to it again. That ended the subject. Luns had taken his step and was now able to point out in his deliberations in parliament that it was not his doing if things were not going the way the Netherlands wanted them to go. To cover himself even more, he paid a visit to U Thant on 1 April to express his personal concern as well.[8]

This approach to the secretary general fitted perfectly with the strategy Luns had followed, which was to lay the responsibility for the dubious plebiscite as much as possible in the lap of the United Nations. However, in that same cabinet debate he had let himself be talked into promising that he would make direct contact with Indonesia about the implementation of the Act of Free Choice. After all, the Dutch government could not, nor did it want to, take any responsibility for the Indonesian plans in this, although it would have to proffer an evaluation sooner or later. Thus, on that same 14 March, he instructed Ambassador Scheltema in Jakarta to inform the Department of Foreign Affairs there that within realistic limits the Netherlands was prepared to confer on the future well-being of the population.[9] This did not lead to any immediate action. Apparently, both sides needed a little push for that. It came from the side of the Papuans present in the Netherlands. They went into action in early May, right after the outcome of the first phase of the Act of Free Choice and the eruption of the disturbances in Enarotali. Together with Dutch and Moluccan sympathizers, with the help of their association *Kobe Oser*, they organized a seven-day freedom march through a number of Dutch towns in which several hundred people participated. The march ended on 9 May 1969 in The Hague with the presentation of petitions to a number of embassies and to the Second Chamber. In it they asked that attention be paid to the Indonesian misrule that

according to their calculations had already cost fifty thousand victims among the Papuans since the transfer. In the document, destined for the Indonesian embassy, they requested the withdrawal of the Indonesian occupying forces.

The document delivered to the Americans contained a request to President Nixon henceforth to support the liberation of their people.[10] A similar request was directed to the Second Chamber. We are unaware of any reaction from the American president. Shortly thereafter he was to visit Indonesia and was instructed by his assistants to be as friendly as possible toward his hosts and not to offer any commentary on the events in West Irian.[11] The Second Chamber of the Netherlands parliament felt more closely concerned and produced a number of questions. Here, too, the cabinet questions were most varied. In the Netherlands the by now popular themes of excess of violence and free information appeared quite applicable to the current situation of the Papuans. The Democrats 1966 (D 66), H.A.F.M.O. van Mierlo and Visser asked a question about free admission of the press to the Act of Free Choice. In addition, E.J. Harmsen (Farmers' Party), P. Jongeling (GPV), N.G. Geelkerken (ARP), and E.H. Toxopeus (VVD) expressed their concern about the lack of freedom of expression and the Indonesian army's harsh conduct in West Irian. Although posing questions is definitely one of the lighter forms of action in the Netherlands parliamentary system, its wide variety did indicate that the Cabinet ought to pay some attention to the matter. Moreover, among the questioners were two representatives of ruling parties, among them the Member of Parliament Toxopeus who as minister had borne shared responsibility for the New York Agreement in 1962. On this occasion, Geelkerken reminded Minister Luns of the promise he had made in March that he would make contact with the opposing party.[12]

In fact, Luns now decided to go into action. The result was that Luns extended an invitation to his Indonesian colleague Malik for a meeting somewhere in Europe. In order not to awaken high expectations and then run the risk of being pressured in advance by public opinion in the Netherlands, he added to this invitation the request that as much secrecy as possible be observed. Malik, who felt no need for publicity himself, was glad to agree and so the ministers met in Rome on 20 May 1969. Luns had brought along the minister of Development Cooperation, B.J. Udink. The latter's presence indicated that the Netherlands wished also to show concretely that it would be involved in the region's development after the plebiscite. In his report to Ambassador Scheltema, Luns wrote that both visits were intended as a concession to the 'sense of joint responsibility that a wide bona fide circle in the Netherlands shared' for the state of affairs there.[13]

At the discussion in Rome, Malik explained in detail how Indonesia intended to handle the plebiscite. Udink, in turn, gave a speech about the possibilities of a special aid programme for West Irian. At the conclusion on 21 May, the ministers issued a joint statement. In it, Malik confirmed that his government would implement the plebiscite in its entirety in accordance with the letter and spirit of the New York Agreement. For technical and practical reasons, Indonesia thereby favoured the system of *musyawarah*, but Malik added that the members of the consultative councils would be freely elected by the different political, traditional, and functional groups in the various regencies. This was followed by the assertion that the Dutch ministers had taken careful note of Malik's exposition and had emphasized that complete consensus needed to exist on the implementation of the plebiscite between the Indonesian government and the secretary general of the United Nations. The statement also said that both parties planned to cooperate in the region's economic development, to which end both governments together would approach the Asian Development Bank. In reaction to Van Mierlo's question in the Second Chamber, Malik promised to partially cancel the announced cessation in admitting journalists. West Irian would remain open to foreign observers and journalists insofar as the facilities there would allow, which qualification was a concession to the Indonesian desire to be able to exclude unwelcome reporters.

This well-prepared closing declaration diverged in some points from the ideas that the Netherlands had proposed earlier. From the very start Luns had made no objections to the announcement of *musyawarah* in the final phase of the plebiscite, but he had insisted that Malik should state that the members of the consultative councils would be freely elected. This went too far for Malik and subsequently the Dutch minister had resigned himself without any visible protest to the much more limited formulation of free election by the different political, traditional, and functional groups. Another difference of opinion had cropped up concerning the point of future economic support to the region. Too explicit a mention of Fundwi had provoked objections from the Indonesian side, fearing that it would point too much to a special mutual responsibility for West Irian by Indonesia and the Netherlands, for the future as well. Thus, Malik had preferred to announce publicly the Dutch support for the Indonesian five-year plan that, after all, included ample arrangements for West Irian, too. However, the Dutch ministers could not possibly bring this to their parliament and, after some discussion back and forth, they had found a formulation that suited everyone. The final declaration stated that the Netherlands and Indonesia together would submit an application for an international development plan for West Irian to the Asian Development Bank in Manila, while Indonesia expressed its willingness for a rapid execution of the

programmes already set up by Fundwi. It was decided secretly that the Netherlands would immediately make the funds available for the acquisition of planes and outboard motors, whereby rapid short-term improvements could be made in the region's deficient internal connections. Obviously, this would not only be to the advantage of West Irian's economic development, but it would also contribute to the administrative and military control. On the other hand, there should be no objections in view of the atmosphere of warm cooperation in which the collaboration was taking place. Thus, the statement ended with the observation that both countries were determined to stay in close touch, since the New York Agreement 'was signed in a spirit of common concern for the future of West Irian.'[14]

Although to a great degree the upshot of Dutch domestic politics, the trip to Rome did not take place in isolation. The Americans followed the meeting with interest and it was the topic of a conversation in New York between the Indonesian diplomat Sudjatmoko and the American Under-Secretary Green. The latter stressed that Luns was under pressure at home but that the same was true for the American government as well. Both governments were loathe to play a direct role in the implementation of the Act of Free Choice. In their view, it was now the task of the Indonesian government to execute the promises made in 1962 and, in any case, it had to be 'a meaningful exercise.' The Americans had always urged this in their various conversations with Indonesian diplomats and ministers. In this theirs did not differ from the Dutch standpoint. In addition, Green also repeated the suggestion made earlier by the American side that the Act of Free Choice should not deal solely with the incorporation into Indonesia, but should also contain a call from the Papuans for greater attention to their economic development.

This step with Sudjatmoko was an underhanded attempt on the part of the State Department to put some pressure on Indonesia to organize a proper referendum. Obviously, on this issue the Americans had maintained regular contact with the Dutch government. Besides, the American side attached a great deal of value to the person of Schiff who, as ambassador in Jakarta, had always shown a great deal of understanding for the detached position of the Americans. It was expected that he would do the same thing in his new position as Secretary General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in The Hague. During previous years, Luns had, in turn, always been keen to underscore as much as possible American responsibility for the outcome of the New Guinea question. That is why he let the Americans know, both before and after his visit to Rome, that the Netherlands had an interest in the proper implementation of the Act of Free Choice.[15] In a cautious way, the meeting with Malik and the declaration that followed it had proven this. The American position did not deviate from it.

A high level of similarity was noticeable between Washington and The Hague, not only in content but in conduct as well. Luns was no longer interested now in passing the buck to Washington.

In this connection it should be mentioned also that, during this period, the Americans were repeatedly urging the Netherlands not to make any statements that might make it appear that America was putting any pressure on Indonesia to hold a meaningful plebiscite. In the opinion of the State Department, that would only diminish the American stance and show a lack of confidence in the determination of the United Nations secretary general genuinely to carry out the tasks that the New York Agreement had assigned to him. Clearly, the true intention was to spare Indonesia as much as possible because the Papuan interests did not compensate for the advantages of the new friendship with Indonesia. The situation was no different for the Netherlands. These exceedingly cautious steps by America and the Netherlands were the weightiest gestures that either country was willing to make on behalf of the guarantees stipulated in the New York Agreement for the right to self-determination of the Papuans.[16]

The composition of the consultative councils

Now back to Indonesia, where the government had publicized the outcome of the first phase of the Act of Free Choice on 17 April 1969. The plans had been submitted to the recently formed regency councils in West Irian and had obtained their approval by consultation in the form of *musyawarah*. The first news about this reached the outside world via the press agency Antara. It made it clear that any room for freedom of choice on the part of the population was gone. The eight regency councils would each establish an 'ad hoc commission' that would make suggestions for the supplementary members. Together with the Papuans who were already seated in the regency councils, they would form the consultative councils. In the month of July, these consultative councils would be visited by a governmental team in whose presence they would confirm that West Irian ought to continue being part of Indonesia.[17] In all its simplicity, this announcement had elicited the necessary comments from the outside world. We have already focused on the reactions of the Papuans in exile and in New Guinea itself, as well as of the politicians in The Hague. There had been little appreciation of the position-finding of Indonesia there. It showed that Malik was forced to take an important step back for the wishes of the military.

The outcome of the first phase of the Act of Free Choice had also been a disappointment for Ortiz Sanz. Although Sudjarwo and his group's consultation

of the regency councils between 22 March and 12 April had taken place according to article 18a, the proposal approved there for the implementation of the Act of Free Choice did not live up to his expectations in any way. At the moment that the consultations were taking place he had been in Jayapura, whereby he had left the observations on the ground to his colleagues. It wasn't until much later that he would declare in a press release that the members there had been told how important a role they had to play.[18] In the customary positive tone of these kinds of statements this may have seemed impressive, but he was anything but pleased with this part of the operation. When he was back in Jakarta again during the second half of April, he made it no secret from his colleagues at the American and Netherlands embassies that he was disappointed in the fact that Adam Malik had not been willing to make a greater effort to use democratic procedures. He recounted that during his long trips across the island he had noticed that everywhere in New Guinea there were strong anti-Indonesian groups and that he firmly planned to ensure that their representatives, too, would be included in the consultative councils. He felt that the manner of electing the members of the consultative councils was indicative of the sincerity with which Indonesia would implement the Act of Free Choice. He himself was still committed to an internationally viable implementation, which would be the case if, at least in the more developed coastal towns, the new members of the consultative councils were to be elected via a vote by call.[19]

These remarks show that Ortiz Sanz at that moment still wanted to give the impression that the agreements Sudjarwo had made with the regency councils offered plenty of room for this. Yet, in his heart he knew better and therein he had the support of New York. Even on the day that the Indonesian plans were made public he had received an angry reaction from Rolz-Bennett who thought that the Indonesians had gone too far with the terms of reference of the ad hoc commissions. The way it was put, it came down to a simple appointment of the supplementary members. In Rolz-Bennett's judgement that was a bit too tactless. In his opinion, 'our Indonesian friends' could surely have come up with something that diverted a little less radically from the generally accepted norms of representation. Ortiz Sanz was instructed to have a talk with Sudjarwo about this while Rolz-Bennett himself lodged an objection to the course of events with Ruslan Abdulgani, the Indonesian representative in New York.[20]

On 1 May Ortiz Sanz performed this directive. He did so in the form of a written comment on the democratic deficiency in the procedures that Indonesia had proposed.[21] The answer was rather long in coming, but when it arrived on 10 May it was proof once again of the bellicose spirit in which Sudjarwo tended to correspond. Without any further ado, he dismissed Ortiz Sanz's complaint that everything was being arranged without his knowledge.

After all, there had been discussions from 11 February onwards about the Indonesian proposals and if that was insufficient it was caused, according to Sudjarwo, by the UN representative's lengthy and frequent absences from Jakarta where the decisions were made, after all. In addition, he pointed out that in all the regency capitals he visited during his tour, the UN co-workers under Ali Nekunam's leadership had agreed with everything that had happened and that if they wanted to know more, or wanted to participate in the planned elections themselves, nothing stood in the way of their informing the bupatis about this. At the same time, that would give them the chance to find out for themselves how hard it was to get anything off the ground under the complicated circumstances in the field. He then told Ortiz Sanz how very regrettable it was that he had not joined them personally on the mission to the regencies. It was an implicit reference to the theme of 'the lazy Ortiz Sanz,' which in the coming months he was to mention frequently in conversations with third parties.[22]

Apart from the question of democratic deficiency, in a separate note of 29 April, Ortiz Sanz had come back to the matter of prior conditions under which the Act of Free Choice would take place. It concerned informing the population, guaranteeing freedom of expression, and releasing prisoners. The first document on this topic had already been made public in November 1968.[23] It had resulted in the release of two hundred prisoners and the promulgation of a general directive about the set-up of the upcoming Act of Free Choice. In his press release of 13 January, Ortiz Sanz had expressed himself most favourably on the matter.[24] He stated that the first reactions of the Indonesian government had been 'prompt and positive'. However, for the observers locally it had been obvious that this freedom of expression had not amounted to anything much. It was an open secret that many people were still incarcerated. The demonstrations and riots in Jayapura, Enarotali, and Biak were an incentive for new arrests to be made. These matters, as well as the refusal by the UN representatives to scrutinize them closely, were taken very seriously by the Papuan world. In various requests and petitions they blamed Ortiz Sanz for never having had the audacity to speak directly with them or to visit the prisons in Jayapura, Manokwari, or Biak himself. For Ortiz Sanz this was an inducement to submit these questions in writing to Sudjarwo once again. In his letter of 29 April, he had added a proposal for a general amnesty. Only then could it be guaranteed that, when the moment of the Act of Free Choice arrived, all political prisoners would actually be free.

Sudjarwo's reaction to this note was as non-committal as his response to the letter concerning the democratic deficiency of the chosen procedures. In his previously mentioned letter of 9 May, he pointed out to his opponent that, in

fact, a great deal was being done where providing information was concerned, but that the United Nations team was simply unable to recognize it due to its insufficient knowledge of the Indonesian language. For Ortiz Sanz and his staff it was not a flattering assertion but it was irrefutable, nevertheless. Peter Jennings, the first and only interpreter of the United Nations proper, arrived in Jayapura precisely around this time. With regard to the issue of the prisoners, Sudjarwo returned to the argument, used earlier by Malik in a different context, that the circumstances in Indonesia imposed limitations on their government in what they were able to afford in New Guinea. This was very definitely the case where the release of prisoners was concerned. In the rest of Indonesia, in the aftermath of the 30 September 1965 attack, tens of thousands of people accused of communist sympathies had been imprisoned without any trial whatsoever. This information should have been a guide for restraint in West Irian as well, all the more because one could not always tell the difference between communism and other forms of resisting authority. He added that any further insistence on releasing the prisoners would be useless because it was inadvisable due to the most recent disturbances. A general amnesty was impossible for the same reason.

The same argument was used regarding free admission for the foreign press. There may well have been an Indonesian promise that at the implementation of the Act of Free Choice journalists would be given the opportunity to follow the events, but this would have to occur within perimeters set by the Indonesian government. Moreover, Sudjarwo let it be known that the invitation his government had extended, on the suggestion of Ortiz Sanz, to Papuans living abroad to return to their country to vote had produced hardly any results. Only one family living in Australia had reacted to the call. On the whole, it was a curt and dismissive letter, which showed that Sudjarwo had very little patience with the opinions of Ortiz Sanz. Even the fact that in his correspondence the latter had referred to Indonesia as the 'administering power' had rubbed him the wrong way. West Irian was not a trust territory allocated to his country but had formed an inextricable part of it ever since 17 August 1945.

Both letters confirmed the Indonesian policy, already demonstrated in practice, to act more firmly and more resolutely in the run-up to the Act of Free Choice. On most points its effect was clearly visible. To restrict ourselves to the most crucial points: there was still no question at all of freedom of expression, army and police were acting more harshly, and the prisons were overflowing. The question remains what the true extent of all this was. On the eve of the Act of Free Choice, according to Sudjarwo, there were a total of 122 prisoners divided over Merauke, Jayapura, and Biak. Presumably, before too long 67 of

these were to be brought before a judge.[25] Information from the Papuan side shows far greater numbers. An impartial looking request to Ortiz Sanz of 10 October 1968, coming from a Biak organization under the leadership of A. B. Krey, estimated the total number of prisoners in West Irian at that time at 1,500. This number did not include the group that had been sent to penal colonies on Java shortly before, which they estimated at 150.[26] Assuming that the releases that had taken place since then had been amply compensated for by new arrests, this figure provides at least the minimum of the number of prisoners around the month of May 1969. That number would increase markedly at the time of the implementation of the Act of Free Choice. Furthermore, structural terror reigned. The always-restrained American reporter Laporta gave an account to his embassy on the harsh behaviour of the Indonesian security forces who could not be controlled by their young officers and committed murder whenever they saw fit.[27]

Sudjarwo's response of 9 May confirmed Ortiz Sanz's fear that the events in Enarotali and Biak were an incentive for the Indonesian military to further curtail any freedom of expression and take larger groups of suspect individuals into preventive custody. As mentioned earlier, between 13 and 19 May he paid a short visit to West Irian to become informed about the situation in the region of the Wissel Lakes and Biak, among other reasons. Before his departure, he let Rolz-Bennett know that he planned to make a reassuring declaration after his return. We have seen that he did. His biggest problem was not so much the rebellion itself as the countermeasures taken by the Indonesian authorities, which had brought the population into a state of anxiety and tension. Therefore he asked Rolz-Bennett for permission to suggest to Sudjarwo that the Act of Free Choice be postponed for a few months. Shortly thereafter, in imitation of Luns and now in New York himself, he put out a feeler about sending a UN peace force to oversee the plebiscite. His superiors in New York rejected both suggestions immediately because they expected it would result in nothing but further destabilization of the situation.[28] This was a disappointment for Ortiz Sanz, although it is hard to imagine he would have expected a different answer. In any case, he had thereby covered himself with New York, should they afterwards blame him for not doing everything in his power to promote the interests with which he had been entrusted.

Ortiz Sanz might have found solace in this thought, but his position with the Indonesians had not been strengthened by it. His conduct taught them that his bark was slight and his bite totally non-existent so that, in effect, they could really do whatever they liked. It put him in an awkward position with his own organization and formed a threat to his future career. In the final report, which

he would have to submit to the United Nations in the end, he would be unable to indicate any great results. It would do neither the reputation of the organization nor his own name any good. The situation grew even darker when once again they threatened to pass him by completely in forming the consultative councils in the eight regencies, so that his ambition to make some democratic adjustment there would come to naught. According to the Indonesian plans, which had been confirmed by the provincial council of West Irian on 24 April, the appointment of the members was to be done by ad hoc commissions to be established by the regency councils. Thereupon, Ortiz Sanz had made it abundantly clear that he not only wanted to play a role in the appointment of the members of those commissions, but in the subsequent 'election' of the members of the consultative councils themselves as well. He had asked Sudjarwo for a schedule to enable him to make the proper preparations in time. The latter had reacted with some vague reassurances but when he returned to Jakarta on 19 May, it became obvious to Ortiz Sanz that the Indonesian government had no intention of waiting for him. It simply carried on. On 23 May, he signalled Rolz-Bennett indignantly that the ad-hoc commissions had already been appointed without his knowledge and that these were by now in the process of appointing the consultative councils. In addition, he stated that he had seen official instructions to the functioning bodies to exclude the UN whenever possible. They were to use the excuse that the elections had already taken place! He had also heard that things were handled in anything but a democratic fashion. An example from Biak showed that the population had simply been left out and that it was the police and the army that had appointed the members. Thereby the credibility of the United Nations had been at issue, for whom a legitimate election of the members of the consultative councils had been the primary condition. He politely requested the secretary general to point this out firmly to the Indonesian government once again.[29]

Indeed, these were difficult times for U Thant's special envoy. Nevertheless, there was a glimmer of hope when he received the message that Adam Malik and Luns had met in Rome on 21 May for a discussion that had been carefully kept secret until then, where they had come to an agreement on the outlines of the execution of the New York Agreement. As we already know, Malik had officially stated afterwards that Indonesia would implement the stipulations of the New York Agreement in their entirety, while Luns had stressed that for him the decisive factor was the credibility of that implementation for the United Nations. Ortiz Sanz thought it to be an important document. Not only did he mention this in his telegram to Rolz-Bennett, but he also got in touch with Sudjarwo right away, which led to a meeting at the Indonesian Ministry of

Foreign Affairs on 24 May. Here he made it clear that this was the first time that the ministers of both contracted parties had given their opinion about the fulfilment of the still unresolved point of the Agreement. As he saw it, Malik's promise implied that there should be a solid referendum. Yet, in practice on a number of points this appeared to him not be the case at all. For instance, nothing had been done to fulfil the guarantees mentioned in Article 22 of the Agreement for freedom of expression for the Papuans, while the growing number of petitions and complaints about arrests left one to imagine there was a great deal of unrest among them. The same was true for Article 18d, which established the eligibility of all adult men and women to participate in an Act of Free Choice. Now that they had chosen, with the agreement of the provincial councils, *musyawarah* as the form of deliberation of the consultative councils, this right could only be realized to a certain degree by having the people elect the members yet to be seated directly, and this under the watchful eye of the United Nations. Finally, he reminded them of his previous suggestion of a general amnesty. In his opinion, it was high time that such a declaration be promulgated. The Indonesian government had to 'adopt courageous and generous measures and take a calculated risk in allowing the opposition the opportunity to express its views.'[30]

This forceful message was not directed to Sudjarwo and his staff alone, but was also given to the press after the meeting ended. In a message to New York, Ortiz Sanz added that it was not yet clear to what extent Indonesia had taken his advice to heart. Thus, no one needed to be uncertain about his or her own position. As far as Sanz was concerned, it was a repetition of earlier steps taken, but with the support of the Malik and Luns' statements in Rome he now dared say so in public. The declaration of Rome was an inducement for his staff as well not to lag behind the Netherlands in vigour. On 27 May there was a positive reaction from that side, in which the secretary general fully backed his representative in West Irian this time. Ruslan Abdulgani was called to headquarters to receive the message, too.[31]

While this was going on, Ortiz Sanz departed again on 2 June for a previously scheduled consultation with his staff in Jayapura. When he returned to Jakarta ten days later, a directive from U Thant was waiting for him, instructing him to convey the displeasure of UN Headquarters to the Indonesian government. Its tone was even sharper than had been the case when Ruslan Abdulgani was approached. According to the secretary general, the fact that as much as seventy per cent of the membership of the consultative councils had been chosen without input from the United Nations was cause for serious doubt about the validity of the procedure that had been followed. That would hurt not only Indonesia's reputation but that of the United Nations as well. Therefore those

elections had to be held again. It goes without saying that the contents of this letter were endorsed by Ortiz Sanz, although he did modify the directive from New York somewhat. In a letter of 13 June, he urged Sudjarwo to hold new elections in a number of specified populous districts, on condition that this would take place in the presence of UN observers.[32]

Unaccustomed to Indonesian helpfulness, to Ortiz Sanz's great surprise Sudjarwo reacted unusually fast this time, albeit with maximum economy. He responded with a letter of 14 June. He wasted no words on the place names the UN representative had mentioned. He did admit that no UN personnel had been present in some of the districts around the Wissel Lakes. In his opinion it would be possible to hold new elections there, but added in the same breath that he would prefer to skip this in view of the trouble and expenses it would entail. He also stated that the principle of representation had been discussed previously with Ali Nekunam, the UN representative in Jayapura, and that the latter had not deemed it necessary to be present everywhere, nor did he have the required staff available for such a presence. In his judgement, observation in a few easily accessible electoral districts per residency had been sufficient. That had been the case in a number of district capitals in the regencies of Tjendrawasih, Sorong, and Jayapura. Having thus thrown the ball back into the UN's court, Sudjarwo then asked curtly in which places Ortiz Sanz actually wanted to see new elections held. He would then relay that information to the provincial council of West Irian, which would consider what might be possible in this regard.[33]

As always, it was not a very accommodating answer. It was especially painful for Ortiz Sanz that he had no rejoinder to Sudjarwo's suggestion that he did not have his system under control. Apparently, he was not aware of agreements of the kind made by Nekunam, not even after he had visited Jayapura, where he surely must have had ample opportunity for an exchange of thoughts. Evidently, there was a lack of communication. This could be attributed in part to the bad telephone and telegraph connections to the outside world of the UN post in Jayapura, while the Indonesians had fully free and undisturbed access to the existing network. The UN team had always been dependent on Indonesian assistance for land and air transportation. The same conditions applied to the receiving of interpreters and supplies. If they so desired, it was not difficult for the Indonesian military to keep the teams waiting for a few days, so that these could not reach their destinations in time.[34] This situation rendered the operation of the UN mission considerably more arduous throughout the entire duration of its stay, and in all likelihood influenced Ali Nekunam's decision to settle for less.

In addition, during his stay in Jayapura, the UN staff there had grown completely demoralized. According to the American observer Laporta, who was

visiting Jayapura at that same time, Ortiz Sanz's colleagues there proved to be cynical and uninterested because they had lost all faith in any Indonesian sincerity. For that same reason, they felt no need to undertake any gruelling trips into the interior and preferred wasting their time in Jayapura with endless conversations and visits to the beach. The first secretary of the UN mission, Marshall Williams, had already been unable to get much done with the Indonesians. Because he was Afro-American, his hosts had intimidated him thoroughly. When it suited them, they acted as if he were a Papuan and treated him as such. An extremely bizarre incident occurred in April when five armed Indonesian soldiers forced their way into the UN office with the intention of hauling off this second in command of the UN team. They did so on the pretext that 'that Papuan' had no business there. From then on, Williams took great pleasure in telling this tale to anyone he met, particularly to highly-placed Indonesians. To what extent Nekunam was better liked by the Indonesians, or demonstrated more understanding for their approach, is unclear from the archival documents consulted.[35]

While Ortiz Sanz was thus being forced into a corner by Sudjarwo, the Indonesian representative in New York was making the same efforts there. In a memorandum of 19 June, Abdulgani declared that the UN representative did not understand what the intention was and that the ad hoc commissions, established by the regency councils, had a far broader role to play than Ortiz Sanz seemed to think. Their task there consisted of the entire organization of the Act of Free Choice (Pepera). Still, he couldn't avoid stating that the composition of the consultative councils was part of this as well and that, insofar as elections were involved here, this would be done democratically, according to the Indonesian plans, that is to say by way of *musyawarah*. Moreover, he explained emphatically once again that Ortiz Sanz in his conversations with Sudjarwo had had every opportunity to offer his opinion, that both in The Hague and in New York deliberations had been held about every primary matter, and that Nekunam had ample opportunity in Jayapura to argue his interests with the local authorities. Therefore, all was well with the 'advise, assist and participate' of the United Nations, as required by the New York Agreement. The implicit message here was that, if such was not the case, the UN only had itself to blame. Not a word was said about the fact that the UN had not been informed until 30 May about the appointment schedule that, to a large extent, had been dealt with by then.[36]

This discouraging reaction did not mean that it had escaped the Indonesians that the United Nations were holding a dangerous weapon in the form of their complaint about the inadequately democratic level of the operation and that it was in their own interest as well that, at the end of the ride, the Act of Free

Choice receive the blessing of the world organization. Therefore, on 16 June, Ortiz Sanz received a message that, if he so wanted, new elections could be held shortly in a number of places of his choice, and that the Minister of the Interior would make a plane available to transport the UN team to those places in the brief period remaining. Finally, the Indonesians suggested that Ortiz Sanz could choose from several districts in the hinterland of Merauke, Fakfak, Biak, and Sorong in the period between 26 June and 5 July.[37] Further data about the execution thereof are either missing or contradict each other. According to the Australian diplomat Watson, present in the area at the time, some ten 'elections' were held in the afore-mentioned regencies and attended by UN functionaries, after all.[38] The reports of the regency-appointed 'ad hoc commissions' only mention such repeated elections in a few places in Fakfak's hinterland. They state nothing other than the fact that UN personnel had been present there.[39]

That was the exact interpretation that Sudjarwo was giving publicly to the meaning of the word 'participation' of the UN team as well. 'To participate is to be present'. This observation did not meet with any objection from Ortiz Sanz. In a personal communication to Rolz-Bennett at this time, he wrote that there were clear shortcomings in the manner in which Indonesia implemented the Act of Free Choice. These were to be found in the freedom of expression and the democratic standard of the procedures. However, the UN participated in the process of self-determination without any authority or means. They were able to witness the shortcomings but it was not theirs to pass judgement on what went on. Their only task could be that of improving matters as much as possible and providing information on this at the General Assembly so that it could draw its own conclusions. In the meantime, it was eminently clear both to Ortiz Sanz and to his superiors in New York that a negative judgement should be prevented, no matter what.[40] Small victories were welcome. Thus, the fact that Indonesia had declared itself willing to hold a few new 'elections' on behalf of the UN was more important than the question of what they actually amounted to. What mattered was that the final report should be able to present it as a sign of good will. The Indonesian pledge met these criteria. It would not cost Indonesia anything, but for Ortiz Sanz it was a victory for his upcoming report. In the interim, for him and his organization, that had become the most significant point.

We shall now look at the actual procedure for the selection of the members of the consultative meetings. The rules had been provided in the report of 10 June of the Indonesian Mission in New York, which was disseminated that same day as a United Nations press release. The members of the consultative councils

would be elected by five hundred to a thousand electors per regency. Their election would be done by the people through *musyawarah* procedures, where experienced civil servants would act as middlemen. All of this was explained in detail and by way of mathematical examples. These are to be found in the massive reports that Ortiz Sanz and Sudjarwo were to present to the United Nations at the end.[41] Otherwise, Ortiz Sanz only gives an account of the preceding consultation that led ultimately to the presence of his UN teams in a number of places, while Sudjarwo confines himself to a lively description of the practical problems that occurred.[42] Neither of the protagonists in this drama have anything to say about the actual course of events. We can imagine it, however, based on the reports of a few diplomats present in the region. These were the previously mentioned Australian diplomat Watson, who was in West Irian between 26 May and 16 June, and his American colleague Laporta, who was travelling through the area from 12 May until 2 June. Each of them visited all the important capitals and the main centres in the interior. There they spoke with Indonesian civil servants, with missionaries, and to a lesser degree with Papuans.

Their reports tell us that generally speaking the ad hoc commissions, appointed by the eight regency councils, consisted of nine individuals divided among civil servants, clergy, and council members. The procedure required that the members of these commissions travel individually to a district assigned to them and there, with the help of the local administration and the representatives of the military apparatus, choose the persons to be included in the consultative council. Ideally, this choice would be made from the candidates nominated by the local tribal and village chiefs. However, that was not always easy in view of the complicated internal relationships and in a number of cases they eventually had to seek advice from the missionaries because they had the greatest insight into the local community.

The overall impression is that the approach differed strongly from place to place but that the outcome was always the same. In the interior it was almost always a matter of appointment, while in the more developed areas on the coast a greater variation could sometimes be seen. At the end of Laporta's stay, the selections had taken place in most of the areas outside the larger towns, with the exception of the turbulent hinterland of Manokwari and Enarotali. The process was still going on in Merauke, Jayapura, and Biak. In some areas, as far as Laporta could tell, certain things had gone off rather democratically. Thus, he gave a detailed report on the Tanah Merah region, where the Keian priest Resubun explained to him how everything had worked. Resubun was a member of the Merauke regency council, of which Tanah Merah was a part. He had travelled around the region assigned to him for several weeks and with the help

of local civil servants had drawn up a list of potential candidates. Subsequently, the final candidates for the consultative council were chosen at meetings in the various villages. It is clear that Resubun did his utmost to handle matters in an exemplary fashion. However, the democratic level is doubtful, while his story does not clarify on what grounds the choices were made. One of his colleagues, who was to organize the elections in Agats, also part of the Merauke district, took an easier way out. He quite simply appointed fourteen of his tribe's members to the consultative council. In the charitable judgement of Laporta, it didn't make any real difference because it was no more or less democratic than any other method one might think of, anyway. It struck him, for instance, that to the surprise of the Indonesians, the concept of 'tribal chief' was not as simple as they had thought. In reality, it turned out that these functionaries often did not actually exist so that appointing the electors from this group was more often than not just a shot in the dark.

A slightly different procedure was followed in one of the Biak districts where they left the persons assigned to be electors free to make the final choice either directly or via *musyawarah*. The majority chose the latter, which in Laporta's opinion was an optimal expression of democratic persuasion. However, he also declared that the local team consisted of a number of Indonesian civil servants, under the leadership of a Javanese police commissioner. Laporta considered this a positive thing but did not elaborate on the obvious question about the way in which this was in accord with the spirit and the letter of the New York Agreement or, for that matter, with the specific instructions announced on 10 June. Another example from Biak comes from Watson. These were the first elections that the UN team attended and, apparently, they had prepared them well. The representatives of fifteen kampongs went to the district capital with a collective proposal of six candidates. Then the representative of the ad hoc commission added another three on the spot, and from these the fifteen representatives were once again allowed to choose six men. Watson, who based his report on the information of the UN people, suspected that the candidature had been selected a priori by the ad hoc commission so that the outcome was wholly in line with their wishes. Here, too, it remains questionable whether Ortiz Sanz's desires had been met. Both Watson and Laporta's general impression was that these elections had been well prepared by the Indonesian police and military present in the region, while in the district capitals matters were closely watched by the officials left behind by Sudjarwo, who had been in the region since October 1968.

The chosen set-up promoted the choice of local heads, that is to say of simple people with an extremely limited education.[43] The political elite had less to do with it, although in the category of functional groups there were quite a few

schoolteachers, civil servants, church leaders, and other individuals with a restricted professional training. However, they definitely were a minority. Due to the effort to make the number of representatives per district proportionate to the population density, the heavily populated but least developed interior sections produced more delegates than the more developed but more thinly populated coastal regions. There were almost no people among the members who had played a more or less prominent role in the preceding Netherlands era. On the lists of speakers of the Act of Free Choice we find only the names of Galim Reasa, of Ibrahim Bauw, and of his nephew Ismaël. It turns out that at the session in Manokwari, Lodewijk Mandatjan was present as well who was thereby offered the chance of realizing the loyalty promise he had made to Suharto after his capitulation. In the opinion of various observers, the total picture presented a reasonably representative average of the broader society, at least of its least developed and most manipulable sections. In any event, the participants whom we consulted for our research had no inkling why they had been thus honoured, and claimed not to have been particularly pleased with it. Having observed the event, a Portuguese diplomat in Jakarta remarked wittily that if Ian Smith, the advocate for a white Rhodesia, proceeded in the same fashion, he would have no trouble whatsoever gaining an overwhelming victory at prospective elections among the indigenous population of his country. Indeed, the chosen procedure left plenty of room for the Indonesian authorities to appoint to the consultative councils those members on whom they could count to follow their directives. Yet, they couldn't feel comfortable that in reality this would be the case as well. More guarantees were needed to this end, as we shall see at the implementation of the final round of the Act of Free Choice.

Self-determination in practice

After the members of the consultative councils were chosen, the path to the Act of Free Choice was open. On 9 July 1969, Ortiz Sanz left for West Irian to fulfil his task as observer. He was planning to attend all eight meetings in person, always in the company of three staff members. According to the schedule, the first session was held in Merauke on 15 July. Then followed Wamena (Central Highlands), Nabire (Wissel Lakes), Fakfak, Sorong, Manokwari, Biak (Schouten Islands), and Jayapura (Hollandia). In this sequence we see an Indonesian preference for a series that runs from 'safe' to more uncertain places, apparently to prevent an undesirable outcome in Jayapura from immediately influencing the atmosphere of the successive meetings. On the island, the army and police were in a maximum state of preparedness on the eve of the Act of Free Choice. The military force had been raised to eighteen thousand

men, according to Malik's reports.[44] Furthermore, large numbers of people had been placed in preventive custody, according to all the Papuan informants, although it is impossible to confirm what the actual number was.

Zacharias Sawor mentions a figure of several tens of thousands. The same number is mentioned also by the well-informed pastor Mesach Koiboer who, as vice-chairman of the Synod of the Protestant Church in Irian Barat (GKI-IB), travelled a great deal and thus was abreast as no other of the true situation in the country.[45] That seems like a high figure in view of our previous estimate of fifteen hundred prisoners in the preceding period. However, other eyewitnesses, too, declare that during the Act of Free Choice countless people were incarcerated and that in those places where the sessions were held, soldiers were to be seen everywhere with their rifles at the ready. During the operation, foreign journalists in Jayapura reported that in that town alone they had seen at least 200 prisoners, but that their own freedom of movement was limited. At any rate, on the basis of these observations we can conclude that the Indonesian army in the days of the implementation of the Act of Free Choice was taking no risks and kept anyone off the streets who might possibly be a threat to public order. In all likelihood, the majority of these were released again after the plebiscite was over.[46]

In the eight places where the Act of Free Choice was to be held, the appointed council members had been assembled in barracks or school buildings weeks before. They were not permitted to have any contact with the outside world. To keep them favourably disposed, they had all been given a transistor radio, a flashlight, clothing, and some money. These were highly appreciated treasures. Additionally, they were carefully briefed about their task, while music and military exercises were there to reinforce the Indonesian national spirit. One may assume that in appointing them the ad hoc commissions had tried their best to pick people who were not manifestly anti-Indonesian. However, that did not mean that the group was therefore pro-Indonesian. According to the reports of some of the participants, the mood was highly anti-Indonesian but they were heavily pressured by the organizers, whereby threats of violence were the order of the day. A speech made by Ali Murtopo in Jayapura at the beginning of the operation served as an indication of this. There, at a training meeting he pointed out to his audience that they and their families would come to a bad end if their conduct was not what Indonesia expected from them.[47] During hour-long sessions, a number of especially chosen participants had to learn previously prepared texts by heart, in which they declared themselves to be for integration with Indonesia. Generally, their content was consistent but in some towns they had been elaborated somewhat further. In that case, there was a choice of several different texts, albeit always of the same tenor. Without

exception, they dealt with the redundancy of the operation, with the value of the proclamation of 17 August 1945, and with the Papuans' firm wish not to be separated from Indonesia anymore. A number of speakers sprinkled the speech with elaborations on the ethnographic unity with Indonesia, their shared past in the kingdom of Mojopahit, and their communal suffering under the yoke of the Dutch.

On the big day itself, the members were assembled in a large hall where they received further instruction on what was expected of them. Later that day, the Pepera delegation of the central administration appeared on the scene, consisting of General Ali Murtopo, Sudjarwo, Governor Kaisiepo, and a choice selection of civil servants and military figures. Others in permanent attendance were Ortiz Sanz and his staff. The ministers Adam Malik, Ali Budiardjo, and Amir Machmud attended the sessions in Merauke, Wamena, Nabire, and Sorong. All but Sorong were also visited by the ambassadors of the Netherlands, Australia, and Thailand. The latter was present in his capacity as chairman of the *corps diplomatique* in Jakarta. In Biak and Jayapura the corps was represented by the ambassadors of Australia, New Zealand, Burma, and West Germany. The meetings were facilitated by the leader of the local ad hoc commission, more often than not the regent. He would present an explanation of the preparations made. Then Frans Kaisiepo gave a stimulating speech in which he outlined the historical background of the event, with an emphasis on the unity with the Republic that the population of West Irian had already demonstrated in 1945 and subsequent years. Ortiz Sanz followed with a short speech in which he indicated the importance of the event in which the electors now had the opportunity to openly express the opinion of the people. Thereupon Sudjarwo and Minister Amir Machmud took the floor, stressing that they expected those present to choose for Indonesia. Then the actual ceremony began. Those who had received a letter or had written one themselves read it aloud. The rest applauded when the outcome was announced. This course of events repeated itself in each of the eight capitals where the consultative meetings were held. It was in this fashion that the people of western New Guinea unanimously agreed on eternal integration with the Republic.[48]

The Indonesian press reports were positive. They stated that the organizers in Fakfak and Nabire couldn't wait for the big day and had announced days in advance that the electors were for integration with Indonesia. They highlighted the festive mood that reigned in the hall and in town. In Merauke, *Antara* said, there was singing and dancing. According to the same press bureau, the council members in Sorong performed songs of joy at the end. When we follow the course of events as reported by the Western press, present with about twenty

journalists, a different picture emerges. The reporter Peter R. Kann of *The Wall Street Journal* wrote that the army commander Sarwo Edhie told anyone who would listen that if the Papuans would choose separation from Indonesia they would have to face 115 million Indonesians. According to him, independence would remain a dream for the Papuans. It would be better if they realized that immediately, rather than have large numbers of victims suffer in the future. Very little was left to chance here. Thus, the reporter noted that the United Nations buildings in Jayapura were guarded day and night and that Papuans who did succeed in making contact with the people inside ran the risk of being arrested, followed by imprisonment or worse. Even so, foreign visitors who had managed to shake off the Indonesian security guards for a few minutes were instantly surrounded by Papuans who whispered the words '*Merdeka*' or 'OPM' to them, or simply the word 'Indonesia,' with thumb pointing down.[49]

During his visit to Jayapura, the Australian journalist Joseph Halloway was also very much impressed by the many young Papuans risking imprisonment and torture just to let any foreigner willing to listen hear their message of independence. He wrote that a dejected mood was common among the Papuans generally. The sole dissident vote in the entire operation was recorded in Fakfak. This particular man declared that West Irian expected no justice from Indonesia but did expect it from the world. He then refused ostentatiously to be counted among the proponents.[50] In the official report this episode is not mentioned. The first incident was reported by the AAP-Reuter correspondent Hugh Lunn in Manokwari on 30 July. Some unrest broke out among the waiting crowd of about a hundred persons in front of the building where the vote was taking place. When a small group pushed forward through the crowd chanting 'self, self, self,' the police and security functionaries dressed in civilian clothes interfered, whereupon a fight broke out that was brought to an end with rubber clubs. The crowd that had dispersed in the meantime was then pushed back under the red-and-white Indonesian flag by the organizers, but unrest in the town continued.

The same reporter provided a series of images showing a negative mood in other places as well. He gave a more detailed report from Nabire, where voters had been confined for weeks on a boat lying at anchor in front of the coast. The day before the council's session, one of the participants had, through a porthole, asked a passing journalist for help. He whispered to him that 100 of the 175 delegates wanted to vote against Indonesia but were afraid to do so. The next day, the same man was one of the speakers who relayed the message that Indonesia extended from Sabang to Merauke and there was no other choice than remaining with that country. An occasional speaker showed greater audacity. After having uttered the desired message, he would add that he

wanted all corrupt (*busuk*) Indonesian officials to depart. More constructive was the commentary of one of the fifteen female voters who were dressed for the occasion in the Javanese sàrong and kabaya that had come in the incentive package. In her short speech she referred to the region's backwardness and expressed the wish that the government would pay more attention to housing and education for the mountain people. According to Lunn, these words caused Minister Amir Machmud, who was there, to rise from his seat. In his closing speech he did, indeed, make a few promises in that direction. It elicited another representative of the people to cry out: 'Fine, if it's true.' In the end, all the votes were for Indonesia here as well. The procedure was accompanied by a large crowd of mountain people who filled the hall with 'whoops like the Indians in the Wild West.' The final meetings took place in Biak and Jayapura. Because the greatest opposition was expected here, the preparations had also been the most thorough. The elections came off without any incidents and the session in Jayapura ended on 2 August with street celebrations and a military parade.[51] Then the official guests left town. Malik departed after first declaring that the outcome could not be disputed by the United Nations or any other country.

We shall add a few memories of a number of Papuans who participated in the Act of Free Choice or else were closely involved in it. The participants were divided across Merauke, Wamena, Biak, and Manokwari. They all stated that they were merely appointed without knowing the reason why. Also, all of them were forced to memorize the pleasant responses provided by Indonesia and read those aloud under the threat of death. In spite of this, three men in Merauke had refused to sign the declaration without any serious consequences. In Wamena there had been disturbances two days before the big day during which two Indonesian soldiers were killed. At the Manokwari session one of the members had read his declaration and mangled it, so that the text could be variously interpreted. Although it was probably simply the result of nerves or lack of understanding, it could be seen as an act of resistance as well. For the Papuans mentioned here there was little reason to look back at the events of that day with any pride. Their stories also show that they were bothered by the fact that Ortiz Sanz's attitude was extremely stand-offish and that he was unavailable for any conversation. They indicated emphatically that the journalists present hardly had the opportunity to accomplish their work. The Indonesian military followed them on their heels at all times and they were not allowed to speak with anyone. When one of them tried to take a photograph in Manokwari, his camera was confiscated right away.

Although limited in content, these reports nevertheless point to an atmosphere of oppression and lack of freedom in which there was no room for any

display of personal preferences. Thereby they confirm the impressions of the journalists and the three ambassadors who attended some of the meetings. The Netherlands ambassador, H. Scheltema wrote a rather detailed report of his experiences from which one can draw the same conclusion. However, he phrased it in such a way that, when disseminated among the members of the Dutch parliament, it would arouse the least number of questions to which the answer had better remain unspoken. As he said himself, Scheltema had therefore only reported that which he had witnessed with his own eyes and had abstained from offering any interpretations or using what he had heard from others. Thereby it became the umpteenth document in this tale of the Act of Free Choice in which a number of facts were given without any context, without any feeling, thus presenting a mutilation of the truth.

This is not to say that the ambassador did not see the underlying reality. While the Act of Free Choice was still in progress, a number of conversations took place at the American embassy in Jakarta between Ambassador Green and his three colleagues who had attended the Act of Free Choice in Merauke, Wamena, and Nabire. Successively, these were Phinit Akson (Thailand), H. Scheltema (the Netherlands), and G. Jockel (Australia). They kept their cards close to their chest and with diplomatic optimism wanted to let everyone know that the ceremony had come off better than they had expected. With that, their praise came to an end. Phinit Akson quoted Minister Luns who had expressed the hope in The Hague that the Act of Free Choice would, at least, be implemented with some dignity. This dignity, so said Phinit, had been utterly missing and his colleagues agreed with him. There had been no question of applying the 'one man one vote' system, which could have been done quite easily in the towns and on the coast. The military had their nose in everything and people who might be expected to sound a deviant note were forced to speak under their watchful eye. In addition, he had noticed that during the meeting the electors had been heavily pressured by the most eloquent adherents of Indonesia.

Scheltema had taken offence at the festivities in Merauke where the pro-Indonesian mood had been laid on with a trowel just a bit too much and every speech seemed taken from the same textbook. On the other hand, in Wamena things had been very calm. No noisy speeches and encouragements here; the appointed speakers had confined themselves to stating the words 'red-and-white' and then sat down again. Conversely, it had struck him also that in Nabire, where the meeting for the area of the Wissel Lakes took place, things had been livelier and that some of the delegation members had even asked questions of the government. It had done his heart good that, in his prayer, the Catholic delegate had expressed the hope that the government would work for the people for a change and not the other way around. He was firmly convinced

these had been spontaneous actions. Finally, Scheltema stated that, if he were honest, he could not easily say anything else of a positive nature in his report to the Netherlands parliament.

Jockel tried to see it from a different angle. He thought that the referendum had forced the Indonesians to indoctrinate the Papuans heavily, which had not promoted their popularity with the latter. The Act of Free Choice had caused divisiveness and aroused expectations that could not be realized. Still, he hoped that the situation would improve through measures on the economic and social levels. In contrast to his colleagues, he had been quite impressed by the pro-Indonesian mood in Merauke, while he believed that in Nabire at least three quarters of the population was on the side of the Indonesians. It was only in Biak and Jayapura, which he visited as well, that he had noted a depressed and discontented atmosphere among the Papuans, but at that time the plebiscite had not yet taken place there.[52] The explanation for his rather optimistic account can be found in his report to Canberra, where he added to an otherwise very similar communication that it was a matter of great importance for Australia to come through this period unscathed. In that case, when it was over, the country could start afresh with a blank slate to work on the well-being of West Irian. He found consolation in the idea that interest in this region had been aroused now that thanks to Pepera so many Indonesians had come in contact with West Irian and its inhabitants for the first time. He could only hope that it had opened their eyes to the possibility of being good neighbours with Australia as well.[53]

Reporting to the United Nations

After the last Pepera session was held in Jayapura, on the eve of Independence Day, Suharto declared in a radio address that henceforth West Irian was part of Indonesia. Ortiz Sanz closed his offices in Jayapura and Jakarta a day later. He left for New York to devote himself entirely to writing his report of the events. Sudjarwo was similarly employed. While the two diplomats were thus occupied, President Suharto paid a ten-day visit to West Irian. On that occasion, he proclaimed a new law in a session of the provincial council there, providing the region with the status of an autonomous province of Indonesia. It was a repetition of earlier government acts. Sukarno had established an autonomous province of West Irian as early as 1956, an act that was repeated in 1962. In each case it had been a political, not an administrative gesture. The new step flowed from the need of the Indonesian government to underline the fact that West Irian was now a regular part of Indonesia.[54]

However, in terms of international law something was still missing here. To clarify this, a brief look back at the preliminary history is needed. At the New

Guinea Conference of December 1950, the Indonesian government had started from the position that the sovereignty of the region had been transferred to it as early as the Round Table Conference, so that the only matter left to be arranged was the transfer of administration. Without giving up this position, it had then posited that sovereignty had rested with it ever since the proclamation of 1945. In turn, the Netherlands government had always insisted that, in Article 2 of the charter of sovereignty transfer, New Guinea was not included and thus was still with the Netherlands. So the matter of sovereignty was unresolved, and was to remain so. In the negotiations that led to the signing of the New York Agreement, too, the question of sovereignty had been left aside. In the text of the Agreement itself it was not touched on either. However, by signing the Agreement, the Netherlands had in essence given up its claim to sovereignty without having put the concept up for discussion. This had become especially clear when the bill was put forward for approval of the New York Agreement in the Netherlands parliament in September 1962. On that occasion, government and parliament accepted the fact that this could occur without any constitutional amendment. The fact that in the constitutional amendment of 1956 article 1, Netherlands New Guinea was mentioned as part of the territory of the Kingdom of the Netherlands was meaningful, according to the government, solely as 'a purely geographical description without any normative significance, which in no way expressed any "aspiration" either.'

At the time, Prime Minister de Quay had defended this position by appealing to the fact that his predecessor Drees had held the same position. Just to be sure, he had added that 'the power of the Constitution is overstrained if one wishes to see in it the recording of positions whose international aspect is at least as important as the national one.' From 1950 onward, the Dutch authority over New Guinea had rested on the fact 'that the Netherlands had not transferred sovereignty in 1949 in the continued, unrestricted performance of authority over a succession of years and in recognition thereof by the vast majority of states,' and not in an article that was not included in the constitution until 1956 and 'where in other respects any meaning is frequently denied as well.' This situation had been changed in 1962 and in plain language De Quay had declared on behalf of the government that, as the government saw it, Dutch sovereignty over the region would automatically come to an end at the same time that the transfer of authority to the UN administrator took place. For the scholars of the constitution this was not a satisfactory position overall, but for the political reality of the moment it would suffice. The law was approved with a great majority on 7 and 13 September by both Chambers.[55]

The next step was that the General Assembly of the United Nations was informed of the Agreement on 21 September 1962, whereupon the

administration of Netherlands New Guinea was transferred to the UNTEA on 1 October, which would be allowed to hand it on to Indonesia after 1 May 1963, at a moment to be decided upon by the UN. According to Article 1 of the Agreement, this recognition had happened after a resolution submitted by the Netherlands and Indonesia together had been tendered. The remaining stipulations of the accord suggested that, in agreement with the concept of self-determination as accepted by the United Nations, the outcome of the Act of Free Choice would definitively settle the matter of sovereignty. One can infer that thereby the international legal position of Indonesia had changed. By accepting the Act of Free Choice and subsequently implementing it, the Indonesian government had left room for the assumption that it accepted the implied concept of self-determination. It had thereby unsettled the claim on sovereignty that it had held since 1950. Suharto's speech of 16 September 1969 to the provincial council in Jayapura and the subsequent government actions underlined Indonesia's claim to sovereignty, but the best way to get this confirmed by international law as well rested with the unanimous acceptance of the report by General Assembly, which the secretary general was to present to the General Assembly pertaining to the proceedings and the implementation of the Act of Free Choice.

This report was mentioned in Article 21 of the Agreement. It only spoke of presenting a report, not of any form of approval. The significance of this treatment was unclear and it certainly did not say that thereby the status of the region was definitively decided. Consequently, the matter of sovereignty here was left up in the air as well, but it was obvious even so that a serious discussion on this question could cause both the United Nations and the parties involved grave difficulties because it was unpredictable how things should be handled thereafter.

Since none of the United Nations member states involved wanted to resurrect this question again, they had carefully looked over the report at an early stage. This was true for Indonesia and the Netherlands as well as for the United Nations and the United States. Still, their positions differed widely. The Netherlands was a partner in the Agreement but, according to its text, had no responsibility in the implementation of the Act of Free Choice other than providing a contribution to its financing. Although intensely involved in the shaping of the Agreement, America had had no formal association with it and therefore could confine itself to watchful observation and making sure that everything would proceed as desired. The only active role was reserved for Indonesia and for the United Nations. The Indonesian Government was responsible for the implementation of the Act of Free Choice, albeit with the cooperation (to advise, assist and participate) of the representative and the

secretary general of the United Nations. Both were required to submit a report to the secretary general after the Act of Free Choice had been achieved and he presumably would base his own report to the General Assembly on theirs.

If that report was to withstand the scrutiny of the General Assembly, U Thant would have to show that he had properly completed the assignment given to him by the Assembly in September 1962. The vagueness of the Agreement's text left enough elbow room for this but, when all was said and done, a critical General Assembly could ask what the 1945 Charter, which was at the root of the legal system of the United Nations, and the resolutions based on it, might have to say about this. Thus, great prudence was called for. Ortiz Sanz, an experienced UN diplomat, had been imbued from the beginning with the necessity to develop a position, at least on paper, that would show his actions to be well-founded, at least for the General Assembly. Our story has shown that initially he expected to have an internationally acceptable plebiscite take place but that after spending several months in Indonesia this expectation had diminished considerably. From February 1969 on, he had resigned himself to the fact that the United Nations was actually powerless, not only as a result of the stipulations of the Agreement but also as a result of the unwillingness of the Indonesian authorities to grant the plebiscite the significance that was internationally attributed to it.

From that moment on he had only hoped to guide the affair from the sidelines. His primary concern was focused on the report of his actions that should be phrased in such a way that the General Assembly would take as little umbrage as possible. U Thant and he himself had imparted this concern to Sudjarwo, which had led to a few cosmetic embellishments in the implementation on the side of Indonesia, which was equally interested in avoiding a clash with the General Assembly. It was at that discussion that Ortiz Sanz had confided in Sudjarwo that, at the very least, he should be able to report that an Act of Free Choice had taken place in West Irian.[56] The ambiguous article indicated that his expectations concerning its democratic level were not very high but that, nevertheless, he entertained the hope that he could manage. The result of this attitude was that to the outside world he had always given an impression of aloofness. Thus, the journalist Brian May who had observed him at work in Indonesia was irritated by the fact that he was always preoccupied with his files and had a tendency to close his eyes to the reality surrounding him.[57] We have seen above that this paper aspect had come to weigh upon him more and more heavily as time passed. After all, he had reason enough to worry about the way in which Indonesia was implementing the Act of Free Choice. He could not very well steer things in a different direction, New York did not want positions focused, and a resignation from his end would not be gratefully accepted there.

Therefore the way out had to be sought in a taut formalism and, here also, the vagueness of the Agreement would turn out to be a life raft.

The Netherlands government shared Ortiz Sanz's worries. We have concluded that there was no interest at all there in stirring up the New Guinea question, which it saw as settled. From the moment the Agreement was signed, Luns had taken the position that dealing with these final parts of the New York Agreement was a matter for Indonesia and the United Nations, which had categorically taken over all responsibilities. All the same, the Netherlands had been party to the Agreement and morally bore a certain responsibility for its execution. Right after the Agreement was signed on 15 August 1962, both Prime Minister de Quay and the negotiator Van Roijen had declared firmly that the Netherlands would not lose sight of the interests of the Papuans. One of the ways in which this was expressed was the Dutch contribution to Fundwi; another way lay in the continuing attention to the right to self-determination of the Papuans that the Dutch government had defended so passionately until 1962. All these factors played their part, and the Second Chamber had repeatedly reminded the minister of Foreign Affairs thereof in the course of the year 1969. It was this that led to his visit to Rome where he once again expressed the Netherlands' interest in the communal declaration of the ministers Malik, Udink, and Luns.

The shared appearance with Indonesia pointed to changed circumstances. Friendship with Indonesia had been a central policy point of the Dutch government for several years now. The continuing concern for the Papuans' interests could only be actualized via this friendship. Under the current circumstances it meant that it was by supporting Adam Malik's position that they could attain the most, and the latter had made it known he was aware of the difficult position in which the Papuans had landed. The deliberations in Rome were also intended to reinforce his position. The fact that Udink had gone along confirmed that the Netherlands wanted to continue providing extra funds for West Irian. In the closing statement at the end of the visit to Rome this had been explicitly declared as well.

For Indonesia this cooperation was important not merely for business reasons but for political ones also. A communal approach during the presentation of the outcome of the Act of Free Choice was an effective way of nipping in the bud any possible criticism about its implementation from the General Assembly. The topic had already been dealt with extensively during Sudjarwo's visit to The Hague in January 1969. At that time, Luns and Sudjarwo had agreed that the presentation of the final report should take place as unobtrusively as possible, preferably during the General Debate so that it wouldn't be necessary to add it to the agenda as a special item. In New York, U Thant had been a bit

more reserved and had stated that the schedule did not leave him enough time to have his report ready for the opening of the General Assembly. An underlying reason must have been also that he did not want to make Indonesia happy in advance with too easy a settlement because, in fact, he was anything but pleased with the Indonesian way of handling the plebiscite. These hesitations would only grow in the subsequent months. This came out during a conversation between the American Under-Secretary Green and Rolz-Bennett at the end of July. The American was still hoping then for a simple implementation but the UN official expressed himself in sombre terms about the possibility of having the matter pass by unnoticed.[58] At the United Nations headquarters they were particularly concerned about the mood among some of the African countries that had been lobbied successfully after Jouwe's trip earlier that year. Illness on the part of U Thant caused some delay but on 15 August 1969 the Secretariat announced that the matter had been placed on the agenda, which created the room for a more significant treatment than a mere final report by the secretary general.

At that moment, Indonesia had already moved on to negotiating. On 13 August 1969, Minister Malik left for Africa for a friendly visit to the capital cities of nine Francophone African states, from whom the greatest resistance to the outcome of the Act of Free choice was to be expected. According to reports from members of his staff at the Indonesian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, it was his intention to alert their governments that resistance to the outcome of the plebiscite would revive the whole dispute between the Netherlands and Indonesia. In addition, he wanted to explain to them that the preference for *musyawarah* did not mean that Indonesia was in principle against voting as the Africans wished. He also hoped that this visit would clear away the obstacles that the Dutch had erected in the early sixties between themselves and the Indonesians.[59]

In September 1969, all parties travelled to New York where the General Assembly would be opened on 1 October. En route, Sudjarwo first stopped off in The Hague to discuss his report at the UN. He was hoping to convince the Dutch government to present a resolution on West Irian together with Indonesia, as it had done in 1962, in which they would recommend together that the General Assembly would just take cognizance of the outcome of the Act of Free Choice, which would prevent any further discussion. Sudjarwo left in good spirits but the mood in The Hague was disappointing. The final phase of the Act of Free Choice had met with a great deal of negative criticism in the press and in parliament, and the Second Chamber had hauled Luns over the coals, particularly from the Protestant corner. Under these circumstances

the government couldn't afford to take Indonesia's side too indiscriminately. During a discussion of the Cabinet on 29 August, Luns had declared that it would be difficult for the Netherlands to avoid expressing its regret about the manner in which the free choice had been executed. When two weeks later the Indonesian proposal to submit a resolution together was on the agenda, it met with very little enthusiasm in the Cabinet. The Minister for Development Cooperation, Udink, at first only wanted to collaborate in a common resolution about development aid, as had already been discussed in Rome. For the rest both he and Minister Marga Klompé were very critical. They thought that it was unseemly to offer a text that stated that the New York Agreement had been properly implemented. Prime Minister De Jong then suggested that in his speech Luns should first say something critical about the implementation of the plebiscite and only then should there be a possible motion put forward about assistance to be offered.[60]

In the meantime, that assistance had grown into an important tool of Dutch international policy. Despite the extremely poor results with the Fundwi, which was still not off the ground, in Rome Udink had strongly urged a meaningful development effort for western New Guinea after the Act of Free Choice. Thereby the argument was used that Indonesia could otherwise expect serious social, political and, conceivably, security problems in that region.[61] After his return from the Italian capital, the General Directorate for International Cooperation (DGIS), which Udink managed, had developed the plan for a special development fund for West Irian, to be administered by the Asian Development Bank in Manila. The Netherlands could contribute five million dollars a year to it. Furthermore, the Australians and Americans had already been sounded out about their participation. This way, a small donor group for West Irian could be formed. The Japanese were not welcome and, for the sake of convenience, on the Dutch side they assumed that the Indonesians would not want them to participate either. These plans were strongly encouraged by the missionary organizations working in West Irian and by the Council of Churches. It is striking that their spokespeople always stated that the situation in West Irian was not as bad as some of the press would have them believe. When it suited them, Luns and Udink made grateful use of this in their contacts with third parties.[62]

The facts show us the result of this internal discussion. During his visit to The Hague, Sudjarwo did not obtain what he had hoped for,[63] but later that month Malik, Luns, and Sudjarwo saw each other on the eve of the United Nations General Assembly that was to be opened with a speech by U Thant. Now that West Irian was a separate item on the agenda, he could make do with the announcement that he would report on that topic in the course of the session.

It offered the Dutch and Indonesian ministers the opportunity of issuing a first sign from their end. Luns and Malik, who were on very good terms now, discussed the texts they were to deliver in advance with each other. Initially, Luns had planned to say that doubt had emerged among the Dutch people about the system and implementation of the Act of Free Choice. At Malik's request, he softened that phrase somewhat, so that when Luns had the floor in the General Assembly he went no further than to announce that in the Netherlands some doubt about these matters had surfaced. Malik followed suit by stating that the outcome of the Act of Free Choice could not be rescinded. He then expressed his gratitude for the cooperation of the Dutch government and for the understanding he had encountered in executing this important task. The Indonesian government saw the continued development of West Irian not only as a national duty, but as a task of tremendous importance for all of humanity as well. After this preamble, the Indonesian minister announced that the Netherlands was willing to contribute to this via the new fund that was to be established with the Asian Development Bank in Manila.[64]

Both phrases were intended as a first introduction to a joint resolution to be presented later. Luns had had his say in extremely cautious terms and Malik had paved the way for future cooperation in West Irian's development. The only problem was that Sudjarwo could not remain silent and started to spread the word that originally Luns had planned to use sharper words, which he had dropped at the urging of Indonesia. This was uncomfortable for Luns because his domestic faultfinders could now accuse him of overindulgence.[65] However, it was not politically dangerous so that he was able to disregard this criticism without too much trouble. Other than that, the topic received little attention in the General Assembly. In the end, Luns was able to declare in the Dutch Cabinet that only Belgium, Luxemburg, and seven African countries shared the Dutch reservations. Since the regime change in Jakarta, the mood in the Cabinet had shifted considerably to the advantage of Indonesia and Suharto's government enjoyed a great deal of sympathy. It was only in the communist states that reservations existed. In this connection, it is not insignificant that in his conversations with Luns in New York, Malik confided to him that Indonesia was having serious financial difficulties with Russia.[66] The latter demanded payment for the credit given for Indonesian armaments, arguing that a proletarian state could not afford to be philanthropic. What was even more problematic for Indonesia was the fact that Russia wanted cash on the nail for the delivery of sorely needed reserve parts. The fact that this conversation could even take place demonstrates their new confidentiality.[67]

That conversation clarified also that the Indonesian alliance with the Russians, which had made Operation Mandala possible, was a thing of the past.

Luns was pleased to hear this. He had a few other conversations at the time that cheered him up. President John F. Kennedy, who was assassinated in 1963, had been succeeded by his fellow party member Lyndon Johnson, who in the elections of 1968 was succeeded by the Republican Richard Nixon. It was a bitter detail that his adversary, Robert Kennedy, had been killed by an assassin during the election campaign as well. Nixon was a loyal supporter of Suharto. Yet, he and his colleagues in the White House had serious doubts about the question of whether their predecessors had been all that lucky in their approach to the South East Asian decolonization. The developments there had proven to be disappointing, notably due to the constantly escalating war in Indo-China. Criticism about that was directed also to the Kennedy brothers. During his stay in New York, the American Secretary of Foreign Affairs Rogers had expressed himself in bitter terms to Luns about the 'obscure role of Bobby Kennedy,' who according to him had 'exercised a decisive influence on his much weaker brother' in the problem of New Guinea.

President Nixon shared these feelings. During a meeting with Luns, the latter even went so far as to agree with his position that since the Second World War America had played a most detrimental role in Indonesia with respect to the Netherlands. Encouraged thereby, in a radio interview on 10 October with the *Voice of America* before his departure from New York, Luns expressed himself critically about the role that America—specifically the two members of the Kennedy family—had played in the New Guinea question. Because of their interference the Netherlands had not been able to realize its promises to the Papuans. His criticism was directed also at the United Nations and Indonesia, both of whom had been responsible for the fact that the implementation of the Act of Free Choice had been less than perfect. The story caused embarrassment in the Dutch Cabinet and irritation in the Indonesian press. The PNI newspaper *Merdeka* was of the opinion that Luns should keep his mouth closed and that the time had come to start again with a blank slate.[68]

The opportunity for that would not come for another month because Sudjarwo's report was not yet finished. This was no coincidence. By delaying the submission of the report, the clever diplomat was counting on the issue of the plebiscite not being on the agenda until the end of the session, which would leave no time for any calm deliberation. It was at this time that various lobbying activities took place. To placate public opinion in the Netherlands, the Indonesian government sent two spiritual leaders to that country that month. They were the Papuan pastor Mamoribo and the Keian Mofit, who represented the Protestant and the Catholic section of West Irian respectively. They were decent and well-educated men. Their message was that everything in West

Irian was fine. The visit resulted in mostly sniggering reactions in the newspapers and the mission's effect was negligible. The high point was a television debate of the two with Nicolaas Jouwe. The latter directed his attack not at the persons themselves but at the fact that, as Christians, they were being used by a largely Islamic Indonesia to mollify the Netherlands. He embellished his speech with the idea that the Javanese, too, were familiar with the proverb that one must set a thief to catch a thief.[69]

As far as the Papuans were concerned, action came from a more oppositional corner as well. Months earlier already, in May 1969, two prominent men from West Irian had crossed the border into the Australian sector. They were Clemens Runawery and Willem Songganao. They both belonged to the well-educated Papuans with a good position in the Indonesian administration, who had also been in the leadership of the resistance. We met them before as members of the Front Pembebasan Papua Barat. On 17 July, they asked the Australian and Dutch authorities in Canberra for travelling facilities to go to New York. There they were hoping to present the secretary general of the United Nations with a report on the development in the region since 1963, which might serve as a counterbalance to the reports of Sudjarwo and Ortiz Sanz. According to Stein Roeed, the Fundwi chief in Jayapura, they were acting on his advice.[70] On 22 August, a supplement to this report became available, containing a description of the period of the Act of Free Choice. It had been written by a former member of the Provincial Council for West Irian, Agus J. Korwa.[71] Both reports became available before those by Ortiz Sanz or Sudjarwo.

Runawery and Songganao's piece delineated a balanced but sombre picture of the Indonesian administration, which is consistent with what we have been able to reconstruct based on a wide range of sources. Their emphasis lay on the lack of freedom of expression and on the harsh measures by which it was exacted. Numbers pertaining to victims were not mentioned, but it did put forward that intimidation and murder were the order of the day. The conclusion stated that 'West Papua' was being ruled as an overseas territory of Indonesia. Korwa's supplement stated that the Papuans never had a chance to express themselves in the Act of Free Choice. The matter had been organized in its entirety by the military. Despite the help of officials from the ministries of the Interior and Foreign Affairs, the final choices had always been made by the military who sought their candidates as much as possible from among the individuals they more or less trusted. In their judgement, a section of the electors had consisted of Indonesians who had lived in New Guinea for longer or shorter periods. In spite of all these precautionary measures, the organizers had not been sure of their case. The persons thus selected had never been given the

chance to say what they thought; with a gun to their back they had been forced to speak out in support of Indonesia. The document ended with a forceful protest about the way in which the Indonesians had approached the Act of Free Choice and violated the basic human rights of the Papuans.

After their arrival in Australian New Guinea, Songganao and Runaweri had tried to reach New York but without any luck. Australia referred them to the UN but the Secretariat declared it was powerless to provide them with the necessary passports. Egress via the Netherlands or the United States was equally inaccessible. In The Hague they reasoned that they were not Dutch and, as refugees to TPNG, were charges of the Australian government. From their end, the Americans politely requested the Australians to hold the two gentlemen a little longer until such a moment when their presence in New York could do less harm. Thereby the circle was complete and thus, in October, both of them were still on the Australian South Sea island of Manus. They would not make it to New York.

In the meantime, two Papuan delegations had arrived from the Netherlands. One represented the Papua Freedom Committee under the leadership of Nicolaas Jouwe. He was accompanied by Herman Womsiwor, Jos Marey, Zacharias Sawor, D.R. Hanasbey, and Th. Wanggai. Originally, Willem Songganao and C. Runawery were to be part of this group as well. The second delegation was composed of Marcus Kaisiepo, Paulis Obinaru, and Fred Korwa. The arrival of these delegations had met with fierce resistance from the Indonesian side. Ambassador Ruslan Abdulgani had pointed out to the State Department that they were 'collaborators' who had no right to speak on behalf of the West Irian population.[72] However, he couldn't prevent their entry because, as Netherlands citizens or foreign residents in the Netherlands, they had a visa for the United States. The necessary finances for the Jouwe mission had been collected through a public action by the *Door de Eeuwen Trouw* (Loyal through the Ages) foundation. The moving force behind it was Jongeling, the MP for the small Protestant party, the *Gereformeerd Politiek Verbond*, who at a previous stage had already urged Minister Luns to cooperate in the mission of Songganao and Runawery. Among the initiators were the former governor P.J. Platteel, the former chief of the military forces in New Guinea L.E.H. Reeser, and the law professor W.W. Feith from Groningen.

In New York, the two Papuan delegations acted separately from the beginning. They each made contact with the representatives of those states that were most devoted to the cause of the Papuans. In the first place, they approached the diplomats Guirma and Zollner, whom we have met before. Furthermore, Jouwe's group also sought to make contact with the representatives of a few Caribbean countries and the Scandinavian states. They found a willing ear

among the delegates from Yugoslavia, Israel, and France as well. On the whole, Jouwe's group appeared to be the most active and consequently received most of the attention.

To clarify relations, Jouwe sent a message to Songganao and Runawery from New York on 22 September, in which he explained their failure to be granted a visa. He demonstrated in minute detail how he had done his utmost to procure their admission to the United Nations but that this had met with the opposition of all the powers concerned. He appealed in emotional terms to Songganao and Runawery to accept this fact without fretting and to show readiness to cooperate in the common struggle for the Papuans in the future as well. In addition, the document contained a swipe at the 'folks who call themselves president' and thereby undermine the unity of the movement. This was something for Kaisiepo to keep in mind. After the separation in 1964, the relationship between the two bigwigs had gone from bad to worse. The aside about Kaisiepo's presidential ambitions indicated that cooperation between the two most important champions of the right to self-determination of the Papuans was a missed opportunity.

As his most important recruitment material, Jouwe had a 'Note of Protest' that was dated 22 September and directed to the secretary general of the United Nations. The document opened with a quote from the speech by Ali Murtopo which he had delivered shortly before the beginning of the Act of Free Choice, which has been discussed here before. The description of the Act of Free Choice itself was taken from Korwa's report. It read as follows: 'The infamous intimidation exerted by Indonesia upon the 1,025 electors whom she herself had appointed in a dictatorial way, and who consequently could not but say "yes" to their brainwashers.' Should the UN accept this violation of the right to self-determination, it would be acting in complete contradiction with its own resolution 1514 on decolonization of 1960. The crux of the message was the call that Jouwe had defended earlier to the United Nations members to ensure that the Indonesian army would withdraw from West Irian, to place the region under the administration of the UN for a solid period of time, and to ensure that sooner or later there would be a truly democratic referendum held in which the population of the whole island would be involved.[73]

The next step was taken on 1 October when Jouwe, leading his delegation, visited Ralph Bunche, the Under-Secretary of the United Nations, to whom he presented the Note of Protest. The UN administrator received them most kindly and even invited them to tea at his home. It was a good start but the subsequent encounters were far more difficult. The members of the delegation distributed the Note of Protest among the interested members of the General Assembly, but any interest continued to be confined to the representatives of

the aforementioned countries. They were getting nowhere with the Dutch. They watched with dismay how the staff members of the Netherlands Permanent Mission were working closely and amiably together with their Indonesian colleagues while they themselves were received just once at the Netherlands Mission for a brief courtesy call. Their attention and time were occupied to a large extent with practical concerns, caused by lack of money. Thus, they had to deliver the note on foot to the diplomats of those governments that might possibly be interested in their case and who lived in various different places in Manhattan. One advantage of Sudjarwo's delaying strategy was that they had ample time to make the contacts they desired.[74]

By early November, Sudjarwo's report was finished at last. On the 6th of that month, U Thant submitted it to the United Nations together with Ortiz Sanz's report that had been finished earlier.[75] U Thant's letter of submission formed the actual report. In it, the secretary general emphasized that his representative may have had reservations about the interpretation of the freedom of expression but was of the opinion, nevertheless, that the end result was acceptable. To this end, he referred to his conclusion 'that in West Irian *an* (author's italics) Act of Free Choice had taken place in which the representatives of the population had expressed the wish to remain with Indonesia'. It was now the General Assembly's task to pronounce its judgement on this issue.

Ortiz Sanz and Sudjarwo's reports were attachments to U Thant's report. Ortiz Sanz's report was a bulky document, in which he carefully explained his successive steps. It reflected his internal conflict between the desire to report properly and the opposing need to do this in such a way that the United Nations would not be embarrassed by it. It contained a great deal of information about places visited, mileage covered, and correspondence sent and received. He did not hide his own light under a bushel. Thus, he described the steps he had taken to provide information with satisfaction, while an entire page was devoted also to the successful return of the one family in exile in Australia. All in all, the document contained a great deal of information about his own good intentions and little about the Indonesian reactions. Insofar as the latter was there, it was always reported in the most positive tone possible.

Thus he reported that the Indonesians had, indeed, picked up many terrorist elements but, on the other hand, they had also released quite a large number of prisoners. Wherever there had been resistance, the government had done its best to calm it down as equably as possible 'bearing in mind that the people involved in the rebellion might have been misled by false propaganda from external sources.' In addition, he gave a rather distorted picture of the course of action concerning the petitions and requests. He confined himself to

mentioning a few numerical data and to an overview of the process he had followed in dealing with these.

With regard to their content, he made an effort to stay as close to the presentation of matters as Indonesia wished, whereby he went even further than in the February declaration he had made at Sudjarwo's request. He now commented disparagingly on the anti-Indonesian material: they were anonymous, illegible, incomprehensible, unjust, and usually did not even bear the address of the sender. He was far more kind to the pro-Indonesian documents. These represented a substantial part of the population and apparently originated with the more educated section thereof. Their writers were 'students and other groups, and individuals aware of the issues involved in the act of free choice.' Obviously, he provided extensive details about the tactful manoeuvring of the UN representative and his various steps of reversal. His explanation that, in the end, he had accepted the Indonesian government's own responsibility in making decisions, was mentioned as an important exploit, as was his decision to 'participate' in its implementation even so. The answer to the possible question about what this participation had actually consisted of he avoided as much as possible. He did take a great deal of trouble to show that the Indonesian government had ended up by making the necessary effort to enable the UN teams to attend the election of some of the members of the consultative councils.

It was only on the issue of the freedom of expression, so prominently mentioned in the Agreement, that he revealed himself a little more. The primary thing was that freedom of speech was there 'in the sense that all the members of the representative bodies were protected from persecution.' He did not delve into the constraints this demonstrated, nor into the question of whether the intimidated members of the consultative councils had enjoyed any freedom of expression. In addition, without any further comment he used the phraseology that apparently came from Sudjarwo that there was no right to form a party for 'those few people who possibly existed, who were not in favour of retaining the ties with Indonesia' (p. 41). However, in his conclusion he did offer his personal opinion that the freedom of expression had not been what one might have expected based on the text of the Agreement. 'In spite of my constant efforts, this important provision was not fully implemented and the Administration exercised at all times a tight political control over the population.' It did not prevent him from drawing the final conclusion, which U Thant had only partially cited, that 'with the limitations imposed by the geographical characteristics of the territory and the general political situation in the area, an act of free choice has taken place in West Irian, in accordance with Indonesian practice, in which the representatives of the population have expressed their wish to remain with Indonesia.' The indefinite article, used earlier by Ortiz Sanz in his

correspondence with Sudjarwo, had thereby returned to the final report. It was in the final report of the secretary general as well, and thus also received the blessing of the leader of the United Nations. It was the means by which Ortiz Sanz and U Thant expressed that the Act of Free Choice as implemented was not in accord with the international practice of which the New York Agreement had spoken. There could hardly have been a more subtle way of expressing their displeasure. As for Ortiz Sanz, it was characteristic of his report as a whole that he attested to maximum benevolence towards the Indonesian government and constantly stressed its positions while omitting the rest or else playing it down.

As was to be expected, Sudjarwo's report focused on the fact that the Act of Free Choice should be seen primarily against the political background of the years-long conflict with the Netherlands. In his opinion, it had been an unnecessary affair because sovereignty had belonged to Indonesia all along and so could not be explained to the population either. His own country had finally accepted it for the sake of peace, but only on condition that Indonesia itself would be able to choose the procedures to be used. For the rest, this report continued with an extensive listing of the steps taken, whereby the necessary attention was paid to President Suharto's declarations. The rebellions in Manokwari and elsewhere were quite simply attributed to mischief-making from the outside.

So much for U Thant's report and the accompanying reports of Ortiz Sanz and Sudjarwo. Once the date for the deliberatoins in the General Assembly had been announced, Luns travelled to New York to add his piece to the discussion. The consultation between the Netherlands and Indonesia had progressed sufficiently to have come to an agreement that, just as in 1962, they would submit a resolution together. Its text had been discussed in The Hague with the chief of political affairs of the Indonesian department of Foreign Affairs, Anwar Sani. In essence, it said that the General Assembly would take note of U Thant's report and conclude that Indonesia was to pay special attention to the development of West Irian, while the Netherlands and Indonesia would make special funds available for that purpose.[76]

In the UN, the discussion of the report took place on 13 November. Malik and Luns each made a statement, wherein Malik asked for understanding for the special circumstances that had made holding a plebiscite in West Irian problematical. Furthermore, he expressed his pleasure with the fact that the Netherlands was willing to cooperate in settling this final part of the New York Agreement and the consideration it had shown. Luns' position was more reserved, reminding people that the Agreement of 1962 had not been created 'without hesitation and doubts on the Dutch side.' He further recalled that

these hesitations and doubts had not been erased in the closing phase of the implementation of the Agreement. In the Netherlands in both press and the parliament new doubts were being articulated about the method, and more specifically about the circumstances under which the right to self-determination was to be executed. Nevertheless, the Netherlands government was willing to recognize the results and adhere to them. As far as they were concerned, the last page of a lengthy chapter was thereby closed.

In addition, Luns expressed the hope that the General Assembly would accept the resolution submitted by the Netherlands and Indonesia, which was now put forward by Belgium, Luxemburg, Malaysia, and Thailand as well. That ended the discussion because Zollner made a point of order on behalf of Dahomey and with the support of Gabon, Togo, Ghana, and Ecuador. They found the three days they had been given to examine the documents too short and asked for postponement. This wholly reasonable request was granted by the secretary general and after some discussion a new date was set. The discussion would be continued on 19 November.[77]

The rescheduling was a fine victory for Jouwe and his people, who had been temporarily added to the Dahomey delegation. Kaisiepo had not made it this far and had to be satisfied with following the discussions from the public gallery. Behind the scenes intense consultation now followed in the circles of Asian and African delegates. The former unconditionally supported Indonesia. They wanted no debate and were hoping for a rapid acceptance without any discussion. The Indonesians then proceeded to pressure the Dutch representatives to pay a joint visit to U Thant and ask him to bring his influence to bear on Zollner and his allies to get them to withdraw their amendment. Luns was not keen on the idea because he did not wish to be too overtly in league with Indonesia, but after some resistance he let himself be persuaded anyway. However, the next visit to U Thant and Rolz-Bennett did not have the desired result. The Indonesian minister expressed his concerns about the potential consequences of an amendment, while Luns persisted in saying that he could not oppose it if it showed no more than some reservations that were also present in the Netherlands. The meeting produced nothing more than Rolz-Bennett's promise that he would point out the legal and constitutional aspects of the question once again to those African representatives who felt a need for it.[78]

In the interim, a more lively discussion was taking place on the African side. Their circle was busily debating the possibility of convening a hearing with the formally excluded Papuans, whereby they thought of Jouwe first and foremost. It would provide him with the opportunity to draw the meeting's attention to the wishes expressed in the discussion piece they had brought and had stated to

Ralph Bunche. That suggestion was not accepted automatically but the thoughts of the majority of the interlocutors certainly went beyond the amendment that Luns had in mind for them. The outcome was a surprise to all the parties involved. When the case was reopened on 19 November, an amendment was on the table that Ghana had submitted. It contained the wish previously expressed by Jouwe and associates to give the population of West Irian the opportunity to exercise the Act of Free Choice anew in 1975.

In their explanation of the amendment the Ghanaian diplomat Dr. Akwei pointed out that the method used by Indonesia to determine the will of the people had been of dubious value and that they did not wish to support any resolution in which they saw a basic violation of the Agreement of 1962. The Netherlands-Indonesian resolution was defended by a group of Asian and Arab speakers who stated that in the case of West Irian it was not a matter of self-determination but of the affirmation of the national unity and territorial integrity of Indonesia. This argument was essentially a denial of the raison d'être of the years-long conflict between the Netherlands and Indonesia, which the United Nations had always seen and debated as such in previous years. India's representative added something extra by claiming that West Irian was a case apart and that the method used there for the Act of Free Choice could never be a precedent for cases of self-determination of countries that were still under colonial rule. This, too, was a speech that raised more questions than answers. This time Malik did not step on the thin ice of speculations of pseudo-international law but clung to the text of the New York Agreement. He did not ask for approval of the Agreement itself or of the secretary general's report. A simple examination would suffice. That turned out to be the majority opinion as well, albeit not a wholehearted one. The Ghanaian amendment was voted on first and found some support in the Assembly. There were fifteen countries in favour of it, sixty against, and thirty-nine abstained. The Netherlands was one of the latter. Indonesia voted against, whereby the difference of opinion between the Netherlands and Indonesia clearly manifested itself once again. However, the outcome also clarified that the amendment was rejected. In the next round, the original Netherlands-Indonesian resolution was accepted with eighty-four votes in favour. There were no nays but there were thirty abstentions. Of these, twenty-four were African countries and the rest were the Latin American states of Barbados, Guyana, Venezuela, Brazil, Trinidad and Tobago. Israel, which had been one of those that submitted the Ghanaian amendment, abstained from voting for the joint Netherlands-Indonesian proposal.[79]

The attitude of the supporters of the Ghanaian amendment was not inspired only by sympathy for the case of the Papuans and the notion of shared 'African values' but also by the fear that accepting the system of *musyawarah* would

open the door in the UN environment to further misappropriations with future plebiscites, which would do more harm than good to the cause of decolonization. They were thinking particularly of the possibilities this kind of practice could offer to the Portuguese and British colonists in their struggle with the nationalist élites in Angola, Mozambique, and Rhodesia.

However, there were counterarguments as well that Zollner, Akwei, and their allies would have to take into account. To their disappointment, the United States of America had kept their options open publicly but secretly their diplomats had pleaded actively in favour of the Netherlands-Indonesian proposal. This was done partly at the request of Malik who had asked for it urgently during a visit to Nixon and his Secretary of State. At that time, the Indonesian minister suggested to them that they should point out to the Africans that they ought to be careful with the concept of self-determination because it might harm their own interests as well. In addition, he indicated subtly that Dahomey had, in fact, been led by the nose by Luns in 1962. At that time he had managed to let him do his dirty work while he now held a very different position.

It is not known to what extent the American diplomats followed this advice, but on the eve of the session of 19 November they were less than certain of a favourable outcome. Their only consolation lay in the fact that Zollner told them he wanted to put the brakes on briefly, but was not planning to let the entire resolution be stranded. What mattered to him primarily was to let Indonesia know that the African states were anything but pleased with the manner in which it had handled the matter, and to remind Indonesia that in this regard their comings and goings would be closely watched in the future as well. As a result, the Americans advised their Indonesian friends to give their opponents the chance to let off some steam during the session of 19 November, whereupon they would probably resign themselves to the matter at hand.[80] That is precisely what happened, although in the future the opposition Papuans would continue to place their hope in these United Nations supporters of 1969.

Looking back in the Netherlands

In the Netherlands, the development of the Act of Free Choice in the summer of 1969 had been followed with Argus' eyes. The Dutch press had been represented by the reporters of *De Telegraaf* and a great many provincial papers. In particular, Robert Kiek, the *De Telegraaf* correspondent, and the radio reporter Link van Bruggen, who acted as the correspondent for *De Tijd*, had tried their hardest. Without exception, their reports were extremely critical with respect to the Indonesian approach, and they were unanimous in their opinion that large-scale intimidation and coercion had been used. The socialist paper *Het*

Vrije Volk spoke of 'the greatest farce of the year.' The liberal *NRC* expressed it a bit more diplomatically by stating that the Act of Free Choice 'had been implemented through a peculiar interpretation of the concept of freedom'. Still, the paper thought that under the circumstances Indonesia still offered the best guarantees for the country's efficient development. In the Roman Catholic *Volkskrant*, the former civil servant with responsibility for New Guinea, Kees Lagerberg, had asked for attention to the need for an international operation to provide aid for the region and it inhabitants. He had also made the dire observation that the Act of Free Choice had been harmful to all parties. It had inspired the Papuans to cherish false hopes, inspired the Indonesians to exercise improper pressure, and the UN to throw away its prestige. The Amsterdam-centred liberal journal *Algemeen Handelsblad* saw matters more straightforwardly and stated in its editorial that, now that the credibility of the plebiscite was at issue, they should really posit that the New York Agreement had not been observed by Jakarta.[81] The public at large had paid little attention because the event had fallen in the middle of the summer vacation, a matter of great importance in the now very prosperous Netherlands. In August there had been some action in parliament when P. Jongeling, the spokesman of the Gereformeerd Politiek Verbond had made inquiries about the non-committal attitude of the Dutch government in the matter of admitting Songganao and Runawery to the United Nations.

In parliament itself the New Guinea plebiscite did not come up for discussion until de General Debate on the budget for the following year. The immediate cause was Luns' 10 October interview with the *Voice of America*. Both the socialist leader J.M. Den Uyl and the anti-revolutionary B. Biesheuvel took offence at this. Biesheuvel wondered whether it was wise of the minister to be looking back to the past at this particular moment. He was also bothered by the lack of piety shown in the criticism of the now deceased Kennedy brothers. On that occasion, it was Prime Minister De Jong who came to the Luns' defence. He pointed out that the minister of Foreign Affairs had wanted to clarify that, as a result of the American policy in 1962, the Netherlands government had had its back to the wall and therefore been unable to keep the promises it had made to the Papuans. He further pointed out that criticism of deceased statesmen was not unusual, although he was willing to admit that the minister's choice of words had been less than felicitous. However, he made a virtue of necessity by demonstrating that it did not hurt to repeat this and that a press interview was a less onerous means than a ministerial utterance in the General Assembly. He emphasized that the Act of Free Choice had been organized according to the New York Agreement and executed under the exclusive responsibility of Indonesia. Finally, he clarified again that the Indonesian view of the method of

a plebiscite differed from the Dutch one but that, according to the United Nations secretary general, this plebiscite had not been deemed in contradiction with the Agreement's stipulations. The Netherlands was willing to accept the resulting obligations. Among other things, this meant that it recognized the outcome and would comply with it.[82]

The next round in the parliamentary debate came a month later, after the United Nations General Assembly had voted on 19 November. There Luns had defended the resolution that he and Malik had submitted as the motivation for his vote. He further declared that, obviously, he felt a great deal of sympathy for the amendments proposed by Ghana and Dahomey but that the time for this had passed. The Agreement of New York had been made as early as 1962 and the Netherlands since then had complied with it. Therefore he had abstained from voting for the amendment.

In the United Nations, this Dutch attitude had not been without weight. A number of still hesitant states had made careful note of it and the already slender chances for success of the African resolution, procured by Jouwe and his people, had grown even slimmer because of it. It was no wonder then that the minister was questioned about this in the Second Chamber a week later by Jouwe's moral supporter, Jongeling. He requested an interpellation, which was held on 27 November. On that occasion he asked the minister to explain how he had reached the point of appearing before the United Nations together with Indonesia with a joint resolution and abstained from voting for the African amendment, which so acutely articulated the feelings alive in the Netherlands. Furthermore, Jongeling and his supporters were sharply critical of the manner in which the Act of Free Choice had been implemented and of the half-hearted way, as they saw it, in which the Dutch government had resigned itself to this *fait accompli*. With some justification, Luns retorted that it had been thanks to Dutch urging that the report of the Act of Free Choice was put on the agenda as a separate item so that a valuable debate had been devoted to it. As had happened before in this matter, the rest of the discussion dealt with the question of the boundaries between moral duty and practical statesmen's wisdom. The spokesmen of the Partij van de Arbeid, P. Dankerts and J.M. den Uyl, themselves made grateful use of this opportunity to go back into history in order to highlight their better judgement in this question as early as 1948. Wisely, they didn't mention the name of their fellow party member Drees in this context.

The end of the story was that Jongeling presented a motion to the Chamber in which it was asked to express its regret that the Netherlands government together with Indonesia had submitted a joint resolution about the report of U Thant to the General Assembly. It received support only from the presenters

themselves and from a few smaller groups on the right and the left. For the great majority of the Chamber the supremacy of the facts was the decisive factor. They all drew hope from the position, forcefully defended by Luns, that only through friendship with Indonesia could the Netherlands do anything further for the Papuans.[83]

Conclusion

In this book, we have followed the fortunes of the inhabitants of western New Guinea from the first exploration of their territory by the Spanish in the sixteenth century. This formed part of the voyages of discovery by means of which the maritime nations of Europe extended their claims to authority overseas. The first chapter summarizes the history up to the Second World War. The key point made is that the area was gradually drawn under the sphere of influence of the Dutch administration in Batavia. The interest in the capital of the Netherlands East Indies for these regions was not really commercial in nature, because New Guinea had too little to offer the world economy at that time. The reason for involvement was primarily political/strategic in nature; to fix the eastern border of the Dutch sphere of influence in Asia. An attempt was initially made to establish this under international law by supporting the vaguely defined claims to authority of the East Indian principality of Tidore, which had recognized Dutch sovereignty. During the nineteenth century, with the arrival of positive international law, the emphasis was in addition increasingly placed on exercising actual deeds of authority as a reason for justifying the sovereignty of the Netherlands. From 1865 onwards, the Dutch government made it clear to the outside world that it regarded the 141st meridian as the eastern border of its sphere of influence. In this way, a border was created which was subsequently accepted by the English and the Germans without discussion and thereby gained international legitimacy.

Up to the end of the nineteenth century, these European claims meant little to the local population. There was some coastal trade and in 1855, the first missionaries settled on the north coast, although initially without much success. This changed when permanent Dutch administrative centres were established in three locations around the turn of the century. These were located in

Manokwari, Fakfak and Merauke. Although only limited resources were available for these centres, this did however signal the start of the reformation of the crumbled world of the Papuans of western New Guinea. Hand in hand with the work of the missions and administrative centres, there was a steady expansion of Western cultural and economic influence in the coastal areas. The inland region was also explored and mapped out bit by bit. By the time the Second World War broke out, the conditions for the development of a new Papuan society had been created. This had a Christian orientation. This Dutch penetration had also led to closer contact between the Papuans and the population of the Indonesian archipelago, who were involved in these activities on New Guinea. Predominantly Ambonese in the north and Kai in the south, they came from the training centres established by the missionaries on their own islands. This also created a demarcation between a Protestant north and a Catholic south, even if this never became a hard and fast border.

There was a large gap between the Ambonese and Kai officials, teachers and clerics on the one hand and the Papuan population on the other. The first group looked down on the less developed Papuans and treated them accordingly. For their part, the Papuans, already suspicious of outsiders or 'amberi' who had, in earlier years, plundered their coasts as participants in the *hongi* tours from Ternate and Tidore, found their existing aversion deepening. This did not as a rule extend to the Europeans, who were ultimately responsible for the arrival of the Moluccan middle management, without whose help they could not have carried out their development programme for this area. This anti-amberi sentiment was the negative form of the Papuans' own sense of identity.

The development of Indonesian nationalism entirely passed the Papuans by. This was not just because of their low level of development, but also because of the related one-way communication with the rest of the Netherlands East Indies. The inhabitants of the latter visited New Guinea, but apart from some traffic with the closer islands, the Papuans did not travel to the centres of the Netherlands East Indies, which had little to offer them. In the few cases where Papuans were indeed sent to Java as school pupils, they felt like fish out of water.

The Second World War and its aftermath increased this gap. The anti-amberi sentiment was strengthened because Moluccan officials were used as enforcers of Japanese coercive measures. In this respect, the position was similar to that in the rest of Indonesia, where comparable situations arose. This was the only point of similarity, however. New Guinea had no nationalist movement, the anti-Dutch nature of which could be encouraged by the occupiers. The disorganization that accompanied the war did however lead to a revival of old cultural patterns in a number of locations. In Biak, this took the form of a

messianic movement, which also incorporated elements of the new era. For the first time, people talked about a Papuan flag and a Papuan state, but embedded in ancient ideas. This was the Koreri, which is discussed in chapter two.

Chapter two also shows that New Guinea had, in most respects, a different occupation history than the rest of Indonesia. It was only partially occupied. The Dutch influence continued to prevail in the south and in the interior. The occupation was also shorter and the island was liberated by the American army in the middle of 1944. The Dutch were also involved in this, and quickly took the administration back into their own hands. As a result, the restoration of power took place well before the independent Indonesian Republic was proclaimed on Java on 17 August 1945. With a few exceptions, the Indonesian revolution passed New Guinea by. Under the firm hand of the enthusiastic Commissioner Van Eechoud, the thread of the pre-war administration was once again picked up, but with a new emphasis. As an authority on the world of the Papuans, Van Eechoud was fully aware of its special character. Partly in view of the revolution underway in the other parts of the Netherlands East Indies, he started creating a Papuan elite who could lead their own people during a complex period. This administrative policy was continued, with far more resources than before, after the transfer of sovereignty in the rest of Indonesia. Chapter six follows this development until around 1958. Armed with the knowledge and experience gained in Indonesia, efforts were made to create a model colony which was, from the Dutch side, increasingly regarded as a unit which should be separate from Indonesia.

The Indonesian revolution and the ensuing transfer of sovereignty on 27 December 1949 determined the development of western New Guinea in the following decades. Chapter three outlines the policy followed by the Netherlands in respect of these historical events and discusses New Guinea's place in this in somewhat greater detail. It is argued that the concept of the right of self-determination was the key to Dutch policy. This right was propagated at the beginning of the Second World War, particularly by the Americans, as one of the aims of the war. It was a particular instance of the older emancipation policy, which was, as far as the Netherlands was concerned, geared towards the archipelago as a whole during the first decades of the twentieth century. The divergence in speed and direction of developments taking place within the archipelago did not hamper this at the time, because the view was that the day had not yet come to take this policy to its ultimate conclusion. The wish to retain permanent relations—the Dutch variant on the theme of European imperial ambitions—also acted as a brake. The flag of the Netherlands would continue to unite all. After 1945, these aspirations had to be set aside one by one. Under the leadership of Lieutenant Governor General Van Mook,

tailor-made solutions were sought, with good use being made of the right of self-determination recently included in the Charter of the United Nations. A distinction was made between the right to self-determination of Indonesia as a whole and that of the constituent parts. This was not only the result of the unequal social and cultural development in the various parts of the archipelago and the divergent degrees to which the Indonesian national sentiment had made headway in these, but was, from the Dutch point of view, also a usable tactical instrument to channel the revolution in an acceptable direction. The right of self-determination could therefore be made to serve Dutch interests and ambitions as well.

This led to the system of federalism, which would, within the larger relationships of a Dutch-Indonesian Union and an Indonesian federation, leave room for the right of the constituent parts to be able to decide on their own place. The outlines of this structure were laid down in the Agreement of Linggadjati between the Netherlands and the Republic of Indonesia. The draft was initialled by both parties in November 1946. This already gave the names of the federal states that would have to make up the federation, but whether these could in fact be created was still uncertain. It was therefore stipulated in Article 3 that if the population of certain areas 'democratically' indicated that they did not yet want to accede to the federation, such an area would be granted a special relationship with the United States of Indonesia and the Kingdom of the Netherlands.

During further discussion of the draft by the Dutch Cabinet, it was established that separate provision would have to be made for New Guinea, since its population could not yet be regarded as capable of deciding on their own fate. The Dutch guardianship would have to be continued for a longer period there. This immediately created a complication since, precisely because the Papuans could not be regarded as being capable of deciding on their own fate, this exceptional situation could not be brought about for them by democratic means. Article 3 had shot itself in the foot. The Dutch government and the parliament wanted to rectify this by incorporating this exceptional position directly in the Agreement, but this was rejected by the Republic. The Agreement of Linggadjati was therefore signed in March 1947 by both parties without agreement having been reached on this point.

The ensuing period was one of intensive consultation between the Netherlands and the Indonesian Republic, interrupted by periods of military campaigns, which would continue until the end of 1949. What was at stake was, among other things, the organization of the future independent Indonesia, with the Netherlands hanging onto the federal concept and the Republic, although it had agreed to this on paper, in reality not wishing to let go of the idea

of a unitary state. During these discussions, the place of New Guinea always played a role in the background. The Dutch reasons for the exceptional treatment of this area were the low level of development, the entirely different character of the population and the virtual absence of Indonesian nationalistic sentiment. A supplementary argument was that the Indonesia-born Dutch would be able to have their own place in the tropical sun here, even after the Dutch flag had ceased to fly over the rest of the archipelago.

It was also of importance that Commissioner Van Eechoud, in consultation with opposition groups in the Netherlands, saw a chance to keep attention focused on the special position of the area entrusted to him. In doing so, he was able to make skilful use of the mining opportunities offered by New Guinea. The significance of these and a number of other arguments is elaborated in chapter four. Not one argument was strong enough on its own to risk the failure of an agreement with the Republic, but in combination they proved strong enough to clinch matters. As a result, the Netherlands dug in its heels on this point during the Round Table Conference (RTC) of 1949 and New Guinea was for the time being excluded from the transfer of sovereignty. This was laid down in the Charter of the Transfer of Sovereignty. Article 1 stated that the Netherlands transferred full sovereignty over Indonesia to the United States of Indonesia, while Article 2 stipulated that New Guinea was excluded from the transfer for the time being. The solution to the dispute that had arisen because of this would have to be found within a year.

The wording was ambiguous, and could be interpreted in several ways. As would become apparent, and as the experts had expected, the Netherlands had saddled itself with a multitude of problems. The initial reaction was not so pessimistic, because a solution could possibly have been found within the relationships between the Dutch-Indonesian Union and the Indonesian Federation which would have made a certain distribution of tasks possible. This never got off the ground, however, because the Federation was abolished by the Indonesian parties six months after it came into existence, their having little or no inclination to give more substance to the Union. Under these circumstances, it was not possible to devise a position for New Guinea which was acceptable to all parties. This course of events is discussed in chapter five. The Dutch government clung to an interpretation in terms of which the text of the RTC agreement guaranteed its right to continue exercising sovereignty. The Indonesian government took the opposite view but also refused to cooperate in eliciting a ruling from the International Court of Justice. Indonesia then took up an even more fundamental position, namely that New Guinea had been included in the proclamation of the independent Indonesian Republic of 17 August 1945 and that discussion with the Netherlands was only possible on that

basis. Negotiations could therefore only be held about the manner in which control would be transferred to Indonesia, not about the principle of sovereignty or any rights of the Papuans. Under these circumstances, successive discussions came to nothing. This conclusion could in fact already have been drawn in the spring of 1951, but the final nail in the coffin was the failure of a conference held in Geneva around the end of 1955/beginning of 1956. The story is sketched against the background of the internal developments in Indonesia and the rapidly deteriorating relationship with the Netherlands. The statement, often made by the Dutch, that New Guinea was not the reason for the conflict but was being used by the Indonesian government to drive it forward, is, in the main, endorsed here. This statement does not of course detract from the fact that New Guinea did indeed form part of the conflict. Without New Guinea, it would have lost part of its focus.

In chapter seven, attention shifts to the developments in Indonesia and to the international situation in the second half of the fifties. The end of an uprising in the outlying areas of Indonesia against the authority of the central government in Jakarta and a failed American attempt to intervene in favour of the rebels constituted the turning point in the position of the United States. From that time onwards, Indonesia could count on more international support, which was intensified by the Cold War. All this led to an arms race on the equator, as both Russia and the United States, each supported by a number of their allies, outbid one another to provide Indonesia with weapons under favourable conditions. The pressure that built up as a result was effectively aimed at the Netherlands. Separate attention is paid to the relationship between the Netherlands and the United States, which shows that the American government was, until around 1960, still prepared to exercise considerable pressure on the Indonesian government to dissuade it from acting against its European ally. The successive American Secretaries of State, Dulles and Herter, assured their colleague Luns in fairly general terms that the Netherlands could count on America's assistance in an emergency. It is shown that these guarantees were not without significance, but that they were always worded in such a way that the American government was free to determine, when it came down to it, how far it actually wanted to go.

Nonetheless, with its simultaneous and much more extensive support for Indonesia, the State Department found itself doing the splits, a position that it could only maintain with difficulty. In Washington, there was intensive internal discussion about an alternative policy. The conflicting American actions were also raising doubts in the Netherlands, but Minister Luns was able to, more or less, reassure the Dutch Cabinet by keeping them meticulously up to date about the guarantees given to him by Dulles and Herter. The Cabinet did

however learn the lesson that international support could only be counted on if the Netherlands also took the necessary steps itself. This led to the dispatch of the aircraft carrier *Karel Doorman* in 1960, which was required to temporarily strengthen New Guinea's defences. In addition to America's attitude, Australia's position is also discussed. As the ruler of the eastern half of New Guinea and Indonesia's closest neighbour, Australia saw itself as a party closely involved in the affairs of the Dutch part. The government in Canberra was generally on the side of the Netherlands, as can be seen from the plans developed for administrative cooperation. It was however very aware that it could not support the Netherlands if America did not unconditionally hold the same view.

Chapter eight discusses how the estrangement of Indonesia, the way in which Indonesia was arming itself and the half-hearted attitude of Washington led to uncertainty among the Dutch public. This was strengthened by the behaviour of the Dutch Reformed Church and a separate, many-hued opposition in which journalist Oltmans, businessman Rijkens and Professor Duynstee from Nijmegen set the pace. Indonesian contacts played an undeniable role in this regard. Moreover, decolonization gained momentum internationally as well because of the hasty withdrawal of the Belgians from the Congo. All these factors together weakened support in the Netherlands for the policy followed by the government up to that time. This happened at a time when the Red-Roman coalition, under the leadership of Prime Minister Drees, dropped out of the picture and was replaced by a centre-right coalition led by J. De Quay of the Roman Catholic People's Party. The Social Democratic Party disappeared into the opposition, where it could freely express the doubts existing among its members about the policy followed up to then. The new Prime Minister and some of the members of his cabinet had the same doubts, however. The aims of the policy were not abandoned, but new ways of achieving these were sought. In this regard, an important role was set aside for Deputy Minister Th. Bot who had already, as an official involved in the Round Table Conference and its aftermath, played with the idea of internationalizing the government of New Guinea in one way or another in 1950. In this way, he hoped to get international support for the policy pursued by the Netherlands. After taking office as Deputy Minister, charged with special administrative responsibility for New Guinea, he raised these ideas again, this time in discussions and in a number of policy documents from 1960. He found Prime Minister De Quay a willing listener.

Initially, this was very much contrary to what Luns wanted, but the minister was forced to go along with this, at least partially, when it became clear that the Cabinet was not prepared to support him through thick and thin, and given

that the American attitude at the time of the voyage of the *Karel Doorman* was anything but reassuring. Luns did not want a war either, especially not without firm American guarantees. An uncertain factor was furthermore that the elections in the United States in November 1960 had brought a new president to power. This was the democrat John F. Kennedy, and it was not certain what his attitude to the New Guinea question would be. The first cautious steps towards the possibility of a limited form of international involvement were taken in the late summer of 1960. A year later this led to the drawing up of the Luns Plan, which was submitted to the General Assembly of the United Nations. This contained the offer to place New Guinea under international rule, on condition that Indonesia would play no part in this. This plan was however withdrawn, because it became apparent during the preliminary talks that this was a step too far for the General Assembly. The general feeling was that the Netherlands would first have to talk to Indonesia. Immediately after the end of the meeting, President Sukarno announced that an operational commando was being set up whose task was to occupy New Guinea by force of arms. This meant that the Netherlands came under pressure from a number of sides at the same time. After thorough discussion of the possibilities and objectives, the Dutch government hesitantly declared on 2 January 1962 that it was prepared to include Indonesia in the discussions on the future of New Guinea. This also meant that it would immediately be faced with the Indonesian assumption that it had had sovereignty over the area since 1945, so that all that needed to be discussed was how to arrange the transfer.

The progress of the ensuing negotiations under American pressure and the threat of Indonesian military action are sketched in chapter nine. First there was a period where the parties sounded each other out, with neither party wanting to let go of its known starting position right at the outset. Luns showed himself to be ready to talk, but subject to a large number of conditions. This was partly because he expected Indonesia to collapse either politically or militarily during the negotiations, after which he could persuade the Americans to take up a position more favourable to the Netherlands. To ensure that it was prepared for all eventualities, the Netherlands substantially strengthened the defence system on New Guinea. The matter turned out differently than Luns had wished, however. The Kennedy government proved to be of little help in strengthening the Dutch defences on New Guinea and brought political pressure to bear on the Netherlands. It also became clear that Indonesia was in fact in a position to continue its military build-up. Intelligence services reported that the country would be in a position to send a large force to New Guinea in the second half of 1962. In April, the deadlock was broken by an American proposal that had been hatched in the State Department long before. This was

known as the Bunker Plan, under which New Guinea would be transferred to Indonesia after a short interim period during which it would be administered by the United Nations. The question of how to react to this divided the Cabinet, but not to such an extent as to cause a rupture. After extensive discussion, the Dutch government accepted this plan as the point of departure for the negotiations, even if they would have to try to hold onto the right of self-determination for the Papuans as far as possible.

The drama ended with the New York Agreement of 15 August 1962, which laid down the more or less immediate transfer of power over New Guinea to the United Nations, followed some time later by a transfer of power to Indonesia. As a concession to Dutch wishes, an Act of Free Choice would take place before the end of 1969, by means of which the Papuans would be able to indicate whether they wanted to continue with Indonesia or not. This was, like all the previous agreements with Indonesia, a document that was vaguely worded on a number of essential points, to the detriment of the Netherlands. This was a reflection of the weak Dutch negotiating position. These uncertainties related in particular to the duration of the transition period and the guarantees for the implementation of an internationally acceptable referendum. The responsibility for the latter was left entirely in the hands of Indonesia, with the United Nations only having the task of lending a helping hand if Indonesia requested this. The vagueness also had its advantages, however. The Netherlands could console itself with the thought that, as matters lay, it had done its best for the Papuans. This opinion was in any event eagerly put forward by the Dutch government to the outside world. Internally, people knew better. When the Agreement was signed on 15 August 1962, the Dutch Council of Ministers was disillusioned about the poor outcome of the consultations, while Luns publicly vented his spleen on the American government.

The last chapters deal mainly with the events on New Guinea. The account is, where necessary, interrupted by considerations about international developments and the reactions to these in the Netherlands. Chapter ten gives an outline of the last years of Dutch rule. After Bot took office, a great deal of effort was put into the accelerated education of the Papuans. They were now involved as a political factor. To this end, district councils were set up in the separate residencies and a New Guinea Council for the entire area. From the platforms provided in this way, a small group of Papuans was able to develop new initiatives for their political future and introduce themselves to the Dutch public. How this was done is explained in chapter eleven. In doing so, they developed their own, supplementary, organizational forms. In their statements, they showed themselves to be enthusiastic advocates of the right of self-determination, but

they also indicated that they hoped that the Netherlands would not abandon them just yet. Immediate independence was the last thing they wanted. Their attitude towards Indonesia was generally guarded, although there were some exceptions to this.

On the whole, this attitude reflected the policy followed by the Dutch government. This was geared towards greater independence, but developed in the context of the conflict with Indonesia. Key points of this policy were the formation of the New Guinea Council in April 1961, followed the same year by the adoption of a flag and a national anthem. Setting up the New Guinea Council required careful preparation in order to achieve as representative a body as possible. Adopting a flag and a national anthem went more quickly. This initiative came entirely from the Papuan side, but was taken up by the Dutch authorities and proposed surprisingly quickly. We must remember that this took place during the period when Luns was trying, and failing, to sell his plan to the United Nations. The first hoisting of the flag on 1 December 1961 was greeted with joy everywhere. The Papuans of western New Guinea now had a widely accepted symbol of their own identity. It was also understood as such, not just in the Netherlands but also in Jakarta. Sukarno saw the raising of the flag for what it was: a direct rejection of the proclamation of 1945 and the unmistakable beginning of the formation of a Papuan state. The Trikora speech in which he announced the attack on New Guinea was therefore, in so many words, directed against this as well.

It is however also shown that this interpretation encountered objections from the Dutch side. The flag was expressly intended as a regional flag, not by definition as the flag of a new state. The final decision about this would have to be left to the Papuans themselves, via the right of self-determination. Furthermore, it was at that time becoming ever clearer that discussion with Indonesia could not be avoided, and that it was desirable to point this out to the Papuans. This did indeed play a role in the information given to the Papuans, even if the Dutch found it hard to be overly explicit, especially since the vast majority of Papuans did not like the idea. After all, Indonesia had been seen as the enemy for years, an enemy that not only made negative comments about what was going on on the island, but was also always needling them with military incursions which had to be warded off by the Dutch with the assistance of the Papuan police. From the end of 1961 onwards, Jakarta's behaviour, both in word and deed, was outright threatening. It was not easy to maintain a high degree of neutrality in these circumstances. Nevertheless, the Papuan elite finally also became aware of the need to do so. Once it had become clear on 15 August 1962 that the days of Dutch rule were at an end, there was intense discussion among this elite about their own position. Self-determination

remained the primary aim, but to achieve this it was necessary to reach a workable relationship with Indonesia. It is therefore possible to state at the end of chapter eleven that the upper layer of Papuan society, albeit small and still in the initial stage of development, had a notable understanding of the reality. At the beginning of September, a hastily convened Papuan Congress decided to accept the consequences of the Agreement. Those present accepted the arrival of the Indonesians, but also decided to hold on to the Act of Free Choice laid down in the New York Agreement.

In chapter twelve we discuss the transition period under the flag of the United Nations and the first years of Indonesian rule from 1962 onwards. The UN administration lacked the necessary power, the will and the expertise to bring about a truly neutral interim phase. It did however make the organized withdrawal of the Dutch administration possible as well as the transfer of its tasks to the Indonesian successors. Initially, the Papuan civil servants and policemen took over many of these tasks, particularly at local government level. At the same time, Indonesian soldiers and officials were pouring into the country in far larger numbers than planned and quickly took control. They exerted heavy pressure on the Papuans to choose their side publicly and to give up the dream of self-determination. Furthermore, the first signs of the violent action taken by the Indonesian military, which would also characterize the new administration in the coming decades, soon appeared. Rapid impoverishment ensued, together with a substantial decline in legal certainty and a loss of civil rights across the board. This was accompanied by a systematic breaking down of everything that harked back to the Netherlands, to be replaced with Indonesian ideas on 'guided democracy'. This led to increasingly negative reactions from the Papuans. The hinterland of Manokwari, in particular, was in a permanent state of opposition from 1965 onwards, which was combated with hard-handed military action. The number of victims quickly rose into the thousands.

Initially, the most politically aware Papuans pinned their hopes on the Act of Free Choice. The Indonesians, however, showed little interest in actually implementing this. Jakarta's attitude changed when Suharto took office as the new president of Indonesia. He found the country in a state of disorganization and economic upheaval and urgently needed international credit. To get this, Indonesia needed international respectability. Indonesia had to show that it could keep to international treaties. Implementing the Act of Free Choice, the last part of the New York Agreement, offered the opportunity to do just that. Nevertheless, the new president did stipulate a proviso, namely that no outcome other than a ruling in favour of Indonesia would be acceptable to him.

The process got underway in the summer of 1968 with the arrival of Ortiz Sanz, who, as the representative of the secretary general of the United Nations, was supposed to assist Indonesia in implementing the Act of Free Choice. How this played out is discussed in chapter thirteen. Initially, Ortiz Sanz was in good spirits and hoped to be able to organize a referendum which would be credible by international standards. His expectations in this regard were strengthened by the attitude of the Indonesian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Adam Malik, who had already visited New Guinea previously and who felt obliged, after his return, to admit that there had been serious mismanagement. Malik indicated that he wanted to improve matters, not just the administration as such but also the way in which the Act of Free Choice was to be implemented. The limits of this willingness were however determined by the position of the President.

The reality was accordingly a bitter disappointment to Ortiz Sanz. Indonesian pressure meant that his team was kept very small. After his arrival on New Guinea in September 1968 he was overrun with petitions from Papuans complaining about Indonesian mismanagement in all kinds of areas. He took these complaints seriously and passed them on to his Indonesian counterpart Sudjarwo Tjondronegoro, asking him to take the required action. Sudjarwo regarded this as inappropriate interference, which meant that their relationship was on a bad footing virtually from the outset. Indonesia disregarded his advice about the form of the referendum and chose instead the system of *musyawarah*, labelled as a traditional Indonesian system. This term had only been referred to in the Agreement for consultations to be held in the initial phase of the operation, but now became the leading principle for the entire referendum. Under this system, only collective decisions were possible and perfect consensus was a prerequisite.

Chapter fourteen discusses the formation of the consultative councils, as well as the ensuing execution of the Act of Free Choice. Ortiz Sanz was not allowed to play any part in putting together the electorate and was given the smallest possible role in the implementation of the referendum itself. The course of events is followed based on the reports of diplomats and journalists, who were able to be present at or observe various parts of the process. Papuans who were involved in the execution of the Act of Free Choice also have their say. The reports from the United Nations and Indonesian government are also used. In the opinion of the Western observers and the Papuans who have spoken out about this, the Act of Free Choice ended up as a sham, where a press-ganged electorate acting under a great deal of pressure appeared to have unanimously declared itself in favour of Indonesia.

The implementation of the Act of Free Choice was supervised from New York by top United Nations officials. They exerted hardly any counterpressure

against the Indonesian plans and practices, however; nor, for that matter, did The Hague or Washington. In The Hague, Minister Luns, still active as the Minister of Foreign Affairs, took the view that the Netherlands did acknowledge a moral responsibility, but did not, according to the text of the Agreement, have the scope to take action itself. Dutch action remained limited to being understanding about Indonesian behaviour without publicly endorsing it. In the meantime, the tide had turned in The Hague and all hopes were pinned on good cooperation with Indonesia. Nevertheless, the parliament did put some pressure on the government to make an effort to support an open referendum for the Papuans. This led to a meeting between Dutch and Indonesian ministers in Rome in May 1969. In a statement made after the meeting, the Dutch ministers took cognizance of the Indonesian approach, and expressed the expectation that there would be full agreement between the Indonesian government and the secretary general of the United Nations about the implementation of the referendum. Malik, Luns and Udink furthermore announced their joint intention to collaborate in the economic development of the area. This Rome Declaration confirmed the basic assumption that had applied up to that point, namely that the United Nations would ultimately have to come to an understanding with Indonesia about the approach to be followed. It gave Ortiz Sanz hardly any foothold from which he could influence the direction of events.

The final report of the secretary general of the United Nations was entirely based on a very rosy-hued report from Ortiz Sanz on his role in the implementation of the Act of Free Choice. It contained only weak criticism of the opposition from the Indonesian side. On the basis of this, U Thant could do nothing other than conclude that *an* Act of Free Choice had been held. He was unable to use the definite article, because the representative value of the operation had been far below the standards referred to in the New York Agreement. Although this could be interpreted as a scathing judgement, the vagueness of the wording also made it possible, for those who wished to do so, to simply pass over it in silence.

The final round took place in October and November 1969 in the General Assembly of the United Nations, where the Netherlands and Indonesia worked together to shepherd the secretary general's report through the meeting. The United States also lent a helping hand. Although in pragmatic terms the latter was to a large degree responsible for the course of events that had led to the New York Agreement and therefore to the Act of Free Choice, the United States, like the Netherlands, hid behind the United Nations, which had therefore drawn the short straw. There was however strong criticism from a group of African countries which had been sympathetic to the problems of the Papuans since 1961. It was of little use. An amendment submitted by them to the effect that a

new referendum should be organized in a number of years was rejected with a clear majority of votes. The result was that the council accepted a resolution jointly submitted by the Netherlands and Indonesia, in which it declared that it took cognizance of the report, with thirty abstentions but no 'nay' votes. It was all the New York Agreement had asked for. Therefore, the 'New Guinea question' was settled and could be removed from the agenda of the United Nations.

Finally, attention is paid to the concluding discussions in the Dutch parliament in 1962 and 1969. These took place after the conclusion of the Agreement and the implementation of the Act of Free Choice, respectively. In both cases, the question of sovereignty came up for discussion, a question which had divided Indonesia and the Netherlands since 1950. It was not dealt with in the text of the Agreement. After the New York Agreement was concluded, all the parties took the position that the rounding off process in the United Nations would be the final phase of the transfer of sovereignty. This would then have taken place *de facto*, if not *de jure*. This was emphatically underlined by the Dutch government in both 1962 and 1969 in a number of statements before parliament. Accordingly, once the General Assembly had taken cognizance of the final report of the secretary general about the completion of this final part of the Agreement, this signalled the end of the conflict about the sovereignty of western New Guinea. This did not mean that there was no future involvement on the Dutch side. This was expressed in a pledge, signed by Indonesia and the Netherlands, to collaborate in the development of the territory. The Dutch government took the view, both then and later, that the Netherlands would only be able to do something for its former subjects by collaborating effectively with Indonesia.

The above was a summary of the content and principal conclusions of this study. The end of the Act of Free Choice meant the start of an Indonesian administration that was fully accepted by the international community. The feared general rebellion of the Papuans failed to materialize, but there was nevertheless continued unrest. In 1971, the militant resistance movement OPM declared independence. This resistance was however harshly dealt with and in any case remained a marginal phenomenon. West Irian, now renamed as Irian Jaya (the victorious Irian), was declared an autonomous province which was under the responsibility of the Minister of the Interior. In reality the situation remained as it had been since 1963: an area under rather unsuccessful military rule, that continued to show all the characteristics of the preceding period. A forced cultural offensive came to nothing. Indonesia imposed its own norms on the Papuan population. Criticism or opposition was not tolerated and was

harshly punished. It is difficult to estimate the number of people who fell victim to this. Figures running into the tens of thousands have been mentioned.

A legal research group linked to Yale University found, in their report of 2003, the facts which had become known to them sufficiently serious to use the ominous word 'genocide' to describe the situation. This implied that in the group's opinion, the behaviour of the Indonesian government suggests that it was out to destroy the Papuans as such.[1] This pronouncement was however accompanied by the requisite doubts. These doubts are, in my opinion, correct, to the extent that this group should not have come to this conclusion. Of course, the violence of the Indonesian administration pointed out by the group is a real fact. It is indeed already apparent from the account given here of the first years of Indonesian rule. It was to grow even worse in the next phase. According to the statements of Papuans with a considerable knowledge of what was going on, not a day went by during the following decades when no one died or was seriously mistreated. Furthermore, Indonesia now started using the area, on a larger scale than before, to soak up the overflow of its own fast-growing population. The Papuans usually came off worst in this regard. During this process, they lost more and more ground, with most of the jobs also going to the immigrants. These were processes which were also apparent elsewhere in Indonesia, but were most oppressive in West Irian. The cities became replicas of the average Indonesian city: densely populated and dirty.

On the positive side, however, the previously stable and only slowly growing Papuan population increased by more than fifty per cent under Indonesian rule. Furthermore, the Indonesian government continued to support education, not just via its own bodies, but also via the existing church institutions. This meant that the education of Papuan youth has continued along well-trodden paths, at least in the cities.[2] Furthermore, more contact with the rest of Indonesia via contact with the newcomers, via the media and by means of personal visits outside the island, ensured a broadening of the Papuans' horizons. Integrating the Papuans into the body of the Indonesian state remained problematic, however. Civil servants educated during the period of Dutch rule usually remained in the lower ranks. The arrival of the Indonesian administration had put an end to the formal professional structure of the government organization, where education was closely linked to career development. Now appointments were all about having the right friends and connections, and this meant that the Papuans lost out. The financing of the government machinery was shaky, which meant that the government officials had to find part of their income locally themselves. This was also the case for the army, which, it is estimated, only received thirty per cent of its financing from the treasury. Added to

all this was the fact that West Irian was not, and had never been, a popular post, which led to a high turnover of Indonesian officials.

It goes without saying that such a system paves the way for all kinds of abuses. The Papuans had little chance of succeeding. After the retirement of Frans Kaisiepo in 1973, Izaak Hindom became the next Papuan governor in 1982. His arrival made little difference to the balance of power. Nor did it lead to any noticeable integration of Papuans into the business world, even if the latter was flourishing. Once the Act of Free Choice had taken place, the extraction of oil once again got going and the copper already discovered in the Carstensz mountains before the war could be exploited under the more stable conditions of the Suharto administration by the American mining company Freeport. This constituted a rich source of income for the Indonesian treasury and for the elite in Jakarta, insofar as the latter was involved in the management and central administration of the company. The positive effects on the local economy remained negligible, however; the disadvantages, in the form of pollution and land loss, were therefore all the greater. The Papuan population is one of the poorest groups in Indonesia.

Organizational and mental integration into the Indonesian state was not achieved. When the tide turned in 1998 and Suharto's regime came to an end, this created a power vacuum during which the population of New Guinea could once again speak freely and the problems of the area became visible to the outside world for a while. One thing was clear: Indonesia had not succeeded in winning the hearts of the Papuans. Their behaviour showed that their own national consciousness had in the meantime increased sharply. By means of their own disciplined behaviour, the leading Papuans in church and society managed to prevent serious riots, and were able to bring the voice of the Papuans to the attention of the Indonesian government and the world in a dignified yet insistent manner. The result was that during a visit to Jayapura on New Year's Day 2000, the Indonesian president Abdurrachman Wahid promised to improve the government and conceded that the name Irian Jaya, which was seen as a symbol of Indonesian domination, could be replaced by the name Papua. This was a key point in the series of events with which we opened this book. Since then, the clock has to a large extent been turned back. Papua is, however, still waiting for the genuine fulfilment of the promises made about broad autonomy. This is no one-sided affair, and what the Papuans themselves have to say will have to weigh heavily in the implementation of this promise. The first condition for this is freedom of speech and movement. This immediately brings to mind the words of the Indonesian minister Adam Malik, who publicly announced, during his visit to the area in 1966, that the army would first have to be withdrawn before Papuan society would be able to develop.

Since he spoke these words, the pressure exerted by the army and police on the population has, however, only increased.

This book tells the story of the entry of the population of New Guinea into modern times. The Netherlands acted as the intermediary in this process until 1962. A great deal of attention has therefore been paid in this study to the objectives of Dutch policy. These were initially strategic in nature: establishing the eastern border of Batavia's sphere of authority. With the creation of the first administrative centres in 1898, the Dutch went a step further. The aim was now, to use the words of Commissioner Plate, 'to turn savages into people'. The terminology chosen fitted in with the idea of guardianship prevalent at the time, which gave the colonial administration the task of educating those under its rule. Once Dutch rule had been established, the coastal population slowly but surely came under the sphere of influence of the modern world. This became much more urgent with the onset of decolonization. More explicitly and in modern language, the move towards self-determination became the main aim of Dutch policy in respect of New Guinea from 1945 onwards. Efforts to achieve this were intensified after 1950. The exclusion from the transfer of sovereignty in 1950 resulted in an additional twelve years of Dutch rule, during which a great deal was done for the country and its population. The Papuan world of 1962 differed radically from that of 1950, let alone 1900. Broad development had taken place and a small but high calibre upper class had been formed, who would, if given the chance, be able to lead society as a whole in the long term. Under the Indonesian regime, this development continued in fits and starts, however without offering the prospect of this elite actually being able to play the leading and guiding role intended for it.

It could be argued, given the last point, that it would in fact have been better to transfer sovereignty in 1950. The society would indeed have developed more slowly, but via the influence of the missions, which were also able to continue their work elsewhere in Indonesia, the direction followed would nevertheless have been the same. Perhaps then the mistrust and enmity, which still characterizes the relationship between Papuans and Indonesians today, would not have arisen. This argument is an attractive one, but does not do justice to the scope and power of the constructive work that took place between 1950 and 1962. Furthermore, it all too easily assumes that the split between the Papuans and Indonesians could then have been avoided. This is not at all certain, however. The anti-amberi sentiment was already present in full force in 1950, and the negative Indonesian attitude towards the Papuans was likewise well established. A speedy transfer would not have prevented the formation of a military regime, nor the accompanying violence. In social terms, the Papuans would, in

1950, have had much less chance to establish a position of their own. As matters were, they undoubtedly found themselves in an extremely difficult position in 1963, but Papuan society was better able to defend itself than it would have been without the extended Dutch rule.

It is however also clear that the desired ultimate aim of the Dutch policy has not been achieved, nor the integration desired by Indonesia. This book was not written to speculate about what could have been, nor to say what the future should look like. The aim is to give as faithful an account as possible of the complex process of the entry of the population of western New Guinea into the world of the twentieth century. This does not mean that this story can be told or read without any emotion or feelings. Those who have become engrossed in the impossible position that the Papuans have found themselves in over the course of this history, can only hope, with the author, that their fate will take a turn for the better. The factors on which such a fate can be based can be found in the above. They lie in the possibilities of Papuan society itself, which has produced the necessary self-control, wisdom and resilience to ensure its survival. They also lie in the interest shown by the international community, which has interfered with the course of events in all kinds of ways and, in doing so, has often been the primary driving force behind change, for better of for worse. This was most clearly expressed in the processes that led to the conclusion of the New York Agreement and the regulations based on this. For those who are able to bear it, historical responsibility should also have significance under international law.

The possibilities for a better future for the inhabitants of western New Guinea can also be found in Indonesia's interest in the area, for Indonesia not only has a tradition of military and authoritarian rule, but also of cultured interaction and efforts to provide good government. We can only hope that the latter two aspects gain the upper hand. In this respect, the activities of the LIPI, which tries to find a way out in its recently published *Papua Roadmap*[3] deserve our attention. Finally, there is the consideration that the interests of Indonesia and the Papuans, because they are neighbours and have a shared history, are interwoven in many respects. The two primary motives for establishing the administrative centres in 1898 were to secure the eastern border of the archipelago and to develop the Papuans and their country. These can still go together, by hook or by crook. A solution should be found that combines a better future for the Papuans with the proper regulation of the eastern border of Indonesia. It would, however, appear to be difficult to combine an open window onto the Pacific with a grumbling, misunderstood and maltreated population on the Indonesian side of the 141st meridian.

Appendix

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AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA AND THE KINGDOM OF THE NETHERLANDS CONCERNING WEST NEW GUINEA (WEST IRIAN), SIGNED AT THE HEADQUARTERS OF THE UNITED NATIONS, NEW YORK, ON 15 AUGUST 1962 *(Registered on 21 September 1962 by the Secretariat acting on behalf of the Contracting Parties pursuant to paragraph 2 of article XXVIII of the Agreement.)*

The Republic of Indonesia and the Kingdom of the Netherlands,
Having in mind the interests and welfare of the people of the territory of West New Guinea (West Irian) hereinafter referred to as "the territory",
Desirous of settling their dispute regarding the territory,
Now therefore, agree as follows:

Ratification of Agreement and Resolution of the General Assembly of the United Nations

Article I

After the present Agreement between Indonesia and the Netherlands has been signed and ratified by both Contracting Parties, Indonesia and the Netherlands will jointly sponsor a draft resolution in the United Nations under the terms of which the General Assembly of the United Nations takes note of the present Agreement, acknowledges the role conferred upon the Secretary-General of the United Nations therein, and authorizes him to carry out the tasks entrusted to him therein.

Transfer of Administration

Article II

After the adoption of the resolution referred to in article I, the Netherlands will transfer administration of the territory to a United Nations Temporary Executive Authority (UNTEA) established by and under the jurisdiction of the Secretary-General upon the arrival of the United Nations administrator appointed in accordance with article IV. The UNTEA will in turn transfer the administration to Indonesia in accordance with article XII.

United Nations Administration

Article III

In order to facilitate the transfer of administration to the UNTEA after the adoption of the resolution by the General Assembly, the Netherlands will invite the Secretary-General to send a representative to consult briefly with the Netherlands Governor of the territory prior to the latter's departure. The Netherlands Governor will depart prior to the arrival of the United Nations Administrator.

Article IV

A United Nations Administrator, acceptable to Indonesia and the Netherlands, will be appointed by the Secretary-General.

Article V

The United Nations Administrator, as chief executive officer of the UNTEA, will have full authority under the direction of the Secretary-General to administer the territory for the period of the UNTEA administration in accordance with the terms of the present Agreement.

Article VI

1. The United Nations flag will be flown during the period of United Nations administration.
2. With regard to the flying of the Indonesian and the Netherlands flags, it is agreed that this matter will be determined by agreement between the Secretary-General and the respective Governments.

Article VII

The Secretary-General will provide the UNTEA with such security forces as the United Nations Administrator deems necessary; such forces will primary

supplement existing Papuan (West Irianese) police in the task of maintaining law and order. The Papuan Volunteer Corps, which on the arrival of the United Nations Administrator will cease being part of the Netherlands armed forces, and the Indonesian armed forces in the territory will be under the authority of, and at the disposal of, the Secretary-General for the same purpose.

The United Nations Administrator will, to the extent feasible, use the Papuan (West Irianese) police as a United Nations security force to maintain law and order and, at his discretion, use Indonesian armed forces. The Netherlands armed forces will be repatriated as rapidly as possible and while still in the territory will be under the authority of the UNTEA.

Article VIII

The United Nations Administrator will send periodic reports to the Secretary-General on the principal aspects of the implementation of the present Agreement. The Secretary-General will submit full reports to Indonesia and the Netherlands and may submit, at his discretion, reports to the General Assembly or to all United Nations Members.

First phase of the UNTEA Administration

Article IX

The United Nations Administrator will replace as rapidly as possible top Netherlands officials as defined in annex A with non-Netherlands, non-Indonesian officials during the first phase of the UNTEA administration which will be completed on 1 May 1963. The United Nations Administrator will be authorized to employ on a temporary basis all Netherlands officials other than top Netherlands officials defined in annex A, who wish to serve the UNTEA, in accordance with such terms and conditions as the Secretary-General may specify. As many Papuans (West Irianese) as possible will be brought into administrative and technical positions. To fill the remaining required posts, the UNTEA will have authority to employ personnel provided by Indonesia.

Salary rates prevailing in the territory will be maintained.

Article X

Immediately after the transfer of administration to the UNTEA, the UNTEA will widely publicize and explain the terms of the present Agreement, and will inform the population concerning the transfer of administration to Indonesia and the provisions for the act of self-determination as set out in the present Agreement.

Article XI

To the extent that they are consistent with the letter and spirit of the present Agreement, existing laws and regulations will remain in effect. The UNTEA will have power to promulgate new laws and regulations or amend them within the spirit and framework of the present Agreement. The representative councils will be consulted prior to the issuance of new laws and regulations or the amendment of existing laws.

Second Phase

Article XII

The United Nations Administrator will have discretion to transfer all or part of the administration to Indonesia at any time after the first phase of the UNTEA administration. The UNTEA's authority will cease at the moment of transfer of full administrative control to Indonesia.

Article XIII

United Nations security forces will be replaced by Indonesian security forces after the first phase of the UNTEA administration. All United Nations security forces will be withdrawn upon the transfer of administration to Indonesia.

Indonesian Administration and Self-Determination

Article XIV

After the transfer of full administrative responsibility to Indonesia, Indonesian national laws and regulations will in principle be applicable in the territory, it being understood that they be consistent with the rights and freedoms guaranteed to the inhabitants under the terms of the present Agreement. New laws and regulations or amendments to the existing ones can be enacted within the spirit of the present Agreement. The representative councils will be consulted as appropriate.

Article XV

After the transfer of full administrative responsibility to Indonesia, the primary task of Indonesia will be further intensification of the education of the people, of the combating of illiteracy, and of the advancement of their social, cultural and economic development. Efforts also will be made in accordance with present Indonesian practice to accelerate the participation of the people in local government through periodic elections. Any aspects relating to the act of free choice will be governed by the terms of this Agreement.

Article XVI

At the time of the transfer of full administrative responsibility to Indonesia a number of United Nations experts, as deemed adequate by the Secretary-General after consultation with Indonesia, will be designated to remain wherever their duties require their presence. Their duties will, prior to the arrival of the United Nations Representative, who will participate at the appropriate time in the arrangements for self-determination, be limited to advising on and assisting in preparations for carrying out the provisions for self-determination except in so far as Indonesia and the Secretary-General may agree upon their performing other expert functions. They will be responsible to the Secretary-General for the carrying out of their duties.

Article XVII

Indonesia will invite the Secretary-General to appoint a Representative who, together with a staff made up, inter alia, of experts referred to in article XVI, will carry out the Secretary-General's responsibilities to advise, assist and participate in arrangements which are the responsibility of Indonesia for the act of free choice. The Secretary-General will, at the proper time, appoint the United Nations Representative in order that he and his staff may assume their duties in the territory one year prior to the date of self-determination.

Such additional staff as the United Nations Representative might feel necessary will be determined by the Secretary-General after consultations with Indonesia.

The United Nations Representative and his staff will have the same freedom of movement as provided for the personnel referred to in article XVI.

Article XVIII

Indonesia will make arrangements, with the assistance and participation of the United Nations Representative and his staff, to give the people of the territory the opportunity to exercise freedom of choice. Such arrangements will include:

(a) Consultations (Musjawarah) with the representative councils on procedures and appropriate methods to be followed for ascertaining the freely expressed will of the population.
(b) The determination of the actual date of the exercise of free choice within the period established by the present Agreement.
(c) Formulation of the questions in such a way as to permit the inhabitants to decide (a) whether they wish to remain with Indonesia; or (b) whether they wish to sever their ties with Indonesia.

(d) The eligibility of all adults, male and female, not foreign nationals to participate in the act of self-determination to be carried out in accordance with international practice, who are resident at the time of the signing of the present Agreement and at the time of the act of self-determination, including those residents who departed after 1945 and who return to the territory to resume residence after the termination of Netherlands administration.

Article XIX

The United Nations Representative will report to the Secretary-General on the arrangements arrived at for freedom of choice.

Article XX

The act of self-determination will be completed before the end of 1969.

Article XXI

1. After the exercise of the right of self-determination, Indonesia and the United Nations Representative will submit final reports to the Secretary-General who will report to the General Assembly on the conduct of the act of self-determination and the results thereof.
2. The Parties to the present Agreement will recognize and abide by the results of the act of self-determination.

Rights of the Inhabitants

Article XXII

1. The UNTEA and Indonesia will guarantee fully the rights, including the rights of free speech, freedom of movement and of assembly, of the inhabitants of the area. These rights will include the existing rights of the inhabitants of the territory at the time of the transfer of administration to the UNTEA.
2. The UNTEA will take over existing Netherlands commitments in respect of concessions and property rights.
3. After Indonesia has taken over the administration it will honour those commitments which are not inconsistent with the interests and economic development of the people of the territory. A joint Indonesian-Netherlands commission will be set up after the transfer of administration to Indonesia to study the nature of the above-mentioned concessions and property rights.

4. During the period of the UNTEA administration there will be freedom of movements for civilians of Indonesian and Netherlands nationalities to and from the territory.

Article XXIII

Vacancies in the representative councils caused by the departure of Netherlands nationals, or for other reasons, will be filled as appropriate consistent with existing legislation by elections, or by appointment by the UNTEA. The representative councils will be consulted prior to the appointment of new representatives.

Financial matters

Article XXIV

1. Deficits in the budget of the territory during the UNTEA administration will be shared equally by Indonesia and the Netherlands.
2. Indonesia and the Netherlands will be consulted by the Secretary-General in the preparation of the UNTEA budget and other financial matters relating to United Nations responsibilities under the present Agreement; however, the Secretary-General will have the final decision.
3. The Parties to the present Agreement will reimburse the Secretary-General for all costs incurred by the United Nations under the present Agreement and will make available suitable funds in advance for the discharge of the Secretary-General's responsibilities. The Parties to the present Agreement will share on an equal basis the costs of such reimbursements and advances.

[Followed chapters XXV **Previous Treaties and Agreements**, XXVI **Privileges and Immunities**, XXVII **Ratification**, XXVIII **Entry into Force** and XXIX **Authentic Text**.]

DONE at the Headquarters of the United Nations, New York, on the fifteenth day of August 1962, in three identical copies, of which one shall be deposited with the Secretary-General and one shall be furnished to the Government of each of the Contracting Parties.

For the Republic of Indonesia:
(Signed) SUBANDRIO

For the Kingdom of the Netherlands:
(Signed) J.H. van ROIJEN
(Signed) C. SCHURMANN

Notes

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55. See J.C. Anceaux, 'De huidige stand van het taalonderzoek op Nieuw-Guinea's westhelft', *Bijdragen tot de Taal- Land- en Volkenkunde* (BKI), CIV, pp. 231–248. See also William A. Foley, 'Towards understanding Papuan languagues', in: Jelle Miedema etc. (eds), *Perspectives on the Bird's Head*, pp. 503–518.
56. J. van Baal, K.W. Galis and Koentjaraningratxenophobicw, *West Irian: a bibliography* (KITLV, Dordrecht 1984).
57. Van Eechoud, Note 25 September 1944; *NA, Memories van Overgave no. 1364.*
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2 The Shock of War, pp. 53–93

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2. A.E. Kersten, 'Londen, Washington, Batavia', in: G. Teitler (ed.), *De val van Nederlands-Indië*, (Dieren 1982) p. 81.
3. Van Eechoud, Annual Report 1947, p. 6.
4. For a more detailed reconstrution of these events, see L. de Jong, *Het Koninkrijk de*

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5. Ross Burns, *War in the Pacific 1937–1945*, (New York 1991) pp. 94, 95.
6. C. Giebel, *Morotai, de bevrijding van de Grote Oost en Borneo*, (Franeker 1976) p. 37.
7. Jan Derix, *Bapa Papua; Jan P.K. van Eechoud, een biografie*, (Venlo 1987) p. 126
8. Information Abdulkadir Widjojoatmodjo to the author. Giebel, *op. cit.*, p. 42.
9. Kamma, *Dat wonderlijke werk*, II p. 737.
10. Giebel, *op. cit.*, pp. 43, 44.
11. Giebel, *op. cit.*, p. 50.
12. D.A. ten Haaft, missionary teacher of the UZV, Report about the xenophobic mood among the population of North New Guinea, specially the Schouten-Eilanden, Biak, 3–12–1946; *NA, archief Minkol, dossier 9532.* In this report the author asks for a better understanding of the difficult position of the Moluccan schoolmasters and missionary assistants (*gurus*) andexpresses the hope that both Papuans and Moluccans will meet each other in a commonly shared Indonesian ideal.
13. F.Ch. Kamma, *Koreri; Messianic movements in the Biak-Numfor culture area* (KITLV, The Hague 1972) pp. 156–213.
14. MvO J.W.M. Courtois, 'Hollandia 1948' (*Irian Jaya Source Materials* No. 2 Series A—No. 1) p. 121.
15. J. Pouwer, 'Socio-politische structuur in de Oostelijke Vogelkop, deel I, bestaans-middelen en sociale structuur, 1958' (*Irian Jaya Source Materials* No. 17 Series B—No. 8) pp. 54–62.
16. MvO J.W.M. Courtois, 'Hollandia 1948' pp. 12, 121.
17. J.P.K. van Eechoud, Note on government policy regarding New Guinea, Hollandia 25 September 1944; *NA, archief Minkol, Memories van overgave, no. 1364.*
18. J.P.K. van Eechoud, Secret and personal memorandum on government policy to all Assistant Residents and Subdivision Heads in New Guinea, Hollandia, 4 Januari 1947; *NA, archief Minkol, memories van overgave no. 1364.* See also J.P.K. van Eechoud, Annual Report New Guinea, Hollandia 23 April 1948; *NA, archief Minkol, rapportage Indonesië 1945–50, no. 780.*
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20. *NIB 45–50*, II, p. 231.
21. *NIB 45–50*, VI, p. 325.
22. Derix, *Bapa Papoea* pp. 157–160.
23. MvO Courtois, 'Hollandia 1948' pp. 146, 147. Van Eechoud, Annual Report 1947, p. 14.
24. Van Eechoud, Annual Report 1947, p. 15.
25. Van Eechoud, Annual Report 1947, p. 36.
26. Derix, *op. cit.*, p. 164. Information given to the author by Sollewijn Gelpke.
27. Speech by M. Kaisiepo in the New Guinea Council, 16–7–1962; *Handelingen Nieuw-Guinea Raad*, 16–7–1962. See also Derix, *op. cit.*, p. 133

28. See Van Eechoud, Annual Report 1947, p. 122 ff.
29. See Van Eechoud, Annual Report 1947, pp. 109–121, where he gives a summary of the content of the correspondence between Kijne and Brouwer that was at the root of it.
30. See the speech given by Kaisiepo in the New Guinea Council, mentioned above in note 27.
31. *NIB 45–50*, V, p. 582.
32. *NIB 45–50*, VIII, p. 489, 490.
33. Van Eechoud, Annual Report 1947, p. 70.
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35. Van Eechoud, Political Report, Hollandia, 9 March 1946; *NA, Rapportage Indonesië 1945–1950, no. 775.*
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37. Van Eechoud and Major H.St.L. Byford, Political Report New Guinea, 31 December 1945; *NA, archief Minkol, Rapportage Indonesië 1945–50, no. 775.*
38. Report N. Makkes 16 April 1948, 'Irregularities in Biak on 14 March 1948'; *NA, archief Minkol, Rapportage Indonesië 1945–50, no. 758.*
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45. Van Eechoud, General survey of the Residency of New Guinea in the 2nd half of November and the month of December 1946, Hollandia 6–1–1947; *NA, archief Rapportage Indonesië 1945–50 no. 781.*
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47. Van Eechoud, Annual Report 1947, pp. 70–75.
48. Pouwer, *op. cit.*, pp. 54–62.
49. Van Eechoud, Secret and personal memorandum on government policy to all Assistant-Residents and Sub-division Heads from New Guinea, Hollandia 4 January 1947; *NA, memories van overgave 1364.*

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2. *NIB 45–50*, VI, *Appendices*, 1
3. *NIB 45–50*, VI, p. 723.
4. *NIB 45–50*, VIII, p. 296.

5. *NIB 45–50*, XIV, no. 217.
6. See P.F. Maas (ed.), *Het Kabinet Drees-Van Schaik*, (Parlementaire Geschiedenis van Nederland na 1945, vol III, Nijmegen 1996) book A pp. 44, 68 and *passim.*
7. *Handelingen Tweede Kamer (TK)1947–1948, Bijlagen*, 907 no. 2. See also Maas, *op. cit.*, pp. 382–392.
8. Maas and Clerx (eds), *Het kabinet Drees-Van Schaik , book* C, pp. 373–377.
9. *NIB 45–50*, XVIII, no. 346.
10. *NIB 45–50*, XIX, no. 244.
11. See H. Klooster, *Indonesiërs schrijven hun geschiedenis*, (Leiden 1985).
12. The sources differ on the subject, but not to the point of giving a different picture of the content of the debate. Compare Saafroedin Bahar, *Risalah sidang Badan Penyelidik Usaha-usaha Persiapan Kemerdekaan Indonesia (BPUPKI, Panitia Persiapan Kemerdekaan Indonesia (PPKI)* (Sekretari Negara Republik Indonesia (Jakarta 1995) pp. 45–59, 380 with A.B. Kusuma, *Lahirnya Undang-undang dasar 1945*, pp. 193, 242.
13. A.B. Kusuma, *op. cit.*, pp. 242–247.
14. A.B. Kusuma, *op. cit.*, pp. 253–255.
15. A.B. Kusuma,*op. cit.*, pp. 240, 241.
16. A.B. Kusuma,*op. cit.*, pp. 251–253, 256–259.
17. A.B. Kusuma,*op. cit.*, pp. 261, 262, 462.
18. A.B. Kusuma, *op. cit.*, pp. 255 noot 252, 480, 481, 594. See also R. Chauvel, *Nationalists, soldiers and separatists*, (Leiden 1990) p. 198.
19. *NIB 45–50*, III, no. 159.
20. *NIB 45–50*, III, no. 346. R. Chauvel, *op. cit.*, pp. 216, 217.
21. Report of the Netherlands East Indies Parliamentary Committee (see Van Pol.), *Hand. TK 1945–1946, Appendices* no. 208.
22. *NIB 45–50*, V, nos. 8, 9, 14, 15, 17, 23, 25.
23. *NIB 45–50*, III, pp. 54, 62.
24. *NIB 45–50*, V, no. 302.
25. *NIB 45–50*, III, no. 289 and IV, no. 69.
26. *NIB 45–50*, XI, no. 92.
27. See supra, note 21.
28. *NIB 45–50*, V, no. 246.
29. D.J. van Wijnen, *Pangkalpinang, werkelijkheidszin der Minderheden* (RVD, Batavia 1946) pp. 62, 63, 90,109.
30. D.J. van Wijnen, *op. cit.*, p. 94.
31. *NIB 45–50*, V, p. 628 note 2.
32. *NIB 45–50*, VI, no. 184.
33. *NIB 45–50*, V, p. 690, VI p. 352.
34. *NIB 45–50*, VI, p. 198, 199.
35. C. Smit (ed.) *Het dagboek van Schermerhorn*, (2 vols, Groningen 1970) I p. 159.
36. *NIB 45–50*, VII, p. 148.
37. *NIB 45–50*, VI, no. 108.

38. *NIB 45–50*, VI, p. 352.
39. *NIB 45–50*, VI, p. 635 note 3.
40. *NIB 45–50*, VI, pp. 768.
41. *NIB 45–50*, VI, p. 781.
42. *NIB 45–50*, VI, no. 272.
43. Uitgave van het Algemeen Regeeringscommissariaat voor Borneo en de Groote Oost, *De conferentie te Denpasar, deel I, Handelingen* pp. 27, 34–36, 43, 58, 75, 76, 81–83. deel II, pp. 1, 7, 9, 23, 26, 29 and 42.
44. See i. a. *NIB 45–50*, VI, pp. 698, 699, 728 and VII, pp. 48, 106, 107.
45. P.J. Drooglever, 'De vrijheid vanuit Ambons perspectief', in: G.J. Knaap etc. (eds.), *Sedjarah Maluku* (Amsterdam 1992) pp. 90–94.
46. R. Chauvel, *Nationalists*, pp. 239, 240.
47. Nota afd. VSH 19 February. 1948 on the future status of New Guinea; *NA, archief Minkol, dossier no. 2282.*
48. *NIB 45–50*, XII, no. 114.
49. See *NIB 45–50*, XIII, no. 196.
50. *NIB 45–50*, VIII, p. 661.
51. *NIB 45–50*, VIII, p. 295.
52. *NIB 45–50*, XV, pp. 592, 641.
53. *NIB 45–50*, XIII, p. 486.
54. *NIB 45–50*, XIV, p. 378.
55. *NIB 45–50*, XV, no. 197.
56. *NIB 45–50*, XVI, pp. 90, 113, 116–119, 125.
57. *NIB 45–50*, XVII, no. 240; XVIII nos. 143, 226; XIX, nos. 126, 230; XX, p. 802.

4 Separation from Indonesia, pp. 137–173

1. *NIB 45–50*, XV, nos. 181, 182.
2. *NIB 45–50*, XVII, no. 306.
3. *NIB 45–50*, XVIII, no. 367.
4. *NIB 45–50*, XVIII, no. 50 noot 5.
5. *NIB 45–50*, XVIII, no. 130 sub e.
6. See note 5[e] div. Minog 4 June 1949; *NA, archief Minkol doss. 9616.*
7. *NIB 45–50*, XIX, no. 17 sub b.
8. *NIB 45–50*, XIX, no. 84.
9. *NIB 45–50*, XIX, nos. 103 and 111.
10. *Keesings Historisch Archief, 1949*, p. 8249
11. *NIB 45–50*, XIX, no. 299.
12. *Handelingen T.K. 1948–1949*, pp. 1468, 1469.
13. Maas & Clerx, *Het kabinet Drees-Van Schaik*, book C, pp.482–485, 495–504.
14. Maas & Clerx, *op. cit.*, p. 504
15. Arend Lijphart, *The Trauma of Decolonization: The Dutch and West New Guinea* (Yale University Press, New Haven and London 1966) p. 289.

16. *NIB 45–50*, XVI, no. 364.
17. *NIB 45–50*, XIII, no. 92a and XVIII, no. 368 note 2.
18. P.J. Drooglever, 'De Indische Nederlanders en de RTC', in: Wim Willems and Jaap de Moor, *Het einde van Indië* (The Hague 1995) pp. 232–238.
19. For this correspondence, see *NA, archief Van Eechoud 9, 12 and 13.* The Note on the economic future of New Guinea dated 16 March 1949 is laid down in *NA, archief Meijer Ranneft* 548.
20. C. van Konijnenburg to L. Götzen, Hollandia 11 July 1949; *NA, archief Minkol, dossier 2283.*
21. Interview Nicolaas Jouwe.
22. Telegram Ariks 1037, 3 June 1949; *NA, archief Minkol dossier 9616.*
23. *NIB 45–50*, XVII, no. 294.
24. *NIB 45–50*, XIX, nos. 84, 236.
25. Interview Jouwe. See also *NIB 45–50*, XX, no. 362.
26. *NIB 45–50*, XIX, no. 236. See also the letter Van Eechoud to Bannier, dated 8 August 1949; *NA, archief Van Eechoud no. 9.*
27. *NIB 45–50*, XIX, no. 288.
28. Letter from Van Eechoud to Meijer Ranneft, 8 August 1949; NA, *archief Van Eechoud 9.*
29. *NIB 45–50*, XIX, no. 241.
30. *NIB 45–50*, XIX, no. 267.
31. See supra, note 26. See also the letter Van Eechoud to Meijer Ranneft, 8 August 1949; *NA, archief Van Eechoud 12.*
32. See Lijphart, *Trauma*, pp. 114–122.
33. *NIB 45–50*, XIX, p. 694.
34. *NIB 45–50*, XIX, no. 372.
35. *NIB 45–50*, XX, nos. 229 and 242.
36. *NIB 45–50*, XIX p. 639.
37. See also the 'Summary of the RTC discussions on New Guinea', presented by the Minister of the Affairs of the Union and Overseas Territories to the chairman of the Standing Parliamentary Comittee (2nd Chamber) for Affairs of the Union on 8 February 1952; *NIB 50–63*, no. 2040.
38. *NIB 45–50*, XX, no. 8.
39. *NIB 45–50*, XX, no. 71.
40. *NIB 45–50*, XX, nos. 121, 137,174 ff. See also David Lee, *Australia & Indonesia's independence; the transfer of sovereignty; documents 1949* (Canberra 1999) nos. 514, 520.
41. *NIB 45–50*, XX, nos. 195 sub 5, 197.
42. *NIB 45–50*, XX, nos. 170, 172.
43. *NIB 45–50*, XX, nos. 208, 212, 215.
44. *Resultaten van de RTC, zoals aanvaard tijdens de tweede algemene vergadering welke op 2 november werd gehouden in de Ridderzaal te 's-Gravenhage* (The Hague, RTC Secretariat) pp. 83, 84.

45. Jan Bank, *Katholieken en de Indonesische revolutie* (Baarn 1983) pp. 466, 467. *NIB 45–50*, XX no. 207.
46. *NIB 45–50*, XIX, no. 324 and XX, nos. 38, 129, 161, 191 ff.
47. *NIB 45–50*, XIX, no. 320, 339 note 4, 254; XX no. 209.
48. See supra, note 18.
49. *NIB 45–50*, XX, nos. 63 note 3, 136.
50. *NIB 45–50*, XX, nos. 36, 52 sub 3f, 53 and 256.
51. *NIB 45–50*, XX, nos. 256, 263.
52. Lijphart, *Trauma*, p. 131, 132.
53. *NIB 45–50*, XX, nos. 291, 329. See also Jan Blokker in *De Volkskrant*, 30–3–1996.
54. Lijphart, *Trauma*, p. 122–124. Maas, *op. cit.*, pp. 586, 593.

5 Locking Horns, pp. 174–242

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2. Maas & Clerx, *Het kabinet Drees-Van Schaik*, book C, p. 660; *Handelingen EK, 1949–50*, p. 785.
3. Bank, *Katholieken en de Indonesische revolutie*, pp. 462, 463, 475–477.
4. *NIB 50–63*, no. 492.
5. See G.C. Zijlmans, *Eindstrijd en ondergang van de Indische bestuursdienst*, (Amsterdam/Dieren 1985) pp. 265–292.
6. C. van Heekeren, *Trekkers en blijvers*, (Franeker 1980) pp. 172–175; Drooglever, *Vaderlandse Club*, p. 6 and Meijer, *Den Haag-Jakarta*, p. 176.
7. *NIB 45–50*, XX, no. 297; NIB 50–63, nos. 7159, 5584, 7126, 7155, 7156, 7160. See also H. Feith, *The decline of constitutional democracy in Indonesia*, (Ithaca, New York 1962) pp. 54 ff.
8. See *NIB 45–50*, XX, no. 337 etc.
9. H. Amirmachmud, *Prajurit pejuang. Otobiografi* (Jakarta 1987) p. 131.
10. Meijer, *op. cit.*, pp. 112, 113. *NIB 50–63*, nos. 7101, 7282 and 7529.
11. De Moor, *Westerling's Oorlog*, pp. 424–428, 480–482. Meijer, *op. cit.*, pp. 111–118. See also *NIB 50–63*, no. 5330 ff.
12. *NIB 50–63*, nos. 7159, 5584, 7155, 7156.
13. E.I. van der Meulen, *Dossier Ambon 1950*, (The Hague 1981) pp.7–38.
14. *NIB 50–63*, nos. 2248, 2297, 2251, 2452.
15. *NIB 50–63*, no. 3416.
16. Feith, *op. cit.*, pp. 113 ff.
17. *NIB 45–50*, XX, no. 208, 212 and 215. Maas & Clerx, *op. cit.*, pp. 582–584.
18. Private letter Van Baal to Luns, 23–8–1954; Archief BZ, *dossier 494*.
19. *NIB 45–50*, XV, no. 259 note 4.
20. *NIB 50–63*, no. 16.
21. *NIB 50–63*, no. 1201.
22. Maas & Clerx, *op. cit.*, pp. 634–639.
23. Van der Meulen, *op. cit.*, pp. 157, 158. Maas et al & Clerx, *op. cit.*, pp. 643, 645–648.
24. *NIB 50–63*, nos. 1616, 873, 34, 7537.

25. *Rapport van de commissie Nieuw-Guinea (Irian) 1950.* Uitgave secretariaat van de Nederlands-Indonesische Unie, 's-Gravenhage 1950. For the minutes of the interviews conducted by the Committee, see *Archief BZ 1945–1954, dossier* 9863. The pro-Indonesian voices are from Petrus Wettebossy (Pidris), Lukas Rumkorem (PIM) and Rumbewas (PKII in Serui).
26. For the speeches of Sukarno, see *NIB 50–63*, nos. 3416, 1181. For the statements in parliament made by Van Maarseveen, see Duynstee, *Schakel*, p. 190–192.
27. Maas & Clerx, *op. cit.*, pp. 661–668.
28. *NIB 50–63*, nos. 5377, 255.
29. *NIB 50–63*, nos. 1979, 1981.
30. *NIB 50–63*, nos. 206, 208, 210.
31. *NIB 50–63*, nos. 217, 246.
32. *NIB 50–63*, no. 2285.
33. Probably H.M. van Randwijk, at the time director of the De Brug-Djambatan publishing house, operating in the Netherlands and Indonesia.
34. *NIB 50–63*, no. 1411.
35. *NIB 50–63* no. 1468.
36. *NIB 50–63* no. 1480.
37. *NIB 50–63*, nos. 253, 256, 259.
38. *NIB 50–63*, no. 2286.
39. *NIB 50–63*, nos. 260, 262. See also Stikker's memorandum for the meeting of the Council of Ministers on 25–12–1950, *NIB 50–63*, no. 2293.
40. *NIB 50–63*, no. 5398.
41. *NIB 50–63*, no. 1965.
42. *NIB 50–63*, no. 1780.
43. In the meeting of the Council of Ministers of 8 January 1951, that is to say four days after the interview given by Van der De Goes van Naters, Drees explained that indeed there had been a letter which indicated that the majority of the PvdA Members of Parliament were prepared to accept a transfer of sovereignty to Indonesia under certain conditions. (NIB 50–63, No. 257). Apparently it was the document handed over by Van Randwijk during his visit to the Prime Minister. See also M. van der Goes van Naters, *Tegen de Tijd, een tocht door de twintigste eeuw* (Amsterdam 1980) p. 145.
44. Maas & Clerx, *op. cit.*, pp. 670–687 offers a clear exposition of the New Guinea Conference and the parliamentary debates associated with it. See also Duynstee, *op. cit.*, 189–203 and the minutes of the discussions in the Council of Ministers in *NIB 50–63*, nos. 254, 255, 256, 259, 260, 261, 264, 249, 263.
45. Meijer, *op. cit.*, p. 468–470. Lijphart, *Trauma*, pp. 247, 248.
46. Meijer, *op. cit.*, pp. 648, 649.
47. *NIB 50–63*, 415. Ide Anak Agung Gde Agung, *Twenty years Indonesian foreign policy 1945–1965*, (The Hague/Paris 1973) pp. 92, 93.
48. For an insight into conditions in West Java in and after 1950, see C. van Dijk, *Rebellion under the banner of Islam*, pp. 102 ff.. For the NIGO and the prossesses associated with it, see see Meijer, *op. cit.*, pp. 431–436.

49. *NIB 50–63*, no. 2680.
50. *NIB 50–63*, no. 416.
51. *NIB 50–63*, no. 2012.
52. The bill wasd rejected later that year for other reasons. The name 'Netherlands New Guinea' only entered the Statute lBook when the Constitution was revised in 1956. It was done so after a cabinet proposal to introduce the name 'Western New Guinea' instead was rejected by the Council of State. Duynstee, *op. cit.*, pp. 243, 267. See also *NIB 50–63*, 519 and Lijphart, *op. cit.*, pp. 179–182.
53. NIB *50–63*, nos. 2070, 2106.
54. *NIB 50–63*, no. 2310.
55. *NIB 50–63*, no. 2093.
56. See Rudolf Mrázek, *Sjahrir; politics and exile in Indonesia* (New York 1994) pp. 432–437.
57. M.C. Ricklefs, *A history of modern Indonesia*, (London 1981) p. 238.
58. Duynstee, *De kabinetsformaties 1946–1961*, pp. 54–70. Meijer, *op. cit.*, pp.373–377. *NIB 45–50*, I, p. 350 and XIX, no. 309.
59. Michel van der Plas, *Luns: ‚ik herinner mij ...'*, pp. 61–65, 85, 86.. Meijer, *op. cit.*, pp. 373–377.
60. *NIB 50–63*, nos. 1521,1544. See also nos. 37, 213 and C.L.M. Penders, *The West New Guinea Debacle. Dutch Decolonization and Indonesia 1945–1962*, (Adelaide 2002) pp. 160–204, 301 ff.
61. Duynstee, *Schakel*, pp. 213, 214.
62. Anak Agung, *op. cit.*, pp. 110, 232.
63. *NIB 50–63*, nos. 3616.
64. *NIB 50–63*, no. 4241.
65. The same estimate was made by the US Ambassador in The Hague, Matthews, *NIB 50–63*, no. 3733.
66. *NIB 50–63*, no. 4263. See also Anak Agung, *op. cit.*, p. 103.
67. *NIB 50–63*, no. 3858.
68. Hans Meijer, *op. cit.*, p. 444. *NIB 50–63*, nos. 3689 ff..
69. See *NIB 50–63*, nos. 3752 etc., *Nederlands Nieuw-Guinea in de Negende Algemene Vergadering van de Verenigde Naties, september–december 1954* (UMBZ no. 37) pp. 10, 33.
70. *NIB 50–63*, no. 3780 ff..
71. C.L.M. Penders, *The West New Guinea Debacle*, p. 247.
72. Penders, *op. cit.*, p. 250.
73. *NIB 50–63*, no. 4269. Meijer, *op cit.*, pp. 487 ff.
74. *NIB 50–63*, no. 4325.
75. Tgm 2340 Jakarta to Geneva, 18–12–1955; Archief BZ, *dossier* 1526/1528a.
76. *NIB 50–63*, nos. 4448, 4785.
77. *NIB 50–63*, no. 529.
78. *NIB 50–63*, no. 494, 520.
79. *NIB 50–63*, nos. 4797, 6122, 5808. UMBZ no. 42, p. 58.

80. Anak Agung, *Twenty Years*, p. 134.
81. The intercepted Indonesian telegrams are inserted in the so-called 'Z-dossiers' made by Blom, *Archief BZ 912.10, Indonesië, conferentie Den Haag-Genève 1955–1956, dossier 1526 (politieke onderwerpen) en 1528A (notawisseling 7 jan.–4 feb. 1956).*
82. *Handelingen T.K. 1955–56, Bijlagen*, 4264.
83. *NIB 50–63*, no. 5440, 4450.
84. Tgm 13, 14 and 41 Geneva to Jakarta, 20 and 28 Dec. 1955; *Archief BZ, Z-dossier.* The document mentioned last was already in circulation. See *NIB 50–63*, no. 529.
85. Tgm 21 Geneva to Jakarta, 21–12–1955; Archief BZ, *Z-dossier.*
86. Tgm 18, Geneva to Jakarta, 21–12–1955; Archief BZ, *Z dossier. Handelingen T.K. 1955–1956*, pp. 570.
87. *NIB 50–63*, nos. 529, 77.
88. *NIB 50–63*, nos. 5446, 5447. Tgm 4/5 Geneva to Jakarta, 5–1–1956; Archief BZ, *Z-dossier.*
89. *NIB 50–63*, no. 4597.
90. *NIB 50–63*, no. 5448.
91. Meijer, *op. cit.*, p. 492.
92. *NIB 50–63*, nos. 77, 4607.
93. Tgm delegation 10/11 Geneva to Jakarta, 5–1–1956; idem nos. 7 (5–1–1956); 12 (5–1–1956); 14 (8–1–1956); Archief BZ, *Z-dossier.*
94. Tgm delegation 9 Jakarta to Geneva, 7–1–1956; Archief BZ, *Z-dossier.*
95. Note Van Wijnen to Blom, 8–1–1956; *NIB 50–63*, no. 5450.
96. *NIB 50–63*, no. 4598.
97. *NIB 50–63*, no. 5449. See also tgm 16 Geneva to Jakarta, 7–1–1956; Archief BZ, *Z-dossier.*
98. Anak Agung, *op. cit.*, p. 142.
99. See also *NIB 50–63*, no. 4453.
100. Tgm 15 and 23 Geneva to Jakarta, 7 and 8 January 1956; Archief BZ, *Z-dossier.*
101. Tgm 43 Geneva to Jakarta, 28–12–1955; Archief BZ, *Z-dossier.*
102. Tgm 20 Geneva to Jakarta, 8–1–1956; Archief BZ, *Z-dossier.*
103. Tgm 17 Jakarta to Geneva, 16–1–1956; Archief BZ, *Z-dossier.*
104. Tgm 19 Geneva to Jakarta, 8–1–1956; Archief BZ, *Z-dossier.*
105. Note Luns to SG (Blom), 13–1–1956; Archief BZ, *Z-dossier.*
106. Tgm 36/37 Geneva to Jakarta, 14–1–1956; Archief BZ, *Z-dossier.*
107. Tgm 40 Geneva to Jakarta, 14–1–1956; Archief BZ, *Z-dossier.*
108. Tgm 17 Jakarta to Geneva, 16–1–1956; Archief BZ, *Z-dossier.*
109. Tgm 200 706 Van Bylandt to The Hague and note from Luns no. 6, 20–1–1956; Archief BZ, *Z dossier.*
110. *NIB 50–63*, no. 4400.
111. *NIB 50–63*, nos. 81, 82. Tgm 89 Geneva to Jakarta, 30–1–1956; Idem 200 Jakarta to Geneva, 29–1–1956; idem 69 Jakarta to The Hague, 1–2–1956; Archief BZ, *Z-dossier.*

112. *NIB 50–63*, no. 4438.
113. *NIB 50–63*, no. 3336. Anak Agung, *op. cit.*, p. 153.
114. *NIB 50–63*, nos. 5454, 5455, 5462.
115. *NIB 50–63*, no. 4765. Report and communiqué in: *Archief BZ, Z-dossier.*
116. Michel van der Plas, *Luns*, pp. 92–96. For a recent summary of the discussion, see Penders, *op. cit.*, pp. 257, 258. See also correspondence on this subject between Drees, Luns and S.J. van Tuyll van Serooskerken from 1971, in: *NA, archief Drees 909.*
117. Tgm 10/11 Geneva to Jakarta, 5–1–1956; idem tgm 23 (8 Jan. 1956); *Archief BZ, Z dossier.*
118. Duynstee, *op. cit.*, pp. 232, 233.
119. *NIB 50–63*, no. 5452.
120. *NIB 50–63*, nos. 4453, 4462.
121. Note written in pencil by Blom, 7–2–195; Archief BZ, *Z dossier.*
122. Mrázek, *Sjahrir*, p. 462 etc.

6 Direct Rule from The Hague, pp. 243–309

1. P. Merkelijn, 'Bevolkingsvoorlichting', in: J.W. Schoorl (ed.), *Besturen in Nederlands-Nieuw-Guinea 1945–1962*, (Leiden 1996) p. 218.
2. Jan Derix, *Bapa Papoea*, pp. 195–203. *NIB* XX pp. 654, 678, 743. Interview with N. Jouwe.
3. *Stb.* 1949, no. J 576. See also *NIB* XX, pp. 652, 653.
4. *Gouvernementsblad van Nieuw-Guinea* 1950, no. 2.
5. Van Baal, *Ontglipt verleden*, II, pp. 317–323.
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9. See Van Baal, *op. cit.*, II, pp. 489 ff.
10. Ministry of Affairs of the Union and Overseas Territories, *Rapport inzake NNG, uitgebracht aan de Verenigde Naties ingevolge artikel 73^{E} van het Handvest*, (issued anually to the United Nations between 1950 and 1962) 1953, p. 57 and appendices V and XXXI.
11. H. Meijer, 'Bestemming Nieuw-Guinea', in: W. Willems etc., *Uit Indië geboren; vier eeuwen familiegeschiedenis*, (Zwolle 1997) pp. 151–165.
12. Joop van den Berg, 'De Deta-jongens op Nederlands Nieuw-Guinea', in: W. Willems and J. de Moor, *Het einde van Indië, Indische Nederlanders tijdens de Japanse bezetting en de dekolonisatie*, (The Hague 1995), pp. 256–266.
13. *NIB 45–50*, XX, pp. 640, 654, 655.
14. *Rapport inzake NNG*, 1953, appendix IVe.
15. Van Eechoud, memorandum entitled 'Analyse van het beleid in Nieuw-Guinea', submitted to Minister van Maarseveen as an appendix to a letter dated 27 January 1951; ARA, *archief Minkol, dossier 11861. NIB 50–63*, nos. 1972, 3527.

16. According to the *Rapport inzake NNG*, 1953, there were approximately 8,500 male and 6,400 female Asians, the majority of whom came from the Moluccas, Kei or Menado.
17. *NIB 50–63*, nos. 131, 132, 1490.
18. *NIB 45–50*, XIX, no. 231.
19. *NIB 50–63*, no. 637.
20. Van Baal, *op. cit.*, II, pp. 193, 234.
21. *KLM Annual Survey* 1951, p. 14.
22. Memorandum Van Eechoud 27 Jan. 1951.
23. *Op. cit.*
24. *NIB 50–63*, nos. 1968, 1970, 1971. These documents originate from the Department of Justice, which had instituted an investigation into the activities of one of Westerling's supporters, the businessman J. Thiessen. They were forwarded to Van Waardenburg via the Ministry of Affairs of the Union and Overseas Territories. See also J.A. de Moor, *Westerling's Oorlog, Indonesië 1945–1950*, pp.402, 403, 504.
25. *NIB 50–63*, nos. 1973, 1974.
26. *NIB 50–63*, no. 1974.
27. J. Derix, *Bapa Papua*, pp 233, 234.
28. *NIB 50–63*, no. 3017.
29. Van Baal, *op. cit.*, pp. 335–338.
30. *NIB 50–63*, no. 1162.
31. *NIB 50–63*, no. 3017.
32. *Rapport inzake NNG*, 1953, appendix IV.
33. Van Baal, *op. cit.*, II, p. 354.
34. *Op. cit.*, II, pp. 174, 175, 183.
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36. F.J.F.M. Duynstee, *De kabinetsformaties 1946–1965* (Deventer 1966) pp. 57, 58.
37. *NIB 50–63*, no. 3023. See also Van Baal, *op. cit.*, II, p. 402.
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39. V. de Bruijn, *Het verdwenen volk*, p. 331.
40. F. van Anrooij, 'Platteel, Pieter Johannes', in: *Biografisch Woordenboek van Nederland* III, pp. 456–458.
41. Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken, *Rapport inzake NNG*, 1960, appendix Va.
42. M.C. Jongeling, *Het zendingsconsulaat in Nederlands-Indië 1906–1942*, pp. 227 ff.
43. Neilson, *Christianity in Irian*, pp. 136–139.
44. J.V. de Bruijn, Het verdwenen volk, pp. 112–114. Neilson, *op. cit.*, pp. 154, 155. See also Dirk Vlasblom, *Papoea. Een Geschiedenis* (Amsterdam 2004), pp. 166–168.
45. Neilson, *op. cit.*, pp. 156 ff.
46. J. Verschueren M.S.C., 'De Katholieke Missie', in: W.C. Klein (ed.), *Nieuw-Guinea*, (3 volumes, The Hague 1953, 1954) I, pp. 214–220. For the 'gentlemen's agreement' in the Wissel Lakes area, see De Bruijn, *op. cit.*, pp. 112, 113.

47. Verschueren, *op cit.*, pp. 207–220. Neilson, *op. cit.* pp. 196, 197. J.F.L.M. Cornelissen, *Pater en Papoea* (Kampen 1899) p. 95. Personal communication J. Sloot.
48. Van Baal, *op. cit.*, II, p. 580.
49. *Op. cit.*, II, pp. 207, 208, 255, 256. Unless otherwise stated, the figures used in this section are taken from the annual report in Dutch about matters relating to Netherlands New Guinea entitled *Rapport inzake Nederlands Nieuw-Guinea.*
50. Van Baal, *op. cit.*, II, pp. 482, 483.
51. *NIB 50–63*, 1966.
52. Confidential letter from Platteel to Bot, no. Kab. 2.3.0/255/2, dated 6 March 1962; *NA, archief kabinet gouverneur NGN, C1–11.* Also in *NIB 50–63*, no. 5129.
53. H. Kroeskamp, 'Grondgedachten van het onderwijsbeleid in Nederlands-Nieuw-Guinea', in : 6 *Nieuw-Guinea Studien* (1962), pp. 97–131.
54. H. Kroeskamp, o*p. cit.*, 105 ff.
55. Van Baal, *op. cit.*, pp. 247–252.
56. See L. Voorhoeve-Visser and Amapon Jos Marey (eds.), *Bakti Pamong Praja Papua* (Jakarta 2008).
57. See, for example, Frits Veldkamp, 'De bestuurlijke dilemma's bij de openlegging van de Baliem', in: Schoorl (ed.), *Besturen in NNG 1945–1962*, pp. 77, 78.
58. *NIB 50–63*, no. 1967. Van Baal, *op. cit.*, pp. 205–209, 247–256, 390, 391, 466, 513, 514, 579–581. Neilson, *op cit.*, p. 140.
59. P.W. van der Veur, 'Dr. Kroeskamp's "principles of educational policy in Netherlands New Guinea—some critical comments" '. This unpublished article was intended as a rejoinder to Dr. Kroeskamp's contribution in *Nieuw Guinea Studiën*, mentioned above in Note 53, but could not be published as this journal was discontinued in 1963. Personal communication P.W. van der Veur. A draft of the article is in the author's possession.
60. On this, see Kees Groeneboer, W*eg naar het Westen. Het Nederlands voor Indië 1600–1959* (Leiden 1993).
61. *NIB 50–63*, nos. 1966, 3016. Van Baal, *op. cit.*, II, pp. 254.
62. Kroeskamp, *op. cit.*, pp. 120–126.
63. As witnessed in his 1973 Ph.D. thesis: H. Kroeskamp, *Early schoolmasters in a developing country, a history of experiments in school education in 19th century Indonesia* (Assen 1974).
64. In what follows, I have based myself chiefly on the 1996 Nijmegen MA thesis by my student Jan-Maarten de Wit, 'Nieuw-Guinea 1934–1962: voor stijfkoppigen en pioniers'.
65. De Wit, *op. cit.*, pp. 25–31.
66. *Op. cit.*, pp. 43–51.
67. Van Baal, *op. cit.*, II, p. 442.
68. De Wit, *op. cit.*, pp. 70–74. For the correspondence on which this is based, see *NA, archief Minkol, dossier G 14846 and G 32573.* See also Greg Poulgrain, 'Delaying

the discovery of oil in West New Guinea', in: 34 *The Journal of Pacific History* (1999) no. 2, pp. 205–218.

69. De Wit, *op. cit.*, pp. 78–90. For the underlying correspondence to this, see *NA, archief Minkol, dossier 9226.*
70. De Wit, *op. cit.*, pp. 91–98. For the underlying correspondence to this, see *NA, archief Minkol, dossier G 32693.* See also Denise Leith, *The politics of power. Freeport in Suharto's Indonesia,* (Honolulu 2003) pp. 1.2.
71. Van Baal, *op. cit.*, II, pp. 384, 428, 481. For an idea of what the town looked like, see K.W. Galis and H.J. van Doornik, *Een gouden jubileum; 50 jaar Hollandia* (Landsdrukkerij, Hollandia 1960).
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73. *Rapport inzake NNG,* 1960, appendix V. Van Baal, *op. cit.*, II, p. 435.
74. *Rapport inzake NNG,* 1960, appendices XXIV–XXVI.
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76. *Rapport NNG 1960,* p. 26, 27. Van Baal, *op. cit.*, pp. 242, 296. For further reading, see Galis, *Bibliografisch Overzicht.*
77. *NIB 50–63,* no. 5122. *Rapport NNG* 1960, appendices VII and XXXIX.
78. Van Baal, *op. cit.*, II, p. 332 and *Rapport inzake NNG,* 1960, pp. 9, 10.
79. *NIB 50–63,* no. 3015.
80. J.W. Schoorl, *Culture and change among the Muyu* (Leiden 1993), p. 167.
81. See L.D. Brongersma and G.F. Venema, *Het witte hart van Nieuw-Guinea* (Amsterdam 1969). For a personal account, see Gerrit Dasselaar, 'Expeditie Sterrengebergte 1959', in Pim Schoorl (ed.), *Besturen in Nederlands-Nieuw-Guinea 1945–1962,* pp. 310–441.
82. Van Baal, *op. cit.*, II, p. 508, 509. NIB 50–63, no. 4847.
83. De Bruijn, *Het verdwenen volk,* pp. 328–331. Van Baal, *op. cit.*, II, pp. 532–534.
84. Gonsalves, *Memoires,* pp. 61–137. See also *NIB 50–63,* nos 4633–4656.
85. F. Springer (pseudoniem for C.J. Schneider), 'Een weerzien', in: Schoorl (ed.), *Besturen in Nederlands-Nieuw-Guinea,* p. 122.

7 The Dispute in an International Perspective, pp. 310–385

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2. *NIB 50–63,* no. 4464.
3. H. Feith, *The decline of constitutional democracy,* pp. 462 ff.
4. Meijer, *Den Haag-Djakarta.* p. 545. For a personal account, see H. Schmidt, *In de greep van Soekarno,* (Leiden 1961).
5. *NIB 50–63,* no. 4771
6. Meijer, *Den Haag-Djakarta.* pp. 554, 555.
7. *NIB 50–63,* no. 4776 ff.

8. Article by Sumitro Djojohadikusumo, in: *Keng Po*, 15–4–1956; *NIB 50–63*, no. 4537.
9. J.M.M.J. Clerx, 'Financiële verhouding tussen Nederland en Indonesië opnieuw bezien', 11–12 *Politieke opstellen centrum voor parlementaire geschiedenis*, 1991–1992, p. 59–71. See also Anne Booth, *The Indonesian Economy in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries*, (Londen 1998) pp. 176, where she argues that Indonesia's debt obligation was not as bad in this period as it had been in the 1930s.
10. *NIB 50–63*, nos. 419, 421, 423, 427, 4754. Meijer, *Den Haag-Djakarta*, pp. 545–548, 567 note 56.
11. J.J.P. de Jong, *To forget the past in favour of a promise for the future*, (The Hague 2004) p. 27.
12. Adnan Buyung Nasution, *The Aspiration for Constitutional Government*, pp. 41–48. Ricklefs, *A History of Modern Indonesia*, p. 241.
13. H. Feith, *The Decline of constitutional democracy*, pp. 487 ff.
14. Audrey Kahin, *Rebellion to integration*, (Amsterdam 1999) pp. 178–192.
15. *NIB 50–63*, no. 5599.
16. Ricklefs, *op. cit.*, p. 248. See also the DBI/PL 23–8–1957 memorandum on the position of communism in Indonesia after the regional elections, *NIB 50–63*, no. 5436.
17. *NIB 50–63*, nos. 5608, 5611.
18. Meijer, *Den Haag-Djakarta*, p. 563.
19. *Nederlands Nieuw-Guinea in de twaalfde algemene vergadering van de Verenigde Naties, september–december 1957* (UMBZ no. 54), pp. 84–91. See also F.J.F.M. Duynstee, *Nieuw-Guinea als schakel tussen Nederland en Indonesië* (Amsterdam 1961) pp. 246, 247, 252–254.
20. L. Giebels, *Soekarno president*, (Amsterdam 2001) pp. 168, 169.
21. *NIB 50–63*, no. 5866.
22. *NIB 50–63*, no. 6076.
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25. Unless otherwise indicated, the information for this section is drawn from Ricklefs, *A history of modern Indonesia*, pp. 236–254.
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27. Yassin el-Ayouti, *The United Nations and decolonization; the role of Afro-Asia*, (The Hague 1971) p. 62.
28. Duynstee, *Schakel*, pp. 226, 260.
29. Yassin el-Ayouti, *The United Nations and decolonization*, pp. 210–212.
30. *NIB XX*, p. 392. *NIB 50–63*, nos. 7104, 7517.
31. *NIB 50–63*, nos. 5383, 5384.
32. *NIB 50–63*, no. 5403.

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35. *NIB 50–63*, no. 504.
36. *NIB XX*, p. 446.
37. See, for example, Nehru's speeches on his visit to Indonesia in June 1950, in: *NIB 50–63*, nos. 1686, 1688.
38. *NIB 50–63*, no. 2412.
39. *NIB 50–63*, no. 1500 ff. For a description of the Australian position in the conflict about New Guinea, see C.L.M. Penders, *The West New Guinea Debacle*. For the conflict in a wider context, see also the articles by David Lee and Peter Gifford, in: David Goldsworthy (ed.), *Facing North. A century of Australian engagement with Asia*, (vol. 1, Melbourne 2001).
40. *NIB 50–63*, no. 5378.
41. In relation to this subject, see Christopher Thorne, *Allies of a Kind. The United States, Britain and the War Against Japan 1941–1945*, (New York 1978) and 'Engeland, Australie en Nederlands Oost-Indie 1941–1945', in: 29 *Internationale Spectator* (1975) pp. 493–505. See also J.F. Engers, *Indië in de branding. De geallieerde wereld over de toekomst van Nederlandsch Indië van Pearl Harbour tot Hollandia*, (New York 1945).
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43. See also *NIB 50–63*, no. 5495.
44. *NIB 50–63*, no. 5497.
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46. *NIB 50–63*, no. 5503.
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48. *NIB 50–63*, no. 6042.
49. *UMBZ no. 54*, pp. 63, 64.
50. *NIB 50–63*, nos. 4124, 4125.
51. *NIB 50–63*, no. 5493.
52. *NIB 50–63*, no. 5038.
53. *NIB 50–63*, nos. 5500, 5508–5512.
54. *NIB 50–63*, no. 5502.
55. *NIB 50–63*, no. 5494.
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61. *NIB 50–63*, nos. 4294, 4103.
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74. *FRUS 1958–1960*, XVII, nos. 20 and 71.
75. *FRUS 1958–1960*, XVII, no. 5.
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91. *FRUS 1958–1960*, XVII, nos. 101, 103, 105, 106.
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98. *FRUS 1958–1960*, XVII, no. 154. *NIB 50–63*, nos. 6754.
99. *NIB 50–63*, 6440 note.
100. *FRUS 1958–1960*, XVII, no. 156.
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102. Memorandum Jandrey for the Secretary, 7–10–58, *NARA, RG 59, cf 611.56D/10.758.*
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104. *FRUS 1958–1960*, XVII, no. 160.
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106. *FRUS 1958–1960*, XVII, no. 183.
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109. See for example, Van Baal in *Ontglipt verleden*, II, pp. 353 ff. Unless otherwise indicated, the information for this section is drawn from R.E. van Holst Pellekaan, I.C. de Regt and J.F. Bastiaans, *Patrouilleren voor de Papoea's. De Koninklijke Marine in Nederlands Nieuw-Guinea* (2 vols, Amsterdam 1989).
110. For a synopsis of the situation in April 1954, see the letter dated 9 April 1954 from the Minister of General Affairs (Drees) to the members of the General Defense Council, with appendices, in: *NIB 50–63*, no. 6983.
111. *NIB 50–63*, nos. 3447, 3616, 4092.
112. *NIB 50–63*, 3514 ff.
113. Holst Pellekaan et al., *Patrouilleren voor de Papoea's*, I, pp. 69–82.
114. See, for example, Nota NSC 171/1, 20–11–1953; *Eisenhower Library, WHO spec. ass., NSC-series, policy papers subseries box 8.*
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124. *NIB 50–63*, no. 541. Holst Pellekaan etc., *Patrouilleren voor de Papoea's*, I, pp. 95, 96.
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127. *NIB 50–63*, nos. 6761 and 7174. See also Penders, *The West New Guinea Debacle*, p. 325.

128. *NIB 50–63*, no. 6686.
129. *NIB 50–63*, no. 5084.
130. *NIB 50–63*, no. 5083.
131. *NIB 50–63*, no. 5085.
132. *NIB 50–63*, nos. 110, 112, 113.
133. *FRUS 1958–1960*, XVII, nos. 183, 237.
134. P.F. Maas, *Kabinetsformaties 1959–1973*, (The Hague 1982) p. 62.
135. *NIB 50–63*, no. 125.
136. *FRUS 1958–1960*, XVII, no. 226.
137. *NIB 50–63*, 571.
138. Ronald Gase, *Misleiding of zelfbedrog. Het Nederlands beleid ten aanzien van Nieuw-Guinea*, (Baarn 1984) pp. 58–59.
139. *NIB 50–63*, no. 5091.
140. *NIB 50–63*, nos. 129, 136, 5093, 5091.
141. *NIB 50–63*, no. 140 ff. See also Holst Pellekaan etc., *Patrouilleren voor de Papoea's*, I, pp. 119 ff.
142. *FRUS 1958–1960*, XVII, no. 253.
143. *NIB 50–63*, no. 7476.
144. Holst Pellekaan etc., *Patrouilleren voor de Papoea's*, I, p. 125.

8 The Turning Tide in The Hague and Washington, pp. 386–433

1. F.J. Goedhart, *Een revolutie op drift. Indonesisch reisjournaal*, (Amsterdam 1953). Dr. M. van Blankenstein, *Indonesië Nu. Nieuwe indrukken* ('s-Gravenhage/ Bandung 1953).
2. *NIB 50–63*, no. 5646.
3. See also Lijphart, *Trauma*, pp. 189, 190, 192.
4. As demonstrated by Luns' complete rejection of the complaints of the *Ondernemersraad* on the lack of interest on the part of the government for the difficulties experienced by the Dutch in Indonesia during the anti-Netherlands campaigns in that country as a result of the New Guinea policy. The Minister explained to them that he shared their worries, but that the responsibility for the life and fate of these people 'all things considered' was not with the Netherlands, but with the Indonesian government. *NIB 50–63*, no. 5683.
5. Examples of this can be found in the corresondence of missionaries with their home base, as edited by Th. Van den Endt and others. See, for instance, Th. van den Endt, *De gereformeerde zendingsbond 1901–1961 Nederland Tanah Toradja* (Alphen a/d Rijn 1985) no. 228. Th. Van den Endt, *Gereformeerde zendingsbond op Sumba 1859–1972* (Alphen a/d Rijn 1987) nos. 244, 251, 268. Chr. G.F. de Jong, *Geschiedenis van de Nederlandse zending op Zuid-Sulawesi 1852–1966* (Alphen a/d Rijn 1995) pp. 19, 28 and nos 85, 86.
6. Lijphart, *Trauma*, p. 152.
7. *NIB 50–63*, nos. 4028, 3855, 4036. J. v.d. Wal, 'De Hervormde zending en de kwestie Nieuw-Guinea; de 'Oproep tot bezinning' van 1956', in: 10

Documentatieblad voor de geschiedenis van de Nederlandse Zending en Overzeese Kerken no. 2 (2003) pp. 13–60. The subject is discussed more fully in his 2006 Kampen dissertation, Hans van de Wal, *Een aanvechtbare en onzekere situatie. De Hervormde Kerk en Nieuw-Guinea 1949–1962* (Hilversum 2006).

8. Communication J.J.P. de Jong.
9. Willem Oltmans, *Memoires 1953–1957*, (Baarn 1986) pp. 140 ff.
10. Lijphart, *Trauma*, pp. 225 ff.
11. Oltmans, *Memoires 1951–1957*, pp. 210 ff., *Memoires 1957–1959*, pp. 47. ff.
12. *NIB 50–63*, no. 458.
13. At the time, the membership of the NHK included about thirty per cent of the Dutch population. Its influence, however, extended much further. See Hans van de Wal, *Een aanvechtbare situatie*, p. 141.
14. H. van Andel, 'Om de toekomst van Nederlands-Nieuw-Guinea', 26 *Anti-Revolutionnaire Staatkunde* no. 8 (August 1956) pp. 213–227.
15. A clear survey of the shifting attitudes within calvinistic circles at the time is given by H. Coerts, *De ARP en Nieuw-Guinea. Historische analyse van een partijcrisis*, (Franeker 1983).
16. Lijphart, *Trauma*, p. 209.
17. Rapport van de Commissie voor internationale zaken van de Oecomenische Raad van Kerken in Nederland, *Nieuw-Guinea als probleem van het Nederlandse Volk* (Ten Have, May 1956).
18. Van Asbeck, 'Waarheen Nieuw-Guinea?', *Wending*, May–June 1956.
19. *Handelingen EK*, 1955–1956, p. 427 ff.
20. Duynstee, *Kabinetsformaties*, pp 109, 110, 112.
21. Duynstee, *Schakel*, p. 247.
22. *Handelingen EK*, 1957–1958, pp. 167–169, 184 ff.
23. *NIB 50–63*, no. 557. Duynstee, *Kabinetsformaties*, p. 177.
24. *Op. cit.*, p. 178.
25. *NIB 50–63*, no. 557.
26. Maas, *Kabinetsformaties*, p. 62.
27. Th. Bot, 'Nederlands Nieuw-Guinea en de wereld', 20 *Internationale Spectator* (October 1950).
28. *NIB 50–63*, no. 129.
29. *NIB 50–63*, nos. 4777, 4478 and 150.
30. *NIB 50–63*, no. 136.
31. *NIB 50–63*, no. 4477.
32. *NIB 50–63*, nos. 5528, 4496.
33. *Handelingen TK*, 1959–1960, pp. 607, 618–620, 701, 702.
34. R. Gase, *Misleiding of zelfbedrog. Het Nederlandse beleid ten aanzien van Nieuw-Guinea* (Baarn 1984) p. 66.
35. *NIB 50–63*, no. 209.
36. Diary De Quay, 4618; *BHIC, archief J.E. de Quay, inv. no. 45.*
37. Diary De Quay, 4641,4658; *loc. cit.*

38. *NIB 50–63*, nos. 557, 561. For the position of Bot at the time, see *NIB 50–63*, no. 7508.
39. *NIB 50–63*, nos. 6997 ff.
40. *NIB 50–63*, nos. 556, 569.
41. *Handelingen TK*, 1960–1961, pp. 43 ff.
42. Memorandum from John G. Day, American Embassy in The Hague to Washington, on current Dutch policy concerning the political development of WNG, 9–8–1960; *NARA, RG 59, cf 60–63 box 1351, 566.56C/8–960.*
43. Diary De Quay 4782; *BHIC, archief J.E. de Quay, Inv. nr. 46.*
44. *Eerste gedeelte van de Vijftiende Algemene Vergadering van de Verenigde Naties, september–december 1960* (UMBZ 67) p. 208. *NIB 50–63*, no. 569.
45. *FRUS 1958–1960*, XVII, p. 503, 506.
46. *FRUS 1958–1960*, XVII, no. 287.
47. *FRUS 1958–1960*, XVII, no. 288.
48. Livingstone Merchant to Secretary, 27–10–1960; *NARA 59, Lot 67 D548.*
49. *FRUS 1958–1960*, XVII, 289.
50. *FRUS 1958–1960*, XVII, nos. 262, 265.
51. *FRUS 1958–1960*, XVII, no. 292. *NIB 50–63*, nos 583, 6558, 4317, 575, 4326, 4332. Airgram G-651 ambassade Londen, Barbour aan Secretary, 3–12–60; *NARA 59, cf 1960–63 box 1351, 656.56D13/12–360 HBS.*
52. Howard Palfrey Jones, *Indonesia, The Possible Dream*, (New York 1971) p. 203.
53. Johnson to Rostow, 'Notes on a conversation with Guy J. Pauker on the Indonesian eight-year development on April 27, 1961'; *NARA 59, lot 67 D 548.*
54. McGhee to Rusk, 'The problem of WNG (West Irian)', 17–2–1961 (falsely dated as 17–2–1960); *NARA 59, lot 67 D 547.*
55. Rusk to Nitze, Memorandum for the Undersecretary, 18–2–1961; *NARA 59, lot 67 D 547.*
56. McGhee to Rusk, Memoranda on 'A UN Commission to deal with the WNG Dispute', 20 and 31 March 1961; *NARA 59, lot 67 D548.*
57. Tgm Rusk 1248 to The Hague and 1490 to Djakarta, 21–3–1961; *JFK-Library, National Security Council Files no. 143.*
58. Tgm Jones 2735 to Rusk, 23–3–1961; *JFK-Libary, National Security Council Files no. 143.*
59. Tgm Service 1218 to Rusk, 24–3–1961; *JFK-Libary, National Security Council Files no. 143.*
60. Memo McGhee to Nitze, 24–4–1961; *NARA 59, lot 67 D 548.* Tgm Service 1250 to Rusk, 30–3–1961; *JFK-Libary, National Security Council Files no. 143.*
61. Tgm Service 1223 to Rusk, 28–3–1961; Tgm Rusk 1296 to Service, 31–3–1961; *JFK-Libary, National Security Council Files no. 143.*
62. Willem L. Oltmans, 'Memorandum to W.W. Rostow, to prepare for the visit of His Excellency, President Sukarno of Indonesia'; *NARA 59, lot 67 D 547.* See also the comments made by L.D. Battle and Walt W. Rostow dated 7, 10 and 14 April.

63. Memorandum of Conversation between President Kennedy, Under-Ministers George W. Ball and Foy D. Kohler and John S. Rice recently appointed Ambassador in The Hague, with Minister Luns, accompanied by Ambassador Van Roijen, 10–4–1961; *JFK-Libary, National Security Council Files no. 143.*
64. Tgm Rusk 1355 and 1375 to The Hague, 11 and 13 April 1961; memorandum Kohler to Rusk, on 'Approach to Sukarno regarding use of force', 19–4–1961; *NARA 59, cf 1960–63 box 1351, 611.56/4–1161, 611.56/4–1461, 611.56/4–2061.*
65. Tgm Rusk 1369 to The Hague; *NARA 59, cf 1960–1963, 12–4–1961, 611.56/4–1261.*
66. Memorandum Rice to Morgan on WNG, 31–1–1961; *NARA 59, lot 67 D 548.*
67. Huydecoper van Nigtevegt, *Het einde van een koloniaal beleid*, (The Hague 1990) pp. 50–53.
68. G. Edward Clark, US Consul General in Amsterdam to Washington, 'Manifesto protesting against Dutch policy on New Guinea', 10–4–1961; *NARA 59, cf 1960–1963 box 1351, 656.56C/4–1061 HBS.*
69. *NIB 50–62, no. 603.*
70. Tgm Service 1313, 1325 to Rusk, 12 and 14 April 1961; *NARA 59, cf 1960–1963 box 1351, 611.56/4–1261 HBS; 611.56/4–1461 HBS.*
71. *NIB 50–63*, nos. 7061–7064.
72. *NIB 50–63*, no. 606.
73. Memorandum Kohler for Under-Secretary on 'visit of Dutch ambassador to discuss WNG', 15–6–1961; memorandum Blue to Kohler with working paper 'Policy for WNG, 29–6–1961; *NARA 59, cf 1960–1963 box 1351, 611.56/6–1561, 611.56/6–2961.*
74. Tgm Rice G-584 to Rusk, 18–6–1961; *NARA 59, cf 1960–1963 box 1351, 656C/6–1861. Handelingen EK*, 1960–61, pp. 301, 302, 325–328.
75. Duynstee to Luns, 17 March 1961; Archief BZ, *dossier 1611.*
76. Graaf van Randwijck to De Quay, 6–6; Archief BZ, *dossier 1611.*
77. Diary De Quay 4572; *BHIC, archief J.E. de Quay, inv. no. 45.*
78. Memorandum of Conversation between President Kennedy and Prince Bernhard, accompanied by Ambassador Van Roijen, 25–4–1961; *JFK-Library, National Security Council Files no. 143.*
79. Henry G. Walter Jr, Memorandum for Mr Bundy and Mr Rostow, 3–5–61; *NARA 59, lot 67 D 548.*
80. Memorandum George A. Morgan, S/P for Secretary, 10–5–1961; *NARA 59, lot 67 D 548.*
81. *NIB 50–63*, no. 6805.
82. *Vrij Nederland*, 10–6–1961. Oltmans, *Memoires 1961*, pp. 191 ff. See also tgm Rice G-586 aan Rusk, 20–6–1961; *NARA 59, cf 1960–1963 box 1351, 656.98/6–2061 HBS.*
83. Tgm Rice G-602 to Rusk, 27–6–1961; *NARA 59, cf 1960–1963 box 1351, 656.98/6–2761 HBS.*
84. *Haagse Post*, 1–7–1961.

85. Lijphart, *Trauma*, pp. 213, 214.
86. Duynstee to De Quay, 25–6; Archief BZ, *dossier1611.*
87. *NIB 50–63*, no. 5062.
88. *NIB 50–63*, nos. 6817, 6821.
89. NIB 50–63, no. 6825.
90. Diary De Quay 5065; *BHIC, archief De Quay, inv. no. 47.*
91. Cabinet of the Queen to Prime Minister, 7–2–62; Archief BZ, *dossier 1612.*
92. *Nieuwe Rotterdamse Courant*, 29–8–1961.
93. Tgm US delegation Oslo to Washington; *NARA 59, cf 1960–1963 box 1351, 611.56/5–1661.*
94. *NIB 50–63*, no. 609.
95. *NIB 50–63*, no.4055.
96. *NIB 50–63*, nos. 7208, 7209, 6269.
97. *NIB 50–63*, nos. 6820, 617.
98. *NIB 50–63*, no. 6278.
99. *NIB 50–63*, no. 620.
100. *Loc. cit.*
101. Diary De Quay 4959a; *BHIC*, inv. No. 46.
102. *NIB 50–63*, nos. 621, 650.
103. *NIB 50–63*, no. 5061.
104. *NIB 50–63*, no. 5262.
105. Tgm Rice A-119 to Rusk, 20–9–1961; *NARA 59, cf 1960–1963 box 1351, 656–56/C/9–2061.*
106. *Handelingen TK*, 1961–1962, p. 50.
107. H. Coerts, *De ARP en Nieuw-Guinea*, pp. 57, 61, 62 ff.
108. *NIB 50–63*, nos. 6280, 6269. *Nederlands Nieuw-Guinea in de Zestiende Algemene Vergadering van de Verenigde Naties, September–December 1961* (UMBZ 73) pp 71–75, 82–96.
109. *Op. cit.*, pp. 71–79, 117–128. See also *NIB 50–63*, no. 7247.
110. *NIB 50–63*, nos. 7253, 7072 ff.
111. *UMBZ* 73, pp. 228, 257–258.
112. *UMBZ* 73, pp. 262–303.
113. *NIB 50–63*, nos. 7652, 7655.

9 The Metamorphoses of the Luns Plan, pp. 434–514

1. *Handelingen EK*, 1961–1962, p. 103. Coerts, *De ARP en Nieuw-Guinea*, pp. 61–66.
2. *NIB 50–63*, no. 5145. Leiphart, *Trauma*, p. 211.
3. Tgm Rice A-234 to Rusk, 2–12–1961; *NARA 59, cf 1960–1963 box 1351, 656.98/12–261.*
4. *NIB 50–63*, no. 5148.
5. *NIB 50–63*, no. 656.
6. *NIB 50–63*, no. 657.
7. UMBZ 73, pp. 40–44.

8. Note FE:SPA, Guidelines of US policy in Indonesia, 3–11–1961; *JFK-Library, Thomson papers, box 21.*
9. Huydecoper, *Nieuw-Guinea*, pp. 610, 611. P.B.R. de Geus, *De Nieuw-Guinea kwestie, aspecten van buitenlands en militair beleid*, p. 155. *NIB 50–63*, nos. 7294, 7300.
10. According to the Dutch Ambassador in New Delhi, Jhr. Mr G. Beelaerts van Blokland, the occupation of Goa and Nieuw-Guinea had been discussed together at the conference of non-aligned countries in Belgrado, while Nehru had speeded up his action against Goa to be ahead of Sukarno; *NIB 50–63*, 4930.
11. *Nederlands Nieuw-Guinea in de zestiende Algemene Vergadering van de Verenigde Naties, januari–oktober 1962*, (UMBZ 76) p. 158.
12. *NIB 50–63*, nos. 7300, 7307, 7308, 7309. De Geus, *op. cit.*, pp. 156, 157
13. *NIB 50–63*, no. 659.
14. UMBZ 76, p.159.
15. *NIB 50–63*, no. 7320.
16. UMBZ 73, p. 52
17. *Handelingen TK*, pp. 61, 622, 549–551. UMBZ 73, pp. 53–61.
18. DIA Intelligence Bulletin, Assessment of Dutch and Indonesian forces available in WG dispute; *JFK-Library, Thomson papers box 21.*
19. Memorandum Averell Harriman for Johnson, Dutch overflights of US territory with troops for WNG, 22–2–1962; *NARA 59, cf 1960–1963 box 1833, 756.5411/2–2267.*
20. *NIB 50–63*, no. 155.
21. Documents in *Archief BZ, dos. 1528B.*
22. *NIB 50–63*, no. 7653.
23. Memorandum of conversation between Van Roijen and Assistant Secretary Tyler, 29–12–1961; *NARA 59, cf 1960–1963 box 1351, 656.98/12–2961.*
24. *NIB 50–63*, nos. 7919, 7929. Huydecoper, *Nieuw-Guinea*, p. 63.
25. *NIB 50–63*, no. 154.
26. *NIB 50–63*, no. 1589.
27. *NIB 50–63*, no. 154. Tgm 476 US Embassy The Hague to Rusk, 8–1–1962; *NARA 59, cf 1960–1963 box 1351, 120.278/1–862.* Tgm 1241 Jones to Rusk, 16–1–1962; *JFK-Library, WH POF box 119.*
28. *NIB 50–63*, no. 7074.
29. *NIB 50–63*, no. 7288.
30. *NIB 50–63*, nos. 7924, 7929, 7330. See also Decki Natalis Pigay Bik, *Evolusi nasionalisme dan sejarah konflik politik di Papua* (Jakarta 2000), p. 223.
31. *NIB 50–63*, no. 6219.
32. UMBZ 76, pp. 40, 41, 165. *NIB 50–63*, nos. 157 ff.
33. On pages 152–156 of his autobiography *Prajurit Pejuang* (Jakarta 1987), H. Amirmachmud, liaison officer to the staff of Suharto, gives a rather detailed survey of the Indonesian strategy. The operation was divided into three phases. It had to start with infiltrations by boat from strongholds in Geser, Dobo and Gebe.

In the second phase, parachutist were to be launched. The final phase was Operation Jayawijaya, i.e. a co-ordinated action of the three component parts of the armed forces, directed toward the conquest of Biak and Hollandia.

34. Report 27 February; *Archief BZ, dossier 1528B.*
35. Tgm. Jones 1241 to Rusk, 16–1–1962; JFK-Library, WH, POF 119.
36. *NIB 50–63*, no. 7343.
37. *NIB 50–63*, no. 7352.
38. *NIB 50–63*, no. 5547.
39. UMBZ 76, p. 169.
40. *NIB 50–63*, no. 7352.
41. *NIB 50–63*, nos. 158, 235. For related documents, see also *Archief BZ, dossier 1612.*
42. *NIB 50–63*, no. 6826, 5548, 7362, 7363.
43. *NIB 50–63*, no. 7355.
44. *NIB 50–63*, no. 235. See also no. 5169.
45. *NIB 45–50*, I, p. 350.
46. *NIB 50–63*, no. 159.
47. *NIB 50–63*, no. 6283.
48. *NIB 50–63*, nos. 7366, 7422, 7368.
49. Zie, e.g., *NIB 50–63*, no. 7352.
50. *NIB 50–63*, no. 5543.
51. *NIB 50–63*, no. 6255.
52. *NIB 50–63*, 6243, 6253.
53. Huydecoper, *Nieuw-Guinea*, pp. 66–68
54. Tgm The Hague 573 to Rusk, 3–2–1962; *NARA 59, cf 1960–1963 box 1351, 956.72/2–361.* Tgm Rusk 662 to The Hague, 3–2–1962; *NARA 59, cf 1960–1963 box 1833, 956.72/2–362.* Memorandum Harriman for Johnson, 22–2–1962; *NARA 59, cf 1960–1963 box 1833, 756.5411/2–2262.*
55. Tgm Rusk 854 to Jones, 4–2–1962; *NARA 59, cf 1960–1963 box 1263, 956.72/2–762.* See also tgm The Hague 580 to Rusk, 7–2–1962; *NARA 59, cf 1960–1963 box 1263, 956.72/2–762.*
56. Soebandrio, *Memoirs, Meluruskan Sejarah Perjuangan Irian Barat* (Jakarta 2000) pp. 53, 54.
57. *NIB 50–63*, no. 7373.
58. *NIB 50–63*, no. 7379. Huydecoper, *Nieuw-Guinea*, p. 71.
59. Memorandum of Conversation, Ambassador Rice with Beaudry, 24–2–1962; *NARA 59, cf 1960–1963 box 1263; 033.1100–KE/2–2462.*
60. *NIB 50–63*, nos. 7378, 7380, 7146, 5729, 7381.
61. *NIB 50–63*, no. 7383.
62. *NIB 50–63*, no. 161.
63. *NIB 50–63*, no. 6256.
64. Memorandum of Conversation, Luns, Van Roijen, Schiff, Huydecoper and Rusk, Ball, McGhee, Harriman, Cleveland, Rice, Tyler, Stone, 20–3–1962; *NARA 59, cf 1960–1963 box 1263, 611.56/3–2–62. NIB 50–63*, no. 7388

65. *NIB 50–63*, nos. 7386, 7387.
66. *NIB 50–63*, nos. 166, 167, 168.
67. *NIB 50–63*, nos. 169, 170.
68. *NIB 50–63*, no. 7408, 7396, 168, 7397.
69. *NIB 50–63* nos. 7388, 7390 ff. Huydecoper, *Nieuw-Guinea*, pp. 74–87, 68–70.
70. *NIB 50–63* no. 7420. Huydecoper, *Nieuw-Guinea*, pp. 74–87.
71. *NIB 50–63*, nos. 7414, 7415.
72. *NIB 50–63*, nos. 7417.
73. Memorandum presented to the meeting of the NATO in Athens, 5 May 62. *NIB 50–63*, no. 173.
74. See, e.g. *NIB 50–63*, nos. 5020 ff.
75. Tgm Rusk 1086 to Jones, 20–3–1962; *JFK Library, WH, POF 119.*
76. Terrence Markin, *The West Irian Dispute* (dissertation at John Hopkins University, Baltimore 1996) pp. 162 ff. See also Huydecoper, *Nieuw-Guinea*, pp. 86–89.
77. *NIB 50–63*, no. 6750 ff.
78. *NIB 50–63*, nos. 5730,
79. *NIB 50–63*, nos. 5750, 5751.
80. *NIB 50–63*, no. 5732.
81. *NIB 50–63*, no. 5752.
82. *NIB 50–63*, nos. 7536, 5763.
83. *NIB 50–63*, no. 175.
84. *NIB 50–63*, no. 219.
85. *NIB 50–63*, no. 5742.
86. *NIB 50–63*, no. 5761.
87. *NIB 50–63*, nos. 5754, 5763, 5768–5770, 5772.
88. *NIB 50–63*, no. 5744.
89. Tgm Rice 818 to Rusk, 25–4–1962; *NARA 59, cf 1960–1963 box 1263, 396.1-AT/4–2562.*
90. Jones 1717 to Rusk, 27–4–1962; *JFK-Library, WH, POF 119.* Tgm Jones 32 from Medan to Rusk, 27–4–1962; *NARA 59, cf 1960–1963 box 1833, 656.9813/4–2762.*
91. *NIB 50–63*, no. 222.
92. *NIB 50–63*, no. 7185.
93. *NIB 50–63*, nos. 5780, 5781, 5782. See also *NIB 50–63*, 7158, 7152.
94. *NIB 50–63*, nos. 5786, 5788, 5790, 5789,5791.
95. *NIB 50–63*, no. 224.
96. Tgm Rice 877 aan Rusk, 16–5–1962; *NARA 59, cf 1960–1963 box 1263, 656.9813/5–1662. NIB 50–63*, nos. 5746, 5794,
97. *NIB 50–63*, no. 5799.
98. *NIB 50–63*, no. 4943.
99. *NIB 50–63*, no. 225.
100. *NIB 50–63*, nos. 5795, 5749.
101. *Handelingen TK, 1961–1962*, pp. 866–880. UMBZ 76, pp. 45–60.

102. *NIB 50–63*, no. 227.
103. *Handelingen TK*, 1961–1962, pp. 1017–1032. UMBZ 76, pp. 75–88.
104. *NIB 50–63*, no. 228.
105. *NIB 50–63*, no. 5905.
106. UMBZ 76, pp 186–188.
107. *NIB 50–63*, no. 5912.
108. *NIB 50–63*, no. 5917.
109. *NIB 50–63*, no. 5919.
110. *NIB 50–63*, no. 5927.
111. *NIB 50–63*, no. 5929.
112. See *NIB 50–63*, no. 5950.
113. Intelligence report 27–2–1962; Archief BZ, *dossier 1528B.*
114. See H. Grouch, *The Army and politics in Indonesia* (Ithaca/London 1988) pp. 53 ff.. *NIB 50–63*, nos. 5433, 6555.
115. These reports are collected in *Archief BZ, dossier 1528B.*
116. *NIB 50–63*, no. 7185. Intelligence report 28–5–1962; Archief BZ, *dossier 1528B.*
117. Holst Pellekaan etc., *Patrouilleren voor de Papoea's 5b*, pp. 27, 28, 37, 55, 65. *NIB 50–63*, no. 7163
118. Holst Pellekaan etc., *Patrouilleren voor de Papoea's 5b*, pp. 126–149. *NIB 50–63*, no. 7163.
119. Holst Pellekaan, *op. cit.*, pp. 154, 155.
120. See also the list of Netherlands military casualties in Martin Elands and Alfred Staarman (eds.), *Afscheid van Nieuw-Guinea* (Bussum 2003) p. 205.
121. *NIB 50–63*, nos. 5915, 5916.
122. *NIB 50–63*, nos. 5930, 5934, 5940, 5718.
123. *NIB 50–63*, no. 5932.
124. *NIB 50–63*, no. 5944.
125. *NIB 50–63*, nos. 5946, 5948.
126. *NIB 50–63*, nos. 5951, 5952, 5954, 5955, 5957, celer 363.
127. *NIB 50–63*, no. 5962.
128. *NIB 50–63*, no. 5964.
129. *NIB 50–63*, no. 5966.
130. *NIB 50–63*, no. 5965.
131. *NIB 50–63*, no. 5968.
132. *NIB 50–63*, nos. 5970, 5971.
133. *NIB 50–63*, no. 5973. Soebandrio, *Meluruskan Sejarah*, pp. 72–76.
134. Huydecoper, *Nieuw-Guinea*, pp. 155–156. According to Subandrio, it was on this occasion that President Kennedy threathened to send the Seventh Fleet to bring the US citizens from New Guinea in safety. Soebandrio, *op. cit.*, p. 76, 77. See also *NIB 50–63*, no. 663.
135. *NIB 50–63*, no.5974, 5975, 5978.
136. *NIB 50–63*, no. 5975. Huydecoper, *Nieuw-Guinea*, pp. 156, 159.

137. *NIB 50–63*, no. 5977.
138. *NIB 50–63*, no. 5979.
139. *NIB 50–63*, no. 5981. Soebandrio, *op. cit.*, pp. 78, 79.
140. *NIB 50–63*, no. 5987.
141. *NIB 50–63*, nos. 5987, 6553.
142. *NIB 50–63*, no. 5963.
143. Huydecoper, report meeting 30–7–62; Archief BZ, *collectie Huydecoper.*
144. *NIB 50–63*, no. 6553.
145. *NIB 50–63*, nos. 5988, 5991.
146. Tgm Bentick 316 to Luns, 31–7–1962; Archief BZ, *ingekomen codetelegrammen Londen.*
147. *NIB 50–63*, no. 7166.
148. Tgm celer 407 to Washington, 1–8–1962; Archief BZ, *uitgaande codetelegrammen Washington.*
149. *NIB 50–63*, no. 7167. Holst Pellekaan etc., *Patrouilleren voor de Papoea's*, 5b, pp. 80–82.
150. *NIB 50–63*, no. 8000.
151. Tgm Rice 95 to Rusk, 8–8–1962; *NARA 59, cf 1960–1963 box 1351, 656.9813/8–862.*
152. *NIB 50–63*, no. 662.
153. *NIB 50–63*, no. 8004.
154. De Wit, *Nieuw-Guinea 1934–1962*, pp. 86–99.
155. *NIB 50–63*, no. 663.
156. *NIB 50–63*, no. 8011.
157. *NIB 50–63*, no. 5991.
158. *NIB 50–63*, nos. 5047 and 8011.
159. *NIB 50–63*, nos. 8005, 8006.
160. *NIB 50–63*, nos. 8012, 8020. According to Subandrio, the suggestion had been made by Mr Schurmann; Soebandrio, *op. cit.*, pp. 80, 81.
161. NIB 50–63, no. 8092.
162. Tgm Van Roijen 731 to Luns, 9–8–1962; Archief BZ, *ingekomen codetelegrammen Washington.*
163. *NIB 50–63*, no. 8016.
164. *NIB 50–63*, no. 6211.
165. *NIB 50–63*, no. 736.
166. J.W.Brouwer etc., *Regeren zonder rood*, p. 229.
167. *NIB 50–63*, no. 5130.
168. *Handelingen TK, 1962–1963, Aanhangsel*, I, pp. 1229–1289.
169. Gaze, *Misleiding of zelfbedrog*, pp. 187–191.

10 Democratization Under Bot and Platteel, pp. 515–547

1. A popular saying among the inhabitants of Hollandia in 1961. *NIB 50–63*, no. 5185.

2. See Leontine Visser and J. Marey, *Bakti Pamong Praja Papua, 1950–1990*, (Jakarta 2008).
3. *Handelingen TK*, 1959–1960, *Bijlagen*, 5818, no. 1. See also *NIB 50–63*, no. 6566 ff.
4. See the report 'Onregelmatigheden in Nederlands-Nieuw-Guinea', presented to the Prime Minister by Minister Kernkamp under Kab Letter Y 81 very secret, date 30–12–1952; *NA, archief AZ, dossier 3903.*
5. See also the 'Aide-Memoire' by Van Baal, dated 2–2–1960; *NA, archief AZ, dossier 4225.*
6. *NIB 50–63*, no. 7180.
7. F. van Anrooy, 'P.J. Platteel', in: J. Charité, *Biografisch Woordenboek van Nederland*, III (The Hague 1989) pp. 456–458.
8. *NIB 50–63*, no. 3195.
9. *NIB 50–63*, no. 4477, 5120.
10. *Rapport inzake NNG*, 1960.
11. Reisverslag Bot 1960; *NIB 50–63*, no. 136.
12. *NIB 50–63*, no. 5265.
13. Information A.J.F. Marey.
14. *NIB 50–63*, no. 3538.
15. *NIB 50–63*, no. 5265.
16. Information J.W. van Eck, Fakfak, 18–1–1962; *NA, archief gouverneur NNG, dossier 164.*
17. *NIB 50–63*, no. 4028.
18. *NIB 50–63*, no. 3950.
19. J. van Baal, 'Volken', in: W.C. Klein (ed.), *Nieuw Guinea* II, p. 439 ff. For the Bird's Head, see J. Pouwer, 'Socio-politische structuur in de Oostelijke Vogelkop, deel I, bestaansmiddelen en sociale structuur', in: Miedema and Stokhof, *Bird's Head studies from the 1950s–1960s* (Irian Yaya Source Materials no. 17 Series B—No. 8., Leiden/Jakarta 1999), pp 34 ff.
20. *NIB 50–63*, no. 4037.
21. *NIB 50–63*, no. 4040 ff.
22. *NIB 50–63*, no. 3886.
23. *NIB 50–63*, no. 4046.
24. *Gouvernementsblad Nederlands-Nieuw-Guinea* 1959, no. 22.
25. *NIB 50–63*, no. 4303.
26. For more details on the membership of the council, see *NA, archief gouverneur NNG, dossier 17.*
27. *NIB 50–63*, nos. 4480, 4482.
28. *Rapport inzake NNG*, 1961, pp. 18, 19.
29. *NIB 50–63*, no. 4007, 4008, 4009.
30. *NIB 50–63*, no. 4363, 4417.
31. *NIB 50–63*, no. 136.
32. Van Baal to N. Jouwe, in *NA, persoonlijk archief Drees, dossier 37.* See also *NIB 50–63*, no. 4485.

33. *NIB 50–63*, 4417, 4418, 4419.
34. Correspondence in *NA, archief gouverneur NNG, dossier 17.*
35. *NIB 50–63*, no. 4413.
36. Boendermaker to Platteel 9 May 1960; *NA, Archief gouverneur NNG, dossier 17.*
37. *NIB 50–63*, nos. 4414, 4415, 4416.
38. *Handelingen TK*, 1959–1966, *Bijlagen*, ond. 5970.
39. *NIB 50–63*, no. 3925.
40. Boendermaker to Platteel 17 Aug. 1961; *NA, archief gouverneur NNG, dossier 17.*
41. *Archief AZ, dossier 4238.*
42. *Rapport inzake NNG*, 1961, pp. 16, 17. See also *NA, archief AZ 4238.*
43. Report of the administrator of the Geelvink Bay Residency, H. Veldkamp, on the months December 1960 and Januari 1961; *NA, archief Minkol, dossier 10854.*
44. *NIB 50–63*, no. 601.
45. *NIB 50–63*, no. 6842.
46. It was the introduction of the junior high schools (PMS), where instruction was given in Dutch, that generated a group of Papuans who were very well-versed in the language. By the end of the Dutch period, that process was only at the initial phase, with a couple of hundred(very young) people belonging to it.
47. *NIB 50–63*, no. 4483.
48. NIB 50–63, no. 4497,4498.
49. G.W. Grootenhuis, *Papoea-elite en politieke partijen* (stencil ed., Hollandia 1961); *NA, archief Minkol, dossier 11575.* See also *NIB 50–63*, no. 4424.
50. *Op. cit.*, pp. 21–23.
51. *Op. cit.*, p. 19.
52. *Op. cit.*, p. 33.
53. *Op. cit.*, p. 30.
54. *Op. cit.*, p. 31.
55. *Op. cit.*, p. 37.
56. *Op. cit.*, p. 113.
57. *Op. cit.*, p. 38.
58. See also *NIB 50–63*, no. 5260.
59. *Op. cit.*, p. 21.
60. *Op. cit.*, pp. 60, 115.
61. *Op. cit.*, pp. 73–75, 117.
62. *Op. cit.*, p. 65.
63. *Op. cit.*, p. 65.
64. *Op. cit.*, p. 71.
65. *Op. cit.*, p. 118.
66. *NIB 50–63*, nos. 6215, 5259.
67. Office of the Attorney General Hollandia, Political survey NNG 1957, pp. 46–47; *NA, archief Minkol. Dossier 10654.*
68. *NIB 50–63*, no. 5292, 5293, 5295.

69. *NIB 50–63*, no. 5299.
70. *NIB 50–63*, no. 5193.

11 Papua Blues, pp. 548–594

1. *NIB 50–63*, no. 5185.
2. *NIB 50–63*, no. 5175, 3926.
3. *NIB 50–63*, no. 6842.
4. *NIB 50–63*, no. 5061.
5. *Handelingen NG-Raad*, meeting I/5 (5–7–1962).
6. *NIB 50–63*, no. 606.
7. *NIB 50–63*, no. 5126, 610.
8. *NIB 50–63*, no. 5995.
9. *Handelingen NG-Raad*, meeting I/10 (19–6–1961).
10. *NIB 50–63*, no. 5183, 4959.
11. *NIB 50–63*, no. 5260.
12. *NIB 50–63*, no. 5185.
13. *NIB 50–63*, no. 5082.
14. *NIB 50–63*, no. 5185.
15. *NIB 50–63*, no. 4057.
16. *NIB 50–63*, nos. 5127, 5128.
17. *NIB 50–63*, no. 5160.
18. *NIB 50–63*, no. 619.
19. *NIB 50–63*, 4427–4429.
20. *NIB 50–63*, no. 654.
21. *NIB 50–63*, no. 5259, 5257. Interview with Jouwe.
22. Changed afterwards into 'Satu Bangsa, satu Jiwa' (one People, one Soul).
23. *NIB 50–63*, no. 7819.
24. *NIB 50–63*, no. 5257. *Handelingen NG-Raad*, first extraordinary meeting, no. I/40 and I/42 (30–10–1961 and 2–11–1962).
25. *Handelingen NG-Raad*, meeting I/42.
26. See also *NIB 50–63*, no. 654.
27. *NIB 50–63*, nos. 4308, 5255, 5455.
28. *NIB 50–63*, no. 5257.
29. Interview with Jouwe.
30. *NIB 50–63*, nos. 654, 657.
31. *NIB 50–63*, no. 4667. For Jouwe's speeches, see Handelingen NG-Raad, second extraordinary meeting, no. I/47 (15–2–1962).
32. *NIB 50–63*, no. 655.
33. *NIB 50–63*, 5287, 5135.
34. *NIB 50–63*, nos. 5145, 5148.
35. *NIB 50–63*, no. 4671,
36. *NIB 50–63*, no. 4665–4671
37. *NIB 50–63*, no. 4972. *Handelingen TK*, 1961–1962, p. 517.

38. *NIB 50–63*, nos. 5268, 5270.
39. *NIB 50–63*, no. 5269.
40. *NIB 50–63*, no. 3925, 5355, 5281, 5032.
41. *NIB 50–63*, nos. 7822, 6555.
42. See for instance the article by Frits Veldkamp, 'Een laat experiment in democratie', in: J.W. Schoorl, *Besturen in Nederlands-Nieuw-Guinea*, pp. 562.
43. *NIB 50–63*, no. 5027 ff.
44. *NIB 50–63*, no. 5033.
45. *NIB 50–63*, no. 4973 ff.
46. *NIB 50–63*, no. 5032.
47. *NIB 50–63*, no. 4975, 4976.
48. *NIB 50–63*, nos. 4982, 6847.
49. *NIB 50–63*, nos. 5024, 5195.
50. *Handelingen NG-Raad*, second extraordinary meeting, no. I/45 (22–1–1962).
51. *NIB 50–63*, no. 5283.
52. *NIB 50–63*, no. 4983.
53. *NIB 50–63*, no. 4462.
54. *NIB 50–63*, no. 4918.
55. *NIB 50–63*, no. 5287.
56. *NIB 50–63*, no. 5287 ff.
57. *NIB 50–63*, no. 5275, 5283–5286.
58. *NIB 50–63*, no. 5352, 5299.
59. *NIB 50–63*, no. 5193.
60. *NIB 50–63*, no. 5195, 5196.
61. *NIB 50–63*, no. 5357.
62. *NIB 50–63*, no. 4660.
63. *NIB 50–63*, no. 5063.
64. *NIB 50–63*, no. 5136, 5137.
65. *NIB 50–63*, nos. 5138, 5139.
66. *NIB 50–63*, no. 4921.
67. *NIB 50–63*, nos. 5141 5129. *Handelingen NG-Raad*, second extraordinary meeting, no. I/47 and I/48 (15 and 16 January 1962).
68. *NIB 50–63*, no. 5063.
69. *NIB 50–63*, no. *5017*.
70. *NIB 50–63*, no. 4979.
71. *NIB 50–63*, no. 4670, 4671.
72. *NIB 50–63*, nos. 7085, 7086, 7328, 7088, 5040.
73. *NIB 50–63*, no. 4360.
74. *NIB 50–63*, no. 4941.
75. *NIB 50–63*, no. 5064.
76. *NIB 50–63*, no. 4144.
77. *NIB 50–63*, nos. 5284, 4939.
78. *NIB 50–63*, no. 5726.

79. *NIB 50–63*, no. 5060.
80. *NIB 50–63*, no. 5186.
81. *NIB 50–63*, no. 4921.
82. *NIB 50–63*, nos. 4939, 5272, 5273, 5181.
83. *NIB 50–63*, no. 4988.
84. *NIB 50–63*, no. 5798.
85. *NIB 50–63*, nos. 4984, 4985.
86. *NIB 50–63*, no. 4984.
87. *NIB 50–63*, nos. 5198, 5199.
88. *Handelingen NG-Raad*, 1962, meeting II/6 (10–7–1962), 7 (11–7–1962) and 8.
89. *Op. cit.*, meeting 6, p. 13.
90. *Op. cit.*, meeting 7, p. 11.
91. *Op. cit.*, meeting 6, p. 12.
92. *Op. cit.*, meeting 7, p. 5.
93. *Op. cit.*, meeting 8, p. 5.
94. *Op. cit.*, meeting 8, p. 19.
95. *Op. cit.*, meeting 6, p. 15.
96. *Op. cit.*, meeting 7, pp. 22, 23.
97. *Op. cit.*, meeting 7, pp. 42–45.
98. *Op. cit.*, meeting 7, pp. 24, 34.
99. *Op. cit.*, meeting 8, p. 16.
100. *Op. cit.*, meeting 9, p. 60
101. *NIB 50–63*, no. 5197.
102. *NIB 50–63*, no. 5252.
103. *NIB 50–63*, no. 5291.
104. *NIB 50–63*, 4990, 5194.
105. *NIB 50–63*, 5252.
106. *NIB 50–63*, nos. 5187, 5253.
107. *NIB 50–63*, no. 5190.
108. *NIB 50–63*, no. 5200.
109. *NIB 50–63*, no. 5191.
110. Interview with F.H. Peters.
111. *NIB 50–63*, nos. 5485, 5488.
112. Memorandum Josephus Jitta 6–9–62; *NA, archief AZ, dossier 4238.* J.F. Saltford, *UNTEA and UNWRI: United Nations Involvement in West New Guinea during the 1960s*, (Ph.D.thesis, University of Hull, 2000) p. 35. Dirk Vlasblom, *Papoea, een geschiedenis*, (Amsterdam 2004), pp. 333, 334.
113. *NIB 50–63*, no. 4312. See also F.H. Peters, *Hollandia 1961–1962, een relaas*, (Leiden 2008), pp.182, 183.

12 Under Jakarta's Thumb, pp. 595–659

1. R.J. Percival, 'Netherlands New Guinea', 7–3–1962; *NAA: A 1838, 3036/2/1 part 1.*
2. *NIB 50–63*, nos. 234, 663, 6860.

3. *NIB 50–63*, nos. 5485–5487. In an interview with the author on 3 September 2003, the former administrator of the Hollandia subdivision, F. H. Peters, stressed the fact that both Bot and Platteel in their information towards the Papuans emphasized right up until the very last moment, that the policy had remained unchanged, that is to say that it was geared towards self-determination, and could also be continued under the altered conditions.
4. 'Summary of discussion held at the Presidential Palace', Bogor, 25–08–1962; *UNA S 0876, 1–4.*
5. Tgm 577 US representative New York to Washington, 24–8–1962; Idem tgm 631, 30–8–1962; *NARA 59, cdf 1960–63, box 526, 325.98/8–2462, 325.98/8.3062.* J. Rolz Bennett, 'Report on WNG', 4–9–62; *UNA S 0876, 1–2.*
6. Tgm 781 US Embassy to Washington, 14–9–1962; *NARA 59, cdf 1960–63, box 526, 325.98/9–1462.*
7. Tgm 299 US Embassy to Washington, 20–8–1962; Idem 859, 21–9–1962; *NARA 59, cdf 1960–63, box 526, 656.9813/8–2062, 325.98/9–2162.* U Thant aan Sudjarwo, 2–10–1962; *UNA S 0884, 22–14. NIB 50–63*, no. 4993.
8. UN, Press Release WNG/31, 1–10–1962; *UNA S 0876, 1–1. NIB 50–63*, nos 4421, 5051, 5157.
9. *NIB 50–63*, no. 5050.
10. *NIB 50–63*, nos. 5051, 5056.
11. Interview conducted by author 1–11–2001 with Mr and Mrs Gandhi in Jakarta. See also: nota Australian Embassy Jakarta 'Irian Barat-Indonesian Policy', 26–10–1962; *NAA A 1838, 3036 2/1 part 2.*
12. *NIB 50–63*, no. 5055.
13. Tgm USUN 1372 to Washington, 20–10–1962; *NARA 59, cdf 1960–63, box 526, 325.98/10–1962.* Memorandum Australian Embassy in Jakarta 'Irian Barat-Indonesian Policy', 26–10–1962; Memorandum Australian Liaison Office Hollandia 'Situation in Hollandia Police', 21–11–1962; *NAA A 1838, 3036 2/1 part 2.* Rapport Abdoh aan Narasimhan, 'Papuan Volunteer Corps', 27–2–1963; *UNA S 0279, 24–13.*
14. R.N. Birch, record of conversation with Mr Max Maramis, 25–11–1962; *NAA, A 1838, 3036 2/1 part 2.* Airgram A 655 US Embassy in Jakarta to Washington, 5–12–1962; *NARA 59, cdf. 1960–63 box 526, 656.9813/12–562.* Report Abdoh to U Thant on the period 15 November-31 December 1962, 10–1–1963; *UNA S 0279 24–13.*
15. *NIB 50–63*, no. 5358. Airgram A 325 US Embassy in Jakarta to Washington, 12–10–1962; Idem A 376, 17–10–1962; *NARA 59, cdf 1960–63, box 526, 325.98/10–862, 325.98/10–1762.* J.C. Ingram, report on 'Irian Barat-Indonesian policy', 29–10–1962; *NAA A 1838, 3036 2/1 part 2. Tjendrawasih,* 29 October 1962.
16. Airgram A 430 US Embassy in Jakarta to Washington, 26–10–1962; Idem A 449, 30–12–1962; idem A 590, 15–11–1962; *NARA 59, cdf 1960–1963, box 526, 325.98/10–2662, 325.98/10–3162, without any number.*

17. Report Abdoh to U Thant 15 November-31 December 1962, 10–1–1963; *UNA S 0279 24–13.* Tgm 828 US Embassy in Jakarta to Washington, 17–11–1962; *NARA 59. cdf 1960–1963, box 526, 325.98/11–1762.*
18. Tgm 531 Rusk to Jones, 19–11–1962; idem 553, 27–11–1962; tgm Rusk 552 to USUN, 30–11–1962; Tgm USUN 2665 aan Rusk, 9–1–1963; *NARA 59, cdf 1960–1963, box 526, 325.98/11–1762, 325.98.11–1762, 325.98/11–3062, 656.9813/1–963.*
19. However, it was something to come back upon later. See Chapter 13, sub *Diplomacy.*
20. *NIB 50–63,* no. 831.
21. See survey of the press, Australian Embassy 20 October; *NAA A 1838, 3036 2/1 part 2.*
22. *NIB 50–63,* no. 5052.
23. *NIB 50–63,* nos. 4315, 4926, 5176, 5054. Report by Abdoh on incidents in Merauke and Sorong, 20–12–1962; *UNA S 0279 0024–16.*
24. Zacharia Sawor, *Ik bén een Papoea* (Groningen 1969), pp. 34–36.
25. *NIB 50–63,* no. 4315. Abdoh to U Thant 13–12–1962 and UNTEA report on visit delegation of 10 Papuans to Abdoh, 6–1–1962; *UNA S 0297 24/16.* Tgm 1015 Jones to Rusk 3–1–1963; *NARA 59, cdf 1960–1963, box 526, 656.9813/263.*
26. *NIB 50–63,* nos. 7194, 7195.
27. Abdoh to U Thant, 13–12–1962; *UNA S 0279 24–16.*
28. Airgram A-1000 USUN to Rusk, 16–12–1962; *NARA 59, cdf 1960–63, box 526, 325.98/12–1662.* Tgm I 718 Birch, Australian liaison officer Hollandia to Canberra; *NAA A 1838, 3036 2/1 part 2.* Report Abdoh on period 15 November–31 December 1962, 10–1–1963; *UNA S 0279, 24/13.*
29. Pressreport UNTEA 182, Hollandia 4–1–1963; *NAA A 1838, 3036 2/1 part 2.*
30. *NIB 50–63,* no. 4964.
31. *NIB 50–63,* no. 5054. Also in author interviews with J. Marey and F. Athaboe.
32. Tgm I 718 Australian liaison officer Jakarta to Canberra, 9–1–1963; *NAA A 1838, 3936 2/1 part 2.*
33. Aigram A 997 US Embassy in Jakarta to Washington, 'Developments in WNG', 8–3–1963, *NARA 59 cfpf 1963, box 4145, pol WNG.*
34. *NIB 50–63,* no. 5053.
35. Interviews conducted by author with Korwa and Athaboe.
36. *NIB 50–63,* no. 4928.
37. *NIB 50–63,* no. 5054.
38. Airgram A 735 US Embassy in Jakarta to Washington, 'Papuans viewing WNG with resignation', 28–12–1962; *NARA 59 cdf 1960–63 box 526, 325.98/12–2862.*
39. *NIB 50–63,* no. 5176.
40. Tgm I 1233 Australian delegate at UN to Canberra, 14–1–1963; *NAA A 1838, 3036 2/1 part 2. NIB 50–63,* no. 5053. Abdoh to Narasimhan, 15–1–1963; *UNA S 0279 24/16.* Tgm 2801 USUN to Rusk, 20–1–1963; *NARA 59, cdf 1960–1962 box 526, 656.9813/1–1963.*

41. Tgm I 1894 Australian Embassy in Jakarta to Canberra, 21–1–1963; Tgm O 1523 Australian delegate in New York to Canberra, 22–1–1963; *AA A 1838, 3036 2/1 part 2.*
42. *NIB 50–63*, nos. 5059, 4937, memorandum Abdoh for U Thant on 'Observations on the role and conduct of the Indonesian troops', 5–2–1963; *UNA 0279 24/13.*
43. *NIB 50–63*, no. 4964. Tgm 2856 US delegate in New York to Washington, press report UN, 25–1–1963; *NARA 59, cdf 1960–1963 box 526, 325.98/1–2563.*
44. Memorandum Australian Embassy in The Hague to Canberra, 'New Guinea, Papuan Volunteer Corps', 7–2–1963; *NAA A 1838, 3036 2/1 part 2.*
45. Djalal Abdoh to Narasimhan. 27–2–63; *UNA S-0279 24/13.*
46. Tgm 2801 USUN to Rusk, 20–1–1963; Idem 2839, 25–1–196; Idem 2890, 30–1–1963; Tgm 2051 Rusk aan USUN, 30–1–1963; *NARA 59, cdf 1960–63 box 526, 656.9813/1–1963, 325.98/1–2463, 325.98/1–2963, 325.98/1–2963.*
47. *NIB 50–63*, no. 5058, 5059.
48. Memorandum Vandrew, Australian liaison officer Hollandia, on 'Indonesian intentions in Irian Barat', Hollandia 7–3–1963; *NAA A 1838, 3036 2/1 part 2.*
49. *NIB 50–63*, nos 4964, 4970, 4971. Memorandum Sisco for Cleveland, 19–3–1963; Yost to Rusk, 25–3–63; *NARA, 59, cfpf 1963, box 4145, pol WNG.* Report Hutton 'following a recent trip to Hollandia', 23–4–1963; *NAA A 1838, 3036/2/1 part 2.*
50. See final report by Djalal Abdoh, 10–6–1963; *UNA S 0099 1/2.*
51. *NIB 50–63;* no. 4929.
52. Airgram A-997 US Embassy in Jakarta to Washington about the discussion with Baron van Tuyll van Serooskerken, 8–3–1969; *NARA 59, cfpf 1963, box 4145, pol WNG.*
53. Airgram A-12 US Embassy in Jakarta to Washington on 'Political Orientation of West Irian', 31–7–1967; *NARA 59, cfpf 1963 box 4145, pol WNG.*
54. This final report was submitted by Abdoh to U Thant with a covering letter dated 10–6–1963; *UNA S-0099 1/2.* A similar report on the period of his administration (15–12–1962–15–11–1963) was handed in by Rolz-Bennett on 5 December 1963; *UNA S-0876 1/3.*
55. *NIB 50–63*, no. 5143.
56. *NIB 50–63*, no. 5437.
57. Memorandum Vandrew to Canberra, 'The President's Visit', 6–5–1963; *NAA 1838, 3036 6/1 part 83.*
58. P.W. van der Veur, 'Field Notes'; *author's collection.*
59. Airgram A-374 US Embassy Jakarta to Rusk, 'Foreign minister controls West-Irian, little rapport with Papuans', 25–10–1963; *NARA 59, cfpf 1963 box 4145, pol 15–1 West Irian.*
60. Later on reduced to one. Archief BZ, dossier 730.
61. *NIB 50–63*, no. 4238.
62. For a survey of the administrative system in this period, see John R.G. Djopari, *Pemberontakan Organisasi Papua Merdeka* (Jakarta 1993). Also very informative

is the 'West Irian' note by Floyd L. Whittington, Chancellor of the American Embassy in Jakarta, 11–9–1964; *NAA A 1838, 3036 6/1 part 84.*

63. Reprt by Philip A, Jackson, Australian Embassy in Jakarta to Canberra, 12–5–1964; *NAA 1838, 3036 2/1 part 3.* See also tgm I 16414 from the Australian Embassy in Jakarta to Canberra; *NAA A 1838, 3036 6/1 part 83.*
64. Tgm I 26671 Australian Embassy in Jakarta to Canberra, 13–6–1965; *NAA A 1838, 3036 6/1 part 85.*
65. Australian Embassy in Jakarta to Canberra, copy of article on West Irian in *Harian Rakjat* 25–8–1965. Memorandum 3/1965 Local Intelligence Committee (LIC), 'Political parties in West Irian', Port Moresby 2–9–1965; *NAA 1838, 3036 2/1 part 4.*
66. Monthly Intelligence Summary no. 9, December 1965, *NAA 1838, 3036 14/1 part 5.*
67. Monthly Intelligence Summary no. 8, November 1965; *NAA 1838, 3036 14/1 part 5. 224b.*
68. Forenz Imbiri, in: L. Voorhoeve-Visser and J, Marey, *Bakti Pamong Praja Papua,* pp. 227–244
69. Djopari, *op. cit.*, p. 94.
70. See the report of Floyd L. Wittington, mentioned *supra* in note 62.
71. Australian Embassy in Jakarta to Canberra, 11–3–1964; *NAA A 1838, 3036 6/1 part 83.*
72. Monthly Intelligence Summary no. 2, February 1966; *NAA A 1838, 3036 14/1 part 5.*
73. Report by Floyd Whittington, 11–9–1964; *NAA A 1838, 3036 6/1 part 84.* Memorandum J.M. Kirtley, Australian Embassy in Jakarta to Canberra, 23–3–1964; *NAA A 1838, 3036 2/1 part 3. Het Vaderland,* 25–5–1965.
74. UPI-report Jakarta 21–9–1965; *NAA A 1838, 3036 6/1 part 85.* Monthly Intelligence Summary no. 3, March 1966; *NAA A 1838, 3036 14/1 part 5.*
75. Interview conducted by author with Mr and Mrs Ghandi.
76. See Koentjaraningrat, *Irian Jaya, Membangun masyarakat majemuk,* (Jakarta 1994) p. 404.
77. Undated 'Note of Protest' by M. W. Kaisiepo cum suis, received at the US Embassy in The Hague on 25 August 1964 and conveyed to Washington as Airgram A-179 on 27–8–1964; *NARA 59, cdf 1964–66, box 3022, pol 30–2 WNG.* Report Baldus Mofu, Biak 24–5–1964, conveyed to the Department of Territories in Canberra by the Administrator of TPNG, Cleland, under letter dated 12–10–1964; *NAA A 1838, 3036 14/1/5 part 1.* Tgm I 34818 Australian Embassy in Washington to Canberra, 21–10–1964; Memorandum from the Australian Embassy in The Hague to Canberra, 14–1–1965; *NAA A 1838, 3036 2/1 part 3.* Tgm 751 from US Embassy in Jakarta to Washington, 27–9–1965, *NAA A 1838, 3036 2/1 part 4.* Note 7/65 'Papuan National Front (abroad) propaganda', Local Intelligence Committee Port Moresby, 8–10–1965; *NAA 1838, 3036 6/1 part 85.*

78. 'Report of visit to West Irian', 8–17 July 1966, written by an Australian diplomat who had joined the group of Dr. Scragg; *NAA A 1838, 3036 6/1 part 86.* Monthly Intelligence Summary 2/66, February 1966, *NAA 1838, 3036 14/1 part 5.* Interview conducted by author with Fred Athaboe.
79. Philip A. Jackson, Australian Embassy in Jakarta to Canberra, 12–5–1964; *NAA A 1838, 3036 2/1 part 3.*
80. M.A. Jaspan, *The Australian Quarterly* vol. XXXVII, no. 2, June 1965; copy in *NAA A 1838, 3036 2/1 part 4.*
81. R. Crawford, 'West Irian, a Field Trip Report' passed on to Washington by Edward E. Masters, US Embassy Jakarta under Airgram A-449 dated 14–1–1966; *NARA, 59, cdf 1964–66, box 3022.*
82. Tgm I 34818 Australian Embassy Washington to Canberra; NAA A 1838, 3036 2/1 part 3.
83. Memorandum 371/64 from Australian Embassy in Washington to Canberra, *NAA A 1838, 3036 2/1 part 3.*
84. Brief 020/1 from Australian Embassy in Jakarta to Canberra, 30–9–1964; *NAA A 1838, 3036 2/1 part 3.*
85. See letters Kaisiepo c.s to president US, 15 and 20 May and 28 August 1964 in *NARA, cdf 1964–66, box 3022, pol 30–2 WNG.*
86. See, among others, Monthly Intelligence Summary nos. 7 and 8, October and November 1965; *NAA 1838, 3036 14/1 part 5.*
87. *NIB 45–50*, XIX, no. 288.
88. For the report from Baldus Mofu and the adjoining petition, see *supra*, note 77.
89. Both documents are in *NAA A 1838, 3036/14/1/6 part 3 attachment 1.*
90. *NIB 50–63*, no. 5438. Undated memorandum (medio 1964) on 'West-Irian'; *NAA A 1838, 3036 6/1 part 85.* Monthly Intelligence Summary no. 8, Nov. 1965; *NAA A 1838, 3036 14/1 part 5.*
91. Memorandum Local Intelligence Committee TPNG no. 11/65 on 'The Manokwari Revolt'; *NAA A 1838, 3036 2/1 part 4.* UPI-226, 19–4–1963 in *NAA A 1838, 3036 12/1 part 7.*
92. *The Age* 26–8–1965. Also in NAA A 1838, 3036 2/1 part 4.
93. Monthly Intelligence Summary no. 1955/5–8 (August up to and includingovember) and 1965/2 (February); *NAA 1838 A 1838, 3036 14/1 part 5.*
94. Letter from the Australian Embassy in Jakarta to Canberra with three appended telegrams from the US Embassy in Jakarta. Two of them feature in n the experiences of the US missionary Lovestrand, who had been arrested by the Indonesians. The third telegram contained comments thereupon by a Dutch missionary from Manokwari; Memorandum from the Australian diplomat Alan Renouf on a discussion, held in Jakarta on 5–10–1965 with the Netherlands Chancellor F. Simons on the same subject; Note Local Intelligence Committee at Port Moresby on 'The Manokwari Revolt', 7–1–1966; *NAA A 1838, 3036 2/1 part 4.*
95. Note 'West Irian', 31–8–1966; *NAA A 1838, 3036 2/1 part 5.*

96. *NIB 50–63*, no. 6171.
97. *Keesings Historisch Archief* 1969, p. 339 and *Nederlands Tractatenblad* 1969, no. 243.
98. *NIB 50–63*, no. 5040.
99. Memorandum 187 from Australian Embassy in Jakarta to Canberra, 9–3–1967, with appended note 'West Irian and Papua New Guinea'; *NAA A 1838, 3036 6/1 part 86.*
100. Note 'West Irian Refugees', written shortly after 31–3–1967; *NAA A 1838, 3036 14/1/6 part 5.*
101. Memorandum 767 Ingram, from the Australian Embassy in Jakarta to Canberra, 8–5–1963; *NAA A 1838, 3036 6/1 part 83.*
102. Tgm from the Australian delegation at the UN to Canberra, 11–5–1964; *NAA A 1838, 3036 6/1 part 83.* Memorandum 35 Percival, from the Australian Embassy in The Hague to Canberra, 'West New Guinea'; Tgm I 26671 from the Australian Embassy in Jakarta to Canberra; *NAA A 1838, 3036 2/1 part 3.*
103. Account Hay, Australian delegation UN to Canberra, on a discussion with Rolz Bennett on West Irian, 11–5–1964; tgm I 19805/10, 14–6–1964, Shann, from Australian Embassy in Jakarta to Canberra, on: 'Irian Barat—visit of Rolz Bennett'; Memorandum Hay, Australian delegation UN to Canberra, on a discussion with Rolz Bennett after his return from Indonesië; *NAA A 1838 3036 6/1 part 83.* Tgm USUN to Washington, 24–6–1964, on a discussion with Rolz Bennet; *NARA 59, cdf 64–66, box 3022, pol 19 W. Irian.*
104. *De Volkskrant*, 4 May 1965.
105. C. Barkman, Bestemming Jakarta, *Het herstel der Nederlands-Indonesische betrekkingen*, (Amsterdam 1993) p. 88 ff.. J.J.P. de Jong, *To forget the past in favour of a promise for the future*, p. 13.
106. Hans Meijer, 'Een hinderlijke formaliteit' in Bob de Graaff etc. (eds.), *De Nederlandse buitenlandse politiek in de twintigste eeuw* (Amsterdam 2003) pp. 181, 182.
107. For a succinct survey of the attempt, see Robert Elson, *Soeharto. Een biografie* (Utrecht 2004) pp. 152 ff. The events therafter are discussed by Robert Cribb (ed.), *The Indonesian killings 1965–1966, Studies from Java and Bali* , (Monash 1991), p. 1 ff.
108. Brian May, *The Indonesian Tragedy*, (London, Henly and Boston 1978) pp. 152–154.
109. Tgm 1084 from the Australian Embassy in Jakarta to Canberra, 16–9–1965; Memorandum 1162 from the Australian Embassy in Jakarta to Canberra, 16–9–1965 on 'the arrest of American Missionary in West Irian'; *NAA A 1838, 3036 2.1 part 4.*
110. Memorandum S.A. Grenville, from the Australian Embassy in Jakarta to Canberra about a discussion with Colonel Marwoto, Director-General for West Irian Affairs, 8–6–1967; *NAA A 1838, 3036 14/1/6 part 6.*
111. Monthly Intelligence Summary no. 3, March 1966; *NAA A 1838, 3036 14/1/part* 5.

112. Memorandum J.R. Burgess, from the Australian Embassy in Jakarta to Canberra, 12–4–1966; *NAA A 1838, 3036 2/1 part 4*; Airgram A-706 Green, from the American Embassy in Jakarta to Washington, 'current notes on West-Irian', 15–5–1966; *NARA 59, cdf 64–66 box 3022, pol 19 WNG.*
113. Account of discussion with T.H. Barnett, Australian Embassy in Jakarta, with Hidayat Djajamihardja on: 'closure West Irian Secretariat', 18–5–1966; Memorandum 562 J.R. Burgess, from the Australian Embassy in Jakarta to Canberra, on 'West Irian Secretariat', 9–6–1966; *NAA A 1838, 3036 2/1 part 5.*
114. Tgm I 32528 Australian Embassy Jakarta to Canberra, 28–6–1966; *NAA 1838, 3036 2/1 part 5.*
115. Memorandum from the Australian Embassy Jakarta 'West Irian' on statements made by Malik as well as comments in the Dutch press after his return from his visit to West Irian, 31–8–1966; Memorandum 201/6 Burgess, from the Australian Embassy in Jakarta to Canberra with appended article Gazali in *Antara News Bulletin* on Malik's trip to West Irian, 1–9–1966; memorandum 227/11/2 P.F. Peters, Australian Embassy Tokio to Canberra with appended articles by Kitakabe in the *Mainichi Shimbun* on Malik's visit to West Irian, 7–9–1966; *NAA A 1838, 3036 2/1 part 5.* Airgram A 1457 Goldberg, USUN to Washington, on 'activities of Papuans and West Irian Fund', 21–3–1967; *NARA, 59, cdf 63–69, box 2833, pol 19 West Irian.*
116. Memorandum J.R. Burgess, from the Australian Embassy in Jakarta to Canberra on 'West Irian, press reports', 2–12–1966; *NAA A 1838, 3036 2/1 part 5.*
117. G.A. Posthumus, 'Een ideale vorm van hulp', in: J.A. Nekkers and P.A.M. Malcontent, *De geschiedenis van vijftig jaar Nederlandse ontwikkelingssamenwerking, 1949–1999* (The Hague 1999), pp.145–162.
118. Note on 'The economy of West Irian', March 1967; *NAA, A 1938, 3036 2/1 part 5.* Airgram A 1625 Goldberg, USUN to Washington, 'Fund of the UN development of West Irian (Fundwi)', 14–4–1967; *NARA 59, cdf 63–69, box 2833, pol 19 West Irian.*
119. *NIB 50–63*, no. 2946, 4928.
120. *NIB 50–63*, no. 4145.
121. *NIB 50–63*, no. 5437. Memorandum 565 L.R. McIntyre, from the Australian Embassy in Tokyo to Canberra on Herman Womsiwor, 12–7–1963; *NAA A 1838, 3036 2/2.* Airgram CA-11392, Rusk to ambassadors in The Hague and Jakarta onAmbaan ambassadeurs The Hague and Jakarta, with one attached note on Womsiwor, 4–5–1964; *NARA 59 cdf 64–66, box 3022, pol 18 WNG.*
122. Memorandum from Benjamin H. Read to McGeorge Bundy, White House, with letter 15–5–64 by M. Kaisiepo to presidents of Australia, New Zealand, Maleysia, the UK, the USA, Canada and France, 3–6–1964; *NARA 59, cdf 64–66, box 3022, pol 39–2 WNG.*
123. Copy of the Note of Protest, attached to Airgram A-179 from US Ambassador in The Hague to Washington, 27–8–1964; Marcus Kaisiepo to the President of the US, 29–12–1964; *NARA 59, cdf 64–66, box 3022, pol 30–2 WNG.*

124. Memorandum 2279 J.M.C. Watson, from the Australian Embassy in Jakarta to Canberra, 'West Irian Students', 20–11–1967; *NAA A 1838, 3036 2/1 part 7.*
125. Tgm 5595, From the American Embassy in Jakarta to Washington, 19–5–1967; *NARA 59, cdf 63–69 box 2833, pol 19 West Irian.*
126. Extract from P.I.B. no. 6, 'Recent developments in West Irian', 31–11–1967; *NAA A 1838, 3036 6/1 part 86.*
127. Tgm 5135 from the American Embassy in Jakarta to Washington, 27–4–67; *NARA 59 cf 63–69 box 2833, pol. 19 West Irian. Jakarta Times* 28–4–1967; *Kompas* 2–5–1967, in *NAA A 1838, 3036 2/1 part 6.*
128. Report F. Awom to the President of West Papua, 'Thus, the Indonesian New Order, Inlands July 20 1967'; *NAA A 1838, 3036 2–1 part 6.*
129. Tgm 4681 from the American Embassy in Jakarta to Washington; *NARA 59, cf 63–69, box 2833, pol 19 West Irian.*
130. Zacharias Sawor, *Ik bén een Papoea*, pp. 40–48.
131. *Kompas*, 2–5–1967.
132. Airgram A 592 from the American Embassy in Jakarta to Washington, 21–6–1967, *NAA 1838, 3036 2/1 part 6.*
133. Police report Port Moresby SBHQ W/1/1, 'National Party Front West Papua Freedom Movement. Visit by Moses Weror to Port Moresby', 17–5–1967; Report from the Australian Embassy in Jakarta to Canberrra, 4–7–1967; *NAA A 1838, 3036 2/1 part 6.*
134. Tgm 2236 and 2333 from the American Embassy in The Hague to Washington, 3 and 9 March 1967; *NARA,59, cf 63–69 box 2833, pol 19 West Irian.*
135. UMBZ 76, pp. 256–258.
136. Tgm USUN 4510 to Washington, 21–3–1967; Airgram A 1648 USUN to Washington, 19–4–1967; Tgm 4945 USUN to New York, 20–4–1967; *NARA cf 63–67 box 2833, pol 19 West Irian.* Tgm I 17421 from the Australian Embassy in Washington to Canberra; *NAA A 1838, 3036 2/1 part 5.* Note Territory Intelligence Committee Port Moresby: 'West Irian nationalist affairs', 1–2–1968; *NAA A 1838, 3036 2/1 part 7.*
137. Note Territory Intelligence Committee Port Moresby: 'West Irian nationalist affairs', end 1968; *NAA 1838, 3036 2/1 part 7.*
138. Airgram A 1457 USUN to Washington: 'West Irian, activities of Papuans at UN and West Irian Fund', 21–3–1967; *NARA 59, cf 63–69, box 2833, pol 19 West Irian.*
139. Monthly Intelligence Summary no. 9, October 1966; Memorandum 1,346 Burgess, from the Australian Embassy in Jakarta to Washington: 'West Irian, Press Reports'; *NAA A 1838, 3036 14/1 part 5*; Local Intelligence Committee Port Moresby, 13–1–1967; Memorandum Burgess, from the Australian Embassy in Jakarta aan Canberra: 'West Irian', 19–1–1967; *NAA 1838, 3036 6/1 part 86.*
140. Note Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 'prepared for Indo-Australian talks, April 1967', April 1967; *NAA 1838, 3036/2/1 part 5.*
141. Tgm I 17418, from Australian Embassy in Washington to Canberra, 21–3–1967; *NAA A 1838, 3036 2/1 part 5.*

142. Tgm 4719 USUN to Washington, 5–4–1967; Airgram USUN A 1636 to Washington, 17–4–1969; Airgram A 1648, USUN to Washington, 19–4–1967; Airgram A 2 from US Embassy in The Hague to Washington, 3–7–1967; Tgm 6605 USUN to Washington, 14–8–1967; *NARA 59, cf 63–69 box 2833, pol 19 West Irian.* Memorandum A74 M.J. Cook, Australian Embassy in Jakarta to Canberra, 'West Irian' 2–8–1967; *NAA A 1838, 3036 2/1 pa t 6.*
143. Tgm 862 US Embassy in Jakarta to Washington, 16–8–1967; *NARA 59, cf 63–69 box 2833, pol 19 West Irian.* Airgram A 95 US Embassy Jakarta to Washington, 'The UN Returns to Irian', *NARA 59, cfpf 63–69 box 2210.* Tgm I 55046 Loveday, Australian Embassy in Jakarta to Canberra, 'West Irian', 18–8–1967; *NAA A 1838, 3036 2/1 part 6.*

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1. UMBZ 76, p. 31.
2. *Idem*, p. 252.
3. Airgram A 95 Green, from the US Embassy in Jakarta to Washington, 18–8–1967; *NARA 59, cfpf 63–69 box 2210.* Tgm 6605 USUN to Washington, 14–8–1967; Tgm Green, US Embassy Jakarta to Washington, 16–8–1967; *NARA 59, cf 63–69 63–69, box 2833, pol 19 West Irian.* Tgm 252 and 257 Schiff, from the Netherlands Embassy in Jakarta to The Hague, 4 and 11 August 1967; *Archief BZ 65–69, GS 675.*
4. Airgram A 1625 Goldberg, ÚSUN to Washington, 'Fund of the UN for the Development of West Irian' 14–4–1967; Tgm 3519, USUN to Washington, 27–1–68; Airgram A 139 Washington to USUN, 31–1–1968; Airgram A 1307 USUN to Washington, 'Development plan for West Irian', 8–3–1968; *NARA 59, cf 63–69, box 2833, pol 19 West Irian.*
5. 'Memorandum Thomas F. Power, UN office in Geneva to Rolz-Bennett, New York, 'Notes on Political and Related Matters in West Irian, July—September 1967 and current Fundwi Status'; *UNA S 0100, 02/05.*
6. Airgrams A-1441 and A 1442 Goldberg, USUN to Rusk, 29 and 30 March 1968; *NARA, cdf 64–69, box 2833, pol 19 West Irian.*
7. Report Jouwe c.s. for 'The Freedom Committee of West Papua/West New Guinea' to Ortiz Sanz, New York 3–5–1968; *UNA S 100 1/6.*
8. Presidential Decree 1967, no. 177. Copy in: *Archief BZ, GS 1965–1969, dossier 730.*
9. Points of understanding reached in the discussions between Ambassador Sudjarwo and Messrs. Rolz-Bennett and Ortiz Sanz concerning the Act of Free Choice in West Irian, 5–6–196'; *UNA S 0100 2/1.*
10. Airgram A 2054 Pederson, USUN to Washington, 'SYG Representative to West Irian, Ambassador Ortiz Sanz', 24–7–1968; Tgm Rusk to Jakarta 26–7–1968; *NARA 59, cdf 64–69, box 2833, pol 19 West I ian.*
11. Airgram A 664 from the American Embassy in The Hague to Washington, 'Indonesia's increased attention for West Irian', 10–5–1968; *NARA cfpf 63–69, box 2210.*
12. *NA, notulen ministerraad* 5–7–1968 and 11–12–1968.

13. Tgm 6697 McMurtrie Godley, Washington to US Embassies in Jakarta and The Hague, 20–7–1968; Tgm 6267 Tyler, US Embassy in The Hague to Washington, 22–7–1968; Tgm 8530 Green, US Embassy in Jakarta to Washington, 30–7–1968; Tgm 8530 William P. Bundy, Washington to US Embassy in Jakarta, 'Dutch demarche concerning West Irian'; *NARA 59, cdf 64–69, box 2833, pol 19 West Irian.*
14. NA, notulen ministerraad 11 and 12 July 1968.
15. Tgm 7437 Lydman, US Embassy in Jakarta to Washington, 'Dutch Parlementarians on West Irian'; *NARA 59, cdf 64/69, box 2833, pol 19 West Irian.* Airgram A 914 Tyler, US Embassy in The Hague to Washington, 'Dutch Parlementarians' views on West Irian. GON states position as that of an interested bystander', 7–10–1968; *NARA, cfpf 63–69, box 2210.*
16. *NA, notulen ministerraad* 11 and 12 Juli 1968.
17. Tgm 5340 Green, from the US Embassy in Jakarta to Washingon, 29–2–1968; Idem nos. 5712 (2–4–1968); 5882 (18–4–1968); 6012 (27–4–1968); 6075 (2–5–1968); Airgram A 657 (28–6–1968); *NARA 59, cdf 64–69, box 2833, pol 19 West Irian.*
18. Airgram A 570, from US Embassy in Jakarta to Washington, Consular trip to West Irian, January 6 to February 2, 1968; *NARA 59, cdf 64–69, box 2833, pol 19 West Irian.*
19. Tgm 6997 Green, from US Embassy in Jakarta to Washington, 23–7–1968; *NARA 59, cdf 64–69, box 2833, pol 19 West Irian.*
20. See collection of articles by Peter Hastings in *The Australian* dated 8, 9, 12, 14, 15 and 21 August 1968; *NAA A 1838, 3036 2/1 part 8.* Tgm 7117 Green, US Embassy in Jakarta to Washington, 11–8–196; *NARA cdf 64–69, 2833, pol 17 West Irian.*
21. Brian May, *The Indonesian Tragedy,* London 1978) p. 172. Personal letter from Hastings to Hasluck, 13–8–1968; *NAA A 1838, 3036 2/1 part 9.*
22. Tgm 6997 from US Embassy in Jakarta to Washington; *NARA 59, cdf 64–69. box 2833, pol. 19 West Irian.*
23. Tgm 3628 Rusk to US Embassy in Jakarta, 26–7–1968; Tgm 7153 Green, US Embassy in Jakarta to Washington, 2–8–1968; Tgm 2170 USUN to Washington, 7–8–1968; Tgm 3628 McMurtrie Godley, Washington to US Embassy in Jakarta, 'Modality of "Act of Free Choice" in West Irian'; Intelligence Note Thomas L. Hughes to Rusk, 'Indonesia faces delicate problem in executing West Irian "Act of Free Choice"'; *NARA 59, cdf 64–69, 29, box 2933, pol. 19 West Irian.*
24. Tgm 7117 Green, from US Embassy in Jakarta to Washington, 11–8–1968; *NARA 59, cdf 64–69, box 2833, pol. 19 West Irian.*
25. Tgm 7247 Green, from US Embassy in Jakarta to Washington, 13–8–1968; NARA 59, cdf 64–69, box 2833, pol 19 West Irian.
26. Tgm I 69130 from Australian Embassy in Jakarta to Canberra, 22–8–1968; *NAA A 1838, 3036 2/1 part 9.*
27. Tgm I 70597 from Australian Embassy in Jakarta to Canberra; 'West Irian visit by Malik and journalists'; *NAA A 1838, 3036 2/1 part 9.*

28. Translation of article by Herald Tidar in *Sinar Harapan*, 'A report from West Irian', 27–8–1968; NAA A 1838, 3036 2/1 part 9. Tgm 7098 Lydman, from US Embassy in Jakarta to Washingon, 28–8–1968, 'Journalists' reaction to West Irian'; *NARA cdf 64–69, box 2833, pol 19 West Irian.*
29. Rapport Local Intelligence Committee Port Moresby 6–9–1968; *NAA A 1838, 3036 14/1/5 part 2.*
30. Ortiz Sanz to U Thant, Sukarnopura 7–9–1968; *UNA 100, 1–3.*
31. Memorandum 1451 M.J. Cook, from Australian Embassy in Jakarta to Canberra, 'West Irian', 12–9–1968; Tgm I 77613 from Australian delegtion at UN to Canberra, text UNPress Report 'Secretary General's representative for West Irian tours Territory', 18–9–1968; Tgm I 80948 from Australian Embassy in Jakarta to Canberra, 27–9–1968; Report from the Australian Embassy in Jakarta, 'West Irian: The Act of Free Choice and Ortiz Sanz', 2–10–1968; *NAA A 1838, 3036 2/1 part 9.*
32. Information Peter Jennings, interpreter at the Ortiz Sanz mission.
33. Ortiz Sanz to Rolz-Bennett, Sukarnopura 19–12–1968. *UNA 100 1–3.*
34. The letter from Ortiz Sanz to Sudjarwo dated 12–11–1968, together with the summaries of the 156 petitions and requests that have been offered by Papuans to Ortiz Sanz between 12 August 1968 and 30 April 1969, are in *UNA 100 1–5.* They are divided over 6 lists. List 7, which covers the last few months of the stay of Ortiz Sans in New Guinea, are not found. See also John Saltford, *UNTEA and UNRWI*, pp. 214–217, 254–258.
35. Sudjarwo's response to the letter from Ortiz Sanze cited above, dated Sukarnopura 22–11–1968, is also on file *UNA 100 1–5.*
36. An explanation of the New York Agreement from the year 1962 to the year 1969 (translation from the Indonesian text), Jakarta 28–10–1968; *UNA 100 1/4.*
37. Sudjarwo to Ortiz Sanz, Sukarnopura 21–11–1968, *UNA 100 1–4.*
38. James Whyte, UN office Jakarta to Ortiz Sanz in Sukarnopura, 11–12–1968; *UNA 100 1–4.*
39. See Final Report Ortiz Sanz to U Thant, pp. 19–26.
40. Letter not found. Its contents could be reproduced for the most part from the following correspondence, in which the most relevant passages are quoted.
41. Explanation of the New York Agreement, Jakarta, 28–10–1968; *UNA, 100 1–4.*
42. Ortiz Sanz to Sudjarwo, 4 Nov. 1968; *UNA 100 1–3.*
43. Ortiz Sanz to Sudjarwo, 21–11–1968; *UNA 100 1–5.*
44. Sudjarwo to Ortiz Sanz 15, 16 and 21 November 1968; *UNA 100 1–4.* Ortiz Sanz to Sudjarwo, 4, 21, 22 November 1968; *UNA 100 1–5*; Ortiz Sanz to Rolz-Bennett, 4–11–1968; *UNA 100 1–3.*
45. Rolz-Bennett to Ortiz Sanz, 5–12–1968; *UNA 100 1–3.*
46. Sudjarwo to Ortiz Sanz, 21–11–1968; *UNA 100 1/4.* Idem 22–11–1968; *UNA 100 1–5.*
47. See calculation by John Saltford, *op. cit.*, p. 257.

48. See also tgm 8600 and 8664 from Green, US Embassy in Jakarta to Washington, 3 and 10 January 1969; *NARA cdf 64–69, box 3833.*
49. Personal letter from Ortiz Sanz to Rolz-Bennett, 16–1–1969; *UNA 100 1–4.*
50. Memorandum 1/69 Luns on 'Bezoek Ambassadeur Soedjarwo', 17–1–1969; *Archief BZ, VN 45–74 dossier 1043.*
51. Memoranda nos 77, 84 and 85 concerning conversations between Schiff and Sudjarwo on 14, 27 en 28 januari 1969; Memorandum 15/69 Udink concerning conversation with Sudjarwo on 28–1–1969; *Archief BZ, GS 65–69 dossier 67.* See also tgm 3367, 3393, 3427 Tyler, US Embassy in The Hague to Washington, 17, 23 and 29 January 1969; *NARA 59, cdf 64–69 box 2833, pol 19 West Irian.*
52. Tgm 43 Rolz-Bennett to Ortiz Sanz, 30–1–1969; Memorandum 99 Watson, from the Australian Embassy in Jakarta to Canberra, 'West Irian—Ortiz Sanz', 31–1–1069; *NAA A 1838, 3036 2/1 part 10.*
53. Sudjarwo to Ortiz Sanz, Jakarta 30–12–1968; *UNA 100 1–5.*
54. Ortiz Sanz to Sudjarwo, 21–1–1969; *UNA 100 1–5.*
55. 'Statement by the office of the UNRWI concerning his functions in relation to the Act of Free Choice (Issued at the Request of the Government of Indonesia)', 11–2–1969; *UNA 100 1–4.*
56. Sudjarwo to Ortiz Sanz, Jakarta 18–2–1969; *UNA 100 1–5.*
57. Personal letter from Ortiz Sanz to Rolz-Bennett, Jakarta 20–9–1968; *UNA 100 1–3.*
58. Personal letter from Ortiz Sanz to Rolz-Bennett, Jakarta 14–2–1969; *UNA 100 1–4.*
59. Ortiz Sanz to Rolz-Bennett, Jakarta 14–2–1969; Personal letter from Ortiz Sanz to Rolz-Bennett, Jakarta 27–2–1969; *UNA 100 1–4.*
60. Tgm 9032 Lydman, from US Embassy in Jakarta to Washington, 17–2–1969; *NARA 59, cdf 64–69, box 2833, pol 19 West Irian.*
61. Memoranda by Udink and Schiff dated 28 January on their discussions with Sudjarwo; *Archief BZ, GS 1965–1969, dossier 67.*
62. Ortiz Sanz to Rolz-Bennett, Jakarta 27–2–1969; *UNA 100 1–4.*
63. This was done by Decree no. 25 of the Minister of Internal Affairs dated 8 March 1969.
64. Tgm 9125 Lydman, from the US Embassy in Jakarta to Washington, 26–2–1964; *NARA 59, cdf 64–69, box 2833, pol 19 West Irian.*
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and ongoing efforts to persuade the UN to review its tacit 1969 acceptance of the fraudulent 'Act of Free Choice', calls for a genuine referendum under strict UN monitoring are growing stronger among the Papuans themselves.

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About the Author

Professor Pieter Drooglever was lead researcher of the task force documenting the decolonisation of Indonesia at the Institute of Netherlands History at The Hague for almost three decades. In 2000 he was commissioned by the Dutch government to conduct a 5-year study into West Papua and the Act of Free Choice, which culminated in the publication of *Een Daad van Vrije Keuze* in 2005. He played a leading role in the Dutch-Indonesian Programme for Indonesian Studies, designed to foster cultural relations between the two countries, was a member of the board of governors of the Royal Netherlands Institute of Southeast Asian and Caribbean Studies in Leiden, and held the L.J. Rogier Chair at Nijmegen University.

Note on the Institute of Netherlands History

The Institute of Netherlands History was founded in 1910 to publish documents on the history of the Netherlands and its overseas dependencies. In addition to *An Act of Free Choice*, it has published some 370 printed volumes in the series *Rijks Geschiedkundige Publicatiën* (RGP).

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Lembit Öpik – MP and member of International Parliamentarians for West Papua

"*An Act of Free Choice* is probably the most important book on the plight of the West Papuans that has yet been published. To understand the great wrong that was done – and continues to be done – to the people of West Papua, it is crucial to read this book. I hope that Western politicians, and perhaps even some Indonesian ones, will read it and understand what needs to change."
Paul Kingsnorth – author of *One No, Many Yeses*

"Based on an unrivalled knowledge of the diplomatic records and archives, and combining a great talent for synthesis with a drily witty and compact style, Drooglever sheds new light on aspects of the story … and does so with impressive comprehensiveness. There can be no doubt this work will serve as essential primary reading for anyone seriously interested in this subject in the future."
Robert Edward Elson – professor of South-East Asian History at the University of Queensland, Brisbane, Australia

"There is always merit in setting the record straight, no matter how much time has passed. For the Indonesian province of Papua, it has been a long and bloody 36-year wait. The Papuans have refused to accept the 'Act of Free Choice' by which they supposedly voted to join Indonesia in 1969. [This book], commissioned by the Dutch government, the former colonial ruler in Indonesia, unequivocally vindicates their stance."
The Sydney Morning Herald

"Extensively researched and highly informative"
Lord Harries of Pentregarth – author and member of International Parliamentarians for West Papua

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